Nov 17, 2016 - Areas of Interest/Research. State Politics, Direct Democracy, Voting Rights & Elections. Contact Information. 2016-2017 Sabbatical Leave.
This article appears as part of a special PSOnline e-Symposium organized by guest editors J. Quin Monson and David B. Magleby of Brigham Young University. Printed abstracts appear in the July 2003 issue of PS: Political Science & Politics and complete articles and appendixes are available as part of PSOnline at www.apsanet.org/PS/.
Distorted by Outside Money: National Parties and the Race for Colorado’s Seventh Congressional District Daniel A. Smith, University of Florida1 Every general election political pundits select a handful of “tossup” congressional races they deem too close to call.2 In 2002, with Democrats seeking to narrow a slight Republican majority in the U.S. House of Representatives, Colorado’s newly carved Seventh Congressional District lived up to its competitive billing. When the polls closed on Election Day, Democrat Mike Feeley tallied 386 fewer votes than Republican Bob Beauprez. The outcome, however, would not be decided for another five weeks, as county clerks had to count over 1,900 valid provisional ballots cast in the district.3 After the provisional ballots were counted, Beauprez led his Democratic challenger by a mere 122 votes, out of more than 170,000 votes cast in the district.4 On December 10, 2002, following a mandatory recount, the Colorado Secretary of State declared Beauprez the official winner, with Beauprez topping Feeley by just 121 votes, 81,789 to 81,668.5 In this chapter I document how the Beauprez-Feeley battle was shaped by outside money. Unlike other closely fought congressional races in 2002, national interest groups largely disregarded the Seventh District, focusing their collective energy instead on Colorado’s hotly contested U.S. Senate race.6 Most of the heavy hitting in the Seventh was carried out by the Republican and Democratic national congressional campaign committees. The independent and coordinated expenditures made by the two parties – more than $3 million combined – had a nationalizing effect on the substantive issues debated by the candidates during the campaign. More importantly, the outside party money restricted the ability of the candidates to control their own campaigns. Though increasingly alarmed by the volume and vitriol of the negative television ads and direct mail produced on their behalf, both Beauprez and Feeley became increasingly beholden to the directives of their respective congressional parties as Election Day neared. While the amount of outside money in congressional campaigns is well-documented, what is less understood is the daily “coordination” that occurs between the candidates and the national parties.7 As stakeholders in the contest, the national congressional campaign committees had a powerful incentive to ensure a yield on their investments, namely that their candidate emerged victorious. In addition to the massive amount of coordinated hard as well as soft money expenditures made on behalf of the two candidates vying for Colorado’s Seventh, the two national congressional campaign committees plied the staffs of both candidates with pointed directives from their perches in Washington, D.C. Reflecting on the campaign a month after the election, Congressman-elect Beauprez deadpanned in his characteristically understated manner, “The national party swung pretty hard.”8
Inside the Seventh District The Seventh District came into existence following a decade of explosive growth in Colorado, in which the state’s population ballooned to 4.3 million.9 The boundaries of the new district did not come easily, though, as a divided state legislature – with Democrats in slight control of the Senate and Republicans in command of the House – was unable to reach an agreement on where to locate the new seat. When party leaders failed to broker a compromise on the congressional redistricting plan in the state legislature, Democrats filed a lawsuit to have the matter settled by a state district court in Denver. In December, 2001, before District Judge John W. Coughlin, attorneys for the Republican and Democratic state parties offered their competing maps. With nearly a 200,000 advantage in registered voters, Republicans figured they could add a fifth safe GOP district against the Democrat’s two.10 Democrats, on the other hand, viewed the additional seat as an opportunity for them to narrow the GOP’s two seat advantage in the state’s Congressional delegation. For his part, Judge Coughlin warned the two sides that if they could not resolve the matter amicably, he would impose his own map on them.11 On January 25, after several weeks of wrangling, Coughlin made his decision. The judge shocked Republicans and delighted Democrats when his ruling adopted an 11th-hour plan drawn up by Scott Martinez, the Colorado Democratic Party’s twenty-something redistricting guru. Keeping the existing six congressional seats relatively intact, Martinez’s plan, which he conjured up on Christmas day at his parents’ house, created a toss-up Seventh district by subtly modifying the penultimate plan offered by Republican attorneys.12 He deftly rotated counterclockwise by 90 degrees a portion of the Republican’s map, which had bracketed the heavily Republican areas on the west and east sides of Denver into the Sixth and Seventh districts, respectively. Martinez’s plan wrapped the new Seventh district around the northern, inner-ring suburbs of Denver, shifting the existing Sixth District, held by Republican Tom Tancredo, slightly south. The Democratic Party’s reconfigured map impressed Judge Coughlin as impartial and balanced. All seven congressional districts had populations of 614,466, give or take a person, and it left largely unharmed the state’s six safe congressional districts. More importantly, the map gave the two major parties equal opportunity to compete for the new-fangled Seventh District, as it had nearly equal numbers of registered Republicans (120,009), Democrats (120,119), and “Unaffiliated” voters (122,888). Democrat party leaders, though, were fully aware that the new Seventh district seemed to lean their way. Of the precincts in the three counties that would eventually comprise the Seventh, Al Gore defeated George W. Bush by slightly less than 8 percent (nearly 2,000 votes) in 2000 (though Bush easily won the state), and in the 1998 gubernatorial election, Republican Governor Bill Owens lost to Democrat Gail Schoettler by 6,200 votes.13 The peri-urban swing district encompasses densely populated chunks of Arapahoe and Jefferson Counties, along with an elongated, mostly rural swath of Adams County. The district provides the major northwest and northeast arteries in and out of Denver, and houses the Colorado School of Mines, Colorado’s Air National Guard at Buckley Air Force Base, and the University of Colorado Medical School at Fitzsimmons. Southwest of Denver, the district stretches up through Jefferson County’s older, middle-class cities of Edgewater, Lakewood, Arvada, Wheat Ridge, and Golden.14 It then expands eastward through Adams County, picking up the increasingly Hispanic communities of Commerce City and Brighton. The district encases Denver International Airport before running east through the county’s rural, sparsely populated agricultural plains. The eastern part of the district dips south to include the lower middle-class city of Aurora, located in northwest Arapahoe County. The Seventh is the state’s second most racially and ethnically diverse congressional district, behind the First District in Denver.
According to the 2000 census, minorities make up more than 31 percent of the population, including 19.6 percent Hispanics and 5.8 percent African Americans. Nearly 40 percent of the residents are renters, and one in ten constituents is 65 years of age or older.15 The Candidates and Their Campaigns The tight race surprised few local election watchers.16 The two candidates and their experienced staffs waged solid campaigns. Each man spoke passionately and articulately about the issues (though Beauprez was far more scripted than Feeley), and generally accorded the other with civility and respect during their numerous personal interactions on the campaign trail.17 Following their respective primary victories on August 13, the two camps vowed to run clean, issue-based, positive campaigns, with each candidate expressing the desire to reach voters with face-to-face contact.18 At the same time, both men were quite cognizant that the race would likely morph beyond their control, as they wearily expected party leaders in Washington would eventually call the shots if the race remained tight. Almost immediately, their fears were realized, as the race devolved into a mud-slinging battle with most of the recriminating direct mail and television ads financed by soft money flowing from the national parties. As anticipated, the new district attracted several talented candidates in the primaries. On the Republican side, the apparent frontrunner, incumbent State Treasurer Mike Coffman, chose not to contest the seat after the Democrat’s redistricting plan coincidentally skirted his Jefferson County home by a few blocks. The Republican primary nevertheless showcased four qualified men: Joe Rogers, the sitting lieutenant governor and the highest ranking elected African American in the county; Rick O’Donnell, a young policy advisor to Governor Bill Owens; businessman Sam Zakhem, a former U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain; and banker, real estate developer, and former dairy farmer, Bob Beauprez. The sitting Republican state party chairman, the 54 year old Beauprez, whose grandfather emigrated from Belgium, entered the race after receiving phone calls from White House political counselors Karl Rove and Ken Mehlman, as well as a visit by National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) chair, Rep. Tom Davis.19 As Chairman of Heritage Bank, an independent community bank, Beauprez revitalized state GOP in 1998, helping it to elect the state’s first Republican governor in 24 years. Beauprez, though, had some obstacles to overcome. Some of his primary opponents tried to pin him with a carpetbagger label, as he his wife resided north of the Seventh, the boundaries of which he had vehemently opposed when the Democrat’s gerrymandered map was adopted. He also failed to win the top line at the GOP’s May district assembly caucus, and had the perception of being a “button-down, distant” banker.20 Nevertheless, Beauprez won the hotly contested primary with 38 percent of the vote. Outspending his opponents – he aired nearly $150,000 worth of television and almost $40,000 radio ads – Beauprez was able to withstand intra-party accusations that he was conducting push-polls and authorizing his bank to run numerous radio ads replete with his folksy testimonials.21 For the Democrats, state and national party leaders, including House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt, lured Mike Feeley to run for the seat after the initial frontrunner, moderate state Senator Ed Perlmutter, declined to throw his hat into the ring. Feeley, who was term-limited in 2000, had represented his predominately Republican constituency in Jefferson County for eight years. Despite being ineligible to run for reelection, the effective legislator led the Democrat’s 2000 campaign when they wrestled control of the state Senate from the GOP for the first time in forty years. Two years earlier, Feeley lost a tough primary battle to become the party’s gubernatorial flag bearer. Upon his retirement from the state Senate in 2000, the 49 year old lawyer joined the Denver law firm Baker and Hostetler, lobbying for a range of clients, including pharmaceutical and nursing home interests. Due to Feeley’s opportunist lobbying in the private
sector combined with some overzealous support from organized labor in the months leading up to the primary, many party faithful shied away from Feeley in the primary.22 Perhaps sensing some rank-in-file opposition among core Democrats, Feeley eschewed the party’s caucus in May, choosing instead to petition his way on to the mid-August primary ballot. During the petitioning process, the former Marine knocked on close to 7,500 doors, telling one journalist, “even when I got yelled at, I had a ball.” “Feeley’s gotta shake your hand, tell you a story and flash that twinkle in his eye,” penned the scribe.23 His gambit to circumvent the party caucus and take his campaign directly to the citizens of the Seventh – along with $37,125 in television ads – paid dividends, as Feeley defeated his only primary opponent, Jefferson County District Attorney Dave Thomas, earning 56 percent of the vote.24 Following their victories in the primaries, both candidates attempted to set the agenda for the general election. During the primary, and during early days of the general election, Beauprez discussed the grave transportation and water concerns in the district, as well as how he could draw on his banking experiences and provide fiscal responsibility in Washington. He also identified himself closely with President Bush, touting the crackdown against Saddam Hussein and terrorist networks and making permanent the president’s tax cuts.25 But in the general election, the campaign quickly shifted gears, largely running a “biographical campaign.” His campaign literature and television ads featured his “life experience” as a dairy farmer and owner of a community bank, contrasting starkly Feeley’s vocation as a “professional lawyer/lobbyist” and his fiery temperament.26 For his part, Feeley initially emphasized solutions to the water, growth, and transportation problems in the district. He also talked about corporate accountability, the affordability of prescription drugs, and the inequities of Bush’s proposed tax cut. In the general election, though, he began to differentiate himself from Beauprez on the questions of abortion, Social Security, and gun control. In the end, Feeley was effective creating fear that his opponent would outlaw abortion and allow more guns on the streets, while Beauprez was able to mitigate criticisms of his neo-privatization of Social Security stance, and more significantly, keep the upper hand on the question of personal character.27 Feeley and Beauprez were not the only candidates contesting the general election. Three minor party candidates appeared on the ballot; the trio performed poorly at the polls, though Feeley lamented in retrospect that the 9,282 votes tallied between the three candidates, “was the last nail in the coffin.”28 Libertarian G.T. “Bud” Smith ran a minimal campaign. Dave Chandler, the Green Party candidate, ran a lackluster campaign, though he generated some earned media in October when the Sierra Club endorsed Feeley. The endorsement caused a momentary stir, as Chandler served on the executive committee of the Rachel Carson Group, the Sierra Club’s local affiliate in Jefferson County. The national association judged Chandler to be a nonviable candidate, which clearly peeved the loyal member of the Green party.29 The Reform Party candidate, Victor Good, was the most active of the three minor party candidates, using his last name as a campaign slogan in a handful of local newspaper ads and AM radio spots. Money: Candidates, Parties, and Interest Groups Beauprez and Feeley proved to be prodigious fundraisers, with each candidate amassing impressive campaign chests. Contrary to conventional wisdom, though, Beauprez held only a slight fundraising advantage, besting the Democrat by less than $200,000, once the candidates’ personal loans and contributions from the parties are excluded from the totals. Both candidates kick-started their primary races by lending their campaigns money. Beauprez secured three banker’s loans for a total of $380,000, while Feeley loaned his campaign $80,000 by taking out a second mortgage on his home.30 Neither candidate was particularly strapped for cash during the primary, as both Beauprez and Feeley raised more money than their primary opponents. Rather,
looking towards the general election, the two candidates borrowed money to run television ads to increase their name recognition. Interestingly, the national parties viewed the candidates’ personal antes differently: the NRCC badgered the Beauprez camp for being too profligate during the primary, while the DCCC strongly suggested that Feeley loan money to his campaign to demonstrate his seriousness about running for Congress. 31 Feeley’s personal investment into his campaign was duly acknowledged by the DCCC, as the national party, according to Feeley’s campaign manager, Erik Greathouse, made the race a “top target.”32 Just days after the primary election, the DCCC conducted an assessment – a “sniff test” – at campaign headquarters. Like “a big stockbroker looking through a portfolio,” the national party was convinced that that Feeley could win, but it nevertheless found the campaign to have “some problems” – from inadequate office equipment to poor message development. To rectify these identified shortcomings, the DCCC in mid-August assigned the veteran Greathouse to manage the campaign, effectively displacing Feeley’s campaign manager in the primary and long-time confidant, Beth Minihan. Working in tandem with the DCCC Midwest regional field director, who “spent lots of time on the ground with us,” Greathouse formulated a strategic plan for paid and earned media and detailed the timetable for weekly campaign conference calls, which included representatives from the DCCC and its direct mail and TV consultants. In the months leading up to election day, the Feeley staff drew on the DCCC’s “institutional knowledge,” as the national party sent daily briefings to the campaign and helped the candidate command a grasp of the issues going on in Washington.33 Though not directly involved, the NRCC too was keenly interested in the outcome of the GOP primary, as it clearly preferred Beauprez as the party’s nominee. While the national party made no attempt to replace Beauprez’s campaign manager, Sean Murphy – an experienced politico and loyalist who had worked previously under Beauprez at the state party – the NRCC constantly monitored the campaign.34 The party made it known to Murphy that it would be pumping into the campaign the “largest amount money to any race in country,” unless the campaign committed “a catastrophic error.” The NRCC’s intrusion clearly peeved Murphy at times, who muttered at one point how the NRCC’s “hands on approach” was “not passive” – “they crawl up our ass on a daily basis.” The NRCC’s regional field office regularly badgered the campaign staff, asking them, “What earned media did you get?” and “What’s your cash on hand.”35 In addition, virtually every day the national party would send a member of Congress or the Bush administration to the district to stump for Beauprez, including some individuals with little or no name recognition or perceived electoral value. “We haven’t turned anyone down,” Murphy lamented at one campaign event which was orchestrated by the NRCC and featured two members of the House Armed Services Committee sent to vouch for Beauprez’s support of veterans, “but there are some offers on the table where I’m like, ‘what are we going to do with this person?’”36 However, if it were not for the dogged efforts of the NRCC – which outspent the DCCC three to one – it is quite possible that Feeley would have topped Beauprez in overall campaign contributions. The NRCC took full advantage of President Bush’s popularity by summoning the Commander-in-Chief to promote Beauprez during the fall campaign. In late September, Beauprez and the state GOP split $1.5 million raised from a $1,000 per plate luncheon with the president (the campaign pocketed more than $600,000 of the total, with the balance going to the state party).37 A month later, on October 28, Air Force One cruised into Denver just long enough for Bush to hold a pep-rally for Beauprez and Allard.38 By the October 16 reporting period, Beauprez had raised $1,013,310 (including his $380,000 loan), with an impressive $542,224 cash on hand, due largely to the star appeal of Bush.39 In contrast, Feeley had only $127,389 on hand for the crucial three week push prior to Election Day. Feeley had collected a total of $808,188 in
contributions (including the $80,000 he lent his campaign), which was aided by having a string of high-profile congressional Democrats, including House Minority Leader Gephardt, House Minority Whip Nancy Pelosi, former Senator Bill Bradley, and Senator Joe Lieberman, stump for him in the district.40 Consistent with national trends, Beauprez raised more money (and a higher percentage of his overall contributions) from individuals than his Democratic challenger, with Feeley garnering a greater share of his total from political action committees (PACs).41 According to FEC reports, both candidates received the bulk of their contributions from entities within the state of Colorado. Beauprez raised roughly 65 percent ($897,655) of his contributions from individual donors; Feeley, in contrast, took in slightly more than 50 percent ($540,477) from individuals. Both candidates received substantial contributions from political action committees (PACs), with Beauprez receiving largely corporate money and Feeley garnering financial support from organized labor. Beauprez received $439,402 (32 percent of his total) in PAC contributions, which included more than $126,000 amassed from more than 40 leadership PACs, including $15,000 in contributions from House Majority Whip Tom DeLay’s Americans for a Republican Majority PAC, and $15,000 from Congressman Jerry Lewis’ Future Leaders Committee PAC.42 Feeley raised $463,396 (44 percent of his total) from PACs, with $59,000 from over 50 leadership PACs.43 [See Table 9.1] In terms of candidate expenditures, both candidates spent the bulk of their money on television ads. In the final week of the campaign, the two candidates alone spent more than $230,000 on television ads.44 Overall during the general election, Beauprez paid National Media $646,330 to air three ads on metro Denver television stations, which came on top of the $149,984 he paid the Alexandria, VA media consultants to run television ads in the primary.45 Although team-Beauprez wanted to broadcast more television spots during the final week of the campaign, the choice time slots were already filled with other political candidates, so it instead paid National Media $35,855 to air three last minute radio ads in the district.46 Except for a fundraising invitation to the September 27 luncheon with Bush, the straight-laced Republican spent no money on direct mail following the primary. For its part, the Feeley campaign paid Amour Media, based in Los Angeles, $547,142 to produce and run three television ads that was beyond the $37,142 it spent on its lone primary television ad. According to Greathouse, the Feeley campaign wanted to do radio ads and direct mail during the general election, but it “only [had] so much money for voter contact.”47 [See Tables 9.2, 9.3, & 9.4] It came as no surprise that the expenditures made by the national parties far outstripped the money spent by the two candidates on their own campaigns. According to reports filed with the FEC and inquiries with the campaigns, the NRCC spent more than $2.3 million in the Seventh, dwarfing the roughly $800,000 spent by the DCCC in coordinated expenditures. Due to a more favorable split available to Colorado state parties, both national parties had a clear financial motivation to transfer coordinated money – a fixed ratio of hard and soft dollars – to the state parties.48 On the Republican side of the ledger, the NRCC funneled nearly $2.3 million in combined hard/soft dollars into the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (CRFCC). The money was used to run television and direct mail issue ads that touted the positions of Beauprez and slammed Feeley. According to Alan Philp, the executive director of the Colorado Republican Party, the NRCC specified what to do with its coordinated money “down to the dollar.”49 With the NRCC’s contributions to the state party coming in two parts – 78 percent in soft dollars the other 22 percent in hard dollars – the CRFCC paid Strategic Media Services nearly $1.95 million to produce five televised issue ads.50 The NRCC also channeled
approximately $200,000 in hard/soft money through the CRFCC to Targeted Creative Communications (TCC) to do 14 direct mail ads.51 In terms of its pure independent expenditures, the NRCC bought one televised ad and paid direct mail consultant Arena Communications $200,000 to produce 10 issue ads.52 Finally, the NRCC contributed $38,000 (matched by the state GOP) into to the state party’s coordinated campaign; roughly $58,000 of the money was used to run a television ad by Strategic Media Services, with the remaining $18,000 pumped into one more direct mailing produced by TCC.53 Like its Republican counterpart, the DCCC used the state party as a conduit to run TV and direct mail issue ads attacking Beauprez and venerating Feeley. Unlike the NRCC, the DCCC ran no soft money issue ads independent of the Colorado Democratic Party in the Seventh. Rather, the national party exploited the generous hard/soft money ratio by transferring its federal and non-federal dollars directly to the state party’s federal campaign fund, which then paid consultants for television spots and direct mail.54 Extrapolating from FEC records and interviews with the media consultants, the DCCC channeled its hard/soft money split through the Colorado Democratic Party to pay the D.C. firm Doak, Carrier, O’Donnell and Associates $47,577 to produce five TV issue ads, and $524,127 to Denver-based Media Strategies and Research to schedule the issue ads.55 The DCCC (via the Colorado Democratic Party) also paid direct mail consultants Mammen-Pritchard $180,000 to produce seven individual pieces, which were developed in consultation with the Feeley campaign.56 The state coordinated campaign also used a mix of federal and state hard dollars to hire Armour Media to produce one late-running ad for $50,000, which was authorized by the Feeley campaign.57 Finally, the DNC (via the state party) paid the D.C.-based Strategy Group $38,000 to produce three narrowly targeted pieces (one to active seniors, one to active young Republican women, and one to active Latinos) that were mailed out only days before the election.58 In contrast to some other states, special interest groups never became heavily involved in the Seventh. Rather, national organizations concentrated the bulk of their attention on the U.S. Senate race between Allard and Strickland. Indeed, special interests ran no television ads and only two ran radio spots featuring candidates running in the Seventh.59 One interest group, National Right to Life Coalition, bought radio time, and Heritage Bank, owned by Beauprez, ran radio spots during the primary and general elections featuring Beauprez and highlighting the importance of a community bank.60 A handful of groups, most notably three 527 organizations fronting for the pharmaceutical industry, sent out direct mail.61 Other interest groups, including the National Rifle Association, the Colorado AFL-CIO, and the Sierra Club, mailed literature to their members advocating the election of a candidate. While the amount spent on issue ads and membership outreach by interest groups is not required to be disclosed, it is likely that less than $100,000 was spent in the Seventh by outside groups. The Effects of Money: Ground War Waging an effective ground war is crucial to electoral success in Colorado. During the 1990s, campaigns became increasingly front-loaded. State legislation authorized county clerks to mail absentee ballot request forms to registered voters and open early voting centers (from October 21 to November 1) in an effort to trim lines on Election Day.62 Both candidates and their state parties appreciated the magnitude, as well as the possible efficiency, of contacting their core supporters to vote well before the November election.63 As expected, the early voting phenomenon was especially pronounced in Jefferson County, with roughly half of those who voted doing so with absentee ballots or at early voting stations.64 Public opinion polls, including the third-wave of the CSED Election Study, found that over 50 percent of Republicans and Democrats who said they voted did so by casting absentee ballots or voting early.65 Overall, early
voting may have slightly benefited Beauprez, as surveys indicated that registered Republicans were more inclined to vote early than Democrats.66 After the election, Feeley conceded that Beauprez and the state GOP did “a terrific job” motivating supporters to vote early and by mail, which put Feeley in “a rather shallow hole that we couldn’t climb out of.”67 With public opinion polls showing the race to be a dead heat, and the partisan breakdown of registered voters in the district so even, both campaigns paid great attention on turning out their base. The strategy of turning out the party’s “lazy” registered voters was further amplified by the fact that nearly a third of the district’s eligible voters were still undecided in late October. As Denver pollster Floyd Ciruli correctly anticipated, “there will be a tough ground campaign to get the votes out – walking, literature,” as “turnout will be a very big thing.” Alan Philp, the Executive Director of the State Republican Party, concurred, saying, “This is the type of race that is decided household by household.” 68 For the most part, the state parties supplied the labor, with the national parties paying for the direct mail and GOTV efforts. In terms of direct mail, the NRCC hired Arena Communications to produce 10 hardhitting, issue ads, half of which slammed Feeley and made no mention of Beauprez.69 Postelection, Beauprez’s campaign manager conceded the ads were “pure, harsh, hate.”70 The NRCC, in concert with the state party, also financed 15 targeted direct mail pieces. Although the Beauprez camp did none of its own direct mail in the general election, the staff pre-approved each coordinated NRCC/state party mailing, including (albeit belatedly) a highly controversial piece produced by TCC that featured side-by-side photographs of a cigar-chomping lobbyist and a rabid dog. The oversized postcard inveighed, “what happens when you cross this [cigarchomping lobbyist] with this [rabid dog]?” and answered, “You get Mike Feeley. And he wants to be your congressman?” The tagline read: “He’s just out for himself. He’s everything wrong with politics today.”71 The “rabid dog” mailing was clearly the nastiest mail piece of the campaign, but only by a matter of degrees. Feeley was so enraged by the piece he sent a copy to his opponent’s home with a curt note inquiring if Beauprez had seen the negative ad. “The Republican Party was pretty shameless,” Feeley complained to one reporter during the prolonged counting of the provisional ballots. “The distortion, the volume – that really wasn’t attributable to Bob – was relentless.72 As Election Day neared, the two camps did their best to make the caustic nature of the campaign an issue, though both were prone to hyperbole in their characterizations. Feeley spokesman Matt Moseley claimed, “We believe that Bob Beauprez has run the most negative and destructive campaign in Colorado history with his ads attacking Mike Feeley’s character,” with the street-smart Feeley adding, “You can only sit back and let people smack you in the belly so many times….You don’t go to a gun fight and bring a knife.” Beauprez admitted in private that he was personally very concerned about the negative tone of the campaign, but he defended the NRCC’s calculated campaign of character assignation, saying, “He [Feeley] said he would do what he had to [as a lobbyist] and take a shower the morning after.73 Beauprez’s campaign manager, Sean Murphy, occasionally chastised Feeley, saying, “His M.O. involves lies and fear. He tries to scare the elderly. He tries to scare parents. He tries to scare the most vulnerable in our society with outright lies.”74 Dan Hazelwood of TCC, the creator of some of the dirtiest direct mail pieces that lambasted Feeley, found it absurd “for [Feeley] to take umbrage over anything” after “how thuggish he’s been” as a state legislator and a lobbyist. Hazelwood euphemistically admitted that his contrast ads, “were fairly negative of Feeley.” Internal polling by the GOP suggested that the campaign in the Seventh could not come close to reaching the viciousness of the U.S. Senate race, so the campaign saw no reason to limit its negative ads. “We could have put a flame-thrower in his [Feeley’s] ear,” Hazelwood confided, “and we almost did!”75
For its part, the DCCC financed no independent expenditure or soft money direct mail issue ads, and spent less than half that of its Republican counterpart in coordinated direct mail efforts with the Colorado Democratic Party. The DCCC, routing its hard/soft money split through the state party (to allow coordination with Feeley) contracted with Mammen-Pritchard to develop seven glossy direct mail pieces, three of which assailed Beauprez for his stances on guns, abortion, and corporate corruption. One piece featured the same cigar smoking lobbyist used by Hazelwood in his infamous rabid dog piece. Another employed a grinning snapshot of Beauprez in corporate attire with a match torching a copy of the Constitution, and the tagline, “Bob Beauprez Wants to Ban All Abortion – EVEN in Cases of Rape and Incest,” and “wants to overturn Roe v. Wade.”76 GOTV efforts in the Seventh fell under the umbrellas of the state parties and bolstered by soft money transferred from the national parties. The Beauprez campaign participated directly in the state party’s GOTV coordinated campaign – its new 96-Hour plan (outlasting by a day the RNC’s 72-Hour STOMP program) – which was for all intents and purposes was run out of Governor Owens’ campaign headquarters. (The Owens campaign had cash to burn, raking in more than $6 million in its effortless reelection bid.) The Republican Party’s GOTV effort aggressively reached out to Latinos for the first time in Colorado.77 Aided by a $250,000 soft money contribution from the RNC, the state party’s 96-Hour program recruited “volunteers,” paying them $200 for their efforts, including 114 Oral Roberts University students bussed in from Oklahoma.78 The students were seen talking on cell phones provided by the party and driving cars courtesy of a John Elway dealership.79 The NRCC also paid $14,559 in hard money to Phoenix-based Feather, Larson, and Synhorst to run a late surge of “robo-calls” strafing Feeley’ legislative and lobbying record.80 The Colorado Democratic Party’s ran its traditional “96 Day Campaign” in an effort to once again turn out its base. The state party’s coordinated campaign, with upwards of 80 paid staff, mobilized over 5,000 volunteers statewide on Election Day, including more than 1,000 union members. Although it fell short of its $3 million goal, the state party, flush with hard/soft dollars contributed by the national parties, paid for generic absentee ballot request forms and mailings, GOTV literature, and phone banks that implored “lazy Dems” to get to the polls.81 The party also expanded its Hispanic voter outreach, which included running Spanish language radio and TV spots aimed at “lazy Democratic Latinos.”82 The Democratic Party’s coordinated campaign ran a “pay to play” system, whereby candidates, the national parties, interest groups, and even proponents and opponents of ballot measures had to “buy in” in order to participate.83 The DCCC sponsored Feeley’s $25,000 “buy-in” to participate in the party’s GOTV efforts.84 Shying away from the expensive Denver television market, interest groups tended to concentrate their electioneering efforts on the ground war, but not nearly to the degree that many observers had expected. Targeting Republican likely voters, unaffiliated women, and especially seniors, several conservative groups sent oversized postcards highlighting issues that were at the heart of the campaign. The National Right to Life Committee mailed a small express advocacy postcard that placed a red heart next to Beauprez’s staunch pro-life position. In addition to holding a political rally in Aurora featuring Charlton Heston in late October, the National Rifle Association sent its members four express advocacy mailings (with a bumper sticker in one) to its Colorado members expressly advocating the election of Beauprez for his defense of the Second Amendment and noting Feeley’s “F” rating for “his anti-gun voting record and support by a national gun ban group.”85 While the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), the Chamber of Commerce, and BIPAC all endorsed Beauprez, any electioneering activities they conducted fell well below the radar screen. The Colorado Christian Coalition was also a nonfactor, producing 385,000 candidate slate cards and distributing them to evangelical churches, but
doing no mailings beyond its members.86 The Arapahoe Republican Men’s Club urged support for Beauprez in addition to other Republican candidates with a slate door hanger. More significantly, three sister 527 organizations – each known shills for the pharmaceutical industry – used direct mail to counter Feeley’s effort to pin down Beauprez’s neoprivatization stance on Social Security and ambiguous plan to rein in skyrocketing costs of prescription drugs. The Seniors Coalition, America 21, and the 60 Plus Association collectively inundated older Republican and independent voters’ homes with their oversized issue ad postcards. None of the four pieces mentioned Feeley. Rather, in a clear indication that the groups were not coordinating their efforts with the Republican candidate, but were working in concert, they each praised “Beuprez” (misspelling his name) for his work on behalf of seniors, with the 60 Plus Association even giving the Republican an “Honorary Guardian of Seniors Award.” With military service a latent issue during the campaign,87 America 21, in a piece filled with images of WWII servicemen, praised “Beuprez’s [sic] Commitment to Seniors,” and willingness to “stand up for the Greatest Generation” and his pledge to “strengthen Social Security” and “improve Medicare and provide a real prescription drug benefit.” National interest groups on the left were not nearly as active on the ground as conservative groups. No outside interest group, besides organized labor and its GOTV efforts, surfaced to counter the conservative mailings on the key issues in the race, especially ones targeting seniors. The state AFL-CIO made personal contacts door-to-door, over the phone, via e-mail, and was a major player in the Democratic Party’s coordinated GOTV campaign, but the national AFL-CIO only ran one television ad in Colorado, which supported Strickland. The Colorado Education Association sent out a couple mailings to its members, one aimed at teachers and the other targeting non-teachers. The Sierra Club’s lone involvement in the race was a Feeley-Beauprez environmental scorecard mailed to its members. The group maintained a low profile (as did the League of Conservation Voters), perhaps sensing that its endorsement of Feeley over Chandler, the Green Party candidate, was turning environmentalists away from the Democratic candidate.88 Finally, while it endorsed Feeley, NARAL did no mailings on behalf of Feeley, focusing its resources instead on the U.S. Senate race and generic pro-choice rallies.89 On the periphery, credit unions entered the fray on Feeley’s behalf, mailing postcards to their members. The Jefferson County Schools Credit Union, the credit union for the state’s largest school district, sent a mailing to voters stating that, “If Credit Unions Don’t Vote, Credit Unions Don’t Count.” While making no mention of his banker opponent, the postcard underscored Feeley’s legislative support for Colorado’s credit unions and included photos and quotes from Feeley at a credit union. Conversely, literature from the Public Service Credit Union emphasized Beauprez’s opposition to credit unions and his bank background. A mailing by America’s Credit Unions made a frontal assault on Beauprez and the banking industry’s opposition to credit unions. The involvement by credit unions was clearly an attempt to mitigate the Heritage Bank radio ads, as well as Beauprez’s role as past Chairman of the Independent Bankers of Colorado.90 The Effects of Money: Air War Despite upwards of $4 million pumped into television ad buys for the Beauprez-Feeley contest, the ads were often drowned out in metro Denver, as the airwaves were chock full with spots for other campaigns and ballot measures. An overwhelming number of ads were dedicated to the U.S. Senate mêlée, Governor Owens’ and Attorney General Ken Salazar’s pacific reelection bids, and the particularly dyspeptic “No on 31” campaign against the elimination of bilingual education. The barrage of negative ads on the airwaves clearly turned off voters and
likely contributed to lower-than-expected statewide turnout.91 The CSED post-election survey revealed that 70 percent of respondents thought the race for the Seventh was “more” negative “compared to other recent political contests,” with 77 percent of respondents saying they “stopped paying attention” to the daily campaign ads.92 The viciousness of the air war, however, was clearly not attributable to special interests trying to influence the outcome in the Seventh District, as they ran no television spots mentioning either candidate. While many party insiders anticipated that outside interests – labor unions, abortion rights, and environmental groups backing Feeley, and the NRA, pro-life, and pharmaceutical companies supporting Beauprez – would storm the airwaves with negative ads, it never happened. The only televised broadcasts by an outside group targeting voters in the district were paid for by the Council for Better Government, a 527 political organization. The secretive operation, run by John Altevogt of Edwardsville, Kansas, spent $33,200 to run two dozen noncandidate specific ads targeting Latinos and blacks and encouraging them to support the GOP. All of the ads were aired on two Spanish-language stations in Denver; a few of the ads were broadcast in English.93 The preponderance of money spent on television ads, though, originated from the national parties (spending more than $2.5 million), with most of it redirected through their state party organs. The DCCC spent $621,704 to run six issue ads aiding Feeley and hammering Beauprez. The NRCC more than tripled the amount of its Democratic foe, spending $1.945 million on six issue ads to trash Feeley and lionize Beauprez. Although some of the ads were called slanderous by the candidates, no TV ads were taken off the air by television stations.94 The TV ad buys by the two candidates paled in comparison: Beauprez bought three general election TV ads for $646,330, and Feeley placed four in the general election for $547,142. As Feeley noted ruefully in mid-September, “I think we’re getting a godawful amount of television.”95 Half of the six issue ads underwritten by the NRCC and the state party that were produced by Strategic Media Services were pure attack ads. While the party ran some positive ads beginning in mid-September, the ads took a decisively negative turn by the beginning of October. The GOP’s most spiteful TV ad opened with a black background and a spray of question marks dotting the screen. A grainy silhouette emerged, as the narrator asks, “What kind of person works for a group that wants to force people to pay rent in a nursing home up to 90 days after they die?” A besotted face of Feeley gradually emerges, with the narrator blasting him for lobbying on behalf of pharmaceutical companies and nursing homes. The 30-second attack closes by asking viewers to “call Mike Feeley” and ask, “What kind of person are you?” Another of the NRCC’s six issue ads, which began running in early October, slammed “lobbyist Mike Feeley” for pushing for a bill backed by “a powerful drug industry group” that would have made “medicine by mail more expensive” and hurt elderly “who have to choose between food and medicine.”96 The spot was a clear indication that the GOP wanted to neutralize any outreach to seniors by the Democrats. The half dozen spots paid for by the DCCC (coordinated with the state party) were nearly all negative, assailing Beauprez’s “extreme views” on abortion and gun control. Feeley’s internal polling found that both issues provided the Democrat with traction among Republican women and unaffiliated voters in the district.97 Two of the party’s six ads – both produced by Doak, Carrier, and O’Donnell and placed by Media Strategies and Research – harshly criticized Beauprez’s unequivocal pro-life stance. DCCC money also helped fund Feeley’s most ruthless assault on Beauprez, an ad produced by Armour Media entitled “Protect.”98 Featuring a clean-cut Beauprez, the ad accused the Republican of opposing a ban on so-called “cop-killer” bullets and broader controls on guns. The coordinated ad, which was authorized by the Feeley campaign,
began running on October 29. Feeley “unveiled” the ad at the state Capitol, accompanied by Rep. Bob Menendez of New Jersey, the vice chairman of the House Democratic Caucus, and several other gun control activists and police officers.99 Of Beauprez’s three broadcast ads, his last – which ran the final week of the campaign – was perhaps the most effective. Entitled “That Smell,” the ad was a ray of hope in the increasingly dark campaign, the first positive ad of the campaign to air in over a month. In the testimonial, Beauprez – dressed in a tailored, blue oxford shirt – addressed the camera directly and spoke in his deliberate, plain-spoken manner. He lamented how a lot of negative things were being said about him lately, and how, as a former dairy farmer, he recognized the smell. The ad closed with Beauprez asking for the support of voters. Produced by National Media, the footage was actually shot in early September in Denver’s City Park. At that time, the Beauprez camp was accentuating to the public how it hoped to wage a clean campaign, eschewing negative attacks against Feeley. Clearly, though, Beauprez’s staff (and the film crew that was also shooting footage for the NRCC that day), had the clairvoyance to anticipate how bitter the campaign would become in the coming months. The Feeley campaign was absolutely “flabbergasted” the “That Smell” spot, after Beauprez had run a “character assassination” campaign, as Greathouse referred to it following the election.100 In response to Beauprez’s uplifting finale, Feeley dearly wanted run a positive ad of his own during the last week of the campaign. But the candidate was short on cash. His staff opted instead to keep airing its uncompromising pro-choice comparison.101 In a post-election interview following the election, Beauprez said he thought his last minute positive TV ad might have put him over the top: “I think that resonated with people, I think that they wanted to hear from the candidate and not third parties.”102 In contrast to television, radio was little utilized by the candidates. The parties did not use the medium at all, and it was used only marginally by a couple of interest groups. Beauprez ran three radio ads on Clear Channel stations, including Colorado’s most listened to AM station, KOA 850, during the last two weeks of the campaign. Beauprez’s final ad tied into the NRCC’s television attack ad that harshly criticized Feeley for lobbying on behalf of nursing home operators and against the elderly. According to Beauprez’s campaign manager, the team “knew [the race] was going to be close,” and although they had the money, they were unable to buy any more air time on television.103 Conclusion If the U.S. Supreme Court upholds the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), affirming bans on soft money contributions to the national parties and the timing of issue ads advocating the indirect support or defeat of federal candidates, this may be the last election cycle where national parties hold greater sway over congressional candidates than special interests. Certainly, it will not be the last House race saturated with negative ads, especially those sent through the mail. Special interests – under the guise of 527 political organizations, not-for-profit corporations, and extra-party (but tacitly linked) groups – will likely become the new conduit of choice for those entities with seemingly limitless financial contributions to influence elections. This chapter highlights the difficulty for congressional candidates to run their own campaigns in the waning days of pre-BCRA electioneering reforms. The race for Colorado’s razor-close, delicately reapportioned Seventh District, exhibits how Washington party insiders are able to exert tremendous pressure on congressional candidates because of their elixir of soft and hard money. Both the Beauprez and Feeley campaigns were financed, albeit indirectly, by their
respective national parties. But the money came with strings attached. The staggering amount of outside money supplied by the NRCC and the DCCC was accompanied by their tightly orchestrated plans. The parties’ external influence had the effect of distorting the issues the two candidates had initially touted, and more worrisome, furthered the widening disconnect between constituents residing in the district and the candidates who tirelessly campaigned to represent them. Time will only tell if the nationalization of congressional campaigns will lessen under the latest iteration of federal campaign finance reforms.
Table 9.1 Candidate Receipts and Expenditures 2001–2002 Mike Feeley (D) - CO 7 Contributions from PACs Contributions from Individuals Contributions from Party Contributions/loans from the Candidate Other Contributions Total Receipts Total Expenditures Cash on hand as of 11/25/2002
Bob Beauprez (R) - CO 7 $463,396 $540,477 $15,700 $56,000 $82,799 $1,158,372 $1,135,632 $22,739
Contributions from PACs Contributions from Individuals Contributions from Party Contributions/loans from the Candidate Other Contributions Total Receipts Total Expenditures Cash on hand as of 12/05/2002
Source: “2001-02 U.S. House and US Senate Candidate Info,” FECInfo, 25 November 2002. At , 13 January 2003.
$439,402 $897,655 $54,320 $380,000 $303 $1,771,680 $1,664,440 $107,238
Table 9.2 The Air War: Most Active Organizations Collected Ad Buy Data in the Colorado 7th Congressional District Race Democratic Allies Type
Candidates Political Parties
Organization Feeley for Congress
TV $547,142
Radio -
Total $ Spent $547,142
CMAG TV $737,406
DCCC / Colorado Democratic Party
$621,704
-
$621,704
$1,128,908
TV $646,330
Radio $35,855
Total $ Spent $682,185
CMAG TV $976,174
$1,945,981
-
$1,945,981
$1,128,854
$58,000
-
$58,000
$463,236
$33,200 $0
-
$33,200 -
-
$0
-
-
-
Republican Allies Type
Candidates Political Parties
Interest Groups
Organization Bob Beauprez for Congress NRCC / Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee NRCC / Republican State Central Committee of Colorado Council for Better Government National Right to Life
Nonpartisan Interest Groups
Heritage Bank
SOURCE: Data compiled from the Election Advocacy database and CMAG data. • Please see Appendix B for a more detailed data explanation. • Regarding Democratic and Republican Allies, certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. • The ad buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data due to the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House or Senatorial candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House or Senate races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. • The ‘ – ‘ for an organization only reflects the absence of collected data, and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium. • Due to the sheer volume of television and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. • This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with Table 9.3.
Table 9.3 The Ground War and Unique Ads: Most Active Organizations Observed Activity in the Colorado 7th Congressional District Race Democratic Allies Type
Organization
Candidates
Feeley for Congress
Political Parties
DCCC/CO Democratic Party DNC/CO Democratic Party
Interest Groups
Colorado AFL-CIO CO Education Assn Alliance for Retired Americansb America’s Credit Unions GLBT Majority Vote Project Jeffco Schools Credit Union Members of the Romer Family Planned Parenthoodc Public Service Credit Union Rocky Mountain Chapter of the Sierra Club Sierra Club
Email
Mail
News
Person
Phone
Radio
TV
5
1
-
2
2
-
4
Total Unique Ads 14
-
7
-
2
-
1a
6
16
-
3
-
-
-
-
-
3
2 -
1 2
-
1 -
1 -
-
-
5 2
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
1d
-
-
1
Email
Mail
News
Person
Phone
Radio
TV
Total Unique Ads
5
3
-
3
-
3
3
17
-
15
-
1
-
-
5
21
-
10
-
-
2
-
1
13
-
2
-
-
-
-
4
6
Republican Allies Type
Organization
Candidates
Bob Beauprez for Congress
Political Parties
NRCC/CO Republican Federal Campaign Committee NRCC NRCC/Republican State Central Committee of CO CO State/Federal Victory 2002 Local Republican Parties RNC
-
1
-
2
-
-
-
3
-
2 -
-
1e
-
-
-
2 1
Council for Better Govt NRA 60 Plus Association National Right to Life Heritage Bank
-
4 2 1 -
-
-
-
1f 2 2
24 -
24 4 3 3 2
Interest Groups
Unknown Organization America 21 Arapahoe Republican Men's Club and Aurora Republican Forum Christian Coalition NFIB The Seniors Coalition US Chamber of Commerceg
-
1
-
-
2 -
-
-
2 1
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
1
-
1 1
-
1 -
-
-
-
1 1 1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
Email
Mail
News
Person
Phone
Radio
TV
Total Unique Ads
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
1
Other Party Allies Type
Organization
Candidates
Victor Good for Congress Committee
SOURCE: Data compiled from the Election Advocacy database. a Mike Matthews, DCCC Political Director, interview by David B. Magleby and Nicole Carlisle, Washington, D.C., 12 November 2002. b Unspecified race involvement. Ed Coyle, Alliance for Retired Americans Executive Director, telephone interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, 20 December 2002. c Unspecified race involvement. David Williams, Planned Parenthood Director of Action Fund and PAC, interview by David B. Magleby and Nicole Carlisle, Washington, D.C., 8 November 2002. d Margaret Conway, Sierra Club National Political Director, telephone interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, 16 December 2002. e Marc Racicot, RNC Chairman, interview by David B. Magleby, Washington, D.C., 6 December 2002. f Jim Martin, 60 Plus Association President, interview by Quin Monson and Jonathan Tanner, Washington, D.C., 11 December 2002. g Unspecified race involvement. Bill Miller, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Political Director, interview by David B. Magleby and Quin Monson, Washington, D.C., 7 November 2002. • Please see Appendix B for a more detailed data explanation. • Data represent the number of unique pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. • Regarding Democratic and Republican Allies, certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was anti- or proconservative or liberal. • This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with Table 9.2.
18
Table 9.4 Direct Mail: Ground War Expenditures in the Colorado 7th Congressional District Race Democratic Allies Type
Political Parties
Organization DCCC / Colorado Democratic Party DNC / Colorado Democratic Party
Direct Mail $180,000 $38,000
Republican Allies Type
Political Parties
Organization NRCC / Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee NRCC NRCC / Republican State Central Committee of Colorado
Direct Mail $200,000 $200,000 $18,000
Source: FEC. • Please see Appendix B for a more detailed data explanation. • This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with Table 9.3.
19 Notes 1
Research for this project was conducted while I was an Associate Professor at the University of Denver. I would like to thank my former student and past collaborator at DU, Joseph Lubinski, for his excellent data collection/entry and research assistance. Andy Busch, my colleague at DU who was working on a related Pew Charitable Trusts project, was an invaluable resource, as we were able to develop a comprehensive reconnaissance network in the Seventh District to collect campaign materials. Former DU students Josh Brodbeck and Kevin Opp, political operatives of different stripes, kept me abreast of the latest campaign developments. I also greatly appreciate the help of Helene Orr, Shena Arellano, Jesse Lucido, Stephanie Roach, and Sam Tatevosyan from the Department of Political Science at DU, who graciously took on several thankless administrative tasks. Finally, both candidates and their campaign staffs were extremely generous with their time, as were the numerous consultants that I interviewed after the election. 2 Congressional Quarterly classified the race as “no clear favorite.” “CQ’s House Race Ranking Update,” CQ Daily Monitor, 15 July 2002, 22. The Cook Political Report called the race a “toss-up.” See Adam Clymer, “G.O.P. Is Seen Ahead by Nose in House Races,” New York Times, 27 September 2002, A21. In late October, Stuart Rothenberg predicted that the race was “tilting” in Democrat Mike Feeley’s favor. Earlier, he had the race favoring Republican Bob Beauprez as well as a “toss-up.” Peggy Lowe, “House Speaker Praises Beauprez,” Rocky Mountain News, 31October 2002, A28. Larry Sabato’s “crystal ball” evidently cracked, as his predictions flip-flopped several times. Sabato first called the race Beauprez’s to lose, later saw it “fluid,” and finally predicted that the seat would go to Feeley. Peggy Lowe, “Feeley Closes Gap Against Beauprez,” Rocky Mountain News, 30 October 2002, A20. 3 In accordance with a 2002 Colorado statute, citizens whose names were not on the official registration rolls at polling stations were permitted to cast provisional ballots. Arthur Kane, “7th Still Undecided,” Denver Post, 7 November 2002, A1; Michele Ames, “Lawyers Get Set for Fight Over Ballots,” Rocky Mountain News, 8 November 2002, A23. 4 When the provisional ballots were finally tallied on November 21, Beauprez picked up 36 more votes in Jefferson County, while Feeley added 161 more votes in Adams County and 140 votes in Arapahoe County, making the difference 122 votes: 81,520 to 81,408. Susan Greene and Ryan Morgan, “Beauprez Wins 7th District: 122-Vote Victory Margin Forces a Recount,” Denver Post, 22 November 2002, A1. During the extended wait for the count of the provisional ballots (which included a successful lawsuit filed by Feeley in state district court to require the Secretary of State to instruct the three county clerks to apply uniform standards in reviewing the validity of the ballots), both candidates were invited to Washington, D.C. by their respective party caucuses for new member orientations. M.E. Sprengelmeyer, “Capitol Hill’s Odd Couple May Deserve an Oscar,” Rocky Mountain News, 13 November 2002, A4. 5 The margin of victory in the congressional race was the second closest in Colorado history. In 1952, Democrat Wayne Aspinall defeated Republican Howard Schults by 29 votes. While the automatic recount did not alter the outcome, there was a potentially debacle, as 535 uncounted ballots were discovered in three voting machines in Jefferson County. Feeley narrowly won the uncounted votes, 258 to 257. Peggy Lowe, “Beauprez Takes 7th,” Rocky Mountain News, 11 December 2002, A5. 6 Wayne Allard’s defeat of Tom Strickland was a rematch of the 1996 election, when Allard won the open seat. The pivotal race helped determine which party would control U.S. Senate. While the race for the newly created Seventh District received by far the most media attention of any of Colorado’s seven congressional races, the Beauprez-Feeley contest was nevertheless greatly conditioned by the U.S. Senate race. In some respect, the campaign waged in the Seventh was downright pleasant compared to the AllardStrickland battle, the most expensive candidate race in Colorado’s history. 7 See David B. Magleby, ed., The Other Campaign: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Congressional Elections (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); David B. Magleby, ed., Financing the 2000 Elections (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002). 8 Michael Janofsky, “Colorado Awaits Result of Electoral Photo Finish,” New York Times, 4 December 2002, A20. 9 The state’s population rose from 3.3 million in 1990 to 4.3 million in 2000. Only the state populations of Nevada (66 percent) and Arizona (40 percent) grew faster than Colorado’s (31 percent) during the 1990s. U.S. Census Bureau, “Ranking Tables for States,” Washington, D.C., 2002. At , 2 September 2002.
20
10
In mid October, Colorado had 1,046,967 registered Republicans, 863,405 registered Democrats, and 939,984 registered unaffiliated voters. Between 1996 and 2002, the state registered 640,670 new voters. Ryan Morgan, “Voter Tallies Inspire GOP,” Denver Post, 18 October 2002, A16; Susan Greene, “Close Races Come Down to the ‘Burbs,’” Denver Post, 22 October 2002, A1. 11 Marlys Duran and Robert Sanchez, “New District Draws Plaudits,” Rocky Mountain News, 26 January 2002, B3. At one point, Judge Coughlin threatened to learn how to use the computer software and draw the districts himself. Scott Martinez, Colorado Democratic Party, Field Organizer, interview by Daniel Smith, Denver, CO, 7 November 2002. 12 Martinez, interview. 13 National Journal Tip Sheet, June 4, 2002; The Cook Report Outlook, February 25, 2002. Interestingly, Feeley’s own polling firm, Harstad Strategic Research, found the new district leaned slightly Republican in terms of likely voters – those registered voters who had cast ballots in the 1998 primary and general elections, or who voted in the 2000 general and 1999 or 2001 off-year general elections. Chris Keating, Harstad Strategic Research, Research Director, interview by Daniel Smith, Denver, 13 November 2002. 14 Candidates running for statewide office tend to concentrate their efforts on Jefferson County, situated due west of the City and County of Denver. With its 355,859 voters, “Jeffco” has become “the holy grail of Colorado politics.” Greene, “Close Races Come Down to the ‘Burbs,” A1. Nearly two-thirds of Jeffco’s registered voters live in the Seventh District. 15 Burt Hubbard, “New 7th District is Middle-class,” Rocky Mountain News, 26 January 2002, B3. 16 See Floyd Ciruli, “Close Races were Challenge to Polling,” Denver Post, 24 November 2002, E1. 17 Both men remained cordial during their odd visit to D.C. “This was certainly a spirited campaign,” Beauprez remarked, “but we always maintained a very good personal relationship and separated the business from the personal rapport we were fortunate to establish very early on.” “We’ve gotten along on a personal level since the beginning of the campaign,” Feeley concurred. “Both of us are continuing that.” Sprengelmeyer, “Capitol Hill’s Odd Couple May Deserve an Oscar,” A4. 18 Erik Greathouse, Feeley Campaign, Campaign Manager, interview by Daniel Smith, Lakewood, CO, 9 September 2002; Sean Murphy, Beauprez Campaign, Campaign Manager, interview by Daniel Smith, Aurora, CO, 12 October 2002. See also, Judith Crosson, “A Tough but Civilized House Fight in Colorado,” Reuters, 15 October 2002. At , 17 October 2002. 19 Julia Martinez, “Feeley, Beauprez for the 7th,” Denver Post, 14 August 2002, A1. 20 Lowe, “House Speaker Praises Beauprez,” A28. 21 Feeley also accused Beauprez of conducting push-polls in the general election, though it was likely phone calls paid for by the NRCC. Peggy Lowe, “GOP Hopeful Blasted; ‘Push Poll’ Claimed,” Rocky Mountain News, 25 September 2002, A28. 22 Tyler Chafee, Political Director, Colorado AFL-CIO, interview by Daniel Smith, Denver, 7 November 2002. Ellen Golombek, the President of the Colorado AFL-CIO, spoke passionately for Feeley in February at the Jefferson County Democratic Party’s Jackson Dinner. According to Chafee, it “was not a question” that labor would support Feeley: “we would be lucky if Feeley won.” On March 5, labor’s COPE Executive Committee voted to endorse Feeley. 23 Bob Ewegen, “Where Politics is Clean and Fun,” Denver Post, 7 September 2002, B23. 24 Martinez, “Feeley, Beauprez for the 7th,” A1. Primary television ad totals derived from the candidates’ ad buy sheets on file with metro Denver TV stations. 25 As Erik Greathouse, Feeley’s campaign manager, accurately predicted in early September that “Beauprez will try to get as close to the President as possible.” Greathouse, interview. 26 Sean Murphy, Beauprez Campaign, Campaign Manager, phone interview with Daniel Smith, December 5, 2002. 27 Surprisingly, Beauprez was personally criticized on the character issue much more harshly by his fellow Republicans during the primary than by Feeley during the general election. O’Donnell, Beauprez’s leading contender in the GOP primary, complained that Beauprez “has little grass-roots support, so he is trying to buy this seat,” adding, “Voters are looking for something different than a banker-developer from Boulder who thinks he can just move in and buy his way into public office….A congressional seat shouldn’t be just another deal to close.” Bill Scanlon, “Funding Feud in District 7,” Rocky Mountain News, 5 August 2002, A14. 28 Janofsky, “Colorado Awaits Result of Electoral Photo Finish,” A20. 29 Peggy Lowe, “Sierra Club Irks Activist,” Rocky Mountain News, 3 October 2002, A28.
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By December, Feeley for Congress had repaid Feeley a portion of the loan. The NRCC was “upset with Bob’s tight fight” in the primary, and chided Murphy that he didn’t have to win with 60 percent of the vote. The NRCC kept on asking him, “Why are you spending so much money?” and that the campaign needed to ‘manage your margin of victory.’” The NRCC clearly “didn’t realize how tight a race it was.” Murphy, interview; Erik Greathouse, Feeley Campaign, Campaign Manager, phone interview by Daniel Smith, 3 December 2002. 32 Greathouse, interview. 33 Matt Mosley, Feeley Campaign, Communications Director, phone interview by Daniel Smith, 13 November 2002. 34 In 1996, Murphy ran Rep. Bob Schaffer’s successful campaign in Colorado’s Fourth District; two years later, he managed Bob Greenlee unsuccessful bid to win Colorado’s Second district, losing to Mark Udall in an open seat. Murphy then served as Executive Director of the State Republican Party under Beauprez. 35 Murphy, interview. 36 Ibid. 37 Murphy, phone interview. Some of the tickets for the Bush event sold for far less than the advertised $1,000. Lynn Bartels, “$1,000 Tickets to GOP Fund-raiser Sold at a Discount to Some Guests,” Rocky Mountain News, 28 September 2002, A8. Countering the Bush luncheon, the Anti-Defamation League held a candidate’s forum featuring corned beef and tuna fish deli sandwiches at the East Side Kosher Deli. “Let Them Eat Tuna,” Rocky Mountain News, 27 September 2002, A28. 38 Karen Hughes, Bush’s former presidential advisor, also flew into Denver to hold a “100-a-ticket” rally for Beauprez. Arthur Kane, “Bush Adviser Rallies for Beauprez,” Denver Post, 23 October 2002, B2. 39 Federal Elections Commission, “Form F3A - period 07/25/2002-09/30/2002, filed 10/15/2002 - OCT Quarterly,” Bob Beauprez for Congress Committee. At , 11 December 2002. See also, Ryan Morgan, “House Races Join Millionaire’s Club,” Denver Post, 16 October 2002, B2. 40 Federal Elections Commission, “Form F3A - period 07/25/2002-09/30/2002, filed 10/15/2002 - OCT Quarterly,” Feeley for Congress. At , 11 December 2002. See also, Trent Seibert, “Stars to Come out in Colorado,” Denver Post, 20 September 2002, A14. 41 One of the reasons Feeley was strapped for cash during the waning weeks of the campaign, according to Greathouse, was that campaign did a poor job securing commitments from national interest groups early in the campaign. National interest also did limited issue advocacy on behalf of Feeley. Greathouse, phone interview. 42 Congressman Jerry Lewis gave Beauprez an additional $3,000 from his Jerry Lewis for Congress committee. 43 FECInfo, “2001-02 Election Cycle Info for: BEAUPREZ, BOB,” At , 1 April, 2002; FECInfo, “2001-02 Election Cycle Info for: FEELEY, MICHAEL FRANCIS,” At < http://www.fecinfo.com/cgiwin/x_candpg.exe?DoFn=H2CO07030*2002>, 1 April, 2002. In contrast, in the First Congressional District, incumbent Democrat Diana DeGette received a total of $853,929; her Republican opponent, Ken Chlouber, raised $114,749. Neither candidate was aided by the national parties and neither candidate aired any television or radio ads. 44 Beauprez spent $166,070 on 151 ads Feeley spent $69,325 on 68 in the final week. Election Advocacy database. Burt Hubbard and Katie Kerwin, “Onslaught of Political Ads will Hit Airwaves,” Rocky Mountain News, 25 October 2002, A8. 45 The figures were confirmed by Beauprez’s actual buy sheets on file with the TV stations. 46 Beauprez’s FEC Post-Election report. Murphy, phone interview. 47 Steven Stenberg, Strategy Group, Partner, phone interview by Daniel Smith, 12 December 2002. Feeley paid the Strategy Group $36,519 do to nine direct mailings in the primary. Federal Elections Commission, “Form F3A - period 07/25/2002-09/30/2002, filed 10/15/2002 - OCT Quarterly,” Feeley for Congress. At , 11 December 2002. 48 FEC reports. See also, Peggy Lowe, “Money Trail: Race for 7th District One of the State’s Most Expensive,” Rocky Mountain News, 6 December 2002, A5. According to Alan Philp, the Colorado Republican Party executive director, and Mike Melanson, the Colorado Democratic Party executive director, the NRCC’s and DCCC’s hard/soft money split to run issue ads is 30 percent/70 percent. In 31
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contrast, when the national parties coordinate with the state parties, the hard/soft money split is a more favorable 22 percent/78 percent. The state parties received two checks from national parties: one for 22 percent of the total in hard money from the national party’s federal fund, and one for 78 percent of the total in non-federal (i.e., “soft”) dollars. As such, the national parties willingly transferred hard and soft dollars to the state parties to pay for issue ads, saving 8 percent of more valuable hard dollars for other purposes. Alan Philp, Colorado Republican Party Executive Director, interview by Daniel Smith, Denver, 24 September 2002; Mike Melanson, Colorado Democratic Party Executive Director, interview by Daniel Smith, Denver, 8 October 2002. For a enlightening discussion of hard and soft money ratios and transfers from national to state parties, see Diana Dwyre and Robin Kolodny, “Throwing out the Rule Book: Party Financing of the 2000 Elections,” in David Magleby, ed., Financing the 2000 Election. Washington, D.C.: Brookings: 2002. 49 Philp, interview. 50 Federal Elections Commission, “FEC-74028 Form F3XA - period 09/01/2002-09/30/2002, filed 01/30/2003 - OCT Monthly,” National Republican Congressional Committee. At , 1 April 2003. 51 Dan Hazelwood, Targeted Creative Consulting (TCC), President, phone interview by Daniel Smith, 3 December 2002. 52 Mike South, Arena Communications, Production Manager, phone interview by Daniel Smith, 3 December 2002. In its 1996 decision, Colorado Republican Campaign Committee vs. Federal Election Commission, 518 U.S. 614 (1996), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that political parties are permitted to make independent expenditures on behalf of their own candidates. The ads may explicitly advocate the election or defeat of a federal candidate, with the expenditures reportable to the FEC, and they may not be coordinated with the candidate benefiting from the spending. 53 The NRCC and state party each put in $38,000 into the coordinated campaign; the state party then signed the money over to NRCC. Most of the money, around $58,000, was spent on a television ad; the remainder was put into a scathing direct mail piece (“Your Mother Just Passed Away”) that dovetailed with the NRCC’s pure soft money TV ad (“What Kind of Person”). Hazelwood, phone interview. 54 In the words of Mike Melanson of the Colorado Democratic Party, the state party’s non-allocable and coordinated campaigns are a “legal fiction,” with the party creating separate financial accounts every election cycle to facilitate independent and collective decision making by the candidates and state and national party officials. Melanson, interview. 55 Federal Elections Commission, “FEC-78524 Form F3XA - period 07/25/2002-09/30/2002, filed 03/14/2003 - OCT Quarterly,” Colorado Democratic Party. At , 1 April 2003. Kyle Osterhout, Media Strategies and Research, Vice President, phone interview by Daniel Smith, 10 December 2002. 56 According to Feeley’s campaign manager, the NRCC already had dropped three to four direct mail pieces by October 7 to the DCCC’s one piece. Greathouse, phone interview. The DCCC set up the contracts with Mammen-Pritchard, that the state party then fulfills. Every once in a while consultants will bill the DCCC for items such as general expenses, long distance phone calls, or photography. Amy Pritchard, Mammen-Pritchard, Partner, phone interview by Daniel Smith, 17 October 2002. 57 The figures were confirmed by viewing the actual buy sheets filed with the various Denver TV stations as well as interviews with consultants. Mark Armour, Armour Media, President, phone interview by Daniel Smith, 10 December 2002. 58 Stenberg, phone interview. 59 In early September, Minihan stated that, “Everyday I get on my knees and pray” that unions and prochoice organizations would run issue ads on behalf of Feeley. Greathouse said that he “fully expect[ed] interest groups to participate in issue ads” on behalf of Beauprez, most notably Gun Owners of America and the NRA. Greathouse, interview. 60 Neither the campaign nor specific political issues were addressed in the Heritage Bank radio ads (which aired on a few Clear Channel stations), but the tone of each preached integrity and trust, with Beauprez speaking during the final 15 seconds. Republicans in the primary asked him to cancel the bank’s ads, but Beauprez’s campaign manager claimed that the ads were taped and scheduled well before he had even entered the race. Bill Scanlon, “Campaign Ads Stir Cries of Foul,” Rocky Mountain News, 11 July 2002, A21.. The reemergence of the bank’s ads never surfaced as a salient issue during the general election,
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although the Feeley campaign did file a complaint with the FEC (which “went nowhere”). Greathouse, phone interview. 61 The National Right to Life Committee paid approximately $20,000 to run an ad on a conservative talk radio show on KOA 850 AM. The spot supported Beauprez as well as Allard. 62 By mid-October, Jefferson County, for example, had mailed 85,000 absentee ballots to voters who had requested them (44,054 to Republicans, 26,910 to Democrats, and 13,815 to unaffiliated voters). At the time, 39 percent or active GOP voters in the Seventh District, compared with 30 percent of active Democrats and 20 percent of active unaffiliated voters, had requested absentee ballots. Lynn Bartels, “Early to Ballot Box,” Rocky Mountain News, 17 October 2002, A28. 63 Contacting likely voters with direct mail becomes more efficient with early voting, as the candidates and parties are able to check with the county clerks to see who has voted as well as get a sense of whether Republicans, Democrats, or unaffiliated voters are casting ballots. “The universe of actual likely voters shrinks every day from now through Election Day,” Philp of the Colorado Republican Party commented at the start of early voting in mid-October, and “candidates [and] both parties will try to avoid contacting Coloradans who have already voted.” But the practice of purging those who already voted from direct mail lists was not always smooth, as the county clerks did provide updated voting records to the consultants in a timely enough fashion so they could do “match-backs.” Stenberg, phone interview. Regardless of the three voting schemes, Colorado citizens must be registered to vote 29 days before an election. Bartels, “Early to Ballot Box,” A28. 64 Berny Morson, “Early Votes Coming in ‘Briskly,’” Rocky Mountain News, 30 October 2002, A19.; Berny Morson, “Early Voting Leaves Big Footprint,” Rocky Mountain News, 5 November 2002, A19. 65 David B. Magelby and J. Quin Monson, “Campaign 2002: ‘The Perfect Storm,’” Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, 3 January 2003. At , 3 January 2003. Similarly, in a poll conducted by Harstad Strategic Research in August for Feeley, 62 percent of likely voters said they would vote early; of those early voters, 56 percent said they would mail in an absentee ballot, with another 6 percent saying they would go to the polls at an early voting center. Greathouse, interview. 66 CSED, “Campaign 2002: ‘The Perfect Storm.’” An independent poll by Talmey-Drake Research and Strategy, however, found early voters were much more likely to be Republicans (45 percent) than Democrats (32 percent). The poll also found that the average age of early voters was nearly 10 years higher than election day voters (55 to 46 years old), and that early voters appeared to be more interested in politics. John Sanko, “Many Loyal Voters Won’t Line up Today,” Rocky Mountain News, 5 November 2002, A4. 67 Peggy Lowe and Lynn Bartels, “Beauprez Grows Used to Close Calls,” Rocky Mountain News, 23 November 2002, A4. 68 Independent polling done by Ciruli found that 35 percent of unaffiliated voters would cast ballots for Feeley and 21 percent for Beauprez. Over one-third of unaffiliated voters, however, said they. Ciruli’s polling also showed that Beauprez was receiving considerable support by Republicans who were toeing the party line. Nearly one-third of those who said they would vote for Beauprez said they were doing so due to party affiliation, whereas only one-fifth said they were supporting Feeley due to partisan loyalty. Arthur Kane, “Near Tie in Race for 7th District,” Denver Post, 18 October 2002, B1. 69 South, phone interview. Arena Communications never once spoke with the Beauprez camp during the campaign and was “totally isolated” from the NRCC’s field representatives. Arena received a sharp photo of Beauprez and two grainy, unflattering images of Feeley from the NRCC as well as polling data that was two or more weeks old. 70 Murphy, phone interview. 71 Hazelwood, phone interview. 72 Lowe and Bartels, “Beauprez Grows Used to Close Calls,” A4.. 73 Arthur Kane, “It’s Down, Dirty in 7th District,” Denver Post, 30 October 2002, A17. 74 John Sanko, “Gun Ad Hits Beauprez,” Rocky Mountain News, 29 October 2002, A22. 75 Hazelwood, phone interview. 76 Interestingly, the ad and another comparing the records of the two candidates on Social Security, were mailed to the 28 year old wife of Beauprez’s campaign manager, even though she is a regular voting Republican. Murphy could not make “heads or tails of the Feeley mailings.” Murphy, interview. Hazelwood had also heard of the DCCC’s outreach to staunch Republican voters, prompting him to
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comment that their direct mail was, “either very sophisticated or they used very sloppy, outdated registrations.” Hazelwood, phone interview. 77 Michele Ames, “Wanted: Hispanic Vote,” Rocky Mountain News, 27 August 2002, A14; Michael Riley, “National GOP Scurries from Tancredo’s Stance,” Denver Post, 20 September 2002, A1; M.E. Sprengelmeyer, “Playing ‘Mariachi Politics,’” Rocky Mountain News, 10 October 2002, A5; Owen S. Good, “Word Is: Get Out the Vote,” Rocky Mountain News, 28 October 2002, A22; Michael Riley, “Program Aims to Coax Hispanics to Voting Booths,” Denver Post, 30 October 2002, A16. 78 Steve Truebner, Owens 2002, Organization Director, interview by Daniel Smith, Golden, 7 November 2002. 79 Chafee, interview. 80 Federal Elections Commission, “FEC-74121 Form F3XA - period 10/01/2002-10/16/2002, filed 01/30/2003 - NOV Monthly,” National Republican Congressional Committee. At , 1 April, 2003. Feeley ran some of his own phone calls, one featuring the voice of his wife, former public radio reporter, Lesley Dahlkemper. 81 Melanson, interview; Chafee, interview. 82 Melanson, interview. The DNC conducted a poll and focus groups in August in Colorado that found that running issue ads on Spanish-language TV was not effective. As Beth Minihan, Feeley’s primary election campaign manger put it: Hispanics “don’t watch Spanish TV.” Greathouse, interview. 83 The backers of Amendment 30, the Election Day registration initiative, were the only issue group to buyin to the Democrat’s coordinated campaign. As such, “Yes on 30” was prominently displayed on the party’s GOTV literature. 84 Two other congressional candidates (Diana DeGette representing the First and Stan Matsunaka running in the Fourth) participated in the coordinated campaign. In addition to the DCCC’s $25,000 contribution on behalf of Feeley, an individual close to the campaign gave the state Democratic Party $50,000 earmarked for Feeley, with the donor informally telling the party that “Feeley’s a good guy.” Greathouse, phone interview. 85 Peggy Lowe, “Heston’s Visit may Sway Tight Races,” Rocky Mountain News, 24 October 2002, A36. Despite Beauprez’s strong pro-gun stance, his campaign understandably did little to publicize the NRA’s rally in Jefferson County, due to the fact that many residents in the district find the NRA too extreme. Beauprez was not featured at the rally, as he arrived just as it was about to end. Murphy, phone interview. See also Chuck Cunningham, Director, Federal Affairs, Institute for Legislative Action, interview by David Magleby, November 7, 2002. 86 Dan Freedman, “Capitol Hill Watching Colorado,” Daily Camera (Boulder), 26 October 2002, B1. 87 Whereas Feeley served in the Marine Corps, Beauprez never served in the military due to a medical exemption (bleeding ulcer). Repeatedly during the campaign, these facts came up, but both candidates supported Bush’s war on terror and action in Iraq. Feeley stressed that the House needed another Marine, and he even crashed a Beauprez function with veterans. Peggy Lowe, “Rhetoric Heats up in 7th Race,” Rocky Mountain News, 14 October 2002, A14. At the time of Bush’s fundraising luncheon, Feeley criticized the President for politicizing national security, saying, “‘I’m pretty upset with our president right now. It is not the time to play politics with us headed to war in Iraq.” Steven Graham, “Feeley Condemns Bush Statements at Forum,” Jefferson County News, 3 October 2002. At , 19 January 2002. Feeley also vowed to reveal “every chicken-hawk Republican running for office.” Peggy Lowe, “Bush’s Iraq Remarks Leave Feeley Furious,” Rocky Mountain News, 26 September 2002, A6.. See also, Carl Hulse, “At Home, Most Politics is Local,” New York Times, 29 September 2002, sec. 4, p. 1. In his most intemperate remark of the campaign, Feeley referred to Vice President Dick Cheney an “SOB.” Mike Littwin, “Does New Enemy Call for New Reality?” Rocky Mountain News, 27 September 2002, A6. 88 Chandler, who raised virtually no money for his campaign, was reprimanded by the national Sierra Club after he publicly voiced his displeasure for being overlooked. Following the rebuke, Chandler asked rhetorically, “Is the club even more aligned with the Democrats than I suspected?” Peggy Lowe, “Sierra Club Gives Officer Ultimatum,” Rocky Mountain News, 12 October 2002, A23. 89 George Merritt, “Pro-choice Democrats Rally on Capitol Steps,” Denver Post, 8 October 2002, A10. 90 Arthur Kane, “Beauprez Accused of Coercion,” Denver Post, 22 October 2002, A12.
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Chris Frates, “Negative Ads Irritate Some,” Denver Post, 31 October 2002, A20. Ryan Morgan, “Turnout was High in Pockets of State,” Denver Post, 8 November 2002, B1. Susan Greene, “Low Turnout of Minorities, Poor Splits Dems on Tactics,” Denver Post, 10 November 2002, A1. 92 CSED, “Campaign 2002: ‘The Perfect Storm.’” 93 KCEC-TV/KTFD-TV, Denver, Facsimile Transmittals from Access Advertising to Paul Chavez, 19 September 2002, in the station’s FCC public file. Some of the more provocative titles of the spots included: “I’m Mad,” “I Don’t Understand the Democrats – Black actor,” “Social Security & Women (generic),” “Faith-Based Initiative – Spanish,” “Listen, You Democrats – Elderly Woman,” “Stop Taxing Me! – Hispanic actress,” and “Social Security & Youth – Spanish.” 94 Trail Dust, “Beauprez Campaign Lambastes Feeley Ethics,” Denver Post, 23 October 2002, A19; Adam Nagourney and Adam Clymer, “Local Television Stations Become the New Arbiters of Political Fair Play,” New York TImes, 2 October 2002, A23. 95 Peggy Lowe, “GOP Airs First Ads in Crucial Contest,” Rocky Mountain News, 18 September 2002, A14. 96 Arthur Kane, “Ad: Feeley Drug Lobby Would Have Hit Elderly,” Denver Post, 8 October 2002, B4. 97 Keating, interview. According to the CSED three-wave panel poll, abortion was the major issue for 12 percent of likely voters by Election Day. However, a poll by Ciruli and Associates revealed that 15 percent of voters said they supported Feeley for his pro-choice stance, but 13 percent of voters supported Beauprez for his pro-life stance. Kane, “Near Tie in Race for 7th District,” B1. 98 Armour, phone interview. 99 Sanko, “Gun Ad Hits Beauprez,” A22. Menendez had made an early campaign stop to stump for Feeley. 100 Greathouse, phone interview. 101 According to Feeley’s Communications Director, Feeley “wanted to go to camera and make personal appeal,” but to be effective the campaign would have had to spend another “$250,000.” Mosley, phone interview. 102 Paola Farer and Susan Wells, “Beauprez Officially Declared Winner of 7th Congressional District,” 9News, 11 December 2002. At , 11 December 2002. 103 Murphy, phone interview.
