Defining the blue economy as a South African ...

Journal of the Indian Ocean Region

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Defining the blue economy as a South African strategic priority: toward a sustainable 10th province? Jo-Ansie van Wyk To cite this article: Jo-Ansie van Wyk (2015) Defining the blue economy as a South African strategic priority: toward a sustainable 10th province?, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 11:2, 153-169, DOI: 10.1080/19480881.2015.1066555 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2015.1066555

Published online: 05 Aug 2015.

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Date: 12 October 2015, At: 05:13

Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 2015 Vol. 11, No. 2, 153–169, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2015.1066555

Defining the blue economy as a South African strategic priority: toward a sustainable 10th province? Jo-Ansie van Wyk*

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Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa In 2014, the South African government announced Operation Phakisa in order to stimulate the country’s blue economy. Operation Phakisa’s strong focus on maritime economic matters ignores two unresolved issues in respect of South Africa’s maritime economy and maritime diplomacy, namely the country’s extended continental shelf claim. If successful in its claim, South Africa’s territory will increase significantly (thus a 10th province) and thus its security and economic opportunities and challenges. The latter includes the exploration and exploitation of extended shelf resources such as oil and gas, gas hydrates, seabed mining, and marine genetic resources. As very little legal precedent and state practice exists in respect of the actual delimitation of the extended continental shelf, South Africa’s claims, which overlaps with that of its neighbours Mozambique and Namibia, could contributes to significant insecurity between these states. The paper concludes with some policy recommendations to address the overlapping claims, and promote an Indian Ocean–South Atlantic dialogue on oceans governance and maritime security cooperation. Keywords: Blue economy; South Africa; Operation Phakisa; continental shelf; Mozambique; Namibia

Introduction Global consensus is converging on the economic benefits and potential of the so-called blue economy, or maritime economy (UNCTAD, 2014). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated that, globally, almost 350 million jobs are linked to the oceans through fishing, aquaculture, coastal and marine tourism and research activities, with an additional one billion people relying on fish as their primary source of protein (UNCTAD, 2014, p. 2). More than 200 million Africans, where 39 of the 54 states and islands are littoral, rely on the ocean for food and nutrition, with the fish industry providing employment for more than 10 million Africans (African Union [AU], 2012, p. 8). In 2010, for example, South Africa’s oceans economy contributed approximately ZAR 54 billion to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), with approximately 316,000 people employed in the sector (South African Government News Agency, 2014). Supporting the said global consensus, South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoane-Mashabane (2014), described the blue economy as the ‘next frontier of global economic growth’. President Jacob Zuma’s *Email: [email protected] © 2015 Indian Ocean Research Group


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announcement of Operation Phakisa (Sesotho for ‘Hurry up’) early in his second presidential term in 2014 is the latest in a series of government initiatives such as the National Development Plan (NDP) to stimulate the South African economy. Operation Phakisa focuses exclusively on harnessing the socio-economic benefits of South Africa’s vast maritime area. South Africa’s maritime sovereignty includes a coastline of 3924 km; an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 1,553,000 km2 and 4,340,000 km2 maritime territory. These vast maritime areas contribute to what can be called an additional 10th province of the Republic. However, if South Africa’s extended continental shelf claim is successful, the country can easily be divided into 10 provinces. Whereas Operation Phakisa predominantly focuses on harnessing the socio-economic benefits of the country’s EEZ, the government is also considering the international political economy of its extended continental shelf claim. Therefore, against the aforesaid, the objective of this paper is three-fold. Firstly, it aims to contextualise Operation Phakisa in the blue economy debate. The second objective is to address two unresolved issues in respect of South Africa’s maritime economy and maritime diplomacy, namely the country’s extended continental shelf. If successful in its claim, South Africa’s territory will increase significantly and thus its security and economic opportunities and challenges. The latter includes the exploration and exploitation of extended shelf resources such as oil and gas, gas hydrates, seabed mining, and marine genetic resources (Schofield, 2012, pp. 11–17). However, very little legal precedent and state practice exists ‘in the actual delimitation of the extended continental’; a matter which contributes to significant insecurity between and within states (Lathrop, 2011, p. 4139) Finally, the paper concludes with some policy recommendations to promote an Indian Ocean– South Atlantic dialogue on oceans governance and maritime security cooperation. The blue economy and Operation Phakisa in comparative perspective A relatively recent concept the blue economy, also referred to as the ocean or maritime economy, is defined as ‘economic and trade activities that integrate the conservation and sustainable use and management of biodiversity, including maritime ecosystems, and genetic resources’ (UNCTAD, 2014, p. 2). The concept has been adopted by various states, including several African and other developing regions. Mauritius, for example, initiated its first Ocean Economy Roadmap in 2013 to take advantage of the economic potential of Island’s oceans. Moreover, the Roadmap emphasises the need to unlock the economic potential of the country’s EEZ ‘by ensuring sustainable and coordinated utilisation of living and non-living resources’ by including the sectors such as tourism, seaports and seafood-related activities and sectors (UNCTAD, 2014, p. 6). In order to achieve these objectives, the government of Mauritius has established a national public-private task force, and plans to establish an oceans business park and an oceans research centre. It also plans to conduct a ‘comprehensive regulatory review of the ocean’s economy’ (UNCTAD, 2014, p. 6). In January 2014, Seychelles, another African state, launched its own ambitions in respect of the blue economy in ‘The Blue Economy – Seychelles’ vision for a Blue Horizon’ (UN, 2014a). Apart from implementing national blue economy policies, the notion of the blue economy was also addressed at conferences and adopted by multilateral organisations. In December 2013, the government of Portugal invited the African Union (AU) to participate in its ‘Blue Growth of the Atlantic’ conference. The AU, in the Final



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Communiqué of the 387th Peace and Security Council on 29 July 2013, described the blue economy as the ‘new frontline of Africa’s renaissance’. In January 2014, small island development states (SIDS) and coastal states attended the Blue Economy Summit in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UN, 2014a). Operation Phakisa was officially launched on 19 July 2014. By President Zuma’s own admission, Operation Phakisa is not an original idea as it is an ‘adaptation of the Big Fast Results Methodology of Malaysia’; following his visit to Malaysia in 2013 (Zuma, 2014). The rationale for Operation Phakisa is predominantly economic. President Zuma explained the origins of Operation Phakisa as the result of a consultative process, including ‘teams from government, labour, business, academia and other sectors to work together in experimental laboratories, to explore all possibilities and further unlock the potential of our country’s vast coastline’.17 These teams focus on four areas, or workstreams, namely: . . . .

Marine transport and manufacturing Offshore oil and gas exploration Aquaculture Marine protection services and ocean governance (Zuma, 2014).

Despite the strong focus on economic issues, Operation Phakisa is silent on security matters, which, given the maritime security concerns of South Africa, cannot be ignored. Speaking at launch of Operation Phakisa, President Zuma (2014) outlined aspects of South Africa’s blue economy whilst maintaining that South Africa’s maritime economy has the ‘potential to contribute up to R 177 billion’ to the country’s GDP and create ‘just over a million jobs by 2033’. South Africa’s blue economy and its strategic value Historically, South Africa has regarded its oceans as of significant strategic value. The Cape Sea Route was, for example, regarded as of major economic, strategic and ideological value during the Cold War and prior to 1994. This continues into the twentyfirst century with, inter alia, South Africa having the most sophisticated maritime industry on the continent including sub-sectors such as shipping and transport (maritime logistics infrastructure; transport shipping; ports, coastal and marine services); marine resources (fisheries, pharmaceuticals and aquaculture; offshore energy and mining); and marine tourism (boating and cruising; sports and recreation; and leisure). Moreover, the South African marine industry also includes marine engineering; operational support services; and marine manufacturing and construction (South African Maritime Safety Authority, 2012). South Africa has, as Table 1 which includes all Southern Africa’s major ports indicates, received 11,787 port calls in 2010; almost the sum of all other southern African states’ port calls for the same period (Endres, 2013, p. 242). South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire are Africa’s top five countries in terms of port traffic (containers) (Endres, 2013, p. 245). South Africa’s port performance is also significantly better than its neighbours in southern Africa (see Table 2). This means that South Africa’s port efficiency, port infrastructure, harbour maintenance and security are on average, with the exception of East London, of a higher standard that other southern African states.

156 Table 1.

J.-A. van Wyk Port calls in Southern Africa.

State Angola Kenya Madagascar Mozambique


Namibia South Africa

Tanzania

Ports

All vessels

Container vessels

Luanda Mombasa Toamasina Beira Maputo Walvis Bay Cape Town Durban East London Port Elizabeth Richard’s Bay Saldanha Dar es Salaam

3457 1731 n/a 288 1000 1052 3451 4388 383 1345 1728 492 1616

272 491 308 50 n/a 145 1037 1174 56 549 4 n/a 478

Source: John Endres. Note: A port call is defined as a vessel docking at the berth to load or offload cargo.

South Africa’s tertiary maritime economy includes, for example, a submarine cable infrastructure. Africa’s nine submarine cables have six landing points in South Africa (see Table 3). In this way, South Africa’s maritime economy is a contributing factor to its connectedness and global competitiveness. Other manifestations of the strategic and economic value of South Africa’s blue economy is its establishment of coast-to-coast development corridors (the Maputo Development Corridor and the Trans-Kalahari Corridor), and coastal special economic zones (SEZs); also referred to as industrial development zones (IDZs). South Africa currently has five coastal IDZs, name Coega IDZ, the Richard’s Bay IDZ, Table 2.

Port performance (containers) in Southern Africa.

State Angola Kenya Madagascar Mozambique Namibia South Africa

Tanzania

Ports Luanda Mombasa Toamasina Beira Maputo Walvis Bay Cape Town Durban East London Port Elizabeth Richard’s Bay Saldanha Bay Dar es Salaam

Source: John Endres.

Pre-berth waiting time (days) (average)

Vessels turnaround time (average)

96 12 n/a 7 3 0 3 5 383 0 3 0 24

48 32 n/a 24 24 48 24 32 56 24 24 24 24

Year of completion

Length (km)

Capacity (Gigabytes)

West African systems 2002 SAT-3/WASC 2012 Africa Coast to Europe (ACE)

14,350 17,000

349 5120

2012

14,916

5120

East African systems 2002 SAFE

13,500

340

2009 2009

East African Marine System (TEAMS) SEACOM/Tata TGN-Eurasie

4800 15,000

1280 1280

2009

Lower Indian Ocean Network (LION)

1060

1300

2010

East African Submarine Cable System (EASSy)

10,500

4720

2012

Lower Indian Ocean Network 2 (LION 2)

2700

1280

West African Cable System (WACS)

Landing points Melkbosstrand (South Africa) Cape Town (South Africa) Muanda (DRC) Swakopmund (Namibia) Muanda (DRC) Ponte Noire (Congo Brazzaville) Swakopmund (Namibia) Yzerfontein (South Africa) Baie de Jacotet (Mauritius) Melkbosstrand (South Africa) Mtunzini (South Africa) Mombasa (Kenya) Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) Maputo (Mozambique) Mombasa (Kenya) Moroni (Comoros) Mtunzini (South Africa) Terre Rouge (Mauritius) Toamasina (Madagascar) Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) Maputo (Mozambique) Mombasa (Kenya) Moroni (Comorros) Mtunzini (South Africa) Toliara (Mozambique) Nyali (Kenya)

Total number (all Africa) 9 18

11

3

1 6

2 8

1

157

Source: John Endres.

Cable



Table 3. Submarine cables with landing points in Southern Africa (excluding planned and incomplete cables, 2013).

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the East London IDZ, Dube Trade Port and the Saldanha IDZ (Department of Trade and Industry [DTI], n.d.).


The continental shelf: origins, definition and importance The Third United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which was adopted on 10 December 1982 and entered into force on 16 November 1994, inter alia, contains provisions on the limits a state’s national jurisdiction over ocean space, access to seas, navigation, protection and preservation of the marine environment, exploitation of living and non-living resources, scientific research, seabed mining and the settlement of any disputes concerning application and interpretation of the Convention (Department of International Relations and Cooperation [DIRCO], n. d.). The First UNCLOS was signed in 1958. Article 76 of the 1982 UNCLOS provides a definition of the continental shelf: The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. (UN, 1982)

Furthermore, in Article 76, the continental margin is defined as comprising the ‘submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State, and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise’, excluding the ‘deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof’ (UN, 1982). The legal definition of continental shelf differs from its scientific and geological definition. Geologically, the continental shelf is defined as ‘part of the continental margin that is between the shoreline and the shelf break. This is the top of the continental slope’ (Schoolmeester & Baker, 2009, p. 9). A more comprehensive scientific definition of the continental shelf is that it forms part of the continental margin, which is made up of the shallow, relatively flat continental shelf, bordered by an inclined continental slope, at the base of which is often found a wedge shaped layer of sediments, the continental rise. Depending on the geological setting continental shelves can be narrow or broad (Schoolmeester & Baker, 2009, p. 26). Moreover, Article 77 of UNCLOS describes the rights of a coastal state over the continental shelf: (1) The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. (2) The rights referred to in paragraph 1 are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities without the express consent of the coastal State. (3) The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation. (4) The natural resources referred to in this Part consist of the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the


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harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil (UN, 1982). In order to resolve the differences between the legal and geological definitions, and resolve disputes over the rights over the continental shelf, UNCLOS established two important institutions, namely the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and the International Seabed Authority (ISA), which, according to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), South Africa ‘actively participated in meetings establishing the International Seabed Authority’ (DIRCO, n.d.). The latter was established to oversee the exploration and exploitation of deep seabed minerals, whereas the CLCS ‘facilitates the implementation’ of UNCLOS ‘in respect of the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (M)’ (UN, 2012). In accordance with Article 76(8), the Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding (UN, 2012). South Africa signed and ratified UNCLOS, respectively, on 5 December 1984 and 23 December 1997, and domesticated the Convention in legislation in, for example, the Maritime Zones Act (Act 15 of 1994). Like other states, South Africa is also keen to extend its maritime territory in terms of the provision of UNCLOS due to the immense economic potential of such an expansion. Apart from the political benefits of extending its continental shelf, a state can also benefit economically due to the exploration and exploitation of the resources due to improved scientific and marine technological abilities. Currently, seabed mining exploration, for example, has focused on four main resources namely polymetallic (predominantly manganese) nodules, seafloor massive sulphides (SMS), cobalt-rich crusts and phosphates. More importantly, it is a lifeline to developing coastal states, island states and poor states.

The scramble for and the international political economy of the continental shelf The international political economy of states’ scramble for the continental shelf can be defined in terms of Strange’s (1993) primary and secondary power structures, namely security, technology, finance, transport and welfare, which will be applied to two of these power structures here. A third power structure contributing to the international political economy of the scramble for the continental shelf – transport – has been referred to earlier in the context of South Africa’s port activities and performance vis-à-vis other African and Southern African states. Security and sovereignty The historical scramble for Antarctica and the contemporary scramble for both Antarctica and the Artic, for example, are manifestations of the importance of territorial sovereignty for states. Despite debates about the ‘end of sovereignty’ due to, inter alia, globalisation, debates about the ‘persistence of sovereignty’ also continue and have escalated to high politics among states as, if claims are successful, will expand states’ territory and thus sovereignty. One area where this is evident is in states’


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sometimes overlapping, thus competing, extended continental shelf claims beyond 200 M in terms of UNCLOS. The relative contribution of the outer continental shelf to a state’s territory is significant in instances such as, for example, Sri Lanka (75%), Portugal (55%), UK (45%) and New Zealand (25%) (Schoolmeester & Baker, 2009, p. 18). By October 2014, 75 individual or joint submissions by states have been submitted to the CLCS (UN, 2014b). Two aspects of these claims stand out namely the large number of claims; several claims around mid-ocean ridges and the Southern Ocean; the large number of developing coastal states and island states that have realised the potential of the blue economy beyond their EEZ and submitted claims; and the global scope of these claims (The scramble for the seabed, 2009). By 2010, several African states had submitted preliminary submissions. These included Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania and Togo (van de Poll & Schofield, 2010). Several African states, including South Africa, Namibia and Kenya, have also made submissions to the CLCS. Ten of the 22 littoral African states that have submitted claims are located in southern Africa (i.e. members of the Southern African Development Community [SADC]) and include claims pertaining to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans (see Table 4). In order to achieve the objectives of this paper, the analysis of African claims will be limited to that of South Africa, Mozambique and Namibia as these claims are in respect to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. African continental claims include several overlapping claims. Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique share some overlapping claims which are pertinent to this contribution. These overlapping claims highlight, inter alia, the international political economy of southern Africa. The AU’s 2050 Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy), which was adopted in 2012, calls on African states with overlapping continental shelf claims to ‘peacefully solve existing maritime boundary issues between Member States including within bays, estuaries, and inland waters (lakes and rivers)’ (AU, 2012, p. 22). In addition to this, the 2050 AIM Strategy also indicate that AU member states shall be encouraged to claim their respective maritime limits, including their extended continental shelf where applicable. Member States are further urged to accept and fulfil all those responsibilities that emanate from the establishment of maritime zones as foreseen by UNCLOS and the International Maritime Organisation Safety of Life at Sea (IMO SOLAS) Convention (AU, 2012, p. 22). However, Somalia, for example, has instituted proceedings against Kenya at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in respect of its competing claims (UN, 2014b). In contrast, members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – including Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo – agreed in February 2009 that ‘issues of the limit of adjacent/opposite boundaries shall continue to be discussed’ and that ECOWAS members would therefore submit a ‘no objection note’ to the submission of their neighbouring states. Since this development, Ghana, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire have lodged submissions with the Commission, and Togo and Benin have submitted separate and joint preliminary information documents. Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo’s claims all overlap, but, to date, none of these

Journal of the Indian Ocean Region Table 4.

African continental shelf claims (October 2014).

State Angola


161

Submission to CLCS (date)

Claim (area and km2)

Overlapping claims with

6 December 2013 25 September 2014

Joint submission by Cabo Verde, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, Sierra Leone Côte d’Ivoire

8 May 2009

Gabon

10 April 2012

Ghana

28 April 2009

Kenya

6 May 2009

No Subcommisssion established Areas in the Atlantic Ocean adjacent to the coast of West Africa

Ghana Togo Benin Nigeria

Benin Côte d’Ivoire Nigeria Tanzania

Somalia

Madagascar Maldives Mozambique Mauritius

29 April 2011 26 July 2010 7 July 2010

Namibia

12 May 2009

Nigeria

7 May 2009

Seychelles

7 May 2009

Somalia

21 July 2014

Status of diplomatic relations with other claiming states

South Africa Region of Rodrigues Island Angola South Africa

Benin Côte d’Ivoire Ghana Togo

Consultations with neighbouring states

Angola DRC Held consultations Subcommisssion established Bilateral Maritime Boundary Agreement On-going negotiations. Somalia instituted proceedings against Kenya at the ICJ

Exchange of Letters Subcommission established Bilateral agreement with Angola on delimitation on maritime boundary Memorandum of Understanding Consultations with neighbouring states Special ECOWAS meeting Northern Plateau region

(Continued )

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J.-A. van Wyk

Table 4.

Continued.


State

Submission to CLCS (date)

South Africa

5 May 2009

Joint submission by South Africa and France Tanzania

6 May 2009

18 January 2012

Claim (area and km2)

Overlapping claims with

Status of diplomatic relations with other claiming states

Mozambique Namibia

Exchange of Letters & Subcommission established Note Verbale Crozet Archipelago Subcommission and Prince established Edward Islands Kenya Bilateral agreement Seychelles with Kenya Memorandum of Understanding

Source: UN.

states has objected to consideration by the Commission (Lathrop, 2011, p. 4155). More pertinent to this paper, is the diplomatic activities vis-à-vis South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique’s claims. Technology and finance The CLCS comprises scientists and base their binding decisions on scientific results. These results have significant political consequences (Jensen, 2014, pp. 171–185), In addition to this, the functions of the CLCS in terms of Article 3 of Annex II of UNCLOS are: (1) To consider the data and other material submitted by coastal States concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf in areas where those limits extend beyond 200 nautical miles, and to make recommendations in accordance with Article 76 and the Statement of Understanding adopted on 29 August 1980 by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea; (2) To provide scientific and technical advice, if requested by the coastal State concerned during preparation of such data. Earlier reference was made to the distinction between the legal and geological definitions of the continental shelf. In order to institute a claim for an extended outer continental shelf, a state has to have access to sophisticated technology, which is very costly. A comparative perspective from India illustrates this aspect: Lack of enough political will and strength on the one hand and poor technological skills to demarcate new maritime boundaries like the territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) have subjected many an Indian Ocean maritime boundary to arbitrary or contested claim. (Rao, 2014, p. 118)

In most instances, African states have been assisted by either the CLCS, multilateral institutions such as the UN and the Commonwealth, and/or individual more


163

scientifically advanced states (Egede, 2012, pp. 185–190). In 2005, four years prior to its submission in 2009, the South African government has allocated an initial sum of ZAR23 million to fund its Continental Claims Project (Egede, 2012, p. 200). Similarly, developed states with advanced technologies and finances are able to explore and exploit their continental shelves more successfully than states that do not have access to technology and finance.


South Africa’s continental shelf claims South Africa’s maritime zones are defined in the Maritime Zones Act (Act 15 of 1994). It defines the country’s territorial waters (12 M), contiguous zone (24 M) and maritime cultural zone (24 M), EEZ (200 M) and the continental shelf as per Article 76 of UNCLOS. Schedule 3 of the Act defines the outer limits of the country’s continental shelf as contained in a series of straight lines’ coordinates included in the Schedule. In 2002, the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs was tasked as the linefunction department to manage and prepare South Africa’s submission to extend its continental shelf beyond the country’s current 370 km (200 nautical miles) EEZ. State-owned utility the South African Agency for the Promotion of Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation (Petroleum Agency SA) was tasked with preparing South Africa’s claim and submitting it to the UN CLCS by 13 May 2009. Institutionally, the South African Shelf Claim Project comprised a Steering Committee and a technical Working Group as outlined in Table 5. The South African Shelf Claim Project focused on two areas, namely the continental shelf around the South African mainland, and that around South Africa’s island territories, Marion and Prince Edward Islands (Petroleum Agency SA, n.d.). Preliminary scoping studies of the South African Shelf Claim Project identified seven potential claim areas for South Africa, with four of these around the mainland of South Africa, and three potential claim areas around the Prince Edward Islands. The latter included the Del Cano Rise claim, the Discovery II Ridge, and the Southwest Indian Ridge (SWIR) claim. At the time, South Africa’s potential claim was assessed as approximately 940,000 km2 (Petroleum Agency SA, n.d.). South Africa made an amended submission on 19 November 2013, which included overlapping claims with Namibia and Mozambique, and a joint submission with France on the Crozet Archipelago and Prince Edward Islands. In its submissions, South Africa’s behaviour was typical of the majority of states claiming overlapping areas, that is, attempting to prevent its claim being blocked by the CLCS. Typically, states with unresolved disputes opted to: (1) settle delimitations prior to making a submission; (2) make a partial submission that avoids unresolved disputes; (3) make a joint submission among several States, thereby internalizing any unresolved disputes within the group of submitting States; (4) make a separate submission after consultation with neighbouring States in order to avoid objection; and (5) make a separate submission without assurances of no objection. (Lathrop, 2011, p. 4147)

Petroleum Agency SA has identified significant exploration opportunities for South Africa in its EEZ. These opportunities are located in the Central and Southern Orange Basins, the Gamtoos and Algoa Basins, the Outeniqua Basin and the Durban

164


Table 5.

J.-A. van Wyk South African shelf claim project.

Source: Petroleum Agency SA.

and Zululand Basins which can be expanded if the country’s claims are successful (Petroleum Agency SA, n.d.). It informed the Commission, inter alia, of ‘unresolved areas of continental shelf between it and other coastal States’ (South Africa, 2013, p. 2). These areas involve both its littoral neighbours, Namibia and Mozambique which are addressed later. Submissions have, in some instances, negatively affected diplomatic relations between states. Moreover, the modus operandi of the CLCS are often secret, contributing to mistrust between states as the only written documents that are made public are the executive summaries of the submissions, written reactions submitted by other States, and – eventually – summaries of the Commission’s recommendations. The other parts of the submissions and the full recommendations are not made public and meetings between the Commission (or its sub-commissions) and submitting States – meetings in which it appears that a substantial dialogue may occur on a number of topics related to the submission, including, presumably, the topic of unresolved disputes with neighbours – are held in private (Lathrop, 2011, p. 4148). Moreover, the process is often long-winding. This was lamented by Namibia’s Surveyor General, Uzochukwu Okafo, in 2014: The application [submitted in May 2009 and completed with the assistance of the Brazilian Navy] to extend Namibia’s sea territory has not been ratified. Namibia was the 50th country to submit her application for an extended continental shelf. To date, [the] Commission has been established for 31 submissions, meaning that Namibia still has at least 18 submissions behind. (Sea territory claim stuck in process, 2014)


165

If successful in its claims, South Africa faces new oceans governance and security issues. Moreover, it will be required to mend relations with Namibia and Mozambique.


South Africa and Namibia claims Namibia has a coastline of 1500 km. Namibia’s economy is heavily mining-dependent. Moreover, the country has been successful in marine exploration mining activities, including oil and gas exploration (Benkenstein, 2014). Public and private local and international exploration activities in the Orange Basin between Namibia and South Africa include, for example, those of Petrobras, Enigma, Andarko, Shell, Petro SA/SASOL and BHP Billiton (Impact Oil and Gas, 2014). The government of Namibia, which has established two working committees to oversee the claims process, signed an agreement with Brazil to assist the Africa state to prepare its submission to the CLCS; a process which was completed in 2003 (Egede, 2012, p. 190). The Brazilian Navy conducted a hydrographic and geophysical survey of the Namibian continental margin and the Walvis Ridge (Nam wants to extend waters, 2007). Like South Africa, Namibia’s public petroleum agency, the Namibia Petroleum Corporation, is also involved in the process. If successful, Namibia’s territorial jurisdiction will expand by 55% (Sea territory claim stuck in process, 2014). Namibia signed a bilateral agreement with Angola on the delimitation of the maritime boundary between these states on 8 December 2004, a few years prior to submitting its claim to the CLCS on 12 May 2009. In terms of the agreement, the northern maritime boundary between Namibia and Angola has been delimited from the mouth of the Kunene River (CLCS, 2010, p. 15). Namibia maintained that in the case of it southern boundary, there is a ‘dispute’ between itself and South Africa ‘with respect to the boundary constituted by the Orange River’ (CLCS, 2010, p. 15). The latter is addressed via a Memorandum of Understanding between these two states. South Africa confirmed that it, via a Note Verbale informed Namibia of its intention to make a submission to the Commission ‘without any prejudice’ regarding ‘future finalisation or delimitation of the boundary between’ these two countries (South Africa, 2013, p. 2). South Africa and Mozambique claims Mozambique has a coastline of 2500 km, and, in terms of its claims, aims to expands its continental shelf from its current 540,000 to 676,000 km2 (Mozambique waits for UN go-ahead to extend its continental shelf, 2012). Petroleum SA assisted Mozambique in the preparation of its submissions. Also assisted by Commonwealth, Germany, France, Norway. Mozambique informed the Continental Shelf Commission that the maritime area referred to in its submission ‘is not subject to any dispute’ between Mozambique and its neighbours. However, it stated that it is ‘aware’ of ‘unresolved issue in relation to maritime delimitation with neighbouring states’, that is, South Africa and Madagascar (Mozambique, 2010, p. 2). Mozambique has also confirmed that it has been in bilateral contact with both South Africa and Madagascar. In both instances, these countries have agreed with Mozambique to raise ‘no objection’ to each other’s submissions (Mozambique, 2010, p. 2). South Africa confirmed that it ‘has agreed’ with Mozambique that ‘their respective submissions may be considered


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by the Commission on the understanding that this shall not form prejudice future delimitation’ (South Africa, 2013, p. 2). Mozambique and Namibia are South Africa’s immediate maritime neighbours. Both have long coast lines and are gateways to, inter alia, some of the land-locked countries in Southern Africa. South Africa and its littoral neighbours have enjoyed some political stability for at least two decades; especially since the end of the Mozambican civil war in 1992. South Africa, which often has been described as the regional hegemon, stands accused of some more regional ambitions through its continental shelf claims. Whereas it has assisted Mozambique with technical assistance in respect of South Africa and Mozambique’s claims, South Africa has not been as helpful towards Namibia. This does not add to improve relations between these states; especially against the background of the unresolved Orange River border between South Africa and Namibia. Conclusion and recommendations Since 2008, the global economic crisis has affected both developed and developing states. By focusing on the blue economy states attempt to improve their socio-economic position as well as that of their populations. This holds true for South Africa and many other African states. With a well-developed maritime economic sector, South Africa is the leading maritime state on the continent. However, estimates indicate that the country’s maritime economy offers significant economic opportunities which should be explored. South Africa’s multilateral commitments cover southern Africa, Africa and the international arena. It is a member of the UN, AU and the SADC and thus a signatory of the 1982 UNCLOS, the 2050 AIM Strategy and the SADC Maritime Security Strategy. These commitments, notwithstanding, South Africa is also keen to enhance its national interests; especially its maritime interests. Nationally, Operation Phakisa follows on, amongst others, the NDP. Internationally, it follows on the country’s submission of a claim for the extended continental shelf in terms of UNCLOS. Highly technical and relying on sophisticated data collection and analysis techniques, continental shelf claims bear significant implications for South Africa’s territory. If successful, the country is set to become the largest African state, boasting 10 provinces. Historically, however, territorial ambitions and claims have resulted in disputes, conflict and/or war among states. South Africa’s vast claims encroach on similar claims by two of its neighbours in Southern Africa. Both Namibia and Mozambique have played in supportive role to the governing party in South Africa, but all three states have enormous economic challenges and ambitions. Like its neighbours, South Africa is awaiting the outcome of its claim from the CLCS. In the meantime, these claims – as well as South Africa’s blue economy quest through Operation Phakisa – remain on the agenda in bilateral and multilateral relations in SADC. The South African government thus needs to toe a fine line between its national interests, and its regional and continental commitments. One way to resolve this is to enhance regional cooperation on the blue economy. Regional maritime cooperation has not been optimally achieved despite the AU and SADC’s ambitious strategies in this respect. The South African Defence Review of 2012 recognised that South Africa will have to contribute significantly to operationalising the SADC Maritime Security Strategy,



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the Djibouti Code of Conduct and the African Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050 in support of the UNCLOS 1982 and the IMO SOLAS Convention. By implication this will mean that the maritime security of South Africa, SADC and the Continent will be ensured by the collective and integrated efforts of all national, regional and continental organisations charged with such responsibility. Furthermore alliances with regional, continental and international forces operating within the, yet to be created ‘Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa (CEMZA)’, will act as force multipliers (Defence Review Committee, 2012). President Zuma has set ambitious targets for Operation Phakisa. However, the implementation and success of the initiative will be determined by several prevailing and/or unresolved matters in respect of maritime matters. These include the country’s unresolved continental shelf claims. Against the aforesaid, the paper concludes with policy recommendations to the South African government:

National level . Communicate the content and status of the country’s continental shelf claims; . Improve governance in all sectors inland and offshore: The character of a regime of a littoral state affects its coastal behaviour. A strong and stable state is capable of regulating and controlling its maritime zones, or enjoys the legitimacy to negotiate maritime differences with neighbouring littoral countries. Conversely, a fragile or failed state is not only incapable of ensuring coastal peace but it can also disturb it through contested maritime claims with its neighbours, or by breaking international maritime codes of conduct. (Rao, 2014, p. 114)

Regional level .

.

.

Bilaterally, cooperate with Namibia and Mozambique to resolve competing claims by promoting and establishing a Southern African Continental Shelf Agency and Strategy including these three states. Commit to and realise regional building in respect of maritime issues similar to what is achieved by rising powers such as Brazil and India in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans (Abdenur & de Souza Neto, 2014, pp. 1–17). This enhances trust and cooperation, and ultimately contributes to regional socio-economic development. Contribute to the realisation of the SADC Maritime Security Strategy. This should precede a stronger focus on SADC as a regional institution.

Continental and international level . . .

With a South African, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, in the top AU job, the country should promote maritime transformation by realising the 2050 AIM Strategy. Invest in scientific cooperation on maritime matters. All South Africa’s key partners in the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum and the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa grouping are regional maritime powers with vast maritime interests and capabilities in sea trade, commerce and naval influence. Therefore, the country should enhance the maritime

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J.-A. van Wyk economy focus of these groupings through dialogue on oceans governance and maritime security cooperation.

Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.


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