cultural approach to public sector corruption in ... - Wiley Online Library

Journal of Public Affairs Volume 16 Number 3 pp 279–293 (2016) Published online 5 January 2016 in Wiley Online Library (www.wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pa.1587

■ Academic Paper

A socio-cultural approach to public sector corruption in Africa: key pointers for reflection Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah1*, Kwame Asamoah2, Justice Nyigmah Bawole2 and Issah Justice Musah-Surugu2 1

School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch Campus, South Africa Department of Public Administration & Health Services Management, University of Ghana Business School, Legon-Accra, Ghana

2

The public sector of many African countries is notoriously corrupt; cultural inclinations and socialization processes largely have a tendency to lead public officials into actions that may amount to corrupt practices. Providing seven (7) key pointers for reflection, this study explores public sector corruption in African countries by examining the interplay between culturally acceptable norms and professional expectations of public officials. The public official, by these two unparalleled expectations, tends to walk on a tight rope which often results in ethical dilemma and conflict of interest. The study adopts Riggs’ prismatic-sala model and uses the case of Ghana and traditional proverbs to explain the cultural context within which Ghanaian public official ought to operate. How can one combine these cultural expectations with professionalism? To what extent does the ‘collectivity culture’, ‘culture of gift giving and acceptance’, ‘extended family system’, ‘ethnic loyalty’ and ‘unfettered respect of the aged’ downplay professional bureaucratic and ethical principles? Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

‘They said a man expects you to accept “kola” from him for services rendered, and until you do, his mind is never at rest.... A man to whom you do a favor will not understand if you say nothing, make no noise, just walk away. You may cause more trouble by refusing a bribe than by accepting it’ (Okwonkwo, in Achebe, 1960) …the extended family system with its web of relatives gives rise to patronage: the official is expected to find jobs for some members of the extended family either his own outfit or elsewhere (Gyekye, 2013)

*Correspondence to: Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah, School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch Campus Private Bag X1 South Africa. E-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

INTRODUCTION Responding to an Afrobarometer Survey (2014) by the Centre for Democratic Development (CDDGhana) which reports on public sector corruption on sector-by-sector basis, the Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCOP) Kofi Boakye, Commander of the Ashanti Regional Police greatly attributed public sector corruption to the cultural setting of the Ghanaian people. He explained that corruption lies ‘within that sentiment of gratitude and reciprocity so we shouldn’t simplify it in terms of money collection… we should look at reciprocity, the issues of nepotism [and] the issues of old-boyism and all these things which are a bigger issue than collecting bribes’1. The phenomenon of public sector corruption has received attention and been treated seriously in the literature of public administration. It

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has been more widespread in underdeveloped countries often with weak democratic institutions and systems which tend to reduce their development and progress making their human development indicators unpalatable (Justesen & Bjørnskov 2014; UNDP, 2008). This point has summarily been posited by Myint (2000) that ‘corruption is most prevalent where there are other forms of institutional weaknesses, such as political instability, bureaucratic red tape, and weak legislative and judicial systems’ (Myint, 2000:56). The phenomenon of corruption—whatever form it takes, bribery, nepotism, extortion, fraud and embezzlement—has been addressed from varying perspectives; from the transactional perspective (Ryvkin & Serra, 2011; Barr & Serra, 2010; Kaufmann & Vicente, 2011; Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 2014); from the level of economic development and institutional development (Paldam, 2002) and from the rationalization perspective (Anand et al., 2004). For instance, Anand et al. (2004) argue that organizations and individuals tend to accept and perpetuate corruption by attempting to rationalize and justify their actions as non-criminal, justified or found in a situation they can hardly contain or control. Various notions and assessment of corruption are worthwhile because they tend to provide diverse analytical tools to conceptualize and tackle the phenomenon from different perspectives. Although the phenomenon has been addressed variously, the literature on corruption has not given much attention to cultural explanations, for instance, Paldam (2002) in his cross country analysis of corruption across different regional blocs argued that culture is not so strong a candidate to explain variances of corruption; he put it succinctly that ‘I have found little basis for the belief that corruption is so deeply embedded in the culture of the society as to be unchangeable (Paldam, 2002: 238). Various approaches to corruption fail to acknowledge the fact that the propensity for public officials to be corrupt or drivers of corruption in many African settings is not purely selfish and private but profoundly social in character, shaped by larger socio-cultural assumptions about power, privilege and responsibility (De Sardan, 1999; Rosen, 2002). Although not in Africa, a recent study by Jávor and Jancsics (2013) carried out in Hungary found out that corruption occurs in all facets of the organization; line managerial, middle management level and at the upper management by each of these using different techniques. Their study revealed that 1

http://myjoyonline.com/news/2014/December-11th/i-loseappetite-when-crime-is-committed-kofi-boakye.php.


even where mechanisms exist to check corruption, individuals at the various levels of the organization have their own machinations to side-step and trick the system to have their corrupt way through. The argument is that where socio-cultural and personal motives pose pressure on the official to engage in favoritism and unethical practices, the control systems and due processes are easily rendered inefficient, deactivated and suspended (Yeboah-Assiamah & Alesu-Dordzi, 2015). An in-depth contextual analysis of the African setting would point out that the very fabric of life of the African people are engrained with local proverbial sayings and wits coupled with certain practices which are culturally acceptable and promoted vehemently to ensure togetherness. But when these penetrate the official milieu of public administration, they tend to cause abuse of office and could be viewed as corruption. These tendencies in most cases bond individuals in the organization together which provides some form of ‘covering for colleagues and bosses’ because people have a sense of comradeship and collectivity culture. The strong attachment to extended family system and ethnic ties encourages nepotism, recruitment that does not encourage representative bureaucracy. This inadvertently may lead to the formation of informal networks which may easily decontrol organizational regulatory circuits and systems in which each crucial control mechanism is deactivated (Javor, 2008). With strong attachment to its culture and heritage, what appears not well treated in the literature is the extent to which the culture of African people from the traditional setting could permeate the formal operations of public officials. The argument is that what occurs in the social or traditional setting easily transcends into the offices of African public sectors. This point finds place in Hofstede and Hofstede’s (2005) conceptualization of culture as the mental software, which suggests that the same mind which has already been developed from the traditional setting with societal values and traditional cultural underpinnings is going to be used to partly run rational public organizations. Human beings are borne with a clean slate ‘tabula rasa’; their first point of socialization is the family which will inculcate societal cherished values into the child who would later receive formal education and grow to become a public administrator. What appears paradoxical is that the expectations of a public administrator tend to be different from what he has learnt from his African cultural society; whilst his traditional people expect certain behaviors and values— such as favoring their own—from the official, his office or professionalism demands neutrality, due process and professionalism. The cultural construct J. Public Affairs 16, 279–293 (2016) DOI: 10.1002/pa

Sociology of corruption and attachment of individuals and societies greatly influences the overall behavior of its public officials; this is because the officials are recruited from the very society whose values then become the ‘software’ to power the various programs ‘human beings’ and also to run the organization. We, therefore, argue that, in an attempt to really understand public sector corruption in Africa, it has to be addressed from the cultural perspective. This is because, that becomes a starting point for all the other explanations to thrive. For instance, Yeboah-Assiamah et al. (2015) view corruption from the transactional perspective and argue that if the process is to be complete, the context, actors, the systems and processes involved are calculated before the transaction occurs. The authors argue that, corruption could be initiated by either the public official (corruptee) or the corrupter after carefully assessing the actors and the context. Institutional weaknesses, laxities in judicial and legislative systems as argued by Myint (2000) could well be explained by the ‘mental software’ of public officials. There have been instances where even systems that have proven more effective, later becomes neutralized, relaxed and some abrogated because they were preventing other people from transacting their corrupt deeds (see Jávor & Jancsics, 2013; Ayee, 2000). Cultural orientations of individuals have various ramifications on the tendency to engage in actions which might appear to be corruption. Cultural tendencies of individuals that have received wider attention in the literature are individualism and collectivism, which provide an indication of the extent to which an individual emphasizes on his or her own ambition, or the ambitions of his or her section, group or society (Bochner, 1994; Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995, 1996). For instance, with these two as basis, Triandis and Gelfand (1998) conceptualize four typologies of cultural orientation: horizontal individualism, vertical individualism, horizontal collectivism and vertical collectivism with each of them having different impacts on corruption and corruption control. For instance, collectivist cultures disapprove of whistleblowing, because it disrupts the unity of an organization (Brody et al. 1998). Culture of collectivism ends up recruiting individuals of some sort usually through attraction–selection–attrition model which ends up forming a formidable squad or cliques that can also ‘eat up’ the technical quality and the goals of the organization (Jávor & Jancsics, 2013). A study by House et al. (2004) observed that in sub-Saharan Africa, people and for that matter leadership are generally high on humane orientation. This suggests Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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that people exhibit high concern for and sensitivity to others, especially, family and friends and tend to rate these even more important than the self (House et al., 2004 cited in Northhouse, 2013). The Ghanaian culture provides various indicators that are potential candidates for public sector corruption. There are various proverbs and wits which in the cultural setting, tend to foster brotherliness and forge alliances with one another. However, if these proverbial sayings transcend into the formal work of individuals in the public or private office, they may have a tendency to promote corruption because rules and due process may become sidestepped and compromised. In other words, if this same ‘mental software’ is used to interpret and transact business in formal capacities of public officials, it tends to create ambivalence between professional expectation and cultural background of officials which could corrupt their actions. This paper assesses public sector corruption from the sociology of African setting using insights from the Ghanaian case. Drawing from the Ghanaian culture using local proverbial sayings, the study discusses how socio-cultural practices and expectations tend to encourage public sector corruption in Africa. Corruption is conceptualized to include bribery, kickbacks, extortion, fraud, graft, nepotism, favoritism, collusion, falsification of records and unscrupulous skewing of rules and processes (see Morris, 2011).

METHODOLOGY The study mainly adopts the retrospective literature analysis of qualitative research approach. It draws extensively on existing literature and secondary sources in explaining and exploring how the cultural underpinnings of Ghanaian people contribute to public sector corruption. According to Creswell (2013), we conduct qualitative research because a problem or issue needs to be explored; we also conduct qualitative research because we need a complex, detailed understanding of the issue. The study draws extensively on several secondary sources of data including magazines, newspapers, scholarly books, journal articles and reports to analyze and explain the cultural undertones of corruption in Africa’s public sector drawing specific pointers from the Ghanaian setting. To really get additional insight into the Ghanaian culture, we further visited four relevant libraries of the University of Ghana; the Linguistics Department, African Studies and Sociology Departments. Additionally, we visited the Africana section of the Balme Library of the University of Ghana. In arriving at the local J. Public Affairs 16, 279–293 (2016) DOI: 10.1002/pa

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proverbial sayings, we visited and interviewed five traditional leaders from the Techiman Traditional Area which is among the Akan ethnic group—the most dominant ethnic group in Ghana. The discussion section appears mainly exploratory and provides pointers to stimulate further empirical studies to collect data and test the extent to which these variables become candidates for public sector corruption.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

refers to the extent to which social obligations influence public officials in the recruitment and personnel function of public administration. Poly communalism refers to the simultaneous but antagonistic existence of several ethnic, religious, racial and linguistic groups in the prismatic society who tend to exert pressure on their fellows in formal public position to seek favor. Poly normativism refers to the existence of traditional norms and ways of life alongside seemingly modern norms in prismatic societies. These elements have serious implications on the corruption in the public administration of developing African societies.

Prismatic-sala model A theory is a body of concepts or variables that explain societal challenges and mostly underpin research studies. The ‘fused-prismatic-diffracted’ also known as the ‘prismatic-sala’ model by Riggs underpinned the study. Fred Riggs made a great effort in searching for an objective and effective model for analyzing public administration in developing regions. ‘Prismatic’ typifies developing countries, which lie in a mid-point between traditional (undeveloped) and advanced (developed) countries. This suggests that prismatic society is neither purely traditional nor purely advanced; although traditional, it has adopted some features from the diffracted (developed) societies. Riggs (1964) explained three key features associated with prismatic societies: formalism, heterogeneity and overlapping. By heterogeneity, it refers to the situation where both modern and traditional structures and practices exist side by side; where Western type administrative institutions exist, the accompanied administrative behavior is guided by ascriptive motivations of a traditional society. By formalism, he explained it to mean the degree of discrepancy between formally documented laws/ regulations/procedures and their actual observance/ actual behavior. This will help explain why the rules prescribe recruitment based on meritocracy, but actual appointments may be made on the basis of non-merit considerations, including obligation to relations and friends, and other socio-cultural concerns. By overlapping, he explains that although both modern and traditional structures carry out functions, the work of the modern institutions or administrative systems are mainly influenced by traditional structures like religion, the family and other cultural practices. Three of the five dimensions of overlapping are more relevant to this study: nepotism, poly normativism and poly communalism. Nepotism Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Hofstede’s dimension of culture In a classical assessment, Hofstede (1991) in an onion diagram model provides in-depth discussion of culture. He analyses culture to entail four basic elements: values, rituals, heroes and symbols. By symbols, culture represents words, gestures, pictures or objects that convey a specific message or understanding which is only familiar by individuals who belong to that cultural fraternity. He explains rituals to mean collective activities that are technically superfluous in reaching desired outcomes, but which within a culture are considered as socially acceptable and significant. These activities are therefore carried out not for their own sake. This includes ways of greetings and paying respect to elders among others. Heroes are persons, living or dead, real or imaginary who are cherished and highly recognized by a certain culture whose renowned characteristics serve as role models for people’s actions. The author classifies these three elements as practices. Value system Hofstede maintained that at the heartbeat of people’s culture is their value system. He explained values to mean broad tendencies or propensity to prefer certain states of affairs over others. Values determine how individuals or groups conceptualize one entity from the other. For instance, evil vs good, paradoxical vs logical and rational vs irrational among others. This suggests that the value system of society or a people provides a frame for sieving through what is socially acceptable and what is unacceptable. What appears problematic is that most people have their value system firmly developed by age 10 and difficult to amend or reform (Hofstede, 1991) See figure 1 below. J. Public Affairs 16, 279–293 (2016) DOI: 10.1002/pa

Sociology of corruption

Figure 1 Onion diagram of culture (source: Hofstede, 1991)

Discussion This section discusses the various value systems, rituals, heroes and symbols of the African people with emphasis on Ghanaian context which appear to be high potential candidates for public sector corruption. The main cultural elements to be discussed are organized and presented under these themes: collectivity and power distance; gift system; inheritance/extended family system; unfettered respect for age; ethnic allegiance and loyalty and undue respect for the rich. High sense of ‘collectivity’ and degree of ‘power distance’ On Hofstede’s 6-D model, a cursory assessment indicates that African countries generally fall quite low on ‘individualism’ indicator. This indicator measures the extent to which societal members are interdependent on one another; a low score on ‘individualism’ suggests that such a society is high on ‘collectivity’ which means there is a high level of inter-linkages among societal members. On the dimension of power distance, African countries are

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notoriously very high on this indicator. Power distance refers to the degree to which subordinates of organizations of a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. This means that both subordinates and superiors within the said culture endorse and live by the inequality between them (http://geert-hofstede.com). There is, however, a sharp contrast between African culture and that of the advanced European or North American culture which is more individualistic and does not endorse power distance. Figures 2 and 3 provide two contrasting cultural tendencies between African countries and Developed, mostly OECD countries. The figures depict an inverse relationship between power distance and individualism indicators between the two regions. The lower a culture scores on individualism, the higher it scores on power distance. The figures suggest that whilst African countries score quite low on ‘individualism’ they score high on ‘power distance’ whilst reverse is the other region. Scoring low on individualism suggests that the culture is more collective and high bond among societal members which have implications for organizational members to be more likely to shield one another. A high score on power distance suggests that the African culture is a type that may utterly accept authority without necessarily questioning the rightfulness of leaders’ actions. These two scores have serious implications for the public sector of the continent which usually encourages the corruptibility of leaders and organizational members. This point is summarily explained by what the DCOP posited in the introduction of the paper that ‘corruption lies “within that sentiment of gratitude and reciprocity so we shouldn’t simplify it in terms of money

Figure 2 African culture towards ‘individualism’ and ‘power distance’


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Figure 3 OECD countries culture towards ‘individualism’ and ‘power distance’

collection”…“We should look at reciprocity, the issues of nepotism [and] the issues of old-boyism and all these things which are a bigger issues than collecting bribes”’1. Collective culture makes it quite difficult for individuals to report wrong doings and tend to easily condone or shield corrupt colleagues (see Ekpo, 1979; Jávor & Jancsics, 2013). The crucial question is, what accounts for this strong sense of collectivity and reciprocity? We attempt to answer this by carrying out in-depth analysis of the cultural expectations and traditional wise sayings among the Akans of Ghana. Proverb: Dua bata bo), ne twa ye twa na Literally: It is difficult to cut a tree which is too close to a rock or stone. Connotation: When trying to cut the tree you will hit the stone with your cutlass and dull the blade. When a close friend hurts you, you will not or should not forsake them, don’t leave them to their own destiny or deal with them harshly. You will not be able to jettison them because of your feelings for them. Proverb: Benkum dware nifa, nifa dware benkum Literally: The left hand baths the right hand, whilst the right also baths the left hand. Connotes: This suggests that each one should be their brother’s keeper even in times of trouble. This proverb is usually cited when people want undue favor from public officials or when an official wants to do something where it needs the assistance or collaboration of others. Proverb: Akok) baatan tia ba na )nkum ba Literally: The hen steps on the chick but does not kill it Connotation: Even if someone engages in unethical or corrupt act, it is better to caution him rather than exposing him to be fired. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Proverb: Wo ba ne gu wo nsa so, yepepa na yentwa Literally: If your child defecates on your lap, you clean it but don’t cut that part away Connotation: It is better to give people second chances even when they engage in vices, you just have to give them caution rather than taking harsher punitive measures. This means that it is bad to throw away the baby with the bath water; it is not the best of options to hand over indicted individuals to face the full rigors of law and sanction. Proverb: Wo se akyi nye wo de a, eho ara na wotafere Literally: If the back of your teeth (gum) is not sweet, it is still where you lick Connotation: If a closer ally offends you or the organization, you cannot forsake him Proverb: Wo nnua nnye a, wo nnua ara no no Literally: Even if your brother is not good, he is still a brother Connotation: This teaches that we do not forsake our brethren when they get themselves into trouble; we should show solidarity and even if possible protect and cover him or her. It would be bad to report or forsake a brother simply because he has been indicted. Still show him affection. From the proverbs and practices of Ghanaians indicated above, one would not be surprised why Ghana scored 15 on individualism; her score of 15 indicates that the Ghanaian culture is low on individualism which implies that it is high on collectivity, and generally a ‘collective one’. This suggests that Ghanaians exhibit a high sense of interdependence and homogeneity among its people. They usually tend to see themselves as a group and not as individuals—what affects one, affects all—and do empathize generally with one another, even if an individual commits an offense. Ghana also scored J. Public Affairs 16, 279–293 (2016) DOI: 10.1002/pa

Sociology of corruption 80 on power distance which suggests that the Ghanaian culture accepts hierarchical order because power distance assesses the extent to which subordinates of organizations within a country expect and accept that power is unequally distributed. People naturally would accept authority however porous or ill the directives and practices of leadership without necessarily challenging or being assertive. The two tendencies and cultural orientations— high on collectivity and power distance—suggest that in the midst of corrupt attitude or malfeasance at the top, subordinates mostly would not question or would find it difficult to even report or blow the whistle. People also have a tendency of providing ‘safe haven’ or shielding their colleagues when one gets into trouble or corrupt scandal. Put differently, collectivist culture has high tendency to cultivate and nurture lower ethical standards (see Banfield, 1958; Hooper, 1996; Husted, 1999). Scholars such as Ekpo (1979) provide that in such context, organizational members tend to owe allegiance to their social groups over their responsibility to act as rational bureaucrats (see also Gould & Amaro Reyes, 1983; Tanzi, 1994). This point has further been advanced by Getz and Volkema (2001) that, in collectivist cultures public officials have a tendency to form a network of friends and family to establish formidable relationships that catalyze unethical or corrupt dealings. In their study which used correlation and regression analysis, Getz and Volkema (2001), however, found no clear relationship. In a recent study, Jávor and Jancsics (2013) observed that corruption in most public organizations is as a result of dominant coalition between line, middle and senior management. They argue that ‘without the help of the middle-level, top executives would not be able to manage the entire corrupt transaction; the top can deactivate several internal and external controls, but the middle elaborates the corrupt contract’s technical, economic, and legal parameters’ (Javor & Jancsics, 2013: 28). This suggests that collectivity and familiarity among people in organization have a high tendency to lead to formation of dominant coalition within the rank and file of the administrative setup. Gifts system The preponderance of gift giving and expectations in the African culture tends to cause greater potential ethical dilemmas for public officials in these settings. In the African culture, gifts are revered and viewed as sacred which portrays the giver as kind and appreciative. It presents a kind of goodwill on the part of an individual visiting the elders or chiefs’ palace. Failing to offer or accept gift for service offered you Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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and service rendered respectively, tends to cause many relationship challenges. For instance, particularly among the Yorubas of Nigeria, the society has a culture of reciprocity which manifests itself in giving ‘thank you gifts’ after they have received a favor or service they deem worthwhile. Achebe (1960) in his bestselling novel No longer at Ease, Okonkwo the protagonist made an important assertion which succinctly explains the African concept of gift giving and expectation ‘They said a man expects you to accept “kola” from him for services rendered, and until you do, his mind is never at rest.... A man to whom you do a favor will not understand if you say nothing, make no noise, just walk away. You may cause more trouble by refusing a bribe than by accepting it’ (p.80). This kind of culture, if it permeates the formal administrative setting, could be conceptualized as corruption; meanwhile the intention of the giver may not reflect an act of corruption but purely cultural fulfillment. From the foregoing, it suggests that gifts expectations are normal, and refusal to give gifts tends to make an individual not cultured or does not know his culture properly, which also suggests that refusing a gift in the African setting is problematic because it is an anathema to relationships. In Ghana, gift-giving is a part of social solidarity in order to maintain harmony and peace across all spheres of society. In a typical Akan tradition of Ghana, gifts are considered sacred and exhibit the character of the giver as generous, kind and civilized. It would be highly bad of you to visit the chief’s palace or priest’s shrine empty handed. It is also unacceptable in the culture to reject gifts which will have several implications. Typically, gifts are not to be refused or rejected in most Ghanaian societies because it is considered an offense to do so. The discussion above finds support in the following Akan proverbs: Proverb: ‘Yemfa nsa pan nko ahenfie’ Literally: We do not go to the chief’s palace empty handed Implications: It is very unusual to visit the chief or the priest in the shrine without any gift which suggests that providing gifts to individuals in positions of authority is a sign of respect and homage. It affirms the legitimacy and suggests your submission to the authority of the office and person you are visiting. More problematic is, there is no excuse to exonerate oneself from not honoring payment of gifts to individuals in authority. Whether the individuals have or do not have, they are expected to show something ‘small’ within their capacity J. Public Affairs 16, 279–293 (2016) DOI: 10.1002/pa

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which is a symbol of knowing ones culture. In most cases, the elders through this proverb would put forward that: Proverb: ‘Nwansena nni hwee koraa no, )popa ne nsam’ Literally: Even the housefly which has nothing at all, tends to flap its palms Implications: this suggests that even the poor and vulnerable, out of their misery and poverty need to strive and get something to give to the relatively affluent or rich officials in positions of authority. This makes gift giving paradoxical in Ghana where usually the poor, vulnerable and affected in society give to the rich (see also Justesen & Bjørnskov, 2014). This is illustrated in Figure 4. This culture of gift expectation tends to permeate into the mindset of personnel in public sectors of Ghana who may be tempted to view their offices as ‘palaces’ where it is bad to visit or seek services without providing gifts to the public officer. Similarly, the one who wants to receive a service or who has received a service sees it as bad if he or she does not offer appreciation. What is problematic about this is that, gifts have the tendency to create the desire for reciprocity which may compromise rational decision processes of public officials (Torfason et al., 2013). This softens grounds which will facilitate the transactional model of corruption (see Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 2014). For instance, in a recent study, Justesen and Bjørnskov (2014) conducted a regression analysis of afrobarometer report from 18 subSaharan African countries; the findings reveal that it is the poorer in society who are frustrated to pay bribes more frequently than the wealthier

and affluent class. It is no wonder why corruption tends to perpetuate the disparity between the haves and haves-not which leads to higher degree of stratification among citizenry (Di John, 2010)

Direct endorsement of reciprocity: recipe for ‘kickbacks’ and misappropriation More related to the point above, the Ghanaian society tends to encourage individuals to expect reciprocity for the good services they have provided. In other words, it may be unacceptable if you help someone achieve a success and you refuse to take an honor or part of the proceeds. In most cases, people who excel very well are given chieftaincy titles in their communities or dashed plots of land. This is very good as it encourages people to do good to society; but it becomes bad when people abusively practice this in the office. For instance, the Ghanaian people have these sayings which could encourage kick back and corruption: Proverb: ‘nea wapoto ama no afe no, onkyiri se ode ne nsa bomu bi’ Literally: It is not wrong for the one who ground the stew to have a taste of it Connotation: When people have this in their mindset, if they are able to generate some revenues for the country or their organizations, it would not be wrong to spend part. Proverb: nea oyi ewoo no, otafere ne nsa Literally: the one who makes honey, licks the hands The implication of the two proverbs above is that, people have to show appreciation to those who help

Figure 4 Figure Culture of gift expectation and extortion



Sociology of corruption them secure jobs, contracts and other services in the public sector. Directly or indirectly, one is told by his culture to show reciprocity or seek reciprocity from individuals or the organization. For instance, one may easily be judged right in his mind to take part of revenues collected because his culture tells him to ‘lick the hands after extracting the honey’. It is no wonder why society and public opinion mostly speak in favor of the corrupt in society. People usually see nothing wrong if someone works hard and ‘chops’ or spends part of the returns. This, we argue needs a cultural re-orientation. With the first proverb, it is very common to hear people exonerating politicians who misappropriate state funds because ‘if they grind it, it is not wrong to have a taste; and also the one who makes honey will necessarily lick the hands’. That is, people find it difficult to understand why those who work in public offices should not buy vehicles and mansions because the people will tell you that ‘do not spare the stick and allow the dog to bite you’.

Inheritance system/extended family system In the African context, people pay particular attention to the extended family and inheritance system which tends to exert pronounced burden and responsibilities on public officials. The matrilineal and patrilineal inheritance systems propel the few family members in public positions to secure properties and assets to safeguard the security of their family members. Every official you see has an extended family where various people such as cousins, nieces, grandparents, uncles among others look up to him or her for a living. On the face value, you would be tempted to view an official as one entity, perhaps with a wife and few children; however, deep-seated is a host of other members of families whose welfare is a responsibility of the few in the family who have excelled and become public officials or seen the ‘brighter light’. People who have some form of income are directly or indirectly responsible for the welfare of their entire family; in most cases it would be unacceptable if an official would want to say his income is insufficient. People in the village have a perception that those who live in the cities or who work in public offices are rich and any excuse given would be unacceptable. Although, unjustified, this puts enough stress and pressure on officials to use other unorthodox means to augment their income and living. People are tempted to enter into deals to bring extra income. This tendency encourages nepotism and favoritism in the recruitment and selection into the public sector of Ghana and most Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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developing African countries. Because people have a feeling of responsibility in catering for their relatives, an alternative is to secure jobs for most of these dependents so that they can earn a living and take their troubles away (see also Gyekye, 2013). Gyekye brings the argument home by arguing that a public official “…takes advantage of his official status and commits acts of official corruption;… the extended family system with its web of relatives gives rise to patronage: the official is expected to find jobs for some members of the extended family either his own outfit or elsewhere” (Gyekye, 2013:88). In so doing, public officials sidestep rules and due process which is a form of corruption; corruption is conceptualized as any behavior or action that results in the violation of established rules for personal gain and profit (Sen, 1999: 275); any action that digresses from “the formal duties of a public role because of privateregarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (Nye 1967:419). The rationale is that, by empowering them, they will also reduce the responsibility burden. Any attempt at understanding nepotism and favoritism in Ghana should observe this phenomenon very well, in people’s quest to secure jobs and favors for family and friends whether qualified or not, they try all means to get in touch with at least an individual who knows someone, then further introduced to another who also knows someone closest to the recruitment and selection process. This creates a nepotism/favoritism causal chain or flow chart which often ends at the door steps of the public official. This point had been observed by De Sardan (1999) in his treatise on Africa where his findings made him conclude that ‘woe betides the man who knows no one, either directly or indirectly’ (De Sardan, 1999:41). The commitment to secure the good of our relatives is not discretionary but culturally mandatory. This is viewed in the following Akan proverbs. Proverb: ‘nea orepe ade ako kotoko no, yenye no aboro’. Literally: the one who wants something to go to Kotoko (home), we ought not to obstruct Proverb: ‘Adze pa wo fie a oye’ Literally: When good thing is in the home (family), it is better and preferred Proverb: ‘Wo nsa akyi beye wo de a ente se wo nsa yam’. Literally: If the back of your palm will be sweet, it cannot be compared to the inner part Proverb: ‘Wontumi nto wonsono ngu mfa ahaban nyehyem’ Literally: You cannot remove or throw away your intestine and replace with leaves J. Public Affairs 16, 279–293 (2016) DOI: 10.1002/pa

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Implication: the implication of these cultural proverbial sayings are that, they tend to communicate or send signals to public officials that if there is any favor, or any opportunity, they should first consider giving to their close relatives and friends. This also may promote nepotism, favoritism and a tendency to side-step of laid down rules to seek the interest of close ties.

Unfettered respect for age Another culture of Ghanaians that encourages corruption and indiscipline at the workplace is unfettered respect of the aged. Age is associated with wisdom, and even if the aged is not in authority, the young officer in authority needs to approach the aged with modicum of circumspection. This is a very beautiful culture which is part of the socialization process; people are taught to speak to the elderly with some respect, and it is even bad to reproach the elder. This message is inherent in the following Akan proverbs: Proverb: Panin enni hwee koraa no, )w) abakye Literally: The elder who has nothing at all, has longer stay on earth than you Connotation: This suggests that people in authority must treat older subordinates with some flexibility. This may make it quite difficult for a younger manager to effectively control an older subordinate which may make indiscipline permeate the organization Proverb: Abodwese betoo anint)nwii Literally: The beard even though long came to meet the eyebrow Connotation: No matter your position in the organization, you still cannot compare yourself to the old or aged. There is a tendency for younger officials to be lenient with older subordinates even if the latter engages in unethical practices. Proverb: Wo tenten ene wo papa pe a, enkyere se wo ne no eye pe Literally: Even though you may be as tall as your father, it does not suggest you are his co-equal Connotation: You could be the superior or boss, but you cannot be equal with the older subordinates. In cultural terms and thinking, older people in the organization who by virtue of age or longer stay in the organization hold a notion that they are worthy or more relevant even than their superior who is relatively younger or newer in the organization. Although these cultural values are inculcated into growing Africans to promote respect for the Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

elderly in society, this habit when it enters into the formal offices or bureaucracies tends to breed paternalism at the workplace. In a typical organization where there are subordinates who have social standing, such as local chiefs, elders, church leaders among others, how effectively could a young leader or manager who is professionally the boss but socially a subordinate discipline these ones? The office, which is mainly run on bureaucratic principles of hierarchy, discipline and chain of commands, the issues of age or one’s social status ideally should be out of the question. This appears difficult to uphold in most offices of the Ghanaian public sector because people have been trained at home to unduly respect and succumb to elders even if we are at the apex of administration; therefore, even if an elderly person engages in acts that amount to indiscipline; the superior who is relatively younger in most cases has to approach it with tact lest people will tout him or her as arrogant. It is commonplace to find out in several offices where people are called names such as Nana (chief), Togbui (chief), Wofa (uncle), Auntie among others; this breeds paternalistic relationships in the organization that tends to bond them together in an informal way that facilitates the transactional process (see YeboahAssiamah et al., 2014).

Ethnic allegiance and loyalty In Ghana, people tend to owe strong allegiance and loyalty to their ethnic groups before the state. People view their ethnic group members as brothers and sisters and are encouraged to help them out through fair or foul means. This is typically observed during recruitment and selection, admission processes where people have tendencies to favor their kinsmen and women. This is so because ethnic groups are underpinned by philosophies that tend to bond them together such as the Onua/nyobroo/ mmabia philosophies of the Akans, Ewes and Northerners respectively. This leads to the formation of ‘clects’ (to borrow from Riggs, 1964) and informal groupings in the organization with traditional outlook which has a tendency to lead to suspicions among workers, and collision and tension among perceived groups. What is problematic about this is that, officials will feel free to perpetrate any corrupt transaction because they know they have people around who would shield them or not blow any whistle. In other words, this leads to the formation of informal networks and cliques who can easily engage in clandestine activities in the organization by carefully deactivating the formal control and check J. Public Affairs 16, 279–293 (2016) DOI: 10.1002/pa

Sociology of corruption mechanisms (Jávor 2008). This ethnic allegiance has a tendency of defying the principle of representative democracy suggested in the Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in chapter six of Ghana’s 1992 Republican Constitution. Section 35 (5) (6) directs the State to actively devise mechanisms and create incentives that reduce sectional and discriminatory practices within the Ghanaian society, and for that matter, public sector of Ghana. However, this role has been very difficult because of the cultural allegiance of people; what do the following cultural wits suggest to their adherents? Proverb: Wo se akyi enye wo de a, eh) ara na wotafere Literally: Even if the back of your teeth (gum) is not sweet, that is where you still lick. Proverb: ‘Wo kurom p3t3 di wonam a, 3bi ka’ Literally: If the vultures of your hometown eat your meat, at least they will spare or leave part Proverb: Kuntun hwan a n’akyiri ara na ek). Literally: At long last, or when things go bad, you will get back to your roots or hometown Connotation: The proverbs above suggest that no matter how it may be, one should try his possible best to serve and favor his townspeople because, in the end, it is where you would turn your eyes to. Even if the candidate is less qualified but ethnic man, his mediocrity may be preferred to an alien’s competence; this may have implication for mediocrity and unprofessionalism in the public sector of many developing African countries. Respect for the rich? The Ghanaian culture has greater regard and respect for affluence, wealth, status and riches. Society unduly reveres affluent individuals and groups without necessarily questioning the source of wealth or power. It becomes a disease or socially unacceptable if people work for several years and cannot point to a vehicle or building; no amount of explanation would go down well with your traditional people. What appears problematic is that they may be tempted to compare your status or situation with probably a young official who entered the sector within a relatively shorter period to make you feel unworthy. This has sunk into the heads of prospective public sector job seekers who have a pre-conceived mind of becoming rich within a shorter period through whatever means. Society cherishes wealth and frowns on poverty or lack. This is evidenced by these cultural wits: Proverb: yenk)te aduro mmra a, eno ara ne ahahan Literally: Herb is the only source of medicine Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Connotation: Whatever that will be done, money is key; money makes everything Proverb: Sika ye abrante Literally: Money makes one a gentleman Connotation: One should strive and get wealth or riches.

CONCLUSIONS From the discussion above, this study draws conclusions and proffers useful recommendations that are relevant to administrative practices of developing African countries, whether public or private administration. First, the Ghanaian culture is generally a ‘collective one’ which has become so as a result of the socialization process and the kind of cultural teachings given to growing individuals. This is evidenced in the wise sayings and proverbs of the people. This feeling of oneness leads to the kind of wanton belongingness and bond between people which easily results in the formation of informal sects in the organization which can easily make corruption and unethical practices normalized and easier to transact. Second, most public officials may not only be intrinsically corrupt but pressure from the traditional people or society exerts exogenous pressure on their fellow ‘sala man’ (to borrow from Riggs) who would be left with no choice but to succumb. Officials, in most cases would have to side-step the rules to favor their own people because of pressure from their poly communal groups in society. Finally, we conclude that overall corruption scandal in society is a product of individuals’ selfish desires for riches and/or status and the exogenously solicited corruption/favor from societal members which mainly emanates from the public officer’s social affiliations.

Policy suggestions From the above conclusions, the following recommendations would be very useful in addressing public sector corruption in developing African societies. National and cultural reorientation First, there is a need for national and cultural reorientation within the Ghanaian society. This activity needs to be embarked upon through a collaborative approach (from planning, through execution phases), involving stakeholders from different facets of society. This should include but not limited J. Public Affairs 16, 279–293 (2016) DOI: 10.1002/pa

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to the Government, Religious groupings, National House of Chiefs, Political Parties, Civil Society Organizations and media. On a national television spanning for about two to three weeks, and on periodic basis, representatives from these sects need to reiterate and echo to their members that culture is not to be used in the offensive manner; we do not hide behind culture of oneness to derail the state and its resources. All these groups should make commitments and pledge their support to the course of not pleading on behalf of any individual who engages in corrupt scandals. This will permeate the rank and file of the society because Ghanaian people take inspiration from their leaders. The role of the media is very critical in exposing any influential individuals in society who would want to plead or seek unscrupulous favor from public officials. Rules should be made to apply objectively so that no unwarranted pressure mounts on public officials. Genuine commitment from chiefs, priests and political elites would cater for and help address the exogenous pressure that comes to public officials. The role of the media is critical in supervising this process by helping throw sunshine on any action; they should name and shame any authority that seeks undue favor from officials, or begs on behalf of a reprimanded individual or groups of individuals. Citizenship and ethical training Although there is a debate on whether ethics could be taught or not, critics cite Samuel Johnson who classically posits that ‘do not be too hasty to trust or to admire the teachers of morality; they discourse like angels, but they live like men’2. This paper, however, agrees with Peter Caws who explains that ethical training could positively influence most organizational members3. We argue for a holistic approach to inculcate ethical awareness and implications of public sector corruption to all public sector officials. We argue that ethical training coupled with practical case studies tends to create awareness among participants who in most cases may be prompted on how to approach ethical dilemma. Most people are not aware of ethical implications, and a holistic training would make them know that one cannot hide behind his boss, subordinates or colleagues to get exonerated. There is individual responsibility and accountability in whatever corrupt act we engage in. Although some Quoted by Peter Caws, ‘On the Teaching of Ethics in a Pluralistic Society’, Hastings Centre Report 8(5), October, 1978. 3 Peter Caws, ‘On the Teaching of Ethics in a Pluralistic Society’, Hastings Centre Report 8(5), October, 1978. 2


actions might be collective or a syndicate, each participant or actor would inadvertently account for his part in the deal. People should be given this kind of citizenship and ethical training right from the infancy or childhood stage with emphasis on the positive connotation of the rich African cultural practices of solidarity and collectivity and the ideal meaning and usage that engender national growth. Monetary promises for whistle blowers The study revealed that whilst the Ghanaian culture ranks high on ‘collectivity’ which suggests that people are bond to one another, the Ghanaian culture equally reveres wealth and riches. This suggests that any attempt to get an insider to provide information requires monetary inducement. This suggests that for whistleblowing—effective anti-corruption strategy—to be effective requires providing incentives to the whistleblower. In Ghana, the Whistleblower Act, Act 720 of 2006 has some economic incentives to motivate whistleblowers. Sections 20 to 25 of the Act provide and discuss how people whose disclosures of corrupt acts will be rewarded from a Fund. In the Bible, if monetary incentive could propel Judas Iscariot to betray Jesus Christ, his greatest confidant, this mechanism will be powerful especially in African countries where poverty is endemic. In Ghana’s Act 720, Section 24 provides that ‘A whistleblower whose disclosure results in the recovery of an amount of money shall be rewarded from the Fund with (a) ten percent of the amount of money recovered (b) the amount of money that the Attorney-General shall, in consultation with the Inspector-General of Police, determine’. However, this information appears to elude the citizenry because there has not been adequate education on the Act and the rewards thereof. The policy has not been effective because there has not been any evidence or media report of any disclosure where the informant has been rewarded; to our utter dismay, various whistle blowers have rather become victimized and even sidelined (see Domfeh & Bawole, 2011 for two clear cases of victimization). Implementation of the policy has been slow and sluggish which might make one to perceive that effective implementation would reveal various actions by senior bureaucrats and politicians who have therefore sought to make the law toothless bulldog or perhaps make it unpopular. Intensifying anti-corruption institutions and third sector approach Anti-corruption institutions must be adequately empowered and allowed to operate freely without any political machinations. Institutions on public J. Public Affairs 16, 279–293 (2016) DOI: 10.1002/pa

Sociology of corruption procurement, whistleblowing, economic and organized crime must be enforced to the latter and should not spare the ‘big fish’ lest it loses its legitimacy. To augment the role of the formal political institutions, the role of non-state actors is imperative. This means non-governmental organizations, labor unions, think tanks, media, civil society organizations as well as opposition parties have an active role in exposing corruption in the public sector. Strict enforcement of representative bureaucracy The directive principles of state policy (Chapter six of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution) direct policy actors on how policy making and actions should be carried out. Section 35 (5) directs the state to ensure a just and fair society by (i) promoting a spirit of loyalty among Ghanaians that overrides sectional, ethnic and other loyalties; and to (ii) achieve reasonable regional and gender balance in recruitment and appointment to public offices. This suggests that recruitment into public offices in Ghana should in the end lead to a workforce that is highly diversified and well balanced to be a ‘representative bureaucracy’ which is a microcosm of the Ghanaian society. However, favoritism and nepotism lead to skewed workforce that is unbalanced which tends to favor people from particular groups and sections of society. There is therefore a need to pragmatically ensure that recruitments take into account merit and reasonable balance. A workforce is well balanced if the composition of employees reflects or typifies the very society within which the organization operates. In other words, the employees should exhibit diversity in terms of inter alia, gender, religion, ethnicity or race, region, and political affiliation as far as practicable. A balanced workforce provides an internal surveillance mechanism because it becomes difficult to determine the corruptibility of other employees. Regular reposting and exchange between ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) More importantly, longevity of one’s stay at a particular office or organization breeds familiarity, social solidarity and bond which may make corruption transaction quite easier. For instance, YeboahAssiamah et al. (2014) explain corruption as a transaction between actors who share a relationship, and the process becomes effective after each actor carefully assesses the context, content, process and the perceived behavior of the other actor involved as well as how the system operates. Regularly transferring and bringing relatively new workforce would reduce the nature and propensity for corruption to thrive because it will take time for one to study the Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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corruptibility of a new worker, or perhaps one may not know the agenda of a new employee; perhaps he could be planted to serve as a whistle blower.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah is a Ph.D. candidate reading Public Management and Development Planning at the School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University, South Africa. He is concurrently a TRECCAFRICA scholar participating in a Transdisciplinary Complexity Studies in Sustainability in same institution. Prior to this, Emmanuel had obtained an MPhil in Public Administration and also started a Ph.D. course work in Public Administration and Policy Management at the University of Ghana Business School where he also served for two years as a Graduate Research and Teaching Assistant. Emmanuel obtained a B.A. in Political Science with Geography & Resource Development from University of Ghana with first class honors and was appointed a Teaching Assistant in Political Science in 2010/2011. The author also holds a single subject diploma in HRM from ICM-UK. His research interests include public sector leadership, governance and institutions; decentralization and local governance; privatization and urban service delivery; environmental governance and sustainability with focus on complexities. E-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] Kwame Asamoah (Ph.D.) is a Lecturer and the Ph.D. Coordinator in the Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management at the University of Ghana Business School. He holds a Ph.D. in Public Administration from Jackson State University in the USA and a Master’s degree in Public Administration from University of Ghana. Dr. Asamoah teaches Public Policy Analysis, Applied Public Policy Analysis, Advanced Public Administration, Issues in Public Administration and Public Sector Human Resource Management at the graduate level. His main research interests include Public Policy Analysis, Decentralization, Human Resource Management, and Organizational Development. E-mail: [email protected] Justice Nyigmah Bawole (Ph.D.) is a Senior Lecturer and Head of Department of the Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management, University of Ghana Business School, Legon. Dr. Bawole obtained a Ph.D. in Development Policy and Management from the Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester, UK. He holds an MPhil, BSc. Administration and Diploma (Public Administration Major) degrees from the University of Ghana Business J. Public Affairs 16, 279–293 (2016) DOI: 10.1002/pa

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School obtained in 2006, 2003 and 1999 respectively. Dr Bawole teaches Management of NGOs, Ethics in Administration and issues in Public Administration. E-mail: [email protected] Issah Justice Musah-Surugu is a PhD candidate reading Public Administration and Policy Management at the University of Ghana Business School. He holds MSc in Sustainable Development, a BSc in Administration and Diploma from the same University. Justice has served as a Teaching and Research Assistant in the Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management, University of Ghana and he is currently President of the Graduate Students Association of Ghana, Legon-Branch. His research focus includes sustainable development and growth, decentralization, governance and poverty. E-mail: [email protected]

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