land degradation & development Land Degrad. Develop. (2017) Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/ldr.2741
COMPLEXITIES SURROUNDING CHINA’S SOIL ACTION PLAN Deyi Hou1* 2
, Fasheng Li2
1 School of Environment, Tsinghua University, Beijing, PR China, 100084 Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences, Beijing, PR China, 100012
Received 6 October 2016; Revised 13 February 2017; Accepted 29 March 2017
ABSTRACT China’s soil pollution is serious, with 16·1% of all soil samples exceeding soil quality standard according to a national soil quality survey. On 31 May 2016, the Chinese government unleashed an ambitious plan to address its soil pollution problem. The large scale and fast pace of the proposed plan pose many challenges. There are biogeochemical complexities governing the fate and transport of soil contaminants that require more thorough study. There are also human-related complexities and dynamic feedback loops, which determine the behaviour of farmers, industrial polluters, remediation practitioners and regulators. Soil pollution prevention and remediation also have externalities and spillover effects ranging from greenhouse gas emission to social justice. Rigorous policy instruments must be developed to account for complex human behaviour, to strengthen risk management and to encourage interdisciplinary scientific research. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. key words:
soil quality; soil pollution; contaminated soil remediation; complex system; sustainability
INTRODUCTION China’s soil pollution is extremely serious (Chen et al., 2014). A national soil survey published in 2014 indicated that of the 6·3 million km2 of land surveyed, 16·1% of all soils contained contaminants exceeding recommended soil quality standards (MEP, 2014). Soil contamination has been a cause of many public health issues in China (Table I). In response to social and environmental pressure, the Chinese government unleashed a grand plan on 31 May 2016, in order to curb soil pollution and clean up contaminated land. The plan is ambitious; however, the many complexities surrounding China’s soil pollution issues may hinder the effectiveness of the plan. The current plan, entitled Soil Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan (‘Action Plan’), creates a demanding schedule for national and local governments: finishing detailed soil investigation of agricultural land by 2018 and industrial land by 2020, cleaning up approximately 700,000 ha of seriously contaminated agricultural land by 2020 and utilizing 95% of the nation’s contaminated land in a safe manner by 2030 (Table II). It was estimated that the Action Plan would generate RMB 450bn (~$65bn) of revenue for the environmental industry by 2020 and would stimulate RMB 2·7 trillion (~$392bn) of gross domestic product growth in 5 years (People’s Daily, 2016). As a basis of comparison, China’s annual gross domestic product was approximately RMB 68 trillion in 2015 (~$10 trillion). This pace of cleanup is unprecedented globally, outpacing the USA’s clean-up effort, which was expected to take *Correspondence to: D. Hou, Qinghuayuan, Haidian District, School of Environment, Tsinghua University Beijing, PR China 100084. E-mail:
[email protected]
Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
30–35 years to clean up most of its 294,000 contaminated sites (USEPA, 2004), or European countries’ effort in cleaning up their estimated 342,000 contaminated sites (Panagos et al., 2013), as China is estimated to have over a million contaminated sites that need to be cleaned up (CSER, 2016). The large scale and fast pace of the proposed plan pose many challenges to Chinese regulators, researchers and industrial practitioners. The present study aims the following: (a) to exam the complexities of soil pollution prevention and remediation as they pertain to human behaviour; (b) to explore complex factors in natural processes that may make it difficult to implement the Soil Action Plan; (c) to identify externality and spillover effects associated with contaminated land remediation; and (d) to discuss policy implications of these complexity factors. HUMAN BEHAVIOUR AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Anthropogenic activities are the major cause of China’s soil pollution. As one of the largest pesticide producers, China manufactured 3·7 million tons of pesticides in 2014. At the same time, Chinese farmers tend to over apply pesticides, and the application dosage in China is 2·5 times the world average. Because of anthropogenic pollution events over time, the percentage of agricultural land contamination in China has increased from 7·3% in 1997 to 19·4% in 2014 (Luo et al., 2015). Pollution prevention is the primary focus of the Action Plan; however, its success depends on behavioural change among industrial polluters, farmers and regulators (Figure 1). There are many feedback loops within a complex system surrounding soil pollution, which may either strengthen or weaken the behavioural pattern causing or mitigating soil pollution. For example, in a negative
D. HOU, F. LI
Table I. China’s soil pollution events and statistics Year
Description
2006
34% of children’s blood lead levels published from 1994 to 2004 exceeded 100 μg L 1 (note: the elevated blood levels may be attributed to not only contaminated soil but also contaminated water and air and lead based paint, etc.). Grain production polluted by heavy metals in China comprises as much as 12 million tons each year, with a direct economic loss of over RMB 20bn (approximate $2·91bn). The media reported 41 ‘cancer’ villages where cancer rates are abnormally high among residents. A survey of rice sold at open market in Guangzhou, conducted in May 2013, found that cadmium levels in 44% of the specimens exceeded health standards. Rodríguez-Lado et al. estimated that 19·6 million Chinese people are affected by the consumption of arsenic contaminated groundwater. A national soil quality survey revealed that 36·3% of heavy industry land, 34·9% of derelict industrial land, 29·4% industrial park land, 19·4% of agricultural land, 10·0% of forest land, 10·4% of grassland and 11·4% of unused land are contaminated. Average concentrations of As, Cd, Cr, Cu, Ni, Pb, Zn and Hg, at 72 mining areas, were 6·5, 36·5, 0·4, 2·1, 2·1, 2·1, 4·7 and 7·6 times greater than Grade II environmental quality standard for soils in China. Each year, approximately 29,000–87,000 tons of antibiotic residual in livestock waste is used as manure soil amendment, causing contamination of agricultural land.
2006 2011 2013 2013 2014 2014 2015
feedback loop, investigation of soil pollution results in more data and knowledge; such information is disclosed to enhance public trust, which encourages public participation and scrutiny, thus suppressing polluting behaviour and mitigating soil pollution. In contrast, in a positive feedback loop, soil data and knowledge are withheld, which discourage pertaining scientific research and weaken the effectiveness and efficiency of remediation operations, thus worsening soil pollution. The success of the Action Plan
Source (Wang & Zhang, 2006) (Zhao & Zhang, 2013) (Zheng et al., 2011) (Luo et al., 2015) (Rodríguez-Lado et al., 2013) (MEP, 2014) (Li et al., 2014) (Hao et al., 2015)
depends on whether it could strengthen the negative feedback loops and weaken the positive feedback loops linking to soil pollution. The Action Plan has many measures to prevent further soil pollution, among others: (1) mandating soil quality monitoring and annual reporting by potential polluters and regulators; (2) reducing toxic heavy metal emission by 10% in 2020 compared with 2013 level; (3) starting zero increase in fertilizer and pesticide use in 2020. This plan is
Table II. Highlights of China’s Soil Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan Type of measures
Leading agency
Target year
Description
Investigation
MEP
2017
Investigation
MEP
2018
Investigation
MEP
2020
PP PP
MEP MEP
2018 2020
PP
MOA
2020
PP Management
SC MLR
2020 2017
Management Management
MEP MEP
2017 2020
Remediation
MOA
2020
Remediation
MOA
2020
Remediation
MLR
2020
Remediation Overall Overall
MEP
2020 2020 2030
Construct a network of national soil monitoring stations; conduct regular soil monitoring every 10 years. Conduct detailed investigation to determine the extent of agricultural land contamination and its effect on food quality. Conduct detailed investigation to determine the distribution of industrial land contamination and its risks. Build a national soil quality data management system. Reduce heavy metal emission from key emitters by 10% in comparison with 2013 levels. Encourage farmers to reduce the usage of fertilizers and pesticides; reach zero increase in fertilizer and pesticide usage; increase effectiveness by 40%. Establish a soil pollution prevention regulatory system. Start to compile a list of contaminated land and manage the contaminated site properly. Publish a series of soil quality standards, technical guidance and technical standards. Classify all agricultural land based on contamination levels and upload results to a central database. Change planting methods and planting species to safety manage 2·7 million ha of agricultural land that is slightly or moderately contaminated. Converting 1·4 million ha of seriously polluted agricultural land to forest or grassland. Conduct remediation for contaminated land; clean up 0·7 million ha of contaminated agricultural land. Complete demonstration remediation projects at 200 contaminated sites. Safely use 90% of contaminated land Safely use 95% of contaminated land
Note: PP, pollution prevention; R&D, research and development; MEP, Ministry of Environmental Protection; SC, State Council; MOA, Ministry of Agriculture; MLR, Ministry of Land and Resource; MOST, Ministry of Science and Technology; NDRC, National Development and Reform Commission. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Figure 1. Complex dynamics and feedback loops surrounding China’s soil pollution issue. Green line denotes strengthening process; red line denotes weakening process; ‘+’ sign denotes positive feedback loop; and ‘ ’ sign denotes negative feedback loop. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
rigorous in regard to the aims; however, it lacks details about ‘how’ to reach the objectives. Specifically, the effectiveness of these measures depends on how effectively policy instruments can be used to change human behaviour. Its success is also dependent upon building up technical and regulatory capacities, and some lessons can be learned from developed countries. For example, in the USA, storm water pollution prevention plan and spill prevention, control and countermeasures are two critical measures that are effective in changing polluter’s behaviour and preventing further soil pollution. China should develop its own storm water pollution prevention plan and spill prevention, control and countermeasures systems. This will require the construction of many pollution prevention infrastructures and building up technical resources within both the industries and the governments. Soil contamination is mostly buried and invisible to the public, posing a major challenge in preventing unethical behaviour. Soil monitoring outside of factory fences is unlikely to drive behaviour change among factory operators. It is also difficult to reduce pesticide usage if farmers have an economic incentive to use more. Existing study has shown that sustainable land management requires both economic incentives to land users and larger investment themes (Tengberg et al., 2016). To add to the complexity, soil is highly heterogeneous and contaminant concentrations can vary by tens to hundreds of times within the distance of a few meters. In reality, this would make it easier for polluters to cherry-pick sampling locations and ‘prove’ that they are clean. All these factors are intertwined, making it difficult to predict behaviour change that can directly influence the effectiveness of pollution prevention efforts. China’s soil pollution issue is also complicated by the general lack of information disclosure and public trust. China has seen very limited public participation (Qi et al., 2016), which can compromise third-party punishment and social learning (Jordan et al., 2016). The lack of transparency is probably a main cause of public anger towards the recent Changzhou incident, where nearly 500 Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
students may have gotten sick because of soil pollution at a neighbouring site. In comparison, accessing soil contamination data in western countries tends to be more transparent, for example, one can access data at nearly 70,000 contaminated sites via California’s Geotracker system (http://geotracker.waterboards.ca.gov/), and soil contamination data in the UK can be accessed in many local authority planning departments. Without information disclosure, it is also difficult for the public to interpret the urgency of local soil contamination and to take proper actions to mitigate exposure risk. The Action Plan may start to change the situation, as it mandates the establishment of a national soil quality database and information management system for data sharing. However, the successful implementation of this measure is dependent upon local regulator acceptance and willingness to act. COMPLEXITIES IN NATURAL SYSTEM There are complicated biological, hydrogeological and chemical processes that affect the fate and transport of soil pollutants, determining the effectiveness of soil clean-up efforts. Many toxic organic contaminants can tightly adsorb to low-permeability soil matrices and then slowly ‘backdiffuse’ into soil gas and groundwater (Liu & Ball, 2002). This back-diffusion process is still not well understood and has caused failures in the remediation of many complex sites in the USA (Chapman & Parker, 2005; Seyedabbasi et al., 2012). Chlorinated hydrocarbons are a group of persistent contaminants that pose health risk for humans and wildlife, and they are a primary driver for soil remediation at many sites; however, researchers have found that they can be produced in natural biogeochemical processes, posing a challenge to pollution prevention and remediation (Myneni, 2002). China faces a particular challenge because its polluted land covers a large geographical area with a great variety of soil types and complicated geology (e.g. karst terrains); moreover, many contaminants are partly attributed to elevated natural backgrounds, further complicating the soil pollution issue. LAND DEGRADATION & DEVELOPMENT, (2017)
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The remediation industry has grown rapidly in China over the last several years (Figure 2). Mathematical regression analysis indicates an approximate exponential growth (R2 value of 0·93) in the number of remediation projects commencing each year. Although it would be infeasible to identify the exact causal mechanism of this exponential function, we tentatively postulate that this may be attributed to a linear relationship between the number of existing projects and the number of additional resources pulled into this sector to identify contaminated sites and promote remediation programs at such sites. Such a linear relationship would translate into a pseudo first order reaction, that is, dN/ dt = kN, and consequently, one could derive N = N0*exp(kt), giving an exponential growth curve. We may assume that this exponential growth trend will continue, or, if catalysed by new policies such as the Soil Action Plan, the growth rate may become even greater still. Facing this fast growth rate, many remediation practitioners lack understanding of complexities in soil systems, causing inefficiency, ineffectiveness and secondary pollution. One particular problem is that Chinese practitioners and regulators often ignore groundwater pollution during soil remediation. It is well understood that contaminants can migrate from soil to groundwater via aqueous infiltration (Mikkelsen et al., 1997) and gaseous diffusion and advection (Luckner, 1991). Conversely, volatile organic contaminants can partition from groundwater back into soil (Sanders & Hers, 2006). Therefore, merely conducting soil remediation may leave residual contaminants in groundwater and lead to eventual soil contamination. More importantly, industrial experience in China shows that contractors without awareness of groundwater contamination may drill deep holes, for example, for building foundations, resulting in pathways for vertical migration of contaminants from the vadose zone into groundwater and cross contamination caused by the extraction contaminated groundwater for usage during construction. Groundwater accounts for 18% of China’s 610 billion m3 of water supply (Ministry of Water Resource of China, 2015), whereas 80% of extractable groundwater in China has been found to be polluted (Ministry of
Figure 2. Number of large remediation projects in China is projected to continue its exponential growth from 2007 to 2014 (data source: (Huang, 2014); note: 2015 data not available). [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Environmental Protection, 2016). Therefore, it is imperative to raise the awareness of groundwater contamination among soil remediation practitioners. EXTERNALITY AND SPILLOVER EFFECTS Over the last four decades, many western countries have established mature decision-making processes, which have been largely based on cost–benefit analysis. Besides economic costs and benefits, the emerging sustainable remediation movement has realized the indirect environmental and socio-economic costs and benefits associated with remediation operations (Ellis & Hadley, 2009). Conducting soil remediation will have externalities that are not accounted for in traditional decision-making processes (Figure 3). For instance, cleaning up 1 kg of contaminants in soil and 1 kg of contaminants in groundwater may result in greenhouse gas emissions of up to 5 and 130 tons, respectively (Hou & Al-Tabbaa, 2014). The Action Plan specifies that by 2020 China will complete demonstration remediation projects at 200 typical sites, convert 1·3 million ha of seriously polluted arable land into forest or grassland and change the cultivating method at 2·7 million ha of moderately polluted arable land. Remediation on such a large scale is bound to result in a large quantity of resource consumption and greenhouse gas emission. Soil is a major terrestrial carbon pool, storing about 1,550 Gt of soil organic carbon and 950 Gt of soil inorganic carbon (Lal, 2004). Environmental processes and anthropogenic activities result in carbon capture and carbon release in soil systems (Deng & Shangguan, 2016) and change the value of ecosystem services (Abulizi et al., 2016). Converting agricultural land into forest or grasslands can increase the soil organic carbon pool in soil (Lugato et al., 2014). Moreover, the use of some remedial technologies, such as incineration in cement kilns, may transfer toxic chemicals from soil into the atmosphere, resulting in much wider exposure and possibly an overall higher cumulative health risk. These externalities must be taken into account to achieve sustainable remediation.
Figure 3. Potential externalities and spillover effects from implementing Soil Action Plan qualitatively ordered on the x axis depending on whether it is more related to environmental concerns or more related to socioeconomic concerns and ordered on the y axis depending on how directly it is linked to the soil pollution prevention and remediation actions. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] LAND DEGRADATION & DEVELOPMENT, (2017)
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The Action Plan may have far-reaching disadvantageous spillover effects. For instance, more stringent remediation standards may make it more costly and difficult to redevelop former industrial sites (De Sousa, 2000). The sites where contamination poses significant risks to health or the environment and are expensive to remediate may be found to be left derelict, resulting in a continued risk posed by the untreated contamination (Hollander et al., 2010). There is also the disadvantage of further urban sprawl onto green field if contaminated land is left derelict because of stringent remediation standards, as has been widely observed in the USA. The derelict sites are also associated with higher crime rates and disproportionate exposure of the poor (Stretesky & Hogan, 1998). Land degradation has both direct and indirect costs (Cheng et al., 2016). As for agricultural land contamination, policies regarding fertilizer and pesticide usage may impact the livelihood of farmers, and stringent pollution prevention regulations in coastal developed regions may drive polluting factories to relocate to poorer regions inland, causing the pollution of previously unpolluted inland rural areas. Local governments need to use financial instruments and social tools to help farmers to address their challenges; inland governments must not blindly accept investment, as investment in polluting industry may increase tax revenue in the short term but may result in much environmental damage and harm to the local economy in the long term. Taking into account externalities and spillover effects also affects the ‘optimum’ level of intervention. The marginal positive benefit of intervention is expected to have a convex shape because removing too little contamination does not render redevelopment value and completely removing the last bit of contamination would result in over-engineering without much supplemental health benefit. In comparison, the marginal negative impact of intervention is expected to have a concave shape, because the marginal direct cost is extremely high at low pollution level and the negative externalities manifests at high pollution level. Consequently,
as Figure 4 shows, the marginal net benefit of intervention actions may have multiple locally optimum points. This complexity has implications to both technology developers and policy makers who attempt to address land degradation and redevelopment. POLICY IMPLICATIONS Pollution prevention is a key for the Action Plan. China can strengthen its governance in soil pollution prevention by implementing policies similar to the USA’s storm water pollution prevention plan and spill prevention, control and countermeasures. The government should encourage transparency and public participation, which can discourage unethical behaviour. The Soil Action Plan wisely calls for environmental impact assessment associated with remediation projects. The ignorance of such impacts has historically caused failures; therefore, it is important for local regulators to develop practical rules and strictly enforce these rules. In soil remediation, the Chinese government must prioritize soil clean-up efforts using a risk-based approach, accounting for changing social and geophysical conditions and taking into consideration the mobility and bioavailability of toxic compounds (Traina & Laperche, 1999). Currently, risk-based environmental management is still in its infancy in China. The Chinese government needs to invest in large scale, long-term and fundamental research to identify the underlying mechanisms and quantitative relationships between soil pollution and public health, taking into account Chinese specific living habits, building style, soil characteristics and others. Scientific research is an important driver for success. The Chinese government is planning to invest billions of dollars in scientific research on soil pollution prevention and remediation. The majority of this funding will be allocated to research on fundamental science problems and technological innovation; however, a significant portion of
Figure 4. Conceptual diagram showing effects of externalities on the net benefit of pollution reduction. The marginal benefit of positive externalities (e.g. preventing urban sprawl, reduce crime rate and enhance food security) and marginal cost of negative externalities (e.g. worker exposure, secondary pollution, greenhouse gas emission and derelict land) are non-linear, resulting in multiple locally optimum points on the marginal net benefit curve: point A representing a balance between health effect thresholds and clean-up standards acceptable to stakeholders and point B representing the least marginal negative externalities. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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the funding should be allocated to interdisciplinary research on human behaviour, risk perception and externalities, because such studies are instrumental in solving the many complex problems surrounding China’s soil pollution issue, which is critical for ensuring the effectiveness of the Soil Action Plan.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The authors acknowledge the funding support from the Thousand Talents Program of the Chinese government and Tsinghua University.
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