Cultural theory and risk perception: a proposal for a better measurement

Journal of Risk Research 5 (2), 147–165 (2002)

Cultural theory and risk perception: a proposal for a better measurement SUSANNE RIPPL* University of Technology Chemnitz, Department of Sociology, 09107 Chemnitz, Germany

Abstract In the 1980s, social and cultural perspectives become increasingly important in the Želd of risk research. In current empirical research on the inuence of social and cultural factors on risk perception, the cultural theory (CT) of Douglas and Wildavsky (Risk and Culture: An Essay on Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers, Berkeley: California University Press, 1982) is the most inuential approach. In 1990 Dake introduced a measurement instrument that is used broadly in quantitative studies on cultural theory and risk. In the discussion of Dake’s work, two questions have emerged as most controversial. First, can Douglas and Wildavsky’s theoretical concept be tested on the basis of data obtained from individuals, as is done by Dake and many other authors? Second, does the instrument introduced by Dake (Journal of CrossCultural Psychology, 22, 61–82, 1991) show sufŽcient validity, in the sense that hypotheses which could be derived from CT hold true when Dake’s scales are used? Both questions are addressed here. A new instrument and strategies to test the validity are introduced, which address criticisms of Dake’s work.

1.

Introduction

The Želd of risk research is currently dominated by two approaches: the so-called psychometric paradigm, which is rooted in psychology and decision theory, and the cultural theory of Douglas and Wildavsky (1982). The psychometric paradigm focuses predominantly on cognitive factors that inuence individuals’ perception of risk. On the basis of empirical work, Slovic and his colleagues in particular (Slovic et al. 1980; Slovic 1987, 1992) found that two main cognitive factors dominate individuals’ perception of risk: the dread risk factor and the unknown risk factor.1 They replicated the signiŽcance of these two factors in various studies and different cultural contexts. Despite these interesting results, the psychometric perspective neglects social and cultural inuences on risk perception. Although Slovic and his colleagues found this two-factor structure in different contexts, this approach cannot explain differences in levels of risk perception among social and ethnic groups. Such differences were found by other researchers in subsequent studies (e.g. Vaughan and Nordenstam, 1991; Flynn * Author to whom correspondence should be addressed: E-mail: [email protected] 1 The so-called dread risk factor includes characteristics such as calm–dread, voluntary–involuntary, controllable–uncontrollable, and catastrophic-not catastrophic. The unknown risk factor includes characteristics such as known–unknown to the individual, known–unknown to science, and new–old.

Journal of Risk Research ISSN 1366-9877 print/ISSN 1466–4461 online © 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/1366987011004259 8

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et al., 1994; Rohrmann, 1994). Cognitive variables could not answer questions such as ‘Why is one technology feared in one society or social context and not in another?’ In the 1980s, however, cultural theory developed by anthropologists and sociologists entered the Želd. Researchers began to analyse social and cultural inuences on risk perception. The theoretically most highly elaborated approach dealing with the impact of such inuences is the so-called cultural theory (CT) developed by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982). This approach has been adopted and developed by other authors (Thompson et al., 1990; Rayner, 1992). Dake, in collaboration with Wildavsky, tried to test the theory empirically, using a quantitative approach (Dake, 1990, 1991, 1992; Wildavsky and Dake, 1990). In discussions of Dake’s work, two questions have emerged as most controversial (Sjöberg, 1995; Marris et al., 1996, 1998). The Žrst is whether Douglas and Wildavsky’s theoretical concept can be tested on the basis of data obtained from individuals, as is done by Dake (1991, 1992) and many other authors (e.g. Marris et al., 1996; Peters and Slovic, 1996; Grendstad and Selle, 1997; Ellis and Thompson, 1997; Coughlin and Lockhart, 1998). The second question is whether the instrument introduced by Dake (1990) shows sufŽcient construct validity: that is, whether the measurement instrument holds true when subjected to an empirical test according to hypotheses that could be derived from CT, concerning the relations between the four constructs (the four cultural types) and relations to other constructs (Schnell et al., 1989, p. 154). Both questions are addressed in this paper. In particular, a new instrument and a new approach using structural equation modelling are presented as a more appropriate method of testing the complex, interconnected structure of the four cultural types.

2.

The cultural theory

In the early 1980s Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) started a discussion about the impact of values and cultural settings on the perception of risks (Johnson and Covello, 1987; Dake, 1991; Stern et al., 1995). In their view, risk perception and concern about environmental or social issues are socially and culturally framed. This means that the values and worldviews of certain social or cultural contexts shape the individual’s perception and evaluation of risks. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) stress that individuals are embedded in a social structure and that the social context of individuals shapes their values, attitudes, and worldviews. In this way, socialized cognitive patterns work like Žlters in the evaluation of information about risks (Stern et al., 1995, p. 726). According to this perspective, the most important predictors for selecting what people fear or do not fear are not individual cognitive processes such as the perception of threats to health or feelings of uncontrollability (as stated in psychometric research), but socially shared worldviews – so-called cultural biases that determine the individual’s perceptions (Wildavsky and Dake, 1990, Dake, 1992). An overview of international studies on risk perception showed, for example, that there is almost no relationship between individual knowledge and concern (Wildavsky, 1993, pp. 193ff). This result can be interpreted as an indication of the relevance of socialized cognitive schemata that work like a Žlter in evaluating information. In this sense, values frame the interpretation of information. Therefore individuals with environmental values, for example, will evaluate a given piece of information about the probability of accidents in nuclear power plants totally differently than supporters of nuclear power. Ellis and Thompson

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(1997) argued that concern (e.g., for environmental issues) is embedded in broader sociocultural orientations and is not merely a function of information about the safety of particular technologies. Cultural theory proposes that individuals choose what they fear in relation to their way of life-that is, in relation to the ‘culture’ they belong to (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Thompson et al., 1990; Douglas, 1997). To identify different types of cultures Douglas and Wildavsky developed the so-called grid/group typology, which suggests four prototypical patterns: Each consists of a characteristic behavioural pattern (pattern of social relations), accompanied by a justiŽcatory cosmology (or cultural bias). The behavioural pattern includes concrete observable social relations and actions as well as the social structure. Cosmology refers to a cognitive system that includes attitudes and values (Gross and Rayner, 1985, p. 14): ‘Grid-group analysis treats ideas and values as both reecting and constituting the experience both of belonging to a social organization and of social differentiation within the organization’. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) developed the four prototypical cultural types using two central dimensions of sociality: control (grid) and social commitment (group). (See Fig. 1.) Egalitarians, for example, have high interest and high identiŽcation regarding group relations, but they dislike social relations that are shaped by social differences or hierarchic structures. In their view, social relations are open to negotiation. In this way, each type is a combination of both dimensions. Diagonally opposed groups show differences on both dimensions (grid and group), while neighbouring groups show similarities

Fig. 1.

Typology of ‘ways of life’ using the grid/group-dimension.

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on one dimension but differences on the other. For example, individualists have both low sympathy for hierarchic structures and low sympathy for group attachment. Fatalists, as the neighbouring category, also have low sympathy for group attachment, but a different relation to the grid dimension: they accept externally ascribed social positions and they recognize constraint by others, although they do not feel that they are part of any social collective. For each of the four types, cultural theory offers clear hypotheses about modes of risk perception. Persons with hierarchic orientations are assumed to accept risks as long as decisions about those risks are justiŽed by governmental authorities or experts. They fear risks that threaten the social order, however. Egalitarians are assumed to oppose risks that will inict irreversible dangers on many people or on future generations. They distrust risks that are forced on them by the decisions of a small elite of experts or governmental authorities. Fatalists have a strong orientation toward socially assigned classiŽcations, but without a group identiŽcation. They try not to know and not to worry about things that they believe they can do nothing about. Individualists perceive risk as opportunity. New technologies, for example, are viewed more as possibilities and less as dangers (see Thompson et al., 1990, pp. 62f). They fear risks that could limit their freedom.

3.

The measurement concept

In dealing with measurement concepts for the cultural types described above, different approaches can be distinguished. One approach focuses on the analyses of ‘small’ organizations or cultural groups (e.g., Gross and Rayner, 1985). Here can be used (for example) observational methods of concrete social behaviour, such as sociometric measures (e.g., number of contacts, positions, types of interactions) combined with attitude measures, to record a highly comprehensive picture of a social unit. This approach is not applicable to large populations, however. For the analysis of larger units, cultural aspects can be inferred in two ways; Žrst, for example, from various cultural products such as folk tales, typical methods of formal and informal learning, or legal systems. Second, cultural aspects also can be inferred by aggregating individuals’ attitudes and value priorities. In the following discussion the latter approach is concentrated on through the development of survey instruments for studies of larger populations. This approach, which is used predominantly with attitude measures, dominates quantitative research on CT today (e.g., Dake, 1991, 1992; Palmer, 1996; Peters and Slovic, 1996; Grendstad and Selle, 1997; Ellis and Thompson, 1997; Marris et al., 1998; Coughlin and Lockhart, 1998). Dake (1990, 1991) developed a measurement instrument for survey research, containing 46 items, to assess the cultural biases. He took items from several instruments that originally were developed to measure personal attitudes such as conŽdence in institutions, patriotism, authoritarianism, and law and order. A modiŽed version was used in several studies by (among others) Marris et al. (1996, 1998), Peters and Slovic (1996), Palmer (1996), and Grendstad and Selle (1997). Dake’s approach addresses only one aspect of what, in cultural theory, constitutes a cultural type: cosmologies or cultural biases. He works in the usual paradigm of attitude measurement, which is well established in the social sciences; the aspect of social relations or behavioural patterns is disregarded. In this sense, attitude measures are

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used as indirect indicators of the more complex latent construct ‘cultural type’. In addition, the idea of shared values is not explicitly operationalized but is regarded as an aggregate quality of individual values.

4.

Individual-level data, cultural-level data, and cultural theory

In the literature is found a contentious discussion about whether it is possible to measure ‘culture’ with individual-level data. Referring to approaches in the research on values, it could be argued critically that culture is not merely an aggregate phenomenon but has an emergent quality as well. It is therefore not possible to measure culture with individual-level data. On the other hand, it is possible to be attracted by the argument of Hofstede (1980) or Schwartz and Ros (1995), who accept the possibility to infer cultural aspects from individual-level data. They ‘view individual value priorities as a product both of shared culture and of unique individual experiences’ (Schwartz and Ros, 1995, p. 94). In a cultural group, a pattern of shared values plus individual variation will be encountered. ‘However, the average priorities . . . reect the central thrust of their shared enculturation. Hence, the average priorities point to the underlying, common cultural values’ (Schwartz and Ros, 1995, p. 94). Nevertheless, as Nauck and Schönpug (1997) comment, the total equivalence of individual and cultural values is imaginable only in a strictly functional conception of society. Thompson (1996, pp. 4ff) focuses on this problem from another perspective when he argues that CT includes an antidualistic conception of the individual; he points out the relational character of this perspective. This idea is not contradictory to the presented view if a ‘weaker’ relational approach is considered whereby individual preferences do not depend totally on patterns of social relations; they are not altogether functionally interconnected. Only from this perspective it is useful to measure cultural biases on the individual level. An individual-level approach is claimed not to measure culture directly, but to measure products of relational processes. In the words of Schwartz and Ros (1995), individual preferences are a product of unique individual experiences and shared enculturation. Empirical evidence for the inuence of ‘culture’ is found in social (in contrast to individual or random) variations in value preferences in different segments (groups) of society, which are based on distinctly different experiences according to their position in the social structure (e.g., Kohn, 1977). Similarities in value preferences often correlate with similarities in social background (e.g., family structure, preferred social relations). This ‘weak’ relational perspective also can be used to analyse tensions that develop if individual preferences come into conict with social relations that the individual is forced to observe. Therefore it makes sense to keep the individual and society as separate levels of analysis. From this viewpoint it is possible learn about social processes from individuallevel analyses. Thus a measurement on the level of individuals is not a direct measure of culture but a measure of processes that are connected to culture.

5. The validity of survey instruments for measuring cultural theory: a measurement theory In the previous section we elaborated on the idea that the measurement of cultural biases on the individual level produces an indirect measure of cultural types – speciŽcally,

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of ‘products’ of cultural contexts. From there we turn to problems of measurement. Most authors (Dake, 1991, 1992; Marris et al., 1996; Peters and Slovic, 1996; Palmer, 1996; Grendstad and Selle, 1997) composed the scales largely in the tradition of classical test theory, assuming unidimensionality of constructs. The reliability of the scales is tested mostly with parameters such as Cronbach’s alpha; the validity of the scales is rarely tested, however. The theoretical approach of cultural theory outlined above implicitly involves numerous hypotheses concerning a measurement theory; this theory, however, is not used explicitly in the actual quantitative research. The term measurement theory refers here to hypotheses that could be derived from CT, and that give instructions in how to measure the four cultural types (e.g., grid and group aspects of the scales, or the internal rationale for distinguishing the four types). In contrast, a structural theory or structural hypotheses include assumptions about the relations of the cultural types to external criteria or other constructs. Although it may be possible to argue about the measurement theory that is proposed here (see next section), this approach is an advance in the actual survey research on CT: in contrast to approaches with a more or less arbitrary use of measurement instruments, it explicates testable hypotheses for proving validity that are derived theoretically from cultural theory. Thus, as a Žrst step, a measurement theory is explicated. As a Žrst clue regarding the validity of the scales, the relationships between the cultural biases should be tested in a way suggested by the rationale for the typology of cultural theory. Each cultural bias is constructed according to a certain scheme using the grid/group dimensions. The cultural biases that show no similarity on one of the two dimensions should have significant negative correlations. Neighbouring cultural biases should show a weak correlation; whether this is negative or positive depends on whether the grid or the group aspect is more dominant in the formulation of items. Hypothesis 1: Individualism and hierarchy should yield a signiŽcant negative correlation. Hypothesis 2: Fatalism and egalitarianism should yield a signiŽcant negative correlation. Hypothesis 3: Individualism and egalitarianism should not be correlated signiŽcantly or should yield only a weak correlation at either sign. Hypothesis 4: Individualism and fatalism should not be correlated signiŽcantly or should yield only a weak correlation at either sign. Hypothesis 5: Hierarchy and egalitarianism should not be correlated signiŽcantly or should yield only a weak correlation at either sign. Hypothesis 6: Hierarchy and fatalism should not be correlated signiŽcantly or should yield only a weak correlation at either sign. The typology also implies that each type includes a certain attitude regarding both grid and group aspects. Thus it should be possible to Žnd items that could be identiŽed a priori as grid or group while also having variation in common. The model given in Fig. 2 illustrates this idea. Hypothesis 7: The items that are used to measure a cultural bias should be clearly identiŽed as ‘grid’ or ‘group’ items.

Cultural theory and risk perception

Fig. 2.

6.

153

Measurement model regarding the grid/group aspect.

An empirical test of validity

To test Hypotheses 1–6 the work began by using the instruments of Dake that had been implemented in different studies. A comparison of the results of Dake (1991), of Marris et al. (1996), and of a small pretest study conducted in Chemnitz, a mid-sized city in eastern Germany, in spring 1997 was made. The data were collected from 106 sociology students during regular classes in which the professors were willing to take time for the research. In this study the scales used by Marris et al. (1996) were modiŽed slightly to make them more reliable. Items with an item-total correlation coefŽcient of less than 0.30 were disregarded.2 Item sum totals were computed for each scale to make the results comparable with those of Dake and of Marris et al. Scale intercorrelations are presented in Table 1. In all the studies correlations were found that do not conform to the theoretical assumptions of cultural theory. In particular, the strong positive correlation between hierarchy and individualism – opposite cultural biases in Douglas and Wildavsky’s typology, with dissimilarity on both the grid and the group dimension – indicates an invalid operationalization and violates Hypothesis 1. Both constructs seem to measure a very similar construct. Also, egalitarianism and fatalism do not show the expected signiŽcant negative relation (Hypothesis 2). Equally inadequate in this context are the strong negative correlations between egalitarianism and hierarchy (Hypothesis 5) and between egalitarianism and individualism (Hypothesis 3). Egalitarianism has one dimension in common with each of these cultural biases. 2

The items in Dake’s British version and the items used here can be found in the appendix.

154 Table 1.

Rippl Dake’s measurement instrument: scale intercorrelations in different samples. Individualism

Hierarchy 1. Dake (1991) 2. Replication of Dake by Marris et al. (1996) 3. ModiŽed Scales (Marris et al.,1996) 4. Replication in Germany (1997)

Hierarchy

Egalitarianism

0.54** 0.65** 0.53** 0.62**

Egalitarianism

–0.30** –0.45** –0.42** –0.44**

–0.28** –0.37** –0.16 –0.30**

Fatalism

–1 0.38** 0.25** 0.28**

– 0.28** 0.21 0.21**

– –0.12 0.07 0.03

Source: Dake, 1991; Marris et al., 1996 and own data. 1 Dake does not report the results of the fatalism scale.

To summarize these results, it is concluded that central assumptions of the measurement theory are violated and that Dake’s instruments, in their published form, are inadequate measures of cultural theory. This problem of nonconformity of correlations between cultural bias measures is addressed in nearly every study that works quantitatively with cultural theory; yet no consequences are drawn. Coughlin and Lockhart (1998, pp. 40ff) even describe the special relational structure of the four types with a ‘sharing of ideological grounds’ between neighbouring types. On the level of measurement, they also draw no consequences regarding the invalid measurement instruments Without a clear prediction as to how the four types should correlate, the measurement of cultural theory becomes arbitrary. Therefore theoretically deduced hypotheses are proposed that can be tested empirically. As long as there is no commonly accepted measurement theory (in the sense of testable hypotheses), the validity of the measures remains questionable, and empirical studies are not based on solid ground. In light of these considerations and results, a new instrument was constructed using items from Dake’s scales and new items. Items were formulated that reect the grid/group dimensions. Therefore each scale should be composed of a number of statements addressing the grid and a number of items addressing the group dimension. Examples for individualism are as follows: I don’t join clubs of any kind (group). My ideal profession would be an independent business (grid).

Thus each item is clearly identiŽed a priori as a grid or a group item. As argued above, a further peculiarity of the measurement is the similarity of neighbouring types. A respondent who Žts (for example) the fatalist type (which is next to the individualist type on the group dimension) could agree with the group item but

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would reject the grid item of the measurement for individualism. As formulated by Couglin and Lockhart (1998), each type shares some ideological ground with its neighbour. The logic of the items thus formulated departs from traditional classical test theory. This approach was adopted because it is more appropriate for the assumptions of cultural theory. The construction of the cultural biases on the basis of two dimensions (grid and group) implies that each cultural bias includes these two dimensions; therefore the classical test theory assumption of unidimensionality is not adequate in this case. For this reason it was also necessary to use statistical procedures other than classical test theory to test the reliability and the validity of the instruments. The new measurement were tested instruments with a new data set from a sample of 475 German sociology students, collected in fall 1997 in Chemnitz and Hildesheim (Rippl, 1999). Both are mid-sized cities, one in eastern Germany and one in the western part of the country.3 The data were collected during regular classes in which the professors were willing to take time for the research. The response rate in the classes that participated was very high: Only 1% of the prospective respondents in the selected classes refused to participate. The nonprobability of the sample places a serious limitation on the generalizability of the Žndings. In this case, however, the sample seems acceptable because we do not present distributions of variables. In this paper we focus primarily on theoretical and measurement hypotheses that should hold true in any sample.4 For the analyses structural equation modelling (SEM) employing LISREL 8.1.4 was used. With SEM, it is possible to test a priori speciŽed hypotheses about the underlying structure (Bollen, 1989). Hypotheses related to the measurement of latent constructs and related to the analysis of structural relations between latent constructs can be tested, controlling for random measurement error. Only SEM allows a simultaneous conŽrmatory factor analysis testing the conceptually proposed interrelations of all four latent constructs (the four cultural biases). SEM allows double loadings. This violates the classical test theory criterion of unidimensionality, but in the case of cultural theory it must be viewed as an adequate reection of the measurement concept we explicated above.5 This measurement concept does not include the assumption of unidimensionality. On the contrary, it postulates that each construct incorporates two dimensions (grid/group) and that neighbouring types have one of the dimensions in common. Thus double loadings of several items in the present case reect the similarities between cultural types that are adjacent in the typology. Weede and Jagodzinski (1977) point out that this procedure is possible and permissible in conŽrmatory factor analysis, and that it is especially useful if one works with indicators that depend on different factors. The following test strategy was used. The work commenced with 31 items and a model tested that reproduces the correlation structure which is implied in Hypotheses In the analyses, no signiŽcant differences between the two samples were found. CT imposes no limitations regarding to its application to any kind of population. 5 Therefore Cronbach’s alpha will not be present as a criterion for the quality of the scales; this criterion is important only if scales are used that are based on sum totals or additive indices. Here full measurement instruments are included in the estimation of structural relations between different constructs; the quality of the measurement instruments will be considered in the estimation of structural parameters. In addition, factor loadings of the measurement instruments are presented. 3 4

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1–6. In this step 13 items were excluded for which the modiŽcation indices6 proposed loadings that did not conform to the measurement concept (Hypotheses 1–6), so that a measurement model could be established with an acceptable model Žt that conforms to the hypotheses. Hypothesis 7 was tested using the remaining 18 items. Because of identiŽcation problems, it was not possible to estimate all seven hypotheses simultaneously; therefore the analyses was divided into two parts. The test of Hypotheses 1–6 is presented in Fig. 3 and Table 2, the test of Hypothesis 7 in Table 3. The analyses were based on correlation matrices produced by PRELIS2. In the LISREL analyses the maximum-likelihood estimation method was used. First Hypotheses 1–6 were tested; the results are presented in Fig. 37 and Table 2. As Fig. 3 shows, the proposed pattern of relations between the four cultural biases can be found (see Hypotheses 1–6). Although the relationships between egalitarianism/hierarchy and hierarchy/fatalism are slightly too strong, they are still within acceptable boundaries. Obviously an overrepresentation of items reecting the grid dimension is responsible for the slightly oversized correlations. Furthermore, following the rationale of grid/group typology, each type (apart from its special relations to the other types) includes both grid and group aspects (Hypothesis 7).

Fig. 3.

Intercorrelations of the four cultural biases.

ModiŽcation indices are used in LISREL for model modiŽcations. In the case of a strict theory testing strategy – as done here – these indices indicate differences between model speciŽcation and empirical covariances . 7 It is tested if the speciŽed model Žts the empirical covariance matrix. One speaks of a model’s acceptable Žt when the Žt indices reach the following values. The goodness-of-Žt index (GFI) should have a value > 0.90; the standardized root mean square residual (standard RMR) should be 0.05; the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) should be < 0.08 (see Jaccard and Wan, 1996, pp. 86ff). The value of chi-square should be as small as possible, but it increases automatically with the sample size (see Bollen, 1989, pp. 263ff). Therefore it is suggested that one use the relationship of chi-square to degrees of freedom (df) as the criterion. Different relationships are accepted in the literature: Some authors demand a ratio of 2:1; others accept a ratio of 5:1 (see Bollen, 1989, pp. 278). 6

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Cultural theory and risk perception Table 2.

A new measurement instrument for cultural biases – item wording and factor loadings. Hierarchy Egalitarianism Individualism Fatalism

v6c

I would not participate in civil action groups. The ones in power do only allow what they like. v6e Important questions for our society should not be decided by experts but by the people. v6f A person is better off if he or she doesn’t trust anyone. v6g In a family adults and children should have the same inuence in decisions. v6h It is important to me that in the case of important decisions at my place of work everybody is asked. v6j We have to accept the limits in our life if we want or not. v6m There is no use in doing things for other people – you only get it in the neck in the long run. v6n Firms and institutions should be organized in a way that everybody can inuence important decisions. v7a It is important to preserve our customs and cultural heritage. v7b I don’t join clubs of any kind. v7c The freedom of the individual should not be limited for reasons for preventing crime. v7g My ideal job would be an independent business. v7k The police should have the right to listen to private phone calls when investigating crime. v7l When I have problems I try to solve them on my own. v7n I prefer tasks where I work something out on my own. v7o Order is a probably unpopular but a important virtue. V7p I prefer clear instruction from my superiors about what to do. v7q An intact family is the basis of a functioning society.

0.22

–

–

0.48

–

0.36

–

–

–

–

–

0.65

–

0.43

–

–

–

0.55

–

–

0.41

–

–

0.17

–

–

–

0.68

–

0.83

–

–

0.37

–

–

–

– –

– 0.25

0.17 0.23

0.33 –

–

0.33

–

–

0.34

–

–

–

–

–

0.54

–

–

–

0.47

–

0.65

–

–

–

0.44

–

–

–

0.54

–

–

–

p < 0.01; the presented analyses are based on the German version of this items.

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This means that all of the items should possess variation because of their commonality in one type and their differences in the aspects that represent grid and group. To address the assumption that each cultural bias contains both the grid and the group aspect, how far each item expresses the culture-speciŽc attitude of one of these two basic dimensions should be tested. This further test criterion makes the measurement theory more stringent and falsiŽcation more probable. To test these assumptions, again conŽrmatory factor analysis was conducted, in this case, for each cultural bias separately. The items were assigned a priori to the grid or the group dimension. Only the items that had been left in the previous step of analysis were included, and the pattern given in Table 3 was found. For hierarchy and fatalism constructs consisting of both grid and group items have been balanced with signiŽcant factor loadings. For individualism there is one grid item; item v7b Žts fatalism better. Egalitarianism is measured only by grid items. Thus a clear identiŽcation of the items in regard to the grid or the group dimension is found. Because of the exclusion of items in the Žrst step of the analysis, which concentrates on the correlation pattern between the four cultural biases, the scales for individualism and especially for egalitarianism are not yet balanced for both dimensions. This solution regarding the correlation pattern was accepted as the more important aspect. Nevertheless, in future research, grid items should be added to the scale for individualism, and group items to the scale for egalitarianism. For a further validation of the measurement concept in the sense of construct validity, the theory was scanned for further hypotheses about relations of the four cultural biases to other concepts. Cultural biases are deŽned as a pattern of attitudes and values concerning the functioning of society and environment (Dake, 1992, p. 62; Thompson et al., 1990, pp. 29ff); therefore they should be connected to attitudes that deal with these aspects. Thompson et al. (1990) argue that the four cultural biases are connected to special myths about the functioning of nature. They distinguish four such myths. In nature benign, the world is forgiving and always Žnds its way back to an equilibrium. Essentially this laissez-faire attitude should be found in individualists. Nature ephemeral is the opposite: small changes made by human beings could lead to a collapse. This myth will be cherished primarily by egalitarians. In nature tolerant, nature forgives events to a certain point; experts are needed to show the boundaries. This should be the favourite myth of hierarchically oriented persons. Nature capricious is the myth of a random world in which human beings, even experts, can control almost nothing. This view will be held by fatalists (see Thompson, 1990, pp. 26ff). A German translation of the items employed by Marris et al. (1996) was used. In the same validation logic – seeing cultural biases as ideas about the functioning of the world – a so-called fairness scale was included. This scale measures how far individuals think the principle of fairness should dominate public decisions and how far the public should be involved in decisions about global risk taking (item 1). Another item consists of the question ‘Is it acceptable to decide about risks that could endanger further generations?’ (item 2). Here reference is made to the idea of cultural theory whereby (for example) the perception of risk and the perception of other social orientations are used as metaphors (Marris et al., 1996, pp. 11) for a view of society, which institutions are trusted, and what is understood to be meant by the terms fairness and justice.

159

Cultural theory and risk perception Table 3.

ConŽrmatory factor analyses of grid/group dimensions for each cultural bias.

Hierarchy: x2: 41,95; df: 13; RMSEA: 0.07; RMR: 0.04; GFI: 0.98 v6c I would not participate in civil action groups. The ones in power do only allow what they like. v6j We have to accept the limits in our life if we want or not. v7a It is important to preserve our customs and cultural heritage. v7k The police should have the right to listen to private phone calls when investigating crime. v7o Order is a probably unpopular but a important virtue. v7p I prefer clear instruction from my superiors about what to do. v7q An intact family is the basis of a functioning society. Egalitarianism: x2: 9,7; df: 5; RMSEA: 0.04; RMR: 0.03; GFI: 0.96 v6e Important questions for our society should not be decided by experts but by the people. v6g In a family adults and children should have the same inuence in decisions. v6h It is important to me that in the case of important decisions at my place of work everybody is asked. v6n Firms and institutions should be organized in a way that everybody can inuence important decisions. v7c The freedom of the individual should not be limited for reasons for preventing crime. Individualism: x2 4,4; df: 5; RMSEA: 0.00; RMR: 0.02; GFI: 1.00 v7b I don’t join clubs of any kind. v7c The freedom of the individual should not be limited for reasons for preventing crime. v7g My ideal job would be an independent business. v7l When I have problems I try to solve them on my own. v7n I prefer tasks where I work something out on my own. Fatalism: x2: 15,5; df: 4; RMSEA: 0.07; RMR: 0.03; GFI: 0.99 v6c I would not participate in civil action groups. The ones in power do only allow what they like. v6f A person is better off if he or she doesn’t trust anyone v6j We have to accept the limits in our life if we want or not. v6m There is no use in doing things for other people – you only get it in the neck in the long run. v7b I don’t join clubs of any kind.

grid

group

0.38

–

0.56 – 0.44

– 0.42 –

– 0.40 –

0.70 – 0.53

0.38

–

0.46

–

0.57

–

0.78

–

0.28

–

– 1.00

0.08 –

– – –

0.40 0.43 0.68

0.83

–

– 0.33 –

0.65 – 0.69

–

0.31

The relations between these myths, the fairness scale, and cultural bias measures are shown in Table 4. Again a SEM analyses was conducted using the speciŽcations described above so that the proposed pattern of intercorrelations between the four cultural biases is part of each tested model. All correlations were tested simultaneously. Acceptable Žt indices were found for this model: chi-square: 720, 05; df: 307; GFI: 0.90; RMSEA: 0.05; RMR: 0.05. The empirically discovered relationships Žt closely with previous assumptions. Only in the case of individualism was no clearly corresponding myth about nature found.

160 Table 4.

Rippl Myths of nature and cultural biases – phi-coefŽcients.

Nature tolerant Nature ephemeral Nature benign Nature capricious Fairness

Hierarchy

Egalitarianism

Individualism

Fatalism

0.34 – – – –

–0.21 0.43 – – 0.47

– – – –0.26 –

– – – 0.70 –

* In cells without coefŽcient we found no signiŽcant correlations; p < 0.01

In a further step, a variable was taken that reects behavioural rather than cognitive aspects as a criterion for validation. Information about memberships in certain institutionalized groups was used that can be viewed as manifestations of the social relations aspect. To obtain this information, the respondents were asked about memberships in any kind of clubs, associations, unions, and the like.8 According to cultural theory, individuals with a low score on the group dimension should participate in such groups to a lesser degree than others. The results show that individualists (–0.46; p < 0.01) and fatalists (–0.10; p < 0.05) tend to reject such memberships, as proposed by the theory. For egalitarians and persons with hierarchic orientations we found nonsigniŽcant correlations. In a Žnal step the four central assumptions of cultural theory about the connection of cultural biases to perception of risk were analysed (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Rayner, 1992; Thompson et al., 1990). As stated above, the perception of risks is socially framed in the light of cultural theory. For our analyses four different types of risks have been taken into account . Ecological risks were measured as a latent variable encompassing various aspects: ozone depletion, nuclear power, genetic engineering, shortage of natural resources.9 Dangers to the social order also were measured as latent construct including crime, demonstrations, conicts between social groups, and civil disobedience.10 Becoming infected with AIDS was measured by only one indicator, as was unemployment. The cultural biases were speciŽed as independent variables, the risks as dependent variables. In the analyses two models were tested. In one model, ecological risks and dangers to the social order were the dependent variables; in the other, becoming infected with AIDS and the personal risk of unemployment were the dependent variables. The gamma coefŽcients are presented in Table 5. For the model that includes risks to ecology and social order as dependent constructs, an acceptable Žt was found: chi-square, 629,33; df, 275; GFI, .91; RMSEA, .05; RMR, 0.05. The perception of ecological risks and risks to the social order correlated at 0.36. AIDS and unemployment also were tested simultaneously, and here an acceptable model Žt was also found: chi-square, 354, 33; df, 150; GFI, 0.93; RMSEA, 0.05; RMR, 0.05. The perception of the risk of being infected with AIDS and the personal risk of becoming unemployed correlated at 0.33. The variable regarding memberships is coded as a dummy variable: yes (2) or no (1). These four aspects loaded in the following pattern on the factor ‘ecological risks’: ozone depletion 0.47, nuclear power 0.76, genetic engineering 0.56, shortness of natural resources 0.51. 10 These four aspects loaded in the following pattern on the factor ‘social order’: crime 0.53, demonstrations 0.74, conicts between social groups 0.47 and civil disobedience 0.79. 8 9

161

Cultural theory and risk perception Table 5.

Cultural biases and risk perception – gamma-coefŽcients.

hierarchy egalitarianism individualism fatalism

Ecology

Social order

Unemployment

Aids

–0.29 0.29 n.s. n.s.

0.27 n.s. –0.26 n.s.

n.s. 0.23 –0.14 0.22

n.s. 0.16 –0.14 0.12

n.s. Not signiŽcant, all other coefŽcients are signiŽcant p < 0.01

Regarding ecological risks, the assumptions of cultural theory are conŽrmed. Egalitarians tend to show a higher perception of risk than all others; persons with hierarchic orientations show the lowest perception. For disturbance of the social order, persons with hierarchic orientations were found to express the strongest perception of risk. Fatalists show a higher risk perception with regard to individual dangers such as personal unemployment and becoming infected with AIDS; this result is also found for egalitarians. Individualists show the lowest level of perception for all types of risks. This Žnding possibly implies strong self-conŽdence and perception of individual control.11

7.

Conclusion

In this article two questions have been addressed. First, is cultural theory testable by individual-level data that emerge from quantitative studies? Second, are the measurement instruments that are used in this quantitative paradigm valid? The Žrst question is answered on a theoretical level. An individual-level measurement is not a measure of culture but a measure of processes that are connected to culture. Thus the instruments discussed here present ‘only’ indirect measures of cultural types, but they are connected to a cultural level. Relecting this ‘limitation’ it is possible to measure culture with individual-level data. To test this idea empirically it should be possible to show their correlations to structural variables such as family structure or preferred social contexts. The second question must be answered empirically. In this article it is argued for the necessity to formulate a measurement theory to establish a valid measurement of CT. Furthermore, a strategy for developing a measurement instrument is demonstrated. To test the validity of the instrument a clear measurement theory was explicated from cultural theory. The usefulness of structural equation modelling (SEM) when it is necessary to work with a complex measurement concept is shown, as in this case. As a result, it is concluded that the measurement instruments presented by Dake (1990, 1991) have been improved. In reference to the theoretically proposed interrelations of the four cultural biases, a model is developed that is consistent with these assumptions. Also regarding the approaches to validate instruments acceptable results were found. In this sense the approach is a contribution to better measurement: it overcomes the restrictions and contradictions of a more or less arbitrary use of diverse measurement instruments in survey research on cultural theory. Using the approach presented, it is possible to refute the criticism regarding the ability to measure the concepts of cultural theory quantitatively. The overall ‘poor’ 11

Further analyses especially the relation to coping styles are documented in Rippl (1999).

162

Rippl

power of cultural biases for explaining risk perception (Sjöberg, 1995) was not improved by using more valid instruments. Nevertheless, the results of this study prove that a theoretically conforming measurement of cultural biases is possible. In respect to deductive theory development, further work on this theory would be fruitful even when the explanatory power of inductively discovered variables is greater (such as the variables used in the psychometric approach). The argument of explanatory power is relative regarding variables that are not embedded in a broader theory; such variables hardly increase the understanding of complex social contexts. In contrast to the psychometric approach, cultural theory uses very basic theoretical concepts, such as values, to explain a special phenomenon (risk perception). In this sense, the argument imputing poor explanatory power fails.12

Acknowledgement The research for this paper was supported by Grant DFG: RI 858/1-1 from the German Research Council. For helpful comments I would like to thank Klaus Boehnke, Christian Seipel and Claudia Stromberg.

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Appendix CULTURAL BIAS ITEMS USED BY DAKE

Hierarchy (15 items) I think there should be more discipline in the youth of today. + I would support the introduction of compulsory National Service. + I am more strict than most people about what is right and wrong. We should have stronger armed forces than we do now. + The police should have the right to listen to private phone calls when investigating crime.+ Those in power often withhold information about things which are harmful to us. One of the problems with people is that they challenge authority too often. + It is important to preserve our customs and heritage. + I think it is important to carry on family traditions. + In my household, family members have their own places at the dinner table. I always sort out clothes into separate categories before washing. + I value regular routines highly. + I think being on time is important. + My time-tabling of meals is haphazard. (score reversed) I like to plan carefully so that Žnancial risks are not taken. + Individualism (9 items) In a fair system people with more ability should earn more. + A free society can only exist by giving companies the opportunity to prosper. + If a person has the get-up-and-go to acquire wealth, that person should have the right to enjoy it. + It is just as well that life tends to sort out those who try harder from those who don’t. + Continued economic growth is the answer to improved quality of life. + This country would be better off if we didn’t worry so much about how equal people are. + Making money is the main reason for hard work. I don’t join clubs of any kind. (score reversed) I tend to be sceptical of health food fads. Egalitarianism (11 items) If people in this country were treated more equally we would have fewer problems. The government should make sure everyone has a good standard of living. + Those who get ahead should be taxed more to support the less fortunate. + I would support a tax change that made people with large incomes pay more. + The world could be a more peaceful place if its wealth were divided more equally among nations. + Social Security tends to stop people from trying harder to get on. (score reversed) Racial discrimination is a very serious problem in our society. What this country needs is a ‘fairness revolution’ to make the distribution of goods more equal. + Most of the meals I eat are vegetarian .

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165

Health requirements are very important in my choice of foods. I prefer simple and unprocessed foods. Fatalism (11 items) There is no use in doing things for other people – you only get it in the neck in the long run. + Cooperating with others rarely works. The future is too uncertain for a person to make serious plans. + I have often been treated unfairly. A person is better off if he or she doesn’t trust anyone. + I don’t worry about politics because I can’t inuence things very much. + Most people make friends only because friends are useful to them. I feel that life is like a lottery. + Even if you work hard you never know if that will help you do better. + It seems to me that, whoever you vote for, things go on pretty much the same. + I have few Žnancial investments. Only items with ‘+’ worked well in Germany.