Democracy and the problem of cultural relativism ...

Global Society

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Democracy and the problem of cultural relativism: Normative issues for international politics Stephanie Lawson To cite this article: Stephanie Lawson (1998) Democracy and the problem of cultural relativism: Normative issues for international politics, Global Society, 12:2, 251-270, DOI: 10.1080/13600829808443163 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13600829808443163

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Global Society, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1998

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Democracy and the Problem of Cultural Relativism: Normative Issues for International Politics

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STEPHANIE LAWSON

Contemporary political studies have paid increasing attention to the idea of culture, and its centrality to a range of concerns in both the theory and practice of international relations in the post-Cold War era is now much more widely recognised. Some of the most obvious areas in which the normative dimension of cultural issues has recently acquired particular salience are those concerned with self-determination and ethnic nationalism, indigenous autonomy and the entitlements of minorities, the various categories of human rights, and the possibility of establishing democratic governance outside its putative heartland—the West. With particular reference to human rights, it has been suggested that the post-Cold War era has given "a new lease of life to an otherwise surprisingly dormant debate over the merits of universal versus relative value systems, and the role of culture in their discovery and interpretation".1 This debate, however, is no less important to the other areas of concern outlined above. Indeed, with respect to democracy, it has often been argued that it is a culturally relative term, at least in the sense that all regimes describe themselves as democratic in some way.2 The dormancy of the universalist/relativist debate during the Cold War period has been attributed to the fact that the old East/West (or communist/ liberal democratic) polarities favoured ideologically constructed notions about such issues as human rights—especially the priority of civil and political rights over economic and social rights, and vice-versa—and, therefore, suppressed tendencies to construe these in culturally relative terms.3 Similarly, debates about the "best" form of rule were structured largely around a left/right ideological spectrum both ends of which, as well as many of the variants in between, assumed the universal applicability of the values embodied in their 1. Philip Alston, "The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights", in Philip Alston (ed.), The Best Interests ofthe Child: Reconciling Culture and Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 5-6. 2. See, for example, Nathan Keyfitz cited in Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison and Garry Rodan, "Introduction: Changing Forms of State Power in Southeast Asia", in Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison and Garry Rodan (eds.), Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1993), p. 5. This view also accords with Gallie's famous depiction of democracy as one of several "essentially contested concepts". See W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 56 (1956), pp. 167-198. 3. Alston, "The Best Interests Principle", op. cit., p. 7. 1360-0826/98/020251-20 © University of Kent at Canterbury


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respective normative frameworks. Again, the formulation of rival models of political rule within an ideological spectrum at least partially suppressed discussion of cultural factors. One of the implications of this is that both dominant ideological models of the Cold War period were usually posited in a universalist form and were therefore assumed—at least by their proponents—to be more or less culturally neutral in the sense that any society could construct a viable political system around them. In many recent debates, however, it has been asserted that democracy, despite its universalist pretensions, is itself attached very firmly to a specific cultural base—a base that is generally labelled "Western". But, if it is questionable whether ideological constructs are indeed culturally neutral, it is also debatable whether cultural constructs are ideologically neutral. One purpose of this discussion is to highlight the extent to which many contemporary debates about culture in international affairs, especially when dealing with democracy and human rights, remain deeply embedded in issues of ideology and power. This is particularly so where culture is linked to particular state or regional interests. In this context, some of the most important questions to be asked are: to what extent is culture seized "from above" by state elites? Is it deployed as an instrument of social and political control? Is the idea of culture used to empower, legitimate and authorise some at the expense of others? And what are the implications of this for culturally relative understandings of democracy? Questions of this kind are crucial to evaluating versions of democratic governance which have been put forward as authentic political expressions of certain cultural areas. They are also important for reflexive theorising about the normative dimensions of democracy itself, since the very idea of cultural relativism obviously directs attention to the socially embedded character of political theorising. By pursuing these questions and issues it should be stated at the outset that I do not intend to endorse the "clash of civilizations" thesis4 and the conflictual model of inter-cultural relations that it supports.5 Indeed, the main arguments are directly contrary to the assumptions that inform this thesis. The sections that follow are each concerned with identifying certain problems associated with the concept of culture, especially as these relate to normative theory. The first focuses initially on the universalist/relativist divide around which much relevant theorising has taken place.6 It then highlights particular problems associated with the marked heterogeneity that actually characterises many "cultural" communities. This is relevant, too, to the deeper theoretical problem of deploying the concept of culture as the basis of a framework-dependent form of ethical relativism. The second part is concerned principally with 4. For the latest treatment, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 5. For an excellent critique of this perspective see Jacinta O'Hagan, "Civilizational Conflict? Looking for Cultural Enemies", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1995), pp. 19-38. 6. This corresponds in some important ways to the cosmopolitan/communitarian dichotomy in normative international relations theory, but which is not specifically addressed here. For a discussion which analyses the discursive dualism generated by the cosmopolitan/communitarian dichotomy, and its implications for normative international relations theory, see Vivienne Jabri, "Texrualising the Self: Moral Agency in Inter-cultural Discourse", Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1996), pp. 57-69.

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developing an approach to understanding democracy that emphasises its normative basis, and the extent to which democratic practice may legitimately reflect cultural (or other) differences, especially in light of the problems identified in the preceding section. I then turn to the major conceptual divide that has been constructed between the "West" and the "Rest", for this has some important, but often neglected, implications for contemporary debates about democracy and the more general role of culture in politics. The concluding discussion highlights the problematic status of "culture" as a satisfactory explanatory and analytic concept when dealing not only with questions of democracy, but a range of pressing issues in global politics.

Ethics and Culture

Universalist ideas in normative international relations theory generally call for the identification of ethical precepts that transcend cultural boundaries and provide "a moral basis for global order in the new international setting".7 Rejecting the proposition that moral standards are located only in the values of specific communities, the concept of common morality implies that all humans share certain attributes and needs which, in turn, create a common moral bond.8 Most versions of universalism therefore repudiate the provincial and arbitrary character of particular cultural traditions as fully determining human character, arguing instead for an explicitly universal theory of human nature.9 This is familiar ground to most, but it is less often recognised that universalism is not be confused with the absolutist insistence on the logical autonomy of valid moral rules from any cultural or social context.10 Thus universalism is sometimes (mis)understood as relegating culture to virtual irrelevance in the wider ethical scheme, whereas most versions of universalism do in fact acknowledge an explicit link between ethics and culture. Morality itself is commonly viewed as a universal in human culture, and is therefore not independent of culture (as the absolutist position suggests), while the specific forms that moral concepts may take are acknowledged as variable according to particular historical (or other contextual) experiences.11 From here, however, universalist arguments stress human commonalities rather than human variances in social life. By so doing, the purpose is to demonstrate that the obvious differences in ways of life around the globe do not preclude the possibility of finding the necessary common ground for establishing norms of conduct in international affairs. 7. Charles W. Kegley Jr, "The New Global Order: The Power of Principle in a Pluralistic World", in Joel H. Rosenthal (ed.), Ethics and International Affairs: A Reader (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1995), p. 118. 8. Joseph Boyle, "Natural Law and International Ethics", in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds.), Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 9. See Samuel Fleischaker, The Ethics of Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. ix. 10. A universalism that repudiates absolutism in this way also acquires the capacity for the kind of theoretically reflexive orientation described by Neufeld in that it does not accept the idea of objective standards existing independently of human thought and practice. See Mark Neufeld, "Reflexivity and International Relations Theory", in Claire Turenne Sjolander and Wayne S. Cox (eds.), Beyond Positivism: Critical Reflections on International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 14. 11. Melville J. Herskovits, "Cultural Relativism and Cultural Values", in John Ladd (ed.), Ethical Relativism (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1973), p. 74.


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Relativist assumptions about the cultural specificity of values and norms seem to preclude the possibility of universally valid moral precepts. It is taken as self-evident that ethical systems represent constructions of reality based on a particular world view, and that such axiomatic constructions are irreducibly varied by virtue of their cultural foundations, thereby making relativism inescapable.12 The development of this understanding is usually attributed to anthropological theories of cultural relativism, which have been summarised as follows: "Cultural relativism maintains that there is an irreducible diversity among cultures because each culture is a unique whole with parts so intertwined that none of them can be understood or evaluated without reference to the other parts and to the cultural whole, the so-called pattern of culture"; and: "Ethics, as part of a culture, cannot be understood or evaluated apart from the distinct world of the society to which it belongs."13 Again, this basic approach is quite familiar to scholars working closely with the concept of culture. There are deeper problems associated with the cultural relativist scheme, however, that have received little attention in international relations theory. The view of "a distinct world", for instance, also depends on the concept of culture as denoting a unique, bounded entity, rather than culture as a dynamic process. In other words, culture is identified not just as an attribute of a community, or even as the defining characteristic of a particular community, but as synonymous with the community itself. Nationalist conceptions of culture depend on an almost identical formulation. Indeed, nationalist and anthropological understandings of culture share a common intellectual heritage.14 And, in relation to the preconditions for democracy, it has been argued in implicit cultural/nationalist terms that "the people must first define itself through a common language and common traditions before it can hope to be the sovereign people".15 Here, we have a line of logic creating an inextricable link between culture, nation, and state. There are some important implications of this schema for the present discussion. One is that cultural homogeneity is a prerequisite for democratic governance (as well as being, perhaps, intrinsically desirable). But this immediately prompts the question: are non-democratic forms the inevitable consequence of cultural heterogeneity within a given political community, or is it the case that democracy simply cannot cope with cultural difference? The prevalence of "ethnic" conflict in the post-Cold War era, which has been seen as a "toxic by-product" of démocratisation in parts of the former USSR and eastern and central Europe, may seem to lend support to such views.16 To accept that these conflicts really are about "primordial" cultural or ethnic identities, however, is to endorse implicitly the tactics of demagogues and ignore the extent to 12. See Bimal Krishna Matilal, "Ethical Relativism and Confrontation of Cultures", in Michael Kraus (ed.), Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), p. 349. 13. John Ladd, "Introduction", in Ladd (ed.), Ethical Relativism, op. cit., pp. 2, 3. 14. German Romantic writers in general, and Johann Herder in particular, were major influences in the early development of both nationalist and anthropological thought on culture. 15. Jacques Barzun, "Is Democratic Theory for Export?" in Rosenthal (ed.), Ethics and International Affairs, op. cit., p. 47. 16. See, for example, John Keane, "Democracy's Poisonous Fruit", Times Literary Supplement (21 August 1992).



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which antagonistic expressions of cultural or ethnic difference are determined contextually by a range of other political and economic factors. These, and a number of related issues concerning the idea that cultural homogeneity is a necessary condition for democracy, are worth pursuing a little further. The simplest and most obvious response to those who hold that cultural homogeneity is an indispensable ingredient for successful democracy is to draw attention to the actual ethnic/cultural composition of most contemporary states. Virtually every state in the world is marked by some degree of ethnic or cultural pluralism, and this heterogeneity is as characteristic of democracies as much as it is of non-democracies. India is one of the more obvious examples of a polity characterised by a very high degree of cultural heterogeneity. Some may be quick to point out that the practice of democratic politics in India is deeply deficient in any number of respects and is far from realising the ideals embodied in democratic theory. It is also clear that democracy in India has not proved to be a panacea for a range of pressing political, social or economic ills. The same observations, however, can be made about most democracies to a greater or lesser degree. Moreover, there is no reason to expect that drawing the boundaries of states around relatively homogeneous cultural groups automatically leads to the adoption of democratic governance in these states.17 There is no necessary causal link between cultural homogeneity and démocratisation, just as there is no such link between economic development and démocratisation either.18 Another related point is that democracy is, in part, a response to heterogeneity or pluralism—at least in the sense that it allows for the articulation of a variety of interests, needs and aspirations by either groups or individuals rather than their repression. Some writers have pointed out that contemporary democracies generally have a much better record in managing cultural or ethnic differences in a non-violent and less repressive manner19—especially when compared with places where ethnic cleansing and similar policies have been employed as the ultimate solution to the "problem" of living with cultural difference. Moreover, governments in democratic states generally do not torture and/or murder their own citizens—at least not in large numbers.20 It is equally important to note that social heterogeneity is not limited to cultural differences per se—there are other categories of "difference" as well. These may relate to such factors as socio-economic class and/or gender—categories that raise further important issues relating to the normative dimensions of culture. Certain interests, needs and aspirations arising specifically, for example, from being female, may be suppressed or subordinated by an over-arching 17. For example, the states of Tonga in the Southwest Pacific and Brunei in Southeast Asia are more homogeneous than most, but far from democratic. 18. Singapore is prime example of a country with a very high level of economic development, but with a very low level of substantive democracy. 19. See Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1993). Note also that I have used "contemporary" to qualify this reference to democracies: historical practices by putatively democratic states which have led, for example, to the "trail of tears", and/or to programmes of forced assimilation which may also be regarded as forms of ethnic cleansing. 20. See R.J. Rummel, "Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 39, No. 1 (1995), pp. 3-26.


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cultural paradigm favouring male dominance and privilege. A female member of the community who recognises this may repudiate "her culture", or certain significant aspects of it. She may also choose to construct her identity primarily on the basis of her gender and articulate her political interests in accordance with her perceived interests as a female, especially vis-à-vis male domination. When considering normative issues surrounding the role of culture, then, it is well to remember that not all practices within a "cultural community" may be embraced wholeheartedly by its "members"; that culture itself often acts as a mechanism for control within groups (via such mechanisms as patriarchy, for example); that these may be just as oppressive as "external" sources of subordination and control; and that culture is not the only plausible basis for the formation of personal and/or group identity. These issues are relevant to a more general theoretical problem pertaining to the relationship between culture and ethics, namely, the framework-dependent character of the culturalist version of ethical relativism. This form of relativism depends explicitly on the positing of a coherent contextual framework as the foundation for an ethical system. The notion of "a culture"—and the group to which it attaches—provides this contextual foundational framework. This may be contrasted with non-framework ethical relativism which holds that any given domain, such as "a culture", is likely to contain a multiplicity of interpretive possibilities which, in turn, give rise to multiple ethical positions,21 and potentially as many different perspectives as there are people. This version, therefore, implies the relativity of individual perspectives rather than group perspectives because it endorses the validity of each and every individual normative perspective on each and every relevant issue. This contrasts sharply with the premises of cultural relativism. For, whereas the non-framework position negates social control over conduct—by effectively abstracting the individual from his/her social embeddedness and assigning him/her complete ethical autonomy, thereby denying the validity of culturally determined bases of ethical norms and practices—the essence of cultural relativism is located in the group codes which are assumed to regulate, control and determine all aspects of social life.22 Taken to its logical conclusion, a cultural relativist perspective repudiates one form of ethical plurality (namely, the individualist, non-framework dependent form) in the name of another, for it is founded on the assertion of irreducible ethical plurality between cultural groups. Moreover, the theory insists not only that each separate cultural group comprises the foundation on which its own ethical framework is constructed, but that each such framework is equally valid. There are several further important implications for ethical theory in general, and democratic theory in particular, that follow from this. First, it implies that there are no valid criteria beyond the framework of each individual group, that is, outside its own boundaries, which may be invoked to provide normative judgement about the rights or wrongs of any actions within the group, including the way in which politics is conducted. At the same time, this obviously implies that no observer "outside" the group is entitled to render judgement on the rights or wrongs of any actions within the group, including (and perhaps especially) the actions of ruling elites. It may also be claimed that 21. See Michael Kraus, "Introduction", in Kraus (ed.), Relativism, op. cit., p. 2. 22. See Herskovits, "Cultural Relativism", op. cit., p. 76.



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the "framework" provides normative endorsement for the immunity of such elites from criticism within the group as well.23 Second, it follows that while a cultural relativist perspective cannot support the view that democracy may mean all things to all individual people, it does support the idea that democracy can mean all things to all "cultures". In other words, "the cultural framework" is privileged insofar as it is seen as providing the only legitimate resources for interpreting what is or what is not "democratic" for any given culturally defined entity. This kind of argument leads directly to a third problem—"cultural frameworks" do not speak for themselves. We must ask, therefore: who is it who claims the authority to interpret the cultural framework, and, therefore, to decide what is or is not "democratic" according to this framework? As suggested above, the framework itself may privilege certain individuals as being uniquely qualified to pronounce judgement on the entire range of normative (and other) issues within the group. This brings us to a fourth crucial point; that is, that states are not "cultures". This is so obvious that it may seem scarcely worth remarking upon. However, the two are still commonly conflated and many discursive practices reinforce this. For example, the word "China" names a geopolitical entity—the "Chinese state". But people also tend generally to speak of "Chinese culture" (as if it were a single, homogeneous "thing"). It is, therefore, very easy to slip into the habit of conflating cultures and states. And, even where variations are acknowledged, they are, none the less, often seen simply as variations on a "national" theme. This tendency has been fortified not only by the practices of many state elites who have attempted to enforce cultural homogenisation in the name of nationbuilding, but also by conventional international relations perspectives on the state. Walker notes, for example, that the competing claims of universality and particularity have been resolved in a theoretically influential way in international relations: cultural diversity frequently has been subsumed into the claims of state and recognition of differences has been limited largely to differences between states (via national identity) co-existing in a state system.24 The positing of distinct frameworks entailed by the cultural relativist position on ethics has also been linked with ideas about incommensurability between cultural systems. Although the original Kuhnian formulation of incommensurability was specifically concerned with scientific paradigms (rather than with cultural systems per se), and did not equate it with incompatibility, let alone incomparability, rigid incommensurability theses carrying these connotations have, none the less, found their way into broader discussions of the cultural dimensions of epistemological and ethical incompatibility.25 In other words, the 23. Certain relevant aspects of hermeneutics and the "insider/outsider" dichotomy are discussed in Stephanie Lawson, Tradition Versus Democracy in the South Pacific: Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 164-166. 24. R.B.J. Walker, "The Concept of Culture in the Theory of International Relation", in Jongsuk Chay (ed.), Culture and International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 6. A good example of this is the construction and deployment of Indonesia's state ideology of Pancasila. Moreover, the principals underlying what is called (disingenuously) "Pancasila democracy" actually legitimate authoritarianism. See Richard Robison, "Indonesia: Tensions in State and Regime", in Hewison et al. (eds.), Southeast Asia, op. cit., p. 44. 25. For a general discussion of some of these issues, see Richard Bernstein, "Incommensurability and Otherness Revisited", in Eliot Deutsch (ed.), Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophic Perspectives

(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), pp. 85-103.


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idea of the framework has reinforced theories of cultural/ethical incommensurability, as well as deterministic and even primordialist perspectives on cultural belonging. In turn, these have far-reaching negative implications for the possibility of intercultural or transcultural understanding as a prerequisite for agreement on valid norms of conduct. Furthermore, while the "frameworks" posited in the original anthropological construction of cultural relativism generally related to small-scale societies, and later developments in political science and international relations tended to view states as the appropriate frameworks, an even grander, and explicitly dichotomous, set of frameworks has now emerged in the form of the "West" and the "non-West". Since democracy is frequently viewed as "Western", and many contemporary formulations of the doctrine of cultural relativism revolve broadly around ideas of the West/nonWest, this is an important issue. I return to this more general theme in the final section. In the meantime, the next concern is to expose some central weaknesses of the doctrine of cultural relativism specifically in relation to democracy, and for this purpose it is necessary to confront the task of saying something about what democracy is, and is not.

Democracy One of the most common approaches to defining democracy, at least in its modern representative form, is via a description of certain institutional arrangements, including constitutional provision for elections, parliaments, certain judicial processes, and so forth. Conventional provisions and procedures of this kind clearly reflect rule of law doctrines—the principles of which are antithetical to the exercise of arbitrary or personalised political power as well as to violence as a means of grasping political power or settling political disputes. But there is no guarantee that substantive democratic practices actually follow from their formal institutionalisation. Formal institutional provisions must also produce certain democratic outcomes. Institutional provisions, therefore, are meant to give effect: first, to competition among individuals and/or organised groups for all effective positions of government power at regular intervals and excluding the use (or threat) of force; second, to a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, and in such a way that no major adult group is excluded; and third, to a sufficient level of political liberties—including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom to form and join organisations—to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.26 These outcomes assist in distinguishing a system characterised by substantive democratic governance from an "elected dictatorship".27 Beyond this, however, the institutions and outcomes reflect a certain ethic of political rule which is embodied in the word "democracy" itself and which receives little attention in revisionist treatments. 26. These three main criteria are based on the parsimonious revisionist formulations of Robert Dahl and Joseph Schumpeter as set out in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), p. xvi. 27. See Henry B. Mayo, "The Theory of Democracy Outlined", in Carl Cohen (ed.), Communism, Fascism and Democracy: The Theoretical Foundations (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 573.



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"Democracy" is the name of a form of rule, meaning literally "rule or power of the people". In its modern representative form, people have ultimate political authority rather than engaging directly in daily governance. It is this meaning which animates, however imperfectly, the institutional structures and outcomes surveyed above. But, beyond the descriptive meaning of democracy, there is also a distinct normative dimension that provides democracy with its basic justification. Put simply, it is assumed that it is right that the people rule or have ultimate political authority.28 The pre-modern origins of this normative conception in the West are usually assumed to lie in the ancient Greek polis, with the emergence of the notion that legitimate political power was not the preserve of a monarch or tyrant, an oligarchy or aristocracy, but lay in the hands of the demos. The effect given to the normative principle of popular political power here was a form of direct democratic rule via an assembly of citizens. The more direct form obviously differed from contemporary representative forms, and this has led to arguments about whether "true" democracy can only ever be direct. I mention this because it helps to illustrate the point that a variety of institutional forms adequately can accommodate democratic rule. This suggests that the normative principle remains essentially the same despite institutional, historical, cultural and other contextual differences. "Essentialism" is an unpopular notion in many spheres of thinking, and rightly so when linked with culture to produce holistic, reified, static and deterministic notions of what "a culture" is. But a notion of conceptual essentialism is necessary for identifying the normative basis of democracy. In short, the argument here is that democracy is based essentially on the primary normative principle that it is right that the people rule or have ultimate political authority.29

But can this be "relativised" without effectively changing it into something else? Certainly, it is difficult to see how any form of government which explicitly repudiates this primary normative principle through the denial of political rights for ordinary people to participate fully in political life, and to exercise ultimate political authority—even if this denial is somehow legitimated by reference to "cultural" values—can seriously claim the name "democracy". To illustrate this point, we shall look briefly at the notion of "Asian democracy"30 as articulated by the Singaporean government in recent years. Singapore's ruling People's Action Party (PAP) has promoted a form of democracy based explicitly on Confucian ideas about politics, power, and political roles. The aim was to devise a new theory of democracy drawing on "authentic" cultural elements within the Singaporean polity. There were a number of obvious problems with this exercise. First, the elements of Confucianism that were selected as the basis for the new theory of democracy were those most clearly at odds with the basic normative principle of democracy. Second, the way in which they were reinterpreted, rather than promoting more democratic practices, effectively reinforced the PAP's authoritarian approach to government. For example, the Confucian values of harmony and consensus were 28. Which is not the same thing as saying that it is good that the people rule in terms of the consequences of democratic rule. 29. This principle is not absolute in the sense that it has some kind of objective status that is independent of human thought and/or action. 30. Which is "Asian" only in the sense that its cultural reference point is one of many traditions found in the Asian region.

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interpreted to mean that criticism of, or opposition to, the government was not to be tolerated. An early proponent of this style of "democracy" contrasted the "Western" approach to the "Confucian" approach in the following terms:


In the Western parliamentary form [democracy] is arrived at through open debate from within and without; in an Eastern form of democracy it is arrived at through closed debate within, with no opposition from without. In this dual and mixed form, democracy is synthesized to become a new polity which may be called CONSENCRACY.31 The literal meaning of this neologism is "rule of consensus"—the "demos" has been completely removed. Moreover, the emphasis on consensus in this context does not mean agreement among the people at large, but conformity with the wishes of the ruling elite. The end result is not a reformulation of "democracy" in order to accommodate cultural differences, preferences, experiences or sensitivities. Rather, it is the effective negation of the primary normative principle of democracy. Whatever else "consencracy" is, then, it is not democracy. A further interesting point to be noted in relation to this particular exercise in revisionism is the fact that Singapore's "traditional" cultural heritage has only very tenuous connections to Confucianism in any case. Most of Singapore's Chinese population—which is itself internally very diverse—do not have a particular familiarity with Confucianism. In addition, the other 25% of the population, comprised largely of people of Malay and South Asian origin, have virtually none at all.32 Does this mean that there is no place for cultural considerations in the theory and practice of democracy? As suggested above, there is a multiplicity of institutional forms and practices that democracy may take without losing the connection with its primary normative basis, and these forms may reflect a variety of cultural—or other—factors. In addition, and again without losing the connection with the primary normative principle, varying cultural (or other) considerations and circumstances may result in differential emphasis being placed on certain secondary normative principles of contemporary democracy, such as liberty, equality and community. This does not imply that equality, for example, may legitimately be crushed in the name of freedom—or vice versa. It does not resolve such vexed questions as to whether social and economic equality are a "democratic right", or at least a prerequisite for meaningful political equality. And it does not offer a resolution of the apparent tensions between communal and individualistic approaches to social, economic and political life.33 Rather, it acknowledges that different polities—which may or may not be equated with "a culture"—can legitimately pursue different modes of democratic expression. 31. Wu Teh Yao, Politics East-Politics West (Singapore: Pan Pacific Book Distributors, 1979), pp. 57-58. 32. For a more detailed discussion of this case, see Stephanie Lawson, "Cultural Relativism and Democracy: Political Myths About 'Asia' and 'the West'", in Richard Robison (ed.), Pathways to Asia: The Politics of Engagement (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1996), esp. pp. 119-121. 33. Issues such as freedom and equality, or political and civil rights, as distinct from social and economic rights, and individualistic versus communal approaches are often posited in a dichotomous, oppositional either/or form. But it should be noted that the oppositional construction of the categories is at least misleading, if not false, in the sense that equality does not preclude freedom (and vice versa), that the enjoyment of political and civil rights does not entail the suppression of social and economic rights (and vice versa), and that individualistic and communal approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive.



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Let us consider some of these points in the context of another brief example. In the recent past, political leaders in some Scandinavian countries can claim to have demonstrated a strong commitment to greater equity in the provision of social and economic goods. But they have not done so by suppressing those political and civil rights that underscore the value of liberty. One possible critique, however, is that a form of discriminatory redistribution has been implemented to achieve this end and that this has in some sense compromised the liberty of certain individual entrepreneurs to enjoy the full fruits of their labour. Of course, an alternative critique could be that redistributive practices have not gone far enough and that the level of social and economic inequality still in evidence remains inconsistent with social justice.34 There is obviously a great deal more that can be said about the implications of this but one or two points must suffice. First, competing demands relating to liberty and equality, individualism and community—which may or may not be related to "cultural" traditions within a community—may remain in perpetual tension in democratic theory and practice. Second, at any particular time it may be that one or other of the sides of the argument about distributive justice/discriminatory redistribution wins greater support and is thereby given greater prominence in public policy measures. The point is that there is sufficient space within a democratic system for these kinds of tensions to be accommodated and, although at different times one or other "side" might seem to win out at the expense of the other, there is nothing necessarily permanent about this, and it certainly does not mean that the connection with the primary normative principle of democracy has been lost. Turning once again to the Asian region, let us also consider the claim that is often made by state elites (especially those from China, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia) that Asian societies generally have a stronger "cultural" orientation to communal values, as opposed to values associated with individualism (including political and civil rights), and that this has led to a greater concern for providing social and economic goods in the form of improved living standards, access to education and so forth. This is usually contrasted with practices in "the West" which are said to elevate individualistic values at the expense of other social and economic goods—despite the experiences of social democracies. These arguments, incidentally, have also been incorporated in the "Asian democracy" model referred to above. Let us also assume for a moment that there is such a thing as, say, "Singaporean culture", and that the values deriving from such a culture are strongly oriented towards the achievement of widespread social and economic goods rather than the enhancement of individualistic opportunities. As suggested above, the privileging of certain public policy measures that support these values is not inconsistent with the basic normative principle of democracy. But neither is there any logical requirement for repressing civil and political liberties in order to support these values. Moreover, if these cultural values are 34. For an interesting discussion of the Swedish case, which also incorporates some comparative discussion of Norway and Denmark, see Gosta Esping-Andersen, "Single-party Dominance in Sweden: The Saga of Social Democracy". See also Jonas Pontusson, "Conditions of Labor-Party Dominance: Sweden and Britain Compared". Both are in T.J. Pempel (ed.), Uncommon Democracies: The One-party Dominant Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).


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indeed very strong, then they can scarcely be under threat from allowing free political expression. But now assume that "Singaporean culture" supports a strictly hierarchical social and political order, and that this order is expressly hostile to the view that it is right that the people rule or have ultimate political power. As a corollary, criticism of the ruling elite by ordinary people is not permitted. Here we get into some further complicated considerations, such as "who says" that this is what "Singaporean culture" actually supports. Is it a very widely accepted view (that is, accepted among ordinary people in Singapore)? Or is it a view held and expressed largely by those who have the power to make themselves heard most effectively, namely, the political elite? And, if so, are we entitled to view their claims as suspect given that they are the major beneficiaries of their own interpretive practices? In addition to these questions, it should also be noted that even where there is tangible popular support for the idea that only an entrenched elite is entitled to rule, and that no criticism, let alone mechanisms to replace the elites in office, should be permitted, this does not render such a political system democratic. Put another way, loyal subjects may support an absolute monarch, just as true believers may die (and kill) willingly for a theocratic cause, but this does not translate into something that is a "democratic" system of rule. The foregoing discussion has emphasised just how problematic the notion of culture can be when attempting to assess its explanatory value in political contexts. However, it has also provided examples of how much practical flexibility there is in allowing variations on the democratic theme. This is important for developing a reasonably flexible, and reflexive, approach to democracy that takes adequate account of the fallibility of human constructions as well as the diversity that characterises human communities—within, as well as between, them. The approach taken here therefore reflects a pluralist position which, while obviously rejecting absolutist solutions, does partake of certain aspects of universalism in that it endorses limitations and the notion of standards, as well as providing space for cultural (and other) forms of diversity.35 A succinct statement of how this works out conceptually has been provided by Matilal in his discussion of singularism, pluralism and relativism: Singularism is to be understood as defying the thought that there may be a variety of conceptions of good cherished by different groups of human beings. Pluralism, on the other hand, allows for the multiplicity of the concept of the common good as well as freedom of choice on the part of the individual to choose his or her own community life. Relativism goes a little further than this and holds that one such conception of good is as good as any other, there being no overarching standard. Pluralism keeps open the possibility for ranking these different concepts of good.36 35. This may be seen as an impossible attempt to synthesise opposites. As St. Thomas Aquinas demonstrated in his "great synthesis" of faith and reason, however, it is possible to turn apparent opposites into logically compatible entities by demonstrating complementarity between them rather than treating them as mutually exclusive concepts. Apparent opposites may also be treated in a dialectical fashion, and again this works to break down the rigidity of the conceptual entities. 36. Bimal K. Matilal, "Pluralism, Relativism and Interaction Between Cultures", in Deutsch (ed.), Culture and Modernity, op. cit., p. 141.



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Following this schema, the argument here is that, although democracy may take a variety of institutional forms, and democratic polities may vary in terms of the value placed on certain secondary democratic values (reflecting, perhaps, the majority's conception of certain "goods" at any given time) without severing the connection with the primary democratic norm, there are limits to the kinds of regimes that may legitimately claim the name "democracy".37 This position contrasts clearly with the rigid or dogmatic relativist position which implies that there is an unlimited range of interpretive possibilities—whether these are linked to a cultural framework or not. Although this seems, on the face of it, to be a more democratic epistemological position to adopt than one prescribing conceptual standards and limitations, the rigid relativist position can (and does) in fact provide a protective cloak for various kinds of authoritarian stances. Furthermore, the infinite diversity of interpretations that are accorded equal legitimacy through the normative endorsement of rigid relativism is best characterised as an anarchic, rather than democratic, epistemological stance. Much of this accords with the arguments of normative theorists who point out that, where pluralist ideas give way to relativism, "critical knowledge /normativity gives way to tolerance of the most oppressive modes of governance".38 It is equally clear, however, that this pluralist position also rejects an equally rigid form of universalism which endorses a single authoritative standard of "correctness" for democracy, for this would be an equally dogmatic and certainly undemocratic epistemological posture in so far as it works to silence alternative views and leaves little space for the legitimate diversity that characterises democratic politics. Viewed in this way, a rigid universalism can be as inherently authoritarian in its implications for political rule as a rigid relativist perspective. The position which best supports a genuinely democratic polity is one underpinned by a pluralistic epistemological position which in turn supports a sufficiently flexible approach to understanding democracy that is neither dogmatically relativist nor universalist. This position is not entirely unassailable—nor can it be if it is to serve as a democratic model. Indeed, given the fallibilism inherent in the nature of a democratic model, it must remain open to criticism. In other words, whereas both the relativist and rigid universalist positions logically entail a certain closure of discourse—and for that reason are dogmatic—the pluralist position must always remain open—while at the same time allowing that some interpretations of democracy may be better than others. In summary, this allows for a theoretical approach to democracy that is reflexive in the sense that it rejects objective standards independent of human experience. Such reflexivity, as Neufeld puts it, is further anchored in the understanding that "the standards that determine what is to count as reliable knowledge are not nature's, but rather always human standards". He adds that these standards are "not imposed by nature but adopted by convention by the members of a specific community".39 With the positing of a "specific community", however, we are brought back once again to the problem that continually confronts a theory of democracy that is applicable across communities. The earlier discussion on ethics 37. The leaders of regimes, of course, can call their preferred style of rule anything they like, but this does not mean that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for example, is, in fact, a democracy. 38. Jabri, "Textualising the Self", op. cit., p. 59. 39. Neufeld, "Reflexivity", op. cit., p. 15.

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and culture has already dealt with a number of important aspects of this problem. The next section addresses yet another conceptual division of humanity that effectively posits, at least implicitly, a "specific community" known generally as "the West", and which has some further important and interesting implications for the main themes of this discussion.


The West and the Rest It was 'noted earlier that a prominent feature of contemporary international debates about culture is that they are often formulated in such a way as to set up another grand dichotomy in place of the "ideologically" defined East/West division of the Cold War period. The defining dichotomy of our times is now constructed, at its most general level, in terms of West/non-West,40 the opposing elements of which are very often understood explicitly in cultural terms.41 This cultural aspect, however, may also be seen in ideological terms, at least to the extent that cultural factors have been used to justify political programmes or legitimate certain structures of political power, as exemplified by the Singaporean model of "Asian democracy". In other words, culture has not necessarily superseded ideology. Rather, it has become a new arena for ideological contestation in international politics. Although a critical approach to the deployment of the concept of culture as an ideological tool in the hands of certain non-Western political elites is taken here, it is also important to take note of another aspect of the universalist/(cultural) relativist debate. This concerns the charge that "the West" is attempting, in the name of ethical universalism, to assume moral authority in areas such as human rights so as to pursue hegemony by other means.42 Much the same has been said about Western "projects of démocratisation" which have been taken to imply that the political systems of non-Western countries must be remade in the image of the West in order to achieve "true" democracy. One author, for example, writes of "Western governments who support democracy in Africa as the process through which the universalizing of the Western model of society can take place".43 In Asia, similar points have been made in relation to Western projections of democracy in the region and the presumed superiority of its underlying values.44 For Islamic societies, absorption of the principles of Western democracy have been urged prescriptively as a means of moving "confidently into the 21st century".45 These perceptions have given rise to charges that many Western elites, in attempting to impose their own particular version of democratic practices and institutions—not only 40. And sometimes the very same entities are depicted as "North/South" when development issues are debated. 41. This is, moreover, a classical rendering of dichotomy-by-contradiction whereby one of the divisions is understood as the negation of the other; that is, everything is either x or not x. 42. See Ann Kent, "The Limits of Ethics in International Politics: The International Human Rights Regime", Asian Studies Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (July 1992), p. 32. 43. Claude Ake, "The Unique Case of African Democracy", International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 2 (1993), p. 239. 44. See Muthiah Alagappa, "Democratic Transition in Asia: The Role of the International Community", Honolulu, East-West Center Special Reports, No. 3 (October 1994), p. 6. 45. Brian Beedham, "Islam and the West", The Economist, Vol. 332, No. 7875 (6 August 1994) (supplement), p. 6.



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through moralistic rhetoric and posturing but also through such means as aid conditionality, structural adjustment policies, favourable (or unfavourable) trade regimes, and so forth—are guilty of arrogance, hubris, intolerance, neo-imperialism and cultural chauvinism. Some of these arguments may be inspired less by strictly ethical concerns about hegemony—and indeed are sometimes voiced most loudly by those who themselves practise domestic hegemony and internal colonialism. None the less, the critique is a powerful one and some aspects of it are certainly worth taking seriously. But, at the same time, to accept that "the West" is any kind of coherent actor vis-à-vis a "non-West" is to fall into the trap of endorsing the dichotomy, and it is as well to keep this in mind as we proceed. In the specific context of democracy as a (potentially) universal model in theory and practice, the assumed cultural division between the West and the Rest has produced several major strands of argument on the "non-Western side". Briefly, the first holds that democracy (and especially its liberal elements) is a product of the modern industrialised West and that, for many non-Western states, it is a "foreign flower" incapable of being transplanted successfully outside its own "native soil". The second holds that for democracy to take root outside the West, it must be modified to suit local conditions. A third holds that some communities have pre-existing indigenous political forms that are essentially democratic and far more appropriate in the local context than any introduced species could possibly be. With respect to the first argument, it is clear that a community does not have to be of the modern or "Western" variety in order to develop normative principles of democratic governance.46 There are democracies throughout the world, from Botswana, to India, and to some East Asian, South Pacific and West Indian states. The polis of ancient Athens, too, was neither modern nor "Western", although the democratic political experiences of classical times have long been regarded as having made vital contributions to the West's civilisational "heritage", along with a significant body of Greek philosophy. It should also be noted, however, that the transmission of classical learning and scholarship from the Hellenistic age did not occur only through the "West", but through the Arab world as well, largely via the work of Islamic scholars.47 Moreover, much doubt is now being cast on orthodox assumptions about the civilisational location of ancient Greece as "Western" or "European". This is worth considering briefly because ideas about the extent to which democracy is Western in origin have been influential in cultural relativist debates. In a sustained attack on what is called the "Aryan Model" of ancient Greek history and culture, which assumes an essentially European character for the "birthplace 46. For the purposes of this discussion, I do not intend to delve into the argument about whether Athens and other Greek city-states really were "democratic" because of the exclusion of women and metics, not to mention slaves, from effective political participation. What was undoubtedly defective from the contemporary perspective was not the normative principle of democratic governance but rather the highly exclusionary basis of citizenship in the polis. 47. Where scholars were in fact far more familiar with the work of Aristotle, for example, than were their Christian counterparts, at least until the time of Aquinas. But, of course, neither Aristotle, nor Plato, nor indeed most of the great philosophers of ancient Greece whose works are regarded as part of the West's classical heritage, were among the ranks of enthusiastic supporters of democracy—but rather among its most scathing critics.


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of democracy", Bernai argues that the major cultural and political characteristics of the Hellenic world were in fact influenced strongly by colonising Africans and Semites.48 Another study, which also aims to upset conventional historiographical assumptions about the essential "Europeaness" of classical democracy, reviews a body of evidence pointing to the Middle Eastern origins of city-republican forms—of which the Greek polis was only one example. Springborg identifies certain ancient Middle Eastern institutional structures indicating a relatively advanced form of democratic governance, some of which pre-date the age of Athenian democracy by about 1,000 years.49 These are interesting points because not only is democracy often assumed to be a peculiarly Western cultural product, it is also assumed that the cultural connections are directly related to a "classical world" which is itself construed as inherently "Western"—thereby excluding possible non-Western connections. The idea of the "West" as the sole historical purveyor of democratic norms is also suspect in the face of evidence from other parts of the globe. Forms of community displaying characteristics of democratic political organisation, for example, have been identified in the African past.50 This has lent support to the argument that pre-existing or indigenous democratic political forms should be resurrected rather than importing an alien Western model. But the translation of such past communities into functioning democratic polities in contemporary times has proved problematic, not least because of the structure of post-colonial states and the diverse communities that they now encompass. These scarcely resemble the smaller-scale communities of earlier eras, which are the ones usually presumed to have incorporated certain democratic norms and practices such as widespread participation in decision-making in a relatively egalitarian communal setting. One of the major problems has been in the translation of communal norms—which, of course, are not inconsistent with democracy—into a theory of the one-party state. This has led (at least in a significant number of cases), to the rise of authoritarian regimes which have often been justified, along with certain economic development imperatives, by explicit reference to their "cultural authenticity" as genuine expressions of autochthonous political forms. In addition, and as with the "Asian democracy" model discussed earlier, African models of "one-party democracy" have often had less to do with a genuine desire to preserve cultural integrity than with the desire of state elites to legitimate repressive forms of rule and maintain political control, often by reference to grossly over-homogenised and selective versions of cultural authenticity.51

48. He argues further that, if he is correct in urging the overthrow of the Aryan Model in favour of a revised Ancient Model which incorporates these non-European influences, then it will be necessary not only to rethink the fundamental bases of "Western Civilization" but to recognise as well the extent to which racism and "continental chauvinism" has infected European historiography. See Martin Bernai, Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, Vol. 1, The Fabrication of Ancient Greece

(London: Free Association Books, 1987), p. 2. 49. Patricia Springborg, Western Republicanism and the Oriental Prince (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 3. 50. See Dov Ronen (ed.), Democracy and Pluralism in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1986). 51. For a more detailed discussion, see Stephanie Lawson, "Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime Change and Democratization", Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 2 (January 1993), pp. 183-206.



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The issue of the "cultural integrity of the state" is also worth emphasising because it begs the question of the extent to which a state can be said to embody a culture. They may indeed embody a kind of elite culture but this is hardly the end of the matter, especially where cultural dimensions of elite authority are deployed in an authoritarian fashion as instruments of social and political repression. Furthermore, one characteristic that most modern states certainly do share are populations that can only be described as culturally heterogeneous, and this applies equally to East, West, North or South. This is not to deny that a certain level of political coherence may obtain at a national level, but this scarcely justifies the conflation of state/regime/culture which, rather than promoting or celebrating cultural difference, is more likely to suppress or obliterate expressions of cultural heterogeneity.52 A further problematic aspect of broad exercises in cultural construction, especially those which have been mounted at the level of the state and/or region, is the extent to which the conceptual deployment of a notion of cultural authenticity by non-Western elites very often depends on the construction of the "West" as the "other". For exercises of this kind fall into precisely the same errors that have been identified in the European construction of Orientalism, but in an inverted Occidentalist form.53 This leads, finally, back to the question of whether it makes sense, in cultural terms, to speak of the "West" versus the "non-West". Of the two terms, the "non-West" clearly represents the least coherent category. Also, reducing the diversity of the non-West to regional constructions such as Africa or Asia may be a common enough exercise, but then to attribute special, unique cultural characteristics to such regions as a whole, as has been attempted in the construction of certain models of "Asian democracy" or "African democracy", is to deny the enormous political and cultural diversity that these regions encompass. Nor can cultural diversity be dissolved within the component states of regions. While they may plausibly be equated more or less with a form of government, such as democracy, monarchy or autocracy, it is rarely possible to equate a state with "a culture". But, to return to the most general level of the "non-West", any usefulness it possesses as a shorthand expression is confined only to distinguishing it from the "West". It follows that the coherence of the non-West is intelligible only as the negation of the West. On the other hand, the West often seems to be taken as a more coherent entity. Certainly, many have little difficulty talking about "Western democracy" or "Western culture" in more or less singular terms. But it takes no more than a modicum of insight to recognise that "the West" is not a culturally or politically congruous entity, and its usefulness as a shorthand expression is quite limited. While there is insufficient space to engage here in a full-scale deconstruction of this reified entity called "the West", I do want to stress that its historical, cultural and political components are just as heterogeneous as, say, those of Asia or 52. Mackerras writes that once many of the new nation-states were established in the Asian region, state elites began to demand greater cultural orthodoxy to reinforce state identity and such demands fell hard on ethnic minorities whose cultures were valued less than those of the dominant centre. Colin Mackerras (ed.), East and Southeast Asia: A Multidisciplinary Survey (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 520. 53. The Occidentalist mode of discourse, and its implications for cultural relativism and democracy, are discussed at greater length in Lawson, Tradition Versus Democracy, op. cit.


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Africa. Most importantly, there is no such thing as a Western theory or model of democracy which is attached to a Western culture. At best there are Western theories of democracy, Western political practices, and Western cultures in the plural. For example, liberal democracy—to take a specific (but none the less internally heterogeneous) body of thought developed in the West—is but one of its cultural-ideological products. There are other theories or models of democracy that can be situated historically in the European heartland as well, and, despite the tendencies of liberal triumphalism to gloss over the issue, the question of what constitutes substantive democracy is scarcely a settled matter in "the West" either. Moreover, communism and fascism must also be counted as products of "Western culture" along with the practices of genocide, slavery, torture, militarism, colonialism, imperialism, the inquisition, divine right of monarchs, anarchist theories, religious fundamentalism, secularism, romanticism, nationalism, and the concept of state sovereignty. Clearly, not all these have been exclusive products of "Western culture"—not even imperialism which has been practised at one time or another in any number of places from Africa to the Pacific. But, to the extent that at one time or another they have indeed all emerged in the West, they illustrate beyond question the irreducible diversity of its historical, ideological, theological, philosophical, economic, social, and political experiences. In addition, the fact that many of the same practices, ideas, theories, projects, world views, or whatever, have also arisen outside the West, either independently as well as by imitation, syncretism or imposition, demonstrates the commensurability of elements on either side of the alleged West/non-West divide.

Conclusion The discussion has canvassed many issues concerning the problematic status of "culture" as an ethical framework and, indeed, as a satisfactory explanatory or analytical category for a range of other social and political considerations— especially in terms of the normative dimensions of democratic rule. Particular attention has been drawn to the potential ideological utility of the concept of culture and the extent to which its symbolic elements may be harnessed by state elites for political advantage. As any successful nationalist leader can attest, there is probably no better banner under which to pursue a political programme than one which displays cultural emblems to maximum advantage and which, at the same time, denigrates or demonises those of "others". A critical perspective on these possibilities should therefore lead one to question such assertions as "the political system is culturally defined"54 and to ask instead whether cultural systems may in fact be politically defined, for a "folk-way" may well be the way of the folk with power.55 I have been concerned as well to dissect gross conceptual entities such as the "West" which, although clearly incapable of holding together in any meaningful 54. Winifred L. Amaturo, "Literature and International Relations: The Question of Culture in the Production of International Power", Millennium, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Spring 1995), p. 3. 55. Ian Hamnett, Chieftainship and Legitimacy: An Anthropological Study of Executive Law in Lesotho (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 15.



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way, have, none the less, very often been taken to encompass a particular cultural framework which has then been used as a means of marking off the non-West (and vice versa). The dichotomy thus produced has also been instrumental in perpetuating obnoxious forms of Orientalism and, more recently, Occidentalism which may be no less obnoxious in its own way. And if cultural imperialism does indeed consist of the imposition of a dominant groups' experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm,56 there is no reason to suppose that this has occurred only in the form of impositions by "the West" on non-Western "others", as evidenced not only by the history of colonialism elsewhere, but also by a substantial literature on internal colonialism in the post-colonial period. The latter, moreover, is implicated in some of the worst human rights abuses now being carried out—abuses which can scarcely be defended in the name of local cultural authenticity. It is also worth noting that comparative studies of contemporary democratising forces, as well as human rights campaigns in a number of regions, suggest that these are emanating not so much from "Western" sources, but rather from within the countries concerned. Moves towards democracy and greater support for human rights, then, is not simply or even primarily driven by "Western epistemological imperialism", but often by local demands. Indeed, it has been observed that in places like Burma and Cambodia, it is local people who have been pushing most strenuously for human rights and democracy, while Western powers are, in reality, "almost languid in their approach", for they have offered very little apart from limited rhetorical support to democratic forces in either country.57 Finally, let us return to some of the broad questions raised by the frameworkdependent view of ethics—where "a culture" is equated with a framework. What is a culture? Where does the boundary of one culture begin and end? What characteristics are decisive in marking one culture off from another? What makes a culture unique? How do we locate "cultures" in the international sphere? And, can ethical systems be understood in terms of their attachments to coherent cultural systems? A major purpose of the discussion has been to demonstrate that most of these questions are virtually unanswerable except in the vaguest of terms. Yet they have often been assumed as providing a tangible basis on which to make confident claims about the role of culture in contemporary international affairs. And those who do attempt to provide a decisive answer to these kinds of questions frequently depict the concept of culture, or a culture, in terms which are reductionist, static, deterministic or which treat it as a reified entity, thereby glossing over any number of "internal" tensions and contradictions. Moreover, to the extent that a static, reified conception of culture lends itself so readily to the ideological projects of authoritarian elites, we are entitled to treat calls for "bringing culture back in" to political analyses with a great deal of caution. If "culture" does have a particular characteristic, this is to be found in its dynamism—in the strong tendency for cultural practices to change, transform, 56. Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 58-59. 57. "Who Speaks for the People?", The Economist (27 January 1996), p. 25. This is also very much the case in the South Pacific. See Lawson, Tradition Versus Democracy, op. cit.


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adapt, evolve, syncretise, imitate, interact, and to produce any number of tensions and contradictions within a society. Perhaps it is precisely because of its dynamism that the concept is so difficult to grasp, let alone to apply in political analysis. To believe that it is otherwise is to endorse fatalistic assumptions of the kind that hold, for example, that societies with a "Confucian heritage" can never absorb liberal values58—an assumption that clearly has been falsified by postWar political change and development in Japan and, more recently, in Taiwan and South Korea. Indeed, the massive social, political and economic transformations across the Asia-Pacific region highlight the impossibility of using a static idea of a "community'sculture" as a useful tool for any kind of futurology. The inherent dynamism of culture is also undoubtedly an important part of the solution to perceived problems of incommensurability and other assumed obstacles to greater cross-cultural or transcultural understanding and communication. This is important not only for understanding democracy and processes of démocratisation, but is also essential for global approaches to such ongoing concerns as debt crises, equitable development, the environment, distributive justice, and human rights, not to mention problems of world order, the potential for a global civil society, and for democracy beyond state borders.59 But a further word of caution for those who see a synthesis or fusion of "cultural horizons" in a process of globalisation as a cause for unguarded optimism about the future—or more naively as a sign of "progress". Syntheses produced in the process of cultural dynamism will not necessarily produce or recombine the best elements of all previous "worlds"; they could also come up with the worst.

58. "Liberal" values here include both economic and political aspects. There is a good case for making an analytical distinction between the two because a capitalist economic system cannot be simply conflated with a democratic political system, even though both contain elements of liberalism. 59. See Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds.), Cosmopolitan Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).