CONTENTS ‘Trust the God’: Tharsein in Ancient Greek Religion

Miguel Herrero de Jáuregui

1

Acusilaus of Argos and the Bronze Tablets

Jordi PàMias

53

Just Desserts: Reversals of Fortune, Feces, Flatus, and Food in Aristophanes’ Wealth

Karen rosenbecKer

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Crito’s Character in Plato’s Crito

Yosef Z. liebersoHn

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Staging the Divine: Epiphany and Apotheosis in Callimachus HE 1121–1124

alexandros KaMPaKoglou

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Muses, Metaphor, and Metapoetics in Catullus 61

cHristoPHer ecKerMan

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The Greek Letters Ascribed To Brutus

Christopher p. Jones

195

Another Sort of Misogyny: Aeneid 9.140–141

Jefferds HuYcK

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Hylas, Hercules, and Valerius Flaccus’ Metamorphosis of the Aeneid

MarK HeerinK

265

Contents

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Pliny the Younger on his Verse and Martial’s Non-Recognition of Pliny as a Poet

lowell edMunds

309

Caesar’s One Fatal Wound: Suetonius Divus Iulius 82.3

eleanor cowan

361

Classical Sophism and Philosophy in Pseudo-Plutarch On the Training of Children

graeMe bourKe

377

Verse Quotations from Festus

Jarrett t. welsH

403

Rome in the Alexander Romance

benJaMin garstad

467

The Latin of the Magerius (Smirat) Mosaic

JaMes n. adaMs

509

The Construction of a Homoerotic Discourse in the Epigrams of Ausonius

lucia floridi

545

Emperor Theodosius’ Liberty and the Roman Past

MassiMiliano vitiello

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Benjamin Larnell, The Last Latin Poet at Harvard Indian College

tHoMas Keeline and stuart M. McManus Summaries of Dissertations for the Degree of PhD

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CRITO’S CHARACTER IN PLATO’S CRITO Yosef Z. Liebersohn

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I. INTRODUCTION

nalyzing the whole of any of Plato’s dialogues within the limits of an article is no longer possible. This is true even of a relatively short dialogue such as the Crito. This paper will focus on what might seem to be a marginal issue, but is, as I hope to show, rather one of the most important issues to be considered in analyzing Plato’s dialogues: determining what exactly is the character of each player in a specific dialogue.1 The Crito is a conversation between Socrates and Crito, where each of the interlocutors tries to persuade the other to act in a certain way. Crito tries to persuade Socrates to escape from jail and Socrates tries to convince Crito to stop trying to persuade him to run away. Throughout the dialogue Socrates is the one who dominates the conversation, and we are to assume that Socrates knows his interlocutor’s personality and what one may call “frame of mind”—including his explicit and implicit views—and designs his strategy accordingly. Understanding Crito’s character is therefore a necessary step in analyzing the Crito and deciphering its message. I shall argue that Crito as he appears in Plato’s All English translations, unless otherwise mentioned, are taken from Vol. 1 of Plato’s works in the Loeb series, translated by H. N. Fowler (1914) with some necessary modifications. 1 The words “in a specific dialogue” are important and need to be emphasized. The characters appearing in Plato’s dialogues have their own personalities that are shaped by Plato in accordance with the specific dialogue in which they appear. Thus, Crito, Critias, Meletus may appear in more than one dialogue, but they are fictitious characters (albeit based on historical people), and Plato can present them in each dialogue as he pleases, to suit the context. While Crito appears in other dialogues too, Crito in the Crito may not be better understood from studying Crito in the Apology, the Phaedo, or the Euthydemus. On this issue see my paper Liebersohn 2005:306–307. See also n. 39 below.

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Crito is designed as a complex personality with regard to friendship, the state, and above all justice. Disentangling this complexity can not only solve some problems raised in the secondary literature, but can also throw new light on the exact status and significance of the speech of the Laws that occupies the greater part of the dialogue, and lead eventually to an understanding of the dialogue in its entirety.

II. IS CRITO A PHILOSOPHER? The importance of deciphering Crito’s personality and world-view before proceeding to the discussion between him and Socrates (actually in order to be able to deal with it) is prominently expressed in two books wholly dedicated to analyzing the Crito. Weiss 1998 and Stokes 2005 each dedicate a whole chapter to a description of Crito.2 Weiss’ view is plainly expressed by the title of one of the sections in her book “The Unphilosophical Crito” (pp. 43–49). Weiss bases her description mainly on evidence she finds in the Crito itself, pointing to three facts in support of her view. (1) “Crito is seen to regard Socrates’ impending death as calamitous.” As she comments, this is not a philosophical view. (2) “Crito does not wish to take counsel; he wants only to be obeyed.” (3) “Socrates avoids using the term ‘soul’ in Crito’s presence, referring instead to ‘that which becomes better by the just and is destroyed by the unjust.’ ” If this description is accepted, one would infer what Weiss does infer, that Crito is wholly ignorant of philosophy, or even stupid.3 The Crito, especially the Laws’ speech, is accordingly seen as aimed at the non2

I take these books as representative of recent secondary literature, especially because they dedicate a declared and self-standing discussion to Crito’s character, which is my main subject in this paper (Weiss 1998:43–49; Stokes 2005:23–35). This is not to dismiss any other discussions that appear in articles and chapters in books dealing with Plato in general, and some of these, indeed, will be mentioned in due course. 3 Weiss 1998:43–49. The fact that Socrates does not use the term ψυχή in his conversation with Crito is considered by Weiss to be proof of “Crito’s total estrangement from philosophy” (43n12). For a similar view, see Fox 1956:227. For a discussion of Weiss’


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philosophical citizen who should keep the laws for non-philosophical reasons.4 I shall address Weiss’ evidence in detail, but before doing so, I wish to turn to a view quite different from that of Weiss. Stokes regards Crito as an ordinary intelligent man, who perhaps is not a perfect and devoted philosopher, but still “likes to listen, and is glad to learn.”5 A third view I would like to propose is that Crito, far from being stupid, and far from being a layman with regard to philosophy,6 is in fact well acquainted with philosophical arguments as used by Socrates. One need only recall the whole passage 49a4–c11 to accept that Crito is quite familiar with philosophical discussions, including philosophical terminology and premises.7 On the other hand, it cannot be denied that he frequently advances vulgar opinions and uses philosophical terms unphilosophically. Thus, as against his “preference for death over justice,” he believes that “in no circumstances must one act unjustly,”8 and against his “not wishing to take counsel”9 when Socrates suggests opinion, see immediately below. See also my paper “The Place of Ψυχή in Plato’s Crito,” ICS 40 (forthcoming). 4 Weiss’ view towards the Laws’ speech as not representing Socrates’ own position is known in scholarship as “the separation thesis” (first termed by Brickhouse and Smith 2006). For a list of other “separationists,” see Weiss 1998:5–6. For an opposed view—“the integration thesis”—see Dasti 2007. Though it is not my intention to argue this point here I may add that in my view this very dispute between “separationists” and “integrationists,” based on the division between Socrates’ own position, namely what he says in his own name, as against imaginary speakers brought by him (such as the Laws in the Crito), does not seem to be very useful, since even when speaking in his own name one should remember that he speaks to someone and at least some of his arguments or statements could, therefore, be ad hominem. See, for example, my paper, Liebersohn 2011, where I argue that what Vlastos 1991 has called “Socrates’ Rejection of Retaliation” should not be referred to Socrates but is an ad hominem argument directed at Crito and his special problem. 5 Stokes 2005:30. Stokes uses, though with a certain reservation, other dialogues too. 6 As against both Young 1974 (especially p. 6, and see also n. 25 below) and Colaiaco 2001:202. 7 A question such as τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστιν, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει; (“And does this hold good or not, that to live well and honorable and justly are the same thing?”, 48b7–8) simply cannot be referred to one who is “totally estranged from philosophy.” Moreover at 44c6–d5 Crito even seems to agree that one is to prefer the opinion of the epieikestatos (“most reasonable man”) rather than that of the Many. On this issue, see my discussion pp. 5–6 below. 8 45a1–3 and 49b7 respectively. Here I use the 1979 tanslation by Woozley. 9 On “preference for death over justice” and “not wishing to take counsel,” see Weiss’ first and second arguments above against considering Crito a philosopher.

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to investigate with him, his answer is “I will try” (49a3).10 It is my claim that the apparent discrepancy in Crito’s expressions is not to be ascribed to Crito’s ability or inability to philosophize or to his education, but rather to the circumstances in which he finds himself. This is clearly emphasized by the multiple references made both by Crito and Socrates to “then” and “now.”11 In other words, in regular circumstances Crito is a follower of Socrates, and accepts how terms such as dikaion (“right”) and andreia (“courage”), to mention but two examples, are used by Socrates. When circumstances change, however, all these philosophical perceptions and insights are put aside. Indeed, the greater part of Socrates’ effort in the Crito is to remove this discrepancy in Crito’s character.12 Plato has created Crito as a “then and now character” in the Crito. This essential feature of the character is in danger of

10 A similar view is found in the 1999 article by Verity Harte. Harte is aware of these two somewhat inconsistent sides in Crito’s character, and conjectures: “One might suggest that Crito is confused” (p. 131). In the end Harte takes Crito to represent the ordinary Athenian citizen whose “value system might be described as involving ‘kinship values’ ” (p. 140). In this sense Harte’s view is closer to that of Stokes 2005, but not too far from that of Weiss 1998. 11 E.g. 43b7–8 (πρότερον–νῦν: “hitherto,” “in this present misfortune”); 44d2 (αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνὶ …: “for this very trouble we are in now shows …”); 46b4 (οὐ νῦν πρῶτον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ: “not only now but always”); 46b6–7 (τοὺς δὴ λόγους οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν: “and I cannot, now … discard the arguments I used to advance”); 46d2–3 (ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνῄσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ …: “or were we right before I was condemned to death, whereas it has now …”). In general the entire passage 46b1–47a5 is wholly dedicated to this principal of countermanding Crito’s discrepancy between “then” and “now.” Had Crito not fallen victim to this discrepancy, Socrates would not have emphasized his own consistency throughout his life. 12 To take but one example: At 46e3–47a2 we read: σὺ γάρ, ὅσα γε τἀνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν αὔριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σὲ παρακρούοι ἡ παροῦσα συμφορά (“For you, humanly speaking, are not involved in the necessity of dying to-morrow, and therefore present conditions would not lead your judgment astray”). Weiss 1998:43n11 refers to this passage. Criticizing the view of Young (1974) who sees here an “ironic proof that Socrates recognizes that Crito is not able to have unclouded judgment at this moment and stick to Socratic principles”, Weiss writes: “The irony in this passage is even greater … because Crito has never really embraced Socratic principles at all.” In my view Socrates’ remark rather reflects the complicated situation in which Crito finds himself and Socrates’ attempt to encourage Crito to return to his philosophical self. In Weiss’ interpretation Socrates’ remark would have no purpose.


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being lost when elements of this or that Crito from other dialogues (all based on the same historical figure) are introduced into this dialogue. The “then and now character” solves not a few problems long ago raised by scholars, as will now be demonstrated. It will also provide a better understanding of the whole of the Crito, as will be shown later.

III. WHAT IS JUSTICE? Strangely, there is in the Crito no discussion of the sort so prevalent in other dialogues of Plato, where the central term used in the dialogue takes on a personality of its own and calls forth an independent discussion in the form of “what is X.”13 This absence is even stranger here, since justice is not merely a term that appears in the Crito,14 but is the notion at the heart of the conversation. Even more important, it is a notion over which Socrates and Crito are sharply divided.15 At 48b10–d6 Socrates appears to begin a new discussion that continues to the end of the conversation, on “whether it is just16 for me to try to escape from here without the permission of the Athenians, or not just” (πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειρᾶσθαι ἐξιέναι μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων ἢ οὐ δίκαιον). Yet this new discussion is actually only the last stage of a long process starting two pages before, at 46b1, after Crito’s second speech.17 It is in this speech that Crito uses for the first time a cognate of “justice.”18 We shall discuss Crito’s various uses of justice and its 13 See e.g. Euth. 5c9–d7; Phileb. 12c5; Men. 71d5; Theaet. 145e9, 146b11; Lach. 190e3; Hipp. Maj. 287d3; Rep. 331d2–3. 14 In the Crito there are no less than 48 appearances of dik- and derivatives in the sense of “just, right” and the like. 15 This question has indeed been raised and addressed by scholars. See Stokes 2005:91– 94. Harte, whose paper is devoted to the different meanings of justice suggested in the Crito, notices the absence of a discussion concerning “what is justice” but seems not to give it much significance: “Neither Socrates nor Crito spells out their respective conceptions of justice. But an impression of the difference between them can be extrapolated from what each of them says” (1999:132). 16 Fowler 1914 translates “right.” 17 It is no accident that Socrates begins his reply not with “justice”, but with “rightness” (ὀρθότης, 46b2). 18 45c6–7: Ἔτι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σωθῆναι (“And besides, Socrates, it seems to me the thing you are

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cognates later on, but for the moment it will suffice to hypothesize that Socrates understands Crito’s usage, and that all the stages of his refutation are now organized around the axis of justice. If so, however, the absence of any discussion of the nature of justice might seem puzzling. The answer is actually quite simple if my main hypothesis is correct: a discussion concerning justice is unnecessary since Crito knows very well what justice means for Socrates. The whole discussion at 49a4–c11 is steeped with the concepts of justice and injustice; but even earlier in the conversation Socrates has made use of justice and Crito has not asked what justice is. Crito knows what justice is for Socrates, and his problem lies precisely in adhering to this meaning of justice in the special circumstances in which he finds himself. The present situation may have Crito being governed by a popular notion of justice (on which later), but he is still well aware of the other—philosophical— meaning of this term. As for Socrates, it is evidently contrary to his aims to open a discussion on the question “what is justice.” It is sufficient for his purposes to leave in the background the right and philosophical meaning of justice (from Socrates’ point of view, of course, but a meaning hardly unfamiliar to Crito), and to conduct the discussion on the basis of the popular notion currently governing Crito.

IV. DEATH: MENTIONING AND INSINUATING One of Weiss’ arguments for claiming that Crito is not a philosopher is as follows: “Crito is seen to regard Socrates’ impending death as calamitous … Crito’s attitude is unphilosophical” (1998:43). In my opinion the fact that Crito regards Socrates’ impending death as calamitous is only evidence for one side of Crito’s character, namely that side that has succumbed to the present conditions and is concerned with the danger of losing both a friend and his own reputation among the Many. Yet a careful examination of Crito’s reference to the evaluation of death, rather than to death as a mere fact, reveals some points of interest. At

undertaking to do is not even just—betraying yourself when you might save yourself ”). Here also what I have translated “just” is translated by Fowler 1914 as “right.”


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44d1–5 Crito responds to Socrates’ attempt to deny the importance of the Many: Ἀλλ’ ὁρᾷς δὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνὶ ὅτι οἷοί τ’ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, ἐάν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ᾖ. But you see it is necessary, Socrates, to care for the opinion of the Many, for this very trouble we are in now shows that the Many are able to accomplish not by any means the least, but almost the greatest of evils, if one has a bad reputation with them. Almost all commentaries interpret the words τὰ μέγιστα τῶν κακῶν (“the greatest of evils”) as hinting at death. If this is the case, why not mention death explicitly? It cannot simply be an issue of style, since at 48a10–11 Socrates mentions death explicitly: “ἀλλὰ μὲν δή,” φαίη γ’ ἄν τις, “οἷοί τέ εἰσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτεινύναι” (“But one might, of course, say that the Many can put us to death”).19 Moreover, what Socrates puts into the mouth of this fictitious questioner is exactly what Crito has argued much earlier at 44d1–5. It is my contention that Crito, as Socrates’ follower, is careful not to place too much weight on death: note the word “almost” (schedon) which Crito adds after “the greatest.” It is, however, precisely death that informs his present sumphora. His “compromise” is to mention death in a roundabout manner. In short, Crito’s choice reflects the tension between “then” (Crito as Socrates’ follower) and “now” (Crito as an Athenian citizen who is troubled by the idea of losing a friend and his own good reputation among the Many). This is exactly why Socrates will later reformulate the same argument, but with two modifications. First, death will be mentioned explicitly. Second, it will be mentioned neither by Crito nor by Socrates, but by an imaginary fictitious questioner.

19

Crito’s response is enthusiastic (48b1): Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες (“Yes, that too is clear; one would say that”).

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Socrates formulates for Crito what he—Crito—would have formulated himself had he not been wavering between “now” and “then.”

V. THE MANY OR THE MOST REASONABLE MEN Throughout our dialogue Crito delivers two speeches, and it is only through these two speeches that Socrates can fully understand Crito’s conflict of interests. This information, indeed, serves Socrates in his treatment of Crito and his problems. For my limited purpose in this article I shall concentrate on Crito’s first speech and Socrates’ response (44b6–d10). At 44b6–c5 Crito offers two reasons for encouraging Socrates to escape, namely his friendship with Socrates and his concern for his own good reputation among the Many. Socrates, however, easily but subtly discovers that the second point is what really motivates Crito, his care for his good reputation among the Many. He does this by mentioning in his response only Crito’s argument from reputation and wholly ignores the issue of friendship. Thus we read (44c6–d2): ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὧν μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπρᾶχθαι ὥσπερ ἂν πραχθῇ. ΚΡ. Ἀλλ’ ὁρᾷς δὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν ... SOC. But, my dear, Crito, why do we care so much for what the Many think? For the most reasonable men, whose opinion is more worth considering, will think that things were done as they really will be done. CR. But you see it is necessary, Socrates, to care for the opinion of the Many ... Crito is here put to the test; had friendship really been what motivated him he should have protested against its omission. Crito does not protest, and Socrates concentrates from now on solely on the reputation motif.20 Socrates’ efforts at this stage focus on drawing a sharp 20

For the relations between these two reasons in Crito’s world-view, see also Weiss 1998:40 and n. 2 above for further references. See also West 1989.


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distinction between the Many and the epieikestatoi (“most reasonable men”). This is carried out in two stages. First (at 44c6–9) Socrates simply dismisses the Many in favor of the epieikestatoi; incidentally, this move would not have been made had Socrates had no hope of Crito being able to accept such a distinction. Crito, indeed, does accept the distinction: in his reply he does not dismiss the opinion of the epieikestatoi, but rather adds the opinion of the Many. This is clearly emphasized by the word kai (“as well,” 44d1).21 The kai indicates that in principle Crito does appreciate the superiority of the opinion of the epieikestatoi; the reason for taking the opinion of the Many into account here is that this has caused the special circumstances in which Crito finds himself (a death punishment awaiting Socrates with all its consequences, including the loss of Crito’s own good reputation among the Many). Given these circumstances, one has—in Crito’s opinion, of course—to consider also the opinion of the Many.22 In other words, Crito has two different outlooks, one when Socrates’ life and his own reputation among the Many are safe, and the other when Socrates’ life and his own reputation among the Many are in danger. Socrates’ second attempt is based exactly on an assumption that Crito accepts such a distinction, and that Crito also considers the opinion of the Many only due to the current special circumstances. At this stage Socrates appears to feel that one more “push” can make Crito return to the right way. Now (at 44d6–10) Socrates tries to sharpen the distinction between the epieikestatoi and the Many by focusing on each group’s ability and power. As against the ability possessed by the Many to take one’s life, Socrates introduces what for him is—and, we assume, has also been for Crito—the superior ability of the epieikestatoi to make a man wise (or “prudent,” phronimos). The 21

Fowler 1914 (above) and Woozley 1979 both ignore the word kai in their translations. Treddenick 1961 correctly translates: “You can see for yourself, Socrates, that one has to think of popular opinion as well” (emphasis mine). 22 This is clearly emphasized by Crito’s’ words αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνὶ ὅτι ... (44d2–3, “your present position is quite enough to show that ...”; Tredennick’s translation). Moreover, in his response at 46b1 (to be discussed shortly) Socrates begins with a kind of a protreptikos logos which focuses exactly on this point, namely the tension between “then” and “now,” and tries to remove it.

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ability of the Many is thus to be seen as inferior and should be paid no attention. Socrates does not entirely fail to influence Crito. At 44e1, Crito answers ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐχέτω (“Well, let that be so”),23 and immediately starts his long speech trying to discover what could deter Socrates from accepting his offer to escape. This response (ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐχέτω) which “is used to indicate acceptance,” as Stokes has justly noted,24 teaches Socrates how serious Crito’s problem is in deciding between these two criteria, namely, Socrates’ teaching and the opinion of the Many.25 Crito’s response (ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐχέτω) does acknowledge Socrates’ statement at least in principle, but the long speech that immediately follows on this acknowledgement, a speech in which Crito is trying to guess what could deter Socrates from accepting his offer to escape, testifies very clearly to the fact that this confirmation is still very far from expressing Crito’s real feelings, and that it is rather the other criterion—the opinion of the Many—that dominates him, or at least does not let him adhere to his philosophical training.

VI. JUSTICE, RIGHT, AND THE LAWS’ SPEECH As has already been observed, Socrates does not initiate a discussion concerning “what is justice,”26 although justice plays a crucial part throughout the dialogue.27 The term “justice” and cognates appear frequently in the speech of the Laws. I shall argue that only by assuming that Crito is vacillating between two meanings of justice—the popular and the philosophical—can the Laws’ speech be fully understood and its exact aim be clarified. It is my contention that the Laws’ speech does not set out to teach Crito anything concerning justice (Crito is well aware of what justice is and what it should be) but is intended to turn Crito away from the popular meaning of justice that he now uses 23

Woozley 1979’s translation. Stokes 2005:216n72. 25 This as against Young’s view (1974:6): “Crito is one of the Many. The dialogue Crito makes this clear.” Crito is, indeed, taking care of the Many, but this does not mean that he is simply one of them. 26 See p. 3 above. 27 See n. 14 above. 24


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because of his sumphora and back to its philosophical meaning. This is done by taking Crito’s current, popular, concept of justice and using it against Crito himself. Crito is the first in this dialogue to use a cognate of the term “justice.” This should reveal what Crito really means by using this term, since he is taking the initiative.28 The first mention appears at 45a1: ἡμεῖς γάρ που δίκαιοί ἐσμεν σώσαντές σε κινδυνεύειν τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον καὶ ἐὰν δέῃ ἔτι τούτου μείζω (“since we are just [dikaioi esmen] to run this risk in saving you, and even a risk greater than this if necessary”). If here we are not sure what dikaioi exactly means, we find somewhat later, at 45c6–9, another mention of ‘just’ that gives us some information concerning its content: Ἔτι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σωθῆναι, καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέσθαι ἅπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροί σου σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ ἔσπευσαν σὲ διαφθεῖραι βουλόμενοι. And besides, Socrates, it seems to me the thing you are undertaking to do is not even just [dikaion]—betraying yourself when it is possible to be saved.29 And you are eager to bring upon yourself just what your enemies would wish and what those were eager for who wished to destroy you. What Crito understands by the terms dikaioi and dikaion, so it seems, has something to do with saving friends and with not doing the will of enemies. In other words, Crito is here motivated by the popular notion of justice, “to help friends and to harm enemies.” In the secondary literature, however, these terms, dikaioi and dikaion, are interpreted as not referring to justice. Already Adam 1888 in his commentary on 45a1 translates “it is right that we” and on 45c6 he comments: “it is not correct to translate δίκαιον here as ‘just’: it is ‘right’, ‘moral.’ ” It is not 28 Crito would of course be aware of Socrates’ usual usage, but he may hope that the conventional view of justice that currently concerns him may also sway Socrates if he uses it first. 29 Fowler 1914 translates “you might” and Woozley 1979 “when saving it [sc. your life] is possible.”

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hard to guess what brought Adam to this conclusion, which, by itself and without taking the drama into account, is right.30 There are other appearances of this term in other places in the dialogue that necessarily should refer to justice in its strict and philosophical meaning (e.g. 45a6–46a9 passim). Indeed, most scholars and translators followed Adam’s insight, among them Fowler’s translation cited above. Here I come to my main argument: Crito’s use of “just” and cognates, at least at this point in the conversation, is in the popular sense. The fact that afterwards Socrates and Crito can have a philosophical conversation concerning “justice,” and indeed use “justice” in the strict and philosophical meaning of the word is no problem at all. It rather reflects the “then and now tension” in which Crito finds himself, and at the same time it also corroborates our hypothesis concerning this very tension. When Crito tries at 45c6–9 to convince Socrates to escape jail he uses a popular and unphilosophical meaning of “justice”; when he responds to Socrates at 47c8–48a10, and especially at 49a4–e3, the meaning of this term is philosophical.31 Socrates is doing nothing but trying to return Crito to the philosophical meaning of “justice,” and this is the point of the Laws’ speech. In order to see how the Laws’ speech fights fire with fire in response to Crito’s popular meaning of justice, we should first examine how Crito expects to achieve his aim. His material means include the use of connections and money. His rhetorical means are directed at Socrates himself, in an attempt to persuade him to exploit the opportunity created to escape from jail and save his life. Crito’s long speech 44e1–46a932 is wholly devoted to trying to convince Socrates to accept the offer to escape. It is principally divided into two main parts. The first (44e1–45c5) seeks and refutes possible reasons for Socrates not 30 Adam’s conclusion is no doubt based on the standard interpretation of the linguistic facts οf the usage of dikaios + einai + infin., which are codified in LSJ’s entry on dikaios under heading C. 31 In all the places where the term dikaion and derivatives are used in a philosophical meaning it is Socrates who initiates and handles the discussion. The only places where Crito uses dikaion or a derivative on his own initiative are at 45a1 and 45c6 cited above. 32 Crito makes two speeches. The first is at 44b6–c5, but it is a kind of an emotional outburst, pace Stokes 2005:27–28. Although it teaches Socrates what really motivates Crito (see p. 5 above) it is irrelevant to our present argument.


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accepting Crito’s offer. These are Socrates’ concern for his friends after his escape, and Socrates’ apprehensions regarding places of refuge. The second part (45c6–46a9) is aimed at trying by rhetorical manipulations to persuade Socrates to accept the offer to run away. The two main themes are Socrates’ apparent neglect of his children, and his claim to have virtue (ἀρετή). When we turn to the Laws’ speech we find exactly these themes.33 In other words, all the themes used by Crito to persuade Socrates to escape are now used by the Laws to persuade Socrates not to escape.34 Let us have a look at two examples. In Crito’s speech we find the argument concerning Socrates’ children: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς ὑεῖς τοὺς σαυτοῦ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὕς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεῦσαι οἰχήσῃ καταλιπών (45c10–d2, “And moreover, I think you are abandoning your children, too, for when you might bring them up and educate them, you are going to desert them and go away”). Against this argument the Laws present a counter argument (54a2–7): ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παίδων ἕνεκα βούλει ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ παιδεύσῃς; … ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται μὴ συνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; But perhaps you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and educate them? … will they be better brought up and educated if you are not with them than if you were dead? The same goes for the argument concerning virtue (ἀρετή). Crito was the first to make use of this argument: χρὴ δέ, ἅπερ ἂν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἕλοιτο, ταῦτα αἱρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντά γε δὴ ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (45d7–9) (“and you ought to choose as a good 33

This has already been noticed by Harte 1999:134–137. Yet Harte sees here an alternative suggested to Crito where his principle of taking care for his friends and relatives should be expanded to include the laws and the state. On Harte’s view, see also n. 38 below. 34 Socrates may be hinting to this at 50b6–7, just before the beginning of the Laws’ speech: πολλὰ γὰρ ἄν τις ἔχοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν (“for one might say many things, especially if one were an orator”). On this point, see Weiss 1998:84–95.

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and brave man would choose, you who have been saying all your life that you cared for virtue”). The Laws have their answer too: λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; (53e6–54a2, “What will become of our conversation about justice and virtue?”). The message is clear.35 If the opinion of the Many is one’s criterion for justice, one must accept that the Many, in the form of the Laws, are stronger than one individual.36 Crito uses every means he can find in order to achieve his aim, but so does the polis (as presented by the Laws). Crito, who came very early to Socrates’ cell quite sure of his success in smuggling Socrates out of jail, finds himself at the end of the conversation with nothing to say. In other words, Socrates’ retort to the Laws does not represent any kind of frustration or an attempt to teach Crito a new meaning of “justice.”37 Its aim is to subvert the device by which Crito tries to make Socrates run away, namely through speeches and rhetoric. By using the same device, the Laws show Crito that speeches and generally rhetoric are not the way to reach the right decision. This interpretation explains Crito’s response whereby he neither agrees nor disagrees (οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν: “I have nothing to say,” 54d9). He cannot decide, since both speeches—his own and that of the Laws—used the same themes but ended with opposite results. When an aporia is reached a different method should be looked for. Rhetoric apparently proves to be unhelpful.38 35

The Laws’ speech is by no means exhausted by this one point. Here rhetoric has been treated as only an example of the means at one’s disposal. However, just how important rhetoric was in a democracy where speeches are prominent in public life is beyond the scope of this article. 37 As against both the “separationists” and the “integrationists”; see n. 4 above. 38 My view here is very similar to that of Harte 1999 but because of our different starting points we reach different conclusions. Both of us agree that Crito’s concept of justice is that of the Many, namely one’s obligation to do whatever one can in order to help one’s friend (τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ’ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς: “to benefit friends and harm enemies”). We further agree that the Laws’ speech does not present a different concept of justice qua justice. We are divided concerning the aim of the Laws’ speech. Harte emphasizes the domain of those to whom Socrates should be obliged. While Crito spoke of Socrates’ duty mainly towards his friends and family, the Laws—adopting this same concept of justice—expand it to include also the state on the ground of its greater importance even than his parents: “The Laws conception of justice can also be construed 36


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VII. CONCLUSION Crito was Socrates’ friend from the same demos. This is undeniable, but most scholarly literature goes a step further and assumes that Crito was only Socrates’ friend. This may have been correct as a historical fact, but the real Crito should be sharply distinguished from the Crito who appears in Plato’s Crito. Here the dramatist (Plato) has the freedom to shape his characters according to the aim of the dialogue.39 Crito in the present dialogue vacillates between two meanings of justice, and this is because of what he regards as his double sumphora, namely losing his good friend and his own good reputation among the Many. In fact, because of this sumphora he is obsessed by the popular meaning of justice, and represses the philosophical meaning. It is Socrates’ aim to restore this philosophical meaning to its rightful place, as that which is the criterion of justice in every case. Crito in this dialogue is designed to represent the man who knows what is right and how a good man should behave, but fails to apply this knowledge when the moment of truth arrives. This is what makes Crito’s complicated character so interesting and human. It is the sort of thing that makes Plato’s dialogues always relevant.

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in terms of concentric circles. But their circles extend further than Crito’s, insofar as they include the political community in which Socrates resides … The Laws argue that the political community is owed allegiance of the same kind, but to a greater degree, than one’s family and friends” (p. 135). Thus for Harte the Laws’ aim is to present an alternative domain for justice: “While Crito’s value system might be described as involving ‘kinship values’; he treats the justice of an agent’s action in terms of their relation to a specific community of family and friends … The Laws’ value system may be described as ‘civic’; they treat the justice of an agent’s action in terms of their relation to the political community” (p. 140). I have no quarrel with Harte concerning what the Laws regard as justice and what they do with it, namely their including in it Crito’s domain but expanding it to include the polis as well. But I take it as the device by which the Laws succeed in defeating Crito. In other words my view emphasizes rather the essence of Crito’s concept of justice. 39 As already emphasized at the beginning of this paper, a character should always be analyzed in context, and not across all the dialogues in which he appears. See n. 1 above.

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WORKS CITED Adam, J. ed. 1888. Plato. Crito. Cambridge. Brickhouse, T. C., and N. D. Smith. 2006. “Socrates and the Law of Athens.” Philosophy Compass 1:564–570. Colaiaco, J. A. 2001. Socrates against Athens: Philosophy on Trial. New York. Dasti, M. R. 2007. “The Crito’s ‘Integrity.’ ” Apeiron 40:123–140. Fox, M. 1956. “The Trials of Socrates: An Interpretation of the First Tetralogy.” Archiv für Philosophie 6:226–261. Harte, V. 1999. “Conflicting Values in Plato’s Crito.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 81.2:117–147 Liebersohn, Y. Z. 2005. “Art and Pseudo-Art in Plato’s Gorgias.” Arethusa 38:303–329. ———. 2011. “Rejecting Socrates’ Rejection of Retaliation: Gregory Vlastos, Socrates’ Morality, Plato’s Dialogues and Related Issues.” Maynooth Philosophical Papers 6:45–56. Stokes, M. C. 2005. Dialectic in Action: An Examination of Plato’s Crito. Swansea. Treddenick, H., trans. 1961. Crito. In The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns. Princeton. Vlastos, G. 1991. “Socrates’ Rejection of Retaliation.” In Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 179–199. Cambridge. Weiss, R. 1998. Socrates Dissatisfied. Oxford. West, E. 1989. “Socrates in the Crito: Patriot or Friend?” In Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy. Vol. 3, Plato, ed. J. Anton and A. Preus, 71–83. Woozley, A. D. 1979. Law and Obedience: The Argument of Plato’s Crito. Chapel Hill. Young, G. 1974. “Socrates and Obedience.” Phronesis 19:1–29

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