Nat Hazards DOI 10.1007/s11069-015-1871-y ORIGINAL PAPER
Deconstructing the concept of shared responsibility for disaster resilience: a Sunshine Coast case study, Australia Lila Singh-Peterson1 • Paul Salmon2 Claudia Baldwin1 • Natassia Goode2
•
Received: 21 October 2014 / Accepted: 10 June 2015 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
Abstract Due in part to the increase in frequency and intensity of extreme weather events in Australia, emergency management has recently transitioned from a commandand-control civil defence structure to one promoting ‘shared responsibility’ between government, businesses, non-government, communities and individuals. The objective is to enable communities to become disaster resilient as opposed to fortified against risk. In this paper, using a case study approach, we examine whether this national resilience approach has been effectively institutionalised at the local scale. To do this, we draw upon the knowledge of those working within the traditional emergency management and community service sectors to identify which factors influence the resilience of a community in the case study location and determine which stakeholder classes are considered responsible for developing and enhancing each factor. The results indicate that all three tiers of government are still seen to be largely responsible for the case study’s disaster resilience; however, local community groups comprised of volunteers are also perceived to be largely responsible for disaster resilience despite obvious capacity and resourcing limitations. Keywords Shared responsibility National strategy for disaster resilience Community resilience Disaster resilience Emergency management Community engagement
1 Introduction The concept of resilience has been the subject of numerous academic disciplines and political discourses and is now applied to a number of practice areas (Manyena 2006; Norris et al. 2008; Alexander 2013; Aldunce et al. 2014). In emergency or disaster & Lila Singh-Peterson
[email protected] 1
Sustainability Research Centre, University of the Sunshine Coast, Locked bag 4, Maroochydore, QLD 4558, Australia
2
University of the Sunshine Coast Accident Research Group, University of the Sunshine Coast, Locked bag 4, Maroochydore, QLD 4558, Australia
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management, the resilience concept has emerged in recent years, as classical risk management approaches have failed during recent disaster experiences (Park et al. 2011). Djalante et al. (2013) report on the transition in disaster risk reduction approaches from hazard to vulnerability assessment, from a single disciplinary approach to interdisciplinary and from a relief and recovery focus to one promoting preparedness and prevention. Lei et al. (2014) emphasise how our approach to managing extreme weather events has evolved from prevention or control to mitigation, and from vulnerability reduction to adaptation. Further, Adger et al. (2005) identify how the concept of resilience has challenged the widely held notions about resistance to change and stability implicit in risk and hazard management. The transition in approach to disaster risk reduction has been propelled by acknowledgments that the capacity of a community to withstand, or adapt and transform in response to disaster events, is not adequately represented by structural determinants of vulnerability alone (O’Brien et al. 2006). Researchers and policy decision makers are now looking beyond engineering-based solutions to natural hazards, to include social and environmental factors that support resilience building (Cohen et al. 2013; Cox 2012; Djalante et al. 2013). Resilience thinking supports disaster management to transition to an all-hazards approach, placing the emphasis on the ability of a complex system to deal with a hazard as proposed by Berkes (2007), who also identified that resilience theories are forward-looking which could support policy development to deal with uncertainty and change. The need for disaster resilience practices to be integrated across scales and across sectors has also been emphasised in more recent literature (Prosser and Peters 2010; Cox 2012; Djalante et al. 2012; Singh-Peterson et al. 2014). Central to the positioning of resilience in disaster risk reduction is the notion that resilience is a dynamic quality, which can be built by mitigating or reducing risks and enhancing the capacity of communities to respond and recover from and adapt to interruptions (Norris et al. 2008). Within the academic literature, resilience in a disaster context has been defined by many who have emphasised specific components of Holling’s (1973) traditional resilience concept (see Aldunce et al. 2014; Alexander 2013; Lei et al. 2014). In this study, we have adopted the following definition of resilience as applied to disaster and emergency management, which is ‘the ability of communities to face up to, and address disaster risks, as well as their capacity to adapt to climate change’ (Alexander 2013, p. 2714). This definition was chosen as it embodies elements of self-organisation and a capacity to learn and adapt, in addition to coping with emergency events which are consistent with the three central aspects of resilience: resilience (coping), adaptability and transformability (Folke et al. 2010). For all of the reasons given above, the concept of disaster resilience has been co-opted within policy cycles in Australia in response to an increase in the frequency and intensity of natural disasters (Australian Government 2011; Queensland Government 2014, 2015). Arguably, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters (UNISDR 2007) has been prominent in positioning the resilience concept in contemporary disaster risk management spheres (Djalante et al. 2013) and has been influential in the development of Australian domestic policy (Ireland 2015). In 2010, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) adopted a resilience approach to disaster management. This approach acknowledged that in order to enhance Australia’s capacity to withstand, recover and learn from emergencies and disasters, a national, cooperative and coordinated approach is required. The National Strategy for Disaster
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Resilience (Australian Government 2011) broadly outlines how Australia should aim to achieve the COAG’s vision, emphasising the role of society as a whole in shaping resilient communities. Although there are many potential benefits that result from the re-framing of disaster resilience as a shared objective, there are also substantial challenges in effecting that position. In transitioning from the traditional paradigm, State Governments are required to re-organise the emergency management arrangements in Australia, which are underpinned by the traditional ‘top-down’, chain-of-command model of disaster management (Victorian Government 2012; Queensland Government 2014, 2015). The new policy approach also challenges the communities entrenched dependence on formal, government-funded institutions (e.g. emergency service providers), acknowledging that most institutions are often overwhelmed during a disaster (Manock et al. 2013; Wyche et al. 2011). There are also increasing concerns that the political discourse relative to disaster resilience does in fact aim to direct risk and responsibility away from the state and onto individuals and nongovernment organisations (Welsh 2013). Responsibility in this article is referred to as social responsibility—the integration of legal and moral responsibility which includes regulatory responsibility and those guided by moral codes or social norms to ‘do the right thing’ (Vallaeys 2014). In the light of these challenges, a key research question lies in the nature and extent of the impact that the Australian national policy, the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (NSDR), has had on emergency and disaster management arrangements at the local, community level. It is from this perspective that the current research project has emerged, to add empirical evidence to the theorising of disaster resilience. This study seeks to identify the factors that influence the resilience of the Sunshine Coast community as perceived by the disaster risk/emergency management and community service professionals. Additionally, stakeholder groups who are considered to be responsible for enhancing these factors are also identified by the participants in order to establish whether a sharing of responsibility across the stakeholder groups promoted in the NSDR has been achieved. Through this static analysis, we consider whether the Australian Government’s positioning of disaster resilience on the national agenda had actually led to an integrated approach to resilience building for our case study community from the perspectives of those involved.
2 Background The Council of Australian Governments’ (COAG) vision of co-ordination and co-operation to ‘enhance Australia’s capacity to withstand and recover from emergencies and disasters’ was translated into the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (NSDR) by the National Emergency Management Committee in 2011 and was soon after adopted by COAG. The NSDR identifies the shared responsibility for individuals, households, communities, governments and businesses to build disaster-resilient communities. To this end, the NSDR is proposed to be the ‘first step in a long-term, evolving process to deliver sustained behavioural change and enduring partnerships’ (Australian Government 2011, p. 2). Broadly speaking, responsibility sharing occurs when more than one stakeholder has obligations or accountability for achieving the same outcome or goal (McLennan and Handmer 2012; Ostrom 1990). Despite the shared responsibility mandate featuring prominently in the NSDR, there is not a clear direction in how this is to be achieved, nor an
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understanding of whom exactly the actors are within the community’s disaster resilience system. Further to this, McLennan and Handmer (2012) suggest that not only is there little understanding of how stakeholders should work together and what type of relationships they should have, there is also ambiguity in regard to what particular obligations each party have with respect to achieving a shared objective. The ambiguity surrounding the shared responsibility for disaster resilience is one factor which could limit the impact of the NSDR. The NSDR has identified four underpinning characteristics of disaster-resilient communities which consist of: individuals and organisations functioning well whilst under stress; successful adaptation; self-reliance; and social capacity (Australian Government 2011, p. 4). These characteristics or attributes are quite ambiguous owing to the concept of community resilience being conceptualised differently in different communities. Others suggest that the ideal of community resilience is in fact place based and anchored within an understanding of local culture, local risks/vulnerabilities and local resources and capacities (Frazier et al. 2013). This suggests that the characteristics that determine whether a community is resilient in the face of an emergency or disaster are likely to be highly specific to the local context, and so characteristics identified at a national or state level may not be applicable or relevant to all communities (Singh-Peterson et al. 2014). Australia has three tiers of government—Commonwealth, State or Territory and Local Government. The legislated role for managing and responding to emergencies and disasters reside principally with the Australian sovereign states and territories (Eburn 2011). Although there are mechanisms in which the State and Territory Governments are able to access additional resourcing and assistance from the Australian Federal Government, such as the Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements, NDRRA (Biggs 2012). In Queensland, where our case study is located, the Emergency Management Act, 2003, defines the State Government and Local Government’s role in managing emergencies and disasters (Queensland Government 2014, 2015). Local Governments in Australia do not have constitutional powers and essentially operate as agents of the State and Territory Governments (Stilwell and Troy 2000). Following the Queensland State Government model, multiple government management arrangements exist at the sub-state level as defined by the Disaster Management Act 2003 see Fig. 1. District Disaster Management Group (DDMG) and Local Disaster Management Group (LDMG) reside at the regional and local scale in multiple locations across Queensland. These groups are responsible for supporting vertical policy integration and coordination across the scales of government, and implementing policy initiatives developed at a state and national level. As networking and coordinating bodies, the LDMG and DDMG have very important roles as Prosser and Peters (2010, p. 10) state ‘the concept of disaster resilience is characterised by its complexity, interactivity and interconnectedness’. In applying this concept, organisations that foster interconnectivity and interactivity are therefore core to resilience building. The DDMG exists at the district level and similarly serves multi-purposes and functions at a larger geographical scale. Its main responsibilities are to develop effective district level disaster management strategies which align with the State Disaster Management Group’s strategic policy framework, and ensure that the community is aware of mitigation, preparation and recovery practices when exposed to emergencies and disasters. In alignment with the state model, the LDMG has multiple functions which include: developing, reviewing and assessing effective disaster management plans at the local scale to build
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Fig. 1 Location of the Sunshine Coast in South Eastern Queensland, Australia
public awareness of disasters and disaster prevention. Additionally, the LDMG co-ordinates and directs resources as needed and enact and align local policies and plans with State Government initiatives.
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3 Methodology Community disaster resilience can be nested within multiple geographic scales. The local scale is emphasised in many studies as Pfefferbaum et al. (2015, p. 239) states ‘resilience at any level depends on the local context and the threats that an individual or system faces’. Breaking down the concept of a community’s resilience into distinct attributes, adaptive capacities or factors supporting resilience are necessary for identifying factors or components that support progression towards resilience. This approach has also been adopted by researchers when determining methods of assessing community resilience (Cutter et al. 2010; Pfefferbaum et al. 2015) assisting communities to identify strengths and address vulnerabilities. The methodology developed for this research is novel, in that the factors influencing a community’s disaster resilience are drawn directly from empirical evidence. Norris et al. (2008) take a similar approach in breaking down the resilience of a community into a network of distinct adaptive capacities which they have identified through an extensive literature review. Similarly, Bahadur et al. (2013) identify ten characteristics of a resilient community based upon a literature review. There is no, to our knowledge, other published work in Australia that examines which stakeholder group holds all, or part of, the responsibility for enhancing specific factors that enhance or impede a community’s resilience. We present a static, moment in time view of where the perception of responsibility lays in a case study community and compare with the overarching objective of ‘shared responsibility’ promoted through political and academic discourses.
3.1 Case study: Sunshine Coast, Queensland The study was undertaken on the Sunshine Coast region located in south-east Queensland, Australia. At the time of the research project, the Sunshine Coast Local Government had recently undergone de-amalgamation with Noosa Council and now occupies the region between Noosa, Somerset and Moreton Bay Regional Councils in South Eastern Queensland as depicted in Fig. 1 (Sunshine Coast Regional Council 2013). The Sunshine Coast is a popular tourist destination located approximately 100 km north of the Queensland capital city of Brisbane. The sub-tropical climate and sandy beaches support a thriving tourism industry. The region is roughly 3000 km2 dominated by coastal plains and basalt ridgelines to the west of the region. In 2011, the region was home to over 306,903 people and receives over 2.5 million domestic visitors annually and approximately 270,000 international visitors annually (Sunshine Coast Regional Council 2013). The demographic profile of Sunshine Coast residents is slightly older than the Queensland average with a median age of 42, rather than 36 years of age. This trend reflects the migration of retirees to the region and the movement of younger populations out of the region pursuing employment or further education opportunities (ABS 2011). Accordingly, the percentage of households with children is lower than experienced in Queensland’s capital city and surrounding region, and the percentage of child-free households and lone households is also greater. Similarly, the percentage of households that earn a high income (more than $2500/week) was significantly less than Greater Brisbane, and the percentage of households that earn a low income (less than $600/week) was higher than the average household in Greater Brisbane (ABS 2011).
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Fig. 2 Multiple government arrangements in place on the Sunshine Coast, Queensland adapted from Queensland Government
In 2011, the Sunshine Coast Regional Council compiled a regional disaster risk assessment task that assessed 24 potential natural and human-made hazards (Sunshine Coast Regional Council 2013). The assessment considered seasonal variations of each risk to ensure a more dynamic and accurate assessment of potential risk exposure. As a result, the risk assessment identified that storms attributed to East Coast Low Pressure Systems and Tropical Cyclones exhibit the greatest risk to the residents of the Sunshine Coast. Other high-priority risks include flooding, bushfire and drought. In addition to the disaster management arrangements presented in Fig. 2, the Sunshine Coast Council has established additional community groups and specialist focus groups at the LDMG sub-group level. The specialist focus groups are mainly clustered around sectors; for example, the health sub-group consists of emergency and general medical and aged care professionals that co-ordinate disaster management health-related planning across the region. The LDMG community sub-groups comprise residents who live in highrisk locations. These groups have been supported and coordinated by Council in the past; however, funding for these activities has ceased at the time of writing.
3.2 Steering group and workshop For the purpose of this project, a steering group was assembled comprised of key individuals active in the community resilience and disaster resilience space in Queensland. The steering group included representatives from the Local Government Association of
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Queensland, Queensland Council of Social Service, Wesley Mission and the Sunshine Coast Council, where the case study was located. The steering group was instrumental in co-designing the scope of the project; drawing on their networks to identify workshop participants; and co-interpreting the key outcomes of the research project, presented herein. Data were compiled through a workshop with participants active in community resilience and disaster or emergency management activities on the Sunshine Coast. A pre-workshop survey was also utilised to collect data which informed the workshop activities. A 1-day workshop was held at the University of the Sunshine Coast, Queensland, on 3 June 2014. Workshop participants were invited from the Local Disaster Management Group (LDMG) and the District Disaster Management Group (DDMG) via invitation from the Disaster Management Coordinator of the local Council, who is a member of the project’s steering group. Other workshop participants were invited directly by the steering group as representatives of various State Government organisations or community welfare organisations. The premise behind selecting the workshop participants was based upon a need to represent emergency management officials, emergency response organisations, community welfare groups and others involved in governance and response at the local level. Thirty-two participants aged from 30 to 61? years took part in the workshop with half of the participants aged between 51 and 60 years of age. Thirty-eight per cent of the participants had been involved in emergency/disaster management for over 11 years. Over 70 % of the participants were based on the Sunshine Coast with other participants located in neighbouring Local Government areas or based in Brisbane with roles relevant to the Sunshine Coast. Many of the state, local and emergency service attendees held senior management roles such as Asset Manager, Disaster Coordinator, Community Engagement Manager, Disaster Management Facilitator, Project and Support Officer—Disaster Management, Inspector/Area Commander, Field Liasion Officer. Not-for-profit or humanitarian group representatives held roles like Community Manager, Community Engagement Officers and Regional Support Officer—Mental Health. In order to determine which factors of disaster resilience were considered relevant to the Sunshine Coast, a pre-workshop online survey was emailed to the registered workshop participants requesting that they rate the relevance of a series of factors influencing disaster resilience. A prospective list of characteristics of disaster resilience was developed through a detailed literature search (Goode et al. forthcoming). Relevant literature was identified from a key word search of ‘disaster’ and ‘resilience’ and ‘models’ or ‘framework’ from Google Scholar, Science Direct, Scopus, Taylor and Francis and Wiley databases. From the 701 articles returned, 15 models were selected for further review if they met the following criteria that (1) they presented a descriptive model of the process or characteristics of disaster resilience, (2) they primarily related resilience to extreme weather events, such as intense, sporadic weather events as opposed to prolonged periods of dry or drought and (3) they were written in English. As the characteristics were influential in either enhancing or impeding a community’s resilience, they have been referred to in this article as factors. In our study, participants rated whether each of these factors identified from the literature were relevant to developing disaster resilience on the Sunshine Coast on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (not relevant at all) to 5 (highly relevant). In addition, participants were invited to nominate other factors that they considered relevant that were not included in the original list. The results were analysed to identify which of the factors were perceived to be relevant to developing disaster resilience on the Sunshine Coast by the majority of survey participants. Consensus was said to exist when at least 75 % of participants agreed that the factor was mostly relevant (4) or highly relevant (5).
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During the workshop, the participants voted on whether each factor was considered relevant to the Sunshine Coast. Once again, consensus was sought for this activity, but attention was given to the factors less popular. Workshop participants were invited or volunteered to share their opinion about whether the factors were relevant or not to fellow participants. Those in disagreement with the majority were also invited to put forward their opinion. During the workshop, some of the factors were re-worded as a group activity to become more relevant to the Sunshine Coast. The additional factors suggested by the online survey participants were also discussed and voted on during the workshop. The final activity of the workshop involved the participants identifying which class of stakeholders (see Table 2) they perceived to hold a high level of responsibility for each of the factors considered relevant to the Sunshine Coast. Responsibility included formal legislative responsibility in addition to informal responsibilities and moral obligations. The process involved the participants physically moving to each worksheet and ticking the stakeholder class against each factor that they considered the stakeholder class currently held a high level of responsibility for. There were 27 workshop attendees who participated in the final activity.
4 Results 4.1 Factors influencing the resilience of the Sunshine Coast The factors influencing resilience deemed relevant to Queensland and the Sunshine Coast were initially appraised by the participants in the pre-workshop online survey. Of the factors identified from the literature review, only two were considered not relevant by the survey participants. Consensus could not be reached by survey participants on two factors, which were: • a healthy economy (i.e. financial capital, employment) 40 % somewhat relevant, 40 % mostly relevant, 20 % highly relevant • each sector understanding their responsibilities (e.g. government, community, business, emergency services and not-for-profit sectors) 4.8 % not very relevant, 23.8 % somewhat relevant, 42.9 % mostly relevant, 28.5 % highly relevant The combined percentage of participants that considered a healthy, diverse economy and each sector understanding their responsibilities, as being mostly or highly relevant to Queensland and the Sunshine Coast, was 60 and 71 %, respectively. Using the consensus criteria, these factors were then considered less relevant than other factors, although the majority of participants thought that they were relevant. For this reason, they were introduced and discussed further in the workshop. Additional factors suggested by the survey participants included: To what extent are … • Access to resources and services from rural and remote communities • Being able to respond to the needs of diverse groups (e.g. culturally, aged, disabled, children) in addition to the broader community • The frequency with which a region is faced with a disaster—subsequent disasters • The speed and accuracy of communication dissemination (prior, during and postdisaster)
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• A clear command and control structure (who make the decisions, who directs when it’s time to evacuate) • A national approach to disaster resilience The federal NDRRA1 program … relevant to disaster resilience on the Sunshine Coast, Queensland Given the transition away from the command-and-control civil defence approach to emergency management policy development, the participants considered that a clear command and control structure were critically important in operationalising a coordinated response to an emergency or disaster. As several emergency response organisations utilise large numbers of volunteers, the participants outline that a clear and efficient command and control structure are necessary. Similarly, the participants considered that coordinating multiple agencies to response to an event requires clear inter-organisational command and control structures. The rating process was repeated during the workshop to further analyse the survey outputs. Workshop participants were asked to discuss the relevance of each factor influencing the resilience of the Sunshine Coast. All of the factors gathered in the literature and those returned by the survey participants were discussed. The economic resilience factor initially voted as less relevant through the consensus criteria by the survey participants was re-instated as a factor relevant to the Sunshine Coast. In total, 27 factors sourced from the literature and online survey results were identified as being relevant to the Sunshine Coast’s disaster resilience, see Table 1. The factors identified above pertain to social, economic, environmental, institutional and infrastructure resilience factors or capitals. Some factors do belong to more than one category. For example, partnerships between sectors could be listed as a factor influencing institutional resilience, in addition to social resilience. The workshop participants identified that the economy and environment were implicitly relevant to the disaster resilience of the Sunshine Coast. The institutional and social factors influencing disaster resilience were unpacked further with more specific factors identified. For example, the institutional factors are related to protocol/processes (i.e. clear command and control structure, risk assessment tools) in addition to paradigms (e.g. national approach, partnerships, etc.). The focus upon institutional and social factors of disaster resilience may be representative of the workshop participants, possibly creating a slight distortion as the majority of the workshop participants were employed in either disaster management, government or the community service/welfare sector. It may be that the survey and workshop participants considered that the economic and environmental resilience were implicit and did not require further deconstructing into a suite of factors or they may have been less familiar with these factors and not confident to de-construct these factors further. The factors influencing the resilience of the built environment were further categorised as components of infrastructure. Of the 27 factors identified relevant to the Sunshine Coast, there were 16 that related to institutional resilience, three related to infrastructure and six related to social resilience. Only one implicit factor of the natural environment/ecosystem and another for the economic resilience were identified. In total, 22 of the 27 factors were predominantly socially and institutionally focused, similar to the focus of the four NSDR characteristics of disaster-resilient communities which are: individuals and organisations functioning well 1
The National Disaster Relief and Recovery (NDRRA) program is a joint program between the Australian federal government and a State/Territory government which provides loans and grants to afflicted individuals, business, primary producers, local and State governments recovering from defined natural disasters.
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Nat Hazards Table 1 Factors influencing the resilience of the Sunshine Coast Environmental factors E1. Natural environment/ecosystem Institutional factors Inst1. Emergency management planning and procedures Inst2. Partnerships between sectors Inst3. Ongoing research and learning systems Inst4. Public warning system Inst5. Prevention and mitigation activities Inst6. Hazard and risk assessments Inst7. Government policies, priorities and political commitment Inst8. Legal and regulatory systems Inst9. Rapidity of the initial response Inst10. Speed, accuracy and multiple methods for communication dissemination Inst11. A clear command and control structure Inst12. Land use and land use management Inst13. National approach to disaster resilience Inst14. Co-ordinated resources for response Inst15. Access to resources and services Infrastructure related factors Inf1. Built environment (i.e. buildings, roads) Inf2. Critical infrastructure (i.e. water, power, public health, transportation) Inf3. Supply chain management (i.e. food and fuel supplies) Social factors S1. Community connectedness, cooperation and support systems (i.e. community-based volunteer organisations) S2. Population characteristics (e.g. health, wellbeing, age) S3. Knowledge and skills of the community S4. Being able to respond to the needs of diverse groups (e.g. culturally, aged, disabled, children) in addition to the broader community S5. The frequency with which a region is faced with a disaster—subsequent disasters (to learn from previous events and cope with frequent events) S6. Community adaptation (i.e. the capacity within the community to improvise and respond to events through social learning) Economic factors Ec1. Economy of the community (i.e. financial capital, employment)
whilst under stress; successful adaptation; self-reliance; and social capacity (Australian Government 2011, p. 4). In contrast, many of the factors identified for the Sunshine Coast were more operationally targeted, which will ultimately enhance the characteristics of a disaster-resilient community identified by the NSDR. For example, the factors influencing social resilience identified by the Sunshine Coast further support this by identifying social inclusion (S1, S5), promoting local skills and knowledge (S3, S6) and the importance of networks and capacity building (S2, S4). The factors of social resilience relate to the NSDR characteristics of self-reliance, social capacity and successful adaptation as
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outcomes for resilient communities. The Sunshine Coast factors, determined by the workshop participants, also acknowledge the importance of the built environment (Inf1), critical infrastructure (Inf2) and supply chain management (Inf3) as factors that support or impede disaster resilience.
4.2 Linking factors to stakeholder classes The stakeholder class which held a high level of responsibility for developing or enhancing each factor influencing the resilience of the Sunshine Coast was identified in the second workshop activity. The results are presented below in Tables 2, 3 and 4 in the following way; a blank cell in the table represents that less than 9 people out of 27 thought that a particular stakeholder class held responsibility for that factor, whereas a 0 indicates that no one considered that stakeholder to be responsible. If 9–15 attendees voted that a particular stakeholder class held responsibility for a specific factor; this was presented in the table as a single tick. A double tick denotes that between 16 and 25 people considered the stakeholder class to be responsible. When all participants agreed, this is denoted as a triple tick.
4.2.1 Institutional factors Participants perceived that all three tiers of government and politicians hold the majority of the responsibility for the development and enhancement of the institutional factors influencing disaster resilience. As anticipated, more than 10 of the 27 participants considered that Local, State and Federal Governments were responsible for every institutional factors identified as relevant to the Sunshine Coast. The Federal Government was considered to hold the highest level of responsibility for matters related to policy development, political will, national strategies and approaches. The State Government was perceived to be predominately responsible for the regulatory environment and operational direction. The Local Government held similar operational responsibilities to State Government with the addition of supporting partnerships, and access to resources and services. The non-government stakeholders perceived to hold a high level of responsibility for 6 of the 15 institutional factors, by more than 10 participants, were the LDMG community groups, whom the participants considered held responsibility for building partnerships (Inst2), emergency planning and procedures (Inst1), contributing to risk assessments (Inst6), accessing and coordinating resources for response (Inst14 and Inst15). The media was also identified as holding responsibility for communication dissemination (Inst10) and public warning systems (Inst4). Other stakeholders considered responsible for facilitating partnerships between sectors (Inst2), by more than 10 participants, were business, non-profit organisations, health sector, religious communities and organised volunteer groups. The university and education sector was not considered to hold responsibility for fostering partnerships between sectors.
4.2.2 Social factors The responsibilities for the social factors influencing resilience were more evenly dispersed across the stakeholder classes. The Local Government was seen to bear the majority of responsibility of the stakeholder classes for all of the social factors except for enhancing community adaptation (S6). The establishment and nurturing of social support systems and
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√ √
√ √
Politicians
√√
√√√
Inst1. Emergency man. planning and procedures
Inst2. Partnerships between sectors
State Govt √√
√√ √
√√ √ √√ √√ √ ^ √√√ √
√√
0
√√√
√√
^
√
√√√
√
Inst5. Prevention and Mitigation Activities
Inst6. Hazard and risk assessments
Inst7. Govt priorities and political commitment
Inst8. Legal and regulatory systems
Inst9. Rapidity of the initial response
Inst10. Speed, accuracy and multiple methods for communication dissemination
√√ √ √
√√√
√
√√
Inst15. Access to resources and services
√
√√
√√
√√
√√
√
√√
Local Govt √√
√
√
√
√√
√
√
√√
√
√
√√√
√√
√
√√
√√
Emerg. Services ^
^
^
0
√√
^
√
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
√
Business ^
^
^
^
0
^
^
^
0
^
√
^
^
√
^
Not-forprofits ^
^
^
0
0
0
^
0
0
0
^
0
0
√
^
Community Grps ^
^
^
^
0
0
0
^
^
0
^
^
0
√√
^
LDMG Community Grps √
√√
√
0
0
^
^
^
0
√
^
^
^
√
√
0
^
^
^
0
0
0
0
^
^
^
0
√√
^
0
^
^
^
0
^
0
^
^
^
√
^
^
0
√
^
0
^
0
0
0
0
0
^
^
0
0
0
0
√
^
Uni / Research Health Services Religious Org.
0, no votes; ^, 1 –9 votes; H, 10–15 participant votes; HH, 16–25 participant votes; HHH, all participants agreed
Inst13. National approach to disaster resilience
Inst14. Co-ordinated resources for response
Inst12. Land use and land use management
Inst11. A clear command and control structure
√√√
√
√
Inst4. Public warning system
√√
√
^
Inst3. Ongoing research and learning systems
√√
Fed Govt
Institutional factors which influence the resilience of the Sunshine Coast / Stakeholder Classes
Education Sector 0
0
^
^
0
^
0
0
0
^
^
0
^
^
^
Media ^
0
^
^
0
√√
^
0
^
0
^
√
0
^
^
Spont. Donors 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
^
0
Volunteer Grps ^
^
^
^
0
0
^
0
0
0
^
0
0
√
^
^
0
^
^
0
0
^
0
0
0
^
0
0
^
0
Individuals
Table 2 Identification of which stakeholder classes hold a high level of responsibility for each institutional factors influencing disaster resilience on the Sunshine Coast
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123
Fed Govt ^ ^
√ ^
^
^
√
^
^
√√
√√
^
Local Govt ^
√√
√
√
√
√
Emerg. Services ^
√
√
^
^
^
Business ^
√
^
^
^
^
Not-forprofits ^
√
^
0
^
√
Community Grps √√
√√
^
^
^
√
LDMG Community Grps ^
√
√
^
^
^
Uni / Research ^
^
^
^
^
0
^
√
√
^
√√
^
Health Services
0, no votes; ^, 1–9 votes; H, 10–15 participant votes; HH, 16–25 participant votes; HHH, all participants agreed
√√
^
√
^
State Govt
0
^
S1. Community connectedness, cooperation and support systems
S2. Population characteristics (e.g.. demographics) S3. Knowledge and skills of the community S4. Being able to respond to the needs of diverse groups (e.g. culturally, aged, disabled, children) in addition to the broader community S5. The frequency with which a region is faced with a disaster (to learn from previous events and cope with frequent events) S6. Community adaptation (capacity of community to adapt)
Politicians
Social factors which influence the resilience of the Sunshine Coast / Stakeholder Classes
Religious Org. ^
√
^
0
^
^
Education Sector ^
^
^
^
^
^
Media ^
√
^
^
0
^
Spont. Donors 0
^
^
0
^
^
^
^
^
^
0
√
√
√
^
^
^
Spont. Volunteers Org. Volunteer Grps ^
^
^
^
^
0
^
Individuals
Table 3 Identification of which stakeholder classes hold a high level of responsibility for the social factors influencing disaster resilience on the Sunshine Coast
Nat Hazards
√
√
√√√
√√
√√√
√
√
^
√√
√√
√
Politicians
√
Fed Govt
√
√√
State Govt
√√
Local Govt √√
√√√
√
√
√√
Emerg. Services 0
^
^
^
0
Business ^
√√
√
^
^
Not-forprofits ^
0
^
0
0
Community Grps ^
0
^
0
0
LDMG Community Grps ^
0
^
0
0
Uni / Research 0
0
0
0
^
Health Services 0
0
^
^
0
0
0
0
0
0
Religious Org.
0, no votes; ^, 1–9 votes; H, 10–15 participant votes; HH, 16–25 participant votes; HHH, all participants agreed
E1. Natural environment / ecosystem
ECOLOGICAL FACTORS
Ec1. Economy of the community (i.e. financial capital,
ECONOMIC FACTORS
INFRASTRUCTURE FACTORS Inf1. Built environment (i.e. buildings, roads) Inf2. Crical infrastructure (i.e. water, power, public infrastructure, transportaon) Inf3. Supply chain management (i.e. food and fuel supplies)
Factors which influence the resilience of the Sunshine Coast / Stakeholder Classes
Education Sector 0
0
0
0
0
Media 0
0
0
0
0
Spont. Donors 0
0
^
0
0
0
0
^
0
^
0
^
0
0
Spont. Volunteers Org. Volunteer Grps 0
0
^
0
0
0
Individuals
Table 4 Identification of which stakeholder classes hold a high level of responsibility for each factors influencing disaster resilience on the Sunshine Coast
Nat Hazards
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community cohesion (S1) were perceived to be largely the responsibility of Local Government, non-profits and community groups. Of interest is that most participants considered that the community groups were also responsible for community adaptation (S6) and coping with frequent events (S5). Participants considered that politicians were also responsible for responding to the needs of diverse groups (S4) and supporting communities to cope with frequent events (S5). Health services and volunteers were also perceived to hold responsibility for responding to the needs of a diverse community (S4) and supporting a community frequently impacted by emergencies and disasters (S5). Additionally, the health sector and all tiers of government were considered to have responsibility for providing information about the population (S2).
4.2.3 Infrastructure, economic and environmental factors The responsibility for infrastructure and environmental factors was largely considered to be the domain of State and Local Governments. Businesses were perceived to hold responsibility for supply chain management (Inf3) and the local economy (Ec1). The Federal Government was also seen to be responsible for the local economy (Ec1); 10–15 participants considered that the Federal Government was also responsible for both the built and natural environment (Inf1 and E1). The majority of participants did not feel that other stakeholders, other than politicians, businesses and government, held responsibility for any of these factors influencing resilience. Community groups and non-profit organisations were not considered responsible for the local economy (Ec1) or local environment (E1).
5 Discussion As the Australian Government and the Queensland State Government continue to promote a ‘shared responsibility’ approach to enhancing disaster resilience, there is not a clear pathway on how this could be achieved (McLennan and Handmer 2012). Whilst this lack of clarity represents a key gap in the research literature, practically it threatens to dilute the potential contribution that the concept can make efforts to build resilience. The NSDR refers to the collective responsibility of all sectors of society, including government, nongovernment, businesses and individuals (p4). More specifically, the health sector, education sector and religious community are all important stakeholders at the local, community level that could also be mobilised to support and enhance resilience building objectives, yet these sectors do not feature in the NSDR. The national approach to a community’s disaster resilience as reported in the NSDR identifies four primarily social and institutional characteristics that a disaster-resilient community should hold. The factors influencing the resilience of Sunshine Coast communities were largely perceived as more operational and, in some cases, further delineated important characteristics of disaster resilience for the Sunshine Coast. For example, the factors related to the institutional elements of resilience were identified as having quality hazard and risk assessment tools, and multiple modes of communication ultimately lead to ‘strengthening preparedness and response capabilities’ as promoted in the NSDR. In contrast, factors like ‘being able to respond to the needs of diverse groups’ expand the concept of what exactly community resilience is for the Sunshine Coast. These empirical findings contribute to the literature regarding the subjectivity of what ‘community resilience’ practically means, and confirm the benefit of a more localised approach to defining
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the factors relevant to each community’s resilience building objectives (Aldunce et al. 2014; Frazier et al. 2013; Singh-Peterson et al. 2014). It is apparent from the case study presented here that those within the community development and emergency management sectors consider that the responsibility for enhancing disaster resilience still resides mostly with government and politicians, and to a lesser extent with the community LDMG sub-groups, despite their obvious capacity and resourcing limitations. The perception that responsibility sits with government and the first responder organisations is in keeping with the traditional mode of operation (see Queensland Government 2015) and makes practical sense, as many of the resources and specific skills are currently located within these organisations. In contrast, the community LDMG sub-groups operating on the Sunshine Coast are made up of volunteers, who are people often engaged in other voluntary community development roles, in addition to their paid employment, and family responsibilities. This stakeholder group is perceived to hold a high level of responsibility for a multitude of important factors that range from supporting and delivering policy (Inst1, 6, 13), accessing and coordinating resources (Inst14, 15) to undertaking community engagement, social cohesion and capacity building activities (S1, 5, 6). In this way, the community LDMG sub-groups are perceived to be agents of Local Government. This arrangement could work well if support, training and resources could enable the sub-groups to meet this expectation. It is appropriate that many of the factors influencing the resilience of a community need to be initiated and nurtured at the local scale, in collaboration with local community. Many researchers have suggested that effective adaptation to climate change and extreme weather events consist of integrated local responses to place-based impacts and risks (Tompkins and Adger 2004; Rodima-Taylor et al. 2012; Cox 2012). This is in keeping with Cox and Perry (2011) who suggest that community resilience is anchored within an understanding of local culture, risks/vulnerabilities, resources and capacities. Djalante et al. (2013) also argue that the community needs to be placed at the centre of climate change and disaster risk reduction integrated and adaptive strategies, and state that there is an urgent need to commit more resources to these objectives and strengthen local collaborations. Our case study results suggest that experts perceive that the local community is responsible for many factors that influence their community’s resilience. This could be interpreted as positioning the community at the centre of resilience building. However, given the volume of local engagement rhetoric in the policy arena, it may be that the workshop participants are responding to the call for locally based, ground-up engagement and inclusion, and as a result, the tension between inclusion and responsibility has become blurred. Another finding emerging from our study is that community groups such as not-forprofit civil service organisations or community welfare organisations on the whole were considered to hold a relatively low level of responsibility for effecting or enhancing the factors relevant to disaster resilience. This is despite the fact that some of the key factors relate specifically to the community and indeed reside within the community. In practice, these organisations often play quite substantial roles in assisting the communities to prepare and recover (see Salvation Army 2015; Red Cross Australia 2015). A number of study limitations were presented during the research process, which were attributed to the relatively small sample size. The hospitality and tourism sector were not represented in the workshop despite the large influx of tourists to the region during ‘storm season’, which presents the region with substantial logistical difficulties. Similarly, community members were largely unrepresented during the project, which would have
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provided an interesting perspective on the responsibilities that the workshop participants considered they were responsible for. Further research will focus on including these and other sectors during the research design phase.
6 Conclusion A key finding emerging from this research has been the perceived responsibilities of nongovernment groups. Clearly, the Federal, State and Local Governments are still considered to hold the majority of the responsibility for the Sunshine Coast’s disaster resilience, despite the Government’s shift to responsibility sharing across households, businesses, communities and across governments. Of interest, however, is that the community subgroups, which are comprised of volunteers, are also considered to hold a high level of responsibility for almost half of the institutional and social factors identified that influence the resilience of a community. There are obvious limitations in the capacity of community groups that comprise only volunteers in meeting these commitments. Discussions with community sub-groups on the Sunshine Coast in 2013 (see Singh-Peterson et al. 2015) revealed the inability of volunteers to undertake and lead capacity building, preparedness and educational activities without resourcing and logistical support from Local and State Governments. In summary, the allocation of responsibilities for resilience building does reflect that the Federal and State Governments hold legislative powers, funding and resources—which places them in the position of holding the greatest level of responsibility. The NSDR also highlights that the whole of government has responsibilities beyond the emergency management sector in government. Our findings indicate that for this case study, stakeholders see a need for greater shared responsibility, beyond the emergency management sector in government, particularly into the education and health sector. Additionally, participants also considered that partnerships with private sector health, education and infrastructure providers were also required to truly realise a collective sense of responsibility, yet from the allocation of responsibilities identified in the case study region, this is not occurring. At this time, policy alignment is not being coordinated or even encouraged across government departments to foster a truly collective sense of responsibility with businesses, non-government organisations, communities and individuals as promoted by academic and political discourses. As the disaster risk reduction community continues to come to terms with the recent policy and practical transitions in Australia, our study indicates that the ‘shared responsibility’ position promoted by the NSDR has not yet gained traction in our case study. In order for this to occur, local community groups require sustainable support and resourcing, and co-ordination across the whole of governments is required to meaningfully facilitate this policy position with the private sector. Acknowledgments The Reframing Community Disaster Resilience Project was developed in partnership between the University of the Sunshine Coast, Local Government Association of Queensland, Sunshine Coast Council, Wesley Mission and the Queensland Council of Social Service. The project partners are grateful for the funding provided by the University of the Sunshine Coast and the Local Government Association of Queensland to undertake the project. The authors would also like to thank the blind reviewers for their contribution to this manuscript.
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