Connected Risks, Connected Solutions - Global Challenges Foundation

Connected Risks, Connected Solutions

Victor Galaz (coordinating author) with contributions from Diego Galafassi, Jonas Tallberg, Ellen Hey, Arjen Boin, Claudia Ituarte-Lima, Jake Dunagan, Frances Westley, Per Olsson, Robert Österbergh

This report is the result of collaboration between scholars from a broad range of disciplines in several parts of the world. I would like to thank all contributing authors for their insights and continuous feedback during the process (Diego Galafassi, Jonas Tallberg, Arjen Boin, Ellen Hey, Claudia Ituarte-Lima, Jake Dunagan, Per Olsson, Robert Österbergh and Frances Westley), our research assistants Patricia Villarrubia, and Matilda Peterson; and the authors of the background papers Robert Österbergh, Claudia Ituarte-Lima, Johannes Kuyper, and Ognjen Zugic. I would also like to thank Prof. Jon Pierre (Göteborg University), prof. Dirk Helbing (ETH Zürich), Dennis Pamlin and Fiona Rotberg for comments on earlier versions of the report. This work would not have been possible without the generous support from the Global Challenges Foundation and Mistra through a core grant to the Stockholm Resilience Centre, a cross-faculty research centre at Stockholm University.

The report can be downloaded at http://www.changingplanet.se/connected-risks The site also contains an online database with interactive material that can be accessed for further exploration.

Global Challenges Foundation Stureplan 4C, SE-114 55 Stockholm, Sweden http://globalchallenges.org/en/ [email protected] telephone +46 (0)73 52 667 86

The Global Challenges Foundation works to raise awareness of the greatest threats facing humanity. In particular climate change, other environmental damage and political violence, and how these threats are linked to poverty and the rapid growth in global population. These problems appear insurmountable without an international body with decision-making mandate. The Foundation is therefore working to identify possible solutions and models as to how the United Nations can develop, and initiate new ideas on working global governance.

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Recommended citation for this report: Galaz, V., D. Galafassi, J. Tallberg, A. Boin, E. Hey, C. Ituarte-Lima, J. Dunagan, P. Olsson, R. Österbergh and F. Westley (2014). Connected Risks, Connected Solutions. Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, and the Global Challenges Foundation, Stockholm. Uses of database and online material should be cited as: Galafassi, D., V. Galaz, J. Tallberg, A. Boin, E. Hey, C. Ituarte-Lima, J. Dunagan, P. Olsson, and F. Westley (2014). Connected Risks, Connected Solutions Dataset: Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, and the Global Challenges Foundation, Stockholm, http://www.changingplanet.se/connected-risks

Foreword We live in a world that differs dramatically from the world in which today’s global institutions were created. Over half a century since the creation of the UN, the World Bank and the IMF, the world population has grown from 3.5 to 7 billion, living in a completely globalised world, with stronger interactions between people, sectors and nations, but also indications of increased social, economic and environ mental turbulence. We are receiving clearer and clearer scientific evidence that we have even entered a new geological epoch, i.e. that we have now left the Holocene, the stable condition the Earth had been in since the last ice age nearly 10,000 years ago, and have entered the Anthropocene. The Anthro stands for human beings, i.e. that we humans have now become a geological force causing changes on a global scale. In the Anthropocene, which is characterised by an exponential increase in the global environmental pressure on planet Earth in the last 50 years, we humans cause new risks that we have not previously seen, from the risk of catastrophic climate changes to the collapse of ecosystems. The most important is however the insight that global changes in the environment, which have different impacts on different parts of the world, interact with financial, social and political changes, which creates new unexpected socioenvironmental changes capable of destabilising economies and nations. One example is how climate changes and increased global prices for oil and phosphorus contributed to the Arab Spring via the turbulence this caused on global food

prices, which in turn contributed to food riots in several of the North African capitals, including Cairo. Global environmental risks have thus developed into security and foreign policy issues which must be managed as strategic risks. Another result of this insight into global risks in the A nthropocene is that we must seek out new forms of global governance for sustainable development. The old “world order” where nation states focus on their own interests or the interests of regions does not cut it in the fully globalised Anthropocene world, where all nations are socially, economic ally and environmentally intertwined. New innovative approaches to understanding and developing new forms of dialogue and cooperation between all the countries of the world are required. This requires advances that span different scientific disciplines. This report presents a scientific analysis of the state of knowledge in global governance of global environmental risks. The aim is to raise understanding for what researchers see as challenges and global governance opportunities for sustainable development with a reduction in global risks. The report also aims to identify knowledge gaps and thus identify new paths and opportunities.

Johan Rockström Professor Water systems and Global Sustainability Director Stockholm Resilience Centre Stockholm University

Table of contents 1. Introduction.. .......................................................................................................... 6 1.1. ‘Anthropocene’: A New Geological Epoch............................................................. 8 1.2. International governance reform: A brief historical outline and current debates... 8 Risk Governance in the international system and prevalent reform proposals...................... 10

2. This report – Aim, Methods, Outline................................................................ 12 2.1. Six Disciplines................................................................................................... 13

2.2. Methodology. . ................................................................................................... 13 2.3. Limitations........................................................................................................ 14 2.4. Outline of this report........................................................................................ 14

3. Identifying Key Governance Challenges. . ......................................................... 15 3.1. Global connected risks and collective action. . .................................................... 15

3.2. Identifying Key Governance Challenges............................................................. 16 3.2.1. Overcoming Gridlock..................................................................................... 17 3.2.2. Evolution of Risk Reducing Principles................................................................. 17 3.2.3. Addressing Thresholds, Connectivity and Surprise................................................ 17 3.2.4. Navigating Fragmentation and Polycentricity....................................................... 18 3.2.5. Promoting Innovation Capacities. . ..................................................................... 18 3.2.6 Improving Legitimacy..................................................................................... 18

4. Mapping the Knowledge Domains.................................................................... 19

4.1. Methodology..................................................................................................... 19 4.2.1. International Environmental Law....................................................................... 19 4.2.2. Global Democracy......................................................................................... 21 4.2.3. Innovation Studies......................................................................................... 22 4.2.4. Global Environmental Governance..................................................................... 23 4.2.5. Adaptive Governance..................................................................................... 24 4.2.6. Crisis management........................................................................................ 25 4.3. An overview of all fields.................................................................................... 26 4.3.1. Finding Key Thinkers and Connectors................................................................ 26

5. Exploring Key Governance Challenges............................................................. 29

5.1. Overcoming Gridlock. . ....................................................................................... 29 Identified Potential................................................................................................ 29 Deep institutional reform........................................................................................ 30 Identified challenges.............................................................................................. 31

5.2. Evolution of Risk Reducing Principles and Norms. . ............................................. 32 Identified Potential................................................................................................ 32 Identified challenges.............................................................................................. 33

5.3. Addressing Thresholds, Uncertainty, Connectivity and Surprise......................... 34 Thresholds and Uncertainty..................................................................................... 34 Connectivity and Surprise.. ...................................................................................... 35 Identified challenges.............................................................................................. 36 5.4. Navigating Fragmentation and Polycentricity..................................................... 36 Managing institutional interactions............................................................................ 36 Polycentric coordination.. ........................................................................................ 37 Legal mechanisms................................................................................................. 37 Identified challenges.............................................................................................. 37

5.5. Promoting Innovation Capacities....................................................................... 37 Shadow networks, “niches” and transition arenas. . ........................................................ 38 Diffusion and Upscaling.......................................................................................... 38 Changing the “framing”.......................................................................................... 38 Identified Challenges. . ............................................................................................ 39 5.6. Improving Legitimacy........................................................................................ 39 Identified challenges.............................................................................................. 42 A Legal Perspective. . .............................................................................................. 43

6. Models of Global Governance............................................................................ 44 6.1. Exploring the Models........................................................................................ 44

6.2. Evaluation of Models of Global Governance...................................................... 48 Criteria according to the Global Challenges Foundation.................................................. 48 Evaluation of models.............................................................................................. 48

7. Areas of Convergence – Concluding comments.............................................. 51 Insight 1. Social science insights to connected risks remain fragmented, but are complementary..........................................................................................

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Insight 2. Different models of governance address different critical functions needed to govern global connected risks.................................................................... 52

Insight 3. There are several highly policy-relevant research gaps with respect to innovation, legitimacy, and adaptability in the face of non-linear change........................ 53 Insight 4. Transformative change in global environmental governance is possible. . ............... 53

References............................................................................................................... 54

1. Introduction

Is humanity moving towards a new predicament of multiple, global and interconnected risks? A number of recent crisis events certainly forces us to raise the question – the “food crisis” in 2008-2009; the financial crash of 2009; recurrent outbreaks of novel infectious diseases; and the cascading impacts of ongoing climate change such as droughts, forest

fires and ocean acidification. The World Economic Forum’s report Global Risks 2014 (WEF 2014, pp. iii) presents an ambitious analysis of this evolving global risk landscape, which includes social, economic, geopolitical, technological as well as environmental risks (table 1).

Table 1. Top 5 Global Risks in Terms of Impact, according to the World Economic Forum 2007

2008

2009

2011

2012

2013

1st

Asset price collapse



Fiscal crises

Major systemic financial failure

Major systemic financial failure

2nd

Retrenchment from globalization

Retrenchment from globaliza tion (deve loped)



Climatological catastrophes

Water supply crises

Water supply crises

3rd

Interstate and civil wars

Slowing Chinese economy

Oil and gas price spike


Geopolitical conflict

Food shortage crises

Chronic fiscal imbalances

4th

Pandemics


Chronic disease

Chronic disease


Chronic fiscal imbalances

Diffusion of weapons of mass destruction

5th

Oil price shock

Pandemics

Fiscal crises

Fiscal crises

Extreme energy and price volatility

Extreme volatility in energy and agricultural proces

Failure of climate change adaptation

The perceived top global risks change over time, but clearly entail a mix of economic, environmental and human health risks. However, it would be a mistake to view these risks as separate. On the contrary, each risk is triggered by a set of interacting social, environmental and technological factors. While this might sound obvious, the fact that risks and their associated unfolding crises are dynamic, and as a result change over time is often overlooked (Kasperson and Kasperson 2001, Boin et al. 2005).

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2010


Another important observation for the purposes of this report is that interacting risks sometimes create systems behaviour entailing so-called “non-linear properties”. This means that changes in systems such as financial markets, social systems and ecosystems can be abrupt, surprising and even irreversible. Examples include financial crashes, riots, and ecosystem collapse.

A final observation: risks can be connected (WEF 2014). That is, changing risks in one domain (say, human health), can affect risks in another domain (say, the economic domain). For example, the financial crisis of 2009 not only affected financial markets all over the world, but also had impacts on food security, investments in public health infrastructure, and the budget of international organizations. These three observations about risk – their underlying dynamic, possibility for non-linear behaviour, and possible connectivity – are fundamental matters for the analysis in this report.

Box 1. What is risk? What is a crisis? The scientific literature is rich in definitions and explorations of different forms of risks, crises and underlying principles to differentiate between risk (e.g. severity, likelihood, anatomy and impacts). In this report, the following definitions are deployed: Risk – risk entails possible outcomes which are known, and where the probability distribution of outcomes is well characterised (also known as “probabilistic risk”, or “known knowns”). Traditional examples of probabilistic risks of this kind are tossing a coin, or the use of a roulette wheel. For less structured events, repeated experience may often provide enough information to enable a reliable probability distribution to be constructed (e.g. risk of 20-year olds to be in a car crash). Connected risks – are those risks created by independent cascading failures (such as ruptures, shocks, disturbances) due to connectivity. Examples of connected risks include large-scale power blackouts, and propagating financial disturbances. Connectivity is created by the interplay between technology, social systems (e.g. institutions, trade connections, financial economic linkages and information flows), and/or environmental and ecological stress factors. The probability distribution for these sorts of risks is characterized by deep uncertainty (e.g. “systemic risks”, “black swans”, “unknown unknowns”). Crisis – is an event that threatens key societal functions and forces decision makers to act promptly, despite chronic uncertainty and intense political pressure. Crises can be local, regional, national and even global depending on the phenomena of interest. Examples include riots, terror attacks, epidemics, and failures in critical infrastructure at large scales.

refers to risks that are generated by one State which may affect the territory of another State or States (Cosens and Williams 2012). Second, it cites risks that require international collective action to address the environmental challenge at stake (e.g. the protection of the ozone layer mentioned earlier or the reduction of CO2 emissions). A third type of risk in the field refers to losing or causing damage to the common interest and heritage of humanity (e.g. biodiversity) (Bodansky et al. 2007). This report builds on previous attempts to understand global risks, but it has a different focus. More precisely, the focal point is emerging and connected risks created by rapid global environmental change – changes increasingly captured under the notion of the ‘Anthropocene’ (below). Table 2 below makes visible how our approach contrasts with the most prevalent scholarly approaches to risk in that it emphasizes risk connectedness and adopts multiple theoretical perspectives .

Table 2. Theoretical approaches to global risks Single theoretical approach

Multidisciplinary approach

Single risk

E.g. Sandler (2004)

E.g. Van Balen and Van Fenema (2009)

Connected risks

E.g. Goldin and Mariathasan (2014)

This report

Global connectivity is not only a problem, of course. On the contrary, increasing flows of information and resour ces have historically provided the fundamental foundation for innovation of different sorts, and helped to increase human-wellbeing. But as Westley and colleagues (2011) note, innovation is a double-edged sword – it is “both a contributing cause for our current unsustainable trajectory, and our hope for tipping in new resilient directions” (Westley et al. 2011: 763).

Based on Helbing (2013), Sandberg et al. (2014), Boin et al. (2005)

It should be noted that different disciplines have different definitions and application of the concept of “risk” and “systemic risk” (e.g. Schwarcz 2008, Helbing 2013, Sandberg et al. 2014, Pamlin and Rockström 2014). For example, the crisis management literature has developed a number of typologies of risks and crises, such as technological risk, high-risk systems, risk society, low-probability risks and similar (Boin 2008). Kasperson and Kasperson (2001) includes detailed elaborations of the concept ‘global environmental risks’, ‘environmental hazards’, ‘vulnerability’, and ‘risk transition’ (amongst other concepts). International environmental law also has its own typology: first, the field

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1.1. ‘Anthropocene’: A New Geological Epoch Global environmental change has been on the international political agenda for decades. However, a number of scholars propose that humanity could have entered a new geological epoch where the dynamics of the Earth system are driven primarily by the human enterprise. Will Steffen, Paul Crutzen and John McNeill summarise the state of know ledge elegantly:

“The term Anthropocene suggests that the Earth has now left its natural geological epoch, the present interglacial state called the Holocene. Human activities have become so pervasive and profound that they rival the great forces of Nature and are pushing the Earth into planetary terra incognita. The Earth is rapidly moving into a less biologically diverse, less forested, much warmer and probably wetter and stormier state” (pp. 614). This shift in thinking about the main drivers of the Earth system has fundamental implications for our understanding of connected risks in a globalized world for a number of reasons. First, the transition into Earth system terra incognita unfolds simultaneously with increases in global population, demand for resources, economic growth, technological breakthroughs, and fundamental geopolitical shifts (Oxford Martin School 2013). Second, emerging pressures on local and regional ecosystems, such as agricultural landscapes and marine systems, are becoming increasingly tangible in a globalized world connected through biophysical interactions, commodity trades, global financial markets, “virtual water” networks, resource substitution, externalities of development, and international institutions (Liu et al. 2013). As a consequence of such connections, environmental risks, such as droughts, floods and associated unexpectedly rapid losses in ecosystem services, have the ability to play out as large-scale disturbances with little consideration for political boundaries (Adger et al. 2009, Galaz et al. 2010). Third, the capacity of the Earth system to underpin human wellbeing, prosperity and security is dependent on the functioning and stability provided by critical Earth system processes. These processes – including climate change, land use change, biodiversity loss and changes in the nitrogen and phosphorus cycle – are now under severe pressure from human activities (Rockström et al. 2009).

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The combination of these stresses and developments could give rise to new systemic environmental global risks with the potential for sudden and unexpected shocks that challenge the problem solving capacities of institutions at the international, national and local level. This issue is of particular concern in states where democratic institutions are weak, social capital is low, and poverty chronic (Galaz et al. 2010, WEF 2013). The threat of globalized environmental risks has spurred repeated discussion about the need to reform international institutions and organizations. As a result, a number of international organizations have been explicitly tasked with addressing global risk governance. The subsequent section provides a brief outline of international governance reform debates and highlights a set of broadly applicable reforms proposals for more robust risk management in the international system. The report then turns to elaborating, in greater detail, its aim and methodology.

1.2. International governance reform: A brief historical outline and current debates1 Reform of the architecture of international institutions and organizations has long been a major area of discussion and remains vibrant. While several long-standing key issues are yet to find practical solutions, the urgency of 21st-century global challenges and the growing impetus of inter connected risks have manifestly actualized a broader and more challenging array of reform needs. Because the scope of organizations and issues involved is vast, outlining past and current reform debates and initiatives must necessarily rely less on precise detail than the broad contours. It is widely held that “global institutions are not working well individually and as a group,” as a recent Brookings Institute report observes (Bradford and Linn 2007). The core of the international system, which includes organizations such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the G8 Summit, is, to varying degrees, beset with significant problems. One of the key, if not overriding problems is the lack of broad-based legitimacy. Core institutions of the international system are rightly considered to be unrepresentative in several respects. They have not adequately moved to reflect major economic, demographic and geopolitical realities materializing over the past few decades, and to accommodate the more diverse, multipolar world in which we now live. They have an “outdated distribution of ownership shares and votes” that gives “too little to the rapidly growing emerging economies” (Bradford and Linn 2007). And they often do 1

This section builds on a background report prepared by Robert Österbergh (Österbergh 2014).

not give sufficient voice and protection to small countries, failing to serve the interests of the international order’s weaker parties. A second key problem is that the major institutions in many cases are not very effective. Their mandate is circumscribed by power politics typically aimed at maximizing narrowly defined strategic interests and at furthering the autarky of its member states rather than cooperation. It is hardly surprising that “inaction afflicts many key global problems, including deadlocked trade negotiations under the Doha Round, persistent global financial imbalances, global warming, and deadly conflicts” (Bradford and Linn 2007). Such inertia in turn further erodes the legitimacy of these institutions. Yet another problem lies in the fact that the major institutions today do not operate as a governance system capable of addressing the growing interlinkages between present-day global challenges (Biermann et al. 2012, Galaz 2014). The institutions are fragmented and stove-piped, lack coordination, and typically operate on issue-specific mandates – all of which impedes effective cross-sectoral and multidisciplinary work. As a result, what we have today is “an international system composed of an array of international institutions fulfilling discrete mandates” (Bradford and Linn 2007). As the principal political arena that brings together the world’s nations to address international affairs, the United Nations is an especially important case in the context of the present discussion. Over the past decades, numerous appeals to reform the United Nations institutions have been voiced. “UN reform” constitutes a multi-faceted and highly contested field with little clarity or consensus about what reform might mean in practice. There are sharply divergent positions concerning the role and function the UN should have. On the most general level, there are those who advocate that the UN play a greater role in world affairs and there are those who, conversely, wish to see its role confined to specific areas of work (such as disaster relief or crisis management) or otherwise reduced. (From the mid-1990s and continuing for more than a decade, there was considerable pressure from Washington for UN downsizing.) In essence, key reform areas notably involve the problem of the representativeness of the General Assembly and its “one state, one vote” principle; the structure and mode of operation of the Security Council, in particular its vetoing power (“seen by many as hampering effective political management”, Global Policy Forum 2013) and the question of permanent membership; as well as crucial management issues, such as making the UN a dministration more transparent, accountable, and efficient.

Over the past twenty years, reform efforts in the UN system have become more frequent.2 Major reforms undertaken in this period can be divided into two categories: efforts dealing with administrative and management matters, and efforts targeting substantive and organizational issues. A broad range of recurrent management reforms have been geared toward improving efficiency, in particular when it comes to achieving increased accountability, oversight and transparency. A major recent initiative is Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s “The Change Plan,” launched in 2011, which was aimed at strengthening the organization internally and promoting greater transparency, accountability, integrity, efficiency and flexibility. A pivotal question in the context of any UN reform effort concerns financing of the UN. For many years, the UN has operated on a tightly constrained budget and has been forced to incrementally downsize the scope of its activities. There is little doubt that the UN needs more funds to be able to cope more forcefully with presentday global challenges.3 Substantive and organizational reform measures, however, may be seen as more directly relevant in the context of the present report, although the two reform areas are obviously closely connected in view of the overall efficacy of the institution. On the one hand, substantive and organizational reforms have targeted specific branches of the UN system and specific problems defined along conventional (i.e., non-cross-cutting) thematic lines. Over the past few years, considerable efforts have been devoted to peacekeeping reform, which has led to the creation of a new Peacebuilding Commission a few years ago. Recently, the Human Rights Commission was transformed into the Human Rights Council, an inter-governmental body responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe and for addressing situations of human rights violations. In 2002, the International Criminal Court in The Hague was permanently established, making it possible to prosecute individuals responsible for violations of human rights and international law. On the other hand, there has been a manifest trend towards improving coherence, cooperation and coordination across the many agencies, funds, departments and research institutes of the UN system – in short, to streamline vast institutional complexity and fragmentation. As early as 1992, Secretary-General Boutros BoutrosGhali changed the organization of the Secretariat by bringing many disparate programs together into a single large Department for Economic and Social Development (Global Policy Forum 2013), creating as well a Senior Management Group tasked with improving the coordination of 2 There have also been external studies, for example, the major Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and Ford Foundation study of 1995 which congregated high-ranking present and past UN officials and centred specifically on the question of inadequate leadership within the UN system. 3 As Global Policy Forum maintains: “Financial reforms must consider new ways to raise funds, including ”alternative financing” such as Global Taxes” (Global Policy Forum, 2013).

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operations. There are several other significant examples, such as the clustering of all peace and security offices into two departments in 1992; the establishment in 1997 of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), aimed at promoting a more collaborative and coherent approach to development operations; in 2005, a High-level Panel on United Nations system-wide coherence in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance and the environment, entitled “Delivering as One,” was launched. New crosscutting, inter-agency bodies, such as the UNDG and UN Water, certainly represent important innovations for managing complex risks, but as many analyses and assessments make clear, institutional arrangements within the UN system that aim to cross sectoral and thematic lines remain, if not marginalized then fairly ineffectual in practice, for a variety of reasons. It bears remembering that UN reform “is not a politically neutral, technocratic exercise,” as the Global Policy Forum states – rather, “bids for power and privilege lurk in every proposal” (Global Policy Forum 2013). The broad recognition of institutional needs notwithstanding, it is no secret that mighty governments can and do exert their power to block change. There is for the moment a stalemate on reform action in not just the UN, but in most global institutions. Against this backdrop, it is clear that global environmental risk management and complex risk connectivities are not being sufficiently promoted, let alone backed up with robust and adequate institutional arrangements. Despite the establishment of new interagency structures and mechanisms, calls for ”breaking down the silos” that still constitute the architecture of the international system remain prominent in reform debates. The present effort to fashion a new global development agenda, the so-called “post-2015 process,” is a case in point. The two major reports that have emanated from the process so far (the High-level panel’s report and the report of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network) both underline the need for greater cross-cutting and interagency coordination and cooperation. Major institutional reform to tackle 21st-century global challenges is urgently needed.

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Risk Governance in the international system and prevalent reform proposals Initial analysis undertaken in the context of this project and report (Österbergh 2014) shows that major international institutions, such as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the OECD, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the World Health Organization (WHO), all have adopted comprehensive risk management schemes. These schemes certainly vary in terms of scope and sophistication. But broadly speaking, risk awareness has grown rapidly and assumed considerable standing among international institutions in the course of just a few years. Variations among the institutions also originate in differences in focus and mandate with, for instance, the FAO’s risk-related work bearing specifically on the area of agricultural production and food security, and the WHO’s risk management pertaining to the field of human health. However, there is a range of distinct commonalities among international institutions when it comes to governance and risk management challenges. These are mainly related to a deficient institutional architecture created by institutional fragmentation, segmentation and incoherence; insufficient multilateral commitment which results in initiatives with little political and economic support; knowledge gaps created by lack of mechanisms for effective monitoring and oversight of emerging connected risks; and a number of additional significant barriers such as unavoidable un certainty when it comes to dynamic risks, and political differences that create gridlock (see Oxford Martin Commission 2014 and Österbergh 2014 for further details). These and other salient governance gaps have given rise to a number of reform proposals articulated by major international organizations, deemed vital for effective and robust risk management. Box 2 below presents a summary of a diverse array some of the most pertinent and broadly applicable of these proposals.

Box 2. Reform proposals among major international institutions to strengthen global risk management Interconnectivity, mainstreaming and holism • Launch a consultative process with the aim to adopt regularized processes for the development of a system-wide strategy for the environment in the UN system, fostering policy coherence on a holistic, cross-sectoral basis (UNEP, UNGA) • Enhance inter-agency cooperation geared toward maximizing policy synergies. Contradictory policies can undermine progress, and these need to be carefully monitored and addressed (OECD, UNDP, UNEP, WB) • Establish new institutions: As the financial architecture of the future must have an element that transcends national borders, so too must the governance of risks that could produce global shocks (OECD, WEF). • Adopt systematic proofing of policies for their impact on the climate and environment, including biodiversity and ecosystem services (UNEP). Institutional architecture and stakeholder cooperation • Elevate and mainstream the sustainable development agenda into the core of decision making within the UN system, supported by enhanced cooperation with and between environmental, economic and social institutions. (FAO, UNEP). • Strengthen international environmental governance, for instance by way of establishing a more coherent institutional framework to address environmental activities efficiently (OECD, UNDP, UNGA, WEF) • Establish a process for creating an international environmental court to address violations of environmental standards (UNEP) • Establish a national risk board to manage risks in a proactive, systematic, and integrated way (World Bank).

• Strengthen the infrastructure for real time data gathering and surveillance for certain important hazards (OECD). • Enhance capacity to operate on the long-term by e.g. creating an index to track the effectiveness of countries, companies and international institutions on longer-term issues, or by building institutional mechanisms that transcend political cycles (World Bank, Oxford Martin Commission). • Strengthen capacity for early warning by developing maps that depict functional interconnections and models that produce a probability of the transmission of risks through complex and interdependent systems (FAO, OECD). Bridging knowledge gap • Within the institutional framework of sustainable development: convene a science-policy interface forum with representatives from existing environmental assessments, scientific panels and information networks to advance their connectivity and efficiency, facilitate ways of meeting the science-policy capacity needs of developing countries, strengthen data gathering and target the communication of scientific findings to various audiences (UNEP) • Promote a strong science-policy interface, building on existing international instruments, assessments, panels and information networks, as one of the processes aimed at bringing together information and assessment to support informed decision-making (UNGA) • Enhance the understanding and monitoring of drivers and their links with the environment (UNEP) and remedy the lack of knowledge about risk amplifiers (OECD) • Increase the ability to monitor potential amplification effects (OECD). From background report by Österbergh (2014). Acronym in parenthesis denotes the organization suggesting the reform.

Adaptability to cope with uncertainty and complex temporalities • Strengthen learning-by-doing processes, and adopt periodic reassessment based on new learning and a diversity of measures to cope with the uncertainty and non-linearity with which many modern risks are associated (UNEP)

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2. This report – Aim, Methods, Outline

Can the international community prepare for a potentially more turbulent future, which may entail a broad range of global risks as well as an emerging predicament of risks that are connected in complex and poorly understood ways? With this report, we aim to provide a partial answer to this question by focusing on the role of governance – including institutions and collaboration patterns between state and non-state actors (see Box 3). The aim with this report to a) identify key functions in governance necessary to understand and address global connected risks b) identify key insights from multiple and complementary scientific fields in the social sciences c) explore and identify insights, patterns of collaboration, and gaps across disciplines d) discuss strengths and weaknesses in alternative models of governance The emphasis is on institutional and societal capacity to specifically address complex and interconnected risks (chapter 1). With this approach we delimit the number of issues broached in order to zero in on a field which in itself is complex and vast. Both the academic literature and the “grey” literature in the area is immensely rich (as we will explore soon) but there are gaps that are critically important to address. Thus, with this report we seek to offer new insights into existing debates in three specific respects: Multiple disciplines – in this report we gather, analyze and summarize insights from not only one, but six different disciplines. More precisely, while global risks of the sort discussed here have been elaborated by scholars before, this report is one of the first attempts to bring together insights from several complementary scientific disciplines. Our ambition is to explore the rich set of ideas, discussions, social and institutional mechanisms and concrete proposals in these disciplines in their attempts to improve our

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understanding of the ability of global governance to address global interconnected risks. New methodological approach – in this report we deploy new methodological approaches to gather, analyze and visualize insights from the selected disciplines. More precisely, we have created a database of relevant scientific publications, and applied network analysis approaches to explore patterns of disciplinary fragmentation and colla boration, emerging topics, and critical knowledge gaps. Appendix 1 available online includes a longer description of the methodologies used in this report, as well as existing online resources created by the writing team. Emphasis on connected approaches – lastly, our emphasis is on identifying and elaborating combinations of ideas, approaches and models of governance capable of improving management of complex global risks. The term “solution” should be used with caution – there seldom are simple “solutions” or institutional “quick-fixes” to address the sort of complex risks discussed here. This should however not distract from the fact that different disciplines not only have their own approaches to analyze global risks, but also often have implicit or explicit propositions on how to better address these. The approach in this report is again to highlight combinations of approaches based on multidisciplinary insights. In section 6 we explore these in more detail, placing a special emphasis on areas where insights from multiple research streams seem to converge.

Box 3. Global Governance and International I nstitutions There are important differences in perspective and analytical focus between concepts such as “global governance”, “government”, and “international institutions”. The difference stems from divergent perceptions on the means by which social actors (such as states) are able to coordinate their actions.

In this report, we refer to “global governance” or “global environmental governance” as attempts for steering social and environmental processes at the international level through institutional development, and by adjusting the interplay between state and non-state actors, and their sometimes-conflicting objectives. “Governance models” are stylized theoretical constructs that explore differences between different ways of steering. By ‘institutions’ we mean ‘shared concepts used by humans in repetitive situations ordered by rules, norms and strategies’ (Ostrom 2007, p. 23). “Governance” in this report hence entails a wider view on societal steering than a mere focus on institutions. Note also that ‘institutions’ and ‘organizations’ describe distinct social phenomena. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) is an international organization, whereas the International Health Regulations (IHR) is an international institution. Based on Pierre and Peters (2005), Ostrom (2007)

2.1. Six Disciplines Why focus on assessing insights from multiple disciplines? And how have these been selected? This report builds on the assumption that even though several disciplines or schools of thought have explored different dimensions of global connected risks, their respective insights are by necessity only partial. Consequentially, this also means that the different

approaches – adaptive governance, international law, crisis management, global democracy, innovation studies, and global environmental governance - are complementary. For example, while legal scholars and institutional scholars have a deep understanding of how international rules and norms emerge; crisis management scholars instead explore the capacity of actors to perceive, cope and learn from crisis events. Researchers of adaptive governance explore the role of multilevel social networks and their ability to deal with uncertainty and change in complex systems; whereas scholars of global institutions and democracy instead explore important normative dimensions such as parti cipation, legitimacy and accountability. In short, the selected disciplines represent key knowledge domains critical for understanding central governance aspects and challenges related to complex evolving risks: their emergence, prevention, detection, response, learning and even transformation. Table 2 below summarizes some key traits of the research fields analyzed in this report, and brings out their complementarity in terms of focus and primary scale.

Table 3. Scientific disciplines – key features Discipline

Key focus

Scale

Reference example

Global environmental governance

Emergence and change of international rules and norms to address global environmental change

International

Young (2011), Biermann (2012)

Global democracy

Exploration of “democratic deficit” created by globalization, and the possibilities for global/ cosmopolitan democracy.

International

Held (1995), Archibugi et al. (2012)

International environmental law

Emergence of legal instruments (binding and non-binding) to address global problems and risks.

International

Ebbesson and Hey (2013), Bodansky et al. (2007).

Adaptive governance

Features of institutions and networks able to cope with uncertainty and complex systems behavior.

Multilevel

Folke et al. (2005), Dietz et al. (2003).

Innovation and governance

The interplay between agency, networks and institutions and their relation to social , ecological and technological innovation

Multilevel

Westley et al. (2011), Loorbach (2010).

Crisis management

Institutional, cognitive, organizational and decision-making challenges created by crisis events that require swift responses despite uncertainty and limited time to act.

Multilevel

Boin et al. (2005), Beck (1998)

Additional disciplines could have been selected for this analysis however. For example, research streams such as social and environmental vulnerability research (Kaspeson and Kasperson 2001), or security studies (e.g. Podesta and Ogden 2008), and additional fields and perspective could be included in a follow-up study. Our analysis should therefore be viewed as a first step towards a more integrated and multidisciplinary understanding of global connected risks and associated governance challenges.

2.2. Methodology We combine bibliometrical analysis (presented in chapter 4,) with a qualitative analysis of identified governance functions (defined below in chapter 3), and conclude with an assessment of alternative governance models (chapter 5). The quantitative (i.e. bibliometrical) approach in this report is explained in detail in appendix 1 (available online), and is inspired by similar studies presented in (Oldham et al. 2012, Zitt and Bassecoulard 2006). The qualitative part of this

13

study is both analytical and normative. By this we mean that we combine an empirical and theoretical understanding of societies’ capacities to steer environmental change, with a normative ambition to bring out shortcomings, and discuss possible ways ahead (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006). While the two methodological parts of the project have been separated into different chapters, we have tried to combine the methodologies when possible. For example, the qualitative analysis in the later parts of this report is informed by results from the bibliometrical analysis. In addition, the search terms and filtering of results in the quantitative analysis has been informed by our qualitative understanding of the literature. This combination allows us to make a systematic analysis of the different streams of literature; identify key insights; explore key work and organizations; and elaborate evolving patterns of multidisciplinary collaboration. The work presented in this report has been developed in continuous dialogue with a group of distinguished scholars from the different fields (Box 4). The experts have supported the creation of the literature database (available online), and provided detailed feedback in an expert workshop that took place in Saltsjöbaden (Stockholm), 24-25th of April 2014.

Box 4. Expert group The following group of distinguished scholars have provided help in the creation of the database, and commented on an early draft of the report presented at a workshop in Saltsjöbaden, 24–25 of April 2014. Arjen Boin (crisis management, Utrecht University) Ellen Hey (international law, Erasmus School of Law) Jake Dunagan (Institute for the Future, Palo Alto) Claudia Ituarte-Lima (international law, Stockholm Resilience Centre) Per Olsson (innovation and transformations, Stockholm Resilience Centre) Jonas Tallberg (political science, Stockholm University) Frances Westley (Social Innovation Generation, University of Waterloo)

2.3. Limitations The approach and methodology used in this report obviously also has some important limitations due to space and time constrains. One important first choice here is the explicit focus on environmental risks and their connectedness to other risks, such as epidemics, food security and water supply crises. This choice is based on the expertise and interest of the core writing team, and also as a means to render the analytical work more manageable. The issues

14

raised in this report however, will be of interest to those interested in understanding connected global risks in general. The second limitation is our emphasis on diagnostics, mechanisms and solutions emerging from peer-reviewed articles in international scientific journals, rather than from so called “grey” literature such as working papers, meetings proceedings, government reports, multi-authored policy papers by international organizations, and similar. Third, and as already mentioned, other theoretical approaches or research streams could have been brought into the analysis. The emphasis in this report is on global governance, with a strong focus on international institutions – their role as influencers of international political behavior, how they change (or don’t) in responses to global changes, and suggested approaches to reform these. Due to the interplay between social, environmental and technological factors in the emergence of global connected risks, our focus is not confined to single international environmental institutions, but spans multiple and multilevel institutional arrangements.

2.4. Outline of this report This report is structured in the following way. In the next chapter, we present and elaborate what we perceive as critical global governance challenges from the perspective of complexity and connected risks. These challenges – including the ability of institutions to overcome gridlock and cope with surprise – are intended to capture broad, but critical functions in global environmental governance as state and non-state actors grapple with the dynamic nature of connected global risks. In chapter 4, we present the results from a bibliometrical analysis of the six selected research fields. Here we identify key thinkers and ideas, and the different ways the six research fields relate to each other through e.g. co-authorship or shared referenced work. This allows us to make a first estimate of emerging research insights across scientific disciplines, and assess knowledge gaps. The bibliometrical analysis is followed by an in-depth exploration in chapter 5 of cross-disciplinary insights as they apply to the identified governance challenges in chapter 3. In chapter 6, we use the bibliometrical (chapter 4) and qualitative analysis (chapter 5) to create 5 highly stylized governance models, and evaluate their strengths and benefits. The models are theoretical constructs (c.f. Pierre and Peters 2005, Hooghe and Marks 2003) created as a means to summarize what we perceive as alternative governance approaches in addressing complex global risks.

3. Identifying Key Governance Challenges

Why is there a need to reform global governance to better cope with global connected risks? Why do international policy-makers systematically fail to create an institutional architecture able to address urgent environmental challen ges facing the international community? Which international institutional reforms are most urgent as risks become increasingly interconnected at large scales? The answers to these questions are fundamentally dependenton the implicit and explicit assumptions made. For example, a social anthropologist concerned about the severe human health risks posed by neglected diseases in Africa, and a complexity scientist studying systemic risk in the world’s financial digital infrastructure, are likely to give two very different answers to the questions. This unavoidable diversity of perspectives illustrates the need for caution and humility in any attempt to contribute to current discussions about the need for reforms in global governance. This report explores what we have identified as six critical global governance challenges in the face of global connected risks. Others could have been added to the list (e.g. Pamlin and Rockström 2014), but we believe these capture central capacities in governance systems as social actors attempt to prevent, detect, respond and learn from connected risks and crises events. In defining these, we assume a) that global interconnected risks display complex adaptive system properties, b) that the creation, dynamics and impacts of these risks are affected by whether international institutions are able to adapt and respond, and c) that a combination of multiple streams within the social sciences research will provide much valuable insight into these issues. The next sections put these claims in a wider perspective before we explore these “key challenges” more in detail.

3.1. Global connected risks and collective action One common approach to explore the links between global environmental problems and international institutions is to view these as fundamental collective action problems (e.g. Sandler 2004, Barrett 2005, Young 2011). However, global and connected risks pose considerably more complex challenges for collective action than normally assumed. The reasons stem from the temporal dimensions, multiple and unavoidable uncertainties, and institutional complexity associated with global connected risks. In the case of temporal dimensions, change in complex systems often result in time delays between stress and impact. For example, slow gradual human-environmental change sometime leads to noticeable impact only after a long delay. Examples include various stresses on ecosystems or climate change where human pressure builds up incrementally and may go unnoticed for a significant amount of time until a point is reached when impacts become detectable, but may not be reversible. This is likely to be an even more important issue for connected risks: the strengths of the connections only become apparent once the repercussions play out at large scales. An example here is the 2008-9 food crisis that for the first time displayed the food security risks associated with an increased connection between oil prices, financial instruments and commodity markets. Subsequently, actions to avoid negative outcomes should ideally be taken before problems become apparent. However, the fact that impacts will occur in a relatively distant future with little evidence of any serious effect today, undermines the incentives for collective action (Underdal 2010), and can even lead to perverse incentives (Gardiner 2006). Multiple uncertainties about the underlying factors creating global risks, and especially their interconnection, can also provide effective obstacles for effective collective action. As

15

Oran Young notes (2008), the specific properties of the problem at hand play a key role in determining whether decision makers are able to reach an agreement. The problem properties implied by global connected risks incorporate many of the characteristics that make the emergence of effective institutions extremely difficult. For example, their connectivity is currently not well understood scientifically, nor are parties such as states in agreement about “their basic character” (Young 2008, p. 122). On the contrary, our initial analysis shows that international organizations’ perceptions and focus on global risks differ considerably (Österbergh 2014). These inherent uncertainties imply highly limited predictability, especially as the drivers of risk evolve continuously. For example, complex information technological systems such as financial markets evolve continuously as the result of multiple interacting components (hardware, software and computer users). In a similar way, ecological systems and the Earth system change and respond to changes as connected physical, chemical, biological, and human components influence each other (Liu et al. 2013, Berkes et al. 1998). Lastly, efforts to create new international institutions to address global connected risks is more than likely to impact on preexisting institutional arrangements. As we explore below, institutional complexity has not only increased over time, but also complicate the emergence of new international institutions (Young 2008, p.123). This is an even bigger obstacle for the governance of connected risks as they necessitate the coordination of actors across multiple sectors, span over a set of international organizational mandates, and require careful navigation of institutional interplay (c.f. Galaz 2014).

3.2. Identifying Key Governance Challenges What is required by institutions and decision-makers as they try to steer societies away from global risks? In other more academic terms, what functions are critical in governance systems as societies attempt to deal with the drivers and impacts of connected risks? Pierre and Peters (2005) for example, explore the need for governance to be able to articulate a common set of priorities, create coherence, accomplish steering, and embed processes for accountability. Evans and colleagues (2010), instead focus on capacities to advance global cooperation around global risks and crises through bandwith, aggregation, foresight, signaling, fairness and penalties. Nilsson and Persson (2012) identify three key governance functions related to the governance of “planetary boundaries”: reduce system stress, risks and vulnerabilities; trigger and navigate transformation of economic activity; and develop a diversity of options. These are only three examples of existing approaches to identify key functions in governance (for example, see also Dietz et al. 2003, Folke et al. 2005, Loorbach 2010, Kanie et al. 2012).

16

Essentially, these approaches vary as a result of differences in underlying theoretical assumptions. One such difference for example, can be assumptions about the nature of change of the system of interest, ranging from incremental and predictable (say, incremental water stress), highly uncertain and rapid (e.g. a new devastating plant disease or unexpected negative breakthroughs in synthetic biology). Another difference stems from the policy area of interest, for example whether the focus is on national governments and their abilities to implement economic policy, or on global gover nance and its ability to address risk complexity. In this report, we build on these existing approaches, but identify and analyze what we perceive to be six key gover nance challenges in the face of interconnected global risks. The ambition is to provide an overview of how different disciplines and schools of thoughts address different key governance challenges created by risks that stem from the interplay between social, technological and environmental changes, and that entail potential “tipping point” behavior, and possible propagating crises and disturbances.

Box 5. Summary of Key Governance Challenges Overcoming gridlock – the ability to address the risks of gridlock in international collaboration. Evolution of Risk Reducing Principles – the capacity to understand and support the creation of international legal principles that would lead to a reduction of risks and their connectivity. Addressing Thresholds, Connectivity and Surprise – the ability to address complex systems behavior associated with thresholds, cascading impacts and unexpected events. Navigating Fragmentation and Polycentricity – the capacity to create international collaboration that spans across institutional silos and with the capacity to support polycentric coordination and order. Promoting Innovation Capacities – the ability to support social, economical, ecological and institutional innovation Improving Legitimacy – the capacity to contribute to transparency and accountability in ways that enhance public perceptions that actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate.

As we discuss below, this is likely to require institutions and modes of governance that are able to cope with not only immediate crises, but also able to reduce long-term stress and drivers of global risks. In addition, these will also require an ability to nurture innovation capabilities as a strategy to cope with future uncertain changes. Lastly, these modes of governance need to address issues of legitimacy as a means to not only improve their problem solving capacities, but also to secure mechanisms for transparency and participatory decision-making. As we have stated already before, the emphasis in this report is on global environmental risks and global environmental governance. Even though this might be seen like a narrow focus, the insights gained from this analysis are broadly applicable in that they reflect more generic governance challenges posed by global connectivity and complexity (cf. Hale et al. 2013, Galaz 2014).

3.2.1. Overcoming Gridlock Why is global cooperation failing when we need it the most? This question has regained prominence after the failure in climate negotiations in Copenhagen 2009 (Boyd 2009, D imitrov 2010, Hale et al. 2013). One common way to denote this failure is “gridlock”. The term is intended to capture a more general problem in global governance characterized by increased difficulties to create effective international agreements despite urgent and globalized environmental and human security issues. The underlying mechanisms are explored by Hale and colleagues (2013) and Victor (2010) amongst others, but can be shortly summarized as follows: while the international system through the United Nations-system and Bretton Woods institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank led to initial successes in the post-World War II era, rapid technological, economical and geopolitical shifts are making these bodies increasingly maladapted to new urgent global problems. Bluntly put, an increasing number of state actors with veto power, the rapid proliferation of international institutions, and the emergence of “harder” global problems, has rapidly increased transactions costs for global collective action (see also Young 2008, Victor 2010). “Gridlock” is directly relevant for the ambition of this report in many ways. First, because gridlock mechanisms undermine global efforts to reduce drivers of global risks (say, climate emissions and ocean acidification). Second, gridlock phenomena also make it difficult for policy-makers to agree on institutional solutions that would address the interconnection between such risks (such as climate change and associated risks of intra- and interstate conflicts, or forced environmental migration). The ability of governance to overcome or steer away from “gridlock” is therefore one of the first critical functions explored in this report from multiple disciplinary perspectives.

3.2.2. Evolution of Risk Reducing Principles Global cooperation entails more than creating effective individual international institutions – it also entails the evolution of deeply entrenched international principles – that is the collection of binding and non-binding rules that guide state behavior. Overarching principles are crucial in global governance as they enable international actors such as states and international organizations to steer the interaction between different institutions, and regulate norm-conflicts between these institutions. One clear example of an overarching principle is the principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CDR). This principle states that certain risks affect and are affected by every state on Earth. It includes both common but also differentiated responsibilities. It involves common responsibilities for addressing challenges which are common concerns of humankind (see reference to “common concern of humankind” in e.g. the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC and the Convention on Biological Diversity, CBD) and differen-

tiated responsibilities based on the application of equity in international law. Not all countries have equal duties, but instead the responsibilities depend on each state’s historical role in generating an environmental problem; their ability to prevent, diminish or manage a risk considering their economic circumstances; and the technology they command. Hence, responsibilities are differentiated in the sense that not all countries should contribute equally, but instead depending on the above-mentioned circumstances. This principle has had important impacts on international environmental agreements and Declarations. The 1987 Montreal Protocol for example not only regulated the protection of the ozone layer, but also gave less-developed countries access to financial resources, as well as an extended deadline for coming into compliance. The UNFCCC also explicitly embeds the principle of CDR (Article 3(1)), and the Kyoto Protocol’s requirements differed between developed and developing countries (both examples from Stone 2004 who also elaborates some existing tensions in detail). The Rio Declaration also recognizes differentiated responsibilities based on each state’s impact on environmental degradation, and control over financial resources and technology (Principle 7). Principles could (as we will see) play a fundamental role in supporting more coherent global environmental governance architecture, especially by providing a means to address global connected risks.

3.2.3. Addressing Thresholds, Connectivity and Surprise Institutions and principles not only need to address incremental environmental changes and stresses however. During the past decades insights from ecology, Earth system sciences, financial studies and other fields (e.g., Scheffer and Carpenter 2003, Folke et al. 2004, Lenton et al. 2008, Galaz 2014), clearly show that decision-makers also need to build capacities to address surprise, thresholds and cascading failures (c.f. Duit and Galaz 2008). The terminology differs considerably between fields, but the common theme is that small events might trigger surprising and abrupt system changes that are difficult, or even impossible to reverse. The reason is that the system in itself can undergo changes in its underlying properties in ways that locks it into characteristics that are profoundly different from those of the original. Examples here include coral reef ecosystems and the climate system with the potential to shift irreversibly to a different state. In addition, the impacts created by a surprisingly abrupt change, can propagate and create cascading stresses as a result of social, technological or environmental interconnectedness (Helbing 2013, Galaz et al. 2010, Adger et al. 2009). The ability of governance to address surprise, thresholds and connectivity is therefore a crucial function to assess in discussions about global governance and connected risks.

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3.2.4. Navigating Fragmentation and Polycentricity It is ironic that one of the major obstacles to global coordination is the success of the international collaboration over time. As noted by many, international cooperation has proceeded at an impressive pace since World War II. This can be noted in the rapid increase of not only international treaties, but also diverse multilateral organizations, transnational agencies, numbers of active international nongovernmental organizations, dense web of mechanisms of collaboration in not only the UN-system, but also in different G-groups (G5, G7, G20, etc.). In 1951 there were 123 intergovernmental organizations. In 2011, that figure increased to 7, 608. The density and complexity of institutions, organizations and what some denote “regime complex” has both positive and negative effects on outcomes (Biermann et al. 2009). Some of these discussions can be found in the research area focusing on “institutional interactions” (Young 2011, Gehring and Oberthür 2009), and polycentricity (Ostrom 2010, Galaz et al. 2011). In general, the field explores the ways in which international institutions either operate in conflict (e.g. trade and environment) or create synergies (e.g. CBD and the London Protocol), in ways that affect the effects of international institutions. Hence global governance faces not only the challenges of complex connected risks, but also of trying to steer in very dense institutional and actor settings. This makes the capacities of governance to navigate fragmentation and polycentricity an additional important challenge that will be explored in the report.

3.2.5. Promoting Innovation Capacities There is a wide concern in the scientific community that reducing risks not only implies applying known technological, institutional, political solutions to known problems, but also requires maintaining a capacity to develop innovative solutions to future, less known ones (Leach et al. 2012, Westley et al. 2011, Folke et al. 2005, Homer-Dixon 2000). Institutional innovation is relevant in this context as well. Addressing increasing demands on food production, coping with the impacts of climate change on mega-cities, or reducing disease risks from emerging infectious diseases for example, are likely to require not only technological breakthroughs, but also considerable institutional ingenuity. This ingenuity could entail new ways to reduce institutional fragmentation; mechanisms to speed up policy-learning, new models of information gathering, analysis and dissemination; and the creation of spaces for novel solutions to emerge and have larger system level impacts (Westley and Antadze 2010, Loorbach 2010). The capacity to support institutional innovation – here defined as institutional changes in form, quality or state which imply a novel or unprecedented departure from the past, Hargrave and Ven 2006) – thus is an additional capacity to consider as we explore key functions of governance in the face of connected risks and uncertainty.

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3.2.6 Improving Legitimacy4 Governing global connected risks entails more than achie ving intended outcomes. It also involves normative requirements on political decision-making processes to be perceived as legitimate, transparent and accountable. The issue has gained increased relevance as processes of globalization challenge the architecture of political decision-making. Although states have always been interdependent in some senses, it is also becoming increasingly clear that increased global connectivity undermines national sovereignty in complex ways. For example, the emergence of supranational bodies – which remove decision-making capacity from the nation-state – have raised questions about the democratic legitimacy of that global authority. The relationships between rule makers and rule takers, if not legitimately and properly governed, constitute a form of risk. Individuals are affected by transnational authority without a democratic right or ability to partake in the formulation and exercise of that governance. This has led to the much-discussed global democratic deficit (Moravcsik 2004). In this report we will focus on legitimacy as an overarching concept to capture the normative and empirical dimensions of decision-making in global environmental governance. Normative legitimacy relates to the extent to which political institutions have a right to rule (= are legitimate) based on their conformance to normative criteria regarding their accountability and pertaining to for example participation and review. Empirical legitimacy entails the extent to which political institutions are perceived to possess a right to rule within some given audience. More specifically, we ask in what ways global environmental governance not only can contribute to more effective steering of global connected risks, but also do so in ways that are perceived as legitimate and without widening a global democratic deficit. “Legitimacy” is indeed a multifaceted concept. Here we refer to legitimacy as the “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate” (Suchman 1995, 574). Legitimacy relates not only to the ability of actors to follow appropriate rules or procedures (input legitimacy) but also to deliver expected results (output legitimacy) (Downs 2000). Legitimacy hence also has strong connections to outcomes. As Young (2011) summarizes it: the “[m]aintenance of feelings of fairness and legitimacy is important to effectiveness, especially in cases where success requires active participation on the part of the members of the group over time” (see also Moynihan 2008). We therefore view legitimacy and in particular mechanisms to address issues related to transparency and accountability, as an important additional governance challenge to be explored in this report.

4

Part of this section builds on the background report by Kuyper (2014).

4. Mapping the Knowledge Domains

In the previous chapter we identified a number of governance challenges and functions associated with connected risks. In this chapter we complement the analysis by exploring the six chosen scientific disciplines or “knowledge domains” from a quantitative and pattern oriented perspective. This sort of analysis is complementary as it allows us to explore questions such as: Who are key thinkers in each domain? What are the main universities and organizations, and how are they linked through collaborations? In what parts of the world is leading research being performed in each field? And who are the “connectors” between these domains? The answers will facilitate and partly guide the in-depth analysis in chapter 5. Our analysis has two layers: a description of each of the knowledge domains, and an analysis of patterns that emerge when all of the domains are juxtaposed and compared. This approach allows us to explore each field in depth, as well as elaborate in what ways scientific fields converge and differ in their approaches. In the next section we describe the methodology and provide the main results from the analysis within and across all six scientific domains.

4.1. Methodology The analysis is based on peer-reviewed articles, review articles, books and book chapter meta-data obtained from Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge database. In contrast to conventional bibliometrical analyses that are strictly based on database searches, our analysis has been undertaken in close collaboration with experts in each of the scientific domains (box 4). This allows for a more rapid and precise delineation of the scientific fields compared to purely data-drive approaches (c.f. Zitt et al. 2006). More

details about the methods can be found in appendix 1 (available online).

Are all relevant articles part of the collection and analysis? The simple answer is no. For various reasons, it is rather difficult to select all papers in a scientific discipline or knowledge domain. Online databases vary in their breath; meta-data can be incomplete; and articles are published everyday. Although we have followed standard methodolo gical approaches, our ambition is not to be all encompassing. Instead, the ambition is to gather and analyze core publications for each field, and associated key ideas, and connections to other fields.

Number of publications analyzed International environmental law: 1,619 Global democracy: 600 Adaptive governance: 665 Innovation and sustainability: 980 Crisis Management: 616 Global environmental governance: 1,184 Total articles: 5,664

4.2. Basic Data from Each Knowledge Domain 4.2.1. International Environmental Law The work in international law has been to a large extent been developed in books. Although Web of Science recently has added books to the collection, our expert informants found that some of the important titles relevant for this work were not available at the time of research for this

19

report. To circumvent this we added books data from Google Scholar (36 records). However, this data does not contain information about cited references. Hence our collaboration networks in this field might not reflect the accurate reality of collaboration amongst the authors in the core collection.

Figure 1. Number of articles in international environmental law over time

Which are the most prominent universities and organizations in this field? Figure 2 shows a network map of the most prominent and connected universities with more than six publications in the database. The size of the nodes illustrates the number of publications, and links indicate patterns of co-authorship. That means that the university of California Berkeley, has the highest numbers of publications in this field, and that the most collaborative networks exist between the University of Colorado, University of Florida and the Chinese Academy of Sciences.5

180 160

Figure 2. Network map of top universities in international environmental law

140 120

Free Univ Berlin

100

Univ Arizona

Univ Washington

80 60

Duke Univ Univ Colorado

40

Univ E Anglia

20

Harvard Univ

0 14

12

Univ N Carolina

20

10

20

08

20

06

20

04

20

02

20

00

20

98

20

96

19

94

19

92

19

90

19

87

19

19

76 83 19

72

Cardiff Univ

19

19

Univ Oxford

Univ Cambridge

The most cited literature in this knowledge domain gives an indication of the ideas that has had the biggest influence in the discipline. Records denote how many times the particular reference is cited in the collection. Our assumption here is that the work that is mostly cited, also is the work that provides the theoretical foundation for a research field. Hence in the table below, the work of Garrett Hardin, Adam B. Jaffe, Ronald Coase are amongst the most influential in this discipline.

Univ Calif Berkeley

UCL

Chinese Acad Sci

Yale Univ

London Sch Econ

Univ Vienna

Univ Leeds Newcastle Univ Univ Toronto Wageningen Univ

Univ Sussex

Univ Calif Santa Barbara

Univ Florida

Georgetown Univ Univ Utrecht

NYU

Univ British Columbia

Columbia Univ Univ Calif Los Angeles

Table 4. Most influential work in international environmental law Records

Cited References

46

Hardin, G. 1968, Science, V.162(3859)

32

Jaffe, A.B., Peterson, S.R., Portney, P.R. and Stavins, R.N., 1995, Journal of Economic Literature, V.33(1)

26

Coase, R. H, 1960, The Journal of Law and Economics, V.3

26

Lazarus R. J, 1993, Northwestern University Law Review, V.87(3)

26

Porter M.E. and van der Linde, C., 1995, Journal of Economic Perspective, V.9

24

The collaborations between organizations include the work of 3,048 authors. Only authors with more than two (2) publications in our database are included in the figure below (figure 3).

Bullard R.D., 1990, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality (book)

23

Palmer, G., 1992, The American Journal of International Law, V.86

23

World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, Our Common Future (book)

22

Ostrom, E., 1990, Governing the Commons, (book)

22

Sands, P., 2003, Principles of International Environmental Law (book)

Figure 3. Author network for international environmental law Craik, N.

Humphreys, H.

Batabyal, A.A.

Costantini, V.

Kellow, A. Paterson, J.

Jahi, J.Md.

Awang, A.

Gillespie, A.

Jennings, R.

Aiyub, K.

Hooghe, L

Razman, M.R.

De Santo, E.M.

Prakash, A.

Alam, S.

Popp, D.

Marks, G..

Gupta, J.

French, D.

Gillespie, A.

Hey, E.

Sunstein, C.R.

Brunnee, J.

Stretesky, P.B.

Ebbesson, J.

Knox, J.H.

Falkner, R. de Chazournes, L.B.

Rajamani, L.

Winkler, H.

Farber, D.A. Okereke, C.

Delreux, T.

De Jonge, B.

Urpelainen, J.

Wiener, J.B.

Cooper, J.C.

Akhtar-Schuster, M. Boyd, W.

Glicksman, R.L. Redgwell, C.

Hey, E

Wirth, D.A.

Bigler, F.

Ge Q. Lawhon, M.

Shelton, D.

Fitzmaurice, M.

5 Note that all network maps can be viewed online at http://www.changinplanet.se/connected-risks

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Martin, A.

Arifin, K.

Proelss, A.

Reisman, W.M.

4.2.2. Global Democracy In June 2014, Web of Science listed 616 publications related to the keywords used to define the core landscape literature of global democracy (see appendix 1 for list of keywords).

collection. Research is conducted in over 88 organizations in 56 countries. One of the most productive institutions includes Lund University in Sweden.

Figure 5. Network map of top universities in global democracy

Figure 4. Number of articles in “global democracy” over time

Univ Pittsburgh

100 80

Univ Penn

60

Harvard Univ

Duke Univ

Indiana Univ

Univ Zurich Univ Lausanne Princeton Univ Univ St Gallen

Univ Sussex

Stanford Univ Univ London NYU London Sch Econ Free Univ Berlin Univ Newcastle Univ Cambridge Univ Maryland Social Sci Res Ctr Berlin McGill Univ Katholieke Univ Leuven

50 40 30 20

European Univ Inst

10

Univ Amsterdam Univ Ottawa Vrije Univ Amsterdam

14

Table 5. Most influential work in global democracy Cited References

67

Held D., 1995, Democracy and the Global Order (book)

52

Keck M. E. and Sikkink, K., 1998, Activists Beyond Borders (book)

43

Grant, R.W. and Keohane, R.O. 2005, American Political Science Review, V. 99(1)

39

Finnemore M. and Sikkink, K., 1998, Inter national Organization, V. 52(4)

37

Keohane R. O., 1984, After Hegemony (book)

35

Buchanan, A. and Keohane R. O., 2006, Ethics & International Affairs, V.20(4)

32 32 31 29 28

Univ Warwick

20

12 20

10 20

08 20

06 20

04 20

02 20

00 20

98 19

96 19

The literature cited by this body of work gives us an idea on the most influential works in the field. As table 5 shows, the most influential thinkers include David Held, Margaret E. Keck, and Ruth W. Grant with Robert O. Keohane.

Records

Yale Univ

Univ Toronto

Univ Bremen

0 94

Univ London London Sch Econ ...

Univ Michigan

70

19

Univ Sheffield

Univ Oxford

Univ Calif San Diego

90

Australian Natl Univ

Abbott K. W., Keohane R. O., Moravcsik, A., Slaughter, A.-M. and Snidal, D., 2000, Interna tional Organization, V.54(3) Slaughter, A.-M., 2004, A New World Order (book) Waltz, K. N., 1979, Theory of International Politics (book) Koremenos, B., 2001, International Organiza tion, V.55 Habermas, J. and Rehg, W., 1996, Between Facts and Norms (book)

Stockholm Univ Lund Univ

In practice, the collaborations between organizations include the work of 821 authors. Authors with higher number of publications are Marchetti, Bernstein, Bexell, Forje, Biermann, Dryzek, Steffek, Tallberg. Figure 6 shows this collaborative work is conducted in relatively differentiated constellations. The image shows authors with more than 3 publications in the collection.

Figure 6. Co-authorship network for authors with more than 3 publications in the core collection Abbott, K.W. Young, I.M.

Archibugi, D.

Patomaki, H

Bexell, M.

Goodhart, M. Ecker-Ehrhardt, M. Glasbergen, P. Stevenson, H. Cashore, B. Zuern, M.

Jonsson, C. Tallberg, J.

Bernstein, S. Dingwerth, K.

Zurn, M. Erman, E.

Richter, U.H.

Bulkeley, H.

Siebenhuener, B.

Costa, O.

Kanie, N.

Payne, A. Cooper, A.F. Gray, J.

Biermann, F.

Roberts, D.

Mitchell, S.M.

Brassett, J. Newell, P.

Baur, D.

Schaeferhoff, M.

Rasche, A.

Huelsse, R.

Ivanova, M.

Slaughter, S.

Kobrin, S.J. Joerke, D. Wheatley, S. Goldmann, M.

Freyburg, T.

Keohane, R.O.

Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, S.I.

Take, I.

Kuo, M-S. Forje, J.W.

Dingwerth, K. Dellas, E.

von Bogdandy, A.

Scherer, A.G.

Marchetti, R.

Smith, W.

Campe, S.

Palazzo, G.

Hurd, I.

Backstrand, K.

Chapman, T.L.

Nicolaidis, K.

Glinavos, I.

Scheuerman, W.E. Bartelson, J. Paterson, M.

Pattberg, P.

Betsill, M.M.

Zondervan, R.

Juncos, A.E. Macdonald, K.

Dryzek, J.S.

Auld, G.

Uhlin, Anders

Pomorska, K.

The network map below (figure 5) shows the most productive institutions in this knowledge domain, as well as their collaboration patterns. Links between organizations in the figure display patterns of co-authorship, and the figure includes organizations with more than 6 publications in the

Cadman, T.

Agne, Hans

Morth, U.

Steffek, J.

Ripsman, N.M.

McCraw, D.J. Bernauer, T.

21

4.2.3. Innovation Studies Innovation studies span a broad range of fields and disciplines. In this report we focus on literature that relates to processes of transformations and innovation in complex organizations and systems. As discussed below, this literature is one critical component in modes of governance able to address global connected risks. There is a rich literature around this theme in business journals, public health, complexity and social innovation journals. In June 2014, Web of Science listed 980 publications related to the keywords used to define the body of literature for Innovation (see appendix 1 for list of keywords). This literature includes key authors studying social innovation, as well as social entrepreneurship, and social enterprises. It also includes a cross-section of the work in organizations, in complexity theory, and social innovation.

Figure 7. Number of articles in “innovation” over time

The most productive institutions and authors are displayed in figures 8 and 9 below. Research is conducted in over 205 organizations in 57 countries and includes the work of 1, 531 authors. The authors with higher number of publications in the database are Moulaert, Geels, Klein, Mumford, Smith, Harrisson, Westley, Chen, Eisenhardt. Figure 8 shows that this collaborative work is conducted in constellations relatively separated from each other. The figure includes authors with more than 2 publications in the collection, and shows some clearly bounded co-authorship clusters. The main components are those around the work of Moulaert. Another cluster can be found around the works of Mumford, Geels and Folke/Westley/Olsson. This indicates subfields within the larger knowledge domain.

Figure 8. Author network in innovation studies Wright, M. Hmieleski, K.M.

Lorenzoni, G. Tan, E.J.

180

Fontan, J-M.

Hall, J.

Wagner, M. Oosterlynck, S.

Bestujevlada, I.V. Kleinschmidt, E.J. Porter, L.A. Tian M. Javier Carrillo, F. Drucker, P.F. Dale, A. Lazonick, W. Tasan-Kok, T.

Boons, F.

Tremblay, D-G.

Yue, Q.

120 100 80 60 40 20

95 19 97 19 99 20 01 20 03 20 05 20 07 20 09 20 12 20 14

19

91

93

19

87

19

19

79

83

19

74

19

19

70

0

19

Salomo, S.

Lopez Cerezo, J.A. Geels, F.W. Hult, G.T.M. Loch, C. Loogma, K. Calantone, R.J. Sornette, D. Mihm, J. Phillips, N. Marion, R. Huchzermeier, A. Lan, Hailin Klein, J-L. McKelvey, B. Benner, MJ Gassmann, O. Hoogma, R Truffer, B. Uhl-Bien, M. Griffin, A. Coenen, L. Geels, F.W. Xu, R. Li, S. Markard, J. Schot, J. Olsson, P. Cameron, S. Valentini, G. Raven, R.P.J.M. Raven, R. Folke, C. Lee, S.H. De Muro, P. Di Guardo, M.C. Tjornbo, O. Ornetzeder, M. Hamdouch, A. Bos, J.J. Moore, M-L. Smith, A. Rohracher, Harald Brown, R.R. Hulgard, L. Martinelli, F. Eren, H. Kern, F. Westley, F.R. Hamalainen, T.J. Halac, D.S. Van Dyck, B. Ishigaki, K. Grin, J. Moulaert, F. Bulut, C. Haddock, S.V. Hamel, G Gonzalez, S. Healey, P. MacCallum, D. Kok, K. Neuvonen, A. Shan, W. Swyngedouw, E. Hillier, J. Hu, Z. Stuiver, M. Parra, C. Jain, S. Hermans, F.L.P. Lahteenoja, S. Xu, Y. Mehmood, A. Zhang, Q-P. Yuan, J. Bennett, S.J. van de Ven, G. Marcy, R.T. Leeuwis, C. Oinas-Kukkonen, H. Chae, B.(K). Chen, Y-S. Pearson, P.J.G. Angel, D. Kim, W.C. Zheng, G. Gershuny, J.I. Mumford, M.D. Wieczorek, A.J. Mauborgne, R. Ravasi, D. Robledo, I.C. Henderson, H. Chen, J. Xu, Q.R. Davis, J.P. Hougen, D.F. Liu, J.J. Peterson, D.R. Harrisson, D.

140

The most cited literature cited in the field gives an idea of the most influential work and scholars, including Richard R. Nelson, Frank Geels and René Kemp.

Table 6. Most influential work in innovation studies Records

22

Kelley, D.

Levesque, B.

160

de Brentani, U.

Eizaguirre Anglada, S. Pradel Miquel, M.

Cited References

70

Nelson, R. R. and Winter, S. G., 1982, An Evolu tionary Theory of Economic Change (book)

54

Geels, F. W., 2002, Research Policy, V.31(8-9)

54

Kemp, R. Schot, J. and Hoogma, R., 1998, Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, V.10(2)

45

Cohen, W. M. and Levinthal, D. A., 1990, Administrative Science Quarterly, V.35(1)

43

Eisenhardt, K. M., 1989, The Academy of Management Review, V.14(4)

40

March, J. G., 1991, Organization Science, V.2(1)

38

DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell, W. W., 1983, American Sociological Review, V.48(2)

37

Rip, A. and R. Kemp,1998, ‘Technological Change’, in Steve Rayner and Liz Malone (eds.) Human Choice and Climate Change, Batelle Press, Washington D.C., 327-399.

37

Teece, D. J., Pisano, G. and Shuen, A., 1997, Strategic Management Journal, V.18(7)

36

Barney, J., 1991, Journal of Management, V.17(1)

Hester, K.S.

Emshoff, J. Jakes, S.S. Blakely, C. Gray, D.O. Elle, M.

Day, E.A.

Barrett, J.D.

Wells, P.

Czarnitzki, D.

Luoma, T. Paasi, J.

Pieters, B. Li, S. Andrieux, G. Mumford, M.D. Buckler, S.A. Lumpkin, G.T.

Manzini, E.

Novy, A.

Nair, A. Andre, I.

Linton, J.D.

Eisenhardt, K.M.

Figure 9 shows the most productive research institutions and the co-authorship patterns. Eindhoven University is one of the most productive organizations, with notable collaborations between European universities, and between North American ones.

Figure 9. Network map of top universities in innovation studies

Table 7. Most influential work in global environmental governance Records

Politecn Milan

Cited References

50

Keohane R. O., 1984, After HegemonyCooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (book).

40

Haas, P. M., Keohane, R. and Levy, M. A., 1993, Institutions for the Earth (book)

38

Victor D. G., Raustiala, K. and Skolnikoff, E. B., 1998, The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments (book)

38

Young, O. R., 1999, The effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes (book)

35

Miles, E. L., Andresen, S., Carlin, E. M., Skjaerseth, J. B., et al., 2002, Environmental Regime Effectiveness (book)

34

Haas, P. M., 1992, International Organization, V.46(1)

33

Biermann, F., 2007, Global Environmental Change, V.17(3-4)

29

Keck M. E. and Sikkink, K., 1998, Activists Beyond Borders (book)

4.2.4. Global Environmental Governance

28

In June 2014, Web of Science listed 1,184 publications rela ted to the keywords used to define the literature in the field “global environmental governance” (see appendix 1 for list of keywords). The figure below shows the number of articles within this field over time.

Krasner, S., 1983, International Regimes (book)

28

Waltz, K. N., 1979, Theory of International Politics (book)

Univ Illinois

Harvard Univ

Lund Univ Univ Calif Berkeley

Wageningen Univ

Cardiff Univ

Univ Twente Michigan State Univ Newcastle Univ

Univ Texas

Univ Cambridge Eindhoven Univ Technol

Univ Oxford

Univ Sussex Katholieke Univ Leuven

Univ Manchester

Univ Wageningen Res Ctr Univ Amsterdam Zhejiang Univ

Stanford Univ

Univ Antwerp Delft Univ Technol Univ Waterloo Univ Quebec

Univ Oklahoma

Stockholm Univ

Figure 10. Number of articles in “global environmental governance” 140 120

Figure 11 below shows the most productive universities in this field, and their co-authorship patterns (only organizations with more than 10 publications in our database are included). As the map shows, the most productive university is the Vrije University in Amsterdam, with co-authorship links to University of Arizona, Stockholm University and University of Oxford (amongst others). Note that only universities with more than 3 articles in the database are included.

100

Figure 11. Network map of top u niversities in global environmental governance

80 60 40

Colorado State Univ

20


Lund Univ

72 19 77 19 82 19 86 19 89 19 91 19 93 19 95 19 97 19 99 20 01 20 03 20 05 20 07 20 09 20 11 20 13

19

19

65

0 Stockholm Univ

Arizona State Univ

Univ Oxford Vrije Univ Amsterdam

Table 7 shows the most cited work and their respective authors in the field. As the table shows, there is some tangible overlap with the field of “global democracy” through the work of Robert Keohane, Margaret Keck, and Kenneth Walz. The reason for this is likely that this field not only explores challenges to environmental governance, but also addresses general challenges for global governance, such as the role of international institutions in guiding state behavior in international politics.

Univ Calif Santa Barbara Univ Oslo

Stanford Univ

Univ Arizona Univ Massachusetts London Sch Econ

Univ Michigan

Harvard Univ

Univ E Anglia

The collaborations between organizations include the work of 2,611 authors. Figure 12 shows the individual authors, and their collaboration patterns (only authors with more

23

than 3 publications are included). Authors with a high number of publications are Biermann, Betsil, Pattberg, Schroeder, Lebel, Young, Gupta, and Abbot. They are also prominent authors in the field called “Earth system governance”. The network also shows some collaborative links with authors in the field of “adaptive governance” (Carl Folke, Per Olsson, see below).

management, which has a stronger emphasis on management strategies for learning and experimentation (Holling 1978, Walters 1986).

Table 8. Most influential work in a daptive governance Records

Figure 12. Author network for “global environmental governance” Snidal, D. Hironaka, A. Schofer, E. Zhu, L.

Siebenhuener, B.

Bernstein, S.

Biermann, F.

Lebel, L.

Bulkeley, H.

Betsill, M.M.

Newell, P. Gupta, J. Liverman, D.

Betsill, M.M.

Zondervan, R.

Levine, S.P. Haas, P.M. Marimon, F. Dyjack, D.T.

Schroeder, H. Olsson, P.

Bernstein, S. Young, O.R.

Bernauer, T. Zhu, Q.

Underdal, A. Oberthur, S.

Folke, C. Newell, P.

Mitchell, R.B.

Sarkis, J.

Mumme, S.P.

Gehring, T.

Fischhendler, I.

Pattberg, P.

Jahi, J.Md. Stokke, O.S. Razman, M.R.

Bulkeley, H. Marcoux, C. Andonova, L.B. Urpelainen, J.

Mason, M. Falaleeva, M. Scott, C.A.

4.2.5. Adaptive Governance The literature on adaptive governance has evolved rapidly from 2009 and onwards. This field has its roots in the study of complexity in ecological and social-ecological systems, and has moved from an emphasis on local management and collaboration, to “governance” including institutions and networks at large scales.

Figure 13. Number of articles in a daptive governance over time 140 120 100 80 60 40 20

14 20

12 20

10 20

08 20

06 20

04 20

02 20

00 20

98 19

96 19

19

93

0

Table 8 shows the most cited work in this field. The list shows a mix of work that focus on the interplay of institutions, networks and actors (Folke et al. 2005, Olsson et al. 2006), and literature with a more explicit focus on adaptive

24

Folke. C., Hahn, T., Olsson, P. and Norberg, J., 2005, Annual Review of Environment and Resources, V.30

143

Olsson. P. Folke, C. and Berkes, F., 2004, Environmental Management, V.34

130

Holling, C. S., 1978, Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management (book)

116

Walters, C. J., 1986, Adaptive Management of Renewable Resources (book)

107

Olsson, P., Gunderson, L. H., Carpenter, S. R., Ryan, P., et al., 2006, Ecology and Society, V.11(1)

Duda, A.M.

Kanie, N. Backstrand, K.

Cited References

230

97

Dietz. T., Ostrom, E. and Stern, P. C., 2003, Science, V.302

91

Gunderson L. H. and Holling, C. S., 2002, Panarchy (book)

86

Ostrom, E., 1990, Governing the Commons, (book)

79

Berkes, F., Colding, J. and Folke, C., 2003, Navigating Social-ecological Systems (book)

75

Berkes, F., 2009, Journal of Environmental Management, V.90

Research is conducted in over 210 organizations in 39 countries, and includes 1,886 authors. Figure 14 shows the 30 most productive organizations (i.e. organizations with more than 4 publications in the database) in the field. These are related to one another in some way, which is shown by their multiple collaborations. Stockholm University is the central and most productive node in this network that includes collaborators in Europe, North America and Australia (e.g. CSIRO).

Figure 14. Network map of top universities in adaptive governance US Forest Serv

140

US EPA

120

Univ British Columbia Monash Univ Univ Wisconsin Swedish Univ Agr Sci Univ Washington Emory Univ Univ E Anglia US Fish Wildlife Serv US Geol Survey Arizona State Univ CSIRO Ecosyst Sci N Carolina State Univ Univ Florida

Brock Univ Univ Waterloo

Vrije Univ Amsterdam

Univ Queensland

Univ Melbourne Univ Arizona Univ Tasmania

Univ Oxford

Cornell Univ

Univ Calif Berkeley Australian Natl Univ

Figure 15 shows the most prominent authors in this field, and their co-authorship patterns. Carl Folke, Per Olsson and Claudia Pahl-Wostl and Ryan Plummer are the most productive authors, each with their respective co-authorship patterns.

Figure 15. Author network for adaptive governance Fabricius, C. Williams, B.K. Nichols, J.D.

Plummer, R.

Cundill, G.

Stringer, L.C. Brown, R.R. Reed, M.S.

Fazey, I

Medeiros, R.P.

Reeves, A.D. Davies, J.

Armitage, D.R. Crona, B.

Table 9. Most influential work in crisis management Records

Andersson, K.

Schultz, L.

Axelsson, R.

Ernstson, H.

Weick, K. E., 1995, Sensemaking in Organiza tions (book)

22

Mileti, D. S., 1999, Disaster by Design (book)

21

Boin, A. Hart, P.’t, Stern E. and Sundelius, B., 2005, The Politics of Crisis Management (book)

19

Waugh, W. L. and Streib, G., 2006, Public Administration Review, V.66

19

Weick, K. E., 1993, Administrative Science Quarterly, V.38(4)

18

Comfort, L. K, 1999, Shared Risk (book)

17

Bruneau, M. Chang, S. E., Eguchi, R. T., Lee, G. C., O’Rourke, et al., 2003, Earthquake Spectra, V.19(4)

16

Comfort, L. K., 2007, Public Administration Review, V.67

16

Perrow, C., 1984, Normal Accidents (book)

15

Boin, A. and Hart, P.’t., 2003, Public Adminis tration Review, V.63(5)

15

Kapucu, N., 2006, The American Review of Public Administration, V.36(2)

15

Pearson, C. M. and Clair, J. A., 1998, Academy of Management Review, V.23(1)

Elbakidze, M.

Bodin, O. Berkes, F.

Hahn, T.

Olsson, P.

Gunderson, L.H.

Elmqvist, T.

Angelstam, P.

Montes, C.

Garmestani, A.S. Hill, R.

Glaser, M. Carpenter, S.R. Osterblom, H.

Benson, M.H.

Curtis, A.

Gunderson, L.

Milner-Gulland, E.J.

Butler, J.R.A.

Robinson, C.J.

Folke, C.

Chapin, F.S.

Dewulf, A. Huitema, D. Brugnach, M.

Walker, B.

Boyd, E.

Lebel, L.

Pahl-wostl, C.

Cited References

27

Krasny, M.E.

Lyons, J.E. Runge, M.C.

Marschke, M. Armitage, D.

20

Table 9 summarizes the most referenced work in the field, including the works of Karl Weick, Dennis S. Mileti and Arjen Boin. As the list illustrates, the field is in itself highly multidisciplinary, e.g. Arjen Boin and colleagues synthesis published in 2005 in the book “The Politics of Crisis Management” (Cambridge University Press).

Univ Manitoba

Colorado State Univ

40

Univ Osnabruck

Delft Univ Technol

CSIRO Sustainable Ecosyst

60

0

Wilfrid Laurier Univ

Royal Swedish Acad Sci

80

96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 20 13 20 14

James Cook Univ

Stockholm Univ

100

19

Univ Cape Town

Univ York

Figure 16. Number of articles in crisis management over time

4.2.6. Crisis management The field of crisis management explores the societal responses to perceived crises. The field is in itself highly multidisciplinary and includes perspectives raging from social psychology, public administration to organizational analysis and media studies. The field does have a common knowledge base, which can be illustrated through its most cited literature and authors (table 9.).

Research in conducted in over 177 organizations in 67 countries, and includes 1,642 authors. Network map in figure 17 shows the most prominent universities (i.e. with more than 4 publications) in this field. American universities clearly dominate this field, with just a few and weak clusters around Louisiana State University, University of Central Florida and National Kaohsiung University (Taiwan).

25

Figure 17. Network map of top universities in crisis management

regular basis are displayed as being closer to each other in the map. The color-coding in the figure below for example shows a snapshot of the authors that belong to the field “adaptive governance”. The thickness of the links represents ranges from 1 to 15 co-authored articles.

Univ Nottingham Cent Michigan Univ Northumbria Univ

Ohio State Univ

Univ Calif Berkeley Macquarie Univ

Kyoto Univ

Univ Colorado

Univ Tehran

Texas A M Univ Univ N Carolina

Natl Kaohsiung Marine Univ Univ Oklahoma

Univ Pittsburgh

Univ Calif San Diego Stockholm Univ

Univ Sydney

Virginia Polytech Inst State Univ

Univ Washington

Univ Wisconsin Univ So Calif

Natl Taiwan Univ

Univ Calif Los Angeles

Louisiana State Univ

Natl Cheng Kung Univ

Univ Cent Florida

Virginia Tech

Univ Georgia Univ Utrecht

George Washington Univ

Our analysis shows the collaboration patterns displayed in figure 17. Prominent in terms of most published publications in the database include authors such as Arjen Boin, Louise Comfort, E.L. Quarantelli,

Figure 18. Author network for crisis management

Kapucu, N. Weick, K.E.

Boenigk, S.

Manyena, S.B.

Nolte, I.M.

Arslan, T.

Zobel, C.W.

Williams, M. Collins, A. Merz, B. Kumar, R.

Moynihan, D.P.

Das, T K

Boin, A.

Kreps, G.

Plough, A.

Wells, K.B.

Dynes, R.

Chandra, A.

Rhinard, M. Caruson, K. Hart, P.T.

Burkle, F. Macmanus, S.A.

Beakley, J.E.

Reinhorn, A.M. Bruneau, M.

Patricelli, F.

Quarantelli, E.

Von Lubitz, D.K.J.E

Cimellaro, G.P.

Thomalla, F. Sylves, R.

Takeuchi, Y.

Berke, P.R.

Hsu, W.-K. Tseng, C.-P.

Chiang, W.-L.

Bish, D.R.

Joerin, J. Shaw, R.

Younis, M.

Chen, C.-W.

Wang, J.-J.

Laefer, D.F. Cutter, S.L.

4.3. An overview of all fields The network map in figure 19 below shows shows the connections between authors in all six fields. That means that each node (i.e. circle) represents an author, and that each link between nodes, represents a paper that has been co-authored. Not surprisingly, authors that belong to the same discipline, tend to cluster. That is, as the number of connections increase, authors that co-author work on a

26

In the previous section, we explored each disciplines, or “knowledge domains” features. We are however also interested in how the different domains are connected to each other. Our assumption is that a proper analysis of the governance of connected risks requires a multidisciplinary understanding. The bibliometrical analysis allows a more fine-grained look at these connections. The analysis presented below assumes that each research field draws from what we have called a “knowledge base”. This base consists of the full body of publications that are cited by the authors in the collection of articles (a total of 5, 664 articles). By studying the overlap in referenced work, we can make an assessment of to what extend the different research fields overlap. That is, if an author in the field adaptive governance and another author in innovation studies reference the same work, this indicates an overlap in ideas and concepts.

Comfort, L.K.

Garayev, V.

The report format does not allow us to explore this map in detail, but interactive network maps with color-codes, and additional information for all disciplines can be found online at the project website http://www.changingplanet.se/connected-risks.6

4.3.1. Finding Key Thinkers and Connectors

Ctr Dis Control Prevent

Arizona State Univ

Australian Natl Univ

Natl Cent Univ

Univ Delaware

N Carolina State Univ


How do we identify connecting ideas? Our combined analysis of the six fields is focused on the overlap of knowledge bases (i.e. shared referenced work between the different disciplines or knowledge domains). This allows us to explore shared key ideas across disciplines. Table 10 shows references that appear in more than 3 of the six studied disciplines. These references appear in the list of the 50 most cited references in each individual field. For example, DiMaggio and Powell’s work about institutional isomorphism appear among the 50 most cited referenced works in not only one, but four different fields. Abbott and Snidal on the other hand, is also on the list of the 50 most cited referenced articles, but in three of the six analyzed fields.

6

Note however that we only display a few selected visuals from this project online for journal embargo reasons. The full set of interactive visualizations will be released once a synthesis article has been published from this project.

Figure 19. Network map of all authors, color-coded for authors in “adaptive governance”

Table 10. Most referenced publications that appear in more than three knowledge domains Reference DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. “The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields.” American Sociological Review (1983): 147-160. Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. “Hard and soft law in international gover nance.” International organization, (2000): 421-456. Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. “Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?“ International Organization, (1996): 379-406.

Disciplines

Adaptive Governance Crisis Management Global Democracy Global Environmental Governance Innovation International Law

Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. “International norm dynamics and political change.” International Organization (1998): 887-917. Folke, Carl, et al. “Adaptive governance of social-ecological systems.” Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour., 30 (2005): 441-473. Haas, Peter M., (ed). Knowledge, power, and international policy coordination. Reaktion Books, 1992. Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games.” International Organization (1988): 427-460. Slaughter, A. M. (2004). A new world order: Government networks and the disaggregated state. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

27

Critical Connections and Connectors The dataset contains almost 10, 000 authors. The reason why this number is higher than the number of total publications (5,564) is that many articles have more than one author. It is interesting to note for our purpose, that about 415 authors appear in more than one knowledge domain (less than 8 %). These authors are of special interest as they represent scholars that collaborate across domains, hence establishing bridges between concepts and ideas in different disciplines. These “connectors” are identified in figure 20 below, where the color indicates the number of domains each appear in.

This comparison allows us to analyse which disciples are most closely related to each other. The lower percentage number of cross-citations, the less interaction between the compared fields. For example, the field “international environmental law” only modestly references the top 100 most cited references of “adaptive governance” (2 %), crisis management (3 %), and innovation studies (6 %). The weakest interactions (marked with red) according to this methodology are between the fields “adaptive governance” and “global democracy” (1 %), as well as “crisis management” and “global democracy” (1 %), and “adaptive governance” with “international law” (2 %). Hence, these seem to be most fruitful combinations to explore in future research.

Figure 20. Authors that appear in 3 to 5 knowledge domains Zuern, M.

Zondervan, R. Palazzo, G.

Newell, P.

Esty, D.C.

McMichael, A..J.

Lawhon, M.

Bernstein, S.

Gupta, J.

Schroeder, H.

Pattberg, P.

Brock, A.

Biermann, F.

Ebi, K.

Stringer, L.C.

Leach, M.

Folke, C.

Cashore, B.

Berkes, F.

Abbott, K.

Mauerhofer, V.

Ebbesson, J.

Mansfield, E.D.

Oberthur, S.

Galaz, V.

Olsson, P.

Bowen, Kalfagianni, A. Urpelainen, J. K.J.

Bulkeley,Kameyama, Y. H.

Clapp, J.

Liverman, D.

Pahl-Wostl, C.

Crona, B.

Betsill, M.M.

Adger, W.N.

Bechtel, Backstrand, K. M.M. Friel, S.

Lebel, L.

The quantitative approach explored here, and the interactive material on the webpage of this project, gives a unique overview of the different research fields. In the next chapter, we explore these fields qualitatively as a means to assess the contribution each research streams has to our understanding of the governance global connected risks.

Scoones, I.

Kanie, Siebenhuener, B. N. Keessen, A.M.

The top 100 most cited articles can be viewed to represent the core ideas in each field. If we look at how these occur not only in their respective fields, but also across fields, we can estimate similarities between the fields. For example, a 100 % overlap would imply that the fields core ideas are practically identic, whereas a 0 % overlap imply that the fields are distinctively different. For example, in international environmental law, the 100 most cited articles appear in 61 % of the total collection of articles in international environmental law, whereas the collection of articles for “crisis management” all cite the top 100 most cited articles in the field (1,0).

Vertinsky, I.

Young, O.R.

Total 3.000

5.000

Table 11. Cross-Citation across research fields Int Law

Glob EnvGov

Innov

Adap Gov

Glob Dem

Cris Man

Int Law

0,61

0,19

0,06

0,02

0,17

0,03

GlobEnvGov

0,19

0,83

0,08

0,15

0,27

0,14

Innov

0,06

0,08

0,67

0,08

0,07

0,10

Adap Gov

0,02

0,15

0,08

0,97

0,01

0,25

Glob Dem

0,17

0,27

0,07

0,01

1,00

0,01

Cris Man

0,03

0,14

0,10

0,25

0,01

1,00

Comment: figures in the table cells display the percentage of association, i.e. 0,99 = 99 %. Colors are also representations of association, starting with red indicating very limited association, and green showing considerable association.

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5. Exploring Key Governance Challenges

What are some possible ways to understand and address the fundamental global environmental governance challenges explored earlier? What is the state of the art, and what intriguing ideas seem to run across disciplines? In this chapter, we explore these issues and highlight a number of proposals stemming from the different streams of literature. We denote these proposals “identified potential” to bring out their possibilities, but also “identified challenges” intended to highlight some known shortcomings and possible weaknesses.

5.1. Overcoming Gridlock Gridlock entails the repeated inability of political actors at the international level to agree on effective international institutions able to address urgent global challenges such as climate change. The underlying mechanisms and definitions of “gridlock” differ (Skolnikoff 1990, Hale et al. 2013, Victor 2010), but are associated with the conflict between international and national interests, and deep divergences in interests between the global North and South.

Identified Potential Suggestions in the literature on how to overcome “gridlock” processes can be broadly separated into three main categories: issue linkage, club approaches and deep institutional reform. The categories can overlap and even be seen as synergistic (van Asselt et al. 2005). For the purpose of the analysis here, the first category involves strategies that aim to link international issues affected by gridlock (such as climate change), with other issues (say, trade and developing assistance) to improve the possibilities for international cooperation (e.g. Viguier 2004). The second category, denoted club approaches, instead build on allowing one or several international agreements evolve through smaller “club” initiatives with a limited number of participants, but with

a membership that grows and becomes more inclusive over time as nations see the benefits of participating. The third category, deep institutional reform, instead builds on the notion that there is a need for profound structural changes at the international level. a) Issue linkage The possibilities for issue-linkage have been widely explored for climate change negotiations, but have more general applications for attempts to address the underlying drivers of global connected risks. Issue-linkage builds on the notion that decision-makers can create incentives for international climate change cooperation by restructuring incentives through direct side payments. That is “by linking […] two negotiations so that high benefits go to A in one area and high benefits go to B in the other, there may be a possibility to secure agreement in both negotiations in a way that brings benefits to both countries […].” (from Viguier 2004, see Conconi and Perroni 2002 and Johnson and Urpelainen 2012 for theoretical explorations). One of the most common proposals is to link climate negotiations with international trade. The threat of trade sanctions (e.g. import ban, restriction, or border tax measures) has been proposed as a mechanism that could deter free-riding and enforce compliance with the agreement (Viguier 2004: 198, based on Barrett 1999). Another proposal is to link environmental agreements with cooperation on research and technological development (Kemfert 2004), and/or a wider sustainable development agenda. The idea is that linking environmental protection with technology diffusion and/or investments in e.g. energy efficiency, sustainable land use policies and similar, might create incentives for non-signatories to join an environmental agreement (Viguier 2004). In addition, linking issues could also help environmental issues such as climate on the agendas of governments and help mobilize domestic support for international agreements (van Asselt et al. 2005:257).

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b) Club approaches The second approach can be seen as complementary to issue linkage but with the important difference to sidestep an all-inclusive binding international agreement. The proposal is to start collaboration and negotiation with much smaller groups – or ‘experiments’, or ‘clubs’ as they are referred to in different streams of literature. Different variants of this proposal have emerged over the years, each placing different emphasis on the role of state actors, non-state coalitions (such as city networks), and local actors. David Victor (2010) explores a model where clubs would start collaborating by focusing on policies that national governments control, rather than on emission targets and timetables. In this model, the United Nation would act as a mediator or “umbrella under which many different experimental efforts flourish and compete” (Victor 2010:26). A similar idea is presented by Rayner (2010) who also raises the importance of adaptation and local responses by both governmental and non-governmental actors that focus on co-benefits for human wellbeing in climate mitigation policies. Elinor Ostrom (2010) raises similar issues under the term “polycentric systems”. Polycentric systems are characterized by multiple governing authorities at differing scales, rather than one monocentric unit. According to Ostrom, partici pants in polycentric systems can take advantage of local knowledge, and continuously learn from other participants engaged in trial-and-error processes. As a result and on aggregate, such a model could over time lead to significant reduction in greenhouse gases as well as “enhance innovation, learning, adaptation, trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of participants, and the achievement of more effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes at multiple scales” (Ostrom 2010:553, see also Victor et al. 2005). Hoffman (2011) formulates a similar alternative to traditional top-down governance approaches such as the prevailing UN treaty system, and explores what he calls an “experimental” approach to governance. His analysis includes 58 “climate experiments” including NGO networks, carbon emission trading systems and similar process outside of the formal negotiation processes, but that could influence climate negotiations. The experiments focus their work on achieving tangible economic benefits, based on voluntary participation and the logic of the market (see also Hajer 2011, PBL 2012, Oxford Martin Commission 2013).

Deep institutional reform Will incremental reforms suffice considering the rate of environmental, social and technological changes taking place at global scales? The answer is a clear sounding ‘no’ from the so-called Earth System Governance Project, an international network of social science scholars analyzing various aspects of environmental institutions and political decision-making. Their conclusion at the run up to the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012 (Rio+20) was that:

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“Our work indicated that incremental change – the main approach since the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment – is no longer sufficient to bring about societal change at the level and with the speed needed to mitigate and adapt to Earth system transformation. Structural change is needed […].” (Biermann et al. 2012: 1306). The call for a “constitutional moment” is seconded by Kanie et al. (2012), and includes a number of specific reform proposals. It is interesting to note that many of these proposals parallel reform proposals from the policy sphere (chapter 1 in this report). However, while these proposals offer detailed suggestions on ways to reform international environmental governance, they do not explore specific mechanisms to address gridlock (see below).

Box 6. Deep institutional reform – specific proposals from research on Earth System Governance A recent synthesis of critical global environmental governance challenges identifies seven important “building blocks” for institutional reform (Biermann et al. 2012). These include tangible policy recommendations such as: • strengthen international environmental treaties by relying more on systems of qualified majority in certain areas. • improved integration of environmental, social, and developmental values into global trade and investment regimes. • closing “regulatory” gaps related to emerging technologies, water, food and energy. • upgrading UNEP to a specialized UN agency, along the lines of the World Health Organization or the International Labour Organization. • better integration of sustainable development policies within the UN system • strengthen national governance, and public–private governance networks and partnerships • strengthen accountability accountability mechanisms

and

legitimacy

through

novel

• address equity concerns within and among countries through e.g. financial support • prepare global governance for a warmer world through adaptation programmes coordinated by the UN system and governments. In another synthesis, Norichika Kanie and colleagues (2012) argue that a “transformation of the international institutional architecture for sustainable development” towards “planetary stewardship” is needed, and present the ‘The Hakone Vision on Governance for Sustainability in the 21st Century’. The “vision” includes a call for broadening of meaningful and accountable participation; improving integration between global-level institutions; and by creating a Sustainable Development Council (SDC). In more practical terms, Kanie et al. (2012) propose that “the current inter-governmental system would be to add a mechanism of checks and balances (between governments and non-state actors)” which

would imply a version of a “two-chamber construction at the global level” (pp. 229). The SDC would replace the existing and weak UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and provide more inclusive participation and better integration of sustainability issues into the UN system.

Similar calls for “deep institutional reform” can also be found in the legal literature. Craig (2010) for example, argues that climate change poses not only fundamental challenges to ecosystems, but also calls for fundamental rethinking of American environmental law through the realization of five legal principles about monitoring; the reduction of stresses; planning for the long-term through improved coordination; promotion of “principled flexibility”; and an acceptance that climate change adaptation will be “painful”. Klaus Bosselman (2008) in a similar way proposes that “sustainability” provides an overarching norm (a so called “Grundnorm”) that could underpin a transformation of environmental law (see also discussion about risk reducing norms and principles below).

Identified challenges All three approaches have known limitations and challen ges. Issue-linkage between climate and trade for example, works only if there is a credible threat of punishment in cases of deflection from a climate agreement. Barrett (1999) however, demonstrates that punishment strategies, such as trade sanctions, capable of deterring a unilateral defection are not credible as they imply too large costs on the punisher. In addition, issue linkage assumes that there is an agreement already, still begging an answer to the question on how to incite states to enter an agreement from the beginning (Viguier 2004). Other authors note that issue linkage can come with some tangible costs. Hale and colleagues for example (2013), note that attempts to link reforestation and land-use policies with climate change could compromise other environmental goals such as biodiversity at the expense of mitigation (pp. 269). In addition, issue linkage could contribute to, rather than ameliorate, institutional complexity and negative institutional interactions (cf. Gehring and Oberthür 2009, Orsini et al. 2013). Hence there might exist a hard-resolved tradeoff between making progress in international collaboration through issue linkages at the expense of additional institutional denseness and complexity. Club approaches or polycentric governance entail a number of benefits but also known limitations and risks known as leakage, the tangible risk of creating a system of inconsistent policies and free-riding (from Ostrom 2010). Other scholars have noted that collaboration of this kind is vulnerable to a set of internal and external stresses that could lead to malfunctioned collaboration, and governance gaps (e.g. Galaz et al. 2011, see also section about polycentricity below).

One critical question is whether this sort of approach would lead to impacts that add up to have a global impact. Or in other words, can club approaches or models based on experimentation and polycentricity really lead to similar outcomes as would be experienced under strong, self-enforcing multilateral agreements (c.f. Dimitrov 2010)? Interestingly enough, aspects of this question can be modeled. Vasconcelos and colleagues (2013) present model simulations (i.e. evolutionary game theory) that contrast a scenario where agents try to establish an agreement by which all must abide, and one where smaller groups are established with the aim to overcome shorter-term goals. An important factor here is the agents’ perceptions of risk of collective disaster, i.e. in a similar sense as explored for thresholds in previous chapter. The paper is rich in technical details, but the key result stands out: decentralized, bottom-up approaches involving multiple institutions instead of a single global one “provides better conditions both for cooperation to thrive and for ensuring the maintenance of such institutions” (p. 4). Or in the words – “self-organization may provide a helping hand” (Tavoni 2013, p. 782). In short, club approaches do not necessarily add up to create synergistic and effective risk reducing collaboration, but could also lead to incoherence, free riding and more complex governance architectures. Deep institutional reforms such as those proposed by (Biermann et al. 2012, Kanie et al. 2012), could potentially bring more coherence and integration to global environmental governance, but do not explicitly address the issue of gridlock. Hence reform proposals that theoretically might lead to a more coherent and risk reducing institutional architecture, have few chances to become adopted due to tangible conflicts of interest, and differences in risk perceptions between nation states (c.f. Dimitrov et al. 2007, Dimitrov 2010, Biermann 2012). This becomes clear in the case of the creation of a World Environmental Organization as a means to reduce institutional fragmentation and strengthening the interests of environmental protection. The issue has been on the international political agenda repeatedly, but with few tangible results as a result of disagreements between states (Biermann 2000, Marshall 2002, Biermann and Pattberg 2008:285f). Countries, such as Germany and France, originally called for the creation of a World Environment Organization to boost coordination efforts, and improve the integration of environmental issues in other related issues. Progress has been modest over time, with the most recent changes including a stronger and upgraded United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) with an expanded membership, and increased financial resources amongst other (see Ivanova 2013 for details).

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5.2. Evolution of Risk Reducing Principles and Norms Is it all possible to overcome the governance failures associated with institutional fragmentation and segmentation? One interesting issue brought up by scholars from the legal field as well as institutional scholars, is the important role played by overarching principles and norms in international institutions including law. The common assumption is that shared ideas, expectations, and beliefs about appropriate behavior guide state and non-state actions at the international level. One example of an overarching principle is the principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CDR) discussed earlier. It has enabled developing states to bring to the negotiating table issues related to the legacy of colonialism and the unequal distribution of wealth across the globe. As a result their position has been taken into account in international environmental treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol and the climate change regime, referred to above. This principle has had important impacts on international environmental agreements. The 1987 Montreal Protocol for example not only regulated the protection of the ozone layer, but also gave less-developed countries access to financial resources, as well as an extended deadline for coming into compliance. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, also explicitly embeds the principle of CDR, and the Kyoto Protocol’s requirements differed between developed and developing countries (both examples from Stone 2004 who also elaborates some existing tensions in detail). Since the 1970s, environmental risks have taken on a higher profile and the most important principles of modern environmental law including the precautionary principle, the preventive principle and the polluter-pays principle which all have emerged as a result of emerging perceptions of globalized ecological risks.

Identified Potential Overarching principles are crucial as they allow international actors such as states as well as regional and international organizations to steer the interaction between different international institutions, and the regulation of norm-conflicts between these institutions. Principles such as these have been proposed as a means to help reduce global environmental risks. Frank Biermann (2012) as an example, argues that overarching principles, as well as concepts of peremptory norms in international law (ius cogens, i.e. norms that no state may derogate from) could theoretically provide two good starting points to help reduce institutional fragmentation in ways that could reduce environmental risks (see also Biermann 1996, Walker et al. 2009). Kim and Bosselmann (2013) argue in a similar vain that there is a legal case for ”a goal-oriented, purposive system of multilateral environmental agreements” based on a new legally binding international norm – a “Grundnorm”. A related idea

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is presented by Polly Higgins in Higgins et al. (2013), including a specific proposal to include ”Ecocide” as one of the crimes against peace. Such a law would make states “legally bound to act before mass damage, destruction or ecosystem collapse occurs and the law will impute a legal duty of care on all nations to provide assistance to those countries that are of risk or are suffering from ecosystem collapse […]” (pp. 257). The assumption is that such a law – if accepted and implemented – would lead to a number of transformative changes including not only law, but also the economy and social activities in general (Higgins et al. 2013, see also Falk 1973). A number of institutional reforms are associated with such a law, including the extension of environmental courts and the establishment of an International Environmental Court (Higgins et al. 2013: 263). A related and well-elaborated legal principle that has distinct and interacting risks at its core, is the precautionary principle.7 The precautionary principle covers serious risks, significant risks and risks of irreversible damage whereas the question is no longer only how to prevent risks which are assessable but how to predict risks pervaded by uncertainty (de Sadeleer 2006). Hence, this principle addresses environmental risks that can be uncertain and interconnected to other risks e.g. health risks such as epidemics, and because of the risk of irreversible damage it is also linked to the equity principles in relation to future generations. Like the precautionary principle, safeguards also place a strong emphasis on risks and are one of the elements of transnational environmental law whereas existing inter national conventions are entangled with relatively new systems. The term “safeguards” was first used in the 1990s by the World Bank and other financial institutions in reference to policies for preventing unintended negative consequences for people and ecosystems arising from international interventions (Herbertson 2012). Since then, in the international environmental arena e.g. under the UNFCCC, a more comprehensive content of the notion of “safeguards” has emerged involving broad topics such as participation, transparency good governance together with specialized tools to support the integration of environmental and social considerations into decision-making processes (ItuarteLima et al. 2013, Glickman and Kaime 2013). International Human Rights Law (IHRL) has also been explored as a legal mechanism that could have large implications for evolving norms that could address global risks. Under international law, linking Multilateral Environmental Agreements to progressive interpretations of IHRL have been suggested as a means to provide a normative basis for diverse judicial and non-judicial actions for addressing global risks e.g. in support of “climate justice” (Nicholson and Chong 2011). Since the 1990, there is an 7

This section builds on the background Ituarte-Lima (2014).

increasing recognition in the international arena of the indivisibility and interdependency of distinct rights including their cross-cutting environmental dimensions. At the regional level, cases with environmental dimensions linked to various human rights have been brought before the European, Inter-American Court and African human right courts grounding their concerns on human rights principles as well as international and regional treaties (see e.g. Anaya and Williams 2001). Moreover, many State’s constitutions - the legal instrument with highest hierarchy and legitimacy in many countries- also enshrine these rights as well as environment-specific rights; national legal systems are especially important for providing coercive enforcement mechanisms for these rights as international mechanisms have significant limitations (Howard 1983). Furthermore, there is potential for even more explicit synergies in ways that will most benefit those in a more disadvan tage position, and who will continue to be affected more from the climate change’s greatest impacts such as droughts (Nicholson and Chong 2011). Hence, the progressive recognition of crosscutting environmental dimensions of human rights can contribute to the theoretical framing including equity dimensions, as well as providing legal basis and legi timacy to action towards fostering spaces where humanity as well as other living beings and ecosystems can thrive. A related and important issue is how international law changes, such as the end of the Cold War, prohibitions against certain kinds of weapons, and the end of slavery (from Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). This issue has been explored at length by scholars in international relations and politics (e.g. True and Mintrom 2001, Acharya 2004), as well as by scholars in the legal literature (Moulton et al. 2003). According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), norms evolve through a “life cycle” as they emerge (often at the national level), cascade and eventually become internalized. An agreement among a critical mass of actors on some emergent norm at the national level, can transgress a “tipping point” at which a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm. This process can be facilitated by “world historical events” such as wars or major depressions, and is driven by “norm entrepreneurs” that link domestic and international politics in ways that contributes to the diffusion of the new norm.

Identified challenges While new international principles and norms could contribute to the reduction of global environmental risks, the practical implications of proposals such as those presented by (Kim and Bosselman 2013, Walker et al. 2009) in terms of acceptance and enforcement by sovereign states, can be questioned (see Biermann 2012 for details). As an example, the notion of ‘common heritage’ with its roots in the 1950s has historically been proposed by some states as a principle to be applied on issues such as climate and the atmosphere. The concept found its way into the United Nations

Convention on the Law and the Sea (LOS Convention) in relation to deep-sea mining, but later proved unacceptable for industrialized countries and was rephrased to reflect this discontent. As Biermann notes, the notion of “common heritage of humankind” over time was effectively divested of its original meaning due to national interests (Biermann 1996: 429). While there has been progress in legal design with the development of environmental legal principles and MEAs, important obstacles for addressing global risks remain. Accountability , enforceability and contested interpretations of transnational environmental norms and law are three important gridlocks for addressing global environmental risks. In the first case, accountability has proven to be seriously undermined by the current fragmentation in international law as it allows actors state and non-state actors to break commitments to one standard of proper behavior, by arguing the need to comply with another (Klabbers 2004). Similar accountability issues have been raised for transnational corporations where current legal structures make it difficult to hold corporations responsible across state borders (Ebbesson 2006). In the second case of enforceability, courts are the traditional mechanisms for enforcing liability rules in cases where conflicts emerge and rights are infringed. However, the role of courts concerning global risks is limited both due to the absence of a global environmental court. For instance, new fields such as genetic resources, their use and associated controversies, has brought existing courts into a new field in which they are often unable to respond effectively (Sampath 2005, see also Rai and Boyle for an elaboration on synthetic biology, and Bodle et al. 2012 for a discussion about geo engineering). Principles could also face serious obstacles to act as reducers of global risks due to conflicting interpretations. For example, the precautionary principle elaborated previously has been argued to have a set of common core components: taking preventive action in the face of uncertainty; shifting the burden of evidence to the proponents of an activity; exploring a wide range of alternatives to possibly harmful actions; and increasing public participation in decision making (Kriebel et al. 2001, p. 871, see also VanderZwaag 1999). Despite agreement on these components, their interpretation in the regulation for emerging environmental risks such as geoengineering experiments, large-scale modifications of ecosystems and new technologies such as synthetic biology, remain contested (Gardiner 2006, Galaz 2014: 96f, Bodle et al. 2012). To summarize: overarching legal norms have the potential to enhance coordination and help resolve norm conflicts in ways to reduce the creation of global risks. Examples here include the principle of common but differentiated respon-

33

sibility, and the precautionary principle, two international principles with tangible impacts on international agreements. In addition, principles such as these can evolve in nonlinear ways thereby contributing to the reduction of global environmental risks. However, the evolution of norms and principles such of these are fundamentally limited by national interests, mechanisms to overcome legal fragmentation, enforceability and conflicting interpretations. The problems also become clear as new risks emerge over time, often challenging existing legal norms, procedures and interpretations.

5.3. Addressing Thresholds, Uncertainty, Connectivity and Surprise As discussed at the outset of this report, complex systems and connected risks entail continuous change, uncertainty and surprise. This often implies rapid and non-linear changes that cascade through spatial scales (local to global) and sectors (e.g. finance to environment). In some streams of the governance literature, these have been argued to pose difficult governance challenges that require specific forms of institutions that differ from those needed to address incremental change and risks (Folke et al. 2005, Ostrom 2005, Duit and Galaz 2008, Young 2011:6, Galaz 2014). As we will explore below, similar discussions are emerging in environmental law, studies of Earth system governance, and in the crisis management literature.

Thresholds and Uncertainty The field of adaptive governance has explored the challenges posed by unavoidable uncertainty and the potential existence of non-linear threshold change for considerable time (e.g. Olsson et al. 2006, Olsson et al. 2008, Folke et al. 2005). The field has its original empirical focus on governance at the local and regional levels, but has over time expanded to also cover global scale challenges relayed to global environmental risks, through notions of ‘Earth Stewardship’ (Chapin et al. 2011), or ‘Planetary Stewardship’ (Folke et. al. 2011, Steffen et al. 2011). The focus between the approaches differ slightly, but one common emphasis is on how actors such as government agencies, stakeholders, associations, and private interests are able to address change and uncertainty, and even use crises as an opportunity for institutional change (see Keeler 1993), and as a means to avoid the transgression of pending thresholds (Olsson et al. 2006, Galaz 2014). This is done by coordinating information flows, initiating collaborative projects, and stimulating small-scale experimentation in informal “shadow networks” as leverages for systemic

34

changes in governance. Networks that span across organizational levels, institutional diversity and redundancy, “bridging organizations”, continuous and complementary information flows, ecological monitoring and understanding, and a capacity for rapid cross-level coordination have proven critical in this stream of literature (e.g. Biggs et al. 2012, Pahl-Wostl 2009, Huitema et al. 2009, Cash et al. 2006, Folke et. al. 2005). Similar discussions about the need for flexibility in the face of changing circumstances are currently evolving within the fields of international environmental governance and international law. In the case of international environmental governance, scholars such as Young 2010, Galaz et al. 2014 and Pahl-Wostl et al. (2008) all focus on processes which allow institutions, networks and their embedded actors to respond, adapt and cope with thresholds, uncertainty and surprise. Galaz and colleagues (2014) for example, propose that the ability of actors to respond to threshold changes lye in their ability to organize in loosely connected multilevel networks, and in four capacities: the ability for information processing and early warning; coordinate multilevel and multi-network responses; secure a diversity in response capacity; and navigate the balance between efficiency and legitimacy. According to Young (2010) for example several institutional mechanisms surface as international regimes try to adapt to changing circumstances. These include the creation of monitoring and reporting systems capable of providing early warnings; processes that enhance institutional learning; used of programmed review procedures; and procedures that allow for amendments (“secondary rules”) (p. 382-383). The importance of secondary rules has also been raised by legal scholars, and the notion of procedural law (see box 7).

Box 7. Substantive and procedural law The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its associated Montreal Protocol entered into force 1985 and 1989 respectively and, in 2009, these two international legal instruments became the first of any kind of international treaties to achieve universal ratification and contribute to reducing stratospheric ozone depletion. These international treaties have substantive dimensions which are in line with the precautionary principle recognizing uncertainty, such as the aim to protect the environment and human health against negative effects derived or likely to derive from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer. In terms of the resilience of law itself, the Montreal Protocol is relatively flexible to deal with changes. It includes procedural provisions, specifically for adjustments provisions which enables the Parties to the Protocol to respond rapidly to new scientific findings in order to foster agreements to accelerate the reductions required on chemicals already covered by the Protocol. These amendments are then applicable to all countries that ratified the Protocol automatically.

There is also an interesting emerging discussion in environmental law inspired by the notion of resilience – the ability of systems to cope with uncertainty and change through adaptability and transformability (e.g. Cooney and Lang 2007, Ebbesson and Hey 2013, Garmenstani et al. 2013). This literature highlights the different functions played by binding legal instruments and non-binding ones (formal and informal law), as well as substantive and procedural law (box 7). Certain eminent global environmental risks require fast agreements and the possibility of prompt adjustments that respond to a rapidly changing environment and hence may not allow for the time required to reaching binding agreements (Kirton and Trebilcock 2004). In this context, non-binding voluntary standards have been put forward as a means to contribute to reaching agreements towards global action in addressing pressing environment risks in a more flexible and timely manner. Depending in the kind of risk at stake, so-called “soft law” maybe sufficient in itself to foster collective action for a specific challenge or be a first step towards a binding agreement.8 Likewise, legally non-binding standards can be part of treaty regimes, e.g. when a conference of the parties adopts decisions to implement the agreements in question. Such decisions provide regulatory detail (prescription) without requiring the subsequent formal consent of individual states (Bodansky et al. 2007). Under international law, another relevant conceptual distinction is between substantive and procedural law (see Box 7). Klabbers (2004) for example, places emphasis on procedural aspects whereas the ends do not justify the means and highlights the importance of international organizations’ conduct of politics which involves processes of discussion, procedural guarantees for minority and majority groups. Walker (2012) considers that the mismatch between law and dynamic changes in ecosystems can be reduced if the rules for modifying rules are agreed before-hand. Ebbesson and Hey (2013) also highlight the importance of substantive and procedural dimensions of law, and argue that values such as equality before the law, and non-discrimination should be fostered at the same time as risks are reduced.

Connectivity and Surprise The ability for shocks and stress to propagate and move across sectors and scales is one of the central properties of connected risks. One of the most prominent fields related to governance challenges emerging from these phenomena, is crisis management. This literature is rich (see chapter 4) and includes a number of theoretical entry points to the issue, ranging from psychology, history to media studies and organizational science. As Ansell notes however, transboundary crisis and risks of the sort explored in this report, pose additional difficult response challenges due to 8

For example, some view the Copenhagen and Cancun Agreements as prior steps needed towards building consensus for a needed binding agreement on carbon emissions.

larger uncertainties, lack of surge capacities, coordination obstacles, and others (Ansell et al. 2010). Some generic properties of governance systems able to navigate all dynamic phases of crises are associated with immediate access to credible sources of information through distributed sense making, improved “surge capacity”, networked coordination, and formal boundary spanning structures (from Ansell et al. 2010, see also Boin et al. 2005, Hermann and Dayton 2009). Box 8 explores these points in more detail, but should not be viewed as an all-encompassing summary of the whole field.

Box 8. Managing Transboundary Crises Distributed sense making – transboundary crisis make it hard to arrive at a common situational awareness. Such a common understanding of the emerging crisis needs to be pulled from incomplete, fragmented and continuously changing information. Institutional features required for distributed sense making include: detection and surveillance systems, analytical capacity, real-time communications and decision support systems. Improved “surge capacity” - entail the ability for rapid, sustainable and properly scaled deployment. Institutional features and organizational ways of operating that entail professional first responders, sophisticated management of supply chains, flexible and rapid decision-making procedures, and integrated command centres able to connect with other centres at other administrative levels and sectors. Networked coordination – this remains critical to secure prompt response to a crisis. The crisis management literature is divided into two schools of thought. From Ansell et al. (2010: 203): “One argues for establishing in advance of a crisis a system for creating authority structures across organizations and jurisdictions. Another argues that pre-established hierarchies will never be adequate to the specific features of a given crisis and that to enable self-organizing during a crisis will be the most effective approach.” Formal boundary spanning structures - transboundary crises require a transboundary authority structure that can be triggered in times of crises to avoid “confusion and bureaucratic infighting”. From Ansell et al. (2010).

How governance mechanisms can address connectivity is however seemingly a considerably less explored issue. For example, only about a 100 articles in our total sample of 5,664 articles explicitly mention connectivity in their title, keywords and abstract.9 Proposals for governance mechanisms and models able to deal with connected risks often build on general principles stemming from complexity theory, rather than on exploring tangible institutional mechanisms.

9 We have used the search terms: connect*, systemic risk, propagat*, and cascade*. Note however that this figure is likely to be generous, a more robust approach would require a more detailed analysis of the selected articles.

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Helbing (2013) for example, explores a number of principles to cope with connected risks. These include “guided self-organization”, the development of risk competence and contingency plans, redundancy, diversity, and to put a “limitation of system size” (p. 55). Additional principles include the introduction of “breaking points” and “frictional effects” to slow down or limit the repercussion of cascading shocks (see also May et al. 2008). Evans and colleagues (2010) also stress the role of foresight, complexity and innovation, and propose the creation of a “challenge function” in the international system that is charged with exploring non-financial risks in similar ways as the current Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (pp. 4). Additional relevant proposals include increased international collaboration through e.g. ad hoc groups created “risk by risk” (pp. 37), and increased investments to the management of global risks. Goldin and Mariathasan (2014) also explore a number of principles that need to be considered in any discussion about global governance reforms: transparency, inclusivity and resilience (their proposals or “lessons” are summarized in Goldin and Mariathasan 2014: 212–218).

Identified challenges “Thresholds” pose difficult governance challenges for several reasons. First, it is difficult to a priori predict how much disturbances and change a system can absorb before reaching such a perceived “tipping points”, a fact that seriously hampers, and even undermines preventive decision-making. Second, institutional fragmentation has been argued to seriously limit the ability of actors to effectively address perceived “tipping point” characteristics due to inherent system uncertainties, information integration difficulties, and poor incentives for collective action across different sectors and segments of society (from Galaz et al. 2014). “Early warnings”, and especially those that relate to the potential transgression of a “tipping point” have also proven more problematic in reality than in theory. There is currently very limited understanding of whether it is possible to extract reliable warnings early enough for societal responses to be effective. Reliability and timeliness are critical issues from a governance perspective, especially considering that complex systems entail irreducible uncertainties (which imply noisy data, uncertainty about whether there is a threshold at all, and the risk of false early warnings) as well as considerable time lags between action and effect (Galaz 2014). Peretti and Munch (2012) also raises the point that while useful early warnings might be possible for simpler closed systems, larger and open systems seriously increase ”noise” in data, and make early warning signals practically impossible to differ from normal variation (see also Groffman et al. 2006, Boettinger and Hastings 2012). In addition, the underlying drivers of “surprise” tend to be contested due to underlying complexities and scientific uncertainties. The 2008-2009 food crisis and ongoing

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debates about the role of financial “speculation” is a case in point (Clapp 2009), but could be viewed as a more generic challenge (Galaz et al. 2010). And as Marten Scheffer and colleagues explore (2003, Scheffer and Westley 2007), multiple mechanisms can contribute to delayed societal responses to new environmental problems. One is critical in the context of connected risks – problems created by phenomena, linkages or processes unlike those experienced in the past, tend to remain undetected for considerable time due to mental “lock-in”. Hence “perfect” monitoring systems, organizational procedures and governance mechanisms are no guarantees for prompt and effective coordinated responses to “surprises”. Lastly, modes of governance that entail redundancy, institutional diversity, elaborate monitoring and early warning systems and crisis preparedness, come at a cost. Sagan (2004) for example, argues that redundancy might increase the possibility of major negative surprises as a result of increased complexity and unexpected interactions. It could also – according to Sagan – lead to ‘social shirking’, which reduces the reliability of individuals or organizations through the diffusion of responsibility (Sagan 2004). These issues point at a more general tension within organizations and modes of governance: the trade-off between exploitation (“doing what you do best”), and exploration (“preparing for the unexpected”) (Duit and Galaz 2008).

5.4. Navigating Fragmentation and Polycentricity As mentioned in the outset of this report, global environmental governance and the ambition to reduce globally spanning and connected risks faces not only the challenges of complex connected risks, but also of trying to steer in very dense institutional and actor settings. This insight has generated an increasing number of studies exploring institutional and legal mechanisms that could help reduce the negative impacts of institutional fragmentation. We identify and explore three main streams in the literature relevant to this challenge: managing institutional interactions, polycentric coordination, and legal mechanisms.

Managing institutional interactions This field analyzes the way in which international institutions (e.g. the UNFCCC and the Convention on Biological Diversity) interact with other institutions in complex setting. As several scholars have pointed out, these interactions are critical for understanding whether individual environmental institutions lead to expected results. For example, early studies in this field showed that the obligations under the World Trade Organization had a “chilling” effect on negotiations for environmental agreements because they limit the effectiveness of environmental trade restrictions (Gehring and Oberthür 2008, p. 189–190).

One interesting development in the field is the argument that these interactions in principle can be managed strategically by international organizations to promote environmental policy integration at the international level (Oberthür 2009, Biermann 2009). This would allow for more integrated steering as a means to reduce drivers of global risks in an institutional setting characterized by serious fragmentation, and a poor capacity to respond to global change surprises (such as the 2008–2009 “food crisis”). Some suggested strategies include the endorsement of inter-institutional learning through joint management among international bureaucracies; expert assessments aiming to promote inter-institutional learning and diffusion; and giving environmental objectives “principled priority” in cases where environmental and non-environmental institutions are in conflict (Oberthür 2009, Biermann 2009).

Polycentric coordination Polycentricity has gained increased interest from institutional scholars in the field of environmental governance for several reasons. One is that they highlight mechanisms for self-organization that are multi-level and multi-sector in scope (Ostrom, V. 2000), even in settings where formal institutions seem to fail. These mechanisms have hence become interesting in a more general and lively debate about what is perceived as a stagnant UN-process and failing multilateral negotiation processes. In this context, it has been proposed that polycentric approaches not only could help overcome gridlock (explored earlier), but also help bridge institutional fragmentation by supporting information sharing, collaboration, experimentation and conflict resolution at the international level, however also with linkages to national and local administrative levels. The issue is explored in Galaz et al. (2011) for the case of climate change and its link to marine biodiversity and ocean acidification.

Legal mechanisms Legal scholars have also explored a number of mechanisms that allow states and non-state actors to adapt to changing circumstances. The issue is explored by Cooney and Lang (2007) in the study of the World Trade Organization (WTO). According to the authors, the organization has developed a number of mechanisms that not only constrain state behavior, but that also facilitate policy learning. These mechanisms – both formal and informal - include iterative review processes and additional review functions that allow for continuous information exchange between states and the WTO. International organizations and mechanisms such as these, can contribute to effective risk reduction by guiding the behavior of state actors in ways that help overcome institutional fragmentation. It is important to note that the engagement of stakeholders such as secretariats of IOs, NGO’s and experts play a critical role to bring about increased coordination and adaptiveness in fragmented and segmented

institutional settings (see Young 2010, and previous section on managing institutional interactions). There is also a rich legal literature focusing on strategies that could help reduce institutional fragmentation, and create better coherence in ways that reduce global environmental risks. Teubner and Fischer-Lescano (2004) for example, call for new legal approaches that can help address “colliding norms”, and elaborate on a number of proposals that have been proposed as a means to reduce fragmentation. These include proposals to give the International Court of Justice (ICJ) the mandate to advise on, and even settle, conflicts between jurisdictions (ibid, see also Bosselmann 2009, Craig 2010).

Identified challenges All these approaches provide tangible and well-studied opportunities to reduce institutional fragmentation and segmentation. At the same time however, there are also known limitations and knowledge gaps. As an example, while the management of institutional interactions and polycentric coordination certainly holds potential as a strategy to address global environmental problems (Galaz 2014), the issue has not been explored explicitly for connected risks. Polycentric coordination at the international level has also been suggested to be vulnerable to a set of internal and external factors, including internal tensions created by differences in mandate and interests, and the unreliability of economic and institutional support (Galaz et al. 2012b). In sum, while these approaches might be appropriate to address underlying drivers of environmental risks such as climate change, biodiversity loss and their interplay, it remains unclear whether and in what ways these could help address the complex early warning and response challenges elaborated earlier.

5.5. Promoting Innovation Capacities If the capacities for innovation – social, institutional, technological and combinations of these – are critical as a means to reduce risks and posing viable alternatives to current institutional practices, how can these be supported through reforms in governance? As the bibliometrical analysis shows, the question is explored from a wide variety of disciplines such as transition management, social innovation studies, and some aspects of adaptive governance. Despite differences in theoretical assumptions and empirical approaches, some convergence between the different fields seems to have emerged the last years (e.g. Westley et al. 2011, Markard et al. 2012, Olsson and Galaz 2012). Below we list what seems to be a number of common features that can be viewed as either supporting innovation capacities through institutions, or that by themselves entail institu-

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tional innovations (Hargrave and Ven 2006).10 Box 9 showcases a few more hands-on attempts to promote governance experiments.

Box 9. Labs and Governance Innovation There are a number of interesting examples of active experimentation with new modes of governance. These often take place in so-called “labs” (short for “laboratory”) where a diversity of stakeholders including academics, programmers, artists and citizens are invited to take active part in inventing new forms of collaboration and steering. One such example is the Governance Futures Lab at the Institute for the Future (Palo Alto, USA). The underlying motive is: “If government as we’ve known it isn’t working, what fair, modern, and viable models will we have to rely upon to re-constitute society? The answer to this question may not be discovered—it may have to be invented.” The lab develop tools which allow for not only participation and experimentation with different ways to “connect, organize and coordinate human behavior”, but also methods for foresight. Another example is the Governance Lab (or “GovLab”) at New York University (USA). The lab focuses on how information communication can help support new forms of governance. The activities of the lab build on the following hypotheses (a) institutions that govern themselves more collaboratively solve problems faster and with greater success; and (b) greater engagement leads to more legitimate democratic governance and also to better solutions for citizens. Sources and more information: http://www.iftf.org/govfutures/ and http://thegovlab.org/

Shadow networks, “niches” and transition arenas Innovation processes and larger system transitions (sometimes denoted transformations) often emerge at “lower” scales, and in settings outside of conventional decision-making structures. The systems of interest (say, technological or social-ecological) as well as the terminology differs between different research streams. These informal settings are generally denoted “shadow networks” (Folke et al. 2005, Olsson et al. 2006), “niches” (Kemp et al. 1998, Geels 2004), or “transition arenas” (Loorbach 2010). The common theme is that actors organize, share information, build trust and experiment with novel solutions or approaches that are considerably different from dominant ones. As phrased by Geels (2004), “niches are locations where it is possible to deviate from the rules in the existing regime. The emergence of new paths has been described as a ‘process of mindful deviation’” (pp. 912). For example, Olsson and colleagues (2006, also Gelchich et al. 2010) explore how different modes of ecosystem governance evolved in “shadow networks” before replacing older 10 It should be noted that the issue of innovation, transitions and transformations are much debated in the academic literature, see e.g. Stirling (2014), Weinstein et al. 2013, O’Brien (2011).

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models of management; Kemp et al. (2007) elaborate the role of “niche policies” that remove barriers to the development of system innovations in Dutch waste management; and Westley and Antadze (2010) analyze the interplay between social entrepreneurs (who create novel programs, projects, products and platforms) and institutional or system entrepreneurs who work to disturb the larger scale institutions and systemic arrangements in order to allow the innovations to flourish and to broaden their transformative impact (see also Westley et al. 2013).

Diffusion and Upscaling Another common theme centers on the ability of actors to not only create small-scale experiments in niches or shadow networks, but also to find means and opportunities (or “windows of opportunities”) to upscale alternative solution. This multilevel process has been explored theoretically from diverse perspectives (Geels 2004, Olsson et al. 2006, Biggs et al. 2010, Loorbach 2010, Westley and Antadze 2010). However, many highlight the role of crisis as opportunities for change, the role of leadership to connect actor networks across scales, and a diverse set of organizational innovations and/or policies to upscale experiments. Loorbach (2010) sees this as a process that can be partly steered through government policies: experiments can be evaluated and if deemed successful, can be repeated in different contexts (broadening) and scaled up from the microto the mesolevel (scaling up). In this model, policy makers can create a “portfolio of related transition experiments that complement and strengthen each other, have a contribution to the sustainability objective, can be scaled up, and are significant and measurable” (pp. 176). Westley and Antadze (2010) instead explore a number of institutional and market mechanisms that contribute to what they denote “scaling out and up” of innovation. In the first case, these include market demand backed up by purchasing power, in the second case driven by institutional entrepreneurs with the ability to mobilize resources, create a vision, and connect actors (pp. 9-13). Diffusion and upscaling of innovation hence evolve as the result of not only the agency of institutional entrepreneurs in complex actor networks (Westley et al. 2013), but also through a mix of policy and market instruments. Opportunity contexts are key to understanding successful transformation. Successful innovation at one scale is limited or enhanced by whether it is embedded in an opaque, hazy or transparent opportunity context defined by economical, social and institutional circumstances (Westley et al. 2013).

Changing the “framing” A few recent contributions to the discussion about global environmental risks and innovation focus less on concrete policy leverages, but rather on frames of reference, or “framings”. Frames are related to the way issues are formulated and communicated, often with important implications for

policy making. Marten Hajer (2013) uses climate change as an example: it can be seen as a technological challenge, the result of market failures, a global distribution issue, or as the ecological limit to overconsumption. Each of these framings implies different policies and assignment of responsibilities and blame (p. 24). Hajer proposes a reframing of the issue – focusing on learning, innovation and creativity instead of “limits”, “boundaries” and top-down implementation. In Hajer’s own words:

“Such a reassessment could involve combining green growth with the f rame of the energetic society. Get c itizens, farmers and businesses onboard, and develop a new, beckoning mindset that presents new opportunities, offers new openings, releases more energy and encourages the creativity that already exists in society to flourish.” (Hajer 2011, p. 29). A similar argument can be found in DeFries at el. 2012, and their discussion about “planetary opportunities”, in this case with a strong focus on a “renewed” research agenda. In Hajer’s case however, a vision of an “energetic society” should be supported with nimble forms of steering: transition management approaches (above) polycentric strategies, information and communications technologies, and a mix of “governance tools” (p. 41-2, 47-50, 51ff).

Identified Challenges Despite an increasing interest in innovation by international actors - such as the World Bank’s 2009 World Development Marketplace, and the 2007 ECOSOC Innovation Fair - current academic understandings of innovation dynamics is limited, and tends to have bias towards technical systems, rather than on innovations that address environmental risks. Even though some very tangible policy-recommendations could be extracted from the literature, their applications are unclear for the reduction of environmental risks. For example, whether, and how “niches” or “transition arenas” can be created and framed at the international level as a means to reduce connected risks, has yet to be explored in the literature (Galaz et al. 2012a). It should also be noted that innovations that entail some sort of modification of natural systems could have largescale effects through diffusion or up-scaling. Examples here include the suggested re-greening of the Sahel, or controversial schemes for iron fertilization of oceans for carbon-dioxide removal. Experiments of this sort can induce new kinds of conflicts at the international level as international policy

makers try to actively support, or regulate certain forms of innovations. The possibility for conflicts around innovation also raises issues about diversity, direction and distribution (Leach et al. 2012). That is, even though “innovation” might be viewed as an overarching social goal, there are issues related to the need to promote a diversity of innovations and approaches, being clear on the particular goals and principles driving policy and innovation, and taking distributional impacts and trade-offs seriously. Innovation is also inherently risky. Adopting an innovation strategy in order to address sustainability challenges demands engagement with early stage innovation which is characterized by unpredictability, high failure rates and unanticipated outcomes. Moreover, successful transformation may result in challenges to many entrenched and powerful interests. These may be motivated to suppress the innovation right at the point that it has demonstrated its transformative potential. For this reason, innovations often need to be nurtured “below the radar screen”, raising issues of the transparency and challenging the participatory process which many hold. However, as noted above, the risks of unintended consequences remain and even augment when an innovation is successful. For this reason innovation policy itself needs to be viewed as experiments. In less hierarchical, more loosely structured and more participatory governance structures the challenge remains how such experiments are monitored, and how flexible the system can be to the requirement for adjustment when negative consequences of innovation become apparent. All these issues highlight the need for not only supporting innovation, but also to establish overarching governance principles that can help define directions, mediate potential conflicts, and facilitate scientific and societal debates.

5.6. Improving Legitimacy11 Discussions about democratic legitimacy at the international level have emerged intensively the last decades as processes of globalization challenge governance capacities at national and international scales. Yet international actors have seemed unable – or unwilling – to tackle the most pressing problems. It is often suggested that democracy, as a process of collective problem solving, may have the ability to break cooperative gridlock in global governance and provide a suitable framework to mitigate transnational risks. Different proposals and models of global democracy and democratic decision-making have emerged over the years, each proposing different mechanisms to enhance legitimacy as a means to address global risks. 11 This part builds on background report Kuyper (2014)

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a) Cosmopolitan Democracy One important stream in this literature centers on the notion of cosmopolitan democracy (Held 1992, Held 1995). Archibugi (2008) outlined how a federation (or ‘commonwealth’) of democratic nations could be constructed. Both Held and Archibugi suggest that cosmopolitan democracy is imperative to reduce the deficit between global rule makers and affected rule takers in a way that respects both individual autonomy and solves global problems. The literature has taken many distinct turns. World government blueprints, and statist alternatives are just a few of the suggestions put forward to address the global democratic deficit. In Box 10, we briefly summarize what one tangible proposals to reform institutions to better reflect the vision of “cosmopolitan democracy” would look like.

Box 10. Cosmopolitan Democracy As noted above, the most prominent response to the global democratic deficit is the model of cosmopolitan democracy (Held 1995). Coming to the forefront at the conclusion of the Cold War and the demise of communism, cosmopolitan democracy builds upon Francis Fukuyama’s famous ‘end of history’ declaration that liberal democracy had become the sine qua non of modern governance. Drawing upon this ideal, cosmopolitan democrats suggest that individual rights and autonomy should be protected and promoted by new and existing international organizations. Individuals – from the local to the global – should be included in the decisions which affect their lives. In doing so, cosmopolitan democracy seeks to lift familiar statist mechanisms to the world stage: parliaments, courts, charters of rights, and so on. These institutions should operate in conjunction with national governments. This model emphasizes a series of short- and long-term proposals required to undercut the democratic deficit and problems of risk (Held 1995). In the short term, the UN Security Council (UNSC) should be reformed to give developing states a more powerful voice, enhanced regional powers, compulsory jurisdiction of the international criminal court (ICC), and the creation of a small but effective international military force. In the long term, a global parliamentary assembly should be established to give individuals direct voting in the matters which affect their lives (c.f. Falk and Strauss 2001). A global charter of rights should also be established, a balance of power between a global parliament, courts, and legislatures should be fostered, and nation-states should be demilitarized. Finally, global civil society should become a diverse and self-regulating force juxtaposed to international politics and economics. These institutions should become the arenas for international problem solving and cooperation.

It is interesting to note the link between proposals for cosmopolitan democracy and versions of it, to the discussion on “gridlock”. As theorist in this field note, international negotiations are often shrouded in secrecy and accountability is highly limited. In almost all cases, citizens are removed from these processes, thus deepening the democratic deficit. The transnational response to global negotiating gridlock has been to shift (back) toward minilateral agreements that also entail a democratic deficit (see previous discussion

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about “club approaches”). This deficit becomes more severe in cases where the distributions of global risks are disproportionate across states, and “club members” exclude the most vulnerable states. Just as relevantly, several scholars have suggested that the rise of global governance is leading to politicization: increased knowledge of, and resistance toward, illegitimate forms of authority beyond the state (Zürn et al. 2012). A key example of the risk of politicization – a trope from the global democracy literature – is the 1999 “Battle in Seattle”. In November of that year, roughly 50,000 protesters flooded the streets to protest the most “powerful, secretive, and anti-democratic body” in the world: the World Trade Organization (WTO). Under the weight of this protest, the much-vaunted Millennium Round collapsed. It was, though, shifted to Doha in subsequent years to evade such public scrutiny. In order to avoid wide spread resistance, Zürn et al. (2012) note that international organizations necessitate legitimacy to maintain functionality. This requires belief in, and support for, the actions of a particular body by affected individuals (Buchanan and Keohane 2006). Many global democracy advocates have suggested that democratic mechanisms will be essential to shore up support and mitigate the risks of destructive politicization. b) World Government The cosmopolitan model stops short of a world government. Many notable proponents – such as Hugo Grotius (the father of international law), Pierre Dubois, Abbé de Saint-Pierre, and Jeremy Bentham – have all engaged with the notion of world government (Cabrera 2010). Proponents – from Luis Cabrera, to Raffaele Marchetti, and Alexander Wendt – argue that cosmopolitan democrats do not do enough (institutionally-speaking) to secure democratic rights and tackle global problems. Instead of balancing national interests against cosmopolitan democracy, the argument is that an overarching world government is needed to give all affected individuals institutional standing. This entails, according to Cabrera (2005) “restructuring of the global system to bring states under the authority of just supranational institutions”. Although subsidiarity would apply, world government institutions would have formal supremacy over states. While this model also entails global parliaments and courts, it also would necessitate a monopoly on coercion, a standing military, and a complete global constitution (Tännsjö 2008:125-6). According to advocates, only a multi-level system of democratic world government, in which current states and sub-state bodies are embedded in global organizations, could remedy global risks (Cabrera 2005). c) Deliberate Global Democracy In stark contrast to cosmopolitan and world government institutional solutions, deliberative democrats offer their own model to remedy the democratic deficit (Dryzek 2000). In contrast to the ‘vote-centric’ notion of democratic politics preferred by cosmopolitan democrats and world govern-

ment scholars, deliberative democracy offers a ‘talk-centric’ view. The ideal of deliberative democracy is that inclusive, non-coercive, and reciprocal discussion on matters of common interest should mold individual preferences and shape public policy. The model suggests that individual rule takers should be allowed to deliberate over the rules and policies to which global rule makers subject them. Institutions should be designed to mitigate bargaining and coercion so that authentic deliberation can come to the fore. This requires restructuring existing institutions – such as the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, and other international organizations – to minimize the effects of power politics. Equal opportunity for participation should be open to all individuals and states, irrespective of national resources or income. Specific institutions – such as a global citizens’ assembly – could be constructed to enable rule takers to discuss their views and inform rule makers of these preferences. Above all, deliberative democracy provides a set of tools to open discussion about tackling global risks which highlights the give and take of reasons (e.g. Habermas 2001). The deliberative model places much faith in global civil society (GCS) as a vehicle of global democratization. GSC – institutionally-composed of NGOs, interest groups, and even individuals – is supposed to offer a free and unconstrained area of deliberation away from the pressures of national governments and the market (Dryzek 2012). GCS often tackle issues of risk which IGOs and states have proven impotent in resolving. In this realm, citizens can discuss their views, transform their preferences, and seek influence over rule makers. This can happen through the lobbying pressure of NGOs, social movements and protests, writing letters to national representatives, and many other channels. James Bohman (2007) has described how a model of global repub licanism could ensure global democracy through trans national deliberation between affected publics in GCS. This model is supposed to provide an outlet for citizens to contest global authority and ameliorate issues of global risk. d) The Statist Model The final institutional solution comes from a diverse range of scholars that could loosely be described as a statist model. In this prescription, the democratic deficit can be reduced by strengthening the links between citizens and their national government, and by heightening the role of national governments in global affairs. If rule takers have democratic control over national rule makers who in turn direct global governance, the democratic deficit is essentially overcome. This entails rolling back global governance and re-asserting national sovereignty. International organizations (IOs) should once again become tools of national governments, and international bureaucrats should be answerable solely to national leaders. Many problems of risk exacerbated by global governance would be undercut. Global governance would be democratic to the extent that multilateral collaboration occurs between democratic states. This

model could take diverse institutional forms, but the design of all IOs should place the rights of democratic states at the core. Statism varies from cosmopolitan democracy which entails giving rule makers a direct say in global governance and limiting national sovereignty (Scholte forthcoming). The statist model comes in two distinct strands. The most radical strand is composed of ‘new sovereigntists’ (Goodhart and Taninchev 2011). These proponents – who include John Bolton, Jack Goldsmith, Eric Posner, Jeremy Rabkin, and many others – argue that global governance in all forms undermines popular sovereignty and, by extension, national democracy. Because states are beholden to IOs, citizens cannot determine the course or policy of the national government. The remedy suggested by most new sovereigntists is to strip back the interdependence of global governance and strengthen national authority. The less radical view comes from Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, and Steven Macedo (2009). These authors suggest that global governance can actually support national democracies by restricting the power of special interest groups, protecting individual rights, and carving out space of deliberation. Both strands suggest that rule makers should have democratic rights within the state, and global governance should be limited to multilateral institutions which bolster national democracy. e) Interconnected Models of Global Democracy The models discussed would all struggle to mitigate issues of global risk and dampen the global democratic deficit. Over the past few years, a new method of thinking about global democracy has come to the fore. Instead of seeking one specific model of global democracy, proponents can disaggregate the concept of democracy (people’s rule) into a set of values which can be sought in myriad ways across the international system (de Búrca 2008). These values – such as equal participation, accountability, popular control, authentic deliberation, and contestation – are common to a range of different democratic models, but exclusive to none (Bexell et al. 2010). This approach suggests that advocates can strive for different democratic values in the international system (Little and Macdonald 2013, Kuyper 2014). IOs can then be judged by how well they secure participation, accountability, deliberation, and other values with respect to affected rule takers. This proposal may also be better equipped to handle interconnected issues of global risk. Climate change, intellectual property rights, financial crises, security, refugee movement, terrorism, and a host of other risks stretch across issue areas. For instance, pandemics are a public health, (bio-) security, and intellectual property issue. Climate change is most obviously an environmental problem, but it raises economic, health, and development questions. While models of democracy provide an ex ante institutional scheme – global parliament, world government, GCS, or intergovernmental organizations and multilateralism – to handle problems of risk, attaining democratic values opens up novel avenues to

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include stakeholders, secure compliance, and find demo cratic solutions to problems (Bexell et al. 2010). In this vein, different risks can be democratized in different ways. Ecological risks may well be more amenable to deliberative democratization as John Dryzek (2012) has suggested, whereas economic governance is more susceptible to standards of (liberal) accountability (Keohane et al. 2009). Indeed, it may also turn out that interconnected problems of risk are most likely to give rise to problem solving and democratization. In the area of intellectual property rights, the ability of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to bolster development rights and public health against the economic mandate of the WTO, highlights how IOs in different issue areas can enable deliberation and participation to tackle risk. Looking at the intersections of issue areas, and the potential of interconnected institutions, presents novel options for democratic problem solving.

Identified challenges The cosmopolitan model seeks to replicate mechanisms from the national level beyond the state to undercut problems of risk. The model is ambitious, but two critical issues remain unclear and pose difficult obstacles. First, why would states agree to create such bodies of decision-making that undermine their sovereignty? As we have seen in previous sections, states are less than prone to agree on institutional reforms that would undermine their independence. Second, it remains unclear whether global parliaments and courts could actually mitigate transnational problems. Even with 1, 000 members of a global parliament, the constituency would cover more than 7 million individuals straining the connection between rule makers and rule takers. Moreover, the global system is characterized by deep pluralism and inequality between developed and developing states. Within states, it is historically clear that introducing parliaments into fragile and unequal contexts leads to corruption and further breakdown (Goldstone 2010). There is good reason to think that a similar problem could emerge under a system of cosmopolitan democracy which may exacerbate both the democratic deficit and issues of risk. While a world government in theory might have the capa city to remedy some risks, it also entails substantial risk itself. Kant specifically sought a democratic federation without formation of a world government as he thought the latter would end in ‘soulless despotism’. By this Kant meant that the absolute power necessary to establish and maintain a world government would lead to power-mongering between elites, rather than democratic participation for affected citizens. Although world government scholars rightly claim that problems of global risk need to be addressed – and that affected citizens should have a democratic say in global rule-making – it is not clear that a world government model could actually be designed and enacted in line with preconceived (democratic) ideals (Kuyper forthcoming). As historical institutionalists have

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so forcefully noted, unintended consequences and the logic of path dependence often knock institutions off their chosen trajectory (Pierson 2004). Given the large-scale and totalizing nature of a world government, this point bears remembering. Moreover, if a world government system was coopted by elites and powerful states who prefer the status quo, international risks might be made less tractable (Kuyper forthcoming). In the deliberate model, global civil society can be an unconstrained arena for deliberation, but it is also susceptible to coercive power relations between individual citizens, NGOs, and rule makers. Elites can frame issues for GCS to discuss. NGOs and individuals with more resources can influence rule makers to a greater extent than individuals with fewer resources. These problems can often make civil society deliberation coercive in nature, and undercut the notion of political equality considered essential to ‘rule by the people’ (Erman forthcoming). Moreover, current problems – such as global corruption, financial governance, and international warfare – have proven quite unresponsive to deliberative mechanisms. The statist model has several well-known limitations. First, it is at odds with the empirical reality of world politics. IGOs, NGOs, multinational corporations, and other international actors all wield authority without the sanctioning of states. Indeed, the credibility of many international actors derives from the fact that they operate without official state control. NGOs often seek to expose unjust state behavior; MNCs evade national regulations and taxes by shifting their headquarters; and international financial bodies such as the IMF require some degree of independence to decide where to allocate funds. These bodies, which operate beyond the control of states, can play an essential role in addressing international risk. While new sovereignists might deride this state of affairs, it is not feasible to curtail global governance (Goodhart and Taninchev 2011). Second, intergovernmental organizations typically develop their own cultures and pathologies which pull against the preferences of national governments (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). Thus, even if citizens have national democratic rights, over time IOs will strain the connections between citizens and global rule makers. Finally, trying to constrain global governance to inter-governmental decision-making may exacerbate global risks. Issues (such as climate change) are subject to seemingly impervious cooperation and collective action problems, and inter-national negotiations have proven ineffective in their resolution. Finally, all models of global democracy should be viewed in the context of persistent feelings of nationalism from citizens. Shifting authority to the regional and global level can generate cosmopolitan feelings and sentiments, but it can also lead to dissatisfaction with governance beyond the state. Under these conditions, individuals tend to reassert their national identity. As a current example,

this reaction can be seen across many European states as citizen dissatisfaction with the EU produces deep levels of Euro-skepticism (de Wilde and Zürn 2012). This is problematic because global problem solving requires both rule makers and rule takers working in tandem. Rule takers should be included in sites of global authority, not just to enhance inclusion and the legitimacy of decision-making, but to help secure support for the outcomes of rule-making. Implementing risk-reducing policies will require action that stretches from international coordination all the way from multinational corporations, and national policies, to individual compliance. If global governance is continually seen as illegitimate and undemocratic, solving problems of global risk will remain elusive.

A Legal Perspective As discussed previously, international human rights law has been explored as a legal mechanism that could have large implications for evolving norms that could address global risks. Progressive interpretations have been proposed as a means to enhance legitimacy and a legal basis for international coordination around the reduction of environmental risks. However, some human rights bodies, the European Court of Human Rights in particular, have been criticized for their limited approach to environmental problems due to their individualistic, and thus reductionist, approach to human rights, instead of focussing on the collective-social dimension of human rights (Francioni 2010). The latter dimension according would enable human rights bodies to more fruitfully engage with environmental problems.

The Aarhus Convention is often raised as an important UN treaty that formulates the public’s right to information and participation in decision making as well as the right to access to justice, and has had some notable impacts in these domains (see Kravchenko 2007 for details). However, the geographical scope of the convention is at present limited to the UNECE region and covers its states parties and the European Union. The qualification of parts of international regulation as global administrative law points to the potential of measures akin to those familiar from national administrative law to enhance transparency, the participation of stakeholders and the accountability of IOs as well as other institutional actors active at the international level. Such actors may also include so-called Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) (Kingsbury and Casini 2009). Examples of relevant mechanisms include the grievance mechanisms established by international development banks, such as the World Bank Inspection Panel, as well as complaint mechanisms established by PPP, such as the Forest Stewardship Council for the purpose of promoting the sustainable production of timber. Creating the possibility for local actors (individuals and groups) to access international grievance and complaint mechanisms requires these actors to ‘speak the language’ of international relations and law. Such procedures therefore may not be accessible to all and may not in fact foster equal participation.

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6. Models of Global Governance

In the previous chapter, we explored how different disciplinary approaches analyze and attempt to tackle a number of fundamental global governance challenges associated with global connected risks. As the discussion has shown, the academic literature is not only very rich, but also contains multiple alternative approaches. In the following chapter, we present four different and highly stylized governance types, or governance models. These are based on the synthesis presented in previous chapters in the report, but in a simplified way to summarize alternative ways of approaching global connected risks. The ambition is to integrate insights from different disciplines into stylized, simple models that can be assessed using a set of criteria. In our case, we use the criteria developed in chapter 5 as a means to make a first rough assessment of each model’s strengths and weaknesses (for similar approaches, see Pierre and Peters 2005, Duit and Galaz 2008, Hooghe and Marks 2003). The methodology is by no means perfect. First of all, it assumes that all of the positive effects identified in the previous chapter play out. Second, the analysis is heavily influenced by the biases created in our selection of the research fields; the identified governance functions; and our interpretation of the literature. The strength however, is that it provides a basis for a much needed multi-theoretical discussion on governance approaches to connected risks. We conclude this chapter with an additional assessment of the models based on the criteria developed by the Global Challenges Foundation.12

12 Criteria from document Global Challenges Foundation ”Stiftelsens syn på global rättsordning (GRO)”. The criteria have been modified slightly for the purpose of this report.

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6.1. Exploring the Models Network revolution – this model focuses on the possibilities and strengths of network steering, club approaches, and polycentric governance. This approach emerges from the attempts by actors to side step, and/or complement existing multilateral agreements. Examples of this form of networked governance include collaborations such as city alliances such as C40 (Ostrom 2010); partnerships between international organizations, NGOs and scientific organizations such as the Global Partnership on Climate, Fisheries and Aquaculture (Pacfa, see Galaz et al. 2011); and a diversity of “creative coalitions” with the ambition to help tackle connected risks (Oxford Martin School 2013). This model is often proposed as a means to overcome gridlock. Smaller “coalitions of the willing” could at best create more ambitious policies as these forms of collaborations do not require unanimous decision-making in complex multilateral actor settings (e.g. Conference of the Parties). These networks and coalitions have been viewed as possible agents that could act as “norm entrepreneurs” and contribute to the evolution of risk reducing principles. The repeated meetings and reports advanced by the World Economic Forum (WEF) on “Global Risks” is an illustrative example of how smaller coalitions of the willing, try to not only put global risks on the international agenda, but also explore alternative modes of steering. Some of these partnerships and networks have the ability to address thresholds, connectivity and surprise by investing in early warning capacities, multilevel collaboration, and by trying to influence formal international institutions. Some of these capacities are embedded in their ability to underpin networked crisis management responses. In addition, evolving networks could help navigate frag mentation and polycentricity as actors (e.g. international organizations and secretariats, business associations,

scientific bodies) self-organize to advance common interests, sometimes directly addressing the creation and responses to global connected risks. Their potential is however considerably limited by the nature of voluntary collaboration as urgent issues could remain poorly addressed due to disagreements, perceived unequal distribution of costs and benefits, and a number of social, economic and scientific uncertainties. The case explored below about geo-engineering is illustrative of potential pertinent governance gaps. It has been proposed that networked forms of governance have an advantage to other forms by their innovation capacities. This capacity is created by the diversity, flexi bility and modularity inherent in networks. This capacity however, is not necessarily matched by a joint clear direction. That is – while some networks emerge that attempt to untangle global connected risks, others might increase these either unintentionally (i.e. by facilitating social activities that enhance risk), or intentionally (i.e. by lobbying against improved risk regulation). Hence this model lacks an explicit understanding of institutional mechanisms needed to coordinate, steer or assess the result of the innovative capacities embedded in networks. The case of geoengineering (Box 11) is an illustrative example of tangible governance gaps that may emerge in governance models relaying to heavily on network approaches.

Box 11. Geoengineering, networks and institutions The debate about the possibilities to engineer the Earth’s climate has changed drastically in the last years. Suggestions of largescale technological interventions to combat climate change that a decade ago would have been discarded as science fiction are slowly moving into the center of international climate change discussions, research, and politics. Part of this debate is centered on several recent geoengineering associated experiments entailing iron fertilization (which theoretically would contribute to carbon sequestration), and technologies to deploy aerosols in the stratosphere (sometimes denoted Solar Radiation Management). Both experimentation and deployment entail a number of environmental, social and political risks, and several self-organized initiatives – such as the Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative – are trying to address the existing global governance gaps. Despite this however, it is clear that the governance of these technologies has a number of pertinent gaps created by the lack of agreed upon overarching principles and international institutions. Sources: Long and Winickoff 2010, Galaz 2014, Barrett et al. 2014.

In a similar way, an increased emphasis on networked forms of governance might enhance legitimacy by increasing the participation of a diversity of actors in international decision-making. At the same time however, there are some relevant concerns that approaches that build on exclusive collaborations of states and non-state actors (such as climate clubs), might undermine legitimacy as they could exclude the participation from relevant actors such as other

states or societal interests. From a normative perspective, two major problems are likely to be (a) the undermining of political equality, as only some get to participate, and (b) problems of accountability, as it is unclear who is responsible for decisions. In the end, a network revolution face tangible challenges of increasing a perceived “global democratic deficit” unless mechanisms for transparency, participation and accountability are embedded as these networks expand. Deep institutional reforms – this model focuses on tangible and transformative institutional reforms at the institutional level. As explored earlier, this includes a stronger mandate to a possible World Environmental Organization; stronger integration of environmental and social concerns in existing regimes including trade; novel accountability mechanisms; and internationally coordinated adaptation policies. In this model, international bodies play a critical role in defining the international policy agenda; promoting improved governance at the national and local level; and by coordinating policies at the international level (see chapter 5). This model could help contribute to the creation and diffusion of risk reducing principles in important ways. For example, global risk assessments (by e.g. UNEP or IPBES) and increased integration between international institutions (e.g. environment and trade regimes), make for a potentially very powerful combination. In addition, this is also the model with the most explicit capacities to support international enforcement. In short, deep institutional reforms of this kind could create an institutional architecture where repeated scientific risk assessments influence international decision-making in important ways from a risk perspective. Such a model is also (by design) targeted at addressing issues related to the need to navigate fragmentation and polycentricity through the strategic management of institutional interactions, as well as the need for increased legitimacy. In the latter case, this is the only model (besides from “global citizen” below) with the ability to include the indirect representation of citizens through state representatives on intergovernmental bodies, in a transparent and accountable way. The model however, addresses issues of gridlock only partially, or could at worst even be seen as a recipe for gridlock. By that we mean that while some of the suggestions such as modification of voting rules towards qualified majority in certain policy areas, it remains unclear how processes of gridlock can be addressed. In similar ways, this model does not address the critical issue of thresholds, connectivity and surprise explicitly. While this model certainly might help reduce environmental stresses that create global connected risks, it does not necessarily result in institutions and modes of governance able to adapt and respond to threshold behavior and cascades. A similar analysis can be made for the model’s lack of emphasis on innovation dynamics. While this model is

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esigned to help overcome fragmentation and segmentad tion, it remains unclear how capacities for technological, social and institutional innovation can be promoted. While innovation can be supported through internationally coordinated programs (such as those proposed for adaptation policies), this model lacks an underlying theory of innovation dynamics and how these can be promoted through institutional design. Legal transformations – this model builds on the assumption that a number of changes unfold in international principles and legal architectures at the international level. These changes are the result of either re-interpretations of international law (e.g. by progressive interpretations of human rights law), or by the creation of new international norms and principles (e.g. a Grundnorm for planetary stewardship, or the recognition of “Ecocide” as an international crime. Such a development could unfold in a nonlinear way as norm entrepreneurs mobilize social support and help spread and implement emerging norms (e.g. NGO’s promoting legislation on “Ecocide” or a “Planetary Boundaries Declaration). These would trigger a set of institutional reforms (such as environmental courts), and have an impact on the behavior of states and non-states actors such as private companies. Questions of legitimacy are important in this model, and could be addressed through institutional mechanisms that secure transparency, participation and accountability, especially through courts. This however, is highly dependent on the general trust that citizens place at courts and judicial processes at the national and international level. As in the previous model, a legal transformation would create and diffuse risk-reducing principles in important ways as governments, courts and other actors adapt their institutional configurations and behavior to a new legal reality. Such a model also has the potential to guide institutional development and interactions towards a shared purpose thereby reducing institutional fragmentation through the evolution of peremptory norms in international law (ius cogens). Such evolving principles could be supported by institutional mechanisms that secure public and stakeholder participation, hence addressing potential legitimacy concerns. Examples here include legal mechanisms for public participation in permit systems and impact assessments (Ebbesson 2010), as well as rules that define the persons with rights to participate, access information and to request legal reviews of decisions (Ebbesson and Folke 2014). As in the previous model “Deep institutional reform”, the model does not address issues of gridlock explicitly. It is unclear the mechanisms by which more progressive interpretations of international law would evolve in the face of serious disagreements and failure to reach agreements between nation states in a multipolar world. As some have noted however, Courts can introduce new doctrines that

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pave the way for political agreements even when these are plagued by gridlock (e.g. the “silent revolution” induced by the European Court of Justice in the 1970’s, Weiler 1994). In addition, this model does only partially address the critical issue of thresholds, connectivity and surprise. The evolution and diffusion of strong legal mechanisms and risk reducing norms can help reduce stresses that create global connected risks, and may result in institutions and modes of governance able to adapt to changing circumstances if proper legal mechanisms are in place (c.f. Ebbesson 2010, Cooney and Lang 2007). However, it is unclear whether these mechanisms could help support societal responses to threshold behavior and cascades. As previous studies indicate, these capacities are not in legal frameworks alone, but rather embedded in the interplay between law and actor networks (van Baalen and van Fenema 2009, Galaz et al. 2014, Österblom and Sumaila 2009). This model also lacks an underlying theory of innovation dynamics, and of how legal mechanisms at the international level can support social, institutional and technological innovation. While some of these issues are covered at the national level by the literature on transition management (e.g. Loorbach 2010), there is a tangible lack of studies exploring similar issues at the international level (Galaz 2014). Global citizen – is the last model. Rather than assuming deep institutional reforms at the international level, or the emergence of international networks and partnerships, it builds on bottom up approaches with a strong emphasis on new forms of global democracy, the advancement of democratic values in existing institutions, and a strong civil society engagement. The model would contribute to the evolution of risk reducing norms, and the reduction of fragmentation only indirectly. Emphasis is instead placed at addressing a perceived global democratic deficit and to enhance legitimacy by making sure that democratic values – such as equal participation, accountability, popular control, authentic deliberation, and contestation – permeate international institutions and organizations. However, scholars have noted that patterns of participation can reproduce structural inequalities in the world, and that actors such as NGOs come with their own legitimacy problems (Tallberg et al. 2013). Such reforms could in addition contribute to enhanced flexibility and adaptiveness of global environmental governance. The reason is that increased participation often entails increased transparency, overview and accountability in the form of permit systems, impact assessments, wider access to information and similar legal mechanisms (Ebbesson 2010, Ebbesson and Folke 2014). While this might contribute to adaptability and stronger enforcement, it is unclear in what ways these mechanisms would be able to better handle thresholds, connectivity and surprise.

Bottom-up approaches of this sort contribute to increased innovative capacities in important ways. A wider participation from civil society and actors, combined with changes in the framing of policies with a focus on innovation and opportunities, has been proposed as an important alternative approach towards the reduction of connected risks (Hajer 2011, Hajer 2013, DeFries et al. 2012). Such a model would

also side-step processes of gridlock by simply focusing on other levels of decision-making and action – the local, national and transnational (c.f. “Network revolution”). Table 12 summarizes the key features of the models and their strengths and weaknesses in relation to the identified governance challenges.

Table 12. Models and Governance Functions

Network Revolution Focus on the potential in network steering, club approaches and polycentric governance

Deep Institutional Reforms Focus on tangible institutional reforms at the international level.

Legal transformation Focus lies in a number of reforms in the international legal architecture with transformative impacts.

Global Citizen Focus on bottom-up approaches, advancement of democratic values in international institutions.

Innovative Capacities

Enhancing Legitimacy

Can at best help bridge fragmentation, but also contribute to additional governance complexity.

High innovation capacities, however difficult to direct through political decision-making.

Could increase legitimacy through increased participation from civil society and non-state actors in partnerships and networks.

Only addresses this issue partially, unclear how institutional reforms would build capacities to better detect, respond and recover from threshold behavior, connectivity and surprise.

Institutional reforms would reduce the impacts of institutional fragmentation through e.g. mechanisms for the management of institutional interactions, as well as better overview of existing international partnerships.

Does not explicitly address innovation dynamics. Potential for international institutions to support a wide set of innovations, but issue remains poorly explored.

Would enhance legitimacy through institutional mechanisms that secure transparency, participation and accountability.

Would contribute to the diffusion of risk reducing norms through e.g. norms for planetary stewardship. International and national (quasi) courts would act as enforcers.

Only addresses this issue partially, unclear how legal reforms would build capacities to better detect, respond and recover from threshold behavior, connectivity and surprise.

New legal norms could contribute to the reduction of institutional fragmentation through e.g. a grundnorm that would act as a legally binding superior and coordinating norm. Grievance mechanisms, including human rights bodies, may serve as connectors between various levels of governance.

This model does not explicitly address innovation dynamics. There is potential for international law to support a wide set of innovations, but issue remains poorly explored.

Would enhance legitimacy through institutional mechanisms that secure transparency, participation and access to justice and thus enhance accountability, including through (quasi-) courts.

Would contribute only indirectly. Assumes that risk reduction is a key concern among citizens and non-state actors.

Only addresses this issue partially, however increased participation is known to enhance adaptive capacities in general.

Unclear how reforms towards global democracy and advancements of democratic values would address issues of fragmentation.

Wider participation combined with a focus on innovation and opportunities, could spur innovation towards the reduction of connected risks

Could increase legitimacy through increased participation from civil society and non-state actors in international fora, or though novel mechanisms that support increased participation and/or transparency.

Thresholds, Connectivity and Surprise

Overcoming Gridlock

Risk Reducing Principles

Smaller coalitions through e.g. “club approaches” and polycentric coordination, can help overcome gridlock.

Smaller coalitions and partnerships can act as risk reducing “norm entrepreneurs”.

Network collaborations can support early warning and response capacities.

Only addresses the issue partially, unclear how deep institutional reforms would come about.

Combination of scientific assessments and stronger international institutions could act as powerful driver of norm changes.

Does not address issues of gridlock, unclear how a legal transformation would come about.

Could help address gridlock by increasing pressure on international policy makers, and by focusing political action on other levels of decision-making.

Fragmentation and Polycen tricity

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Table 13. Concepts associated with governance challenges and research fields complexity

legitimacy

innovation

gridlock

network

Int Law

0,48

0,39

0,37

0,32

0,19

GlobEnvGov

0,58

0,54

0,39

0,36

0,24

Glob Dem

0,54

0,96

0,25

0,43

0,33

Cris Man

0,63

0,28

0,68

0,32

0,34

Adap Gov

0,99

0,41

0,65

0,21

0,37

Innov

0,67

0,34

0,99

0,47

0,24

Comment: figures in the table cells display the percentage of association, i.e. 0,99 = 99 %. Colors are also representations of association, starting with red indicating very limited association, and green showing considerable association.

The multidisciplinary nature of these issues can be explored using the database created for this project. Table 13 shows the relative number of articles that appear in each field related to each governance function (see appendix 1 for methodology). The selection was done by comparing keywords associated with each governance function (explored earlier in chapter 5). For example, 96 % percent of the articles in the literature about global democracy contain keywords associated with legitimacy, but only 33 % associated with network governance. The field adaptive governance on the other hand, addresses issues of complexity in depth (99 %), but is considerably weaker on issues about legitimacy (41 %). It is also interesting to note, that issues related to “gridlock” are poorly represented across all fields. As the analysis in table shows, each field has it clear strengths and weaknesses.13

6.2. Evaluation of Models of Global Governance In this section, we use the same four governance models and assess their strengths and weaknesses according to the criteria developed by the Global Challenges Foundation. While some the criteria are similar to those discussed in the previous section, we have chosen to separate these to simplify the analysis.

Criteria according to the Global Challenges Foundation The criteria according to the Foundation are the following14: Clearly defined purview – that is, the scope and boundaries and the organization of relevance are clearly defined, and include highly relevant global issues, such as violent interstate and intrastate conflicts. Competence 13 The numbers and analysis in this table builds on text mining techniques explained in appendix 1. The percentage shows the degree of mentions of the selected keywords. This however, does not mean that the articles address the selected issue in depth. Figures should hence be viewed as rough estimates of the contents in the analyzed articles. 14 Criteria from document Global Challenges Foundation ”Stiftelsens syn på global rättsordning (GRO)”. The criteria have translated and modified slightly for the purpose of this report.

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and resources – the organization or model has enough resources and the proper resources to be able to identify, analyze and respond to serious global issues and risks, as well as the capacity to make decisions on how to best address these problems and risks. Neutrality and justice – decision-making processes in the model lead to decisions that are to the benefit to all of human mankind and in accordance with well-established principles about neutrality, justice and human rights. Decision-making capacities – decision making and/or rules are constructed in such a way that decisions can be taken in important questions. For example, a lack of majority or veto mechanisms should not be able to block decisions that would reduce risks. Power – the model should secure that decision-makers have enough authority to be able to implement decisions in member countries. Protection against abuse of power – the model should not transgress its decision making mandate, nor benefit certain persons, groups, states or groups of states in unfair ways. Achievability – the model should be possible to realize or achieve at least on a medium term.

Evaluation of models Network revolution implies as already elaborated, a strong emphasis on advancing partnerships, networks and polycentric coordination with an emphasis on international actors. This model does not result in a clear organization with clearly defined purview. On the contrary, the key feature of this model is that decisions are dispersed across a number of actors, issues and sectors and is defined by the emerging collaboration patterns. This does not mean that competences and resources are limited however. On the contrary, networks have proven apt to bring together competences and resources even in the face of complex global risks. However, this is dependent on the perceived saliency of the issue at hand, as well as the possibilities for voluntary and non-conflictive collaboration. Networks can contribute to risk reduction in important ways, however one of the model’s main weaknesses is associated with steering. Many international network collaborations and partnerships operate with the aim to advance the common good (“neutrality and justice”), while others contribute to the creation of risk intentionally or unintentionally.

There is also a tangible risk of severe governance gaps if networks are unable to address novel risks. Examples here include synthetic biology, and geoengineering (box. 11). Decision-making capacities are distributed in this model, which means that processes of gridlock can be partly circumvented as alliances, partnerships and global networks mobilize to build early warning and response capacities, and spread risk-reducing norms. These distributed capacities however, also imply that power is diffuse, and that enforcement within nation states can’t be guaranteed. The potential abuse of power is not likely to be an issue in this model, but depends on the motives, mandate and focus of the emerging networks and partnership. This question links to issues of neutrality and justice explored earlier. Achievability is high in this model as networks and partnerships have proven to self-organize as a response to global changes and perceived global risks. Deep institutional reform – in this model, a number of targeted and deep reforms in the existing international institutional architecture would result in international organizations with clear mandates and purview, enhance decision-making capacities, provide competences and resources, and mechanisms that would secure transparency and participation in ways that minimize the potential abuse of power, and with a clear direction to contribute to the common good. The strategic management of institutional interactions and proposed new voting rules would also imply considerable power to implement new multilateral agreements. The considerable strengths of this model however assume that deep institutional reforms are guided towards improved integration of environmental risks into all sectors of international decision-making, and that this integration and empowerment of international organizations is guided by an explicit ambition to reduce and adapt to global and connected environmental risks. The achievability of this model is unclear: several proposals for deep institutional reforms of this sort have faced considerable opposition over the years (e.g. suggestions to create a World Environmental Organization), and could even trigger additional gridlock. Legal transformation – in this model, a number of changes unfold in international principles and legal architectures at the international level. The model entails new and clear mandates to especially (quasi-)courts (international and national) and would imply clear mandates and purview. It is not clear how resources and compe tences would be increased in this model, a major obstacle for the realization of any legal framework. Whether this model would contribute to the advancement of the common good depends on the underlying motive of legal reforms, but has been viewed as an outcome if legal changes build on norms and principles associated with Earth stewardship. Concerns regarding conflictive interpretations and enforcement capacities are always present. The achievability of this model is unclear for the same reason as for deep

institutional reform – attempts for reforms that would create a stronger legal architecture to reduce environmental risks have faced considerable opposition before. For example, the suggestion to include “Ecocide” as part of the potential list of Crimes against Peace (Higgins et al. 2013) was intensively debated in the United Nations between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. Yet, due to strong divergences between states on this issue, including whether intent should be a condition for liability to punishment, “Ecocide” was finally removed from the negotiating text that became the Statue of the International Criminal Court which codifies the international crimes. Global citizen is the last model, and builds on bottom-up mobilization and a number of institutional reforms that would secure participation, transparency and accountability at the international level. As for all the other models, the details of institutional reform and citizen participation matter (c.f. Kuyper 2014). This model does not necessarily result in organizations with clearly defined purview. On the contrary, the result may very well be the emergence of multiple arenas where participation of civil society and stakeholders influence international decision-making. Competences and resources can be considerable, but only if increased participation is matched with increased investments in international institutions, as well as the emergence of principles that advance the common good (“neutrality and justice”) and risk reduction. Reforms with the intention to enhance transparency and accountability are likely to help minimize the potential abuse of power. Decision-making capacities are dependent on the sort of institutions created to secure participation in international institutions. In its strongest form, decision rules in a potential global parliament could evolve in ways to prevent gridlock processes (e.g. delegation of decisions making power to expert bodies), but these mechanisms can’t be taken for granted as they could be viewed to u ndermine democratic values and contribute to a democratic deficit. The achievability of this model is unclear: several proposals for deep institutional reforms of this sort have faced strong over the years (e.g. suggestions to create a World Environmental Organization). The achievability of this model is unclear as it would require not only the support from sovereign nation states, but also general support from citizens around the world. As discussed earlier, while shifting authority to the regional and global level can generate cosmopolitan feelings and sentiments, it can also lead to strong dissatisfaction and opposition against governance beyond the state. The following table summarizes the assessment of the models according to the criteria created by the Global Challenges Foundation.

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Table 14. Summary of assessment of models based on GCF criteria

Network Revolution Focus on the potential in network steering, club approaches and polycentric governance

Deep Institutional Reforms Focus on tangible institutional reforms at the international level.

Legal transformation Focus lies in a number of reforms in the international legal architecture with transformative impacts.

Global Citizen Focus on bottom-up approaches, advancement of democratic values in international institutions.

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Clearly defined purview

Competences and resources

Neutrality and justice

Minimize abuse of power

Power

Decisionmaking capacities

Achievability

No, as decisions are dispersed across sectors, and levels of social organization.

Yes, can bring together competences and resources if issue considered salient.

Yes, in cases where networks and partnerships are driven by the ambition to reduce risk. However, their legitimacy and possibilities for equal participation have been questioned.

Unclear, depends on the aims of emerging networks, and patterns of collaboration.

Power is diffuse, no guarantee that nation states will implement agreed upon measures.

Can be high in cases where network coordination helps overcome processes of gridlock.

High, patterns of these sort already emerging potentially creating polycentric coordination

Yes, these are central aspects of this model. Emphasis on international environmental agreements and organizations.

Yes, assuming that institutional reforms also address financial mechanisms.

Yes, this model places a big emphasis on mechanisms that would enhance participation, legitimacy and accountability.

Yes, this model puts a big emphasis on mechanisms that would enhance participation, legitimacy and accountability.

Power to implement agreements can be considered high according to reformed institutions.

These capacities can be strong assuming changes in voting rules.

Unclear due to previous failed reform attempts.

Yes, these are central aspects of this model. Emphasis on courts.

Unclear, resources and competence require financial mechanisms.

Yes, but depends on underlying principles that underpin a legal transformation.

Yes, this model puts a big emphasis on legal mechanisms that would enhance participation, legitimacy and accountability.

Power to implement new legal frameworks can be high if support from nation states can be secured.

Strong if new legal principles are matched by competences and resources and support from nation states.

Unclear how a legal transformation would gain support from sovereign states.

No, as decisions are dispersed across sectors, levels of social organization. Possible with creation of global parliament.

Yes, assuming that reforms also lead to new financial mechanisms.

Yes, if increased participation is combined with new principles and norms that lead to the reduction of environmental risks.

Possibly as this model puts big emphasis on legal mechanisms that would enhance participation, legitimacy and accountability.

Highly dependent on the specifics of newly created institutions.

Can be high dependent on the specifics of newly created institutions.

Low, unclear how such a model including global parliament would unfold.

7. Areas of Convergence – Concluding comments

What are some of the best ways to address global connec ted risks? Which tangible governance pathways exist, how realistic are these, and what would they imply? This report has explored these issues combining a bibliometrical analysis with more qualitative approaches. The ambition has been to explore different streams within the social science litera ture; identify a number of critical governance functions in the face of complexity and connectivity; and try to identify some novel terrain. This terrain hopefully includes new insights, and innovative combinations of ideas from multiple scientific fields. As we already have discussed, the fragmented nature of social science approaches to the governance of risk is problematic. And it becomes increasingly so as global connectivity increases, and connected risks evolve.

tation. By that we mean that authors in the fields as a rule collaborate within their respective scientific field (Figures 3, 6, 8, 12, 15, 18). This can be seen both in the complete coauthorship network (Figure 19) and in the degree of overlap between the different disciplines (Table 11).

The emphasis in this report has been on connected environmental risks. The focus has been chosen as a way to keep the project manageable, and to match our competences. Additional disciplines as well as other kind of material (such as grey literature) could of course be included in a larger project. The benefit is that the focus has allowed us to explore and compare no less than six scientific fields of relevance for the issue. To our knowledge, this has not been done before.

From a qualitative point of view, it is clear that each domain has different and complementary strengths (see also Table 11). The last decade of changes in the way the global health community responds to outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases, is a case in point (Box 12).

In this last chapter, we summarize some key insights from the report under four main headings. The material and analysis presented here and online is much richer, but the four propositions can be seen as the main results from this initiative.15

Insight 1. Social science insights to connected risks remain fragmented, but are complementary As our previous analysis has shown (chapter 4), the investigated six research fields show some considerable fragmen15 The number in parenthesis denotes the number of the chapter, figure, table or section in this report where details can be found.

There are clear exceptions however, or what we in the report have denoted “connectors”. These are authors who co-author scientific work with scholars from multiple scientific disciplines. “Connectors” also includes a number of authors that publish in not only one, but in several domains (Figure 20). These collaborations contribute to a more integrated understanding of the issue by bringing scholars and associated insights from multiple disciplines together.

Box 12. Emerging Infectious Diseases and global health governance The way in which the global health community has attempted to address emerging infectious diseases (such as avian flu, Ebola hemorrhagic fever, and similar) is an excellent example of the interplay between international norms, international institutions, innovation and the operation of global networks. The need for early and reliable warning of pending epidemics has been a major concern for the global community since the mid-nineteenth century, when cholera epidemics overran Europe. The fact that there are strong disincentives for individual states to report disease outbreaks (due to associated losses of income from export and tourism) has created severe problems with detecting early warning signals and response problems. This is particularly critical, as coordinated responses are needed in order to avoid transgressing critical epidemic thresholds.

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A range of networks, from surveillance, laboratory and expert networks, has emerged the last decades. These networks are both global and regional, and include the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and NGO’s such as the Red Cross, Doctors without Borders (MSF), an additional international and national organizations. The networks facilitate responses to epidemic emergencies of international concern by providing early warning signals, rapid laboratory analysis, information dissemination and coordination of activities on the ground. Their operation would be seriously undermined however, if it weren’t for the creation of a strong supportive institutional framework (i.e. the International Health Regulations), and recent shifts in international norms that prioritize international collaboration over national sovereignty. These changes in norms, institutions and networks are often viewed as being supported by a number of information technological innovations, such as a new generation of Internet based monitoring systems. While global governance of emerging infectious diseases can be viewed as a success story in the context of global connected risks, it also shows some tangible weaknesses. One is the current international regime’s inability to address complex underlying drivers creating emerging infectious diseases, such as the erosion of national health infrastructures, environmental changes and increased social connectivity. As the recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa illustrates, addressing connected risks not only entails building robust international collaboration, but also building national capacities (in this case public health systems), and mobilizing international economic and human resources promptly. Source and additional references: Galaz (2014), pp. 63-83.

As the case illustrates, understanding the anatomy of global risks responses, requires and understanding of the evolution and changes in international principles and institutions, and patterns of collaboration and innovation in networks, and mechanisms to enhance legitimacy. With that being said however, the case also illustrates that evolution of risk reducing norms, new international institutions, and polycentric coordination in networks, is no guarantee for

the successful reduction of global connected risks. As the current Ebola outbreak in West Africa illustrates, lack of prompt mobilization of international economic and human resources, national governance capacities, and inadequate national public health infrastructure are creating serious challenges for the international health community. In addition, the current governance model is not well equipped to deal with the complex underlying drivers of emerging infectious diseases – environmental, demographic and social change (Galaz 2014).

Insight 2. Different models of governance address different critical functions needed to govern global connected risks The report has also explored not only a number critical governance functions, but also how the various disciplines contribute with insights for each (Table 11). As we hope to have shown, several disciplines can provide insights into each function. For example, exploring the possibilities to reduce institutional fragmentation can benefit from insights in global environmental governance, adaptive governance and international law. Scholars interested in the abilities of networks to facilitate coordination and innovation will benefit considerably by looking into insights from fields like innovation studies, adaptive governance and crisis management. The possibilities for cross-fertilization across fields can be explored quickly by looking into the details of table 11, as well as in the interactive database we have set up uniquely for this project.16 A simple way to summarize this complementarity can be found in table 15 below. The table builds on our qualitative understanding of the fields presented in chapter 5. 16 See http://www.changingplanet.se/connected-risks

Table 15. Governance challenges and contributions from the different disciplines Overcoming Gridlock

Risk Reducing Principles

Thresholds, Connectivity and Surprise

Fragmentation and Polycentricity

Innovative Capacities

Enhancing Legitimacy

Global environ mental governance

International law

Crisis management


Innovation studies

Global democracy

Adaptive governance


Adaptive governance

Adaptive governance

Adaptive governance

International law

Innovation studies

Global democracy

Global democracy

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International law


Insight 3. There are several highly policyrelevant research gaps with respect to innovation, legitimacy, and adaptability in the face of non-linear change Despite these complementarities, we have also identified a number of tangible and policy relevant research gaps. One such gap is associated with international institutions and innovation. As we discussed at the beginning of this report, innovation capacities are a critical aspect of resilience in the face of uncertainty, surprise and shocks (3.2.5). While the innovation literature is rich, there is a clear lack of literature exploring the dynamics of institutional innovation at the international level, and in what ways these could be amended to secure legitimacy and help bridge the “democratic deficit”. That is: the literature at the moment provides little guidance on how to map, analyze and if possible support new forms of governance that would help the international community address connected global risks in ways that are perceived as legitimate. There are a few notable exceptions in the literature (e.g. Hoffman 2011, Rosen and Olsson 2012), as well as a number of interesting local experiments (Box 9), but this should be viewed as one urgent gap to bridge. In addition, the report has shown that there is a lack of studies that explore capacity-building needs of international institutions and governance structures to address nonlinear change on large scales (5.3). This point has been raised before on the basis of a more limited empirical material (Young 2011, Galaz 2014). In light of the more extensive analysis undertaken in this report and considering the growing connectivities and complexity of environmental risks, it is increasingly urgent to address this gap as well.

Insight 4. Transformative change in global environmental governance is possible Finally, this report has shown that transformative changes of the governance of global environmental risks are, indeed, possible. The analysis of the six scientific disciplines has yielded significant insights into the ways in which governance modalities has changed and could continue to change. Norms can evolve rapidly in non-linear ways and diffuse with the help of “norm entrepreneurs” (5.2); crises may create “windows of opportunity” that allow for processes of learning and institutional change at different political levels, including the international level (5.5); international legal architectures can shift rapidly with the support of progressive interpretations of existing international law, or with the emergence of new legal principles (5.2); networks and patterns of polycentric coordination hold a great potential for addressing complex drivers and outcomes (3.2.4.); and, finally, there is a number of institutional and legal mechanisms that could not only help build adaptiveness and overcome institutional fragmentation, but also assist in bridging the perceived democratic deficit at the international level (5.2). Changes of this sort are not without problems, as has been acknowledged throughout this report. Nonetheless, this report does highlight several important possible ways to move forward and strengthen international environmental governance. The existing “institutional toolkit” is much more diverse and powerful than ordinarily assumed. It is high time the international community makes good use of it.

These gaps are pertinent in both theoretical and practical terms. In the first case, they bring to the fore the need for increased cooperation between diverse research communities to further integrated frameworks, methods and data. Second, the insights are important to decision-makers, civil society and the general public in the pursuit to address risks characterized by global connectivity and rapid environ mental change.

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