Conceptualizing and Measuring Personality Vulnerability ... - CiteSeerX

Psychological Bulletin 2004, Vol. 130, No. 3, 489 –511

Copyright 2004 by the American Psychological Association 0033-2909/04/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.130.3.489

Conceptualizing and Measuring Personality Vulnerability to Depression: Comment on Coyne and Whiffen (1995) David C. Zuroff

Myriam Mongrain

McGill University

York University

Darcy A. Santor Dalhousie University

J. C. Coyne and V. E. Whiffen (1995) reviewed research on personality vulnerability to depression, focusing on S. J. Blatt’s (1974, 1990) concepts of dependency and self-criticism and A. T. Beck’s (1983) concepts of sociotropy and autonomy. The authors discuss 6 issues raised in that review: (a) the typological or dimensional nature of vulnerability, (b) the theoretical implications of “mixed” vulnerability, (c) the relations of vulnerability to Neuroticism, (d) the potential confounding of vulnerability with concurrent depression, (e) the potential confounding of vulnerability with social context, and (f) the differentiation of dependency from relatedness. The authors conclude that Blatt’s and Beck’s concepts are continuous, nearly orthogonal dimensions that can be identified and measured independently from Neuroticism, depression, and social context.

Blatt’s (1974) seminal integration of psychoanalytic theory and Piagetian cognitive developmental theory. Blatt’s central thesis was that depression in adults takes two forms, which he labeled anaclitic depression and introjective depression. Blatt (1974) proposed that

The contribution of personality to vulnerability to depression has become a lively focus of inquiry over the past 25 years. Considerable bodies of literature have developed around the concepts of dependency and self-criticism (Blatt & Zuroff, 1992), sociotropy and autonomy (Beck, 1983), perfectionism (Flett & Hewitt, 2002; Frost, Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990), and interpersonal dependency (Hirschfeld et al., 1977). Despite the interest aroused by these concepts, vulnerability research has not been without inconsistencies and controversies. Coyne and Whiffen (1995) published a lengthy critique of studies of dependency and self-criticism and the related pair of variables, sociotropy and autonomy. The current article addresses six key issues they raised concerning the conceptualization and measurement of personality vulnerability.1 While reconsidering these issues, we seek to identify points of agreement as well as disagreement, to identify aspects of vulnerability theory that require modification, and to highlight empirical issues that require resolution. We begin by briefly summarizing some of the major ideas and findings in the vulnerability literature as it existed prior to Coyne and Whiffen’s article.

anaclitic depression is characterized by feelings of helplessness, weakness, and depletion. There are intense fears of abandonment and desperate struggles to maintain direct physical contact with the needgratifying object. Introjective depression, in contrast, is characterized by feelings of worthlessness, guilt, and a sense of having failed to live up to expectations and standards. There are intense fears of a loss of approval, recognition, and love from the object. (p. 107)

The fundamental premise of Blatt’s later theorizing was already apparent in this early article: Untoward early developmental experiences give rise to characterological features that increase the individual’s risk of developing one of two forms of depression. Subsequently, Blatt and Shichman (1983) described a wide range of psychopathology in terms of the anaclitic and the introjective configurations of psychopathology. The anaclitic configuration entails concerns about maintaining gratifying relatedness with others, as well as conscious and unconscious strategies for doing so. The introjective configuration entails concerns about maintaining a sense of the self as separate, autonomous, and positively valued, as well as conscious and unconscious strategies for doing so. When these strategies fail, individuals experience different forms of psychopathology, depending on their relative emphasis

A Brief History of Research on Dependency and Self-Criticism and Sociotropy and Autonomy The relation between personality and depression has been discussed at least since the ancient Greeks, but our starting point is David C. Zuroff, Department of Psychology, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada; Myriam Mongrain, Department of Psychology, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada; Darcy A. Santor, Departments of Psychology and Psychiatry, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. Order of second and third authorship was determined randomly. We thank Sidney Blatt, Golan Shahar, and Marc Fournier for their thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this article. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to David C. Zuroff, Department of Psychology, McGill University, 1205 Dr. Penfield Avenue, Montreal, Quebec H3A 1B1, Canada. E-mail: [email protected]

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Hoping to produce a focused article of reasonable length, we chose not to address other aspects of Coyne and Whiffen’s (1995) critique, such as the continuity of clinical and subclinical forms of depression and the status of the personality– event congruence hypothesis. Clarification of fundamental issues of definition and measurement is needed before the other issues can be resolved. 489

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on one configuration over the other, as well as their level of psychological maturity. The concepts of dependency and self-criticism emerged from a principal-components analysis of a set of items chosen to represent common experiences, but not overt symptoms, of depressed individuals (Blatt, D’Afflitti, & Quinlan, 1976). The items loading on the first factor were described as containing “themes of being concerned about abandonment, feeling lonely and helpless, and wanting to be close to, related to, and dependent upon others” (Blatt et al., 1976, p. 384). The items loading on the second factor were described as reflecting concerns about “having failed to meet expectations and standards . . . feeling ambivalent about self and others, and tending to assume blame and feel critical towards self ” (Blatt et al., 1976, p. 385). These two factors were recognized as corresponding to Blatt’s previously articulated concepts of anaclitic and introjective depression and were labeled Dependency and Self-Criticism, respectively. Early work with the Depressive Experiences Questionnaire (DEQ; Blatt et al., 1976) focused on the content and structure of object representations (Blatt, Wein, Chevron, & Quinlan, 1979), sex differences (Chevron, Quinlan, & Blatt, 1978), and clinical correlates of Dependency and SelfCriticism (Blatt, Quinlan, Chevron, McDonald, & Zuroff, 1982). Starting from Blatt’s (1974) theoretical formulations, our group advanced research with the DEQ in two directions. First, Zuroff, Moskowitz, Wielgus, Powers, and Franko (1983) suggested that DEQ–Dependency and DEQ–Self-Criticism did not measure qualitative features of depressive states but rather measured stable, continuous personality characteristics that could be interpreted as vulnerability factors for depression. The specificity of dependent and self-critical individuals’ vulnerabilities to interpersonal and achievement stressors was investigated in a laboratory experiment (Zuroff & Mongrain, 1987) and a naturalistic, longitudinal study (Zuroff, Igreja, & Mongrain, 1990). (Hammen, Marks, Mayol, & de Mayo, 1985, had previously investigated the “schemacongruence” hypothesis using information-processing measures of dependency and self-criticism.) Second, Zuroff (1992) linked the literature on dependency and self-criticism, whose intellectual roots were in the psychodynamic tradition, with the mainstream of empirically oriented personality research, especially the approach of dynamic interactionism (e.g., Magnusson & Endler, 1977; Wachtel, 1977), which arose in response to Mischel’s (1968) critique of trait concepts. The idea that people’s personalities shape their social environments, together with Coyne’s (1976) interactional theory of depression, led us to focus on the interpersonal correlates of depressive vulnerability (e.g., Zuroff & de Lorimier, 1989; Zuroff, Stotland, Sweetman, Craig, & Koestner, 1995). Blatt and Zuroff (1992) attempted to integrate the theoretical ideas and empirical findings that had accumulated since Blatt’s (1974) original statement. The core ideas were that dependency and self-criticism originate in adverse parent– child relationships and that they predispose individuals to qualitatively distinct forms of depression in the face of stressful life events. These ideas composed the diathesis–stress component of the theory. In addition, Blatt and Zuroff reviewed the negative interpersonal correlates of dependency and self-criticism and suggested that disturbed relationships contribute to depression through increases in stressful events, daily hassles, and chronic strains, as well as decreases in social support. Beck (1983) developed a similar diathesis–stress model based on two predisposing dimensions or “modes”: sociality (or social

dependency) and individuality (or autonomy). According to Beck (1983), sociality “refers to the person’s investment in positive interchange with other people. This cluster includes passivereceptive wishes (acceptance, intimacy, understanding, support, guidance); ‘narcissistic wishes’ (admiration, prestige, status); and feedback-validation of beliefs and behavior” (p. 272). Individuality “refers to the person’s investment in preserving and increasing his independence, mobility, and personal rights; freedom of choice, action, and expression; protection of his domain; and defining his boundaries” (Beck, 1983, p. 272). Beck (1983) suggested that the premorbid personalities of people with depression tended to show a predominance of one mode over the other, but he acknowledged that some patients display a mixture of both. Beck (1983) offered a number of hypotheses about sociality and individuality, most notably that they confer vulnerability to different kinds of precipitating events, that they present somewhat different symptoms, and that they predict differential responding to different therapeutic strategies and styles. On the basis of Beck’s (1983) descriptions, Beck, Epstein, Harrison, and Emery (1983) developed a questionnaire measure of the two personality dimensions, renamed sociotropy and autonomy. The Sociotropy–Autonomy Scale (SAS; Beck et al., 1983) and subsequent revisions were used in numerous studies, including tests of the congruence hypothesis (e.g., Clark, Beck, & Brown, 1992; C. J. Robins, 1990; C. J. Robins & Block, 1988) and the symptom specificity hypothesis (e.g., C. J. Robins, Block, & Peselow, 1989). Although there are undoubtedly similarities between Blatt’s (1974, 1990) and Beck’s (1983) formulations, they are by no means identical (Blaney & Kutcher, 1991; Blatt & Maroudas, 1992; C. J. Robins, 1995; Zuroff, 1994). Sociality includes some of the evaluative concerns that Blatt attributed to self-criticism, and individuality implies positive rather than negative premorbid selfevaluations. Furthermore, Beck (1983) rejected the assumption of long-term stability of the personality modes, instead proposing that individuals can switch over time from one mode to the other. Research on the congruence hypothesis yielded mixed results, with interactions between vulnerability measures and stress found in many, although not all, investigations. Blatt and Zuroff (1992) concluded that dependency confers a specific vulnerability to interpersonal loss events, whereas self-criticism confers a broader, nonspecific vulnerability.2 However, Blatt’s and Beck’s theories are compatible with either specific vulnerability or nonspecific vulnerability (Zuroff & Mongrain, 1987) because cognitive pro2

Evidence has continued to accumulate that the vulnerability measures frequently interact with stress measures. Interactions have been found both with experimental designs (e.g., Allen, de L. Horne, & Trinder, 1996; Blaney, 2000; Gruen, Silva, Ehrlich, Schweitzer, & Friedhoff, 1997; Zuroff & Mongrain, 1987) and naturalistic, longitudinal designs (e.g., Clark et al., 1992; Hammen et al., 1985), and in early adolescents (Fichman, Koestner, & Zuroff, 1997), older adolescents (Abela, McIntyre-Smith, & Dechef, in press), college students (e.g., C. J. Robins et al., 1995 ), depressed adults (Segal, Shaw, Vella, & Katz, 1992), and the elderly (Mazure, Maciejewski, Jacobs, & Bruce, 2002). Although some recent studies support the congruence hypothesis (e.g., Abela et al., in press; Blaney, 2000), we think that the broad generalization that dependency confers a specific vulnerability and self-criticism a broader vulnerability remains valid. In contrast, sociotropy confers a broader vulnerability than autonomy.

PERSONALITY VULNERABILITY: COMMENT

cesses can transform objectively defined events of one type into subjectively defined events of the other type. Early reviews of Blatt’s and Beck’s theories were generally favorable (Blaney & Kutcher, 1991; Nietzel & Harris, 1990). The theories were appealing for several reasons. First, they were broad, comprehensive theories that spoke to issues of predisposition, episode onset, symptomatic presentation, course of episode, and optimal treatment strategy. Second, they provided an alternative to atheoretical, psychiatric nosology. Third, they resonated with clinical observations of large individual differences among depressed patients and promised to assist clinicians in understanding and treating their depressed patients. Fourth, they held out the promise of increased power in predicting the onset and course of depressive episodes. Coyne and Whiffen’s (1995) critique dispelled some of the optimism surrounding Blatt’s and Beck’s theories. Coyne and Whiffen advanced several arguments suggesting that stable, context-free, predisposing personality traits could not be meaningfully defined or assessed. They also raised a number of more specific issues about the conceptualization and measurement of Blatt’s and Beck’s variables. We have identified six key issues in Coyne and Whiffen’s (1995) conceptual critique: (a) the typological or dimensional nature of vulnerability, (b) the existence and implications of “mixed” vulnerability individuals, (c) the relations of vulnerability variables to Neuroticism, (d) the potential confounding of measures of vulnerability with concurrent depression; (e) the potential confounding of vulnerability characteristics and the individual’s social context, and (f) the nature of dependency and its differentiation from healthy relatedness to others. We revisit these issues, making use of the extensive literature that has emerged in the intervening years.

Issue 1: Is Vulnerability Typological or Dimensional? Coyne and Whiffen (1995) criticized vulnerability researchers for adopting a typological rather than a dimensional conceptualization of vulnerability. Coyne and Whiffen’s attribution of a typological perspective to vulnerability researchers rested on two observations. First, they correctly noted that Blatt (1974, 1990; Blatt & Shichman, 1983) and Beck (1983) made extensive use of typological language in their descriptions of depressed individuals. Second, some of the early empirical studies of Blatt’s and Beck’s variables used cutting scores to create groups of subjects, which were then compared by using analysis of variance. We discuss each of these practices in turn.

Typological Versus Dimensional Theoretical Language Blatt’s (1974, 1990; Blatt & Shichman, 1983) and Beck’s (1983) views are actually more complex than is implied by the label, typological. A true typology has no dimensional constructs; differences are qualitative rather than quantitative. In contrast, both theorists make use of notions of intensity or severity and are better described as mixtures of typological and dimensional concepts.3 Our approach has been fundamentally dimensional since the first publication from our laboratory (Zuroff et al., 1983). We conceptualize dependency and self-criticism as personality variables that are approximately normally distributed within the gen-

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eral population and that are nearly orthogonal, that is, whose correlation is typically in the range from .00 to .30. Sociotropy and autonomy researchers have also endorsed dimensional conceptualizations (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; C. J. Robins, 1995). How can we reconcile these dimensional approaches with the typological elements in Blatt’s (1974, 1990; Blatt & Shichman, 1983) and Beck’s (1983) theoretical expositions? We interpret Blatt (1974, 1990; Blatt & Shichman, 1983) and Beck (1983) as delineating prototypes of vulnerable individuals. Although all combinations of low and high levels of both vulnerabilities exist in the population, some people display relatively pure forms of vulnerability characterized by high levels of one vulnerability and low levels of the other. Description of these pure, or prototypic, cases of dependency and self-criticism allows the theorist to portray vividly the essential correlates of the personality variables, permitting others to visualize the kind of person being described. However, the description of prototypic individuals does not require a commitment to an underlying typology. Continuous scores on scales such as DEQ–Dependency and DEQ–SelfCriticism can be understood as measures of the frequency and intensity with which individuals display the attributes associated with each of the two prototypes. This framework accommodates both the typological and dimensional aspects of the Blatt’s and Beck’s theories.

The Use of Group Designs in Vulnerability Research Coyne and Whiffen (1995) might insist that the use of group designs (typically 2 ⫻ 2 designs with low– high Dependency and low– high Self-Criticism as factors) betrays vulnerability researchers’ commitment to typology. Although Coyne and Whiffen portrayed group designs as ubiquitous, research on depressive vulnerability is actually dominated by the use of continuous variables that are analyzed using multiple regression techniques. When group designs have been used, they have almost always been motivated by the possibility that extreme-groups designs can enhance statistical power (McClelland & Judd, 1993). Articles using this design have explicitly stated that rationale and have rejected any implication of an underlying typology (e.g., Mongrain & Zuroff, 1989, 1994, 1995; Zuroff & de Lorimier, 1989). Coyne and Whiffen (1995) also criticized group designs because continuous variables retain more information than dichotomized variables and consequently have greater power to detect differences. However, there is a fundamental difference between the extreme-groups design and the inefficient practice of dichotomizing continuous scores. In the first case, a large pool of potential subjects is pretested, and N subjects with extreme scores are selected for further experimentation. In the second case, N subjects are tested, unselected for the personality characteristic in question, and their scores on the personality variable are dichotomized, or worse yet, some fraction of the subjects with middling scores are discarded. The effect on power of testing extreme groups depends on the shape and size of the relation between the personality variable and the dependent variable. In many cases, testing N subjects selected for extreme scores will yield more power than 3 Blatt also postulates a dimension of developmental level. Two individuals who both display the “introjective” personality configuration might differ greatly in terms of the maturity or immaturity of their personalities.

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testing N unselected subjects, even if the personality variable is treated as categorical in the extreme-groups design. Consequently, the extreme-groups designs may be preferable, especially if data collection is costly (McClelland & Judd, 1993). We are not suggesting that extreme-groups designs are preferable to studies of unselected samples. The “dark side” of increased power is that standardized parameter estimates and effect sizes will be inflated, compared with population values (Cortina & DeShon, 1998). We are suggesting that the extreme-groups design is a legitimate option, which like all designs, has advantages as well as disadvantages. In keeping with our emphasis on the dimensional nature of vulnerability, we also suggest that the results of group studies be presented in terms of the effects of variables (e.g., “high scores on self-criticism were associated with low levels of social support”) rather than in terms of types of subjects (e.g., “selfcritical subjects were characterized by low levels of social support”).

Conclusion Coyne and Whiffen’s (1995) preference for dimensional models is actually consistent with the consensus within the field.4 Recent empirical studies support this position (C. J. Robins, Bagby, Rector, Lynch, & Kennedy, 1997). We agree with Coyne and Whiffen that multiple regression analysis is the statistical tool of choice when samples are unselected. However, there are circumstances in which the potential gain in power justifies an extreme-groups design.

Issue 2: Are Mixed-Vulnerability Subjects Theoretically Problematic? Coyne and Whiffen (1995) stated that “the notion that different mechanisms drive the development of two personality types has been interpreted as a requirement that scales measuring DEP [dependency] and SC [self-criticism] be independent or orthogonal” (p. 360). They went on to suggest that the correlation between dependency and self-criticism is actually substantial, that subjects who score high on both dependency and self-criticism are routinely discarded by researchers, and that the existence of mixedvulnerability subjects poses a major problem for Blatt’s (1974, 1990; Blatt & Shichman, 1983) theory. We discuss each of these arguments in turn.

and found nonsignificant correlations in both men (r ⫽ .12) and women (r ⫽ .03). The correlation of Dependency and Self-Criticism is sometimes higher in clinical populations. Klein, Harding, Taylor, and Dickstein (1988) found a significant correlation of .28 in depressed female outpatients. Klein (1989) reported a correlation of .14 (ns) in male outpatients and .18 ( p ⬍ .05) in female outpatients. Rector, Bagby, Segal, Joffe, and Levitt (2000) found a pretreatment correlations of .05 (ns) in mixed gender samples of outpatients who were to receive cognitive therapy or pharmacotherapy. Using depressed inpatients, Riley and McCranie (1990) found correlations of ⫺.17 for males and .42 for females. In a diagnostically heterogeneous sample of inpatients and outpatients, Blatt et al. (1982) found significant correlations of .28 in women and .35 in men. The magnitude of these correlations does not pose a threat to the discriminant validity of the scales. Furthermore, patient populations would be expected to contain a higher proportion of dual vulnerability individuals, so a higher correlation in such samples would be expected. In contrast to the standard DEQ, modified scoring systems produce dependency and self-criticism scales with moderately high correlations (Bagby, Parker, Joffe, & Buis, 1994; Welkowitz, Lish, & Bond, 1985). The modified scoring systems use unit weighting of a small number of items selected on the basis of factor loadings. Santor, Zuroff, and Fielding (1997) instead used multiple regression to select items, referring to the resulting unitweighted scoring system as the “McGill revision.” The McGill scoring system yielded dependency and self-criticism scales with low correlations in both student and clinical samples. Thus, the moderately high correlations between dependency and selfcriticism in studies using modified scoring systems are attributable to the properties of those scoring systems, rather than any actual redundancy between dependency and self-criticism. In summary, when dependency and self-criticism are assessed using the standard DEQ or the McGill revision, correlations are near zero in normal populations and are small to moderate in clinical samples. There is no difficulty discriminating these variables from one another. Sociotropy and autonomy are also readily distinguished from one another. Using C. J. Robins et al.’s (1994) revised Personal Style Inventory, researchers have found that sociotropy and autonomy were correlated in the small-to-moderate range in both student samples (r ⫽ .35 in males and .30 in females [Zuroff, 1994]; r ⫽ .29 [Sato & McCann, 1997]) and in depressed outpatients (r ⫽ .22 [Bagby et al., 2001]; r ⫽ .36 [Lynch, Robins, & Morse, 2001]).

Orthogonality of Dependency and Self-Criticism Discarding Mixed-Vulnerability Subjects It is crucial to distinguish between results obtained using the standard scoring of the DEQ developed by Blatt et al. (1976) and those obtained with modified scoring systems. The standard scoring system assigns weights to items on the basis of a factor analysis of a large college student sample (Blatt et al., 1976) that was later replicated by Zuroff, Quinlan, and Blatt (1990). Using this scoring system, researchers have found that the size of the correlation between Dependency and Self-Criticism varies across samples, but in nondepressed samples it is positive, small (⬍ .20), and most often nonsignificant. For example, Zuroff, Quinlan, and Blatt (1990) found correlations of .05 in a sample of 779 undergraduate women and .01 in a sample of 373 undergraduate men. Zuroff and Moskowitz (2002) used a sample of employed adults

Coyne and Whiffen (1995) wrote that “persons who are high in both SOC–DEP [sociotropy– depression] and AUT–SC [autonomy– self-criticism] represent a theoretical conundrum . . . and this is the reason researchers typically discard them from data analyses” (p. 360). In fact, we found only three studies that discarded such subjects: Abela et al. (in press); Hammen et al. (1985); and Zuroff 4 An apparent exception is Clark, Steer, Haslam, Beck, and Brown’s (1997) use of cluster analysis to define groups of depressed subjects. However, Clark et al. (1999) described cluster analysis as a useful way to explore the two underlying dimensions of sociotropy and autonomy, not as a means of uncovering a true typology of vulnerable individuals.


and Mongrain (1987). It is simply not the case that vulnerability researchers have routinely discarded high– high subjects; even in the early 1980s, Blatt et al. (1982) explicitly differentiated them, concluding that they might be more vulnerable than low– high or high–low subjects.

Theoretical Implications of Mixed Vulnerability Coyne and Whiffen (1995) suggested that mixed-vulnerability subjects were problematic for Blatt’s (1990; Blatt & Blass, 1990; Blatt & Homann, 1992; Blatt & Shichman, 1983) theory because his developmental model implies that “the two types represent enduring, stable personality traits that are fixed in early childhood experience and that these distinct sets of characteristics are unlikely to occur in the same person” (p. 358). A brief exposition of Blatt’s theory is necessary to achieve a balanced perspective on the theoretical implications of mixed-vulnerability subjects. Blatt’s (1990; Blatt & Blass, 1990; Blatt & Homann, 1992; Blatt & Shichman, 1983) theory draws on many strands of psychoanalytic theory, including Erikson’s (1950) life span developmental theory, object relations theories, feminist theories, and Bowlby’s (1969) attachment theory. Blatt portrays development as a lifelong, dialectical process in which the individual must deal with the twin tasks of self-definition (the “introjective” developmental line) and the establishment of relatedness to others (the “anaclitic” developmental line). Ideally, the processes of establishing mature, constructive relationships and a positive identity proceed in a balanced, interdependent, and mutually facilitating fashion. Vulnerability and overt psychopathology reflect an exaggerated preoccupation with one developmental line, coupled with the neglect of, or even defensive avoidance of, the other: “Psychopathological symptoms are compensatory attempts or maneuvers, exaggerations and extreme distortions of normal development which are usually focused primarily in one or the other developmental line” (Blatt & Shichman, 1983, p. 194). Psychopathology of the anaclitic configuration involves an exaggerated focus on maintaining relatedness at the expense of identity development; psychopathology of the introjective configuration involves an exaggerated focus on preserving and enhancing self-identity at the expense of relatedness. The idea that psychopathology usually takes one of two forms, or configurations, is a common theme in Blatt’s writing, and it is this theme that Coyne and Whiffen (1995) criticized. On the other hand, Blatt did not propose a rigid dichotomy, but rather spoke in terms of “usually” and “primarily.” Addressing the issue of mixed vulnerability directly, Blatt and Shichman (1983) wrote, Although most forms of psychopathology are organized primarily around one configuration or the other, there may also be patients who have features from both the anaclitic and introjective dimensions, and whose psychopathology derives from both configurations. (p. 247)

Blatt et al. (1976) also recognized that some depressed patients show both dependent and self-critical features. The psychodynamics of the combination of high dependency and self-criticism were discussed in the first article using the DEQ in a clinical sample (Blatt et al., 1982). Even classic Freudian theory permits mixed vulnerability, because an individual can have multiple psychosexual fixation points arising from adverse experiences at multiple points in development. It is an oversimplification to suppose that an individual must

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exclusively display oral, anal, or phallic character traits. Similarly, although Blatt portrays individuals as generally preoccupied with one or the other set of issues, his theory is compatible with the possibility of multiple adverse experiences leading to impairments of both self-definition and relatedness. Moreover, Blatt’s theory is a life span developmental model with very different implications for the stability of personality from classic Freudian formulations; it does not assert that personality is complete and fixed by age 5. Blatt states that, throughout life, psychosocial factors, especially favorable or unfavorable experiences in relationships (including psychotherapeutic relationships), can lead to developmental advances or regressions along either developmental line. It is true, however, that a switch from a predominantly anaclitic configuration to a predominantly introjective configuration would be expected to be rare. In summary, we agree that Blatt (1974, 1990; Blatt & Shichman, 1983) underestimated the prevalence of mixed-vulnerability individuals and that more theoretical attention should be devoted to explicating their development and adjustment. Recognizing this need, Blatt and his associates have recently examined the implications of mixed vulnerability in severely disturbed patients (Shahar, Blatt, & Ford, 2003) and in a community sample of adolescents (Shahar, Gallagher, Blatt, Kuperminc, & Leadbeater, in press). The crucial point is that the existence of mixedvulnerability people poses no deep problem for Blatt’s theory. Zuroff (1992) suggested that mixed-vulnerability individuals could be conceptualized as possessing the cognitive–affective structures associated with both vulnerabilities, with their activation depending on the situational context. This general formulation is applicable regardless of the precise nature of the structures postulated by the theorist. Thus, Blatt might portray mixed-vulnerability individuals as having had untoward developmental experiences that created both anaclitic and introjective mental representations. A cognitive theorist might prefer to speak of multiple core schemas or multiple “modes” (Beck, 1996).

Investigating Mixed Vulnerability The correlates of mixed vulnerability can arise either from two main effects or from an interaction effect (Shahar, Gallagher, et al., in press). For example, it is possible that high– high individuals have a heightened vulnerability to stress that can be attributed to the additive effects of dependency and self-criticism or that the combination of the two vulnerabilities gives rise to an intensified vulnerability that exceeds the additive effects. In addition to identifying statistical interactions between vulnerabilities, researchers need to explicate the psychological processes whose interaction accounts for the statistical effects (Shahar, Gallagher, et al., in press). As an illustration of such processes, consider that high– high individuals may be caught in an especially confusing and emotionally painful dilemma as their strivings for self-control and self-definition conflict with their desires to establish supportive connections with others. An interesting situation arises when the main effects of dependency and self-criticism are in opposite directions. For example, Dependency is associated with agreeableness and support seeking, whereas Self-Criticism is associated with disagreeableness and avoidance of self-disclosure (Zuroff & Fitzpatrick, 1995). This pattern of main effects implies that subjects with high scores on both Dependency and Self-Criticism should display moderate lev-

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els of agreeableness, as the opposing effects of the two vulnerabilities cancel one another. We suspect that the truth may be more complex, reflecting the activation of different patterns of behavior in different psychosocial contexts. High– high subjects may display moderate aggregate levels of agreeableness, but these may conceal oscillations between bursts of the hostility linked with self-criticism and the warmth associated with dependency. Temporal shifts from one pattern of functioning to another may be apparent in other domains as well, for example, oscillation between repressive defenses and self-punitive, introjective defenses. Further exploration with methods that are sensitive to temporal patterns and variability in behavior (Moskowitz, Brown, & Cote´, 1997) are needed to illuminate the psychology of the mixedvulnerability individual.

Conclusions Concerning Orthogonality and Mixed Vulnerability Measured using the standard DEQ or the McGill revision of the DEQ, Dependency and Self-Criticism rarely correlate above .30 in student, community, and clinical samples. The magnitude of these correlations poses no threat to vulnerability theories, which contrary to Coyne and Whiffen’s (1995) claims, are compatible with the existence of mixed-vulnerability individuals. Mixedvulnerability individuals have not been discarded from research studies, but they do merit greater attention from researchers.

Issue 3: Can Vulnerability Variables Be Discriminated From Neuroticism? Coyne and Whiffen (1995) suggested that it is important to investigate the relations of dependency and self-criticism with other personality variables. Flett, Hewitt, Endler, and Bagby (1995) also urged vulnerability researchers to better integrate their work with the general personality literature. We agree and have explored vulnerability variables’ associations with the Big Five personality traits (Mongrain, 1993; Zuroff, 1994) and with social motives (Mongrain & Zuroff, 1995; Saragovi, Aube´, Koestner, & Zuroff, 2002). Coyne and Whiffen (1995) went on to argue that findings encourage researchers to find explanations of the apparent effects of SOC–DEP and AUT–SC in terms of other personality variables, perhaps a single variable to which they are both related . . . Neuroticism would seem to be a good candidate for explaining the apparent effects of SOC–DEP and AUT–SC. (p. 362)

However, the available evidence indicates that: (a) neither dependency nor self-criticism is equivalent to, or reducible to, Neuroticism; (b) consequently, correlations of dependency and selfcriticism with other variables can only sometimes be explained by their shared variance with Neuroticism; and (c) the roles of dependency and self-criticism as vulnerability variables cannot be fully explained by shared variance with Neuroticism.

Vulnerability Variables and the Five-Factor Model of Personality Several studies have explored relations between Blatt’s (1990) and Beck’s (1983) variables and the Big Five traits (Bagby et al., 2001; Cappeliez, 1993; Dunkley, Blankstein, & Flett, 1997; Gilbert & Reynolds, 1990; Mongrain, 1993; Zuroff, 1994). The re-

sults for Dependency and Self-Criticism are quite consistent. Dependency and Self-Criticism are both moderately correlated with Neuroticism, but there are consistently secondary relationships with one or more of the other Big Five. For example, Dunkley et al. (1997) examined the relations between Dependency and SelfCriticism and the five factors in college students. Dunkley et al. found that, for both men and women, Dependency and SelfCriticism correlated between .50 and .60 with Neuroticism. Dependency was also moderately positively correlated with Agreeableness (rs ⬎ .40 in both men and women), whereas SelfCriticism was negatively correlated with Agreeableness (r ⫽ ⫺.21 for men; r ⫽ ⫺.30 for women). Similar results were obtained in a college student sample (Zuroff, 1994) and a sample of employed, community adults (Zuroff & Moskowitz, 2002). We focus on results obtained using the more recently developed measures of sociotropy and autonomy, the revised Personal Style Inventory (PSI–II; C. J. Robins et al., 1994) and the revised SAS (Clark & Beck, 1991). In college students (Dunkley et al., 1997; Zuroff, 1994), sociotropy was moderately to highly correlated with Neuroticism (rs ranging from .60 to .72), and autonomy was more weakly, but usually significantly, correlated with Neuroticism (rs ranging from .11 to .43). Sociotropy was positively related to Agreeableness (rs ranging from .20 to .34), and autonomy was negatively related to Agreeableness (rs ranging from ⫺.20 to ⫺.37). In a sample of depressed outpatients, Bagby et al. (2001) found that sociotropy was positively correlated with Neuroticism (r ⫽ .57) and positively correlated with Agreeableness (r ⫽ .14). Autonomy was also positively correlated with Neuroticism (r ⫽ .38), but was negatively related to Extraversion (r ⫽ ⫺.39) and Agreeableness (r ⫽ ⫺.27). In summary, Blatt et al.’s (1976) and Beck’s (1983) variables are not reducible to Neuroticism, but rather reflect different neurotic styles, one characterized by social approach (dependency or sociotropy), the other by social avoidance (self-criticism or autonomy). The pairs of variables provide more differentiated characterizations of vulnerability than the global dimension of Neuroticism. Depending on the researcher’s purposes, it may be preferable to focus on the general, undifferentiated variable or the more nuanced variables elaborated by Blatt and Beck.

Neuroticism as an Alternative Explanation of Relations of Vulnerability Measures to Other Variables The extent to which Neuroticism can serve as an alternative explanation for effects attributed to vulnerability variables depends on the nature of the outcome variables. If a variable is saturated with undifferentiated negative affectivity, its relations with depressive personality styles will be largely or entirely explained by shared variance with Neuroticism. For example, Dunkley et al. (1997) found that, after controlling for Neuroticism, the vulnerability variables accounted for very little additional variance in dysphoria. However, there is more to be said about vulnerable individuals than that they are at increased risk for experiencing negative affect. Correlations with interpersonal variables, for example, should not be explainable in terms of shared variance with Neuroticism. To illustrate this point, we reanalyzed previously published data (Zuroff, 1994) and found that, after controlling for Neuroticism, both Self-Criticism and autonomy were significantly negatively related to satisfaction, trust, and self-disclosure within romantic


relationships. Reanalysis of another data set (Zuroff & Fitzpatrick, 1995) demonstrated that, after controlling for Neuroticism, SelfCriticism and autonomy significantly predicted the avoidance dimension of adult attachment style (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). Thus, shared variance with Neuroticism did not explain the interpersonal correlates of the personality styles. Leather and Mongrain (2004) tested whether Dependency and Self-Criticism could postdict the number of past episodes of depression, established by structured interview, in a sample of graduate students. After controlling for Neuroticism and present dysphoria, Self-Criticism and the interaction of Dependency and SelfCriticism predicted more frequent past episodes of depression. These results demonstrate relations between vulnerability measures and clinical depression that cannot be attributed to shared variance with Neuroticism, although the direction of causality between personality and depression cannot be determined from these data.

Neuroticism as an Explanation of Vulnerability As noted above, Neuroticism may explain, in a statistical sense, the association between vulnerability measures and self-reported dysphoria. Does this mean that vulnerability variables are superfluous, that Neuroticism can carry the full burden of explaining why some people are more vulnerable to depression than others? Certainly not. That Neuroticism statistically explains an association leaves many unanswered questions concerning the process and mechanisms by which vulnerabilities increase risk for dysphoria and clinically significant depression. Furthermore, it is already known that dependency and self-criticism are differently related to many etiologically significant variables. Because the pathways from the two vulnerability variables to depression differ, it is impossible for a single supposed alternative explanatory variable—Neuroticism—to account for the effects of both vulnerability variables. To better document this point, we briefly enumerate some of the known differences in the relations between dependency and selfcriticism and etiologically significant variables. First, dependency and self-criticism interact with different classes of stressful events to trigger distress (e.g., Blaney, 2000; Dunkley, Zuroff, & Blankstein, 2003; Fichman et al., 1997; Gruen et al., 1997; Zuroff & Mongrain, 1987). Second, dependency and self-criticism are associated with different styles of coping (Besser & Priel, 2003c; Fichman, Koestner, Zuroff, & Gordon, 1999). Third, dependency and self-criticism are differentially associated with adult attachment styles (Besser & Priel, 2003b; Zuroff & Fitzpatrick, 1995), interpersonal problems (Alden & Bieling, 1996; Fichman, Koestner, & Zuroff, 1994, 1996), evoked responses from others (Mongrain, Lubbers, & Struthers, 2004), and perceived social support (Mongrain, 1998; Priel & Besser, 2000; Priel & Shahar, 2000). Finally, although vulnerable individuals can be described as at heightened risk for the undifferentiated concepts of “dysphoria” and “depression,” they in fact experience distinct types of dysphoria (Zuroff, Igreja, & Mongrain, 1990; Zuroff & Mongrain, 1987) and distinct patterns of depressed symptoms (Blatt et al., 1982; C. J. Robins et al., 1989, 1997; C. J. Robins, Hayes, Block, Kramer, & Villena, 1995; C. J. Robins & Luten, 1991). The single construct of neuroticism is unable to capture these complexities.

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Conclusion Attempts to link vulnerability research to the mainstream of personality research are likely to be beneficial. However, Blatt et al.’s (1976) and Beck’s (1983) vulnerability variables cannot be reduced to any one of the Big Five, including Neuroticism. Broadband variables such as Neuroticism have their uses, but there is no reason to forego the detailed understanding of vulnerability processes that more narrowly defined variables can provide.

Issue 4: Can Vulnerability Be Discriminated From Depression? Coyne and Whiffen (1995) raised three questions concerning the relation between vulnerability measures and depression: (a) Are cross-sectional relations between depression and vulnerability measures too high on both theoretical and practical grounds? (b) Do scores on vulnerability measures remain elevated after the remission of episodes of depression? and (c) Do vulnerability measures predict depression prospectively? Cumulatively, the thrust of their argument was to suggest that characteristics that might be thought to reflect personality-based vulnerability to depression are instead concomitants of concurrent depression or the scars of prior episodes of depression.5

Cross-Sectional Relations With Depressive Symptoms Coyne and Whiffen (1995) regarded correlations between vulnerability measures and depressive symptoms as theoretically problematic because, in their view, diathesis–stress models predict a relation between the diathesis and depression only in the presence of stressors. Because stressors are not common, they reasoned, there should be minimal correlations between diatheses and depression in the general population. Stated differently, if a diathesis is presumed to be “latent” until activated by stress, vulnerable individuals should be essentially indistinguishable from nonvulnerable individuals when they are not experiencing stress. In addition, correlations between vulnerability and depression were said to pose a practical problem because a high correlation reduces the amount of variance in the presumed diathesis that can predict future levels of depression after controlling for baseline depression. Theoretical implications of personality– depression correlations. Coyne and Whiffen’s (1995) critique assumes that the diathesis is silent and invisible, latent until activated by stress. However, diathesis–stress theories can take a wide range of positions on how the diathesis and stress are related (Monroe & Simons, 1991). Ironically, Blatt and Zuroff’s (1992) model is much closer to Coyne and Whiffen’s preferred “pathoconsortive” approach emphasizing mutual causal influences between diathesis, 5

We agree with Coyne and Whiffen that it is important to make a distinction between elevated scores on self-report measures of depression and episodes of major depressive disorder, as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and assessed by structured clinical interview. Accordingly, we reserve the term depression for the clinical disorder and use the terms depressive symptoms and dysphoria to refer to elevated scores on the BDI and related instruments in nondiagnosed samples.

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stress, and depression than to the diathesis–stress model they criticized. Blatt and Zuroff (1992) explicitly tied vulnerability research to the person–situation interaction tradition in personality psychology. Their approach is represented diagrammatically in Figure 1. The top two boxes represent the diathesis–stress component of the model, that is, the idea that stressful events can precipitate depressive states when they impinge on underlying vulnerabilities that magnify the events’ psychological impact. The middle two boxes represent Coyne’s (1976) hypothesis that relational disturbances and depression can mutually reinforce one another in a vicious cycle in which demands for reassurance trigger withdrawal of support and possibly overt discord. The dynamic interactionist component of the model is embodied in three linkages: (a) the path connecting personality vulnerability and disturbed relationships, (b) the interaction cycle path from disturbed relationships to personality vulnerability (Wachtel, 1977), and (c) the stressgeneration path from disturbed relationships to stressful events. The path from personality vulnerability variables to disturbed relationships indicates that there are systematic differences, generally of an adverse nature, in the interpersonal environments of vulnerable individuals. These differences arise because personality vulnerabilities influence whom one selects to be part of one’s social network, how one perceives and remembers social interactions, and which social behavioral strategies one uses. The path from disturbed relationships to personality vulnerability indicates that living in disturbed relationships can maintain or intensify

underlying vulnerabilities. The stress-generation path from disturbed relationships to stressful events indicates that disturbed relationships can lead to negative events like family quarrels, the dissolution of relationships, and loss of promotions. Thus, personality vulnerabilities lead to depressive states through multiple pathways. In addition to diathesis–stress interactions, there are indirect paths via heightened exposure to activating events and reductions in social support. For present purposes, the crucial point is that Blatt and Zuroff (1992) maintained that, through a variety of transactional processes, dependent and self-critical characteristics dynamically influence the social environment while also being maintained by, and sometimes transformed by, the social environment. Extensive research has supported the interactionist perspective (for reviews and theoretical elaborations, see Santor, 2003; Shahar, 2001; Zuroff, Santor, & Mongrain, in press). Stress-generation effects have been found for both dependency and self-criticism. Self-criticism predicted number of negative life events and number of chronic life difficulties in young adults living in the community (Moskowitz & Zuroff, 1991). Mongrain and Zuroff (1994) found that for male and female college students, Dependency was related to a greater number of negative relationship events, which in turn predicted dysphoria. In women, SelfCriticism predicted number of academic events, which predicted dysphoria. Shahar, Joiner, Zuroff, and Blatt (in press) found that Self-Criticism predicted higher levels of several types of negative life events and this heightened level of stress mediated the effect of

Figure 1. This diagram of a dynamic interactionist model of vulnerability to depression is essentially the same as Zuroff’s (1992), with additional labeling of the paths. The model includes a diathesis–stress component, a component based on the interpersonal processes hypothesized by Coyne (1976), and three paths representing dynamic interactions of person and situation. The dynamic interactionist paths are those connecting personality vulnerability and disturbed relationships, disturbed relationships and personality vulnerability (interaction cycles), and disturbed relationships and stressful events (stress generation). From “New Directions for Cognitive Models of Depression,” by D. C. Zuroff, 1992, Psychological Inquiry, 3, p. 276. Copyright 1992 by Erlbaum. Adapted with permission.


Self-Criticism on depressive symptoms measured 5 weeks later. Similarly, Dunkley et al. (2003) demonstrated that event stress mediated the relation between Self-Critical Perfectionism and negative affect. Shahar, Henrich, Blatt, Ryan, and Little (2003) found that both Dependency and Self-Criticism were related to a higher number of negative life events. Shahar and Priel (2003), using a longitudinal design, found that Self-Criticism predicted more negative life events and fewer positive life events and that Dependency predicted more negative events as well as more positive events. Thus, both personality characteristics have been associated with heightened levels of stress. Self-criticism has also been linked with lower social support (Dunkley et al., 2003; Mongrain, 1998; Priel & Besser, 2000; Priel & Shahar, 2000; and Moskowitz & Zuroff, 1991). More broadly, self-criticism has an adverse impact on a wide range of relationships, including those with friends, romantic partners, peers, parents, and one’s own children (e.g., Fichman et al., 1994; Mongrain et al., 2004; Santor & Zuroff, 1997, 1998; Thompson & Zuroff, 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Zuroff & Duncan, 1999; Zuroff, Koestner, & Powers, 1994). Dependency, on the other hand, has been associated with higher levels of perceived social support (Mongrain, 1998; Priel & Besser, 2000; Priel & Shahar, 2000). This is not surprising, because so much of the social behavior of dependent individuals is organized around maintaining support. Social support is a very broad concept, however, and these results do not imply that dependent individuals are able to establish mature, satisfying, untroubled relationships. Dependency is associated with self-reported interpersonal problems of being nonassertive and exploitable by others (Alden & Bieling, 1996; Whisman & Friedman, 1998), a pattern also observed in laboratory studies of female friends (Santor & Zuroff, 1997, 1998) and romantic couples (Santor, Pringle, & Israeli, 2000) and in a naturalistic study of roommate relationships (Mongrain et al., 2004). The relationships of dependent individuals may begin on a positive note but may deteriorate with time as the other person begins to withdraw in the face of their demands (Hokanson & Butler, 1992). Finally, dependent individuals’ intense desires for intimacy and caring may impair their capacity to support others and nurture their autonomy (Thompson & Zuroff, 1998, 1999a). Cognitive theorists were initially less interested in person– situation transactions than those working in Blatt’s (1974) framework, and their portrayals of sociotropy and autonomy were more reminiscent of the silent, inactive diatheses critiqued by Coyne and Whiffen (1995). An important exception was the early study by Hammen et al. (1985), which explicitly examined the possible link between sociotropy and autonomy and stressful events. More recently, the hypothesis that the interpersonal styles associated with sociotropy and autonomy can influence the vulnerable individual’s social environment has been examined by Alden’s research group (Alden & Bieling, 1996; Bieling & Alden, 1998), Hammen’s research group (Daley et al., 1997; Nelson, Hammen, Daley, Burge, & Davila, 2001), C. J. Robins and his associates (Lynch et al., 2001; C. J. Robins, 1995), and Clark et al. (1999). For example, Daley et al. (1997) demonstrated a stress-generation process associated with autonomy, concluding that “autonomy is not merely an inert vulnerability factor that predisposes one to depression when coupled with an achievement-related stress . . . it also has its own effect on the generation of episodic life stress” (p. 257).

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In summary, vulnerability variables are not silent, latent diatheses. They exert powerful influences on people’s social environments, and consequently, it is to be expected that they will entail higher levels of dysphoria. The effects of self-criticism on the social environment appear to be especially pernicious and pervasive; the effects of dependency are more variable across relationships and involve a mixture of positive and negative features that can both instigate and moderate depressive states. These findings are concordant with the interactionist emphasis of Blatt and Zuroff’s (1992) theory. Practical implications. Although moderate relations between vulnerabilities and dysphoria do not pose a theoretical problem, it might still be argued that, as a practical matter, the correlations preclude demonstrations that the vulnerability variables have effects that are independent of concurrent levels of dysphoria. In a later section, we summarize evidence that vulnerability measures can predict dysphoria prospectively, even when initial symptoms are controlled; here we examine cross-sectional studies. Crosssectional relations between vulnerability measures and other variables are frequently reported after controlling for concurrent depression. In some cases, results were no longer significant after using this stringent statistical control (e.g., Brewin, Firth-Cozens, Furnham, & McManus, 1992). In many other studies, Dependency and Self-Criticism remained related to a variety of theoretically important variables. For example, controlling for dysphoria, Dependency and Self-Criticism remained related to the Big Five personality variables (Mongrain, 1993), dysfunctional attitudes (Mongrain & Zuroff, 1994), number of negative life events (Shahar, Henrich, et al., 2003), social behavior assessed using event sampling (Zuroff et al., 1995), interpersonal behavior observed in the laboratory with romantic partners (Mongrain, Vettese, Shuster, & Kendal, 1998; Vettese & Mongrain, 2000) and with same-sex friends (Santor & Zuroff, 1997, 1998), and number of prior episodes of depression (Leather & Mongrain, 2004). We conducted some new analyses to further examine this issue. Using data from Mongrain (1998), we found that even after controlling for mean levels of negative affect over 21 days, dependent subjects’ peers reported that they provided more informational and emotional support, and self-critical subjects reported making fewer requests for social support. Dunkley (2001) collected self-report measures of perceived social support, hassles, and negative affect from college students. Controlling for negative affect, Dependency significantly predicted number of hassles, whereas Self-Criticism predicted lower perceived social support and more hassles. Thus, concurrent correlations with dysphoria do not preclude identifying specific correlates of vulnerability.

Stability of Vulnerability in Individuals Treated for Depression The question of whether vulnerability variables are stable characteristics of the person or merely concomitants of the depressed state is more complex than it appears. Caspi and Bem (1990) and Caspi and Roberts (1999) identified five meanings of the term stability. Changes in mean scores, which were the focus of Coyne and Whiffen’s (1995) review, are one way to judge stability. Stability in mean scores (absolute stability) must be distinguished

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from stability in the rank order of individuals (relative stability).6 For example, Santor, Bagby, and Joffe (1997) examined the absolute and relative stability of Neuroticism and Extraversion in a sample of individuals pharmacologically treated for depression and demonstrated high levels of relative stability despite the presence of substantial decreases in Neuroticism and introversion. Thus, it is crucial to consider the effect of reductions in depressive severity on both mean scores and the rank ordering of individuals. Changes in mean scores. Coyne and Whiffen (1995) reviewed studies in which vulnerability measures were compared in currently depressed and remitted patients or before and after treatment of depression. We found several additional studies that have appeared since then. Of six studies using the DEQ, two suggested that Dependency decreases as depression remits (Klein et al., 1988; Rector et al., 2000) and four did not find evidence for mean change in Dependency (Bagby, Schuller, et al., 1994; Franche & Dobson, 1992; Frank et al., 1997; Rosenfarb, Becker, Khan, & Mintz, 1998). Conversely, four of these six studies suggested that Self-Criticism decreases as depression remits (Bagby, Schuller, et al., 1994; Frank et al., 1997; Rector et al., 2000; Rosenfarb et al., 1998). Four of the studies included comparison data from nondepressed controls (Bagby, Schuller, et al., 1994; Franche & Dobson, 1992; Klein et al., 1988; Rosenfarb et al., 1998). These four studies suggested that Self-Criticism in formerly depressed patients remains elevated compared with Self-Criticism in controls. Three of the four studies suggest persistent elevations for Dependency. Two other studies used measures of dependency other than the DEQ. Birtchnell, Deahl, and Falkowski (1991) found that dependency scores decreased in successfully treated inpatients, whereas Hirschfeld, Klerman, Clayton, Keller, and Andreason (1984) found persistent elevations in dependency scores in remitted patients compared with controls. There are great methodological differences across these studies, and certainly more research needs to be done. However, the available data suggest that mean scores on self-criticism are sensitive to treatment-related decreases in depression but do not decrease fully to the normal range; evidence for decreases in mean dependency scores is less consistent. Several recent studies examined the stability of mean scores on sociotropy and autonomy. Of four studies that compared scores before and after treatment, three found evidence of a decrease in sociotropy (Bagby et al., 2001; Fairbrother & Moretti, 1998; Moore & Blackburn, 1996); only Scott, Harrington, House, and Ferrier (1996) did not. Only one of the four (Bagby et al., 2001) found evidence of a significant decrease in autonomy. All three studies that provided data from nondepressed controls (Fairbrother & Moretti, 1998; Moore & Blackburn, 1996; Solomon, Haaga, Brody, Kirk, & Friedman, 1998) found that sociotropy and autonomy remained elevated in treated patients compared with controls. The need for more data is evident. However, the available evidence suggests that despite treatment-related decreases in sociotropy, both vulnerabilities remain elevated in depressed patients after treatment, compared with controls. Relative stability. Data on the relative stability of vulnerability measures are unfortunately sparse. Bagby et al. (2001) found test–retest correlations of .77 for both sociotropy and autonomy, measured using the PSI–II. Using the SAS, Moore and Blackburn (1996) found test–retest correlations of .77 for sociotropy and .72 for autonomy. Zuroff, Blatt, Sanislow, Bondi, and Pilkonis (1999) found test–retest correlations over 16 weeks of treatment of .65 for the Perfectionism subscale of the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale

(DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978) and .56 for the Need for Approval subscale. The available data suggest that there is moderateto-large relative stability in personality vulnerabilities, even in the face of treatments that reduce the symptoms of depression and, in some cases, mean scores on the vulnerabilities themselves. Ipsative stability. Caspi and Bem (1990) identified a third form of stability that is highly relevant to vulnerability research, yet which has received little attention: ipsative stability. Caspi and Bem defined ipsative stability as “continuity in the configuration of variables within an individual across time” (p. 552). Ipsative stability is addressed by within-subjects analyses, whereas stability of means and relative rank ordering are addressed by betweensubjects analyses. In the present context, the “stability of intraindividual organization” refers to the degree to which individuals in whom, for example, dependent characteristics are more important than self-critical characteristics remain “predominantly” dependent after treatment. Blatt’s (1974) theory predicts a high level of ipsative stability. Hammen et al. (1985) classified subjects as dependent or as self-critical by comparing the number of interpersonal and achievement memories they recalled in response to several stimuli. Because the comparison was made within each subject, it was an ipsative definition. Hammen et al. reported that the classification was stable over 2 months and was not significantly affected by changes in dysphoric status. Zuroff and Bagby (2002) calculated difference scores between sociotropy and autonomy at intake and between sociotropy and autonomy at termination following drug treatment for depression. The test–retest correlation of the difference was .82, indicating a high level of ipsative stability. We conducted similar analyses using the intake and termination measures of Perfectionism and Need for Approval in the publicly available data set from the National Institute of Mental Health’s Treatment of Depression Collaborative Research Program (TDCRP). The test–retest correlation for the difference on these vulnerability measures was .60, indicating stability in subjects’ personality patterns. The state–trait vulnerability model. The question of whether personality vulnerabilities are “stable” is complex, and it is time for the field to move beyond defending or attacking a dichotomous notion of stability. What is needed is a conceptual framework that can accommodate the accumulated evidence that (a) mean scores on vulnerability variables can decrease as depressive symptoms lessen, but generally remain elevated compared with nondepressed controls; (b) relative stability, assessed with test–retest correlations, is moderate to high; and (c) the ipsative stability of the configuration of vulnerabilities is also moderate to high. Fortunately, that theoretical framework has already been developed by researchers concerned with the mood state dependence of cognitive vulnerability (e.g., Clark et al., 1999; Persons & Miranda, 1992; Riskind & Rholes, 1984; Segal & Ingram, 1994; Teasdale, 1983). Termed the state–trait vulnerability model by Zuroff, Blatt, et al. (1999), it proposes that the availability of cognitive–affective structures remains more or less constant over time but that the accessibility of those structures is dependent on current levels of 6

The term rank order is conventionally applied to this form of stability, but most studies have used parametric (Pearson) rather than nonparametric (Spearman) correlations and therefore have assessed the stability of relative differences measured on an interval scale.


depressive symptoms. The stability of the underlying cognitive– affective structures accounts for relative and ipsative stability, whereas fluctuations in accessibility account for changes in mean scores. Structural equation (or path) models consistent with the state–trait model have been presented by Zuroff, Blatt, et al. (1999) for Perfectionism, Need for Approval, and total dysfunctional attitudes; by Cox and Enns (2003) for perfectionism; and by Zuroff and Bagby (2002) for sociotropy and autonomy. Stability viewed from a multilevel perspective. Social psychological researchers have increasingly used multilevel models (also known as “hierarchical linear models” and “mixed models”) in order to separate between-subjects and within-subjects relations between variables that are measured on multiple occasions (e.g., Bolger & Schilling, 1991; Tate & Hokanson, 1993). Imagine that a researcher has obtained scores on mood and personality on multiple occasions over the course of patients’ depressive episodes. The researcher could then distinguish the between-subjects relation between mean personality scores and mean mood scores from the within-subjects relation between fluctuations in personality and mood. Crucially, there is no necessary relation between the two; it is even mathematically possible for within-subjects and between-subjects relations to be in opposite directions. Multilevel models also permit calculation of the intraclass correlation (ICC), which is the ratio of between-subjects variance to the total (between ⫹ within) variance (Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998). The ICC is another way to assess stability. If subjects’ scores are unchanging over repeated observations, the ICC will be 1.0; if subjects’ mean scores are identical and if all variance is due to subjects’ fluctuations about their means, the ICC will be 0.0. This conceptual and data-analytic framework provides another perspective on the stability of vulnerability measures. The strong form of the state model implies that there will be a very strong within-subjects relation between depressive symptoms and vulnerability scores and that the ICC of vulnerability measures will be low, approaching zero. Further, the state model implies that any between-subjects variance in vulnerability will be explained by between-subjects differences in depressive symptoms. The strong form of the trait model implies that there will be no within-subjects relation with mood and that the ICC will be very high, approaching 1.0. The state–trait model, which we believe best reflects Blatt’s and Beck’s theories (Zuroff, Blatt, et al., 1999), is consistent with the presence of both within-subjects and between-subjects relations between depressive symptoms and vulnerability. However, Blatt’s position requires that the bulk of individual differences in vulnerability not be attributable to the influence of depression; that is, there should be considerable between-subjects variance in vulnerability remaining after the between-subjects effects of depressive symptoms are explained. Multilevel analyses require longitudinal data sets with more than two waves of observation. Such data sets are rare, but we were able to use data from the 18-month follow-up period of the TDCRP. (See Zuroff & Blatt, 2002, for a fuller description of the application of multilevel modeling in the TDCRP.) We examined the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD; Hamilton, 1960), the Perfectionism subscale of the DAS, and the Need for Approval subscale of the DAS assessed at termination and the 6-month, 12-month, and 18-month follow-ups. Patients were included regardless of whether they had completed treatment; data were available for about 200 patients. The ICCs over the four observation points were .42 for the HRSD, .78 for Perfectionism,

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and .89 for Need for Approval. These findings demonstrate that the strong form of the state model is not plausible; between-subjects differences in mean vulnerability scores accounted for considerably more variance than within-subjects fluctuations. The strong form of the trait model is also not plausible, because there were significant within-subjects and between-subjects effects of depressive symptoms on both Perfectionism and Need for Approval (all ps ⬍ .001). These analyses demonstrate that patients with high average levels of depressive symptoms reported more vulnerability and that upward and downward fluctuations in depressive symptoms were associated with heightened or diminished reports of vulnerability. However, 82.5% of the between-subjects variance in Perfectionism and 88.2% of the between-subjects variance in Need for Approval could not be explained by depressive symptoms. In summary, our analyses supported the state–trait model of vulnerability. There were effects of both chronic depressive symptoms and fluctuations of symptoms, but there remained large individual differences in vulnerability that were not attributable to the influences of depressive symptoms.

Prospective Prediction of Dysphoria Coyne and Whiffen (1995) also asked whether vulnerability variables could predict dysphoria or depression prospectively, after initial level of depressive symptoms was statistically controlled. At the time, only a handful of longitudinal studies were available; evidence has accumulated since then suggesting that the predictive power of vulnerability measures cannot be attributed to shared variance with initial dysphoria. Four studies followed college students, using longitudinal designs and self-report measures of dysphoria and stress. Brown, Hammen, Craske, and Wickens (1995) found that Perfectionism measured using the DAS predicted increases in BDI scores in response to poorer-than-expected exam performance. Flett, Hewitt, Blankstein, and Mosher (1995) found that self-oriented perfectionism interacted with self-reported life stress to predict increases in depressive symptoms over a 3-month period. C. J. Robins et al. (1995) found that sociotropy and autonomy each interacted with both interpersonal and achievement events to predict increases in depressive symptoms. Mongrain et al. (2004) tested college students over an academic term and found that Dependency and Self-Criticism assessed in September predicted depressive symptoms over the course of the year, controlling for initial dysphoria. Two other studies have been conducted with nonundergraduate populations. Hewitt, Flett, and Ediger (1996) followed a sample of current or former psychiatric patients. After controlling for initial depressive symptoms, both self-oriented perfectionism and socially prescribed perfectionism predicted depression 4 months later. Brewin and Firth-Cozens (1997) assessed dependency, selfcriticism, and depressive symptoms in male and female medical students. Controlling for initial level of symptoms, depressive symptoms 2 years later were predicted by dependency in males and by self-criticism in both sexes. At the 10-year follow-up, predictive effects were found for males. Santor (2003) argued that tests of vulnerability theories have focused on the intensity of depressive symptoms and have neglected the frequency and duration of mood disturbances. He pointed out that dependency and self-criticism might be related to maladaptive responses to initial mood disturbances, which in turn

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could contribute to longer standing, clinically significant problems. Using a sample of college students followed throughout a semester, Santor and Patterson (2004) showed that Dependency and Self-Criticism each predicted more frequent and longer-lasting mood disturbances. None of these studies assessed the onset of major depressive episodes in nonselected populations. Thus, the skeptical reviewer is justified in insisting that there is still no strong evidence that personality variables confer vulnerability to the initial onset of clinically significant depression as well as to dysphoria. On the other hand, these studies do speak strongly to the issue of whether these personality variables can be measured independently of concurrent depression and dysphoria. The fact that they can prospectively predict depressive symptoms demonstrates that they are not merely indirect, proxy measures of concurrent dysphoria.

The Scar Hypothesis Coyne and Whiffen (1995) raised the possibility that putative vulnerability variables are consequences (“scars”) rather than antecedents of episodes of depression. Consistent with our general framework of dynamic interactionism, we are open to the possibility of two-way causation between personality characteristics and episodes of depression or depressive symptoms (Zuroff, 1992). Zuroff, Igreja, and Mongrain (1990) noted that initial BDI scores tended to predict increased self-criticism at a 12-month follow-up of college women and suggested that the results implied a reciprocal relation between depressed affect and self-criticism. Zuroff, Igreja, and Mongrain concluded that “research into more complex causal models of vulnerability may be warranted” (p. 323). Shahar, Blatt, Zuroff, Kuperminc, and Leadbeater (2004) found evidence of cross-lagged reciprocal relations between depressed symptoms and Self-Criticism in adolescent girls, but not adolescent boys. Nevertheless, we regard the influence of personality on depression as primary and the scarring influence of depression on personality as an interesting, but secondary, process. The available evidence suggests that the long-term influence of depression on adult personality is slight. Duggan, Sham, Lee, and Murray (1991) found that episodes of depression did not lead to increased Neuroticism. Rohde, Lewinsohn, and Seeley (1990) found no effect of depression on emotional reliance and social self-confidence, two dimensions of interpersonal dependency. Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath, and Eaves (1993) did find an increase in Neuroticism among subjects who experienced the onset of a depressive episode during a 15-month study period, but the effect was, in their own words, “modest,” achieving significance only because of a large sample size. Shea et al. (1996) followed a large group of individuals with no prior episodes of depression over a 6-year period. Subjects who did (N ⫽ 94) or did not (N ⫽ 708) go on to experience a major depressive episode failed to differ on follow-up measures of personality, including Neuroticism and interpersonal dependency. Thus, no evidence of scarring was obtained. On the other hand, and consistent with the vulnerability hypothesis, subjects who eventually experienced depression were initially higher on Neuroticism and emotional reliance. We do not wish to argue that the experience of depression has no influence on personality. On the contrary, we think that such effects do exist. However, the magnitude of scar effects is sufficiently small that they cannot be detected reliably in adults; conceivably, the effects are stronger in children. In contrast, person-

ality has been shown to be stable over periods of several decades (Costa & McCrae, 1997). We do not consider it credible that relations between depression and personality are primarily a consequence of scarring, and we think that Coyne and Whiffen (1995) exaggerated the extent to which this theoretical possibility undermines the vulnerability literature. In fact, the evidence for the influence of personality on depression—imperfect as it is—is far more extensive and robust than the evidence for a scarring effect of depression on personality. In saying this, we do not intend to minimize or trivialize the potentially devastating aftereffects of an episode of major depression (Coryell et al., 1993). Major depressive episodes may indeed leave many scars; we only assert that significant, lasting change in personality is seldom one of them.

Issue 5: Can Vulnerability Be Discriminated From the Social Context? Coyne and Whiffen (1995) raised the question of “whether assessments of what is presumed to be a diathesis accurately reflect an enduring personality trait, rather than effects of involvement in a particular kind of social context” (p. 366). In particular, they suggested that “two key threats to the validity of a personality measure are the effects of stable contextual features and of recent life events serious enough to precipitate changes in personality functioning” (p. 367). They gave as examples an insecure intimate relationship that might explain behavior otherwise attributed to a trait of dependency, and a marital separation or divorce, an event that might engender increases in dependency (or self-criticism). After advancing this argument, Coyne and Whiffen qualified their position by stating, “We do not propose replacing an overemphasis on personality variables with an exclusive emphasis on the social context” (p. 369).

Stable Contextual Features and Personality Coyne and Whiffen (1995) were wise to adopt this more moderate stance, because a strong contextualist position is not credible in the light of current personality research. Given that people’s social contexts change in different ways over time, strong contextualism would imply that there would be little relative stability over the life span. Recent reviews have concluded, on the contrary, that there is a significant and impressive degree of relative stability in personality (Caspi & Roberts, 1999; Costa & McCrae, 1997). Behavioral styles measured in early childhood (age 3) have been shown to predict personality traits assessed at age 18 (Caspi & Silva, 1995) and at age 26 (Caspi et al., 2003). Relative stability over periods of many years has been demonstrated for the Big Five variables (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000) and for self-esteem (Trzesniewski, Donnellan, & Robins, 2003), with initial assessments ranging from childhood to old age. The relative stability of personality increases with age, with a high level of stability (mean r ⫽ .64) achieved by age 30 (Caspi & Roberts, 1999; Costa & McCrae, 1997; Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000). Nevertheless, “highly stable” does not mean perfectly stable, so there remains a role for personality change—possibly, but not necessarily, linked to social contextual change—throughout the life span. Relative stability is not inconsistent with changes in absolute levels, and a growing number of studies have demonstrated agerelated changes in mean personality scores (e.g., Srivastava, John, Gosling, & Potter, 2003; Vaidya, Gray, Haig, & Watson, 2002).


These studies suggest that broadly shared, age-related, contextual features of people’s lives may influence their scores on personality measures. Caspi and Roberts (1999) reviewed explanations for the relative stability of personality. The substantial heritability of individual differences in personality is well documented (Plomin & Caspi, 1999). Behavior genetics methods can be extended to determine the extent of genetic influences on both age-to-age change and age-to-age continuity in personality. Caspi and Roberts (1999) found little evidence of genetic contributions to personality change in adulthood; however, they did find evidence for genetic contributions to the stability of personality assessed both in infancy (Plomin et al., 1993) and in adulthood (McGue, Bacon, & Lykken, 1993). Caspi and Roberts (1999) also considered one of the mechanisms proposed by Coyne and Whiffen (1995), that is, that continuities in the social environment might underlie continuities in personality. Several studies suggest that the longitudinal stability of socioenvironmental variables is of approximately the same magnitude as the longitudinal stability of personality. Although this finding is suggestive, there is no direct evidence that environmental continuities account for personality continuities. More fundamentally, the social environment should not be conceptualized as a clearly distinct, independent variable that might explain the dependent variable of personality. Individuals are not randomly assigned to social contexts but rather are active agents in the selection and construction of their social environments. Caspi and Roberts (1999) state that person– environment linkages can be produced by three kinds of person– environment transactions: reactive, evocative, and proactive. Reactive transactions are those in which personality variables influence the subjective meaning and impact of environmental events. Evocative transactions are those in which the reactions evoked in others are partly determined by one’s personal qualities. Proactive transactions include the influences of personality on the selection of social network members and the construction and negotiation of the nature of relationships with network members. Reactive, evocative, and proactive transactions are not hypothetical possibilities but are well documented. Indeed, they have been a focus of research on dependency and self-criticism (e.g., Mongrain, 1998; Santor & Zuroff, 1997, 1998; Shahar & Priel, 2003; Zuroff & de Lorimier, 1989). Behavior genetic research has also illuminated the processes linking personality and socioenvironmental variables. Plomin and Caspi’s (1999) review documents genetic influences on a range of contextual variables, including aspects of the parenting experienced by children, peer groups, work environments, social support, and life events. These genetic influences appear to be mediated by personality; that is, genetic factors influence personality, which then influences the social environment through evocative and proactive transactions. Plomin and Caspi (1999) concluded, These findings support a current shift from thinking about passive models of how the environment affects individuals toward models that recognize the active role we play in selecting, modifying, and creating our own environments (Plomin, 1994). It seems likely that personality contributes importantly in this construction of experience. (p. 261)

Asendorpf and Wilpers (1998) conducted an illuminating study of the relations between personality and social relationships during the transition to university. The Big Five personality variables and

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social network variables were assessed on multiple occasions over 18 months. Personality variables at the beginning of the study prospectively predicted many aspects of students’ social relations, including number of new peer relationships, available social support, conflict with peers, falling in love, and frequency of contact with family members. In contrast, the number of effects of relationship variables on subsequent personality measures did not exceed chance. Neyer and Asendorpf (2001) assessed personality and social relationships on two occasions separated by 4 years. They found that subjects who experienced the transition to partner status (i.e., entered a married or cohabitating relationship) reported larger personality changes in the direction of greater maturity and adjustment than did those who did not enter such relationships. Other life transitions did not moderate changes in personality. In particular, dissolution of partnerships did not lead to long-term change in mean personality levels, although short-term effects on personality might not have been detected by the design. The relative stability of personality traits (mean r ⫽ .59) was higher than the relative stability of social network variables (mean r ⫽ .39). Numerous prospective effects of personality on relationship variables were found, whereas few effects of relationship variables on subsequent personality were found. Neyer and Asendorpf concluded that “the young adult personality clearly emerged as active creator of the individual’s social environment rather than being a passive victim of external social forces” (p. 1201). However, Neuroticism and insecurity in relationships were reciprocally related to one another. High initial Neuroticism predicted an increase in insecurity, and high initial insecurity predicted increases in Neuroticism. R. W. Robins, Caspi, and Moffitt (2002) conducted another longitudinal study of personality and romantic relationships in a large, representative sample of young adults. Personality was assessed at ages 18, 21, and 26; relationship variables (overall quality, level of conflict, and presence of abusive behavior) were assessed at ages 21 and 26. Both classes of variables displayed relative stability, but stability was greater for personality than for relationship qualities. Strong evidence was found for the prospective effect of personality on relationships. The trait of negative emotionality measured at age 18 predicted deterioration from age 21 to 26 in relationship functioning. As in Neyer and Asendorpf’s (2001) study, there was also some evidence of bidirectional influences, with adverse relationships at age 21 predicting increases in negative emotionality from age 18 to age 26. Although these bidirectional effects are of considerable theoretical interest, they were of small magnitude, with standardized regression coefficients seldom exceeding .20. Whiffen and Aube´ (1999), in a study of married or cohabitating couples, found that Self-Criticism in both sexes was associated with having a spouse with many marital complaints, whereas Neediness (a subfactor of Dependency) was associated in women with having a spouse who was low in intimacy. Whiffen and Aube´ (1999) stressed the possible influence of marital complaints and coldness on personality, but acknowledged that the cross-sectional design made it impossible to determine the direction of the causal relation between personality and marital context. That is, it is equally possible that preexisting personality traits influenced individuals’ marital choices and dynamics, thereby affecting their eventual marital climates. The research reviewed in this section was not explicitly directed at depressive personality styles. It is conceivable that Blatt’s


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(1990) and Beck’s (1983) variables are more strongly determined by contextual variables than are other personality variables. However, given the significant relations between the Big Five and the depressive personality styles, it seems unlikely that there are marked differences in context-boundedness between Blatt’s and Beck’s variables and other personality variables. Thus, we view contemporary personality research as implying that depressive personality styles cannot be explained as mere products of stable features of the social environment. To the extent that personality and socioenvironmental factors are linked—and we agree that they are—the influence of personality on stable features of the environment is both highly important and well documented. The hypothesis that socioenvironmental factors are the principal causal determinants of individual differences in personality is not tenable. Socioenvironmental factors do, however, contribute to the maintenance of personality and can, to a limited degree, contribute to negative or positive changes in personality.

Serious Life Events and Personality Coyne and Whiffen (1995) suggested that elevations on depressive personality styles might actually reflect the consequences of negative life events. In addition, they pointed out limitations of self-report checklists for assessing stressful life events and urged the adoption of interview-based measures of stress. There are two important methodological points with which we wish to express agreement. First, self-report measures of stress are indeed limited in ways identified by Coyne and Whiffen, as well as by other stress researchers (e.g., Monroe & Simons, 1991). These low-cost measures were appropriate in the initial phase of vulnerability research, but the field now needs to adopt more rigorous methodological conventions. A second point, related to the first, is that accurate dating of the onset and duration of stressful events is important. A researcher hoping to demonstrate that personality assessed prior to the onset of stressful events can predict the subsequent emergence of depression would want to be confident that the onset of the stressor did not overlap in time with the assessment of personality. On the other hand, we are not willing to concede that stressful events provide a credible threat to the construct validity of measures of personality. Serious life events are relatively rare. If the few subjects in any given sample who had recently experienced such events were eliminated, there would be little effect on the relations between dependency and self-criticism and most other variables. Onset of depression is admittedly an important exception in which the omission of such subjects might matter. Furthermore, although it is plausible that life events might affect personality variables, there is little evidence that they actually do so. Asendorpf and Wilpers (1998) found hardly any significant correlations between changes in students’ social networks and changes in their personalities. Asendorpf and Wilpers (1998) expressed surprise that whether students’ peer network grew quickly or slowly, whether they experienced increasing or decreasing conflict with parents or peers, whether they fell in love or not, whether they began a serious romantic relationship or not, and whether their perception of available support from parents or peers increased or decreased had no effect on their personality. (p. 1541)

The evidence that personality affects the occurrence of some stressful events, that is, the stress-generation effect (Gotlib &

Hammen, 1992), is more extensive and convincing. Using large, representative samples, Headey and Wearing (1989) and Ormel and Wohlfarth (1991) showed that Neuroticism prospectively predicted the occurrence of adverse life events and long-term life difficulties. Bates and Pandina (1989) assessed stress and personality in three cohorts of adolescents and retested them 3 years later. Although personality change in boys was related to increases in subjective aspects of stress, no relation was found, for boys or girls, between personality change and increases in the frequency of life events. That is, adolescents who experienced an increase in negative life events were no more likely to undergo personality change than those who did not experience increased stressors. Shahar and Priel (2003) also conducted a longitudinal study of adolescents. Dependency and Self-Criticism at Time 1 were significant predictors of both negative and positive life events. Daley et al. (1997) conducted a longitudinal study of late adolescent women with interview-based measurement of life stress and depression. Sociotropy and autonomy measured at Time 1 predicted the subsequent occurrence of dependent life events and, in particular, events involving interpersonal conflict. When depression at Time 1 was controlled, the effects of autonomy remained significant. Nelson et al. (2001) conducted additional analyses using Daley et al.’s sample, focusing on chronic rather than episodic stressors. Controlling for Time 1 levels of chronic stress as well as Time 1 levels of depressive symptoms, Nelson et al. (2001) found that sociotropy and autonomy were each prospectively related to increases in chronic stress.

Effects of Social Context Viewed From a Multilevel Perspective The relation of personality to social context can be viewed from a multilevel perspective. As with depressive symptoms, one can separate the within-subjects effect of fluctuations in social circumstances from the between-subjects effects of chronically adverse social environments. The strong form of contextualism would predict that there are strong between-subjects and within-subjects effects of social context on vulnerability and that there are minimal residual between-subjects differences in vulnerability after contextual variables are taken into account. Our position acknowledges the possibility of both types of relations but differs from the contextualists’ on two points. First, we believe that much of the covariation between personality and context reflects the causal influence of the former on the latter. Second, we believe that there is a great deal of between-subjects variance in personality that cannot be explained, even in a statistical sense, by social contextual variables. Testing these assertions requires data sets with multiple observations of personality and social contextual variables and these are very rare. For the purposes of this article, we conducted some new analyses, again using the follow-up data from the TDCRP. Perfectionism, Need for Approval, social support, stress, and strains were assessed at termination and at the 6-, 12-, and 18-month follow-ups. We used interviewer-based measures of perceived social support (defined as the number of types of relationships with which the patient was somewhat or very satisfied), negative life events (number of events that were very or extremely stressful), and chronic strains (number of strains that were very or extremely stressful). Mean levels of these contextual variables served as between-subjects predictors, and deviations (fluctuations) about


the patient’s mean served as within-subjects predictors. For Perfectionism, there were within-subjects effects of stress ( p ⬍ .001), strains ( p ⬍ .001), and social support ( p ⬍ .05), as well as between-subjects effects of strains ( p ⬍ .001) and social support ( p ⬍ .001). For Need for Approval, there were no within-subjects effects, but there were between-subjects effects of strains ( p ⬍ .001) and social support ( p ⬍ .001). These results demonstrate associations between social contextual variables and personality variables, and so are consistent with Coyne and Whiffen’s (1995) emphasis on the effect of social context on personality, as well as with our interactionist perspective. Crucially, the social context variables failed to account for 77.8% of the between-subjects variance in Perfectionism and 83.0% of the between-subjects variance in Need for Approval. The presence of substantial residual between-subjects variance supports our belief in the importance of stable individual differences that are not attributable to socioenvironmental differences.7

Conclusion Coyne and Whiffen (1995) disavowed a desire to promulgate an exclusive emphasis on the social context. For our part, we disavow a desire to promulgate an exclusive emphasis on the stability and causal priority of personality. We have consistently advocated an interactionist perspective (Blatt & Zuroff, 1992; Zuroff et al., in press) in which “person” and “situation” are assumed to mutually influence one another over the course of time. The social contexts that people select and construct serve to maintain—and occasionally to transform—their personalities. Vulnerable individuals’ social contexts can generate increases in negative life events and chronic life difficulties and decreased social support. However, this does not imply that depressive personality variables can plausibly be interpreted as mere artifacts of stable socioenvironmental factors or of stressful life events. Analyses that focus on the role of the person in constructing his or her social environment and in generating stressful events run the risk of “blaming the victim.” It is therefore important to emphasize that these processes are only part of the story and that many important features of the environment cannot be attributed to the person. Fateful events such as war, disease, terrorism, family deaths, and massive layoffs are not constructed by the individuals experiencing them. Many chronic life difficulties are fundamentally products of external social or natural forces. We also wish to disavow any implication that victims of abuse or other forms of maltreatment are to be blamed even if their choices and actions have, in a causal sense, contributed to their victimization. Causal analyses are distinct from moral analyses. Perpetrators of abuse are morally blameworthy, whatever causal factors might be in play.

Issue 6: Is Dependency a Pathologizing of the Need for Relatedness? Coyne and Whiffen (1995) took issue with the concept of dependency as a vulnerability marker and described it as “the reduction of relatedness to a pathogenic personality trait” (p. 368). They continued, “The notion of dependence on others as a deficit and source of vulnerability to depression suggests independence as the antidote” (p. 368). These comments raise important questions about the conceptualization and measurement of dependency.

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We are perplexed by Coyne and Whiffen’s (1995) claims that Blatt denied the central role of relatedness in human life and confused the need for relatedness with the problematic trait of dependency. His core theoretical idea is that there are two fundamental developmental lines, equal in importance and dialectically interrelated: relatedness and self-definition (e.g., Blatt & Shichman, 1983). Dependency in either gender reflects a failure to achieve the capacity for satisfying, mature relationships. Independence is not a solution, but merely a different problem, sometimes called counterdependency. The “antidote” to dependency is renewed growth along both developmental lines. Mature, healthy relatedness differs from dependency in several ways (Blatt, 1974; Blatt & Shichman, 1983). The primary motivation of dependent people, according to Bornstein (1993), is to obtain and maintain nurturant, supportive relationships, that is, relationships in which they are the primary recipients. In contrast, fully mature relatedness implies a motivation to give as well as to receive, to nurture and protect as well as to be nurtured and protected. Mature relatedness also implies a high level of attachment security. In addition, the mature person flexibly uses a wide range of interpersonal behaviors, compared with the dependent individual’s overreliance on submissive, ingratiating, and compliant behavior. Finally, the mature individual, like the dependent person, can experience intense sadness in response to loss, but the sadness is less likely to persist and develop into clinical depression.

Dependency Subscales Although mature relatedness and dependency are clearly conceptually distinct, it is a separate question whether the measurement of dependency has confounded more problematic and less problematic aspects of relatedness. Several groups of investigators have suggested that there is significant heterogeneity in the item content of the DEQ–Dependency and the SAS–Sociotropy scales. Blatt, Zohar, Quinlan, Zuroff, and Mongrain (1995), using college student samples, identified two clusters of dependency items in the DEQ, labeled dependence and relatedness. The dependence subscale reflected an undifferentiated dependency on others for gratification, feelings of helplessness, and fears of abandonment. The relatedness subscale reflected vulnerability to feelings of loneliness in response to loss and separation from specific, valued others. The dependence subscale assessed a less mature form of relatedness and better captured the maladaptive quality implied by the term dependency. Dependence, but not relatedness, was significantly related to measures of maladjustment. Blatt, Zohar, Quinlan, Luthar, and Hart (1996) obtained similar results by using the adolescent version of the DEQ. Using a college student sample, Rude and Burnham (1995) conducted principal factor analyses, followed by oblique rotations, of dependency items from the DEQ and sociotropy items from the SAS. The analyses yielded two factors, labeled Neediness and Connectedness, that were closely related to the subscales identified by Blatt et al. (1995). Rude and Burnham reported two other important findings: (a) Women scored higher than men on Con7 When depressive symptoms and the social context variables were included as predictors, 74.0% of the between-subjects variance in perfectionism and 80.7% of the need for approval variance were unexplained.

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nectedness, but not on Neediness, and (b) Neediness, but not Connectedness, was predictive of depression. Bieling, Beck, and Brown (2000) conducted exploratory factor analyses, followed by confirmatory factor analyses, of the SAS sociotropy items in psychiatric outpatients. They identified two correlated latent factors, which they labeled Fear of Criticism and Rejection and Preference for Affiliation. Bieling et al. felt that the factors corresponded to those previously identified by Blatt et al. (1995, 1996) and Rude and Burnham (1995). The first factor, similar to dependence and neediness, was significantly more strongly related to measures of maladjustment than was the second factor. Sato and McCann (1997), using a college student sample, carried out a principal-components analysis with a varimax rotation on the combined item pool from the revised SAS and the PSI–II. The sociotropy items formed two factors, labeled Sensitivity and Attachment. Sensitivity items referred to concerns about how others regard the self and fear of disappointing others. Attachment items referred to discomfort with being alone and needing to be loved by or attached to others. Sensitivity was more strongly related than Attachment to the BDI. Pincus and Gurtman (1995) conducted the most comprehensive and sophisticated analyses, examining items from the dependency or sociotropy scales of the SAS, the DEQ, the DAS, and the Interpersonal Dependency Inventory (IDI; Hirschfeld et al., 1977). They first operationally defined an “interpersonal space,” based on the interpersonal circumplex and its two dimensions of Dominance and Love. They then determined where on that circumplex each item from the sociotropy or dependency scales could be placed. Several important findings emerged. First, there was a great deal of dispersal of the items around the circumplex, indicating that dependency items are highly variable in terms of interpersonal content. Second, the SAS, DEQ, DAS, and IDI differed in terms of their interpersonal content, that is, where their items fell on the circumplex and the degree of dispersion of their constituent items. Third, they were able to create three dependency subscales by dividing the items into thirds on the basis of their position on the circumplex. These new scales were relatively internally consistent in terms of interpersonal content yet were clearly differentiated from one another. Pincus and Gurtman labeled the scale centered on the Love pole love dependency, the scale centered on the Submissiveness pole submissive dependency, and the scale lying in the warm-submissive region between those two poles exploitable dependency. Submissive dependency and exploitable dependency were more strongly related to Neuroticism than was love dependency. Subsequent research confirmed that submissive dependency has more maladaptive correlates than love dependency (Pincus & Wilson, 2001). On the basis of item content and interpersonal correlates, it appears that Pincus and Gurtman’s submissive dependency is closely related to Neediness and that love dependency is related to Connectedness. It is interesting to note that the total DEQ–Dependency scale seemed most closely aligned with exploitable dependency, which lies between love and submissive dependency. Although there are differences across these studies in how the subscales were extracted and interpreted, they consistently identified heterogeneity in the dependency items of the DEQ and the sociotropy items of the SAS.8 Furthermore, the studies consistently found that one subscale (e.g., Neediness) was more strongly predictive of psychopathology than the other subscale (e.g., Con-

nectedness). Thus, the broad measures of dependency and sociotropy appear to contain two correlated, yet distinguishable, factors representing more problematic and less problematic aspects of relatedness. Convinced of the importance of the distinction between the two forms of dependency, we have begun to include Neediness and Connectedness as separate predictors in regression models (e.g., Zuroff, Moskowitz, & Cote´, 1999). We have also reanalyzed old data sets in an effort to deepen our understanding of the distinction (Zuroff, Moskowitz, & Koestner, 1996). The picture that emerges for neediness is of very unhappy people who badly want to be cared for and protected by others, but who expect to be hurt in relationships and have adopted submissive interpersonal styles to forestall conflict and to elicit protection and support. The picture that emerges for connectedness is of somewhat dysphoric, somewhat insecure people who have developed warm, intimate ways of relating that cement relationships by making them valued interactional partners.

Conclusions and Implications for Vulnerability Research The distinction between Neediness and Connectedness fits comfortably within Blatt and Shichman’s (1983) model of two developmental lines. As would be expected, the two subfactors are significantly correlated, because both represent anaclitic personality configurations. Items loading on Neediness suggest lesser psychological maturity, because they imply an inability to tolerate separateness and a view of others as undifferentiated sources of need gratification. Items loading on Connectedness demonstrate greater psychological maturity, because they evidence an appreciation of other people’s feelings and needs and a concern with relationships rather than with need gratification. We do not regard Connectedness as representing a fully mature, nonneurotic valuing of relatedness; it is more mature and more adaptive than neediness but is still a form of dependency. Consistent with this interpretation, Whiffen, Aube´, Thompson, and Campbell (2000) found that both Neediness and Connectedness were related to attachment anxiety in both partners in romantic couples. Although the distinction between Neediness and Connectedness does not pose a theoretical challenge, it is an important innovation in the assessment of dependency. It provides a partial explanation of why measures of dysphoria and depression are generally more strongly related to self-criticism than to dependency. Correlations of dependency with depression are attenuated by the inclusion of variance related to Connectedness that is weakly related or unrelated to psychopathology. Studies of the mechanisms underlying vulnerability, including studies of interpersonal processes, will also frequently yield clearer results when Neediness and Connectedness are examined separately. Pincus and Gurtman (1995) suggested that submissive dependent (needy) and love dependent (connected) individuals might be vulnerable to different kinds of interpersonal losses. In general, vulnerability researchers may find stronger and more consistent results if they replace the undifferentiated construct of dependency with its more and less mature forms, Neediness and Connectedness. 8 The PSI sociotropy scale was deliberately constructed with three correlated subscales. Factor analyses of these items using Zuroff’s (1994) sample did not produce factors similar to those found in the DEQ and SAS.


Interpretations of the gender difference in the prevalence of depression also need to take account of this distinction. Although women generally score slightly higher on the DEQ Dependency scale, Blatt and his associates have never attempted, as Coyne and Whiffen (1995) implied, to explain prevalence differences on this basis; such an explanation would immediately run into the difficulty that men generally score higher on Self-Criticism. Regardless, it is now apparent that the gender difference in DEQ– Dependency primarily reflects women’s higher scores on Connectedness, which is weakly related to depression. An explanation for the gender difference in the prevalence of depression must be sought elsewhere than in mean differences between the sexes on depressive personality variables.

Future Directions Although many interesting, complex, and challenging issues surround the conceptualization and measurement of personality vulnerability to depression, we believe that we have shown that there are no fundamental impediments to continued progress within this research tradition. In this concluding section, we return to each of the six issues and indicate what we believe are the highest priorities for theoretical development and empirical study.

Is Vulnerability Typological or Dimensional? We asserted that the answer is “dimensional” and that research practices have from the beginning been consistent with that approach. Empirically, there is a strong need, as Coyne and Whiffen (1995) suggested, for normative data on vulnerability measures in diverse clinical populations. The greatest theoretical challenge is to reformulate vulnerability theories so that they are consistently framed in dimensional rather than categorical language. Prototypical descriptions have been enormously valuable but should be treated as illustrative of the quadrants defined by an underlying dimensional framework. Similarly, a dimensional system for describing the vulnerable individual’s social context is needed in place of the dichotomy of achievement and interpersonal stressors. The dimensions should be derived from a larger theoretical framework, such as evolutionary psychology, rather than being based on an atheoretical, intuitively derived distinction between the realms of achievement and interpersonal relations (Santor, 2003).

Are Individuals With Mixed Vulnerability Theoretically Problematic? We asserted that the answer is “no.” Nevertheless, we agree with Coyne and Whiffen (1995) that more attention should be devoted to the study of these individuals. In particular, researchers need a better understanding of the psychological interplay of the need to preserve and protect supportive relationships and the need to preserve and protect fragile self-esteem and self-identity. When and how do attempts to serve one need exacerbate the other need? What are the temporal dynamics of behaviors serving each need? Are there contexts or life transitions in which one need will predominate? What are the impacts of these behaviors on the social context?

Can Vulnerability Variables Be Discriminated From Neuroticism? We asserted that the answer is “yes.” We do not feel that more correlational studies examining the Big Five and personality vul-

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nerability are a high priority. However, there is a great deal more to personality than is encompassed by the five-factor model. McAdams (1995) suggested that there are two levels, or domains, beyond traits: personal concerns (motivational variables) and personal identity (especially the life narrative). Only a few studies have examined the motivational underpinnings of dependency and self-criticism (e.g., Mongrain & Zuroff, 1995; Saragovi et al., 2002). Research on the content, structure, functioning, and evolution of the life narratives of vulnerable individuals is also very limited, but promising (Abela, Sarin, Ngo, Lakdawalla, & Murad, 2003; McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, & Bowman, 2001). It would be valuable to examine changes in vulnerable individuals’ life narratives in response to positive or negative social contextual changes, life stress, episodes of depression, and psychotherapy. In general, research on personality vulnerability would benefit enormously from greater integration with current research in personality and social psychology (Flett et al., 1995).

Can Vulnerability Be Discriminated From Depression? We asserted that the answer is “yes” but that a great deal of empirical and theoretical work remains to be done. Researchers need more data on the relative and ipsative stability of vulnerability variables. The existing database is especially sparse for Dependency and Self-Criticism in clinical populations. The greatest need is for theoretical explication of how depressive symptoms or episodes of depression influence mean scores on vulnerability measures. Mood state priming is the leading contender, but other possible mechanisms can be imagined (Zuroff, Blatt, et al., 1999). It is also unclear whether depression primarily influences the measurement of personality, or whether it actually induces shortterm alterations in personality. That is, when vulnerable individuals experience depressive symptoms, do they merely describe themselves as being more self-critical or dependent, or do they actually become more self-critical or dependent? Answering this question will require moving beyond self-report measures.

Can Vulnerability Be Discriminated From the Social Context? Again we answered “yes,” but we admit that much remains to be learned. The evidence that personality is not reducible to social context derives primarily from studies concerned with the Big Five traits rather than with Blatt et al.’s (1976) and Beck’s (1983) variables. Consequently, there is a need to examine directly the mutual influence of social context and personality vulnerability by using longitudinal designs. Vulnerability researchers will do well to heed Coyne and Whiffen’s (1995) call for improved measurement of social context and life stress. In addition, developmental differences in the relations between personality and social context need to be examined. It is possible that the influence of social context is greater in children than in adults. There seems to be a consensus, including Coyne and Whiffen (1995), that vulnerability research should be rooted in person– situation interaction models. Of the many possible ways in which personality may influence relationships and generate stress and the many possible ways in which relationships and events might influence personality, which are the truly important ones? The model presented in Figure 1 suggests that attention should be focused on processes related to the selection and creation of social


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context, cognitions about that context, the behavioral strategies used by vulnerable individuals, and the impact of those strategies on their social context. Investigators must also consider the possibility that the social correlates of vulnerability variables are complex, including a mixture of positive and negative outcomes. Dependency, in particular, seems to be associated with both riskenhancing and protective consequences (Mongrain et al., 2004; Shahar & Priel, 2003). It is surprising that the cognitive mechanisms by which people perceive, assign personal meaning to, and remember negative life events and negative relational episodes have been neglected by vulnerability researchers. Although both psychodynamic and cognitive theorists acknowledge that the psychological significance of achievement and interpersonal events can vary widely depending on the individual, even to the extent that a “rejection” can mean “failure” to a self-critic, little research has been directed to understanding the link between objective, contextual features and the nature of the psychological threat. In order for progress to occur, researchers must identify a set of constructs for characterizing the subjective, psychological threat. One possibility is Blatt and Shichman’s (1983) distinction between self-definition and relatedness; alternatively, evolutionarily derived concepts such as “attachment security” and “perceived social rank” might be applied (Santor, 2003). Studies of the interaction of personality and stress have routinely assumed that such interactions are linear. Although linear effects are conceptually simple and easy to test, diathesis–stress theories in general do not require linearity (Monroe & Simons, 1991), nor does the work of Blatt and Beck make specific predictions in this regard. Besser and Priel (2003a) recently demonstrated, using nonlinear regression analysis, a threshold effect in which Dependency was unrelated to stress until a certain level of stress was reached. Thus, we recommend that researchers postulate and test specific forms of the functional relation between personality and stress.

Is Dependency a Pathologizing of the Need for Relatedness? We answered “no” and went on to summarize developments in the assessment of dependency that separate more and less mature forms of relatedness. The resulting subscales were empirically derived, and there is a need for more systematic research in which types of dependency are given formal, theoretical definitions and modern test construction methods are applied to create corresponding measures. Blatt’s (1990; Blatt & Shichman, 1983) developmental theory also implies that more and less mature forms of introjective (self-critical) maladjustment could be identified. Thompson and Zuroff (2004) have taken an initial step in this direction, developing separate measures of an immature form of self-criticism focused on feelings of inferiority to others and a more mature form of self-criticism focused on self-punitive responses to perceived failings to live up to one’s own internal standards.

Final Conclusion We conclude by acknowledging the generally salutary effect that Coyne and Whiffen’s (1995) critique has had on vulnerability research through their effort to hold it to higher methodological

and conceptual standards. Their article has required theorists to more clearly articulate a transactional, person–situation model of vulnerability (e.g., Flett et al., 1995; C. J. Robins et al., 1995; Santor, 2003; Shahar, 2001; Zuroff et al., in press). There may be disagreement about the degree of mutual influence between person and situation, but there is a consensus favoring the transactional approach, which is consistent with the “pathoconsortive” models advocated by Coyne and Whiffen (1995). Coyne and Whiffen underestimated the heuristic value of theories of personality vulnerability, but their stimulating critique undoubtedly contributed to the flowering of this line of research.

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PERSONALITY VULNERABILITY: COMMENT Zuroff, D. C., Igreja, I., & Mongrain, M. (1990). Dysfunctional attitudes, dependency, and self-criticism as predictors of depressive mood states: A 12-month longitudinal study. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 14, 315– 326. Zuroff, D. C., Koestner, R., & Powers, T. A. (1994). Self-criticism at age 12: A longitudinal study of adjustment. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 18, 367–385. Zuroff, D. C., & Mongrain, M. (1987). Dependency and self-criticism: Vulnerability factors for depressive affective states. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 96, 14 –22. Zuroff, D. C., & Moskowitz, D. S. (2002). [NEO-Personality Inventory scores in 296 employed adults in Montreal, Quebec, Canada]. Unpublished raw data. Zuroff, D. C., Moskowitz, D. S., & Cote´, S. (1999). Dependency, selfcriticism, interpersonal behaviour and affect: Evolutionary perspectives. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 38, 231–250. Zuroff, D. C., Moskowitz, D. S., & Koestner, R. (1996, August). Differentiating the construct of dependency: Rude and Burnham’s neediness and connectedness factors. Poster session presented at the 104th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

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Zuroff, D. C., Moskowitz, D. S., Wielgus, M. S., Powers, T. A., & Franko, D. L. (1983). Construct validation of the Dependency and Self-Criticism scales of the Depressive Experiences Questionnaire. Journal of Research in Personality, 17, 226 –241. Zuroff, D. C., Quinlan, D. M., & Blatt, S. J. (1990). Psychometric properties of the Depressive Experiences Questionnaire. Journal of Personality Assessment, 55, 65–72. Zuroff, D. C., Santor, D. A., & Mongrain, M. (in press). Dependency, self-criticism, and maladjustment. In J. S. Auerbach, K. J. Levy, & C. E. Schaffer (Eds.), Relatedness, self-definition and mental representation: Essays in honor of Sidney J. Blatt. London: Brunner-Routledge. Zuroff, D. C., Stotland, S., Sweetman, E., Craig, J.-A., & Koestner, R. (1995). Dependency, self-criticism, and social interactions. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 34, 543–553.

Received February 18, 2003 Revision received June 30, 2003 Accepted July 29, 2003 䡲

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