Decision-making - CiteSeerX

Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, volume 18, number 3, September 2000, pages 191–200, Beech Tree Publishing, 10 Watford Close, Guildford, Surrey GU1 2EP, UK.

Decision-making Rationality in decision- and policy-making: implications for strategic environmental assessment Lone Kørnøv and Wil A H Thissen

A proper integration of strategic environmental assessment (SEA) into policy-making processes is considered critical to the success of SEA. Most of the work in SEA seems to be based on the assumption that the provision of rational information will help improve decision-making, but the literature points to other characteristics of real decision-making processes, including cognitive limitations, behavioural biases, ambiguity and variability of preferences and norms, distribution of decision-making over actors and in time, and the notion of decision-making as a process of learning and negotiation between multiple actors. All these are very relevant at the planning and policy level. In the policy sciences literature, some approaches may also hold promise for SEA, such as supporting an open learning process, variety in ways to support and roles to play in these processes, and paying more attention to the actor configuration and distribution of interests, as a basis for finding implementable and effective solutions to policy problems. The elaboration of these ideas holds promises as well as challenges for SEA. Keywords: strategic environmental assessment; rationality; decision-making models Lone Kørnøv is in the Department of Development and Planning, Aalborg University, Fibigerstraede 13, 9220 Aalborg, Denmark. Wil A H Thissen is in the School of Systems Engineering, Policy Analysis and Management, Delft University of Technology, PO Box 5015, 2600 GA Delft, Netherlands. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000

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NTEGRATION OF STRATEGIC environmental assessment (SEA) into the planning and policy-making processes is widely recognised as critical to the success of SEA: “The links between SEA and the PPP [policies, plans and programmes]making process are difficult to clearly identify and explain, but are crucial to the effectiveness of SEA” (Thérivel and Partidário, 1996; see also Partidário, 1996; Sadler, 1994; Partidário, 2000). Most of the literature in the field concentrates on the substantive aspects of decision alternatives and their anticipated (environmental or integrated) impacts, and on discussions about the formal or institutional status of SEA. Relatively little attention so far has been given in the SEA literature to the relevance and consequences of theories and insights about policy- and decisionmaking processes and the role of knowledge therein. As a supplement to the important practical experience being built up in SEA, we can learn from the experience gained within the psychological, behavioural and policy sciences, which all have a significantly longer empirical and theoretical history. With this in mind, in this paper we explore a selection of existing and emerging theories about decision- and policy-making, and the lessons they may hold for SEA practice and research. Rationalities, norms and values Much of the work in impact assessment is based on the belief or assumption that the provision of better, scientifically valid information or knowledge regarding a decision issue will contribute to a better, more

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rational decision, which may be defined as “… one that pursues a logic of consequences” (March, 1994). That is, a decision is considered more rational if the process leading to it is based on insight into the consequences of alternatives, and the selection follows the logic of choosing the alternative that is expected to best achieve one’s goals or objectives. Associated with this notion is a model of the decision process as a sequence of logical steps, starting with the establishment of objectives or goals in a given decision context, followed by identification or design of alternatives, assessment of the impacts of alternatives, and choice of the ‘best ‘ alternative in view of the goals. First, we note that this view of rationality in decision-making requires a distinction between the rationality of the process (meaning that rational procedures are followed) and the rationality of the outcome of the process (meaning that, in the end, the best approach is chosen to achieve given aims). A rational procedure will not automatically lead to a rational choice — considering imperfect information, multiple objectives the preferences of which are often not clearly established, and the fact that people do not always behave as assumed in rational models for decision-making. Second, implicitly or explicitly, a separation is made between objective, science-based knowledge on the one hand, and subjective, decision-maker specific norms and values that come into play in making the trade-offs between alternatives, assuming their impacts are known. Third, this model of decision-making is a normative one, that is, its proponents believe that it should be applied as it will lead to improvement in real-world decision-making over present practice. However, virtually all empirical research shows that decisionmaking processes in practice often do not follow such a rational procedure, even in cases where significant efforts are made to improve rationality (Brewer, 1973; March, 1987; 1988; 1994; Katz and Kahn, 1966; Simon and March, 1958; Lindblom, 1959; Scott, 1987; Breheny and Hooper, 1985). The fact that real-world decision processes do not appear to follow rational principles does not automatically mean that attempts at increasing rationality are undesirable. Nevertheless, insight into the reasons why attempts in the past have often not been successful may increase our understanding of the limits of the rational model, and of the merits of other models that may provide additional guidance for our efforts to affect decision-making. In addition to the distinctions between process and substantive or outcome characteristics, between scientific knowledge and values, and between normative and descriptive views of decision-making, it is helpful to distinguish conceptually different levels of decision processes: the individual level, where an individual actor or decision-maker develops insight and comes to a choice of a strategy or action, and the collective level, where individuals interact, possibly 192

resulting in (partial) agreement or commitment to a jointly chosen course of action. There is a wide variation of situations at the collective level, for example, team or group decision-making, decision-making within an organisation, and decision-making between independent parties. For the sake of simplicity, we will adopt the simple conceptual dichotomy of individual versus collective or multi-actor decision-making. Note that collective decisions are always based on a set of decisions of individuals, and that in many real-world processes both types of decision-making are intertwined. We will start with an exploration of models of decision-making at the individual level, proceed to the multi-actor situation, then discuss some insights and developments in the field of decision support, and finally return to the implications for SEA. Limits to individual rationality

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Individuals make decisions all the time — both simple (such as deciding which paper the environmental statement has to be printed on, or which train to take to work) and complex with far reaching consequences (such as buying an expensive house, migrating to another part of the world, changing a national strategic decision towards recycling of paper, glass, metal, garbage and so on to decrease landfill). The process of problem solving at the individual level is often described as consisting of three overall types of activity, frequently referred to as stages (Simon, 1957):

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finding or identifying occasions calling for a decision; inventing, developing and analysing possible alternative courses of action; and selecting a particular alternative from those available. These activities are, at the individual level, affected by several limitations to rationality, which we will divide into two categories: cognitive and resource limitations; and behavioural variations and biases. Cognitive and resource limitations Traditional economic theory assumes complete rationality: the ‘economic decision-maker’ maximises profit by systematic search for the best solution to a problem. It assumes complete and perfect information for the decision-maker, and demands consideration of all alternatives and consequences to make the optimal decision. It is self-evident that the theory of rational– economic behaviour is hardly applicable to individual reality. The decision-maker does not and cannot know all alternatives, consequences and preferences. Alternatives have to be searched, consequences have to be researched and finally preferences have to be found Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000


In theories of limited rationality, attention is seen as a scarce resource: decision-makers — like all other people — have a natural limited mental capacity and are therefore only able to cope within these limits and with a limited volume of information and developed. In theories of limited rationality (Simon, 1957), attention is seen as a scarce resource. Decision-makers — like all other people — have a natural limited mental capacity and are therefore only able to cope within these limits and with a limited volume of information. There is a link between (a) attention, (b) available resources and (c) search and development for alternatives, consequences and preferences. The available attention to search and develop is limited, which therefore limits the search for information and thereby also affects the decision itself (March, 1994). The number of alternatives considered is limited by both the mental capacity of the decision-maker and the available resources. In addition, decision-makers do not have perfect information about resulting consequences upon which to determine the best alternative. As a consequence, there will always be uncertainty and risk about the eventual impacts of decisions taken, which means that a fully rational decision may eventually lead to an undesired effect. To replace the unrealistic idea of “the economic man” Simon (1957) proposes a model of “the administrative man”. The economic man maximises and reaches for the optimal choice, while the administrative man tries to satisfice: “… making an optimal decision is like searching a haystack for the sharpest needle, but making a satisficing decision is like searching a haystack for a needle just sharp enough with which to sew” (Simon and March, 1958). A summary of the differences between the rational– economic model and the administrative model is shown in Table 1.

Figure 1. Expectations and preferences define how a person participates in decision-making

Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000

Table 1. Characterisation of ‘the rational–economic model’ and ‘the administrative model’ Aspect

Rational–economic model

Administrative model

Rationality of decision-maker

Perfect

Bounded

Available information

Complete, and complete access

Limited

Selection of alternatives

Optimal, rational choice Satisficing choice

Behavioural variations and biases Common decision-making procedures do not follow a rational pattern, but include such principles as habit, tradition, doing similar things as other people would do, repeating what worked in the past, or imitating successful people (Dawes, 1988, pages 8–9). Empirical research shows that the framing of decisions affects our preference. In Figure 1 we make a distinction between what a person ‘likes’ (preferences) and what a person ‘sees’ (perceptions and expectations) in a decision situation. Our interpretation of what we see and expect is affected by our past experiences, by availability of information and examples, by our norms and values (that is, what we would like to see) and by what we expect to see. Typically, the first considered alternative tends to be close to the situation today, marginal changes are examined and the number of alternatives being considered is restricted (March, 1994; Lindblom, 1959). In addition, empirical research shows that one’s judgement of a situation is affected by the way it is framed, for example, by the ordering of alternatives and presentation of consequences (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). It is also important to recognise that not all decisions involve all three stages, and thereby neither do they involve all the stages of the rational approach. Decisions under immediate pressure may result in an immediate ‘jump to a solution’ with little analysis of the problem, no search for alternatives and little effort to weigh the consequences (Katz and Kahn, 1966). This is often the case after the occurrence of disasters or the discovery of some new serious problem. Another situation in which the rational decisionmaking model is not followed is when decision-making results from following rules. Decision-making can then be seen as a consequence of standardised working procedures, professional standards, cultural norms and institutional structures (March, 1994). You can imagine that decision-makers ask the questions (March, 1994, page 58): 1. Situation: What kind of situation is this? 2. Identity: What kind of person am I? or what kind of organisation is this? 3. Rules: What will be appropriate to do in a situation like this? 193


The rules do not have to be expressed explicitly. It can be a collection of attitudes and understandings of how the world functions, who you are and how to act. Rule-based action will therefore mean that the rational decision model is not followed. Because experience and thereby learning is incorporated in rules, exploration of rules and changes in rules are an important source for understanding decision-making in organisations. Multi-actor decision-making When several persons or organisations are involved in decision-making, mutual dependencies and the distribution of power or authority among the participants become important dimensions that characterise the process. At the organisational and policy level, the nature of decision-making can vary widely. At one end of the spectrum are situations of centralised control where essentially one powerful individual makes decisions regarding matters that concern the whole organisation or even society. At the other end, we see policy processes in which, sometimes, large numbers of essentially independent actors debate and negotiate (for instance, the international process on reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and prevention of longterm climatic change). In between are many variations, in which individual policy-makers (for instance, a minister) formally make a decision that has been prepared in negotiation-like processes, or in which a group or body of actors or representatives (such as a senate) take formal decisions. For SEA, oriented to policy and planning processes, the situations in which power or influence is distributed over several actors are most relevant, and our focus will be on these. Not unlike the situation at the individual level, two kinds of views on policy-making in multi-actor situations can be found in the literature. Normative or ‘ideal’ views are often characterised by: ·

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The notion of a single decision-making group or entity (unicentric), such as an agency or a government, capable of controlling developments in society; often also referred to as the notion of centralistic governance; A recognisable key decision point in time; Process and substantive rationality as an explicit or implicit norm.

These idealised views are not only coherent with the rational view of individual decision-making, they also model multi-actor decision-making as if it were individual (except for the processes taking place within the unitary group). Other views or models do take the multi-actor nature more explicitly into account, and conceptualise decision-making as a process of negotiation between different actors with different interests. However, not unlike the economic model, ideal models like those 194

developed in fields such as game theory and conflict analysis assume rational behaviour of individual actors, including clarity of objectives and full information availability. As in the individual case, empirical research demonstrates the invalidity of these idealised assumptions. Decision-making depends on individual preferences and interests, which can contradict, most likely change over time, and can develop based on experience with the issues at hand (March, 1981; 1994; March and Olsen, 1989). In multi-actor situations, there is often a high level of confusion and complexity. Views and preferences diverge and change just like the alliances between participants in the process. Participants often do not really know what the problem is, what to aim for, how to achieve it, even less what the best way is to achieve it. Decision-makers have to consider uncertain outcomes, act in a political system, face many new and interlinked situations and problems and thereby continuously have to search for new ways to handle them. Various models have been developed to characterise these multi-actor policy processes. Examples include terms such as ‘policy soups’, ‘garbage cans’ or ‘policy arenas’ (Cohen et al, 1972; Kingdon, 1995) all of which express the idea of multi-actor situations in which a plethora of objectives, problems and solutions are present, and out of which decisions emerge in unpredictable ways. The process of policy-making has been described as consisting of independent streams of actors with goals or objectives, solutions, and problems. Occasionally, specific views on problems, available solutions, and objectives happen to match, resulting in a so-called “policy window” (Kingdon, 1995). Another model, the so-called ‘rounds model’, concentrates on the time dimension (Teisman, 1992): Decision-making often does not happen at one specific point in time, but is a far more gradual and continuous process of interaction, negotiation and learning, in which rounds can be distinguished in which agreement on a certain aspect or part is reached and accepted as a basis for the next round. Taking actor configurations as a central perspective, decision-making may be described as interactions in a ‘policy network, which is defined as a more or less stable pattern of social relations between independent actors, which takes shape around specific policy problems or programmes (Kickert et al, 1997). “Policy formation and policy implementation are inevitably the result of interactions among a plurality of separate actors with separate interests, goals, and strategies” (Scharpf et al, 1978). Actors participate in the network, as they are mutually dependent on each other to achieve their goals. At the same time, each actor tries to steer towards his/ her own preferences. Individual actor’s views, strategies and influences are not very predictable, and, thus neither are the policy outcomes. In addition, interactions between actors may change relation patterns, which in turn will influence the interaction patterns. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000

Rationality in decision- and policy-making Table 2. Key differences between the rational, unicentric and the network or policy-centric views on multi-actor policy-making Aspect

Rational, unicentric model

Network or polycentric model

Power structure

A central decision-maker or decision-making group

Decision-making takes place in a network of interdependent actors

Primary basis for decisions

Rational/intellectual

Political/strategic power play

Decision results from

Scientific evidence led by pre-formulated objectives/goals

Compromise, often more determined by available means and solutions than by goals

Process

Sequential, in rational steps or phases

Unpredictable rounds

Basis for agreement

More knowledge will lead to convergence

Political will and support determines possibility for solution

Role of norms and values

Explicit separation of objective knowledge from values

Facts and values cannot be separated; objective knowledge does not exist

Use of knowledge

Instrumental, decisive

Knowledge can provide idea’s, but will mostly be used as strategic ammunition

Focus of support

Technical/analytical

Process management, catalytic, search for exchanges, compromises

Research in the policy sciences also points out that political power play and compromise-making are often more important than scientific evidence in determining the outcome. The ideal of separation of objective knowledge from subjective values is considered unrealistic since all perceptions, information selections and inferences are affected by one’s inevitable bias (Fisher and Forester, 1993; Schön and Rein, 1994). Policy-making is not a cognitive activity starting with fixed objectives resulting in the best way to achieve these, but rather an open interactive process in which problems, solutions and preferences, along with problem and solution perceptions, develop. Objectives and targets are then an output rather than an input to the process. Table 2 summarises a number of key differences between the unicentric or rational view, and the empirical network view on policy-making. We point out that in reality elements of both models often co-exist or compete. The distinction however clarifies the conceptual discussion. Supporting decision processes As in SEA, a significant part of the traditional literature on knowledge-based support of decision processes is based on the (often implicit) assumption of rationality, a unicentric process, and a stepwise approach. Guidelines and methods are focused on the collection, analysis and presentation of objective information on the basis of which the decision-maker can improve his or her judgement. While initially most of the attention was given to assessing the impacts of alternatives and choosing among a given set of alternatives with known outcomes (such as in cost–benefit analysis or decision analysis, see for instance, Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976), later publications in this thread of thinking broaden the approach to paying significantly more attention to formulating the problem, identifying the values of interest and identifying Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000

a wide enough range of alternatives (Miser and Quade, 1985; 1988; Patton and Sawicki, 1993; Dunn, 1994; Keeney, 1994). As a result of practical experience with this approach showing limited success, and under the influence of empirical research in the policy sciences, a number of new ideas and approaches to the support of decision and policy processes have emerged over the last decades. Participative or interactive modes First, participative or interactive modes of policy development and associated policy support have been developed. An important trigger was the frustration with decisions that were made from a centralistic governance point of view, but which appeared to be ineffective because of lack of support among those who were involved in the implementation. Similarly, policy studies performed by experts in their study offices often had no impact, ending up on a shelf collecting dust. The key notion in participation is to involve relevant actors in the policy preparation process. Relevance of parties may be determined by their formal position (for instance, a government authority), their control of relevant resources (for instance, money, expertise), their power to hinder or block implementation (lobby groups, implementers) or by the stakes in the issue (for instance, proponents of some policy).

Initially focus was on assessing the impacts of alternatives with known outcomes: later significantly more attention was paid to formulating the problem, identifying the values of interest and identifying a wide enough range of alternatives

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among the participating actors concentrates on the full lines of arguments followed to support or reject certain positions, including the underlying differences in perceptions and values (Fisher and Forester, 1993) The objective of the approach is to increase the mutual understanding of participant’s differences of view, and to attempt a “frame-reflective discourse” (Schön and Rein, 1994) in which frames are adjusted and new joint views are constructed as a basis for action. Accordingly, methods and techniques for identifying and portraying actor perceptions are being developed (for instance, Durning, 1999). Critics have pointed out, however, that such an approach can only be productive in situations in which all participants adopt an open and constructive attitude towards each other. This is often not the case, particularly if strong differences in norms or interests exist, the stakes are high, and the situation is perceived in terms of winners and losers. In such situations, we see more of a court-room type of discourse, in which each of the participants attempts to improve and add to their argumentation in an attempt to win the case, rather than to search for openings and a more open, joint solution. Therefore, the style and culture of the policy environment seem to be important contextual conditions that determine the potential for success of discourse approaches.

The idea is that participation will improve the process in four different ways (Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Mayer, 1997): · ·

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Increased richness of information and creativity, as the points of view and knowledge of a variety of actors are taken into account. Increased acceptance of the result of the assessment and/or decision process, as participation may lead to shared visions and a sense of ownership of the results. Incorporation instead of exclusion of the dynamics and learning so characteristic of many such processes. Rather than a study process in which objectives and problems are fixed at the start, a participative process allows for emergent insights and shifts in problem perspectives and objectives over time, with the consent of all those involved. Contribution to the democratic character of the process, depending on how the participants are selected, how the process is managed, and how ‘democratic’ is defined.

Participation can be realised in a wide variety of forms and degrees of intensity. Expert participation is primarily beneficial to knowledge provision and integration; stakeholder participation may contribute to both knowledge enrichment and the building of a support base; and public participation may be more oriented to enhancing the democratic nature of the process. Participation may take the form of hearings or more active involvement, and it may take place at one or more specific points in the process, or on a more continuous basis. A wide variety of techniques may be used to structure participative processes, including gaming, scenario workshops and the like (Mayer, 1997).

Process design

Normative debates

A third line of innovation emphasises the process design rather than the content of the interaction process. The assumption is that an adequate set of agreed-upon rules for interaction and decision-making is a necessary condition for effective and efficient substantive deliberations between the participants. Guidelines for process design emphasise things such as openness of the process, transparency of procedures, a certain degree of freedom and protection for participants, the provision of opportunities for parties to enter or leave the process, and so on (Kickert et al, 1997; de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof, 1999). Complementary to the development of ideas on different types of support that may fit different types of policy situations (or may even complement each other) is the notion that supporting specialists or analysts may play a variety of roles in a policy process. Empirical research on the roles played by policy analysts in practice, has shown the existence of different roles being played (adapted from Meltsner, 1976):

Second, it has been argued that concentration on substantive, scientific and ‘objective’ aspects of a policy issue, such as the range of alternatives and their impacts, does not address the core issues of many policy debates (Fisher and Forester, 1993; Schön and Rein, 1994, White, 1994). The underlying debates are often essentially normative. The views of participants on what the problem is, what the possible solutions are, and what is desirable are framed by their world view and underlying norms. For example, conflicts on PVC regulations have been dominated by the normative differences on how to act under the inevitable uncertainty about the impacts of PVC on the environment and human health, which uncertainty cannot be resolved by more analysis (Bras-Klapwijk, 1999; van Eeten, 1999). Even when participants have largely the same values, they may still have difficulties in communication because they may not speak the same ‘language’ (Bogetoft and Pruzan, 1997). As a response, so-called ‘argumentative’ policy analysis has been proposed. In an argumentative discourse, the debate and learning 196

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the technician; the mediator–facilitator (also indicated as catalyst); the policy entrepreneur; the policy advocate. ·

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A technician mainly concentrates on collecting and presenting objective, science-based information to the decision-maker or the set of actors participating in the process. He or she limits attention to what can be Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000

Rationality in decision- and policy-making Table 3. Typology of problem situations with indicated support approach Social/value consensus

Strong conflicts of values, interests

Mediation Ample substantive Rational problem Negotiation support knowledge solving Technical, objective design Lack of knowledge, high uncertainty

Additional research Argumentative and Risk approach other approaches Facilitation or entrepreneurial styles

Source: Adapted from Flood and Jackson, 1991; Hisschemoller, 1993; Dunn, 1994

considered value-free knowledge, leaving normative issues and trading off values to the individual or group supported. A mediator–facilitator takes a more active role in the process by being instrumental in exchanging information between actors, pointing out differences and areas of agreement, and structuring the discussion. He may search for compromises, identify new options, suggest inviting new actors in, and so on. Both technicians and mediator–facilitators adopt a more or less neutral, serving position with respect to the parties and interests involved. A policy entrepreneur, however, may explicitly choose to support a particular policy point of view that he or she sees as being the most beneficial outcome of the process, and then act from that perspective as a leader instead of a servant. Policy advocates analyse and act deliberately as the a priori representatives of one of the stakeholders or interests, and concentrate on providing information and arguments from that particular point of view. Generally, the role of policy advocate is considered to be incompatible with the technician and mediator roles, as these require independence with respect to the interests of the parties involved. The distinction of different roles an analyst may play is similar to a distinction of different ways in which (scientific) information is, or can be, used in a policy debate. First, information can be used in the traditional, rational sense as input to solving a given and well specified problem, generally of the character ‘find the best solution given specific objectives and constraints’. Second, information can provide new ideas to a policy debate, opening the way to new options, to look at other angles, and so on (van Eeten, 1999). Third, information can be used as ammunition in a strategic debate, to strengthen one’s own arguments and weaken those of the opponents. The recognition of different types of roles and contributions, and different types of problem situations, has led several authors to come up with typologies intended to assist analysts and policy-makers in choosing an appropriate approach in a given situation. This typology generally identifies problem situation characteristics on the one hand, and approaches that best fit these characteristic situations on the other. One simple typology mentioned by various authors in Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000

different terms distinguishes situations according to first the availability of substantive knowledge, and second the degree of social or value consensus on the other (see Table 3). Four archetypical situations emerge. When social consensus is combined with sufficient knowledge, a rational problem-solving approach will probably work. When knowledge is lacking, either more research can provide a solution, or the choice of a solution is guided by a conscious (agreed upon) approach to taking risks. When there are strong value conflicts and ample knowledge, additional analysis will not help, and either negotiation support and mediation approaches or a courtroom set-up with agreed decision rules might lead to an accepted solution. Catalytic or entrepreneurial approaches are generally advised in the messiest situations: combinations of lack of knowledge and disagreement on values or conflicts of interests may support the reaching of a compromise solution. Implications for SEA Much of the earlier work in SEA is based on the assumption that the provision of better information on the environmental impacts of plans or policies will result in decision-makers taking environmental aspects more seriously than would be the case without SEA, and that this will lead to decisions that will turn out to be better for the environment. Recently, broader approaches are being adopted targeting sustainability and pointing out the need for adaptation and integration (several papers in this issue). In addition, there is a tendency towards participatory approaches (Thérivel and Partidário, 2000). Here, we will now concentrate on the implications of the theoretical and empirical notions discussed above for the practice of SEA and for SEA-related research. First and foremost, the notion that different roles can be fulfilled in the context of a multi-actor decision process relates to the very essence of SEA. SEA intends to promote environmental preservation or, more broadly, sustainability. By taking that stance, it takes a position probably not shared by (all) other stakeholders and thereby becomes a stakeholder itself. As a consequence, SEA plays an advocative role, and will be seen as such by other stakeholders even if SEA practitioners would prefer to consider themselves as being objective scientists. There need to be nothing wrong with this. The provision of information about environmental impacts, and the development and promotion of more sustainable alternatives may indeed have the desired impact on the decisions eventually taken. An advocative role may be very appropriate in situations characterised as a battle of special interest analyses, where SEA would provide counterarguments and balance amidst economic, traffic, health, safety, or whatever other partial impact assessments. Criteria for success of SEA would then relate to the degree to which 197


In addition to the analysts’ own objectives and those of the client, these conditions provide some guidance to the choice among a variety of approaches, answering questions such as:

SEA’s dilemma is whether to stick to the original objectives, provide partial analyses and play an advocative role, or to aim at ‘good’ decision-making by providing balanced overall assessments and ‘outside’ support to the learning and negotiation process of stakeholders and policy-makers environmental or sustainability concerns have been taken into account in the decision process, and to the eventual impact of this on the environment. Problems may develop, however, when the original mission of SEA evolves into, or is substituted by, the ambition to provide integrated assessments and decision process support. Integrated support, whether it is directed at (technical) knowledge integration, stakeholder process facilitation, public participation, or a combination of these, requires a neutral position with respect to the issues at hand and the stakeholders involved, and an equal ability on the part of the analyst to understand the different stakes and points of view. This is at odds with the original mission and position of SEA. Success criteria for such integrated support emphasise process efficiency and richness, stakeholder satisfaction, openness, balanced knowledge provision, and so on, irrespective of the decision outcome (Thissen and Twaalfhoven, 2000). The dilemma for SEA and its practitioners is whether to stick to the original objectives, provide partial analyses and play an advocative role, or to shift to a position close to that of (traditional or participative) policy analysis and integrated planning, aiming at ‘good’ decision-making by providing balanced overall assessments and providing ‘outside’ support to the learning and negotiation process of stakeholders and policy-makers. The crucial point here is that SEA practitioners should be aware of this dilemma, and make conscious choices regarding their objectives and associated roles, and also make it very clear to clients and stakeholders what their position is (Thissen, 1997). Second, and irrespective of the choice of primary objectives discussed in the preceding paragraph, impact assessors should more deliberately choose the kind of approach that seems to be the most promising to achieve the objectives chosen. As indicated in Table 3 and in the discussion above, different situations may require different approaches. To make a well considered choice, attention should be given at the very beginning of a process to the nature and context of the decision situation, the style and culture of the actor network involved, the mutual dependencies and fundamental interests of the actors, requirements in terms of openness and democratic nature, and probably other relevant factors. 198

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Should the approach concentrate on substance or on process? Should the process be open and interactive, or closed? If interactive, what is the prime objective of the interaction? Enrichment of content? Enhancement of democracy? Ensuring the commitment of important players? What actors or persons should be invited to participate? Should they be experts or scientists? Prime stakeholder representatives? What should be the nature of the discourse to be started? Is there an opportunity for an open, constructive debate? Or are parties entrenched, which may make a successful participative approach much harder to realise?

Scientific theory and empirical evaluations, however, do not yet provide clear and unambiguous guidelines for answering these questions, leaving much to craftsmanship and good judgement. However, this is no excuse for not realising that these choices are made, and for attempting to make them as well as possible. Third, impact assessors can only deal effectively with the dynamics and unpredictability of decision processes if they adopt a flexible, adaptive and learning approach themselves. If they do not, they run the risk of writing a thorough report based on an initial but fixed problem formulation, only to find out after a while that the policy agenda and issues have changed significantly in the mean time, as a consequence of which a well researched report remains unused and ineffective. A key requirement for analysts is to maintain good and regular communication with stakeholders and decision-makers during the whole process (Majone and Quade, 1980; Miser and Quade, 1988). Participative approaches are less vulnerable than non-participative to the risk of working with a fixed but outdated problem formulation in as far as the stakeholders take the process seriously, and the major parties of relevance are involved. Fourth, the cognitive and attention limitations resulting in satisficing rather than optimising behaviour suggest that refinement of analysis to include larger numbers of alternatives, more detailed impacts, and more scientific rigour will not necessarily lead to more impact on the decision situation. Rather, an approach focusing on a limited set of key issues to be brought to the attention of decision-makers seems to be advisable. This is not to say that scientific rigour is bad; arguments based on data that cannot be supported in a scientific debate are vulnerable, and scientists should continue to work on improved understanding of environmental impacts. However, to be effective in a Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000


decision context, emphasis should not be on the advancement of science, but on the use of existing scientific insights to enlighten decision-makers, and the information should be tuned to decision-maker capabilities, interests and timetables. The challenge for impact assessors is to identify those key issues in an effective and timely way. Quick-scan approaches early in the process look promising. For example, a few interactive rounds with stakeholders identifying their key interests, views on the issues and on potential solutions, supported by a broad-brush evaluation may provide a good basis for determining the scope of further analyses (Enserink, 2000). Fifth, impact assessors should consider broadening their analytic scope in two respects: broaden the system to be analysed, and broaden the aspects taken into account. Traditionally, impact assessment has mostly concentrated on policies, plans or projects and their potential impacts on the environment and other aspects of relevance. Decision- and policy-making, however, in essence are activities of and between actors with different interests in and perspectives on the problem situation. That means that an analysis of the positions, interests and interrelations of the actors involved in a decision situation may provide insights that could help to identify creative and workable solutions. Equally relevant is the suggestion of including values and arguments in addition to ‘facts’ in an analysis of a decision situation. This will help clarify the reasons for diverging views or positions, and may, depending on the situation, provide ways to build bridges between different viewpoints (van Eeten, 1999). Sixth, and following directly from the preceding point, the present focus of methods for analysis and assessment on the substance of the decision issue (for instance, on alternatives and their impacts) should be broadened to include methods for analysis of actor configurations, their interests and perceptions. Methods to be developed may also extend to identification of possible exchanges between actors. Recent literature in the field of social sciences and policy analysis provides some interesting starting points (Coleman, 1990). Seventh, the need for flexibility and adaptability in policy contexts provides arguments against detailed regulation or legal prescription. The open and flexible approach required might be at conflict with the rigour and fixed terms that are often part of formal environmental impact assessments. Therefore, possible legal frameworks for SEA should prescribe what should be achieved (depending on the specific objectives of SEA) rather than how exactly this should be done. Eighth, the points made above suggest a number of new research directions in SEA. Generally, research in and on SEA should pay more attention to the multi-actor characteristics of decision situations. At present, most of the attention is either focused on the formal, institutional and/or legal structures in which Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal September 2000

SEA (or EIA) is embedded, or on specific approaches, techniques or tools to perform the content analysis, that is, the design of alternatives and the exploration of their impacts. More attention should be given to issues such as process design, matching approaches to problem and context characteristics, and to the selection of methods and combinations of tools in relation to problem characteristics. As a consequence, evaluative and comparative research should be broadened beyond evaluation of the qualities of the assessment process and its direct products (usually the report). The use of assessment results in, and their impacts on, decision-making should also be observed, as well as the contextual conditions within which the assessment was performed and how the assessment was designed to match those conditions. In addition, a sufficiently broad set of possible impacts should be monitored, including impacts related to the learning of participants and the social structure (Thissen, 2000). Concluding remarks SEA is intended to affect policy processes and their outcomes. If SEA is to have the intended impact; the approach should be guided by insights into the nature of decision processes and the ways to influence these processes. In this paper, we have explored a limited number of characteristics of decision processes and paid attention to two levels: the individual and the multi-actor. Individual decision characteristics justify only to a limited extent the assumption of rationality in the process, and of the added value of more detailed assessment information. At the multi-actor level, which is most relevant for SEA, the problems with the assumptions of full rationality are even deeper. Research findings in, and theories from, decision and policy sciences, and developments in decision support and policy analysis provide a number of insights and experiences that may help to redirect SEA to make it more effective. Key notions include the type of information to be provided, the transition to more open and emergent approaches based on interaction with relevant parties, the need to include actor configurations and interests as central elements in the analysis, and the need deliberately to choose a role and function in the process. In addition, the debate on the roles of knowledge and knowledge workers in policy processes points to the need for SEA to keep fundamentally apart two missions that tend to get mixed up in present-day discussions: its advocative mission as an instrument to enhance the preservation of the natural environment, and the ambition to support balanced decisionmaking which requires a neutral position towards the stakes in the process. Nevertheless, the policy and decision sciences do not offer final answers. Both SEA and the policy sciences may benefit from further experiments and 199


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