Dan Schmidt Excelsior College 19 August 2016

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Law Enforcement Communication Networks: Using Real Time Data to Protect the Protectors Dan Schmidt Excelsior College 19 August 2016        

Author Note This assignment was written for CYS595 Capstone Project in Cybersecurity, Summer 2016

Contents Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... 3  Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 4  Background ................................................................................................................................................... 5  Current Technologies .................................................................................................................................... 6  Architecture .................................................................................................................................................. 7  Phase 1 – Outfitting the Vehicle ............................................................................................................... 8  Phase 2 – Headquarters ............................................................................................................................ 9  Data Concerns ............................................................................................................................................... 9  Encryption ................................................................................................................................................. 9  Cloud Storage .......................................................................................................................................... 10  Regulations ................................................................................................................................................. 10  Users and Roles ........................................................................................................................................... 11  Risk Assessment .......................................................................................................................................... 12  Risk Mitigation ............................................................................................................................................ 13  Cloud Data Protection ............................................................................................................................. 13  Unauthorized Network Access ................................................................................................................ 14  Signal Intercept ....................................................................................................................................... 15  Budgeting .................................................................................................................................................... 17  Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 18  References .................................................................................................................................................. 19  Appendix A .................................................................................................................................................. 23  Appendix B .................................................................................................................................................. 24     

 

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Abstract  

In today’s world where information is expected and often needed instantly, there has been a growing need in law enforcement for the ability to stream video live from an ongoing pursuit, raid, or routine traffic stop. However, the technology currently in place is expensive and unreliable. Currently, live feed transmissions are conducted via cellular networks either through air cards or mobile hotspots. This paper will explore alternate methods for providing real time video streaming from mobile units (patrol cars) across large geographic regions. Cost, risks, coverage area, and quality of the data (video and audio) will be explored and presented while taking into considering the limitations of state budgetary requirements.  

 

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Introduction In a world where information is so widely available, there is a growing need for law enforcement to have the ability to stream video live from an ongoing pursuit, raid, or routine traffic stop. Technologies exist in the 21st century that can support this type of functionality, yet traditionally they have been expensive to implement at an enterprise level. This is especially true considering the budgetary constraints that state and local governments often face. Commercial applications of direct television broadcasting have led to the creation of highly functional networks distributed over large geographic areas that deliver high definition video and audio to millions of customers simultaneously, with a delay of only a few seconds. This demand for high definition video has driven the technology costs of equipment down in addition to making the equipment smaller. As a result, high definition satellite dishes are less than three feet in diameter and their receivers are the size of an average laptop computer. This technology has been adapted and adopted to meet military needs in the form of providing near real time (NRT) video in support of intelligence and combat operations. With little modification, the technology can be adapted to the needs of law enforcement organizations. Additionally, this technology is available commercially off-the-shelf, and uses existing wireless technologies such as satellite, cellular, and radio transmissions. Benefits for implementing a NRT video streaming solution would be extraordinary. Militaries use NRT video streaming to assist with combat operations including tactical raids and safety evolutions. In the 2010’s, some state law enforcement agencies began using drones to aid in search and rescue operations (Greene, 2013). However, the video captured from these drones was only available locally to the drone operator and not by individuals at headquarters or a command center who could potentially provide assistance during the operation. Additionally,

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there is an increasing demand for law enforcement officers not only to operate by themselves but also to perform duties dozens, if not hundreds, of miles away from the nearest officer or station. State troopers in large states such as Alaska or Texas can cover hundreds of miles during a single eight hour shift. During the shift, they have the possibility to deal with drug and human trafficking, violent crimes, and drunken or unruly citizens with their nearest backup 30-60 minutes away. NRT video streaming technology exists, but sufficient analysis for deployment for peace officers has not been thoroughly explored. The infrastructure and logistics of a statewide real time video solution would be a massive undertaking, especially for larger states such as Alaska, Texas and California. Texas creates a unique environment not only due to its size but also because it has the longest stretch of the United States – Mexico border at 1,254 miles (Texas Tribune, 2016). Due to these unique characteristics, this this paper will examine the potential implementation of a NRT video solution for the state police of Texas, the Texas Department of Public Safety.

Background The Texas Department of Public Safety is responsible for statewide law enforcement operations in Texas. This also includes regulatory servicing, drivers and concealed handgun licensing, and anti-terrorism operations (Texas Department of Public Safety, 2016). They are divided into thirteen divisions, three of which are law enforcement divisions: Criminal Investigations, Texas Highway Patrol (State Police) and the Texas Rangers (Texas Department of Public Safety, 2016). Within the Highway Patrol, there are currently 2,162 commissioned officers (Texas Department of Public Safety, 2016). It is these 2,162 officers whom a near real time (NRT) video solution would be needed.

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The Texas Department of Public Safety (TxDPS) operates on a budget of 1.2 billion to 1.3 billion dollars every year (Texas Department of Public Safety, 2015). Of that budget, approximately $50 million is allocated for information technology and is utilized more for everyday operational support with very little to no money set aside for technology enhancements or upgrades (Texas Department of Public Safety, 2015). Thus, to implement a NRT video solution costs would need to be kept at an absolute minimum while ensuring not to endanger the lives of the officers or anyone they may be interacting with. Depending on the need, costs, and benefits additional money can be allocated for the Department but these types of requests need to be presented to the Texas Legislature, who then weigh the options and determine if additional funds can be allocated (Collier, 2014). With the mission TxDPS has, and the geographic size of their operating environment, this provides an extremely unique environment to try to protect, and introducing a NRT system and the supporting infrastructure presents a considerable security challenge. Factors that need to be taken into consideration include bandwidth, connectivity, signal strength (since there are large portions of Texas with limited cellular reception), and storage options including cloud based vs stored locally.

Current Technologies Drone technology has introduced new opportunities with regards to the recording and streaming of video. In May 2011 President Barack Obama watched the raid on the Osama Bin Laden compound in real time via a video feed from a drone circling the compound fed to the White House Situation Room (The Telegraph, 2011). The drone used was a RQ-170 Sentinel (Bowden, 2012, p. 217). While much information about the RQ-170 is still classified, it is known that it used satellite communications to provide the live feed to mission commanders in 6   

Afghanistan and the White House (Fulghum & Sweetman, 2009). However, a lot can be learned by analyzing a similar drone, the MQ-1 Predator. The MQ-1 is built by General Atomics and there is an abundance of unclassified information available on it. A crucial feature of the MQ-1 Predator is its communications system, which is able to send video in near real time via one of two methods: a line-of-sight data link utilizing the C-band and by satellite data link on the Ku-band (United States Air Force, 1996). C-band communications from the Predator are able to send full color and infrared video to a Ground Control Station (GCS) at a 30 Hz frame rate with a speed between 1.5 Mbps to 137 Mbps (United States Air Force, 1996). The range for this communication is 110 miles but requires lineof-sight between the drone and the GCS. Ku-band communications are one-way, being sent from the Predator to an orbiting geostationary satellite before being forwarded to either the GCS (when the drone is not within line-of-sight) or onto other receivers used to view and monitor the ongoing operations (United States Air Force, 2015). The Ku-band transmissions take place over the Global Broadcast Service and is capable of transmitting at speeds from 0.5 Mbps to 50 Mbps from the drone to the geostationary communications satellite and then at speeds from T-1 (1.5 Mbps) to T-3 (45 Mbps) from the satellite to the GCS (United States Air Force, 1996). The Global Broadcast Service is an excellent example of providing video transmissions cheaply and reliably using commercial off-the-shelf equipment.

Architecture The technology and network behind military drone communications make it an ideal example of how successful commercial off the shelf equipment can be utilized in a law enforcement environment. Using the Predator drone as an example, a network can be designed that incorporates a variety of technologies and communication systems to provide near real time 7   

video and audio from an officer’s patrol car. The implementation of a NRT video solution involves two phases: outfitting the officer’s vehicle and outfitting the ground command station/headquarters to receive and view the information.

Phase 1 – Outfitting the Vehicle Learning from the developments made by the commercial direct-to-home television market, the Global Broadcast Service (GBS) began in the late 1990’s as a way to broadcast critical information to the battlefield (United States Air Force, 2014). GBS utilizes both commercial and government satellites including the Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) and Ultra High Frequency Follow-On (UFO) satellites (United States Air Force, 2014). One of the distinguishing features of GBS is that it is one way, thus video can be provided at speeds up to 45 Mbps in a timely manner to individuals who need it quickly (United States Air Force, 2014). Additionally, it can be used with commercial off-the-shelf hardware. One of the off-the-shelf devices vital to the Predator’s (and thus, the officer’s) communication is the Ku wideband SATCOM antenna. Only 18 inches in diameter it provides one-way video communications from the drone to an orbiting satellite (L3 Communications, 2008). The design of the antenna allows for continuous communication with the satellite regardless of how fast the vehicle is moving. Additionally, its small size would allow the antenna to be placed within the trunk of the officer’s vehicle. An outlined diagram of the patrol car setup is included as Appendix A. As noted previously, additional communication would be provided via line of site UHF antennas. UHF is capable of transmitting National Television System Committee (NTSC) formatted video at frequencies between 6.8 MHz and 7.5 MHz (White, 2003, pp. 2-1). This allows for a minimum speed of 4.5 Mbs which can transmit at a 30 Hz frame rate full color and 8   

infrared video (United States Air Force, 1996). UHF antennas are freely available from a variety of commercial sources and would be relatively to implement in an officer’s patrol vehicle. Because UHF is line of sight, a network of corresponding antennas and repeaters would have to be implemented to ensure adequate communication. In the absence of line-of-site (UHF) transmission the Ku band antenna would have to be utilized, sending data via the Global Broadcast Service (GBS).

Phase 2 – Headquarters Any ground location needing to view the in car video in real time would need a variety of communications antennas and receivers to ensure they could receive all of the necessary data. To ensure communications are received the Headquarters location would need three primary pieces of equipment: Ku-band antennas, UHF (C-band) antennas and Internet access. Since the video and audio would be compressed by software on the officer’s in car laptop it would reach the ground station already formatted in MPEG-4 and be easily viewable. A digital recording system should be setup so that the videos can be saved, sorted, and then stored in the cloud. Ideally, this would be an automated process since in large agencies there could easily be multiple videos coming in at the same time. A diagram of the headquarters network is included in Appendix B.

Data Concerns Encryption Any type of active law enforcement operation would be sensitive in nature, from a traffic stop to a high speed pursuit. Thus, it would be critical to ensure that the NRT videos could not be intercepted and the location of officers not be revealed. During operations in Iraq and Afghanistan it was discovered that Predator drone video feeds could be intercepted using an inexpensive satellite antenna and a program called SkyGrabber (McCullagh, 2009). This is 9   

because the Predator video system did not use any form of encryption due to their being designed in the early 1990’s, before encryption was common and easy to use (McCullagh, 2009).

Cloud Storage Additionally, with any type of cloud storage there would be concerns of unauthorized access. In a SaaS model, most of the responsibility for the security falls on the vendor. Thus, it is important to know not only the reputation of the cloud provider, but also be familiar with their policies, procedures, and extending support they have in the event of unauthorized access or an attack. Thus, it is critical to ensure that proper security language is presented in the SaaS contract, with a clear understanding from both parties on what will, and will not, be included (Kanaracus, 2013).

Regulations State agencies, including law enforcement agencies, deal with public information requests/open records requests on a regular basis. Under most circumstances, a governmental body has 10 days to respond to the requestor with the information, or at a minimum notify them why they do not have the information yet and give the requestor an anticipated return date (Texas Attorney General, 2016). Thus, ideally the storage for the near real time (NRT) video system will be automated based on date of the incident and officer whose camera recorded the information. This can amount to thousands of hours of video per officer, per year. To meet public information request law, the videos need to be searchable so they can be released if needed and/or requested. Additionally, depending on if the type of data captured, the timeframe that the video files will have to be stored will vary widely. For example, the current records retention schedule for investigative polygraph examinations related to homicide cases is 75 years after the case is closed (Texas State Library and Archives Commission, 2014). In the event a shooting is captured 10   

by either the in car video system or the officer’s body camera a similar retention schedule can be assumed. Thus, a saleable storage medium is required that can be expanded regularly and then archived when needed. As of 2016 the largest tape backups can hold 10 terabytes of data, which is the equivalent of 5,000 hours of high definition video (IBM, 2016). While tape backups should be a viable method of archival storage, the NRT system will need to be able to support several petabytes of information that is searchable.

Users and Roles With regards to users and roles, NRT video would need to be accessible only to certain people at certain times. During the stream of the video, the Operations Center (OC) will need to be able to view the videos of any officer on duty in real time. The OC would not be the same as a communications/dispatchers office, but more similar to a command center similar to those used in the military. A web based UI would be ideal to view the streaming video, and access to it would be controlled via single sign on (SSO) from the agency’s network with further access determined based on Active Directory (AD) security groups. Depending on the staffing level of the OC, this should limit the number of live stream connections to less than 10, which will significantly reduce bandwidth. Additional personnel, such as the organization’s Director or Assistant Directors would also need real time access, so they could watch sensitive or specific operations. Once streamed, the videos would be stored where they would be accessible to more individuals, such as those within the officer’s chain of command. This setup would be very similar to voice call recording in call centers, where supervisors can listen to their agent’s interactions with customers after the call has been completed. This access would also be granted via AD security groups with SSO capability. 11   

Additional users who would need access would include legal, the media office, government relations, and internal affairs. These offices may need to obtain a video for an investigation, press release, or similar event. Access should not be granted to every video in then archive for these individuals, but rather an administrator could “release” the video to them within the UI. When the video is released, the original video would remain untouched and a copy would be given to the users. This video could then be cut/edited as needed to allow for press releases, court cases, etc.

Risk Assessment Securing an agency that provides law enforcement operations for a state the size of Texas is no simple task, and nearly impossible to do with a state budget. Thus, prior to introducing a near real time video solution a risk analysis must be conducted to gain a better understanding of the risks, vulnerabilities, and critical needs of the organization in an attempt to better protect, or mitigate, these risks. It is obvious that the number of risks associated with a statewide law enforcement organization is many, and there is a continued battle to ensure information technology security and integrity versus the allowed budget. A Facilitated Risk Analysis and Assessment Process (FRAAP) analysis was conducted incorporating multiple individuals from every available team within IT. The top 3 risks as determined by the FRAAP analysis are identified below. IT Risks to Law Enforcement Organizations

Risk Data Breach

Threat

Impact

Data servers are vulnerable via multiple attack vectors, including unqualified employees, unsecure databases, and out of date equipment

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Catastrophic (5)

Probability / Likelihood Likely (4)

Unauthorized Network Access

Signal Intercept

With such a large surface area, there are numerous opportunities for the network to be penetrated Signals over UHF or C band could be intercepted

Catastrophic

Possible (3)

(5) Major (4)

Unlikely (2)

To help visually identify the impact and likelihood of a cyber security event happing involving that risk, the following risk heat map was created:

Risk Heat Map

Risk Mitigation Cloud Data Protection A 2010 report showed that of all of the cyber security events that occurred that year, only 28% were intentionally targeted at specific organizations (Deloitte, 2015). Thus, the most responsible approach to protecting data is by not wondering if an organization will be attacked, but when. By utilizing a cloud based storage solution the organization would be putting the majority of the risk on the vendor. With a this type of solution, it is important to know not only 13   

the reputation of the cloud provider, but also be familiar with their policies, procedures, and extending support they have in the event of unauthorized access or an attack. Thus, it is critical to ensure that proper security language is presented in the SaaS contract, with a clear understanding from both parties on what will, and will not, be included (Kanaracus, 2013). Almost all of the massive data breaches within the past five years occurred on traditional, on-site storage platforms and not the cloud (Rossi, 2015). Thus, by ensuring that a cloud vendor is reputable and demonstrates a proven history of no breaches, this risk can be mitigated significantly. With a cloud based solution the security, ensuring that qualified personal are employed, and equipment maintenance, replacement, and upkeep are all put on the shoulders of the service provider. While the initial cost of cloud computing can appear to be excessive, it is important to remember that additional cost includes 24/7 support and high availability in addition to the previously mentioned advantages.

Unauthorized Network Access Unauthorized network access can come in several forms, including physically taping into the network via direct access to a router or switch, cracking the Wi-Fi assess key or logging onto a guest wireless network, or having an authorized network user access the data who should not be allowed to access it (permissions). Additional forms of access could originate from stolen devices such as laptops or compromised usernames and passwords. Basic network segregation would significantly reduce the potential attack vectors available to an unauthorized user, in addition to limiting an attacker’s access if they were able to get onto the network. Furthermore, simple device hardening procedures such as MAC address filtering and port security would prevent unauthorized devices from physically plugging into the network in the event an attacker were to gain access to a network closet or an open network port. 14   

To deal with security risks involving end client equipment, there are several relatively easy to implement policies that would significantly mitigate the risk of unauthorized access. For laptops in vehicles, encrypting the hard drives with Bitlocker would prevent data access in the event the device is stolen. Bitlocker is enforceable at the Enterprise level and requires a decryption key in the event an unauthorized user is attempting to gain access (Microsoft, 2009). Additionally, implementing two-factor authentication for user accounts (even if only for the commissioned officers) would be a significant step in preventing unauthorized network access in the event credentials are compromised. Two-factor authentication can be controlled via Active Directory, and could be implementing with a smart card, or the fingerprint scanner that is common on many modern laptop computers.

Signal Intercept While encryption is relatively easy to implement, there are considerable downsides to it when weighted against the positive aspects of encryption. Encryption would be done by software inside the officer’s vehicle prior to being transmitted through the C or Ku-band antennas onto the satellite or line-of-sight antenna. Without encryption, the video would be readily available for intercept by those with limited technology; a laptop, software, and satellite dish is all that is needed. The determination needs to be decided that in the event a live video feed from an officer’s car is intercepted what sensitive information may be learned and what type of impact, if any, will it have on the officer’s life. In a highly populated area, with many buildings and places to hide, attackers could easily conceal themselves while they intercepted radio signals and then broadcast the location of officers. In geographically space areas, signal intercept is less of a problem, largely because signals intercept requires line of site.

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After proper risk mitigation and procedures developed and put in place, the risks can be re-classified as follows: IT Risks to Law Enforcement Organizations

Risk

Threat

Impact

Data Breach

Data servers are vulnerable via multiple attack vectors, including unqualified employees, unsecure databases, and out of date equipment

Catastrophic (4)

Unauthorized Network Access

With such a large surface area, there are numerous opportunities for the network to be penetrated

Catastrophic

Signal Intercept

Signals over UHF or C band could be intercepted

Post Mitigation Risk Heat Map

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Probability / Likelihood Likely (2)

Possible (2)

(3) Major (4)

Unlikely (1)

Budgeting Cloud storage can be a considerable expense, especially when dealing with videos. As of 2016, vendors such as Rackspace, Amazon Web Service, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud are fairly competitive with regards to their pricing, with their storage, upload, and download fees prices similarly (Backblaze, 2016). On average, utilizing Amazon Web Services or Microsoft Azure a single petabyte of information stored for one year will cost approximately $264,000 (Backblaze, 2016). A petabyte roughly translates to 116,508 hours of HD video (Mozy, 2009). This would be enough data to store every hour of a year’s worth of eight hour shifts for 13 officers (at 8,760 hours per year worked, per trooper). To store the data for every hour of every officer’s shift for the 2,000+ commissioned officers the storage price would quickly run into the tens of millions of dollars (over $40 million, per year). Based on this data, the organization can decide how much money they want to spend or can choose to store the videos in standard definition which takes significantly less space. Additionally, the decision can be made to store the data locally on hard drives in the officer’s computer while simply streaming the data to the operations center, thus reducing the needed storage. Furthermore, they could decide to store the data on-site in an archival manner while simply streaming the data to a cloud-based service which is then overwritten after a certain amount of time. With regards to outfitting the officer’s patrol car, a Ku-band communications satellite similar to the one used in the Predator drones can be purchased for just over $2000 (The Digital Oasis, 2016). UHF and C-band antennas are very inexpensive, and are sometimes already installed on the patrol cars. Thus, it can be safely calculated that outfitting an officer’s patrol car

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would cost less than $3,000 per car. Texas DPS trooper vehicles are already outfitted with in-car video systems (Watchguard, 2006).

Conclusion  

It is clear that the technology exists for law enforcement departments to implement live video streaming from both their patrol vehicles as well as their officers. The implementation of this type of project would contribute significantly towards improving the officer’s safety and as a result would also contribute towards the safety of the citizens of Texas. While there are several concerns, both budgetary and from a security standpoint, they could be overcome with the appropriate approach and forethought. The streaming of video for law enforcement operations has never been done before, but the applications and benefits could be substantial. In a world where technology is so abundant it is unfortunate that the individuals who have tasked themselves with protecting and serving fellow citizens are often left on their own when crisis happen.

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Appendix A

 

 

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Appendix B

 

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