Constructivist Mind: False Memory, Freedom, and ...

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Constructivist Mind: False Memory, Freedom, and Democracy Wojciech Cwalina Andrzej Falkowski Warsaw School of Social Psychology, Poland

ABSTRACT. The dynamic development of the media and the possibility of reaching every person with information create the temptation to construct a particular outlook in his or her mind. Political marketing consultants have recently taken interest in such outlook constructing, using the achievements of modern cognitive psychology to create methods of influencing voters’ behavior. A number of studies on distorting a politician’s image in advertising and on presenting the issue in the media according to the theory of media priming demonstrate that a citizen’s freedom is in fact limited. Characteristically, in democratic countries such limitation comes from inside, by creating in a voter’s mind a certain picture of some part of reality stimulating her or him toward expected behaviors. Market mechanisms, which allow Wojciech Cwalina is Associate Professor in the Department of Marketing Psychology at the Warsaw School of Social Psychology, Warsaw, Poland. His research specialties include political marketing psychology, organizational and management psychology, and analysis of media coverage. Andrzej Falkowski is a Professor in the Department of Marketing Psychology at the Warsaw School of Social Psychology, Warsaw, Poland. His research specialty is cognitive psychology, including consumer behavior, marketing, and political advertising. Address correspondence to: Wojciech Cwalina, Department of Marketing Psychology, Warsaw School of Social Psychology, ul. Chodakowska 19=31, 03-815 Warsaw, Poland (E-mail: [email protected]). Journal of Political Marketing, Vol. 7(3=4) 2008 Available online at http://www.haworthpress.com # 2008 by The Haworth Press. All rights reserved. doi: 10.1080/15377850802008319

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for the control of information reaching different segments of voters, lead to a situation in which absolute freedom in creating and broadcasting political advertisements does not contribute to the freedom of expressing political ideas but limits this freedom. Modern studies on the perception and remembering of political advertisements show that the goal of such advertisements is inconsistent with the classical notion of freedom and democracy according to which they should facilitate conscious discussion and voters’ critical reflection. KEYWORDS. Democracy, media, memory illusions, perceptual distortions, political advertising, voter behavior

CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION SOCIETY It is undeniable that the current social and cultural changes have led to the development of an information society, in which information becomes its fundamental resource and processing information becomes an important source of the society’s gross national product. In a truly democratic manner, each member of the society has the right to inform others and to be informed. The new forms of social and political life in the information society can increase people’s access to democracy and administration procedures. One has to be able then to transform information into knowledge, which is the task of media education. Information technology, which is already a key element of a society’s life, can be considered advantageous, as it facilitates the development of cognitive structures through which one learns how to transform information into knowledge. One has to remember, however, the world of ‘‘virtual reality’’ that is being constructed by information. Information creates a new category of market products, which can be sold to create profits. Therefore, one might be tempted to use information as a tool to achieve power and control over society. Such information often creates illusions and artificial worlds in people’s minds, and the danger here lies in people’s mixing fiction with reality; this threat prevents members of an information society from enjoying one of the most fundamental rights that democracy offers—the right to be broadly informed. It is undeniable that such a vision of an information society turning quickly into reality has led to the creation of sophisticated tools


Wojciech Cwalina and Andrzej Falkowski

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that can be used to manipulate people’s minds. Such visions of reality can be constructed in an individual’s mind and will determine his or her preferences and attitudes, including those related to the social and political spheres. A certain construction of information can lead to increasing or decreasing people’s sensitivity to certain social phenomena and controlling voting preferences during parliamentary and presidential elections. Modern society can be seen to be implementing something that for the past decades has been the object of laboratory research in constructivist cognitive psychology. Psychology of perception, for instance, has been studying perceptual illusions. The cognitive paradigm stands often in opposition to the ecological approach in psychology, which focuses not on ‘‘illusions’’ but on man’s natural environment (Gibson, 1979). We will examine here a few examples of constructivist research and its connection with the surrounding political reality.

THE LABORATORY WORLD OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY IN POLITICAL MARKETING Constructivism in the Perception of Political Advertising Every handbook of general or cognitive psychology offers many examples of various stimuli and their combinations that one rarely finds in the surrounding reality. Many artificial situations from the area of perception processes, which cannot be found in the natural environment, are presented as effective spectacular illusions. A number of such illusions, called perceptual illusions, are excellent illustrations of the laws of Gestalt psychology, including the law of proximity, similarity, or common fate (Wilkie, 1994). These laws, described in detail by Kurt Koffka (1935) in the first half of the previous century, show the collaboration of the mind with sensual reception of stimuli. It means that the received stimulation is given meaning and organized in a meaningful manner often by the mind’s adding nonexisting stimuli to this stimulation and thus creating a figure that is separated from the background. A classical example of such a construction is the illusory contour of the triangle shown in psychology handbooks as an illustration of the law of a figure’s closure. The laws of Gestalt psychology therefore became a foundation for formulating the constructivist approach in cognitive psychology.


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The constructivist approach was very well presented in the classical book by Ulric Neisser (1967) and in the joint publication edited by Jerome Bruner (1973), in which the authors analyzed in detail the psychological mechanisms of creating the surrounding reality in one’s mind. According to this approach, one ‘‘goes outside’’ the perceived stimuli, constructing, on the basis of them, his or her own world as a cognitive representation of the surrounding reality. Although a lot of well-conducted empirical research shows the cognitive mechanisms of creating the mind’s world, these studies have been criticized as presenting a ‘‘laboratory’’ world, having nothing in common with the world in one which lives on an everyday basis. Psychologists following the ecological approach to visual perception, including among others Edward Reed and Rebeck Jones (1982), claim that the perceptual illusions often presented in psychology handbooks or ambiguous figures can only be found in the fictitious world of laboratory research and never in the real world. They can be treated as interesting phenomena that one can watch on the computer screen in a research lab or in psychology handbooks but not in everyday life. However, given the current development of the information society, one may wonder whether this sometimes criticized ‘‘laboratory world’’ is not an excellent model of what is currently going on in the surrounding social reality. The fast development of the media and the ability to reach everybody with information make it very tempting to construct a certain way of perceiving the surrounding reality in one’s mind. It is mainly marketing strategy managers working in business and, more recently, political consultants who are interested in such constructing. The first group uses the achievements of modern cognitive psychology to develop methods of influencing customers, whereas the second group uses them to influence voters. The more that the sophisticated advertising being used appeals to the cognitive and affection spheres, often on the level of the subconscious, the more it creates a certain image of reality in the receiver’s mind. Creating such a reality follows the perceptual rules described by Gestalt psychology. Let us analyze then a concrete example of creating in one’s mind an image of a presidential candidate on the basis of visual advertising. In 1996, Lynda Kaid conducted experimental research on the perception of advertising spots distorting the image of the candidate during the presidential campaign in the United States, where Bill Clinton and Bob Dole were competing for the presidency (Kaid, 1997). It is



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relatively easy to distort an image in political advertising using modern computer technology by, for instance, slow motion, superimposing of images, and top, bottom, and front shots (Cwalina, Falkowski, and Roznowski, 1999). Such manipulations have a laboratory character and are typical of the research on perception processes in the constructivist approach to the cognitive psychology model mentioned above. However, unlike this research, the goal of these manipulations is to influence someone not in an artificial environment but in the real social environment. The negative affective attitude toward a candidate created as a result of distorting his image significantly influences the results of presidential elections and has consequences for the development of the state’s economic and social policies. Thus, these effects are visible in a real (and not laboratory) situation. The conclusions presented above are confirmed by a number of studies on the relations between voting preferences and the emotional attitude toward a candidate, tested in a number of models of political advertising’s influence on voting behaviors (including Cwalina, Falkowski, and Kaid, 2000; Falkowski and Cwalina, 1999; Kaid and Chanslor, 1995; Newman and Sheth, 1985). Kaid (1997) selected a few television spots from the presidential campaigns in which a visual distortion of the content describing the candidate was used. As a rule, such spots only appear in a negative campaign the task of which is to reduce the appeal of the candidate among the voters. In total, as many as 70 percent of the spots distorted the image of the candidate. Clinton’s voting spots were focused on criticizing his rival, and in 84 percent of the cases they presented a distorted picture of Dole; Dole’s campaign presented a distorted voice of his rival in half of its spots. In order to determine the influence of the distorted image of the candidate on people’s evaluation of him and their voting preferences, Kaid selected four experimental groups. The first two groups watched, in sequence, two original negative spots of Dole and Clinton in which a distorted picture was used. Dole’s spot used complex computer graphics, and Clinton’s picture was distorted by a superimposition of words consisting of big, red letters. They expressed the criticism of Clinton’s attitude toward taxes. The spot also presented a cutting from a publication, suggesting that it was published in a newspaper, presenting arguments for increasing taxes. In addition, the spot presented a growing red arrow illustrating how quickly

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FIGURE 1. The Effect of Distorted Stimuli in the Ads Presented by the Dole Campaign on Candidate Image and Vote Intention (Adapted from Kaid’s Data [Kaid, 1997])

taxes were rising. Clinton’s spot presented his rival moving in slow motion among the elderly and children against a background showing a polluted environment. The spot was black and white, in order to increase the viewers’ negative impressions. The second and third group watched the same two spots; however, the distortion was completely removed from them. In Dole’s spot, the red color of the letters distorting Clinton’s picture was removed and the arguments for increasing taxes were no longer presented as press cuttings, but the size of the red arrow presenting growing taxes was the same during the whole presentation of the spot. In Clinton’s spot, the picture presenting Dole remained but the colors of the landscape were restored. The same verbal expression, distorted or not, was preserved in each of the candidate’s spots. The influence of advertising using distortion on the evaluation of the candidate and subjects’ intention about voting for him is presented in Figure 1. The evaluation is the mean of twelve 7-point scales of semantic differential, developed in order to measure the candidate’s image, and the intention was measured on one 7-point scale. The higher the number, the more positive the picture of the candidate or the greater the intention.



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The differences in the evaluation of the candidates connected with watching the distorted spots and the spots from which the distortion was removed are relevant and clearly demonstrate the negative influence of distorted stimuli in advertising on the evaluation of the rival and subjects’ voting intentions. Besides, distorted advertising not only decreases the rival’s chances but also increases the chances of the candidates whose campaign prepared these spots. It is undeniable that the presented voting situation refers to a real social situation, because the spots distorting the presented content were actually broadcast during the presidential campaign. Their influence was one of the many factors responsible for the distribution of votes in the presidential elections in the United States in 1996. The way of constructing them, however, had been adopted from the methodology of research on the influence of artificial perceptual stimuli having nothing to do with the surrounding reality. Like proper combinations of such stimuli causing perceptual illusions in artificial situations, perceptually distorted spots create illusions about the image of the candidates. As Kaid (1997) observes, improving the candidate’s own image and spoiling the image of his opponent by using the advanced technology of perceptual distortion is a serious problem and threat to democratic systems. The voters have the right to accurate information during political elections, and this can be controlled and blocked by specialists working for a given political side.

Constructivism in the Memory of Political Events The situation presenting the influence of distorted perceptual stimuli in advertising on the evaluation of the candidate presented by this advertising has far-reaching consequences for people’s memories of his image. Distorted stimuli in advertising influence people’s attitude toward a candidate not only during the emission of the spot. They also cause changes in the previously remembered image. Recent research in consumer marketing on the reconstruction of memory occurring as a result of backward framing shows the way false memory about past events is created. It is worthwhile to take a closer look at some empirical research showing the changes in remembering simple perceptual stimuli as a result of distorting them in spots. Kathryn Braun and Elizabeth Loftus (1998) conducted research on the changing of the wrapper of the Suisse candy. The experimental procedure was quite simple and consisted of a few stages. In the first


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stage of the research, the subjects evaluated the taste of the Suisse bar, which aimed to challenge a brand already existing on the market, Godiva. The experimenter passed around a few samples of the bar, each in green wrapper. The respondents’ task was to unwrap the bar, taste it, and evaluate it. In the next part of the experiment, the subjects evaluated candy spots from the two companies. The first experimental group (visual) was shown a few advertisements of the Suisse bar wrappers with a blue color, that is, a color different from that wrapping the bars they had tasted at the beginning. In the second group, (verbal) advertising was descriptive and it included a statement that the bars were available in blue wrappers. The third group (control) was given no information about the color of the Suisse bar. In the last part of the research, the respondents were tested on their memory of the color of the wrappers of the bars they tasted at the beginning of the research. They were presented a color wheel divided into 30 different colors, with primary and mixed colors. The colors also included the color green that corresponded to the wrapper of the Suisse bar they had been asked to taste and color blue representing the color in which the bar was later presented. As one might have predicted, the control group to which the advertisements of the products were presented without any mentioning of their wrapper identified the color that was closest to the color of the Suisse bars they tasted. None of the respondents chose the color blue. In the visual group, half of the respondents chose a blue. A similar result was observed in the verbal group. The results show that both in the visual and verbal groups the respondents more often selected the color that was suggested to them by the advertisement of the wrapper than the color in which the bars were actually wrapped when they tasted the Suisse bars. Although Braun and her colleagues’ research is about the influence of advertising on the creation of false memory in the process of reconstructing the experience with consumer products, such reconstruction process also occurs with people’s ideas about candidates for state positions under the influence of political advertising. Many researchers, including Bruce Newman (1994), Andrew Lock and Phil Harris (1996), treating voters as consumers of political information find analogies between voters’ and consumers’ behavior. Use of consumer marketing techniques leads to suitable ‘‘packaging’’ of candidates during parliamentary and presidential elections.



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It can then be inferred that the distorted stimuli in Clinton’s and Dole’s negative advertisements and used in Kaid’s research might have distorted the voters’ memory of their previous experiences with the candidates and created a false image of the candidates. From the marketing perspective, the procedure of distorting the image in voters’ memory offers a chance to make the product better or worse without any changes in its quality. The quality that is controlled in this way is an intervention into the voter’s mind and fits the strategy of candidate positioning, that is, finding a clear and desirable place in the voter’s mind in relation to the competition (Newman, 1994). The history of political elections provides many examples of creating false images of candidates in voters’ memory by the strategy of distorting reality used in marketing strategies. As Newman points out (1999a, 1999b), the first application of marketing techniques to create an image of the president that would not be inconsistent with reality took place under Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency. The main attempt made by his campaign advisors involved creating an image of their boss as a physically strong person. During Roosevelt’s presidential campaign, specialists responsible for his image created an image of a man who could walk freely when, in fact, Roosevelt was confined to his wheelchair. He had mastered the technique of selfpresentation: he would prop one of his hands against his son’s arm and the other one against a stick. Such a presentation created the impression that the president was able to walk, but it was only an illusion projecting a false image of the president. Out of around 50,000 pictures that could be found in Roosevelt’s summer house in New York, only two presented him sitting in a wheelchair. The image of the president constructed in voters’ minds was not consistent then with the reality. Following changed stimuli, voters had false memories of Roosevelt. The constructed image is mainly presented through the media, which can be compared to retailers. If the media are not convinced that the material provided by the campaign advisors in certain packaging is good, then it will be hard to sell it (Newman, 1999a). Newman, like Kaid, claims that democracy is threatened by the use of increasingly sophisticated techniques in political advertising. He notices very clearly the development of market-driven democracy, in which marketing strategies of controlling voting behaviors using falsely constructed images of reality play crucial roles. It can then be stated that voters’ freedom in developed democratic countries is

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becoming more and more limited. However, before presenting this paradoxical relation between freedom and democracy, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at the empirically tested models of voting behaviors in which the presented image of a candidate plays an important role.

Paradox of Freedom in Democratic Countries The constructivist approach in voting behaviors was used in the sequential model of voting behaviors developed by Falkowski and Cwalina (1999) and Cwalina, Falkowski, and Kaid (2000, 2005). The model, tested empirically in Poland, France, Germany, and the United States shows causal relations between the image of the candidate formed during the process of watching advertising and the affective attitude toward the candidate and voting intentions.

Voting Behaviors The sequential model of voting behaviors assumes that in order to determine whether political advertising has influence on voting decisions, it is necessary to determine the links between the four components: (1) cognitive-affective elements (the image of the candidate); (2) general feelings toward the candidate; (3) intention for whom to vote; and (4) decision for whom to vote. The causal relations between the elements in which the image influences affection, which, in turn, influences voting intention, are presented in Figure 2. A concrete example of using this model with voting behaviors is presented in Figure 2, which shows cause and effect relationships on the basis of the analysis of structural equations. The example (see Figure 3) presents the influence of political advertising on the image, emotional attitude, and voting intentions for Al Gore during the presidential elections in the United States in 2000 (Cwalina et al., 2005). The image of the candidate analyzed with semantic differential was divided into two components obtained as a result of using factor analysis for the differential: ‘‘leadership skills’’ and ‘‘self-control.’’ The goodness of fit of the empirical data is (v2 ¼ 17.21, P ¼ 0.19, and v2=df ¼ 1.32). Then, after using regression analysis in which the dependent variable is the emotional attitude and the independent variables are the adjectives describing the image of the candidate through semantic


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FIGURE 2. Sequential Model of the Influence of Ads on Voting Behavior (Falkowski and Cwalina, 1999; Cwalina, Falkowski, and Kaid, 2000, 2005)

FIGURE 3. Causal Relationships in Voting Behaviors Toward Al Gore in the U.S. Presidential Election in 2000 (Cwalina, Falkowski, and Kaid, 2005)


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differential, it was possible to determine to which characteristics of the candidate the voters were most and least sensitive. Using such an analysis before and immediately after watching the spots helped researchers to observe changes in the relevance of these characteristics relative to voting preferences and thus changes in the influence of these characteristics on the voters’ emotional attitude toward the candidate. A detailed presentation of such analyses and the testing of the sequential model during parliamentary and presidential elections can be found in the above-mentioned works by Cwalina et al. (2000, 2005). Empirical research in the sequential model of the influence of political advertising shows the way political reality is created in the minds of the voters. However, one should remember that the example presented here is only one of the versions of the model, and one should not disregard the fact that the emotions invoked by advertising may contribute to the forming of the candidate’s image, which would mean that the direction of cause and effect relationships presented in Figure 2 should be changed. Empirical testing of such a model is presented by Cwalina et al. (2005). It is highly likely, then, that the sequential model would provide a good interpretation of the results of Kaid’s research (1997) on the influence of perceptually distorted negative advertising on the evaluation of the candidate and people’s voting intentions. Additional research on the influence of the media on voting behaviors was presented by Joanne Miller and Jon Krosnick (2000). They demonstrated, on the basis of empirical research, that the evaluation of the president depends on the perceived relevance of domestic or international problems and his way of managing these problems. By highlighting the relevance of various social and economic problems, for instance, drugs, immigration, crime, environmental pollution, and unemployment, the media makes them more important for the voters. In evaluating the president, the voters recall the previously highlighted problems that have important influence on the evaluation. The authors place their research within the theoretical perspective of priming, where a previously remembered event, that is, a multiple description of certain problems in the media, is recalled from memory and is the basis for the evaluation of the president. In light of John Anderson’s (1983) model of associative network memory, one can talk about a strong correlation between the perceived situation in



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which the evaluation of the remembered problems takes place and spreading of activity following such stimuli as the survey questions about the president’s performance or spots associated with presidential elections. This problem can also be approached from the perspective of availability hypothesis, according to which priming provides easy access to the remembered events that are important for political evaluations. ‘‘More frequent’’ events, including various social problems publicized by the media are, due to the frequency of their occurring, more available to our memory than ‘‘less frequent’’ events. Availability hypothesis is described by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1974) as heuristics used by people for the evaluation of various cognitive and social situations that may lead to illusions and, as a consequence, to availability bias. The media can then consciously publicize various problems in order to influence political evaluations through the psychological processes of remembering them. Miller and Krosnick (2000), like Kaid (1997) and Newman (1999a, 1999b), claim that democracy is threatened by such conduct. Intentional control of the evaluations of a politician’s activities by the voters limits the voters’ access to broad information and, by causing priming and heuristics, it creates the illusion of a free and conscious choice. It is worthwhile to quote the authors’ words here: ‘‘According to the theory of media priming, people are victims of the architecture of their minds—if a political issue is activated in people’s memories by media attention to it, they presumably use the concept when asked to make political judgments— not by conscious choice, but merely because information about the issue appears automatically and effortlessly in consciousness’’ (Miller and Krosnick, 2000, p. 302). But, as Ulrich Beck (1992) points out, what is publicized by the media, whose task is to look reliable and credible, is only single facts extracted from the excess of various hypothetical results. The point here is that the political sphere cannot afford to ignore ‘‘well-known common views’’ without losing votes (Beck, 1992).

Does Freedom Limit? The research on voting behaviors and political judgments in light of psychological processes of perception and memory points to a certain characteristic of the development of democratic societies. The foundation of such societies is their citizens’ freedom, which creates


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favorable conditions for political marketing consultants to create more and more sophisticated marketing strategies the goal of which is to make the voter vote for a certain political option. We face then a paradoxical situation because a by-product of these strategies is the limitation of the voter’s choice in his voting decisions. The character of limiting freedom in democratic states is different from totalitarian states. In the latter, this limitation is imposed from outside. The whole legal structure, including state bills and rulings, had efficiently inhibited the freedom of citizens in East-Central Europe. The citizens were aware of the limitations imposed by the state. In democratic countries, however, these limitations come from inside, through creating in man’s mind a certain picture of a part of reality, stimulating certain behaviors. The character of such internal limitation is much more dangerous than external limitation because one does not often realize that he or she is being limited in his or her freedom and there are no formal ways to oppose these limits. Like in totalitarian states, political organizations in democratic countries can achieve their goals through dishonest competition or falsifying the results of political elections. This falsifying, however, does not take place outside the voters but within them, when false images and false memories of a candidate are created in their minds. The problem of limiting voters’ choice by political advertising and its threat to democracy were the subjects of a boisterous debate in the Australian Parliament at the beginning of 1990s. Ian Ward and Ian Cook (1992), describe in detail the debate during which the Australian government suggested a ban on political advertising reaching similar conclusions on the paradoxical relationship between freedom and democracy. The authors do not agree with the sharp criticism of this ban that states that a ban on political advertising violates the right to the freedom of thought. On the contrary, such a ban protects this right. Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which declares that ‘‘Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . .’’ Interpreting this provision, Justice Oliver Holmes of the Supreme Court used the analogy of the ‘‘marketplace’’ with regard to election campaigns, when considering the need for ideas to be freely disseminated in the community: The freedoms of speech promote ’’ a free circulation of ideas from which people could pick those which seemed most likely to be true’’ (Ward and Cook, 1992, p. 23).



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A healthy democracy means that voters are offered a number of ideas from which, based on their critical judgment, they reject those they do not accept. However, the market mechanisms allowing information to reach various voter segments permit the complete freedom in creating and broadcasting political advertising to limit the expression of political ideas rather than facilitate it. The research on perception and remembering political advertising presented here shows that the goal of such advertising is at variance with the classical notion of freedom and democracy according to which they should contribute to voters’ conscious participation and critical reflection. Instead of stimulating critical thinking, advertising inhibits it by not conveying accurate information but hiding and distorting it. Marketing strategies in the economic and political spheres, using the power of the media, have expanded the methods of laboratory cognitive psychology into the natural social environment in democratic countries. An important case in point is Newman’s book (1999a), The Mass Marketing of Politics: Democracy in an Age of Manufactured Images, whose very title suggests that the process of creating various images of politicians is particularly important in modern democracies. The work of Miller and Krosnick (2000) discussed above presents practical applications of empirical research on priming, until recently conducted only in laboratory environment. After 1989, many countries of East-Central Europe opposed the totalitarian dictatorships and when creating democratization processes in their societies adopted, quite naturally, many models from well-established democracies. A rapid development of economic marketing was followed by political marketing. Television and the Internet began to be used to create economic and political realities in consumers’ and voters’ minds. The reality, which is constructed in this way, is reinforced in the form of remembered images, in which political and economic brand personalities are created. It is exactly these images, equipped with a huge load of emotions, that direct the behavior of the consumer and voter. A number of empirical research projects on political elections in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Slovenia have shown that the development of democracy in these countries is proceeding in the same direction in which the United States and Western Europe have been going (Falkowski and Cwalina, 2004).

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