deaf-mutes, feral children and savages

DEAF-MUTES, FERAL CHILDREN AND SAVAGES: Of analogical evidence in 18th century theoretical history of language Rüdiger Schreyer Rheinisch-Westfälische technische Hochschule Aachen

1

Language and the science of man .................................................................... 1

2

Theoretical history and the problem of evidence................................................. 2

3

The natural origin and progress of language ...................................................... 3

4

The divine origin of language........................................................................... 5

5

Savage linguistics .......................................................................................... 6

6

5.1

Savage linguistics à la Monboddo .............................................................. 6

5.2

Savage linguistics à la Süßmilch .............................................................. 10

Monboddo vs. Süßmilch ................................................................................ 13

Summary The voyages and travels of the 16th and 17th centuries impressed on the European mind a consciousness of the cultural and social diversity of mankind. 18th century thinkers worked at a 'natural' explanation of this diversity by developing a 'natural' science of man. The attempted explanation was of the genetic, invisible-hand type. In accordance with this model, language was explained as the necessary result of the principles of human nature and the physical or social circumstances of society. Its was assumed that all languages progress through a regular sequence of stages. For reconstructions of the undocumented earlier and earliest stages of civilised languages to be plausible, facts had to be adduced. These facts are usually observations on the behaviour, linguistic and otherwise, of babies, feral children, deaf-mutes, and especially savages. Observations on Amerindian languages, in particular, were unquestioningly adduced (and accepted) as evidence. In this paper I shall discuss some of the sources, the 'facts' selected from the sources and the use made of these in 18th century theoretical history of language. Finally I shall offer an answer as to why these 'facts' could be substituted for evidence irretrievably lost.

1

Language and the science of man

The question of the origin and development of language was one of the major issues in the linguistic theory of the Enlightenment. It preoccupied some of its greatest minds and many lesser lights, too. If for this reason alone, it merits the attention of the linguistic historiographer. At present we are witnessing a surging historiographical interest in glottogenesis;1 it is, however, not sufficiently realized that the problem of the

1

The exorbitant price of Gessinger/Rahden's (1989) two volumes devoted to glottogonic theories is perhaps the best proof of this claim

Schreyer, Rüdiger 1994 Deaf-Mutes, Feral Children and Savages: Of Analogical Evidence in 18th-Century Theoretical History of Language. Proceedings of The Anglistentag 1993, Eichstätt, vol.XV. Blaicher, G. & Glaser, B. (eds.) Nie,meyer: Tübingen. 70-86.

2

origin and progress of language was an integral part of the larger problem of man's place in this world. The Christian view had come under attack; Bible criticism cast doubt on the authority of the holy book itself. Faith in the literal truth of the Bible was superseded by faith in the Book of Nature. Unlike the Bible this book was written in God's own hand and to decipher it the new scientists had been developing the experimental method of observation, analysis and synthesis. The age of discovery had added new volumes to the Book of Nature. The voyages and travels of two centuries had impressed on the European mind a consciousness of the cultural, social and linguistic diversity of mankind. Eighteenth-century thinkers were devising a ` natural' explanation of diversity, a `natural' science of man, which was to be as solid and convincing as the `natural philosophy' founded by Galileo and Newton. Moral philosophy, as this science of man was called, was to explain all cultures on this earth as a product of the immutable laws of human nature and the environment. Enlightenment philosophers saw that, once created, societal conditions themselves become part of the individual's environment and influence its future shape. The science of man recognized that social man changes both himself and his environment. Thus moral philosophers needed a new causal philosophy of change. Historical change was now interpreted as an inevitable progress from disorder to order, from chaos to rule, from simplicity to complexity, or — to borrow a popular 18th-century dichotomy — from nature to art. This causal theory of change was variously known as natural, theoretical or conjectural history. Theoretical historians strove to replace prevalent degenerationist or providentialist philosophies of history by a theory of human progress. The ideas making up theoretical history were old; they had been anticipated by Roman thinkers like Lucretius, Ho-race or Diodorus Siculus. What was new in the Enlightenment was the demand for causal coherence and scientific proof.

2

Theoretical history and the problem of evidence

Theoretical history described the general march of societal progress as a sequence of stages, each the result of the immutable laws of human nature and the societal and geographical circumstances of the previous one. The theory of stages was considered an idealization. It rested on the assumption that in a favourable environment a people undisturbed by external disruptions, a people isolated from others, would eventually pass through each of these stages. As conditions are not the same for all peoples, however, philosophers assumed that cultures progress at unequal rates or may be arrested in their development. Contemporaneous cultures, such as European civil society and the savage American nations, may be different because they represent different stages of progress. Historically or geographically unrelated cultures, such as the Roman and the Inca Empires, may be similar because they represent the same stage of progress.


3

The invention of unequal rates of societal progress is useful to explain the similarities and differences between cultures; it saves the doctrine of the basic uniformity of human nature while creating empirical data for the early stages of mankind. Human nature being constant, the environment was identified as the variable responsible for different rates of progress. The gist of the argument runs as follows. Progress in any art or science depends on the exercise of certain latent human faculties or powers. Skills do not develop without necessity and necessity depends on the environment. A favourable environment is one that challenges man's physical and mental powers. Too abundant a nature does not activate any of man's faculties. Too unfavourable a climate, too harsh a nature exercises man's physical, not however his mental faculties. The arts and sciences are acquired skills and the more developed the material or societal artefacts of a people the more civilised or — to use an 18th-century term — `polite' they are. The degree of `politeness' becomes a measure of progress. With this yardstick the theoretical historian arranges cultures along a scale of progressiveness which is taken to represent the standard or `natural' sequence of societal evolution. Once established, this sequence of stages can be examined like individual exposures of a film. Any cultural feature observed in a people at a given stage of progress becomes legitimate evidence for that stage and can therefore be ascribed to all peoples relegated or promoted to that stage on independent grounds. The savage civilizations all over the globe clearly represented an earlier stage of societal progress. It follows that "whoever [...] would trace human nature up to its source, must study very diligently the manners of barbarous nations, instead of forming theories of man from what he observes among civilized nations" (Monboddo 1967, I: 133). 2 By studying "herds of men [... ] living in a state almost entirely brutish" we can at least come close to the original state, the state when society and language began.

3

The natural origin and progress of language

It was a brute fact that all known peoples had the use of speech. Caliban could speak, even without a Prospero to teach him. There was a multitude of languages in this world, many seemingly utterly different from each other. Since there were many good reasons for considering language an art like all the other arts, theoretical history was called in to explain the origin, development and diversity of language. Like the theoretical histories of other arts, the theoretical history of language had to be in line with the general principles of the construction of scientific theory adopted and adapted from natural philosophy.

2

Monboddo (1967, I: 141) expresses his satisfaction that these ideas coincide so perfectly with those of Rousseau, "an author of so much genius, and original thought, as well as learning".


4

In accordance with this model, language was explained as the necessary product of the laws of human nature and the physical or social circumstances of a people. It was assumed that languages progress through a regular sequence of stages, starting with the presocietal and pre-linguistic state of nature. Eighteenth-century moral philosophers insisted that language is not only a product, but also an instrument of society. They were fully conscious of the decisive role of language in societal progress. Language as a vehicle of instruction transforms individual knowledge into common knowledge. Furthermore, by enabling the transfer of knowledge from one generation to the next, language makes knowledge cumulative in time. Through language, the cumulative experience of predecessors and contemporaries becomes available to all its speakers and therefore it must speed up the progress of the arts and sciences. Thus theoretical history postulated a feedback loop between language, mind and society which would enforce their inevitable progress. The progress of knowledge leads to the progress of society which, in its turn, must lead to the improvement of its major instrument - language, and so on in a spiral of progress. So much for the theory, but what about the evidence? If reconstructions of the undocumented earlier and earliest stages of civilised languages were to be plausible, facts had to be found. And facts were found – or should we say fabricated? For the theoretical historian of language, observations of savages supplied the evidence legitimated by the doctrine of (linguistic) progress. This evidence was different for the pre-and the post-linguistic stages of society. The doctrine of linguistic progress had to postulate a primordial speech-less man, Horace's mutum et turpe pecus. Since the search for speechless but social humans had turned up no reliable evidence, analogical evidence had to be resorted to. Substitute facts were discovered in the babbling of babies,

in

the communication of

the deaf and dumb, in feral children and other solitary savages, as they were now and then caught in the forests of Europe. These seemingly disparate groups had one thing

in

common:

they

were

outside,

or

at

the

fringe

of,

society.

Their

communication systems, if any, had to be pre-linguistic and therefore they were handy analogues of the unobserved and perhaps unobservable, speechless savage that was natural man. For the post-linguistic stages evidence abounded. Theoretical history had converted all the world's languages into evidence for students of linguistic progress. The early post-linguistic stages could still be observed in the languages of the primitive savage societies discovered in many parts of the world. Their study would fill the gaps in the projected theoretical history of language. Moreover, it would throw light on the undocumented early stages of civilized languages. Thus, what Herder (17441803) called die wilden Sprachen offered a wealth of pertinent data for the beginnings of linguistic evolution. These living fossils of earlier linguistic stages allow a


5

panhistorical reconstruction of linguistic progress, a reconstruction based on what the Enlightenment called "observation and experiment". Observations on savage languages were unquestioningly adduced and accepted as relevant evidence. Mandeville, Condillac, Rousseau, Smith, Herder, or Monboddo — they all share the idea of linguistic progress from pre-linguistic origins, and they all refer to savages to support their theoretical constructs with linguistic facts. However, not all make the same use of the facts available nor do they exploit them to the same extent or detail.3 As a matter of fact, the appeal to savage languages increases as the glottogonic debate continues.

4

The divine origin of language

There were, of course, 18th-century thinkers who had their doubts about a natural origin of language, among them Stackhouse, Dr. Johnson, Beattie and Süßmilch. They were convinced that the first language was due to a miracle wrought by the Almighty, even though they did not all agree on the extent of divine language planning. The Bible happened to be rather vague on this point. Did God give Adam a complete and perfect language? Or did he merely grant him the ability of naming, thus leaving the development of a fully fledged language to him and his offspring? Apart from the obscurities of Genesis the advocates of a divine origin of language knew that dogmatic insistence on a divine miracle was not in the spirit of their time; it demanded faith without affording conviction. Miracles as explanatory devices were unacceptable to the new scientists in search of the laws of nature. They were in the business of reducing the miraculous. Miracles were, by definition, breaches of the god-given laws of nature. Furthermore, mere orthodox insistence on a divine revelation of language did not meet the hypothetical mode of argument of the advocates of a natural origin. These merely argued for the possibility of a human invention of language. They merely showed how language could have developed; that is, they developed a positive theoretical history of language. Arguments for a possibility can only be met by arguments against that possibility. Thus, to disprove the arguments of their antagonists the advocates of a divine origin of language had to take issue with the logic of the arguments of their opponents or with the truth, reliability and interpretation of their evidence. Their argument for a divine origin was based on the alleged failure of natural theories of glottogenesis. The irrational miracle was the ultima ratio.

3

Hanzeli (1984: 223) notes that in the debate between Maupertuis and Turgot both stress the importance of the study of savage languages, but neither cites one single linguistic `fact'. He rightly concludes that the real issue was "the origin of knowledge and not the origin and development of languages". A linguist may find this regrettable, but a historian of linguistics must use this insight to place 18th-century linguistic theory in its proper context.


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5

Savage linguistics

I will now review some linguistic evidence adduced by two authors who had — to the best of my knowledge — never heard of each other, although they were both familiar with most of their predecessors from Lucretius to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Both made extensive use of evidence drawn from pre-and post-linguistic savagery, but with one difference. Monboddo (1714—1799), the Scottish Laird and judge, tried to prove the human origin of language, while Johann Peter Süßmilch (1707—1767), the Prussian physician and statistician, tried to prove its impossibility. Both expressly offered a philosophical argument. Faith does not come into play.

5.1 Savage linguistics à la Monboddo The picture drawn here of Monboddo's train of thought is, by and large, representative of the views of the advocates of a natural evolution of language. Monboddo tries to prove [... ] that no part of language, neither matter nor form, is natural to man, but the effect of acquired habit: - That this habit could not have been acquired, except by men living in political society; but that neither is the political life natural to man: That the political life arose from the necessities of men, and that it may exist without the use of language: - That the first languages were without art, such as might be expected among people altogether barbarous: - and, lastly, That if language was at all invented, there is no reason to believe that it was invented only in one nation, and that all the languages of the earth are but dialects of that one original language; although there be good reason to believe, that language has not been the invention of many nations, and that all the languages presently spoken in Europe, Asia, and a part of Africa, are derived from one original language. (Monboddo 1967, I: 490) Monboddo is looking for a natural explanation of the origin and evolution of language. If language was indeed `by art' and not `by nature', would it not have developed from primitive beginnings like the other arts and sciences and even in parallel with them? Several linguistic stages would have to be distinguished. A linguistic stage would correspond to the stage of progress attributed to a culture on the basis of other arts and sciences - government, law, economy, architecture, dress or even music. They all are manifestations of the progress of the ideas of a people. Language, however, is more; it is the mirror of their ideas and therefore "it is by language, that we trace, with the greatest certainty, the progress of the human mind" (Monboddo 1967, I: 143). Savages cannot be expected to have a structured language, because they need not express many or complex ideas. Monboddo's savages are too busy with gratifying the appetites of their body (Monboddo 1967, I: 142) to bother with their mind; they want "that leisure, and that assistance to knowledge, which civil society affords to speculative men". In sum, a primitive people will have a few simple ideas, a primitive language and a primitive culture, and a polished people numerous complex ideas, a polished language and a sophisticated culture.


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Like his learned friend James Harris, Monboddo uses the Aristotelian categories of matter and form in his discussion of language. Matter refers to the material part, to the sounds of language; form refers to the immaterial part, to grammar and the lexicon. The marks of a language of art are regularity and structure. This means articulation, vowels and consonants in the material part, and parts of speech, derivation, inflexion and syntax in the formal part. By definition the primeval language is the very opposite of a language of art, a language with little grammatical or semantic structure. As is his wont, Monboddo proves this "both from theory and facts" (Monboddo 1967, I: 172), and these facts are observations on the language of savages. As we have seen, there are two types of savages, the solitary ones and the social ones. The speechless existence of the former type of natural man is proof that speech is not natural to man: "Of all those savages which have been caught in different parts of Europe, not one had the use of speech" (Monboddo 1967, I: 17273),4 which, Monboddo says, only proves the difficulty of articulation. This difficulty becomes even more pronounced, as it were, in the case of deaf persons, who but learn to speak after much effort on the part of their teachers and themselves.5With respect to the origin of language Monboddo concludes: "If, therefore, this art is so difficult to be learned without imitation, even by the assistance of the most diligent instruction, how much more difficult must the invention of it have been; that is the acquiring of it without either instruction or example?" (1967, I: 182). Monboddo conjectures therefore that the earliest language must have been a collection of long inarticulate cries expressing a complete need or emotion. During the slow progress of the savage mind new ideas will now and then arise for those objects the primitives are most familiar with. To name these the cries needed to be varied by some articulation, but not much: The ideas expressed by and reflected in the vocabulary of savages will be few in scope and degree of abstraction. They will not be differentiated or compounded, nor do they have to be. To express the few needs of savages the juxtaposition of few `words' with little phonetical and morphological structure is enough (Monboddo 1967, I: 364-370). Monboddo's theory thus assumes that in its early stages language is virtually without rules. This early linguistic stage is still preserved in "the savage and barbarous nations" , mostly of America. Even those who "are advanced to the length of civil society and language" have very imperfect ideas; "for `thou' they have general notions, without which there could be no language, they can hardly be said to have abstracted ideas" (Monboddo 1967, I: 143). Neither do savages have ideas of reflection in the Lockian sense: "For even such of them as have formed themselves into society, and have

4

Monboddo took great pains to inform himself about feral children, especially two caught in his time, who were by then more or less civilized adults: Wild Peter of Hannover and Memmie Le Blanc, whom he visited in France. 5

Monboddo is familiar with the work of John Wallis and the famous Abbé de l'Epée.


8

got the use of language, and of other arts, have hardly any words to express the operations of mind. And in all languages, even those the most cultivated, the words of that kind are metaphors borrowed from the objects of sense" (Monboddo 1967, I: 143).6Monboddo's pet example of a primitive language is Huron, " the rudest and most imperfect" language known to him (Monboddo 1967, I: 364). As a matter of fact, Huron is "so imperfect and irregular that it is impossible to form a grammar of it, that is, to reduce it to any rule" (Monboddo 1967, I: 327). It is "more imperfect, and therefore nearer to the origin of the art, than any other language, so far as I know, that has hitherto been discovered" (Monboddo 1967, I: 323). In Monboddo's description Huron is marked by the virtual absence of all those wonderful grammatical devices found in languages of art. There is little connection and little regularity in the language. Huron vocabulary has no higher genuses, no words denoting animal or vegetable, let alone matter, space, being or other such "metaphysical entities". Its words are morphologically monolithic, for Huron knows neither derivation nor composition. Indeed, "the least change of circumstance makes the expression quite different [...]: wounded with a hatchet is quite different from the word which denotes simply wounded" (Monboddo 1967, I: 365). And one year, two years, four years or ten years are all expressed by words totally unrelated. No quality can be expressed without mentioning the substance it is inherent in: There is in the whole language not one single adjective, nor are there nouns derived from adjectives. Huron lacks possessive pronouns: Mine, thine, his father, his mother, his uncle, his aunt are all expressed by morphologically unrelated words. Frequently the expression of actions is not divided into words for agent, action, subject (= patient) and manner. One word is made to express it all "in the lump", and therefore many words express so many sentences. Thus, cutting fish, cutting wood, cutting the head, the arm are all different words in Huron, while there is no simple word for to cut. Huron has no negation, unless by words totally unrelated to the negated ones. Number, tense and person in the verb are only distinguished by tone or accent, as are affirmation and interrogation. And if that were not enough grammatical poverty, the Huron have no cases, no genders, no numbers, no moods, no prepositions, no conjunctions; in short, "with respect to syntax, they appear to have none at all" (Monboddo 1967, I: 368). Monboddo concludes that theory and fact both point to the same conclusion, namely [...] that those primitive languages are natural cries, a little varied and distinguished by articulation, signifying things as they are conceived by savages; that is, mixed together as they are in nature, without being divided into certain classes, commonly known by the name of the parts of speech, and without being connected together in syntax. (Monboddo 1967, I: 370)

6

Monboddo adds in a footnote: "This, I think, is an observation of Mr. Locke" (1967, I: 143). It is, indeed.


9

But even the Huron show some slight improvement in "the faculty of thinking, and by consequence of their language" (Monboddo 1967, I: 371-2), which is to be expected in humans living together in a society. Nevertheless, Huron is Monboddo's best evidence for a language at the bottom of linguistic progress. Is it really? Monboddo could not help noticing that some linguistic observations were at odds with his theory of linguistic progress. And since no one will sacrifice a beloved theory to a few recalcitrant facts, they must be explained away. When such facts cannot be ignored Monboddo usually declares them non-permissible evidence, exceptions that do not affect his linguistic history. Thus he notes, for instance, that Huron has a numeral system far more elaborate than Carib, which he considers a more advanced language. Huron and Carib, he maintains, did not follow the natural course of development. The Hurons "have learned their knowledge of numbers from some other nation, more advanced in the arts of life: and it is not unlikely that the Caribbees have got their language in the same way; for there have been strange migrations and mixtures of nations at different times; and indeed there is hardly any thing that we conceive to be possible that has not happened in a long course of time" (Monboddo 1967, I: 378). Guarani, an Amazonian language, is another clear counter-example to Monboddo's theory. It has an elaborate grammatical structure which seems to have the edge even on the polished European languages. Again Monboddo declares the language an exception: I think it impossible that they who made so little progress in the other arts of life should have invented so complete a language; and as they could not have learned it from any of the nations presently in their neighbourhood, I think it is very probable, that, some time or other, by one of the many changes and revolutions that have happened in this earth, they have been connected with some more civilized nation, from whom they have learned to speak. (Monboddo 1967, I: 381) Clearly the theory determines the legitimacy of the evidence. If some linguistic facts do not fit, explain them away by declaring them borrowings. Never mind the lack of historical evidence! Monboddo's second immunization strategy is also familiar to modern linguists. Theory amendment is the preferred way out in the case of Abnaki, an Algonquian language, "the most artificial, if not the most perfect language of any that I have hitherto mentioned" (Monboddo 1967, I: 383). It has "those three great artifices of language": composition, derivation, and inflection of which Monboddo gives a fairly detailed description. Most astonishing is that the "almost infinite variety of their verbs was all according to the exactest rule and strictest analogy, without those irregularities and anomalies to be observed even in our learned languages" (Monboddo 1967, I: 393-94). Abnaki merits the addition of a new stage of linguistic progress, the stage of hyper-artificiality: [... ] in the progress of language, which I imagine has been very long, there has been invented a language too artificial, such as this of the Albinaquois, and such as it is said the Armenian language is, before a language of complete art was formed,


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which is always as simple as the nature of the thing will permit. (Monboddo 1967, I: 393-94) This is Monboddo's restructured progress of language: First there was a language altogether rude and barbarous, such as we have described; then was formed a language of art; but by very slow degrees, as we have also seen. Before the art was completed, there was an intermediate stage of a language, too intricate and complex in its structure. And in this respect I imagine the invention of languages resembles the invention of machines. (Monboddo 1967, I: 394)7 Monboddo adds "that if the Albinaquois were to cultivate arts and sciences as much as the antient Greeks did, and among other arts the art of language, they would come at last to simplify their language, and make it perhaps as perfect as the Greek" (Monboddo 1967, I: 394-95). Unfortunately, the spirited defense of a pet theory is not seldom accompanied by amnesia. Monboddo forgets that, in his theory, Abnaki should never have reached this state of hyper-artificiality, since the Abnaki people were known to be more primitive than the Huron. Had not Monboddo said about the Guarani that he thought it "impossible that they who made so little progress in the other arts of life should have invented so complete a language"? Why then the Abnaki?

5.2

Savage linguistics à la Süßmilch

One writer who was convinced that the natural origin of language was beyond proof was Johann Peter Süßmilch (1707-1767), a physician, chaplain in the army of Frederick the Great of Prussia and author of a work on mortality statistics, but better known nowadays as Herder's whipping boy. In 1754 Süßmilch read his own Versuch eines Beweises, daß die erste Sprache ihren Ursprung nicht vom Menschen, sondern allein vom Schöpfer erhalten habe 8(1766) to the Prussian Academy of Sciences, whose member he was. His argument can be summed up as follows: The first language de-rives either from man or from God (Süßmilch 1766: 3-4).9 Linguistic signs are arbitrary and the result of random or reasonable choice on the part of its creator. Now random choice will never produce order. Any complex, symmetrical, ordered, perfect and purposeful structure like a building or a clock must be the product of an intelligent, reasonable and purposive mind. Man in the state of nature was neither intelligent nor reasonable and

7

Here Monboddo is borrowing from Adam Smith, who exploits the machine metaphor to explain the change from synthetic to analytic languages. Hypercomplicated machines are eventually replaced by machines which do the same work by "as few powers and movements as possible; and this is what I call the perfection of art" (Monboddo1967, I: 394). 8

Attempt of a Proof that the First Language had ist Origin, not in Man, but alone in the Creator. (Transl. R.S.)

9

He will not consider dew God might have proceeded "since [his] proof is merely philosophical" (1766: Preface p. 5).


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therefore unequal to the task of creating language. Like Rousseau be-fore him Süßmilch argues that the categories represented by the parts of speech — substantives for substances, verbs for actions, adjectives for qualities and numerals for numbers — show that the makers of languages must have been very sophisticated thinkers. He frequently compares language to an " immensely artificial edifice, in which perfection, order, excellent pro-portion, eurhythmy and symmetry may be found" (Süßmilch 1766: Inhalt n.p). In all languages he finds perfection, order, rules, even beauty and harmony (Süßmilch Preface: 5; 1766: 17; 19). All known languages have a grammar and lend themselves to a grammatical description (Süßmilch 1766: 30). How else could they be learned? "So ist aber die Sprache und so sind alle Sprachen beschaffen, wir mögen nehmen und prüfen welche wir wollen. Auch die Sprachen der uncultivirtesten Völker haben ihre Regeln der Vollkommenheit und Ordnung"10 (1766: 18). This is where empirical proof is required, and Süßmilch seeks his

evidence

in

exotic

languages:

"Die

elenden

Grönländer,

die

schmutzigen

Hottentotten, die vielsylbigen Oronocks, die umschweifenden Tartarn, die feinen Chinesen, der Japaner und sein Antipode, der Caraibe, alles redet eine ordentliche Sprache" (1766: 71)11. The more primitive the speakers of such a perfect language the more persuasive the argument. Siißmilch's most primitive savages were not the Huron but "the miserable Greenlanders": "Dieses arme Volk, das in Kälte, Eis, Finsternis und Schmutz verhüllet, hat gleichwohl eine vollkommene Sprache, die zwar einem Europäer schwer zu erlernen ist, die aber doch alles hat was zu einer Sprache gehöret" (1766: 27).12 Can one really believe, Süßmilch asks (1766: 81), that a miserable people who "seem little more intelligent than bears and seals" ever had the wits and energy to produce such an artful and regular language? The answer is obvious and it argues against a human origin of language. The theory of progress demands that the first language must be considered disorderly and in need of improvement. Why then do we not know of "one single people" (Süßmilch 1766: 81) that has retained such a language? Or, to put it

10

"That is the nature of language, and of all languages, we may take and examine whichever we like. Even the languages of the most uncivilised peoples have their rules of perfection and order." (Transl. R.S.)

11

"The miserable Greenlanders, the dirty Hottentots, the polysyllabic Oronocks, the nomadic Tartars, the sophisticated Chinese, the Japanese and his antipode, the Carib, all speak an orderly language." (Transl. R.S.)

12

"This poor nation, covered in cold, ice, darkness and dirt, still has a perfect language, which, though difficult for a European to learn, has everything a language needs." (Transl. R.S.). Cf. Süßmilch 1766: 29: "Die elenden Grönländer haben, wie schon angeführet, eine schwere und vollkommene Sprache, die ganz besondere Kunststücke besitzet, die wir in keiner unserer bekanten Sprachen antreffen, allein mit den Rechnen sieht es bey ihnen schlecht aus ... " . The miserable Greenlanders have, as mentioned above, a difficult and


12

bluntly, why do primitive peoples not speak primitive languages? The order, beauty and perfection found in every single language can hardly be the result of chance or of blind choice (Süßmilch 1766: 122). Languages must be the product of a reasonable and highly intelligent mind, a mind able to keep in view all signs, all purposes, and the complete structure of the complex edifice (Süßmilch 1766: 14, 85). To sum up in Süßmilch's own words: "Ich habe also erstlich bewiesen, daß in der Sprache Vollkommenheit, Ordnung und Regeln anzutreffen sind, daher sie also nicht durch ein Ohngefehr hat entstehen können, sondern sie muß mit Absicht und vieler Vernunft seyn gebildet worden" (Süßmilch 1766: 17)13. There are grammatically sophisticated languages whose speakers show substandard intelligence and a low culture and it is not credible that they have or ever had the mental abilities to plan their language. Even less so did the alleged rude and simple-minded inventors of the first language. Human language must have been bestowed on us by a greater artificer (Süßmilch 1766: 31). In his proof Süßmilch extends to glottogenesis a familiar theological argument which proves the existence of God from what was often called the `artificiality' (the complex structure) of the world. However, he also offers other arguments against a human origin of language. Süßmilch, the sociologist, can imagine no motive which might impel savages to improve their language. The very wild peoples apparently had no incentive to develop any arts and sciences. "How", asks Süßmilch, "was it possible for them to improve their language, and how come that their languages are governed by order, perfection and art, as much as the languages of the learned nations?" The philosopher holds that the use of reason presupposes the use of language, and vice versa (Süßmilch 1766: Preface; 10), a repetition of Rousseau's chicken-and-egg problem. The statistician suggests that the alleged human origin of language would favour polygenesis. Owing to the arbitrariness of linguistic structure languages ought to be very different in grammatical form. But Süßmilch (1766: 82), the linguist, maintains that all languages share the same universal grammar, the same eight parts of speech (Süßmilch 1766: 31; 82-83). He also intimates that comparison will confirm the kinship of all languages, which is yet another argument for the monogenesis of language in God (Süßmilch 1766: Inhalt n.p.). How would different inventors independently hit upon the same solution? Of the infinite grammatical possibilities, why should they choose the same general grammar? Why is the same solution encountered even among "the very wildest and most stupid peoples, who even at this moment barely have the human shape, albeit a perfect language similar to that of the other more intelligent peoples"? (Süßmilch 1766: 82).

perfect language, which has very special artifices, not to be met in any of our known languages, only their maths is in a bad way…". 13

"Thus I have proved first, that in language we find perfection, order and rules, consequently it could not have arisen by chance, but must have been formed intentionally and with much intelligence." (Transl. R.S.)


13

6

Monboddo vs. Süßmilch

Monboddo and Süßmilch share the same concept of linguistic perfection. They agree that the best language is a type of `Greekish', a language with inflection, derivation and a `proper' syntax with concord, government and prepositions. They also agree that if language were of human invention a primitive people should speak a language with little grammar, and with terms of a low level of abstraction. Monboddo's argument for the human origin of language hinges on the alleged imperfection of the grammars of primitive, ignorant and savage peoples. For Monboddo primitive cultures with primitive languages are the norm, while primitive peoples with sophisticated languages are exceptions. Süßmilch 's argument for a divine origin of language depends on the alleged perfection of their grammars. For Süßmilch primitive languages do not exist. If Süßmilch and Monboddo have the same linguistic predilections, why do they disagree on linguistic facts? Why does one pronounce the savage languages perfect, whereas the other pronounces them very imperfect? Why does one say grammar is universal, while the other says it isn't? It would be too easy to blame this difference of opinion on linguistic ignorance. Neither the Scottish Laird nor the Prussian physician neglected linguistic information. In fact, they were armchair linguists of sorts. Monboddo in his search for and analysis of linguistic facts was far more serious and thorough than his predecessors. He devoted much effort to the collection of grammatical and lexical information especially on exotic and savage languages and he consistently supported his arguments with illustrations drawn from these. Of Amerindian languages he refers to Eskimo, various Algonquian languages, Huron, Carib, Galibi, Tupi, Guarani and Quechua. Of non-Amerindian languages he mentions Chinese and Tahitian beside the more familiar occidental languages. Süßmilch refers to the languages of the Greenland Eskimo, of the peoples of the Hudson Bay (among them the Huron), and he mentions the languages of Caribs and South Americans, among them `Oronocks' (Tupinamba) and Patagonians. Non-Amerindian languages abound: Arabic, Bohemian, Breton, Chinese, Croatian, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Ethiopian, Finnish, French, Gaelic, Gothic, Greek, Hindustani, Hottentot, Hungarian, Icelandic, Italian, Lap, Latin, Latvian, Lithuanian, Persian, Phoenician, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Slovakian, Spanish, Swedish, Tartar, Turkish, Welsh, Wendish, and possibly others. Monboddo's and Süßmilch's linguistic facts were second-hand. A comparison of their reading on matters linguistic (as far as the pertinent titles could be identified) shows that they draw on different sources.14 Further-more, their sources are not always the best or

14

Exceptions are only Connor (1697) on feral children and the ubiquitous la Condamine

(1745), who seems to have been on everybody's reading list.


14

the most reliable. Travellers and explorers scarcely ever had the time to learn the languages of the weird and wonderful peoples they encountered, but they usually included in their reports some hearsay remarks on these languages and — for the reader's delectation — a list of words. The relations of missionaries were more solid: They often shared the life of their savage converts-to-be, endeavoured to learn their languages and described them for their confreres as best they could. Their printed works represented the best and often the only source of linguistic information readily available during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Both Monboddo and Süßmilch draw on missionary sources. However, the missionary writings referred to were not seldom sadly out of date. Thus Monboddo's inspiration for his monumental opus and his sole authority on Huron was Sagard (1632), which was the very first printed report on Huronia and very rare in Monboddo's time. The book included a few remarks on the Huron language and a small dictionary or phrase-book, based on ten month's stay among the Huron and, possibly, on information obtained from a professional interpreter and a Franciscan confrere. Sagard (1632: 3-12) himself confesses that he is "not very versed" in the language, which is hardly surprising in view of the brevity of his stay. He blames his difficulties in learning Huron on its being "nearly without rule and so imperfect", and thus makes a remark that was grist on Monboddo's mill. Monboddo ignores the later and more favourable statements about the Huron language published by Jesuit missionaries and scholars (Brebeuf [1593—1649], Chaumonot [1611—1693], Charlevoix [1682-1761], Rasles [1652—1724] or Lafitau [1681—1746]). The case of Huron is not the only instance of Monboddo's idiosyncratic and haphazard choice of sources. However, to be fair to him it must be said that he does pay attention to grammatical detail even if he does not consistently go in search for it. Süßmilch, on the other hand, seems quite happy with sweeping generalizations about the grammars of indigenous languages, although it is hard to see where he derived them from. There were some German sources (Cranz 1767; Anderson 1746) which suggested that Eskimo had a sophisticated grammar. However, even here

Süßmilch

does not waste his time with

grammatical detail. Neither Monboddo nor Süßmilch seem to know or bother with the numerous grammars of Amerindian languages published by Spanish, Portuguese or French missionaries. Monboddo (1967, I: 364) claims that "there are only three barbarous languages, so far as I know, of which we have any particular account published that can be depended upon", viz. Huron, Galibi and Carib. Of these "we have dictionaries, and grammars also, so far as it is possible to make a grammar of them, given us by men of letters who had studied them" (Monboddo 1967, I: 364). In fact, there were hundreds of such dictionaries and grammars.


15

Our authors made generalizations on an unnecessarily narrow and unreliable empirical basis. Furthermore, their reading was eclectic; they did not use the best authorities available, while some of the best authorities were unavailable in print. Their sources often were unreliable, out of date, and neither precise nor detailed nor explicit enough. Even if we allow for the relative paucity, inaccessibility and bias of linguistic information in their day, we cannot but assume that our authors' selection and use of evidence from savage languages was largely determined by their theoretical blinkers. Monboddo and Süßmilch had an axe to grind. Süßmilch saw God's providence everywhere, in the language of savages or in the mortality rates of Europe. He knew language was a divine gift, as much as Monboddo knew it was a human art. Their conclusions, we must assume, are the result of mental bias and selective attention. It is common knowledge that false premises can lead to a true conclusion. In his assessment of the grammar of indigenous languages Süßmilch was right, and Monboddo was wrong. As for the divine origin of language Monboddo was right and Süßmilch was wrong. However, the apportioning of praise or blame contributes little to our understanding of linguistic theories of the Enlightenment or , indeed, of our own more enlightened times. For the history of linguistics it may be more significant that the debate on the origin of language generated a growing curiosity about the grammars of indigenous languages, that it stirred an interest in the grammatical comparison of languages, civilized or barbarous, and in this roundabout way helped to ring in the linguistics of the nineteenth century. Ironically, theoretical history may be just another instance of the invisible hand in the history of linguistics.

References

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