Current Issues in Tourism Coinciding crises and

This article was downloaded by: [Cohen, Erik] On: 17 August 2010 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 925293591] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 3741 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Current Issues in Tourism

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t901682222

Coinciding crises and tourism in contemporary Thailand

Erik Cohena; Mark Nealb a Department of Sociology, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel b Eastern Institute of Technology, School of Business, Napier, New Zealand Online publication date: 06 August 2010

To cite this Article Cohen, Erik and Neal, Mark(2010) 'Coinciding crises and tourism in contemporary Thailand', Current

Issues in Tourism, 13: 5, 455 — 475 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13683500.2010.491898 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13683500.2010.491898

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Current Issues in Tourism Vol. 13, No. 5, September 2010, 455 –475

Coinciding crises and tourism in contemporary Thailand Erik Cohena∗ and Mark Nealb a

Department of Sociology, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel; bEastern Institute of Technology, School of Business, Napier, New Zealand

Downloaded By: [Cohen, Erik] At: 02:15 17 August 2010

(Received 18 July 2009; final version received 29 November 2009) Although tourism crises have received increased attention in recent years, there has been a lack of research into coinciding crises and their effects on tourism. Correspondingly, there has been little theoretical work done on their nature, interaction and dynamics. In this article, we seek to redress this, and extend the study of tourism crises by looking at antecedent crises of different orders that interact and escalate in ways that damage tourism. As a case of this, we discuss the situation in Thailand from 2007 to 2009, and explain how two different orders of antecedent crises – an economic meltdown, and an escalating political crisis – interacted to form an acute and complex megacrisis, which ultimately facilitated the spectacular occupation of Bangkok’s two main airports by the opposition to the government in November 2008; this in turn completely disrupted, and provoked a sharp and prolonged drop in, tourist arrivals to the country. Through a discussion of this case, we raise some important theoretical issues regarding the development of tourism crises generally, most notably the analytical importance of human agency within unfurling antecedent crises. Keywords: tourism crises; coinciding crises; Thailand; sociology of tourism; airports

Introduction The social scientific study of crises has gained growing prominence in recent years, particularly after the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center in New York (Blake & Sinclair, 2003; Urry, 2002). Other catastrophic events, like the terrorist attacks on tourist sites in Bali (Anderson, 2003; Hitchcock & Putra, 2005) and on Egypt’s Sinai peninsula (Botha, 2006, pp. 11 – 15), and the 26 December 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami (Cohen, 2007, 2008a, pp. 23– 51; Henderson, 2006; Keys, Masterman-Smith, & Cottle, 2006), have stimulated an intensive concern with ‘tourism crises’ in tourism studies. The emergent literature has sought to create a theoretical basis for the study of tourism crises; but, considering the urgency of the problems, its primary concern has been with the practical issues of crisis management and resolution. Hence, some significant aspects of the topic have received as-yet scant attention. Firstly, though they may be aware that ‘a wide range of events, shocks and incidents’, exogenous to the tourist industry, ‘can trigger crisis situations [in the industry]’ (Laws & Prideaux, 2005, p. 4), most observers have manifested little, if any, concern with the broader social processes in which tourism crises are embedded. In this respect, the literature ∗

Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

ISSN 1368-3500 print/ISSN 1747-7603 online # 2010 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/13683500.2010.491898 http://www.informaworld.com


456

E. Cohen and M. Neal

resembles the earlier approach to disasters, which, until recently, saw disasters as exogenous events, rather than at least a partial consequence of social practices (Cohen, 2008a, pp. 26–27; Oliver-Smith & Hoffmann, 1999). Secondly, most of the literature is preoccupied with issues of ‘crisis management’ (Blake & Sinclair, 2003; Faulkner, 2001; Laws & Prideaux, 2005). The focus of most studies is on ways in which the consequences of a tourism crisis have been dealt with, rather than on an analysis of the conditions of its onset and dynamics. The principal, often taken for granted, concern of most studies is with the practical issue of how a swift revival of tourism in affected destinations is achieved. Only few studies (Hitchcock & Putra, 2005) have explicitly paid attention to some other objectives of crisis management. The social sources of tourism crises and their socially or politically conditioned dynamics have rarely served as leading research topics. The principal theoretical issue raised in the literature thus relates to the systemic effects of tourism crises: Does the tourist system return to stasis once the crisis is overcome, or does it change (Scott & Laws, 2005)? However, the sociologically more incisive questions, concerning whether, how and in what circumstances the tourism crises possess an ‘agency’ of their own in fostering a transformation of a tourist system, remain theoretically and empirically little examined. Thirdly, while in some studies the coexistence of multiple crises is pointed out (Lew, 1999), the synergetic effects of that coexistence remain unanalysed. The question of how coinciding crises interact to impact the tourism system is the principal theoretical and empirical issue to be explored in this article. Thailand found itself in a multiplicity of crises in the years 2008 – 2009. Indeed, the veteran political scientist Likhit Dhiravegin recently noted that: ‘Thailand is now not only faced with an economic crisis, but . . . with crises (emphasis in original) and hence the problem is multi-dimensional or multi-faceted’ (Dhiravegin, 2009). However, Dhiravegin passed over the question of how these crises interact; especially how one crisis neutralises the efforts to resolve the other. As we aim to show in this article, this synergy between two crises of independent origins – an economic and a political one – played a crucial role in the escalation of events in Thailand, which culminated in the occupation of the Bangkok airports, and provoked a breakdown of the tourist system. We shall analyse the process by which that startling outcome came about, and raise, on the basis of our analysis, some broader theoretical issues. We did not, unfortunately, conduct our study in ‘real time’. One of the authors was, in fact, stranded abroad by the closure of the airports, and was able to return to Thailand only after they had been reopened. Ours is, therefore, a reconstructed case study conducted after the events, and based on secondary sources. In presenting such a case study, we have therefore been careful to base our account on uncontested ‘hard facts’: events like elections, the appointment and fall of Prime Ministers, demonstrations and airport occupations. We did note and report conflicting versions of some episodes, but desisted from taking sides, for lack of independent verification. Our report, therefore – though perhaps lacking the immediacy and detail of an anthropological study – is hopefully reliable regarding the principal features of the event, and enlightening in terms of their representation and analysis. Past tourism crises in Thailand The tourism crisis provoked by the airport occupation from 25 November 2008 was exceptional in terms of its drastic immediate effects and its long-range consequences. In the past,


457


foreign tourism to Thailand has proved itself highly resilient to all kinds of problems. Over the last decade, it has experienced a number of well-publicised events, the more serious of which might have been expected to negatively affect foreign tourist numbers, but which, in fact, did not critically reduce them: (1) The devastating tsunami that hit the Andaman coast of southern Thailand on 26 December 2004 might have been expected to bring about a wholesale collapse of Thai tourism in the following year. Tourism to the Andaman region indeed dipped sharply in 2005, with huge economic, social and political consequences (Cohen, 2007, 2008a, pp. 23– 51). The national figures for that year, however, show that arrivals decreased by only 1.45%, following a huge growth of 16.4% in 2004, the year leading up to the tsunami (OTD, 2008). Given the decline of tourism to the highly popular Andaman region, a drop of 1.45% nationally actually reflected a continuing growth in tourist arrivals to other popular Thai destinations, such as Pattaya, Koh Samui, Bangkok and Chiang Mai. (2) The violent and well-publicised Muslim insurgency in the South of the country, resulting in the deaths of over 4000 people over the past four years, along with well-publicised risks of insurgency-fuelled terror attacks in Bangkok, were highlighted in the foreign office websites of several countries. However, these bloody events, and their associated risks, also failed to deter foreigners from visiting Thailand. The figures during this period show an average annual growth in arrivals of around 6% (OTD, 2002 – 2008). (3) Several brutal high-profile murders of foreign tourists occurred in recent years in popular destinations (Post Reporters, 2008a), such as Pai (Cohen, 2008b), Pattaya (Spooner, 2008), Kanchanaburi (Kaewmorakot, 2004), Koh Samui (Post Reporters, 2008a) and Koh Phangan (Pollard, 2008), but these also had little effect on the growth in tourism arrivals. (4) The recent military standoff between Thailand and Cambodia over the disputed Preah Vihear temple threatened to lead to hostilities in July 2008. The conflict was widely publicised around the world, but seemingly had no significant deterrent effect on foreign tourism. There has thus been a profusion of bad news from Thailand over the past 10 years about these issues and events, as well as about health crises such as HIV, SARS and Bird Flu, which might have been expected to deter tourists from visiting the country. But still people persisted in coming – with numbers increasing at a healthy average of about 6% annually over a decade (OTD, 2002 –2008). The remarkable nature of this resilience has been displayed on a popular tourist t-shirt, which lists chronologically the various crises and disasters which have hit Thailand year on year. At the bottom of the list, the T shirt states ‘What Next?’, but on the front of the shirt, it boasts ‘Still Alive’. This humour highlights the fact that although Thailand had experienced significant and highly publicised crises over the past decade, there had not been a confluence of crises sufficient in impact to deter tourists from coming – until the concomitant political and economic crises of 2008. The coinciding and interrelating political and economic events that culminated in the occupation of Bangkok’s two main airports thus offer an excellent opportunity to examine the interplay between two kinds of crisis, and their resultant separate and integral effects, which led – for the first time – to a protracted and dramatic dip in tourist arrivals.

458



The economic crisis in Thailand Despite Thailand’s dual image as a tropical paradise and a developing country, it has evolved into a major industrial economy, with a reported GDP in 2008 of over 273 billion USD, the second largest in Southeast Asia after Indonesia, and the 35th biggest in the world (IMF, 2008, 2009). With about 67 million people, the domestic market is big, and is growing rapidly. With Bangkok and its environs at the hub of the economy, a diverse and dynamic network of companies serves domestic and export markets. Foreign-owned businesses dominate in areas such as the automobile and non-generic pharmaceutical sectors, while local Thai-owned companies compete successfully with foreign businesses in markets such as food processing, financial services, textiles, music, retail, fashion and telecommunications. Big Thai companies are market leaders in sectors such as finance and banking, health services, tourism, minerals and cement, construction, hospitality, publishing and communications. Much of Thailand’s economy relies upon foreign trade, primarily with the USA, Japan, China and its ASEAN neighbours. In 2007, Thailand was reported to be the 25th biggest exporter of goods in the world, with exports of 153 billion USD, ahead of major economies such as India and Australia (WTO, 2008). However, since much of the export revenue derives from goods such as computers, electronic devices and automobiles, which are manufactured in Thailand from imported parts, the net value of exports is probably considerably smaller than the figures suggest. Along with manufacturing, agriculture remains an important source of exports. In 2007, Thailand reportedly exported around 25 billion USD of agricultural products, mainly rice, which constituted 16% of total exports (WTO, 2008). Figures suggest that agriculture contributes about 11% of GDP (CIA, 2009), though the reliability of such estimates is doubtful in a sector in which much of the production is consumed by the producers themselves. A rough indicator of the continuing significance of agriculture in the Thai socio-economy is that an estimated 65% of the Thai workforce is at least nominally employed in agriculture (WHO, 2008, 2009). Such a high proportion of low-income agricultural workers partly explains why, in spite of Thailand’s economic dynamism, per capita income remains relatively low, at about USD 8700 – on one scale, 86th in the world (IMF, 2008, 2009). Over the past decade, Thailand has enjoyed relatively consistent growth in exports, and GDP. However, the global financial meltdown in 2008 hit Thailand hard, particularly in its key exports, which declined more steeply than any time since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In January 2009, electronics reportedly fell 40% year on year, automobile exports were down 35% and, significantly, Thailand’s rice exports reportedly fell 24% (Saicheua & Fongarunrung, 2009). The effects of this collapse in export activity reverberated throughout the Thai economy, and posed a threat to the many people who relied on employment in those sectors. As we have seen, one sector of the economy – tourism – has been a remarkably robust source of revenue, growing year on year over the last decade at an average rate of about 6%. As policy-makers realised the impacts of the financial meltdown on the manufacturing, service and agricultural sectors, the importance of tourism as an industry that was historically resilient to economic shocks was recognised. In an effort to increase tourism’s contribution to the economy, the Thai Ministry of Tourism and Sports in February 2008 launched a drive to encourage investment in small- and medium-sized tourism companies, and to give an impetus to the further construction of tourist infrastructure. In July 2008, Tourism Authority Thailand (TAT) launched a campaign in collaboration with local airlines to stimulate domestic travel, and initiated a ‘Visit Isan’ campaign to attract both domestic and


459


international tourists to the Northeast (Isan), the poorest region of the country (TAT, 2008a). In partnership with Mastercard, TAT launched the ‘72 hours Amazing Thailand Chiang Mai’ campaign intended to boost domestic and international tourism to the capital of the North. In August 2008, as the political crisis was gathering steam on top of the economic crisis, TAT unveiled a scheme in collaboration with Pyathai Hospital, to attract more medical tourists from Indonesia; and in a brief respite following the end of a state of emergency in September 2008, Thai Airways launched the Thailand Invitation Mega Familiarization Trip, giving away 840 free air tickets to international tourism and media representatives in an effort to revive Thailand’s battered image, and to repair the damage done to tourist arrivals by the political infighting. The efforts of the Thai authorities to intensify their tourism promotion campaigns in order to counteract the increasingly negative effects on Thailand of the global downturn, however, were confounded by the aggravating political crisis, which interacted with the economic downturn to produce unprecedented and devastating effects on tourism to the country. The political crisis in Thailand At its most fundamental level, the ongoing Thai political crisis is rooted in a conflict over the future of the highest institution of the Thai state, the monarchy. In particular, the issue of the royal succession has recently gained growing urgency, but cannot be publicly debated, owing to Thailand’s tough le`se majeste´ law (Ockey, 2005; Preechasilpakul & Streckfuss, 2008). This issue also lurks in the background of the ongoing confrontation between the opponents and supporters of the former Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, who was deposed in a military coup in November 2006. In the period following the coup, the confrontation continued, taking the form of a struggle between two extra-parliamentary protest movements: the fiercely monarchist anti-Thaksin People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) supported primarily by the traditional elites and the urban middle classes; and the proThaksin National United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), whose support derives primarily from people in the rural areas in the North and the Northeast (Isan) of the country, and urban in-migrants. Some ex-Communist student leaders are prominent in the leadership of the UDD, and it is frequently accused of harbouring republican tendencies. The intensifying struggle between these contesting movements led to a successive weakening of the government’s ability to control the deteriorating political situation, rendering it eventually powerless either to prevent the occupation of the airports by PAD’s supporters in November 2008, or to dislodge them. While limitations of space preclude a detailed presentation of the complex events leading to that outcome, we shall briefly outline the basic dynamics of the conflict, which culminated in the political crisis of 2008, wherein the occupation of the airports was the most drastic and decisive manifestation. Political antecedents to the tourism crisis Since the revolution of 1932, when the absolute monarchy was abolished, Thailand has formally been a constitutional monarchy, with a nominally democratic regime, under the King as Head of State. However, the status of the people’s sovereignty, as against that of the monarch, has never been clearly established (Preechasilpakul & Streckfuss, 2008). The Royal role is nominally a symbolic one. The monarch has no formal political power, and is seen as ‘beyond politics’.


460


King Bhumibol, who has reigned since 1946, is widely revered, and popularly enjoys the status of a semi-divinity, resembling that of the divinized Siamese monarchs of the premodern period (Tambiah, 1976). As such, the King wields considerable personal authority, which he has used sparingly, but effectively, in several past crises – as in 1992, during the popular uprising against the appointment of General Suchinda Kraprayun as Thai Prime Minister (Pellegi, 2007, pp. 139– 140). Although the King is formally ‘beyond politics’, since the 1970s he has in fact acquired growing political power and influence on national affairs (Handley, 2006; Hewison, 2008), which he exercises through proxy institutions, rather than directly. The political scientist Duncan McCargo claims that ‘Thai politics are best understood in terms of political networks’ and that ‘the leading network in the 1973– 2001 period was centred on the palace’. McCargo terms this the ‘network monarchy’ (McCargo, 2005, p. 499). The Privy Council has been the node of that network, representing the interests of the monarchy in the political process, just as the Crown Property Bureau has represented its economic interests. The dominant position of the ‘network monarchy’ in Thai politics was challenged by the rise in power and popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra, a wealthy communications tycoon, who founded the nationalist Thai Rak Thai (TRT) (Thai Love Thai) party, and, as its leader, became Prime Minister after the 2001 elections. Thaksin combined neoliberal economic policies with some novel and imaginative populist initiatives, such as a universal healthcare program, soft loans to rural communities, and a three-year debt moratorium for farmers (Hewison, 2008, p. 201). These policies gained him wide support among the rural masses in the North and the impoverished Northeast (Isan) of the country, while alienating both the traditional royalist elites, as well as the new urban professional middle classes. As he systematically broadened his power basis (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005; Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004), placing trusty followers into leading positions in most sectors of the government apparatus, Thaksin became increasingly authoritarian (Pongsudhirak, 2005), posing a challenge to the ‘network monarchy’. Indeed, he appeared in some instances to be challenging the palace (Pathmanand, 2007, p. 10), and infringing upon royal prerogative, thus exposing himself to charges of disrespect of the monarchy (Hewison, 2008, p. 193) and of le`se majeste´ (McCargo, 2006, Preechasilpakul & Streckfuss, 2008, p. 13). He was accused of competing with the monarchy for the allegiance of the people, and even of harbouring republican tendencies – though he himself frequently protested his loyalty to the King. TRT won another resounding victory in the next elections, held in 2005 (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2005). Thaksin became ‘the first elected Prime Minister to complete a full fouryear term, the first to be re-elected and the first to preside over a one-party government’ (Pongsudhirak, 2005). His political position thus appeared unassailable. However, his allegedly divisive personal style, cronyism, disregard for human rights, exercise of control over the mass media, attempts to manage the news and his self-aggrandisement, engendered growing opposition across a wide political spectrum. In January 2006, Thaksin, allegedly in response to accusations of conflict of interest, sold his family’s holdings in the Shin Corporation (which he had founded) to Singapore’s Temasek Holdings. The sale, amounting to US$1.9 billion, yielded a huge windfall profit, but compliant tax officials failed to oblige him to pay any capital gain taxes. The sale was the trigger which turned the already growing opposition to Thaksin into a political crisis. Thaksin was attacked for manipulating the tax system, for changing the telecommunication law prior to the sale, and for selling a national asset to a foreign country. The incipient anti-Thaksin protest movement, led by the PAD, unified different sectors of Thai society (Pathmanand, 2007,



461

p. 9; Pye & Schaffar, 2008). As it intensified its activities, it gained strength rapidly, and increasingly destabilised the country’s social and political order. To reassert his popular support, and thus undermine the opposition, Thaksin in April 2006 dissolved the Parliament, and called for snap elections. However, the opposition boycotted the elections, claiming unfair procedures. TRT won another victory, but the King declared the elections undemocratic, and they were invalidated by the Constitution Court on a technicality (Schafferer, 2008, p. 1). Thaksin called for new elections in October 2006, but the social divisions worsened, and the PAD intensified its protests. As the crisis peaked, the military became the decisive factor regarding its outcome. It eventually swung its support behind the anti-Thaksin forces (Hewison, 2008, p. 204); on 19 September 2006 the army staged a coup-d’e´tat (Pathmanand, 2007; Winichakul, 2008), which was widely perceived as enjoying royal support (Hewison, 2008, p. 204), and seen as a victory for the monarchist forces (Pathmanand, 2007, p. 10). The military junta cancelled the October elections, and abrogated the 1997 constitution. It appointed a special court, which dissolved the TRT party, and banned Thaksin and 111 of the party’s leaders from politics for five years. Thaksin’s bank accounts, which contained the payments for the Shin transaction, were frozen. The junta nominated a temporary civilian government, under a retired general; a constitutional assembly was convened, and a new constitution drafted and approved in a national referendum. New elections were announced to be held under the new constitution in 2007 (Schafferer, 2008, p. 1). The ousting of Thaksin, and the dissolution of his party, however, did not calm Thailand’s political life. Rather, it led to a prolonged, and increasingly bitter, struggle between Thaksin’s supporters and his opponents. His party was reconstituted under a different name, the People’s Power Party (PPP), and joined by most Members of Parliament of the dissolved TRT. Still enjoying wide popular support, the reconstituted party won a sound victory in the December 2007 elections, though it did not achieve a majority in Parliament (Schafferer, 2008, p. 3). In January 2008, the PPP established a coalition government under the Premiership of Samak Sundaravej, an experienced, old-style politician, hand-picked by Thaksin to lead the government. Thaksin’s opponents realised that they were unable to suppress Thaksin’s influence in a democratic way, owing to the persistent support he enjoyed among the rural masses. Rather, under the leadership of PAD, his opponents returned to extra-parliamentary protests against the continuous indirect influence of Thaksin on the government, while at the same time moving the struggle to the courts. The opposition’s ‘judicialisation’ of Thai politics proved a decisive strategic step in tilting the balance of forces in its favour. The ensuing judicial struggle was not conducted in a social vacuum. Although formally neutral, the Thai judiciary constitutes part of the royalist establishment; and its decisions seem to have been to no small extent influenced by the political situation. Thaksin was charged with more than 20 criminal offences, committed during his term in power, including tax-avoidance and corruption, as well as thousands of extra-judicial killings during his ‘war on drugs’, conducted in the early 2000s. In October 2008, he was found guilty by a special branch of the Supreme Court of a conflict of interest in a land purchase by his wife from a governmental company, and sentenced to two years in prison. However, Thaksin failed to return from Beijing, where he had been staying when sentenced, and became a refugee from justice, living at first in England, and – after being refused a visa there – in the United Arab Emirates, from where he continued to interfere in the Thai political process and to fight for his political comeback. Thaksin’s nominee Prime Minster, Samak, was also disposed of by the courts. A wellknown food connoisseur, he had continued to host a cooking show on television after

462



becoming Prime Minister. Though the honorarium for these shows was tiny, the Court found him guilty of infringing upon the constitution by earning a side-income while serving as Premier; and Samak had to step down. A new nominee Prime Minister was appointed: Thaksin’s brother in law, Somchai Wongsawat, a retired judge and public servant with little political experience. As we shall see, his fate did not differ much from that of his predecessor. The judicial struggle following the deposal of Thaksin, which led to the resignation of Samak, and to the appointment of a weaker nominee Prime Minster, considerably enfeebled the authority of the government, while strengthening the power of the extra-parliamentary forces opposing it. Since the PAD was the leading protagonist in the conflict, which culminated in its occupation of the Bangkok airports, we now turn to an examination of its background and tactics. The PAD The PAD’s origins are to be found in the anti-Thaksin political TV talks in 2005 by Thaksin’s former ally and later nemesis, media mogul Sondhi Limthongkul. The PAD was officially established in February 2006, following the sale of Thaksin’s Shin Company to Singapore’s Temasek. The movement was a heterogeneous conglomerate of anti-Thaksin groups (Pye & Schaffar, 2008) from the left and the right, but its leadership was dominated by rightist, ultra-nationalist individuals, and was thus perceived by some commentators as being ‘fascist’. It manifested a fierce royalist orientation, adopting yellow, the royal colour, as its symbol. Its followers hence became known as the ‘yellow shirts’, while its antagonists, the supporters of the UDD, adopting red, came to be known as the ‘red shirts’. Under the leadership of Sondhi and retired Major General Chamlong Srimuang, an experienced politician and protest leader, who served as the movement’s tactician, the PAD was at the forefront of the protest movement that led to the ousting of Thaksin in the September 2006 coup. The movement had disbanded itself after the coup, but was re-constituted in March 2008, with the aim of bringing down Thaksin’s nominee Prime Minister, Samak, and defeating the PPP, a reincarnation of the disbanded TRT. After Samak’s fall, it continued to struggle against his successor, Thaksin’s brother-in-law, Somchai, seeking to bring about his downfall. In the process, the PAD’s tactics became increasingly more audacious. While not violent in themselves, they invited violence against the movement, seeking thereby to destabilise the regime, and to force the Prime Minster to resign. The occupation of the Bangkok airports from 25th November 2008 constituted the culmination of that effort, but was preceded by a series of other audacious acts. The PAD started a series of street protests against the Samak government in May 2008. In August of that year, its supporters seized the Prime Minister’s office, the Government House, and occupied it for more than three months, resisting all attempts to evict them. The then Prime Minister Samak tried unsuccessfully to obtain the Army’s consent to enforce an Emergency Decree to dislodge the occupiers. Unable to access the Prime Minister’s offices, the Prime Minister and his government were thus forced to relocate to Don Meuang Airport, which had been partially deactivated after the opening of Bangkok’s new Suwarnabhumi Airport. Clashes between the PAD and the pro-Thaksin UDD during Samak’s premiership led to some casualties, but there were no violent confrontations with the authorities. On 7 October 2008, just after Somchai replaced the disqualified Samak as Prime Minister, the PAD surrounded the Parliament building, attempting to prevent the new Premier from formally


463

announcing his policies. The police was ordered to disperse the protesters, but it is unclear by exactly whom: some accused Somchai for giving the order, but the new Prime Minister denied giving it. In the following violent clash, at least one person was killed and hundreds injured, some seriously. While Somchai was able to deliver his speech in the Parliament building, the police action provoked a huge public outrage. The politically weakened Prime Minister consequently became reluctant to use violent means against further PAD provocations, thereby in fact facilitating the movement’s most daring act, the occupation of Bangkok’s airports.


The occupation of Bangkok’s airports On the evening of 25 November 2008, in a surprise move, hundreds of PAD members blockaded the main road to Bangkok’s new Suvarnabhumi International Airport, in their ultimate attempt to bring about the resignation of Somchai Wongsawat and his government. Overpowering the police contingent that was supposed to protect the airport, they entered its terminal hall, which was still teeming with passengers, and established themselves there for a protracted siege. The occupation of Bangkok’s second, older and smaller airport, Don Meuang, followed soon afterwards. The occupation of Suvarnabhumi Airport had a three-fold significance: Firstly, it had been under lackluster construction for many years, but its completion was pushed energetically by Thaksin, who saw it as one of the principal achievements of his premiership, and as a spectacular show-piece of Thailand’s modernity. Although he could not preside at its opening in 2007, having been toppled the preceding year by a military coup, the airport is still regarded as his major creation. Its occupation by his enemies thus had an implicit symbolic significance. Secondly, the ease with which the PAD succeeded in blockading and entering the airport demonstrated the weakness of the forces of law and order, and the lack of authority of the Somchai government. This weakness become ever more apparent, as the siege continued. Somchai, who had been abroad at the time the occupation occurred, was unable to land at Suvarnabhumi on his return to Thailand; upon landing at an alternative provincial airport, he promptly relocated his government to the northern city of Chiang Mai, the bastion of Thaksin supporters – a move which reinforced the impression of his powerlessness. Thirdly, and most importantly, the occupation had a major strategic significance: it virtually cut off Thailand from the world, and stopped the flow of passengers and goods, thus paralysing the tourist industry at the start of the high-season. From a broader perspective, the occupation of Suvarnabhumi airport constituted a threat to ‘Bangkok’s status as an air hub for Southeast Asia’ (Kositchotethana, 2008), threatening Thailand’s international standing, as well as having far-reaching economic consequences. All attempts by the authorities to expel the occupiers from the airports remained unsuccessful. At the request of the Airports Authority of Thailand (AoT), the Civil Court ordered PAD on the day after the occupation to leave the airport, but its order was ignored by the occupiers. The government then ordered the Army to clear both airports, but the Army Commander, the key power-holder in the situation, blankly refused the order, claiming neutrality. His own initiative to resolve the conflict, which included a proposal for the PAD to withdraw, and the government to resign and declare new elections, was rejected by both Somchai and the PAD (Post Reporters, 2008b). The Army proving unwilling to intervene, the government declared a state of emergency and authorised the police to end the siege (Post Reporters, 2008d). The PAD responded by barricading itself inside the terminals of both airports, and posting guards at their entrances.


464


The authorities now faced a dilemma: remembering the violence that had followed the police action at the Parliament on October 7, the Prime Minister ‘insisted the government had no plan to harm the demonstrators’ (Post Reporters, 2008d). But, since the PAD ‘refused to end their siege of the airports in face of [a] police crackdown’, warnings of new bloodshed as well as possible damage to the airports were sounded by the army spokesman and by the press (Post Reporters, 2008d, 2008e). The use of force against the demonstrators was feared to become the trigger for another military coup (Post Reporters, 2008d). In the event, the police did not execute the order to clear the airports. It deployed its forces near the demonstrators at Suvarnabhumi airport, but did not try to remove them. The government then demoted the national police chief, because he was reluctant to use force against the demonstrators. However, the Air Force and the Navy also declined to assist in the forceful removal of the demonstrators from Don Meuang Airport, to which they had been assigned (Post Reporters, 2008f). No further action was taken to resolve the situation by force, up to the end of the siege. The police stationed around Suvarnabhumi airport suffered a humiliation on November 29, when, in a commando-like action, ‘. . . about 500 PAD supporters driving about 50 vehicles burst through three [police] barricades manned by 200 police. . .[and] deflated the tyres of 12 police vehicles,. . .five vans and two cars. Police had to flee, leaving behind their clubs, shields and vehicles. . .Some police managed to drive away, while others found themselves surrounded by protesters. . ..’ However, the PAD later permitted the police ‘to take. . .their gear and vehicles and leave’ (Arunmas, Thip-Osod, & Bunnag, 2008). All flights from Suvarnabhumi airport were cancelled during its occupation, leaving about 3000 passengers stranded in its terminals (Post Reporters, 2008c). Pictures of utter chaos at the airport appeared in the printed media and on television footage throughout the world, causing a flood of cancellations of visits to Thailand. Other travellers, whose number reached an estimated 100,000 (Theparat & Chinmaneevong, 2008; PAD releases 88 stranded airliners, 2008), were stranded in hotels in town, uncertain when they would be able to leave the country, while Thais staying abroad could not return home. The government activated U-Tapao, a Vietnam-era military airport about 160 km from Bangkok, owned by the Thai Navy, to handle passenger traffic. However, the small airport, which normally handles just a few flights from Bangkok to nearby Pattaya, proved a meagre substitute for Suvarnabhumi. While the latter could handle about 700 flights a day, U-Tapao could handle at most 40 (Purnell, 2008). It lacked adequate staff, and facilities like X-ray machines, luggage belts and cranes to handle large numbers of passengers (Wipatayotin, 2008), so their processing was slow and cumbersome. Unable to get correct flight information, but hoping to catch a flight home, thousands of passengers crowded into the small departure area, causing, according to one of them, ‘complete chaos and pandemonium’ (Purnell, 2008). As growing numbers of passengers tried to get to the airport, traffic jams on roads to the airport extended for several kilometres (Post Reporters, 2008g). Logistic and sanitary problems became ever more acute. Garbage mounted. Tents had to be erected outside the airport, and mobile toilets supplied, to accommodate the new arrivals. Some passengers manifested psychosomatic symptoms, and had to be treated in a makeshift clinic (Purnell, 2008). A troop of Thai dancing girls sent to the airport by a nearby hotel, ‘donned red and silver dresses with feather boas’, and sang such tunes as, ‘you’ll fall in love with Pattaya’ (Purnell, 2008), but they failed to lift the passengers’ spirits. The Director of the Department of Civil Aviation encouraged airlines to use other airports around the country, but no efforts were made by the authorities to divert passenger traffic to them. The Don Meuang military airport, adjoining the civil one, was eventually



465

opened to commercial flights (Post Reporters, 2008g), but apparently took few, if any, flights before the siege came to an abrupt end. As the siege went on, the PAD agreed to release 88 Thai and foreign-owned airliners, stranded on Suvarnabhumi Airport, so that they could be used to repatriate stranded foreigners (PAD releases 88 stranded airliners, 2008) from U-Tapao airport. The planes left, but the congestion at U-Tapao slowed down the repatriation efforts. The government took some steps to alleviate the suffering of those passengers who were not stranded at the airports, but could not leave the country. It offered foreigners staying at 51 nominated hotels ‘accommodation and three meals a day to the amount of 2000 baht a day’, free-of-charge, from November 25 to December 9 (Ministry of Tourism and Sport, 2008; TAT, 2008b) (but not to those staying in service apartments or guest houses). This offer helped some foreigners to finance their unplanned stay, but did not resolve their remaining problems, especially the need to return to work on time and fulfil other urgent obligations. The reaction to the siege of the worst affected foreigners, those stranded at the Bangkok airports, was relatively passive. They were inconvenienced, often confused, worried, angry or simply resigned. No conflicts or tensions between the passengers and the occupiers have been reported, though observers have differed significantly in their perception of the occupiers’ conduct: some claimed that they inconvenienced passengers, but behaved peacefully, while others perceived their behaviour as violent (Christian, 2009; Dugdale, 2009; Praditsmanont, 2009). Stranded passengers in Suvarnabhumi tried to make themselves as comfortable as they could under the circumstances, sleeping behind check-in counters, or on the floor. Most were desperate for information from the airport authorities, which, due to the general uncertainty, was not forthcoming. Their main complaint was that ‘They were not part of the local political conflict and should not be forced to bear the burden of it’ (Glahan, 2008). The protesters were accused of ‘hurting other people, including tourists, who had nothing to do with the [political] problems in Thailand’. But some complained about the ‘government’s slow response to the chaos which followed the seizure of Suvarnabhumi Airport’, and charged that it ‘had not been professional in handling the crisis’, and that Prime Minister Somchai ‘appeared unconvincing’ (Chinmaneevong, 2008a). The passengers had to wait at the airport for a few days, until some were eventually taken away by Thai Airways and TAT, and accommodated in hotels in Bangkok (Glahan, 2008); but many remained stuck there up to the end of the siege. On 1 December, in a sudden move, the PAD abandoned Government House, which it had occupied since late August, and deployed the released forces as reinforcements for the siege of the two airports (Laohong & Sattaburuth, 2008). The movement’s leadership now settled down to wait for the verdict in another crucial case before the Constitution Court – the possible dissolution of the ruling PPP, the party which had succeeded Thaksin’s dissolved TRT, for fraud in the 2007 elections. In an unusually swift move, which was possibly influenced by the growing crisis, the Court on 2 December decided to dissolve the PPP, and banned Prime Minster Somchai and several other members of the government from public office for five years. Declaring victory, the PAD suddenly ended its protest, and its occupation of the airports (Charoensuthipan & Mahitthirook, 2008). A judicial decision, under pressure of circumstances, thus again temporarily terminated a political crisis, in a manner favourable to the royalist opposition. This decision marked the end of a series of governments acting under the influence of the fugitive former Prime Minster, Thaksin Shinawatra. Right after the occupiers left, thousand of cleaners swept into the airports, while employees of the AoT and airline personnel reactivated the installations, to which the PAD occupants had inflicted remarkably little damage. The airports were thus brought

466


into operation in a surprisingly short time; the first flights leaving Suvarnabhumi merely a day after the protesters had left (Post Reporters, 2008h). Operations were officially restarted a day later (Mahitthirok, 2008), and the backlog of stranded foreigners was cleared in a few days. However, the damage to Thai tourism, and the Thai economy, would take considerably longer to repair.


Political aftermath Following the Constitution Court’s decision to ban Prime Minister Somchai from politics, a Deputy Prime Minister was made Acting PM of a caretaker government. In anticipation of its dissolution by the Court, the PPP had already formed a new party, Puea Thai, which the members of the former PPP were now invited to join. However, the new party lacked a powerful leader, and lost much of the appeal of its predecessors, TRT and PPP. Not all members of the banned party joined the new one, and an important faction split-off, signifying the possible fading of Thaksin’s power over Thai politics. Under the influence of the army, in what some dubbed a ‘silent coup’, some smaller parties, which had participated in Somchai’s coalition government, abandoned their links with the Thaksin camp, and joined a coalition with the principal opposition party, the Democrats, who formed a new government under the premiership of the youthful and talented Abhisit Vejjajiva. Thaksin’s supporters now rallied around the UDD, whose ‘red shirts’ began to stage new mass protest rallies, attacking some leading members of the King’s Privy Council, and demanding the resignation of the allegedly undemocratically appointed government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, the dissolution of the Parliament, and new elections, (which would presumably bring Thaksin back into power). Significantly, the UDD’s supporters publicly declared that, whatever form its protests might take, they would not re-occupy the airports. Rather, they proceeded to cause gridlock on Bangkok’s traffic on the eve of the Songkhran (Thai New Year) holiday, by occupying some strategic crossings in the city, thus replicating PAD’s action in a different variation leaving Thai citizens stranded on the roads, rather than foreigners at the airports. They also severely disrupted the ASEAN Summit Meeting in Pattaya a few days later. These actions aggravated the consequences of the preceding crisis, undermining tourist arrivals, and Thailand’s image as a safe tourist destination. The new government, however, took firm action against the protesters. Though the UDD continued to organise periodic protest rallies, no further clashes with the authorities have occurred up to the time of writing. Relative peace has since prevailed, but the conflicts underlying the political crisis remain unresolved.

Effects of the airports occupation on the tourism and travel sectors The airports and the airline industry The occupation of Bangkok’s two airports had a tremendous impact upon the airports themselves, and on their support industries, as well as on the airlines that used them. At the time of the crisis, concerns were raised that the physical damage done by the occupation of Suvarnabhumi airport would cost hundreds of millions of dollars, and take months to repair (Horn, 2008). As it turned out – and to many commentators’ surprise – the damage done, and the money and time needed to restore the airports to operational effectiveness, were less serious than anticipated. However, the long-term damage was more serious. The direct loss suffered by the AoT from the occupation was at first estimated at around 350 million baht (about 10 million USD) (‘AoT suffers loss’, 2008), but the AoT



467

later posted an aggregate net loss for the last Quarter of 2008 of 1.68 billion baht (about 48 million USD), caused primarily by the political crisis culminating with the airports occupation (Kositchotethana, 2009a). This was in stark contrast to the corresponding figures for the same period in 2007, in which the AoT made a profit of about 340 million baht (about 9.7 million USD) (AFP, 2009a). The outlook for its 2009 revenue also remained gloomy. The events threatened to undermine Bangkok’s position as Southeast Asia’s aviation hub (Kositchotethana, 2008). During the occupation, foreign airlines were forced to reroute their flights to other Southeast Asian countries. By March 2009, 30% of those flights had not yet returned to Bangkok’s international airport, causing a corresponding loss of revenue (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2009). During the years 2007 – 2009, the national carrier, Thai International Airways, faced some challenging problems: the dramatic buckle-tightening caused by the global economic slump; the spectacular, though temporary, hike in oil prices of 2007– 2008 and finally, the occupation of its home airport – Suvarnabhumi – and the subsequent sharp decline in tourist arrivals to Thailand. In 2007 (in spite of the oil shock), the company reported a modest profit of 4.4 billion baht (about 126 million USD) (AFP, 2009b). In 2008, however, it made a loss of 21 billion baht (about 600 million USD) and experienced a liquidity crisis (AFP, 2009b). In April 2009, the company was forced to ask the government for 15 billion baht (about 428 million USD), to be able to continue operations through 2009 (Airline Business, 2009). The case of Thai airways demonstrates pointedly the destructive effects of coincident economic, political and tourist crises. The configuration of crises threatened the very survival of a national carrier, which had been a longstanding and reliable source of revenue and of national pride, while promoting Thailand to an international audience. The tourism industry Expectations that the traditionally robust tourism industry could at least partially alleviate the escalating troubles of the Thai economy were already unravelling before the intensification of the political crisis. In July 2008, the TAT cut its projection of tourist arrivals for 2009 from 17 million to 16 million, thus revising an anticipated 10% growth in arrivals down to a mere 3.3% (Sritama, 2008). Explaining this revision, TAT’s Deputy Governor for International Marketing, Santichai Eua-Chongprasit, observed that the ‘three key negative factors were oil prices, world economic uncertainty and fewer flights into the Kingdom’ (Sritama, 2008). The effects of the global economic downturn were thus already factored into revised tourist projections. After July 2008, however, as Thailand’s political crisis came to dominate the public sphere, the risks of coincident economic and political crises were at last recognised by the tourism authorities. TAT implemented a two-pronged approach to deal with them: to counter the effects of the economic crisis, it intensified its marketing and promotional campaigns abroad, while simultaneously attempting to reassure increasingly nervous and skeptical international markets that travel to Thailand was safe, despite the political crisis. As part of the latter effort, the Thai authorities intensively lobbied foreign governments and agencies to remove official travel warnings from their websites (Chinmaneevong, 2008b). However, as the political crisis intensified, and reports and images of riots and beatings of protesters hit the world’s media, the tourism authorities found it increasingly difficult to sustain Thailand’s image as a safe and attractive destination. The traditionally conservative tourism authorities were eventually forced to recognise that, despite all their efforts, tourist arrivals would experience a more dramatic

468


decline than earlier anticipated. As Chinmaneevong (2008b) reported on November 23, just two days before the airport occupations:


Hotel reservations nationwide during the coming high season [November to February] will drop by at least 15%, the Thai Hotel Association (THA) predicts. Forward bookings began declining from this month. For Phuket, a top destination among foreign tourists from both Asia and Europe, bookings for the high season running from last month to March 2009 are now at 60% occupancy, compared with 75% in the same period last year.

After the occupation of the airports, international arrivals to Thailand declined dramatically. Tourist arrivals in January 2009 were down by almost 20% – a fifth – from the year before (‘Thailand visitor arrivals down’, 2009), and remained low in the following months. The TAT forecast total arrivals in 2009 at 12.7 million, similar to actual arrivals in 2008, which was itself a bad year for Thai tourism (OTD, 2008, 2009). Since arrivals in 2007 amounted to 14.4 million (OTD, 2007, 2008), this signified a projected sustained drop of 12% over a two-year period, a remarkable slump, considering the historically high regional economic growth rates, and the fact that the Thai tourism industry had previously grown year on year, in spite of a succession of crises and disasters.

Hotel and hospitality industry In the wake of the events of November 2008, hotel occupancy collapsed below even the most pessimistic expectations. The effects of the tourism slump were felt most keenly by the luxurious international hotels. The THA reported in December 2008 (which should have been peak season) that average hotel occupancy was about 20– 30%, and in some high-end hotels even under 10% (Agence France-Presse, 2008). At the time, Mr Prakit of the THA declared that ‘The airport closures have had a direct impact on tourist confidence’, adding that it would take at least six months to rebuild confidence in the kingdom, and predicting a loss of 100,000 jobs as the result of the occupation (Agence France-Presse, 2008). In an effort to deal with the depressed occupancy rates, many hotels and hotel chains drastically cut their room rates, and targeted domestic visitors, practically their only remaining customers, with unprecedented special offers. However, high-end hotels could not rely upon domestic tourists and local business people as a substitute for the loss of foreign visitors. Hotel occupancy rates continue to remain depressed through 2009. Bangkok hotel occupancy rates in the first quarter of 2009 dropped by 20– 30% compared to the previous year (Sritama, 2009). Bookings for the 2009 high season were also low.

Efforts to bolster the Thai tourism industry The Thai government attempted swiftly to alleviate the effects of the aggravated ongoing downturn, and to boost the weakened tourism sector. In January 2009, the Finance Minister, Korn Chatikavanij, announced an injection of 3.3 billion USD of government money into the economy (Ten Kate & Yuvejwattana, 2009). In March 2009, the government introduced a 142.8 million USD debt relief programme for affected companies in the travel, hospitality and souvenir sectors (‘Thai gov’t’, 2009). That programme was explicitly intended as integral to a macro strategy to revive Thailand’s economic fortunes, and not just as a boost to the recovery of tourism. As part of this broader strategy, as of April 2009, the TAT engaged upon an effort to resurrect international tourism by means of a series of


469

high-level campaigns around the world: an Arabian Travel Market in May; Asia Luxury Travel Market in June; Indian International Travel Mart in July; and the Amazing Thailand Road Show in Korea, New Zealand, Australia and Indonesia, in, respectively, April, May and August 2009. Related events included a Thailand Golf Travel Mart in May, Thailand Travel Mart Plus 2009 in June, and the key Amazing Thailand Grand Sale in JuneAugust 2009. Referring to the role tourism would play in the economic revival of Thailand, Mr Chumpol of the Tourism Ministry argued that:


Solving the problem in the tourism industry is the easiest compared to solving problems in other sectors, including the exports and investments.. . . The tourism industry is seen to concretely and quickly bring in foreign revenues to the country to offset the sharply falling revenues from the export sector. (‘Thai gov’t’, 2009)

The authorities thus went out of their way to bolster the Thai tourism industry. This was highlighted by a recent episode when powerful health and safety lobby groups were pressuring the government to ban alcohol during the internationally famous Songkran [Thai New Year] water-tossing festival, which fell in mid-April 2009. The grounds for this demand were that, in past years, widespread drunkenness and drunk driving had resulted in an average of 300– 400 people killed, and about 3000 – 4000 injured during the festivities (Khamchoo, 2009). In spite of polls showing that a clear majority of Thai people supported the ban, the government eventually and controversially decided against it on the grounds that it would harm foreign tourism. In announcing the hotly contested decision, Deputy Prime Minister Sanan Kachornprasart, who chaired the National Committee for Alcohol Consumption Control, declared: The meeting decided the ban would have more of an impact on tourism, particularly on the Songkhran day, which draws over 80,000 foreign tourists. An alcohol ban, if imposed, would drive away foreign tourists. (‘Plan to ban’, 2009)

This episode vividly illustrates the extent to which the new government was willing to go to accommodate foreign tourists. However, further political protest against the government of Abhisit Vejajjiva, initiated by the UDD’s ‘red shirt’ supporters of ex-Prime Minster Thaksin, and the ongoing global economic crisis, continue to undermine such active efforts, and Thai tourism remains sluggish.

Effects of the airports occupation on the economic crisis In April 2009, the international risk assessment company, Moody’s, produced a bleak report on Thailand’s economy, warning that further political instability could have very negative consequences for investment (Moody’s, 2009). Around the same time, an Asian Development Bank (ADB) report forecast a 2% contraction of the Thai economy in 2009, and a steep rise in unemployment by about two million workers (Bumroongpuk, 2009). Although the economic recession in Thailand was caused primarily by the global financial meltdown, its combination with the ongoing political crisis, and the resulting airports occupation of November 2009, exacerbated the current woes of the national economy, with complex knock-on effects that have proved difficult to manage or measure. A study by Thailand’s central bank shortly after the events, in January 2009, broadly estimated that the airport occupation would cost about 290 billion baht (8.3 billion dollars) (‘Airport siege’, 2009). Whatever the accuracy of that estimate, the shortfall in


470


tourist spending in Thailand has been an important direct cause of that loss. However, the losses go further than that: the decline in tourism arrivals affected countless industries serving the tourist sector, and their own supply chains. A contraction of 12% in tourist arrivals caused an oversupply of such goods and services, a fall in prices, and an absence of incentives for local entrepreneurship and investment. This has had consequences not just for services directly related to the tourism sector, but also for others, such as taxi operators, travel and excursion agencies, restaurants and food stalls in popular tourist destinations such as Chiang Mai and the southern resort islands, Internet cafes and massage parlours, and for handicraft and textile producers. The estimate of two million unemployed made by the ADB may not include layoffs in some of these fields, since many of the establishments that make them up operate in the informal economy, and there may be no official records on people employed in them. The coinciding crises have hit the government coffers hard. Government revenue for 2009 is expected to fall by 230 billion baht, down about 15% from its earlier target (Chantanusornsiri, 2009). Revenues from 1 October 2008 –31 January 2009 were only 364 billion baht (about 10.4 billion USD), lower by some 70 billion baht (about 2 billion USD) from the target (Thailand to roll out more stimulus measures, 2009). Government revenues for 2009 are expected to fall behind expenditures, causing the Thai public sector to sink further into debt. However, notwithstanding the treasury’s weakness, in January 2009 Prime Minister Abhisit announced an injection of 116.7 billion baht (about 3.33 billion USD) to alleviate the impact of the coincident crises, and he referred explicitly to the impact of the airport occupation upon the economy as one of the reasons for his initiative (Srisukkasem, 2009). The effectiveness of this intervention will, however, depend upon the Prime Minister’s ability to stabilise the country politically. The political crisis, broadcast internationally in footage of demonstrations and clashes, and of stranded tourists during the airport occupation has damaged the reputation of Thailand, not only as a tourist destination, but also as a location for foreign investments and business activities. The crisis has thus exacerbated the impact of the global financial meltdown in Thailand, and compromised governmental and non-governmental efforts to recover from the depressed economic situation. The disastrous coincidence of economic, political and tourism crises experienced by Thailand has required the government and relevant non-governmental bodies to develop strategies to stop such a thing happening again. As an example of this fresh, more systemic thinking, one of the principal conclusions that the new government drew from the airport occupation was the need to upgrade other airports, so that the country’s air traffic would not be utterly dependent on Suvarnabhumi. Work has recently started on an upgrade of U-tapao airport (Kositchotethana, 2009b). Conclusions Research into tourism crises to date has usually examined individual, discrete crises, without analysing their interaction (Henderson, 2006), and has focused primarily on the management of their effects, rather than on their genesis and development (Carlsen, 2006; Laws & Prideaux, 2005; Scott, Laws, & Prideaux, 2007). While such studies have often been interesting and useful, such approaches can overlook or underplay human agency in the development of tourism crises, and simplify the antecedent conditions and dynamics. This article has aimed to add theoretical balance to the analysis of tourism crises, by discussing the case of the interaction and combined effects of different orders of antecedent crises in the lead up to a destructive meta-crisis, preceding the airport



471

occupation in Thailand - and the consequences of this for the country’s tourism industry, its economy and its political order. In the events of 2008 in Thailand, we see two crises increasingly interacting, eventually whipping up a ‘perfect storm’, which wreaked havoc at different levels, beyond the political and the economic. In this particular case, a pre-existing and growing domestic political crisis increasingly contributed towards the intensifying economic crisis – with demonstrations, riots and political instability undermining international tourism to the country, and exacerbating the perception of risk among actual and potential inward investors. The occupation of the airports marked in spectacular form a sudden and massive escalation in the intensity of interaction between the political and economic systems, which resulted in failed tourist policy and economic planning: fewer international tourists, damage to Thailand’s reputation, decreasing economic welfare, further economic and political destabilisation, and a fallen government. Our study shows how coincident crises of different socio-economic orders can interact and then develop synergetic effects, and how unrelated crises, operating at different levels, can combine to form a complex and dynamic mega crisis, which provokes unpredictable and acute calamities. Importantly, the coincidence exacerbates both the ongoing crises, even as it undermines the ability of ‘crisis managing’ institutions such as ministries, police forces, legislatures and regulating bodies, to respond to and alleviate the damaging developments, or to deal effectively with either their short-lived acute effects on particular aspects of the tourist sector, or with their unfurling chronic consequences for the tourism system as a whole. The study of multiple crises is therefore worthy of special attention in tourism research, as a particularly virulent variety of systemic interaction and breakdown. The occupation of the airports, unprecedented in the history of civil protest movements, would have not been possible or successful, if the political system had not already been on the verge of implosion. After three Prime Ministers in a row had been deposed, the occupation gave it only a final push. In most countries, an airport occupation would either not have been allowed to happen at all, or it would have been quickly cleared, using mainstream crowd-dispersal policing methods. After the bloody events of July 2008, which led to vivid and damaging footage being broadcast around the world, and which occasioned intense expressions of international concern, the government adopted a strategy of minimal intervention and non-violence. This was intended mainly to prevent a widespread popular uprising, but also to avoid further damage to Thailand’s reputation in the international arena, and the economic implications of this. This acute (partly economy-oriented) sensitivity to the possible consequences of further bloodshed paralysed the government and engendered a growing impression of impotence, which the PAD exploited to intensify its campaigns, eventually resulting in the occupation of the airports. By now, the political crisis in Thailand had reached the point where the Prime Minister’s order to the police or the armed forces to clear the airports did not wield authority any more, and was not executed. The political system imploded. While our study deals with a single, possibly idiosyncratic case, it leads to some broader theoretical conclusions, which could be of significance for the future study of tourism crises. Firstly, the study demonstrates the significance of the systemic location of the source of a crisis for its distinct dynamics; specifically, whether the source is exogenous to the social system (as in natural disasters), within one or more of the society’s institutional domains, or internal in the tourist system itself (Cohen, 2009). In this case study, the source was within the political system: the meltdown of Thai political authority allowed the opposition to

472



occupy the airports, which led to the tourism crisis. But the protestors’ choice of the airports was undoubtedly a strategic decision, owing to the facilities’ importance for the government’s policy of promoting tourism as a panacea for the growing economic crisis in the context of global financial meltdown. Secondly, the study highlights the important role that deliberate human action might play in the creation of (at least some) tourism crises. This indicates that the theoretical analysis of tourism crises should not confine itself to the activities related to the management of tourism crises after they already happened, but should also be concerned with activities which produce (or, alternatively, prevent) such crises. Such an antecedent sociological approach can be used to complement, frame and inform current work on tourism crises. Thirdly, the study reveals the transformative agency inherent in crises. In the case reported in this article, the airport occupation had multiple ‘agencies’ in that it engendered a political transition, as it flung the Thai tourist and economic systems into states of near-collapse.

References AFP. (2009a, February 16). Thai airports lost US48 Mil on Q4 amid blockade. Asia One. Retrieved from http://travel.asiaone.com/Travel/News/Story/A1Story20090216-122404.html AFP. (2009b, February 28). Thai Airways posts huge loss in 2008. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/aviation/136966/thai-airways-posts-huge-loss-in-2008. Agence France-Presse. (2008, December 12). Thai hotels nearly empty after riots. Adelaide Now. Retrieved from http://www.news.com.au/adelaidenow/story/0,22606,24789082-5005962,00. html Airline Business. (2009, April 20). Thai Airways begins turnaround work. Flight Global. Retrieved from http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/04/20/325536/thai-airways-begins-turnaroundwork.html Airport siege cost Thailand 8.3 bln dollars: Central bank. (2009, January 7). Economic Times. Retrieved from http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/International_Business/Airport_ siege_cost_Thailand_83_bln_dollars_central_bank/articleshow/3945957.cms Anderson, J.C. (2003). Terrorism and tourism: Managing the consequences of the Bali bombings. Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 11, 41–58. AoT suffers loss of over Bt350 million since airport closure. (2008, December 2). The Nation. Retrieved from http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/read.php?newsid=30090011& keyword=AOT Arunmas, Ph., Thip-Osod, M., & Bunnag, S. (2008, November 30). PAD force police retreat. Bangkok Post, 1. Blake, A., & Sinclair, M.T. (2003). Tourism crisis management: Responding to September 11. Annals of Tourism Research, 30(1), 813–832. Botha, A. (2006). Politics and terrorism: An assessment of the origins and threat of terrorism in Egypt (ISS Paper No. 13). South Africa: Institute for Security Studies. Bumroongpuk, E. (2009, March 31). ADB forecasts Thai economy to shrink by 2 per cent this year. NNBT (National News Bureau of Thailand). Retrieved from http://thainews.prd.go.th/en/news. php?id=255203310016 Carlsen, J. (2006). Post-tsunami tourism strategies for the Maldives. Tourism Review International, 10, 69–79. Chantanusornsiri, W. (2009, April 22). Govt cuts B200bn from 2010 budget: Spending slashed as tax revenues plunge. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/15412/ govt-cuts-b200bn-from-2010-budget Charoensuthipan, P., & Mahitthirook, A. (2008, December 3). PAD rejoices with warning to govt not to provoke it. Bangkok Post. p. 1. Chinmaneevong, Ch. (2008a, December 3). Stranded tourists frustrated by slow government response. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http://bangkokpost.net/031208_Business/03Dec2008_ biz40.php



473

Chinmaneevong, Ch. (2008b, November 11). Hotel occupancy collapsing rapidly/politics greatest worry for tourism operators. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/print/ 6260/hotel-occupancy-collapsing-rapidly Christian. (2009, July 11). Don’t talk about the airport seizure: You weren’t there! [Letter-to-editor]. The Nation. p. 9A. CIA. (2009). World Factbook. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/TH.html Cohen, E. (2007). Tsunami and flash floods: Contrasting modes of tourism-related disasters in Thailand. Tourism Recreation Research, 31, 21–39. Cohen, E. (2008a). Explorations in Thai tourism: Collected case studies. Bingley, UK: Emerald. Cohen, E. (2008b). Death of a backpacker: Incidental but not random. Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change, 6, 209–226. Cohen, E. (2009, September). Tourism crises: A comparative perspective. ICTDM Bi-annual Conference, Kos Island, Greece. Deutsche Presse-Agentur. (2009, March 19). 30% capacity lost since airport closures. The Nation, 19, 3A. Dhiravegin, L. (2009, February 9). Little room for Thai divisions. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/11307/little-room-for-thai-divisions Dugdale, Th. (2009, July 11). Inconvenience and violence are two different things [Letter to the editor]. The Nation. pp. 9A. Faulkner, B. (2001). Towards a framework for tourism disaster management. Tourism Management, 22, 135–147. Glahan, S. (2008, November 27). Stranded and angry, unsure or just resigned. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/271108_News/27Nov2008_news09.php Handley, P. (2006). The King never smiles: A biography of Thailand’s Bhumibol Adulyadej. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Henderson, J.C. (2006). Corporate social responsibility and tourism: Hotel companies in Phuket, Thailand, after the Indian Ocean tsunami. International Journal of Hospitality Management, 26, 228–239. Hewison, K. (2008). A book, the King and the 2006 coup. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38, 190–211. Hitchcock, M., & Putra, I.N.D. (2005). The Bali bombing: Tourism crises management and conflict avoidance. Current Issues in Tourism, 8, 62–76. Horn, R. (2008, November 30). Thailand crisis deepens amid new violence. Time. Retrieved from http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1862851,00.html IMF. (2008, 2009). World economic outlook database – April 2009. International Monetary Fund. Retrieved April 25, 2009, from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata Kaewmorakot, C. (2004, September 17). Motive in tourists’ killing a mystery. The Nation. pp. 2A. Keys, A., Masterman-Smith, H., & Cottle, D. (2006). The political economy of a natural disaster: The Boxing Day tsunami, 2004. Antipode, 38, 195–204. Khamchoo, W. (2009, April 16). Road toll down on last year. The Nation. Retrieved from http://www. nationmultimedia.com/search/read.php?newsid=30100599&keyword=The+People Kositchotethana, B. (2008, November 27). Airlines ponder options as blockade threatens hub status. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/271108_Business/27Nov2008_ biz27.php Kositchotethana, B. (2009a, September 2). Work begins on U-tapao upgrade. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/aviation/23099/work-begins-on-u-tapaoupgrade Kositchotethana, B. (2009b, February 17). Dec airport closures lead AoT 4q08 losses. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/economics/11782/dec-airport-closureslead-aot-4q08-losses Laohong, K.-O., & Sattaburuth, A. (2008, December 2). PAD leaves govt house, shifts camp to airports. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/7186/pad-leavesgovt-house-shifts-camp-to-airports Laws, E., & Prideaux, B. (Ed.). (2005). Tourism crises: Management responses and theoretical insights. New York, NY: Haworth Press. Lew, A. (1999). Tourism and the Southeast Asian crises of 1997 and 1998: A view from Singapore. Current Issues in Tourism, 2, 301–315.


474


Mahitthirok, A. (2008, December 6). Airport is officially open for business. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/061208_News/06Dec2008_news01.php McCargo, D. (2005). Network monarchy and legitimation crises in Thailand. The Pacific Review, 18, 499–519. McCargo, D. (2006). Toxic Thaksin (September 27). Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/61939/duncan-mccargo/toxic-thaksin McCargo, D., & Pathmanand, U. (2005). The Thaksinization of Thailand. Copenhagen, Denmark: NIAS Press. Ministry of Tourism and Sport. (2008, December 8). Circular: Third and last circular concerning tourism crisis. Bangkok, Thailand: Author. Moody’s. (2009, April). Thailand’s April turmoil adds to economic challenges and rating pressures. New York: Moody’s Global Credit Research. Ockey, J. (2005). Monarch, monarchy, succession and stability in Thailand. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 46, 115–127. Oliver-Smith, A., & Hoffmann, S.M. (Ed.). (1999). The angry earth: Disaster in anthropological perspective. New York: Routledge. OTD (Office of Tourism Development). (2002–2009). Tourism Authority of Thailand. Retrieved from http://www.tourism.go.th/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2610&Itemid=25 PAD releases 88 stranded airliners. (2008, December 1). Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http://www. bangkokpost.com/news/politics/7113/pad-releases-88-stranded-airliners Pathmanand, U. (2007). Coup, capital and confrontation in the late Thaksin era. Asia Insights, 3, 8–11. Pellegi, M. (2007). Thailand, the worldly kingdom. Singapore: Talisman. Phongpaichit, P., & Baker, C. (2004). Thaksin: The business of politics in Thailand. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books. Phongpaichit, P., & Baker, C. (2005). ‘Business populism’ in Thailand. Journal of Democracy, 16, 58–72. Plan to ban alcohol sales for Songkran gets canned. (2009, March 30). Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/139062/songkran-booze-ban-denied Pollard, J. (2008, March 26). Full moon madness. The Nation, Daily Xpress. pp. 10. Pongsudhirak, Th. (2005). Thai politics after the 6 February elections. Trends in Southeast Asia Series 6. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Retrieved from http://www.iseas.edu. sg/tr62005.pdf Post Reporters. (2008a, March 23). Shock over tourist murders. Bangkok Post, 1–2. Post Reporters. (2008b, November 27). PAD, Somchai say no to Anupong’s compromise. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/271108_News/27Nov2008_news01.php Post Reporters. (2008c, November 27). Aid fund for tourism planned. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/271108_Business/27Nov2008_biz29.php Post Reporters. (2008d, November 28). Police told to move in. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http:// www.bangkokpost.com/281108_News/28Nov2008_news01.php Post Reporters. (2008e, November 29). Govt jolted into action. Bangkok Post. p. 1. Post Reporters. (2008f, November 29). Police chief ousted. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http:// www.bangkokpost.com/291108_News/29Nov2008_news03.php Post Reporters. (2008g, November 30). Tourists crowd U-Tapao airport in bid to go home. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/301108_News/30Nov2008_news04.php Post Reporters. (2008h, December 4). First THAI flights begin using BKK airport again. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/print/7352/first-thai-flights-begin-usingbkk-airport-again Praditsmanont, S. (2009, July 13). Yellow shirts went too far alarming foreigners [letter to the editor]. The Nation. pp. 9A. Preechasilpakul, S., & Streckfuss, D. (2008, January 9– 11). Ramification and re-sacralization of the lese majeste´ law in Thailand, Paper presented at the 10th International Conference on Thai Studies, Bangkok, Thailand. Purnell, N. (2008, December 1). Confusion reigns at U-Tapao airlift. Bangkok Post. pp. B3. Pye, O., & Schaffar, W. (2008). The 2006 anti-thaksin movement in Thailand: An analysis. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38, 38–61. Saicheua, S., & Fongarunrung, T. (2009, February 20). Thailand: Jan. Exports – 25.6%. Bangkok, Thailand: Phatra Securities Public Company Limited. Schafferer, Ch. (2008). Parliamentary elections in Thailand. Electoral Studies, 30, 1–4.



475

Scott, N., & Laws, E. (2005). Tourism crises and disasters: Enhancing understanding of system effects. In E. Laws & B. Prideaux (Eds.), Tourism crises: Management responses and theoretical insights (pp. 149–156). New York, NY: Haworth Press. Scott, N.R., Laws, E., & Prideaux, B.R. (2007). Tourism crises and marketing recovery strategies. Journal of Travel & Tourism Marketing, 23, 1–14. Spooner, A. (2008, January 13). With so many Britons murdered in Thailand, why does our government not warn of the dangers faced there? The Independent. Retrieved from http://www. independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/with-so-many-britons-murdered-in-thailand-why-does-ourgovernment-not-warn-of-the-dangers-faced-there-769640.html?r=RSS Srisukkasem, A. (2009, January 24). Thai contraction ‘possible’ if global slide worsens. The Nation. Retrieved from http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/01/24/business/business_30094078.php Sritama, S. (2008, July 8). Tat lowers tourism projection. The Nation. Retrieved from http://www. nationmultimedia.com/search/read.php?newsid=30077522&keyword=%22sharply+cut%22+16 Sritama, S. (2009, April, 16). Tourism industry asks for global campaigns. The Nation. Retrieved from http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/04/16/business/business_30100581.php Tambiah, S.J. (1976). World conqueror and world renouncer. New York: Cambridge University Press. TAT. (2008a). Overseas operators and media invited to explore the North, Northeast and the Andaman. Bangkok, Thailand: Author. Retrieved from http://www.tatnews.org/tat_release/ detail.asp?id=3982 TAT. (2008b, December). Update B.E. 2551 [2008]. Update on Thailand tourism crisis. Bangkok, Thailand: Author. Retrieved from http://www.oknation.net/blog/print.php?id=360292 Ten Kate, D., & Yuvejwattana, S. (2009, February 23). Thai economy shrinks more than expected on exports. Bloomberg. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601110 &sid=afPIanKnJREc Thai gov’t offering loans to ease liquidity problem among tourism operators. (2009, March 18). China Economic Net. Retrieved from http://en.ce.cn/subject/financialcrisis/financialcrisiswr/200903/18/ t20090318_18535380.shtml Thailand to roll out more stimulus measures. (2009, March 8). ASEAN Affairs. Retrieved from http:// www.aseanaffairs.com/thailand_to_roll_out_more_stimulus_measures Thailand visitor arrivals down by 20 per cent in 2008. (2009, January 17). Tourism Travel Asia. Retrieved from http://www.tourismtravelasia.com/2009/01/thailand-visitor-arrivals-down-by-20. html Theparat, Ch., & Chinmaneevong, Ch. (2008, November 29). 100,000 foreign tourists stranded. Bangkok Post. p. 2. Urry, J. (2002). The global complexities of September 11. Theory, Culture and Society, 19, 57–69. WHO. (2008, 2009). Country health system profile: Thailand. Geneva, Switzerland: Author. Retrieved from http://www.searo.who.int/EN/Section313/Section1525.htm Winichakul, Th. (2008). Toppling democracy. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38, 11–37. Wipatayotin, A., & AFP. (2008, November 2). U-Tapao struggles to handle traffic. Bangkok Post, 2. WTO. (2006–2009). International trade and tariff data. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization. Retrieved from http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm