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British Journal of Social Psychology (1988). 27, 19-33
Printed in G n a t Britain
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@ 1988 The British Psychological Society
Constructing emotions: Weaving meaning from memories Susan Kippax", June Crawford, Pam Benton, Una Gault School of Behavioural Sciencer, Macquarie Unitwritye NSW 2109. Australia
Jenny Noesjirwan Kuring-gai College of Advanced Education, Lindbld, NS W 2070, Australia
This paper is in threesections-theory, method and data. Weconsider that emotions are socially constructed, and begin with an interpretation of social constructionism as it applies to emotion. The conclusion drawn from the analysis of theories from a variety of disciplines is that it is important to incorporate and extend the notion of appraisal into a study of emotion. This notion is prominent in the cognitive approach and the social constructionist approach allows the cognitive and social views of emotion to be integrated. This approach enabled us to examine the process whereby individuals engage with each other, and hence with the social structures, in their construction of emotions. We employed a method 'memory-work' which uses written memories as source material. This is discussed at some length since it is integrated within a theory of socialization which is closely related to social constructionism. Finally, we present an analysis of some data which illustrate and demonstrate the processes involved in constructing emotion. Our work confirms and extends the social constructionist view. Paradoxically, in highlighting the notion of agency, we stress the essentially social nature of the individual and overcome some of the problems which arise in methods which examine only the individual or the society.
Empirical explorations of the social constructionist approach to emotions are very limited. This paper provides such an exploration drawing from a range of theoretical accounts of emotion in psychology, anthropology, sociology and philosophy, which are not normally connected either with each other or with empirical work. Specifically we link the work on contradiction and identity with social constructionism Within this framework we examine the process of the construction of emotion using a new and powerful methodology, 'memory-work'. In this innovative approach theory, method and data are inseparable. This integration, one of the strengths of the approach, provides a firm grounding for a social constructionist account of emotion. This account asserts that emotions involve the contribution of the social world by way of linguistic practices and moral judgements. It is in terms of these that feelings are interpreted as emotions. As Hard , Clarke & De Carlo (1985) note, emotions are Requests for reprints.
Susan Kippax et al. manifested in typical behavioural displays but such displays are, in humans, strongly influenced by cultural convention. Emotions may derive from some universal evolutionary givens but they are identified and expressed in particular cultural and historical contexts (Scherer, Summerfield & Wallbott, 1983; Wallbott & Scherer, 1986). Thus, while feelings and emotion may overlap, they are not coextensive. The social constructionist view of emotion may be contrasted with the paradigms most readily used by psychologists such as behaviourist, biological, psychoanalytic and cognitive paradigms. Of these, the cognitive paradigm appears to offer most to the social psychologist interested in exploring the domain of the emotions. Knowing and understanding, both cognitive activities, are intimately connected with emotions. One cannot experience sadness without an understanding of loss, or experience guilt without some understanding of personal responsibility and wrongdoing. Emotions are intentional concepts, that is, they have objects: one is angry at someone, grieves for someone, is happy about something, etc. However, cognitivism fails to come to terms with the essentially social aspect of emotion since it is unable to shift the level of analysis from the individualistic or the inter-individualistic to the genuinely social (Coulter, 1979; Harre, 1983; Shotter, 1986). Shotter ( 1984, 1986) shows that, in order to be a person, a member of society, individuals have to act in an intelligible and appropriate manner. They are unable to be persons unless they have knowledge constituted in common understandings. Part of being a person involves feeling and emoting; people cannot experience an emotion unless they share in the common stock of knowledge with regard to that emotion. As Coulter (1979, p. 133) notes, ‘the capacity to experience genuinely either shame, or guilt, or remorse, hinges upon a mastery of a natural language involving cultural knowledge and reasoning conventions’. But persons do not merely absorb the cultural or common meanings nor are they simply the bearers of roles. Any account must deal with the manner in which the individual engages the social, and reproduces and transforms given meanings. The duality between the individual and the social structures must be recognized and incorporated into any successful theory of emotions. The social constructionist position argues that not only are individuals produced in social relations and structures but that they construct themselves by wresting meaning from the contradictions carried by the social structures. Haug’s ( 1987) theory of socialization addresses these issues and as well provides the methodology which we use. Her theory, of which her method is an integral part, suggests how individuals might ‘grow into’ and construct their emotions by reflecting on and attempting to resolve these contradictions. She points out the relationship between contradiction and identity, just as other theorists such as Doise (1986), Gilligan (1982) and H a d (1983) have done. These theorists have come to realize that growth and/or change arise out of contradiction. It may be that action to resolve contradiction is what gives us our theories about self (Hard, 1983). While not dealing with contradiction, Averill’s work (1980, 1982, 1985) is a starting-point for a social psychological account of emotion. Essentially it is in agreement with the position first put forward by the philosopher Bedford (1962) and elaborated by the social constructionists discussed above. In addition to notions of appraisal and moral evaluation, both Bedford and Averill argue that emotion concepts are not purely psychological but that they presuppose concepts of social relationships and institutions. 20
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Averill (1980, p. 3 12) defines emotion* in the following manner: An emotion is a transitory social role (a socially constituted syndrome) that includes an individual‘s appraisal of the situation and that is interpreted as a passion rather than as an action.
His work on romantic love (Averill, 1985) provides a nice example in which to explicate the above definition. Love, he argues, is made up of many facets or components. It is a complex syndrome. These components may differ in the extent to which they are determined by biological, psychological and social factors, but no component by itself is a necessary or sufficient condition for the entire syndrome. Love may be composed of or constituted in the idealization of the loved one, suddenness of onset, physiological arousal and commitment. These components are organized into a coherent whole and the way they are organized is determined by interpretation which is based on cultural paradigms illustrated in the case of love by the romantic ideal. I t is argued that it is this organized coherent whole which constitutes the emotion love. When one is in love one enacts a certain social role; one acts in a way socially prescribed as being in love. This definition, particularly with reference to ‘role’, fails to recognize fully the agency of the individual. Although Armon-Jones ( 1985) does not use the role concept, she too seems to underplay agency. She argues that emotions are constructions from a person’s responses to happenings in the environment which are presented through modes of social organization, normative expectations, beliefs and values. In presenting our theory, we prefer to stress the creative component in the construction derived from the human practice of assimilating the unfamiliar and resolving contradiction. Whatever the shortcomings of a purely cognitive approach (see above), an element of creativity in the construction of emotion can be incorporated via the notion of appraisal. Psychologists such as Arnold (1969, 1970), Averill (1980) and Lazarus, Averill & Opton (1970), educationalists such as Peters (197O), and anthropologists such as Levy (1984) and Lutz (1982) have in their various ways stressed this cognitive aspect of emotion. Levy (1984) speaks of primary and secondary appraisal, and Averill ( 1980) of first- and second-order monitoring. Levy (1984, p. 223) argues for a sequencing of the appraisals. First, he says, there is the initial appraisal of an eliciting situation, perhaps the loss of a lover. Second, there is a feeling that enters into awareness as a result of the initial appraisal, perhaps a hurt feeling. Finally, there is the evaluation, the secondary appraisal, that is, the interpretation of the first and second steps above based on a social or a culturally structured understanding of such loss and such feelings. The secondary appraisal is reflective and available to consciousness. It is the emotion - grief. Averill (1980), in his account of emotion as the enactment of a social role, is in general agreement with Levy. One enacts the role of a bereft lover, mourns, for example, in the light of the meanings arising out of the appraisals, both primary and secondary. The performance of the role, which usually takes place in a specific and appropriate social or physical setting, is monitored as are all actions. This is what Averill refers to as a first-order monitoring. He distinguishes this from a second-order monitoring which he argues, as Levy does, is reflective. Averill’s notion of second-order monitoring is akin to We agree with Averill that emotions are passions, that is, they overcome us. However, we note that, for example, one can act from anger as well as in anger (Bedford, 1962). +
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Levy’s notion of secondary appraisal: ‘Emotional experiences are reflective, the product of second-order monitoring’ (Averill, 1980, p. 3 16). Our view is that the social constructionist position provides an integration of the cognitive and the social. A person’s understanding is based on and derives from the collective understanding, the common sense or, to use Moscovici’s( 1984) term, the social representations. Emotions are constructed via the simultaneous organization and labelling of a set of actions as the emotion, in contexts where that emotion is deemed appropriate (Armon-Jones, 1985). This engagement with the social is not always unproblematic. Much of the organization and labelling involves appraisal and reappraisal, evaluation and re-evaluation, in order to resolve contradiction and assimilate the unfamiliar. These actions or sets of actions which are criteria1 for a particular emotion constitute that emotion and the experiential content of that emotion. The emotions are constructed via these secondary and later appraisals or evaluations which are, as we have argued, essentially part of the moral and social realm. Adults may find it difficult to separate the primary and secondary appraisals and there may be occasions in adulthood where the secondary appraisal precedes the primary appraisal, that is, where the social context produces an emotional response which in turn evokes the primary appraisal. Attendance at a funeral may evoke crying which in turn evokes memories of loss, the primary appraisal. Schachter & Singer’s (1962) much discussed results may be partially accounted for in this way. As Averill ( 1980, p. 32 1) notes: As adults, emotional reactions are likely to proceed automatically and in the absence of any verbal mediation. It is therefore easy to overlook the amount and kind of prior experiencethat is required for the proper enactment of an emotional role.
The thrust of Armon-Jones’ ( 1985) and Averill’s (1985) work suggests that they are concerned with the outcome, that is, the constructed emotion. Hence their underplaying of agency. Our work concentrates on the process, or how individuals actively construct or ‘grow into’ their emotions. In order to achieve this aim and to avoid the limitations pointed to by Averill above with respect to adult emotions, we have used a method that enables us to explore early memories of emotion. In highlighting agency in the context of social construction, we are not lapsing into an individualistic psychology. The constructing of emotions, although done by individuals acting in and on their world, can only be accomplished socially, that is, by activity infused with content and structure couched in communicative terms, derived from social activity. (This was suggested by an anonymous reviewer.)
Haug’s methodological perspective The method of inquiry was based on that developed by the German scholar Frigga Haug (Haug, 1987). This method of inquiry has been used successfully to study the sexualization of women’s bodies, and we began to explore it as a way of investigating the social construction of emotion. The strength of Haug’s method is that it is integral to her theory of socialization which shows striking similarities to Shotter’s theory of the social construction of the person (Shotter, 1984, 1986). Haug, too, draws attention to the duality of individual and structure. She refers to the part played by women in their own subordination and in so doing makes a more general point about the nature of social research:
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If we refuse to understand ourselves simply as a bundle of reactions to all-powerful structures or to the social relations within which we have formed us, if we search instead for possible indications of how we have participated actively in the formation of our own past experience, then the usual mode of social scientific research, in which individuals figure exclusively as objects of the process of research, has to be abandoned (Haug, 1987, p. 35).
Shotter (1986) in discussing Vico’s theory also points to the need for developing new means of research. Further correspondences between Haug and Shotter/Vico are discussed below. Inherent in Haug’s theory is the method called ‘memory-work’. In seeking to examine the processes whereby ‘we have participated actively in the formation of our own past experience’, we use memories of past events or episodes. The underlying theory is that subjectively significant events, events which are remembered, and the way they are subsequently constructed, play an important part in the construction of self. The importance of memories as source material is also suggested by H a rk ( 1983) and Shotter (1984). Events which are remembered are likely to be those which involve contradiction, conflict or unfamiliarity. Memory-work proceeds by theorizing the reflections involved in assimilating the unfamiliar and resolving contradiction and conflict, thus demonstrating the nature of the processes whereby emotions are constructed. Memory-work involves collecting and analysing memories according to certain rules. It is carried out by a collective of co-researchers. The collective decides by negotiation on a topic or episode about which each member is to write an account of a memory. These written accounts form the database. It is an important part of the method that the memories are theorized as a cross-sectional example of a common experience. In order to facilitate this theorizing, there are rules laid down regarding how the memories are to be produced. One is that they are to be written. They are also to be in the third person and as far as possible from the point of view of an outside observer. The aim is to uncover the social meaning embodied by the performances described in the written accounts. Our collective reflection and theorizing of the episodes deconstructs the written accounts and exposes the processes involved in the making of a ‘common’sense of the actions described. The set of memories about a particular episode are analysed in a cross-sectional manner in order to allow common features and patterns to be identified. In addition, each memory is individually examined for gaps, contradictions, clichCs and cultural imperatives. This examination may suggest revising the interpretation of the common patterns, and the analysis proceeds by moving from individual memories to the cross-sectional approach and back again in a recursive fashion. Further, at the same time, theories of emotion such as those discussed above are critically examined. At some stage a coherent picture emerges and the analysis of that particular episode is complete. How we decide when the analysis is complete raises the whole issue of subjectivity. Haug (1987, p. 35) insists that memory-work is possible only ifsubject and object are the same individual. In addition, she stresses that memories are both the instruments and objects of the research. She resolves this issue of subjectivity in a manner very similar to that which Vico (Shotter, 1986) describes, i.e. by building upon the human ability to recognize the commonality ofexperience. This is akin to Vico’s ‘third way of knowing’ (see point 6 below). In fact, there are many correspondences between Haug’s theorizing and Shotter’s discussion of Vico’s scienaa nuova. Some of these Correspondences can be outlined as follows.
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(1) The method is sensitive to the ‘historical nature of the phenomena’ (Shotter, 1986, p. 201) and uses ordinary language narrative as its source material. (2) As an alternative to theoretical knowledge, it bases its test of adequacy on ’shared feelings. . . people attributing a shared significance to an already shared circumstance’ (Shotter, 1986, p. 201). (See discussion of the collective nature of theorizing above.) (3) The emphasis on contradiction and its resolution is similar to Vico’s ‘plot structure’. ‘Whatever people find problematic or unfamiliar they understand by relating to or representing it by aspects of what is familiar and unproblematic to them’, and ‘asthe mode of relating what is unfamiliar to what is familiar changes so will the social order change’ (Shotter, 1986, p. 202). (4) Haug (1987, p. 42) states: . . . identities are not formed through imitation nor through any simple reproductionof predetermined patterns, but. . . the human capacity for action. . . forces individuals to attempt to live their own meanings and find means of self-fulfilment, albeit within a pre-determined and circumscribed social space.
Compare with Shotter (1986, p. 202):
. . . individuals make their own individual choices within a socially constructed setting which is both enabling and constraining in what they do. . . [people can] act in the ways made possible for them by their historical circumstance. ( 5 ) The use of memory or rather accounts of memories as source material is in keeping with the section on ‘Archaeology’: (Earlier modes of being] UTC still available to us and can bc found within the current form of our consciousness. But how we now think and communicate hides from us the nature of the underlying conditions which make our productive or formative achievements possible (Shotter, 1986, p. 204).
This is what memory-work attempts to do, that is, to uncover the processes in our own production. (6) The collective nature of memory-work and the use of negotiation and consensus as a test of adequacy may be compared with Vico’s ‘common-sense’or ‘third way of knowing’. The sense of rightness which we experience during our work when our interpretation is accepted seems to resonate with Shotter’s ( 1986)description of this aspect ofVico. Indeed, the test of our work in the wider community will be whether our interpretation seems plausible to others. This plausibility is not confined to memory-work but applies to communication of all kinds, including the strictly ‘hard science’ theories. As psychologists we have been trained to be suspicious of subjectivity and hence ignore a possibly potent source of knowledge - especially knowledge of ourselves as human beings. There are also some differences in approach: Shotter ( 1984, 1986) seems to suggest oral narrative as a basis for data collection. Haug (1987) on the other hand insists that the memories should be collected in written form. In studies (for example, Connell, Ashenden, Kessler & Dowsett, 1982; Kippax, 1987 and Marsh, Rosser & H a d , 1978) which use oral narrative in the form of accounts (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) as their major source ofdata, experiencesand events are depicted from the point of view of the first person. In accounting, the person gives an appropriate and hence intelligible description. Meanings present in any account have already been interpreted and constructed. Accounting encourages explanation and biography (see
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below). The rules for writing memories, however, encourage or at least do not discourage the presence of contradiction, conflict and the absence of explanation. This distinction may be highlighted by comparing memory-work with other studies (e.g. de Waele & H a d , 1976; Runyan, 1984) using memory for life-events in the form of autobiography. Haug (1987) is very insistent that memory-work should not be biography. W e have found that it is difficult, but not impossible, to work with our memories without importing the kind of coherence which biography brings and that Haug warns against. This refers to the reinterpretation of past events as antecedents of what follows, that is, what we ‘know’ to be the consequences. Memories are not coherent and free from contradiction and conflict, indeed it is the contradiction and conflict which provide the basis for theorizing. Memory-work may also be compared with other studies using memories to explore emotion such as those of Cowan & Davidson (1984)and Scherer et al. (1983).This work is more concerned with statistical and/or normative data than with process. Other studies again are concerned with naturalistic observations of memory. As our prime concern is with process, i t should be clear that accuracy of memories is not a central issue. However, we would expect that the meaning ofan event is remembered accurately, and studies such as that of Neisser (1982)of the testimony of John Dean after Watergate confirm that the meaning of an event is remembered accurately even if circumstantial detail undergoes transformation in a later reconstruction of it. The theorizing of the memories as part of the method also introduces an important distinguishing feature in that its collective nature gives a second person perspective to the methodology. It ensures that the significance of an episode is seen in its relationship to memories elicited from other members of the collective, examining both similarities and distinctiveness. This ‘collective nature’ also points to a difference between memory-work and psychoanalytic case study work. The cross-sectional approach to the analysis and the collective nature of the theorizing in memory-work serve to emphasize the common socializing influences and practices of our society as they affect individuals rather than those which might be specific to any one individual. Two issues are raised by the above comparisons. The first is the issue of generalizability. Haug (1987, p. 44) argues that ‘Individual modes of appropriation of the social are frequently conceived as personally unique; . . . this involves an underestimation of the sociality of human beings’. She also argues that human beings are always active. So that, although it is virtually impossible for them completely to abandon norms and expectations, they can and do make compromises: ‘. . . we witness individuals searching for a meaning to life within pre-existing structures, by engaging with those structures, yet at the same time negating them’ (Haug, 1987, p. 44). Thus, the range of actions accessible to any given individual can be viewed in research as general possibilities. Each individual mode of appropriation of the social - the processes involved in each individual’s construction of self - is potentially generalizable. ‘If therefore a given experience is possible, it is also subject to universalization’ (Haug, 1987, p. 44). The second issue concerns the essentially social nature of both memory (Bartlett, 1932) and emotions and the complex relationship between the two. Emotions, as argued above, are constructed in reflections. It is in our reflections that we (as human beings) make sense of our experience of the world and negotiate the meanings
Susan Kippax et al. that we and others attach to them. Our knowledge of, our ‘third way of knowing’ about, emotions comes both from our reflective activities, that is, how we ‘talk to ourselves’about out experience and from how others talk to us about our and their experiences. Importantly, these reflections also construct our selves who, in turn, ‘do’ the experiencing. What this means in terms of memory-work is that reflections on a particular event or episode are based in the meanings (derived from appraisal) available and communicated both then and now. The meanings arrived at in memory-work are thus a function of both those persons present theti at the time of the event and those now collectively involved in the theorizing. The task is to uncover or deconstruct the earlier understandings and to reconstruct them, thus elucidating the nature of the underlying conditions which make our emotions what they are. The aim of our study was to come to an understanding of the processes involved in the construction of emotions. We did this by writing down memories of particular episodes or events and collectively examining and theorizing these written memories. In the analysis we pay particular attention to the appraisals implicit in the memories and our theorizing of them. 26
Procedure The five co-researchers are female, aged between 40 and 60, come from a range of class backgrounds and all have worked in academic psychology. We met fortnightly for two to three hours over a period of 18 months. The data reported below are the product of five such meetings. During this period we researched the psychological literature on emotions. For the first of these meetings we had each independently written a memory on a hitherto agreed upon topic of ‘saying you are sorry’. The rules for producing these written accounts were: 1. use the third person; 2 . include as much circumstantial detail as possible and particularly avoid censoring apparent 1y ‘irrelevant’ detai Is; 3. avoid interpretation and biographical explanation; 4. produce the earliest memory.
These five memories were then collectively analysed and theorized in structured group discussions which were taped. W e examined each account for gaps, absences, contradictions and cliches. W e looked for cultural imperatives and commonalities and differences between accounts. Additional critical reading of theories of emotion and examination of common-sense ideas continued in conjunction with the production and theorizing of these accounts, and analysis became a recursive processs. These discussions, in turn, generated the topic of ‘transgressions’ for a subsequent written memory which was analysed in the same way.
Notes on posedwe In discussing the memory-work method, Haug (1987, p. 53) notes that ‘any set of ready-made questions is likely to be firmly rooted in popular prejudice’ - a warning
27 against starting with the obvious. We found that choosing an episode directly identified with an emotion, such as ‘a happy memory’, tended to preclude deconstruction and therefore an understanding of the process of construction. Our choice of ‘apology’as the initial topic came from the context of the group’s broader project, which is concerned to examine the construction of gender, and our own female participation in this process. We were aware of both ourselves and other female friends frequently using ‘I’m sorry’ in circumstances where personal apology seemed unwarranted, and we thought this might connect with lack of assertion, and also be very different for men. ‘Transgression’ was chosen as the second topic because our initial ‘apology’ memories were not what we as children saw as transgressions, i.e. as intentional rule-breaking. They did not, as might have been expected, result in stories containing references to shame and guilt. Both memories were the earliest we could remember. As noted in the introductory section, we believed that our earliest memories would tell us more about the construction of emotion. We would stress that the memories were written individually without consultation among members of the collective. There is no sense in which the common elements in the memories could have been predicted. This report comes from work in progress. We have adapted Haug’s original method to some extent and expect that further modifications of procedure will occur as we initiate some comparison groups of men and younger women. Constructing emotions
The process of construction First, we consider the primary appraisals. How were the feelings and actions of the actor and the others described in the written accounts? In the apologies the feelings felt by the actors were described, in general, as associated with puzzlement and surprise. [The written accounts of the memories, on average about 250 words, are too long to be included in full.] Ann’s father is asleep in an armchair and she creeps up and tickles him under the arms. ‘At the first touch in his armpits he comes awake, startled, and simultaneously hits her across the face. “Don’t you ever do that again”, he shouts. She is sobbing with fright and surprise: I’m sorry, I’m sorry.’ Margaret tells her grandmother that she must say her prayers in response to her grandmother’s request that she go to sleep. Her grandmother is very cross with her for saying ‘no’ to a request to go to sleep. Margaret is ‘very upset’; she ‘said she was sorry but was hurt and didn’t understand why her grandmother was so cross’. Fay reads an aunt’s newspaper before her aunt has a chance to look at i t and she is reprimanded by her mother, who becomes quite upset, and is asked to apologize. Fay’s response is puzzlement. She ‘was puzzled . . . she could see no reason why she should not read it if nobody else wanted it at the time . . . she really felt agreat sense of injustice in it all. She did not believe that she had anything to apologize for, and felt self-righteous and unjustly treated.’ Marie becomes involved in an argument with a neighbour’s child whose parents complain to Marie’s parents. She is sent to her room and ‘given the strap’. ‘Shedid not feel guilt at the incident, only indignation . . She received the belting sullenly - she felt
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28 Susan Kippax et al. unjustly betrayed, persecuted and defeated - humiliated and without alliance or support . . . she remained hurt but defiant.’ The last memory, from Liz, is of calling the mother of one of her schoolmates ‘an old hag’. This mother complains to the school and the class is given a lecture on courtesy. No names are mentioned but Liz experienced ‘shame and mortification’. With the exception of the last memory, all the actors speak of not understanding, puzzlement or indignation. The feelings of the actors are primarily surprise, hurt and indignation. Although one might have thought that memories associated with apologies would involve shame and guilt, this was not the experience reported. In the earliest memories, those of Ann, Margaret and Fay - who are aged,about four, four and eight respectively - the sense of puzzlement and surprise is more evident than in the stories of Liz and Marie - who are about 10 or 11 years old. Marie is indignant and does not feel guilty and it is only Liz who speaks of shame. All the memories seem to be about actions which have gone badly wrong. The actions themselves, again with the exception of Liz’s name calling, are not actions that in and of themselves might be expected to produce annoyance, anger or demands for apology. Ann tickles her father. Margaret voices a wish to her grandmother to say her prayers. Fay reads her aunt’s newspaper. Marie tries to keep children, who don’t belong to her gang, away from her club. These actions have, it seems, unintended consequences. The unexpected and problematic responses of the adults in the stories reveal why they are remembered. They are, with perhaps the exception of Liz’s memory, unresolved. The actors’ primary appraisals of the situation and the others’ responses to it don’t make sense. The unintended consequence, in most cases, as appraised and remembered by the actors is anger or being cross. Ann’s father shouts and hits her; Margaret describes her grandmother as cross and as asking for an apology; Fay’s mother is ‘quite upset’ and asks Fay to apologize to her aunt; Marie is ‘given the strap’; and anger is implicit in Liz’s account. The mother, described as an ‘old hag’, would not have complained to the school had she not been angered or annoyed by the description. Next, consider the secondary appraisals, that is, what we as theorists see as the attempt by the actor to make sense of the event at the time of the event. This involves reflection. The feelings of surprise and puzzlement are the outcome of the mismatch of the actors’ primary appraisals and the apparent appraisals of others. A secondary appraisal takes place. It is an attempt by the actors, as children, to make the episodes intelligible to themselves, to reflect on them, and to make sense of them. The actions and the feelings of the children, as described above, have to be put together with their appraisals of the others’ actions and feelings in the light of what the children know about such episodes and others like them. In these attempts at understanding, in their secondary appraisals, are the beginnings of the construction of many emotions. All the children learn about anger. Anger is shouting, hitting, being given ‘the strap’; they learn that saying ‘no’ is likely to lead to anger, as is waking someone, reading someone else’s newspaper, excluding others who then report the exclusion, and name calling. They also learn that adults - grandmother, father, mother, aunt and schoolteacher - sometimes respond in an unexpected manner. The adults’ behaviour does not fit the children’s appraisals. In many of the stories there is a sense of being wrongly accused and in these cases what is being constructed is indignation and a sense of injustice. Margaret was upset. She wanted to explain. She felt her grandmother was ‘unjustly
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cross . . . a sense of injustice’. Ann is sobbing ‘loudly enough so her mother heard (or perhaps she heard his shout) and came in’. Her mother is given an explanation. She sides with Ann’s father - ‘She [Ann] didn’t mean to upset you’ - but there is an implicit acknowledgement that Ann’s father had acted somewhat hastily if not unjustly. Fay’s mother quietly explains to Fay that the person who buys the newspaper is entitled to be the first one to read it. But this explanation is followed up by: ‘She told Fay that she must be careful not to annoy the aunt, who earned the money to pay the rent on the house they all lived in’. There is an admission that the aunt had acted unjustly and Fay feels ‘unjustly treated’. The sense of injustice in Marie’s case is tied to betrayal (her parents). They do not understand that she was defending her club against ‘other kids trying to muscle in’ and they take ‘the side of the enemy by belting her’. In all four cases, injustice is born of misunderstanding on the part of the adults and their accompanying unfair anger. In Liz’s case the anger, as indirectly evidenced via the teacher’s lecture to the class, is seen to be justified and Liz experiences shame and mortification, even though she, personally, is not accused. In these secondary appraisals, intelligibility may be reached in a variety of ways. Children may come to adopt the adult view of the episode, or they may come to realize that adults sometimes misconstrue children’s intentions and hence realize that their actions may have unintended consequences. In addition, they may learn that adults themselves sometimes act inappropriately by breaking their own rules. This last interpretation is strengthened if one looks at the ‘transgression’ stories of the same five people. However, it is important to note that any understanding reached may not be reached immediately, that is at the time of the episode, but later - on reflection and re-evaluation. The reflection involved may be what determines that these particular episodes are the ones remembered. The secondary appraisals contained in the transgression memories also illustrate the construction of a sense of injustice and indignation and self-righteousness. These stories, all in different ways, have to do with finding the boundaries of acceptable behaviour, uncovering and testing the rules and experiencing the power of others. This is often done using adults as the ‘experimental animals’. Fay’s story of an early transgression involves her in a confrontation with a hospital nurse. Fay is 10 years old and has been in hospital for some time and is well aware of the rules, one of which was that patients were allowed to read between 8 and 9 pm. ‘Fay was reading her film star magazine. Sister Leslie was in her office. . . At about 20 minutes to nine, Sister Leslie came into the room. She saw Fay was the only one reading, and said she was turning out the light. Fay said, “It’s not time yet.” Sister said, “Don’t argue with me. I’m turning out the light.” Fay said, “It’s 20 minutes to nine. It’s not time to turn the light out.” Sister said, “Don’t speak to me like that.” She took Fay’s magazine, turned out the light, and went back to the office. Fay stood up in bed, leaned over so that she see the office, and saw Sister sitting at the desk reading the film magazine. She could also see the clock, which still said something between 15 and 20 minutes to nine. She was so angry. . .’ Fay labelled her transgression as being angry (but see the third appraisal below). ‘She was angry, crying, shouting and in a real rage of frustration. ’ Her appraisal of the episode leads her to believe that she is justifiably angry - the Sister has broken the rules which she herself (the hospital) has set. Margaret’s transgression also tests authority, in this case, the authority of the school.
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Susan Kippax et al. She has a kindergarten teacher who gets the children to do ‘silly things like tear paper into thin strips without breaking it’. Margaret recounts how the same teacher tells them not to make little balloons by sucking the remains of burst balloons because the balloon pieces may get stuck in their throats and they might die. Margaret does not believe the teacher and reads these remarks in the same way as she responded to the paper-tearing exercise. She cuts up a balloon at home and eats it. She does not die and is vindicated. ‘There is a questioning of authority and some satisfaction in being proved right.’ Marie’s transgression also involves the authority of the school. Her memory is of ‘loitering behind the hedge after school and jumping out to say “boo” to Miss Levy (her teacher)’. Miss Levy remains ‘calm and patient - she smiled - but very distant’ and Marie ‘felt very ashamed and unworthy’. She has broken the rules, or at least she believes she has, and the response is unexpected. Nothing happens. Marie is convinced that Miss Levy only ‘put up with Marie for Marie’s mother’s sake’. What is important to Marie is to be recognized by Miss Levy. Ann’s transgression is a very early memory of staying awake and whispering and giggling with a friend after bedtime. She is troubled because it is not she who gets into trouble but her elder brother who is responsible for her. Liz’s story, too, involves rules being tested out. She wets the bed and wakes her father by telling him there is a stranger in the room. The next morning her father takes her aside: ‘His manner is serious: “You know you wet the bed last night, don’t you?” It is unclear whether she is being reprimanded for wetting the bed, making up the story, waking her father, or all three.’ These stories, like the apology stories, are remembered because they contain contradictions and uncertainties. In this case the mismatches occur where punishment is problematic. The punishment is either expected and absent: Margaret neither dies nor gets into trouble, and Ann’s brother not Ann is punished for her transgression; or the punishment is ambiguous and unclear: Marie detects a covert punishment as does Liz, or it is interpreted, by Fay, as unjust. Some of these stories, like the apology stories, throw light on the ways in which emotions such as self-righteousness and a sense of injustice are constructed. Nurses are supposed to keep the hospital rules and teachers to behave with sense. If adults fail the tests and break the rules the children are likely to feel a strong sense of injustice and impotence. Other emotions such as a sense of satisfaction and even revenge are evident. There is in Fay’s story a feeling that she had at one level ‘won’. In Margaret’s story, too, there is a sense of smug satisfaction: Margaret was ‘proved right’. In both cases there is an explicit testing of the norms - the institutional norms. This is also true, but in a more indirect way, in the other stories. Shame and feelings of unworthiness are also constructed; these emotions are learnt in situations where the anger is seen as justified. Liz should not call people names, nor, she believes, should she wet the bed or wake her father. Marie feels unworthy and appraises the episode as one likely to incur justified anger: Miss Levy should have been angry and had it not been for her friendship with Marie’s mother she would have been. What also becomes clear in the transgression stories is the importance of the secondary appraisals, the attempt to find meaning and to make episodes intelligible. It is this search for meaning that constructs the emotions and, at the same time, because that search involves the actor in reflection, makes the episode memorable. Actors construct their
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emotions out of their own and others’ feelings and actions in the light of their own understandings of social mores. When the above memories were written down, they were written down by adults. Clearly it is difficult to separate the secondary appraisals of the actors as children from the adults’ theorizing of those episodes. As noted in the methodology section, episodes are appraised at the time of the episode in terms of the meanings available to, and communicated to, the actors then, and at the time of writing and theorizing them now as members of a collective. The appraisals made and the meanings derived from these are necessarily based in our social identities then as female children and now as women and for most of us, as mothers; then as pupils and now as teachers and academics; and then as novices in the interpersonal and social worlds and now as psychologists! By focusing, in the above analyses, on the memories as written down and attempting to deconstruct them by examining them for clichCs, cultural imperatives, gaps, etc., and by resisting biography and instead searching for commonalities, we believe that we have begun to uncover and tease out the processes involved in the production of our emotions. These processes, as we shall show below in the reconstruction phase of the analysis 3,are constituted in the ‘then’ and the ‘now’. The process of appraisal may continue. The disconnected traces left by early childhood experiences may be reinterpreted in terms of later childhood experiences, or adolescent or adult schemata. The appraisal continues now when as adults we are asked to write down an account of our early memories. We call this process the third level of appraisal. As the collective theorized the memories, the third step in the construction of the emotions - the reconstruction from our current perspective - became evident. One outcome of our theorizing relates to the common theme of agency which we find in all our memories. Many of the actions are initiations of adult activities. Margaret’s grandmother is the source of the family’s religious beliefs and practices and Margaret is attempting to please her grandmother - to be adult and say her prayers. In the transgression story she tests out her assessment of her teacher and measures her own sense of what is sensible against the teacher’s sense of the same. The sense of self-assertion and initiative is strong. Ann initiates a game that her father has often played with her. I t is her attempt to reciprocate. She also tests out the rules which she knows apply to bedtime. Fay’s act of reading the newspaper is adult. She initiates the reading and reading newspapers is an extremely adult pastime. She also asserts herself by questioning and confronting the Sister who she knows has broken the hospital rules. Marie asserts adulthood through her peer relations; she tries to maintain her prestige in the group by ousting the other children. Liz, too, acts to cement her relations with her peers. Name calling is one way for girls to be smart. The response to these initiatives is ‘don’t do it’. Don’t assert yourself, don’t initiate adult activities, at least not yet. If you do you lose because you have no power. You are still children, girls are not assertive, and you are not yet truly independent or agentic. The above assertions of independence and attempts at being a person are, in most cases, squashed. The emotions that are constructed from these episodes are ones that deal with indignation, self-righteousness and an overpowering sense of injustice. When the emotions of shame and mortification are experienced, however, they are constructed within episodes in which ‘childish’ performances are enacted; name calling, wetting the bed and saying ‘boo’ to your teacher. Acting like a child invokes shame.
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Conclusion The writing of this paper is the fourth step in the appraisal process. We have shown that it is valuable to extend the concept of appraisal. In addition, we have successfully incorporated this concept into a method which uncovers the process of the construction of emotions. We are both the objects and the subjects of our research. The instruments of our ‘research are our own memories, and our reflections and collective theorizing of them are our data. Our method successfullygrounds the social construction theory of emotion. Work with other collectives and other emotions will confirm and extend our understanding, particularly with regard to the issues surrounding the deconstruction and reconstruction of the memories, in the search for the social activity and relations from which the appraisals and meanings derive. These further data will also provide evidence regarding the influence of our particular group and its dynamics on the outcomes of our work. People ‘grow into’ their emotions which they have constructed in their attempts to be agents. In their appraisals they have appropriated the cultural rules and norms, but not in apassive way. They reflect in order to resolve contradictions and to produce intelligibility, and out of these attempts at resolution emotions are constructed. The ways in which they do this, by communicating to each other and thereby negotiating their identities and social relations, should reveal differences in emotions between men and women, young and old, those from the working-class as compared with the middle-class, and those with different race and ethnic backgrounds. The human capacity for action forces individuals to attempt to live their own meanings and to construct their own selves even if within a predetermined and circumscribed social space. Meanings and practices are reproduced and transformed. Emotions are constructed in the individual reflections of the social. Thus as, Haug (1987, p. 42) argues, ‘experience may be seen as lived practice in the memory of a self-constructed identity’.
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