Conflict Prevention from a Nordic Perspective: Putting

International Peacekeeping

ISSN: 1353-3312 (Print) 1743-906X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/finp20

Conflict Prevention from a Nordic Perspective: Putting Prevention into Practice Annika Björkdahl To cite this article: Annika Björkdahl (1999) Conflict Prevention from a Nordic Perspective: Putting Prevention into Practice, International Peacekeeping, 6:3, 54-72, DOI: 10.1080/13533319908413785 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533319908413785

Published online: 08 Nov 2007.

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Conflict Prevention from a Nordic Perspective: Putting Prevention into Practice ANNIKA BJÖRKDAHL Since conflict prevention is a visionary strategy it has been rather difficult to put it into practice. This article explores conflict prevention in practice as well as in theory. There have been several attempts by the international community to take a proactive rather than a reactive approach to conflict management. One case often held up as a model for post-Cold War prevention is the preventive mission to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), which is the first and only substantive preventive mission undertaken by the UN. The mission was supported by large contributions of troops by the Nordic states. Hence, the Nordic contributions to the FYROM Command of UNPROFOR will here be used to illustrate how conflict prevention can move from the realm of ideas to the field of action.

Since the end of the Cold War, conflict prevention has emerged as an alternative policy designed to tackle the problem of an increase in the number of internal wars worldwide. This increased interest in conflict prevention is based on the belief that once a violent conflict has erupted it is difficult to manage, contain or resolve. However, conflict prevention is a visionary strategy, and as such, rather difficult to put into practice. The overall ambition of this article is therefore to understand how conflict prevention can move from the realm of ideas to the field of action. This article has three different, albeit clearly inter-linked, goals. First, it explores conflict prevention in theory and in practice in order to contribute to the discussion about the possibilities and limits of multilateral preventive action. There have been several attempts by the international community to take a proactive rather than a reactive approach to conflict management. Some preventive efforts have been more successful, some less. One case, often held up as a model of post-Cold War prevention, is the case of Macedonia. Since Macedonia is the first and only substantive preventive mission by the UN, the second of aim of the article is to discuss Macedonia as a prime 'test-case' of preventive action.1 The preventive mission to Macedonia was

Annika Bjökdahl is a researcher at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, and is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science, Lund University, Sweden. International Peacekeeping, Vol.6, No.3, Autumn 1999, pp.54-72 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

CONFLICT PREVENTION FROM A NORDIC PERSPECTIVE

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supported by large contributions of troops by four Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden). The issue of conflict prevention was on top of their policy agenda and these countries have attempted to promote this policy in various international forums. The Nordic participation in the UN mission in Macedonia will therefore be used to illustrate how conflict prevention can be put into practice. The third aim of the article is to present and discuss the motivations behind Nordic participation in this preventive mission. The strong Nordic tradition of participating in UN peace missions, the fact that conflict prevention has been, and still is, at the core of the Nordic internationalism, and the distinct preventive aspect of the Macedonian deployment lead us to identify idealistic motivations for contributing and supporting the Macedonian mission. However, more strategic and pragmatic considerations behind the Nordic participation in the preventive UN mission to Macedonia should not be disregarded. In practice, the distinction between idealistic and strategic-pragmatic motivations may be less clear. For smaller, open states like the Nordics, the desire to contribute to a more organized world system and to international peace and security may be idealistic but simultaneously very rational and strategically conceived. Conflict Prevention in Theory and the Concept of Preventive Force Deployment The end of the Cold War contributed to the revival of the concept of conflict prevention. Today, the United Nations, NGOs and individual governments stress the importance of acting early to prevent the outbreak and escalation of inter- and intra-state conflicts. This increased support is based on the presumption that violence is easier to forestall in the earlier phases of a conflict. The dynamics and complexity of contemporary conflicts increase the need for acting early. There are several advantages to early intervention: the issues are fewer, the parties' positions are less cemented, societies are less polarized and hence, the conflict is less intractable. In addition, preventive action is no doubt a cost-effective way of dealing with conflicts. In view of the human toll and material damage caused by military conflicts, preventive action in the face of uncertainties and obstacles may nevertheless be worthwhile. There are times when inaction is hard to justify even when the risk of failure is considerable. Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld initially articulated the idea of conflict prevention in the late 1950s and early 1960s. During his years as head of the UN organization Hammarskjöld worked hard to develop a proactive rather than a reactive approach to conflict management.2 In striving to reconstruct a useful definition of conflict prevention one may

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build on the core notion of prevention, namely that 'proaction is better than reaction and that crises and conflict can be better addressed as they emerge, rather than when they have already deepened and widened'.3 In the traditional meaning of conflict prevention, the primary aim is to thwart violent conflict and prevent the outbreak of hostilities or other forms of disruptive behaviour. However, in recent literature, conflict prevention has frequently been defined as a broader notion, addressing different phases of a conflict.4 In An Agenda for Peace, and in A Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, for example, former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali elaborates on the ideas presented by Hammarskjöld and expands the notion of preventive diplomacy. This comprehensive approach to preventive diplomacy includes 'actions to prevent disputes from arising between parities, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur'.5 By the late 1990s, however, the usefulness of preventive diplomacy was being questioned. The main criticism raised against the term preventive diplomacy is the state-centric focus, which to some extent makes it difficult to act in complex intra-state conflicts. In reality preventive action tends to include a broad range of instruments, strategies, and actors. The statist notion of diplomacy also tends to exclude non-state actors as potential actors in preventive efforts.6 Hence, in response to the state-centric notion of preventive diplomacy scholars and practitioners at a conference on preventive diplomacy in Skopje in 19967 suggested the following definition: Special actions, policies procedures and institutions that are called for in situations where existing means seem unlikely to peacefully manage the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international change and thus they are applied by governmental and non-governmental bodies or the protagonists themselves in order to keep states or groups within them from threatening or using violence, armed force or related forms of coercion, as the way of settle interstate or national political disputes.8 The Nordic states have a great interest in conflict prevention and several studies, reports, policy proposals and speeches reflect their concern. In 1997 the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs completed a study in which a similar notion of conflict prevention was presented. Here conflict prevention included norm-based measures generally associated with early conflict prevention, such as the development, establishment, and monitoring of international arms control regimes, as well as force-based measures often considered in connection with late conflict prevention. Furthermore, the study proposed a step-by step establishment of a global regime for conflict prevention, involving various instruments and a broad range of actors at


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different levels in the international system.9 Analyses of Norwegian foreign policy show that it changed in the early 1990s, and by the late 1990s was dominated by 'peace diplomacy', human rights issues and emergency assistance.10 A Norwegian report concerning conflict prevention was presented in 1998, advocating the inclusion not only of preventive diplomacy, but also of various other strategies of prevention. The report proposes a long-term approach to prevention where development aid is used to support preventive action, since it detects a close relationship between poverty and conflict." Hence, in theory and in practice conflict prevention refers to actions and institutions that are used to keep political disputes between and within states from becoming violent, and to hinder existing violent conflicts from escalating. Conflict prevention is needed when and where existing international or national politics appear unable to manage tensions without violence erupting. One way of structuring an analysis of conflict prevention could be to focus on the temporal dimension. For clarification, this article suggests three stages of prevention related to time and to how a conflict evolves. Each stage is distinguished by its objectives, which in turn is related to phases of the conflict. These stages are: outbreak prevention, escalation prevention and relapse prevention. Outbreak prevention describes efforts taken in a latent conflict before an outburst of violence, in order to forestall an eruption of violence. Escalation prevention refers to actions taken after the outbreak of violence, aimed at preventing both the vertical and the horizontal escalation of hostilities to more destructive forms of violence and to involve additional actors. Of special interest with regard to prevention is the early escalation phase, before the 'point of no return' after which the escalation is unrestrained. Before this threshold there are still opportunities for prevention. Relapse prevention denotes efforts undertaken once violence has abated and are guided by the objective to prevent the re-emergence of conflicts.12 This tripartite definition expands the traditional core concept in two dimensions. First, conflict prevention can also occur once violence has broken out, that is, late conflict prevention to prevent the escalation of violence, mainly in the form of coercive preventive diplomacy, economic sanctions, and preventive force deployment. Second, conflict prevention is also concerned with the re-emergence of a conflict after a settlement has been reached, that is to say, relapse prevention. Within this framework the main focus of this article is on one of the three stages of prevention, namely escalation prevention. In order to operationalize escalation prevention one preventive approach is of particular interest: the strategy of preventive force deployment. The intellectual origins of the idea of preventive force deployment can be traced

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back to An Agenda for Peace (1992). The term is used for the military aspect of conflict prevention, and refers to the deployment of military or police and civilian personnel in volatile areas with the ambition of preventing the escalation of a conflict.13 It is a rather innovative strategy that has only been applied once by the UN, and it differs somewhat from traditional peacekeeping missions. Preventive force deployment can be established only with the consent of one party to the impeding conflict. These missions may therefore be deployed only on one side of the border on the request of the party feeling threatened. In contrast to the new and broader peacekeeping missions, the preventive deployment of force has a more limited mandate and a more distinctive role.14 The credibility of preventive force deployment relies on a rapid response capacity. Whenever there are early warning signals from an emerging conflict these must be followed by early action. The time dimension is of utmost importance in prevention. If a conflict escalates, peacekeepers need to be deployed at short notice. In An Agenda for Peace preventive deployment is regarded as a strategy of preventive diplomacy: The time has come to plan for circumstances warranting preventive deployment, which could take place in a variety of instances and ways. For example, in conditions of national crisis there could be preventive deployment at the request of the government or all parties concerned, or with their consent; in inter-state disputes such deployment could take place when two countries feel that a United Nations presence on both sides of their border can discourage hostilities; furthermore, preventive deployment could take place when a country feels threatened and requests the deployment of an appropriate United Nations presence along its side of the border alone.15 However, most of the potential conflicts in the world today are of an intra- or trans-state nature. This complicates the nature of prevention in several ways. The methodology of conflict management has developed in the context of conflicts between states. In internal conflicts, third party intervention is more likely to be blocked by objections based on statesovereignty. In addition, it is often difficult to identify the parties in an emerging intra-state conflict and the government may be reluctant to consider the insurgent movement as an equal party in negotiations. Moreover, the issues are generally highly sensitive politically. However, against the background of an increase in the numbers of internal wars, the concept of preventive force deployment was modified to make it a possible strategy of prevention in intra-state conflicts as well: In conditions of crisis within a country, when the Government requests or all parties consent (emphasis added), preventive


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deployment could help in a number of ways to alleviate suffering and to limit or control violence.16 One source of confusion has been justifying the use of force preventively. According to the discussions in Skopje referred to above, there is a tendency for polarization between those who regard prevention as predominantly a civilian mechanism which should not involve military force and those who suggest that military contingents are required for success. This raises the question of whether prevention is consistent with enforcement functions to the fore. One suggestion to avoid this difficulty is to rely on the principle used in traditional peacekeeping or more precisely the need to obtain consent for deployment of military contingents by the host government(s). However, securing consent is not always easy, particularly not when it comes to internal conflicts. In addition, once given, consent can always be withdrawn at any time.17 The approach taken by various international organizations, but in particular the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), is that consent is generally a pre-requisite for all activities related to preventive diplomacy, including negotiations, mediation, good offices and preventive force deployment. If consent is necessary, how can a way be found to increase the willingness of the protagonists to accept third-party involvement? In A Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, it is suggested that the solution may lie in creating a climate of opinion, or ethos within the international community in which the norm would be for states to accept an offer of mediation. Conflict prevention has become increasingly popular and it has frequently been used in political speeches and in various policy proposals. To some extent it has become a catchword. However, there is a growing need to operationalize it and put prevention into practice. This article explores one case where prevention actually was implemented. When the Yugoslavian conflict threatened to escalate geographically to Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the international community took the opportunity to attempt to apply the concept of preventive force deployment and implement the visionary strategy of conflict prevention. With the Macedonian operation, preventive force deployment moved from the realm of ideas to the field of action. Conflict Prevention in Practice: The UN Mission in Macedonia Fears about the Yugoslav war spreading to Macedonia led the UN Security Council to authorize the extension of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in a radically new direction - the deployment of a precedent-

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setting force in Macedonia. Security Council resolution 795 of 11 December 1992 established the UN's first preventive force deployment operation UNPROFOR's Macedonian Command, with a mandate to monitor and report any developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in the republic and threaten its territory. Several factors contributed to the establishment of the mission. A general fear that the Yugoslavian war might spread to Macedonia contributed to raising this issue to the top of the international political agenda. The UN involvement grew out of an initiative by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY),18 which was deeply concerned about the potential for the horizontal escalation of the conflict. However, perhaps the most important reason for considering deploying a mission to Macedonia was a request from the President of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, for the deployment of UN observers. Gligorov was concerned about the possible impact of fighting elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia on Macedonia's security and stability. In response to this request, the Secretary-General dispatched a fact-finding mission composed of military observers, policemen and civilians to prepare a report on the situation. The report resulted in a recommendation from the Secretary-General to the Security Council to accept the request by President Gligorov and authorize the mission with the following mandate: •

Establish a presence on the Macedonian side of the republic's borders primarily with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania with an essentially preventive mandate.

•

Monitor and report any developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence in and stability of Macedonia or threaten its territory from any source.

•

Deter by its presence threats from any source, as well as help prevent clashes which could otherwise come between external elements and Macedonian Forces, thus helping to strengthen security and confidence in Macedonia.19

Subsequently, in early 1993 the FYROM Command of the UNPROFOR was established with two-thirds of its personnel contributed by the Nordic countries. An informal request by the Secretary-General directed to the Swedish government in 1992 was accepted and a meeting of the Nordic foreign ministers was held in Stockholm in mid-December. Representatives from Nordic defence and foreign ministries planned the Macedonian mission through the Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters (NordSamFN). The Nordic countries decided to set up a Nordic battalion (NordBatt) with contingents from Finland, Norway and Sweden with a joint


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command structure to be deployed in Macedonia. Since Danish troops were already committed to UNPROFOR, Denmark could only make staff personnel available. Training, material and coordination within the Nordic countries were carried out in a short period of time, as was the coordination with UNPROFOR., The Nordic battalion took over from the Canadian company which had been deployed on an interim basis on 7 January, awaiting the arrival of the joint battalion. By 13-15 February 1993 most of the Nordic troops had arrived in Skopje and NordBatt was operational by 19 February.20 It was sent to the Macedonia-Serbia and Macedonia-Albania border areas, commanded by Danish Brig.-Gen. Finn Scermark-Thomsen.21 Contributing to the rapidity of deployment was the long Nordic experience in UN peace support operations, the history of close cooperation between the Nordic countries as well as the practical advantage that the Nordic states already had troops in UNPROFOR.22 In mid-1993, the United States agreed to deploy just over 300 troops to the mission, and the US marines that were sent strengthened the command further.23 Hence, the FYROM Command consisted of 1,032 troops. By Security Council resolution 983 (1995), the FYROM Command was replaced by UNPREDEP (United Nations Preventive Force Deployment), with a mandate, responsibility and composition identical to its predecessor.24 After March 1995 the mission was extended on several occasions. Given the unstable situation in the region all members of the Security Council, albeit with hesitation by the Russian Federation, supported the extension of the mission to 28 February 1999.25 When Macedonia recognized Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with the country in exchange for foreign investments in Macedonia, China suddenly refused to allow UNPREDEP to continue, and on 25 February 1999 vetoed a renewal of UNPREDEP's mandate for a further six months to 31 August 1999, thereby ending the mission on 28 February 1999.26 With the volatile situation in Kosovo, this was perhaps not the time to withdraw a stabilizing force, after almost six successful years. The FYROM government strongly supported the extension of UNPREDEP's mandate claiming that the reasons which led to its establishment continued to exist.27 The government expressed a wish that the mandate should continue until three conditions were met: first, mutual recognition and normalization of relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the commencement of negotiations on the demarcation of the border between the two states; second, the full implementation of the peace agreement in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including its arms control and confidencebuilding measures; third, the attainment of sufficient national indigenous defensive capability. The Secretary-General and the Security Council shared the view that the continuation of the UNPREDEP mission was an important contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in the region.28

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Norway, at the time a member of the Security Council, raised the issue on several occasions, and at formal Security Council meetings Sweden spoke in favour of extending UNPREDEP's mandate.19 However, the Nordic states' capacity to exert influence on international issues in such formal settings has been rather limited. Instead they often choose to influence more powerful states informally. One way of exerting influence on the policy process is to get involved early on in the process and by introducing ideas and suggestions that can be agreed to by all the parties, perhaps just because they are suggested by a small state.30 In informal discussions within the Security Council, Sweden has strongly worked for the extension of the UNPREDEP's mandate arguing that its mission is important for stability in the region. The turbulence in the region and the fear of prematurely ending one of the UN's most successful missions had been the main reasons why UNPREDEP's mandate had been extended. Insurrection in Albania, it was argued, and the emerging conflict in Kosovo could destabilize Macedonia, particularly if there was an inflow of Albanian refugees upsetting the fragile ethnic relationships in Macedonia. From a Nordic perspective this motivated extensions of the mandate. In 1989-99, the conflict in Kosovo triggered renewed fears of spill-over effects. However, this time, as noted above, China's veto ended the mission on 28 February 1999. This coincided with the start of the Serbian offensive in Kosovo's southern border area on 26 February, prompting an influx of refugees into Macedonia. Non-renewal of UNPREDEP's mandate thus created a security and protection vacuum that (as of March 1999) remained unfilled.31 With the termination of UNPREDEP, the future of Macedonia's security umbrella remained unclear until the establishment of KFOR in Kosovo provided an element of extended deterrence.32 Positive developments elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia and UNPREDEP's presence had contributed to stability in the country. Bilateral relations between FYROM and its neighbouring countries have improved. On 8 April 1996, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and FYROM signed an Agreement on the Regulation of Relations and the Promotion of Cooperation between the two countries. The relationship with Bulgaria also improved, illustrated by an official signing of a Declaration on Cooperation and the eight agreements between Macedonia and Bulgaria settling a yearlong language dispute.33 In addition, the country has also upgraded its defence capabilities by signing a number of bilateral military cooperation treaties with countries outside the region, of which the most important was an agreement with the United States. However, the internal situation in Macedonia continued to pose a threat to its long-term stability. Inter-ethnic tension had increased between the ethnic-Macedonians and the ethnicAlbanians, though the situation was stable.34


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Why the Nordic States Contributed to Conflict Prevention in Macedonia There are two possible explanations for the Nordic willingness to contribute to the preventive mission in Macedonia, one ideological and one strategicpragmatic. This theoretical distinction should not be overdrawn, since in practice the two tend to be interrelated. The Nordic tradition of supporting internationalism and measures of international interaction, such as international law, international organizations, and transnational communication in order to inhibit conflicts is often referred to as being based on ideological motives. In strategic terms, as Turid Laegreid, former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, argues, supporting peace and international peace missions will also strengthen the security of one's own country.35 As small states in international politics, the Nordic countries have few opportunities to be important actors and influence their environment. Therefore, it is also a strategic interest for the Nordic states to promote internationalism. Politics based on idealistic motivations need not contradict 'realpolitik', and strategic interests can be integrated into idealism and altruism and should not be ruled out as a motivating factor. The Nordic countries may promote internationalism to create an international niche for themselves, and by using the strategy of moral power be able to influence some aspects of world politics. Finally, in the preventive mission to Macedonia they saw an opportunity to act on their rhetoric and be seen to take a lead in a relatively low risk situation. Idealistic Motives From an idealistic point of view, the Nordic countries were acting out their 'internationalist approach' to international peace and security. As small states in world affairs the Nordic states tend to stress particular issues in their foreign policy. Among other things, they show strong support for international law and ethics, international organizations (especially the United Nations), global disarmament and foreign aid, an approach to international peace and security known as 'internationalism'. In the words of Kjell Goldmann, internationalism 'denotes a set of beliefs to the effect that if there is more law, organizations, exchanges and communication between states, this will reinforce peace and security'.36 In brief, internationalism is a universalistic, outward-looking and co-existenceoriented strategy. Hence, it is a programme for preserving peace and coexistence among sovereign states in the international system by promoting universal ideals. However, it does not mean replacing sovereign states by a world state; but embedding them in a network of rules, institutions, contacts and interdependencies.

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In this respect, small states' actions can contribute towards the smooth operations of the international security system and the maintenance of existing norms of conduct as well as upholding of the system." One of the guiding principles in Nordic foreign policy is to strengthen international law, since that is perceived as a precondition for peace and security and specifically for the integrity of small and independent states. Hence, strengthening international law is considered more beneficial to small states than to large states, because international law is applicable to everyone, without distinguishing the powerful from the weak. In accordance with this tradition, Nordic security declarations often tend to refer to both legal and moral norms such as: global peace, solidarity with the Third World, human rights, social justice, democratization and good governance.38 The Nordic countries make an effort to promote the norms and principles laid down in the UN Charter and international conventions which set out the basic rights and obligations for international interaction. Whilst on the UN Security Council the Swedish government tried to generate support for, and shape opinion about, conflict prevention. Opinion formation as a foreign policy tool is often used by small states.39 It is obvious that international opinion can be shaped and that the Nordic countries can contribute in its formation. The fact that world opinion exists and that it has an impact in some situations may be exemplified by the global condemnation of apartheid. Still, little is known about the actual impact of international opinion. Sweden has stressed the importance of a consensus for conflict prevention and has taken responsibility to try to loosen the deadlock between states over the proactive approach to conflict management. Nordic representatives have frequently urged the international community to pay much more attention to the imperative of prevention.40 In a speech to the General Assembly the Swedish Foreign Minster, Lena Hjelm-Wallen, pointed out that conflict prevention is a 'moral imperative of today's world'.41 Hence, there has been strong support for international organizations among the Nordic states both at the global and regional level.42 Participating in UN peace missions could be regarded as acting on the rhetoric of political declarations. In their efforts to encourage global peace and security the Nordic countries have a long and distinguished history of contributing to UN peace support operations. Nordic involvement dates back to the establishment of the UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) in the Israel/Palestine area in 1948, and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNIMOGIP) in 1949. The Nordic countries also contributed to the first peacekeeping force (UNEF I) established in the Middle East after the Suez conflict of November 1956.43 The need for Nordic contributions to peace, be it mediation or peacekeeping troops, increased in the early 1990s, highlighted by the civil war in Yugoslavia.


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However, with the end of the Cold War the Nordic countries, among others, stressed the importance of acting early before conflicts erupted. The emphasis on prevention has been particularly apparent in the approaches taken by the Danish and Swedish governments. The Danish Ministry of Defence gives the highest priority to participation in international efforts of prevention, management and resolution of conflicts around the world.44 The Swedish Ministry of Defence stresses the importance of preventing the spread of conflicts once they occur. Its ambition is to link military aspects with the civilian and humanitarian dimension of conflict resolution.45 The UN has been regarded as being the only universal organization that offers opportunities for managing conflicts and promoting peace worldwide.46 The Nordic countries have therefore suggested new reforms and supported improvements of the UN system in order to make it more efficient and able to act in both inter- and intra-state conflicts.47 As part of this effort they have attempted to revitalize the interest in preventive diplomacy.48 On the issue of conflict prevention there is a broad consensus among the Nordic countries. In October 1991, the five Nordic states (Iceland included) presented the 'Skagen Document' for strengthening the UN in the post-Cold War era to the UN Secretary-General. Among its recommendations, three are relevant to Nordic participation in the UN mission in Macedonia. First, the document suggested that the UN 'should consider to initiate anticipatory discussions of potential conflicts and preventive measures'. Second, the UN should 'send a fact-finding mission to areas of potential conflict as a matter of routine'. Third, 'the early launching of UN peace-keeping operations as a deterrent to potential armed conflicts should be considered'.49 Boutros-Ghali subsequently included some of these suggestions in An Agenda for Peace. Strategic and Pragmatic Considerations Contributing to a more well organized world system by promoting international norms of behaviour, international law, participating in peacekeeping missions and supporting and contributing to conflict prevention may, for some countries at certain times, may be idealistic but simultaneously both rational and strategic.50 Most states are not simply altruistic, empathetic or acting according to ideational commitments to something perceived as 'good'. Rational self-interest should therefore not be ruled out as a motivation for supporting and undertaking conflict prevention. Hence, there may be strategic and practical considerations as well behind the Nordic states' decision to contribute to the UN preventive mission in Macedonia. Formal aspects of power balances between the large and small states within international bodies such as the UN are important. Small states are

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interested in exerting influence to pursue their value preferences.51 By participating in a mission that had a good chance of success, the Nordic states could gain international prestige and improve their already high reputation in the UN. From an economic point of view, the Nordic states, as major donors to the UN, saw conflict prevention as a way of making UN conflict management more cost-effective. Another strategic explanation is that the Nordic governments were responding to their public opinion.32 Most governments confronted with a potential crisis in a faraway land feel pressured, and perhaps obliged, to do something about it. They often opt for the least costly and most revocable action. However, the failure to prevent the outbreak of the Yugoslavian war of dissolution increased the pressure to prevent war from spreading. Yugoslavia was not perceived as a faraway land, but as a European country and this, too, contributed to pressure for action. On the other hand, it can be argued that the very notion of prevention is really not compatible with the nature of most democracies. Foreign policy issues are usually viewed by electorates as diverting the government's attention from more important things, such as improving the welfare and economic wealth. Foreign policy issues only tend to become important once they become acute. Therefore, no politician wins votes by claiming to have prevented a conflict, which by definition does not break out. In addition, the Nordic governments may have responded to some institutional pressure within the military to keep peacekeeping operations alive in order to develop new post-Cold war tasks.53 There may also have been institutional pressures from the UN, in the sense that the Secretariat wanted to attempt to change its reactive methodology to a more proactive one, by demonstrating the new concept of preventive force deployment. The Nordic countries proved to themselves, to their publics, to their regional environment and to the UN that conflict prevention was not just rhetorical, but something that the Nordic countries were actually willing to commit both political energy and material resources to over an extensive period of time. Of course other more practical factors also played a role in the joint Nordic decision to send troops to Macedonia. They were already contributing to UNPROFOR I and II in Croatia and Bosnia, and Nordic involvement in Macedonia can be regarded as a continuation of standing policy. However, participating in UNPROFOR I and II was not considered to be very safe, and safety is a priority for Nordic engagement in peace support missions. The degree of risk in Macedonia was perceived as being low and safety high. In addition, the size of the required composition of troops and its activities were suitable to the Nordic capabilities. Another significant factor that encouraged the Nordic states was that they knew that


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the United States was going to participate as well. US troops would arrive approximately six months after the deployment of NordBatt. Hence, one should not exclude the importance of cooperating with the United States, nor the fact that the mere presence of US troops may have acted as a deterrent to high risk in this preventive mission. However, the Nordics had peacekeeping experience, which US forces did not, so to some extent the US contingents could 'learn peacekeeping' from the Nordic states. Putting Prevention into Practice? The Nordic countries not only talked about conflict prevention but managed to put it in to practice. They contributed to raising conscience and shaping international opinion for conflict prevention; they supported the UN in its efforts to reform and become more effective when undertaking preventive efforts; and they have supported existing international law and the norms of the international system related to conflict prevention. Most importantly, however, the Nordic states could contribute in a practical way through a collaborative approach. Through Nordic cooperation they increased their ability to achieve shared foreign policy objectives and a capacity to influence international politics. Insistence on a common Nordic identity and 'Nordicity' has influenced integration and cooperation. This Nordic identity has been a significant tool of statecraft in their attempts to affect their environment. The Nordic countries have had long tradition of cooperation on a political level, within the Nordic Council as a forum for consultations and recommendations, for example. They have also worked closely together in various UN missions since the 1950s. Through regional collaboration and the presentation of a united front, the Nordic states have greatly strengthened their otherwise rather limited ability to influence international politics both during and after the Cold War.54 In multilateral diplomacy, especially within the UN system, the Nordic countries have often voted and acted as a common front, to promote Nordic ideals and views more effectively.55 In this regard the 'Nordic' concept has been a public relations success, not least among Third World countries, and the 'banding together' strategy has often strengthened the influence of each individual state. The decision to offer troops for Macedonia was taken mutually by the Nordic foreign ministers. Once decided, representatives from the Nordic defence and foreign ministries planned the mission within the Nordic Committee for Military and UN Matters (NordSamFN). The fact that there already existed an institution with the capacity to handle UN-related matters facilitated the coordination between them. Hence, NordBatt was pieced together as a battalion from four national armies under a joint command structure, and a division of labour and territory was decided. The

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deployment of the Nordic battalion was carried out in a short time frame. After the Secretary-General's request of 23 December 1993, the main body of force was in place by 15 February 1994 and operational only four days later.56 An additional factor facilitating the establishment of NordBatt was the agreement by all four governments to place a number of troops at the UN's disposal at all times.57 In sum, the operation was a valuable demonstration of close Nordic cooperation. Conclusion In assessing the Macedonia preventive mission as a model for post-Cold War order, it is essential to point out its unique features. First, the establishment of UNPROFOR Macedonia came as part of a larger package of attempts to cope with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Second, long before the mission to Macedonia was established the international community had chosen to recognize the former republic of Macedonia as a sovereign state, thus setting the scene for further developments.58 Although Macedonia's independence was the outcome of what, in the first place, was an internal conflict within what used to be Yugoslavia, recognition made an interstate approach to conflict prevention possible. Third, Macedonia had for some time managed to stay out of conflict on its own. Fourth, President Gligorov requested international assistance to keep his country out of the conflicts. Thus an extraordinarily benign and case-specific situation for preventive deployment existed. Another essential and necessary factor for undertaking conflict prevention was the international community's ability to mobilize political will to act in a preventive manner. Despite these reservations, the case is still extremely interesting from a preventive perspective and the experiences from Macedonia need to be systematically analysed in order to understand how conflict prevention can move from the realm of ideas to the field of action. Preventive action requires the same degree of political commitment as traditional peacekeeping operations. In the case of Macedonia the Nordic governments were prepared to take a political lead. Yet governments that are reluctant to send in troops after a conflict has broken out are usually reluctant to do the same before the outbreak of violence in order to prevent it. Governments tend to react better to tragedies that have already occurred than to warnings of potential tragedies yet to happen. One reason for the rapid deployment of troops in Macedonia may be the fact that a tragedy had already happened when the Yugoslavian war broke out. Subsequently there was an opportunity to act and prevent it from escalating. By the same token, the settlements in Croatia and Bosnia, notwithstanding growing tension in Kosovo, may have diminished the impetus to keep UNPREDEP in place.


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Practical and strategic considerations and the long Nordic tradition of supporting UN peace operations can only partly explain Nordic participation in UNPREDEP. The preventive aspect of the mission was vital to the Nordic willingness to participate. Prevention is at the core of the Nordic states' broad approach to security in the post-Cold War era. Consequently, the opportunity to contribute to this clearly preventive mission was consistent with the Nordic view of security based on internationalism emphasizing the encouragement of international norms, institutions and laws, which in turn can balance the disadvantages of international anarchy and prevent the outbreak of violent conflict. It has been argued here that it is rational for countries like the Nordics to stress internationalism since this has created a certain niche for these countries and a way to influence certain aspects of world politics. Whether the presence of some thousand UN peacekeepers in Macedonia actually prevented the geographical escalation of the Yugoslav war is difficult to say, and in any case is a non-falsifiable proposition. This article has also abstained from premature speculation concerning the situation after UNPREDEP in Macedonia. However, the fact that conflict prevention could be put into practice makes this preventive mission worth exploring. Despite difficulties in proving its 'preventive effect' the Macedonian mission has widely been considered a successful case of conflict prevention. Because of their large contribution, the Nordic states tend to regard the mission both as a UN success story, and as a success for Nordic cooperation. Is this the model for future Nordic participation in UN peace operations? In part, the foundation for cooperation has been the Nordic identity and consensus behind the internationalist approach. However, Nordic cooperation on security issues faces interesting challenges. The main focus today is an all-European security model in which the Nordic dimension would probably have to be abandoned or would play a less prominent role. If the locus of a European security model is within the EU, Norway standing outside the EU - will suffer the most. A second challenge comes from an erosion of the Nordic identity, which some believe is being replaced by the new identity emerging in the Baltic area. Several actors around the Baltic Sea have an interest in supporting a wider Baltic identity. Still, the Nordic states have a lot to gain from maintaining their identity, which has been a significant tool in their statecraft. The preventive force deployment in Macedonia showed that they could move beyond political rhetoric.

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INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING NOTES

1. In the light of China's veto in the UN Security Council on 25 February 1999 against extending UNPREDEP's mandate, and because of the increased turbulence in the region, the future of peace and security in FYROM became an open question in early 1999. 2. Peter Wallénsteen, Dag Hammarskjöld, Uppsala, Uppsala University Press, 1995, pp.22-31. 3. Michael S. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, Washington DC, United States Institute for Peace Press, 1996, p.37 4. See, e.g., Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, New York UN Department of Public Information, 1992; Boutros-Ghali, A Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1995; Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Departements skrivelse 1997:18 Preventing Violent Conflict - A study, Stockholm, 1997; Muthiah Alagappa, 'Regionalism and Conflict Management: A Framework of Analysis', Review of International Studies Vol.21, 1995, pp.359-87; Lund (n.3 above). 5. Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (n.4 above), p.11. 6. See, e.g., Lund (n.3 above); Kalypso Nicolaidis, 'International Preventive Action: Developing a Strategic Framework', in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), Vigilance and Vengeance, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press 1996; Jeremy Ginifer and Espen Barth-Eide, An Agenda for Preventive Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, Skopje, NUPI research report no.215, 1997; Kevin M. Cahill (ed.) Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars before They Start, New York: Basic Books, 1996. 7. The Skopje workshop, 16-19 October,1996, 'An Agenda for Preventive diplomacy. Theory and Practice', was organized by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in cooperation with the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force. The Norwegian and the Swedish governments provided funding for the conference. 8. Ginifer and Eide (n.6 above), p.10. 9. Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.4 above), pp.35-37 and Departements skrivelse 1995:24 Sveriges deltagande i internationella fredsfrämjande insatser [Swedish participation in international peace support operations], p.39. 10. Turid Lægreid, 'Den "nye" utanrikspolitikken: humanitsr assistanse som real politikk?' ['The new Foreign policy: humanitarian assistance and realpolitik'], in Iver, B. Neumann and Ulriksen Ståle, (eds), Sikkerhetspolitikk: Norge i makttriangelet mellom EU, Russland og USA, Oslo: Tano, 1996, pp.288-307. 11. NUPI, Development Assistance as a Means of Conflict Prevention, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1998. 12. Raimo Väyrynen, 'Preventive Action: Failure in Yugoslavia', in Michael Pugh (ed.), The UN, Peace and Force, London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997, pp.21-42. See also Alagappa's terms: conflict prevention, conflict containment and conflict termination (n.4 above), pp.360-65. 13. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (n.4 above), p.16. 14. Annika Mårtensson, A Failure of Conflict Prevention - The Yugoslavian Conflict, Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, occasional paper series, 1998. 15. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, p.16. 16. Ibid., p.17. 17. Ginifer and Eide (n.6 above), p.13. 18. The ICFY was an ad hoc institution established by the EU and the Secretary General to facilitate the coordination of peace efforts in the Former Yugoslavia. Initially it was headed by Lord David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg. 19. Secretary-General's Report UN Doc. S/24923 (9 Dec. 1992) outlined the mandate later authorized in SC Res. 795 (11 Dec. 1992). 20. Clive Archer, 'Conflict Prevention in Europe; The Case of the Nordic States and Macedonia', in Cooperation and Conflict, Vol.29, No.4, 1994, p.370. 21. Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/1994/1067 (17 Sept. 1994); Age Eknes, The Blue Helmets in a Blown Mission? UNPROFOR informer Yugoslavia, NUPI research report no. 174, 1994, p.31. The position of Force Commander for the Macedonian mission has


22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33.

34.

35. 36.

37. 38.

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always been occupied by a soldier from the Nordic countries. Brig.-Gen. Finn ScermarkThomsen of Denmark was succeeded by the Norwegian Brig.-Gen. Trygve Tellefsen, Brig.Gen. Juha Engström of Finland, Brig.-Gen. Bo Wranker of Sweden, Brig.-Gen. Bent Sohnemann of Denmark and by Brig.-Gen. Ove Johnny Stromberg of Norway (appointed September 1998). Lægreid (see n.10 above), pp.293-7; Eknes (n.21 above). UN S/Res./842 (18 June 1993). UN S/Res./983 (31 March 1995). See also Eknes (n.21 above), p.33. See, e.g. Security Council resolutions: 1027 (30 Nov. 1995), 1058 (30 May 1996), 1082 (27 Nov. 1996), 1110 (28 May 1997), 1140 (28 Nov. 1997), 1142 (4 Dec. 1997), 1186 (21 July 1998). Draft Security Council Res. S/6648 (25 Feb. 1999); 'UN peacekeepers to stop monitoring', Financial Times, London, 27-28 Feb. 1999; 'Ett olyckligt kinesiskt veto' [An unfortunate Chinese veto], Dagens Nyheter, Stockholm, 27 Feb. 1999. The Russian representative had earlier stressed that an extension to 31 August 1998 would be final, S/Res. 1186 (21 July 1998), but had allowed an extension until 28 February 1999, S/Res. 1142 (4 Dec. 1997). A letter of 19 January 1999, UN doc. S/1999/108, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the Secretary-General presents some of the government's arguments for extending the mission. UN Secretary-General's Report, UN doc. S/1996/65 (30 Jan. 1996). Security Council Index to Speeches 1997, e.g., Anders Liden speech at the 3839th meeting of the UN Security Council (4 Dec. 1997). Bengt Sundelius, Sverige bortom småstatsbindningen: litet men smart i ett intemationaliserat Europa, Stockholm: SOU (Statens offentliga utredningar), 1995, p.132. Per Jönsson, 'Inmarch logisk följd', Dagens Nyheter, 3 March 1999. Ibid. Jönsson argues that there were some 2,550 NATO soldiers in the NATO Extraction Force in Macedonia ready to rescue the 2,000 unarmed military observers in Kosovo. In addition, large numbers of NATO troops were gathering in Macedonia to prepare for a potential NATO involvement in the conflict between the Albanian Liberation Army (KLA) and Serbian Security Forces. The language dispute concerned FYROM's claim that Macedonian was a separate language rather than a dialect of Bulgarian. Official statements by Macedonian Prime Minister, Ljobco Georgievski, and his Bulgarian counterpart, Ivan Kostov, presented by the English-speaking Macedonian News Service, 23 Feb. 1999. See also International Herald Tribune, 9 March 1999. The exact proportion of Albanians in FYROM is unknown, but Susan Woodward cites a figure of 23 per cent, Balkan Tragedy, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995, p.341, n.17. This is also the figure cited in the UN Secretary-General's Report, UN doc. S/1996/819 (30 Sept. 1996). Læreid (n.10 above). Kjell Goldmann, The Logic of Internationalism, London: Routledge, 1994, p.2. Internationalism assumes: (1) that the source of some of the incompatibilities of interest leading to war are anarchy-related concerns; (2) that these anarchy-related incompatibilities of interest can be significantly reduced without replacing national sovereignty and independence by a world authority; (3) that frequently war results from escalation rather than directly from inherent incompatibilities; and (4) that the elements of the internationalist programme - law, organization, exchange and communication - contribute to reducing both the scope of interest incompatibilities of and escalation probability. Goldmann draws on earlier studies by J.H. Herz and Hedley Bull, but also identifies a Swedish model of security policy in which 'internationalism' is one of the cornerstones. Its other components, not discussed here, are international exchange of goods and services, foreign aid and human rights: 'The Swedish Model of Security Policy', West European Politics, Vol. 14, No.3, 1991, pp.122-43. Sture Theolin, 'Sverige och den Europeiska Fredsordningen', Folk och Försvars skriftserie Försvar i Nutid, No.6, 1993, p.17. Swedish Foreign Minister, Lena Hjelm-Wallén, Swedish government's declaration in

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39.

40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING Parliament, 14 Feb. 1996; Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report No. 19 to Norwegian Parliament, 1995-1996. See also, Hans Mouritzen, 'Nordic Model for Foreign policy', Journal of Peace Research, Vol.32, No.1, 1995, pp.10-11. Magnus Jerneck, Kritik som utrikespolitiskt medel [Critic as a Foreign Policy Strategy], Lund: Dialogus; Goldmann, 'Swedish Model' (n.35 above); Ulf Bjereld, 'Critic or Mediator? Sweden in World Politics, 1945-1990', Journal of Peace Research Vol.32, No.l, 1995, pp.23-35. Under-Secretary of State, Jan Eliasson, speech at the International Peace Academy meeting, Vienna, 3 March 1995. See also Eliasson, 'Responding to Crises', Security Dialogue, Vol.26, No.4, 1995, p.406; Deputy State Secretary of Sweden, Anders Bjurner, speech at the conference, 'Preventing Conflicts: Past Record and Future Challenges', Uppsala, Sweden, 20-22 Aug. 1997. Lena Hjelm-Wallén, speech at the 52nd UN General Assembly meeting, New York, 24 Sept. 1997. Læreid (n.10 above), p.298. Archer (n.20 above), p.375, Swedish Foreign Ministry, Ds. 1995:24, Sveriges deltagande i nternationella freds-främjande insatser [Swedish participation in peace support operations]. Interview with Maj.-Gen. Jan Scharling, Danish Ministry of Defence, Copenhagen, 30 March 1998. Swedish Ministry of Defence, Ds 1998:9, Svensk säkerhetspolitik i ny omvärldsbelysning, [Swedish security policy in a new international environment], Stockholm, 1998, pp.101-3. Hjelm-Wallén (n.41 above); Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebak, speech at the Parliament Assembly of the Nordic Council, 10 Nov. 1997; Finnish Foreign Policy statement No.23; Danish Foreign Minster, speech at the UN General Assembly, 26 Sept. 1995. Swedish Ministry of Defence (n.43 above). See e.g., Hjelm-Wallén's speech at Folk och Försvars Rikskonferens i Sälen, 19 Jan. 1998, and UN speech (n.41 above). NordSamFN, Nordic UN Stand-by Forces, 4th edn, Helsinki, 1993, pp.24-5. Læreid (n. 10 above). Sundelius (n.30 above). Læreid (n.10 above), pp.299-301. Ibid., p.298; Swedish Ministry of Defence, Sveriges deltagande i internationella fredsfrämjande insatser [Swedish participation in international peace support operations], Ds. 1995:24. Bengt Sundelius, 'The Nordic Model of Neighborly Cooperation', in Sundelius (ed.), Foreign Policy of Northern Europe, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1982, p.191. Volleback (n.46 above). Archer (n.20 above), p.370. Swedish Ministry of Defence (n.53 above) which argues that as early as 1964 the Nordic countries had agreed to establish 'Nordic Stand-by Forces' at the disposal of the UN. S/Res. 817 (7 April 1993); General Assembly Res. 47/225 (8 April 1993).