Democracy in Haiti - UTA

Download PDF
17 downloads 125 Views 3MB Size Report
Comment
Building 'Low-Intensity' Democracy in Haiti: The OAS Contribution .... empowering notions of social justice and participation, and privileges civil and political rights ..... research institute), Camille Chalmers, conceded the limits in an interview.
Third World Quarterly

Building 'Low-Intensity' Democracy in Haiti: The OAS Contribution Author(s): Yasmine Shamsie Reviewed work(s): Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 6 (2004), pp. 1097-1115 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993753 . Accessed: 11/06/2012 18:51 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. and Third World Quarterly are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Third World Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 6, pp. 1097-1115, 2004

Building Haiti:

*

Carfax Publishing Taylor&Francis Group

'low-intensity' democracy the

in

OAS contribution

YASMINE SHAMSIE ABSTRACT This article explores the phenomenon of democracy assistance by

examining Organizationof AmericanStates (oAs) efforts to restore and promote democracy in Haiti between 1990 and 2000. The case study reveals that marked contradictions emerged as the organisation tried to promote a democratic outcome while both supporting and facilitating the workings of a profoundly undemocraticeconomic and trading system. Because the OAS has proclaimed its commitmentto advancing democracy as well as its supportfor economic and trade liberalisation,privatisation of national industries,and a deeper insertion of the region's economies into global markets,it provides an excellent vantage point from which to explore this form of political intervention. The article concludes by reflecting on the recent fall of the country's ill-fated president, Jean-BertrandAristide and, in keeping with the theme of this piece, it examines the role of the OAS and other internationalactors in shaping events leading up to the collapse of his government. Haiti's fledgling democracy was dealt a devastating blow when its president, Jean-BertrandAristide, escaped into exile on 29 February 2004. This is the second time PresidentAristide,the formerpriestturnedpolitician,has had to flee the island nation. The first time was in 1991, just seven months into his term as president,when he was ousted by a military coup. Although armed gangs were able to control a numberof Haitian cities before the president's departurethis time, the term 'coup' seems less fitting. Nevertherless,he did not resign entirely of his own volition. Rather,it was a mixtureof political protestsby a determined and intransigentopposition, violent intimidationby gangs of ex-militaryofficers from the country's disbanded army, and unambiguous, and some would say 'strategic', abandonmentby the internationalcommunity that caused the president to abandonhis office. With an interim governmentnow in place, the country finds itself once more plodding through what Haiti scholar Robert Fatton Jr has so aptly called, its 'unendingtransitionto democracy'.' Over the years the internationalcommunity has played an active role in this 'unendingtransition',particularlysince the fall of the Duvalier dictatorshipin 1986. Indeed, internationalactorswere implicated in the most recent demise of Haitiandemocracyand are now at the forefrontof efforts to rebuild it. Given this commitment and involvement, it is a fitting YasmineShamsie is in the Departmentof Political Science, WilfridLaurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3C5, Canada. ISSN 0143-6597 printfISSN 1360-2241 online/04/061097-19 ? 2004 Third World Quarterly DOI: 10.1080/0143659042000256913

1097

YASMINE SHAMSIE

momentfor key actors (the UN, the Organizationof AmericanStates (OAS), and nationalgovernments)to engage in a review and reflectionof their earlierefforts to promote democracy. This article aims to contributeto this undertakingby examining how the hemisphere's political forum, the OAS, sought to promote democracy in Haiti over the course of more than a decade (1986-2000). In addition,and perhapsmore importantlyfor scholars of comparativepolitics, the article draws on this example of OAS efforts to explore the broaderphenomenon of democracy promotion.2 Since the end of the Cold War a great many resources have been devoted to promotingdemocracy.Indeed, it has been suggested that we are witnessing the most extensive and systematic effort to advance democracy to date by national governments, private foundations, internationalorganisationsand non-governmental actors.3This paper explores the intensifiedinterestin promotingdemocracy, linking this trendto changes in the global economy. It is structuredaround two central arguments. First, I suggest that democracy assistance is firmly embedded within the central dynamic of our era, globalisation, and deeply connected to its economic project, neoliberalism4.Hence an analysis of democracy promotion in a particularcountry cannot be separatedfrom the socioeconomic restructuringwhich that country is undergoing.Second, I argue that the form of democracybeing advancedis one which complementscurrentprocesses of economic restructuring.It is a variant of democracy divorced from any empowering notions of social justice and participation,and privileges civil and political rights over social and economic rights. It is an election- and institutioncentred view of democracy with a focus on order and stability, the two prerequisitesfor capitalist growth.5 Given that the OAS has proclaimed a renewed commitment to democracy, while simultaneously affirming its strong support for economic and trade liberalisation,privatisationof national industries, and a deeper insertion of the region's economies into global markets, the organisationprovides an excellent vantage point from which to explore the contradictionsinherent in this internationalco-operationagenda.6Before beginning,it is importantto establishfrom the outset that dismissing the active role of the OAS in defending democracy in member states, particularlysince 1990, would be a serious error. The organisation's commitment to democracy has been expressed through the sanctions, declarationsand resolutionsit has adopted,as well in the mandatesdeveloped at the three presidential Summits of the Americas. The establishment of a unit dedicatedto safeguardingdemocraticinstitutionsand procedures;the creationof a mechanism to respond automaticallyto illegal interruptionsof democracy in any country of the region; an amendmentto the organisation's charterwhich allows for the suspension of any member state whose democraticallyelected government is overthrown by force; and, most recently, the creation of an Inter-AmericanDemocraticCharterwhich is viewed as 'a guide for democratic behaviourand a manualof conduct' are all energetic examples of a commitment to collectively defend democracy.7 Nevertheless, without obscuring or minimising the political and diplomatic effort that these gains represent,we cannot ignore the fact that they have been adopted in the context of neoliberal marketreforms and the opening up of the 1098

BUILDING'LOW-INTENSITY' DEMOCRACY IN HAITI

hemisphereto free trade.At the same time the autonomyof developing countries dependenton loans from internationalfinancialinstitutionshas been increasingly constrained. Hence, the form of democracy which OAS diplomatic efforts is promotingand safeguardingis one which has been shaped and constrainedto be consistent with the overall export-led development strategy and economic prescriptionsof the World Bank and the course of IMF-imposedrestructuring. Gills, Rocamora,and Wilson have called this form of democracy,prevalentin the Third World today, 'low intensity democracy'.8 This 'lighter' notion of democracy legitimises the status quo, preserving existing economic and social arrangementsand maintaining the existing distributionof power, rather than redistributingit. Hence the terms of the democratictransitionare being set by the internationalisedruling elites of the Americas, rather than by those popular sectors who suffered so egregiously in the era of dictatorships. The paper begins with an analysis of the global economic context within which the government of Haiti and outside donors pursued democratisation efforts. This is followed by a discussion of the relevance of post-Washington consensus thinking to democracy assistance programmes. The article then examines how the OAS has affected the course of democratisationin Haiti throughits supportfor three areas:economic policy, institutionbuilding (judicial reformin particular)and civil society. As the article was initially writtenbefore the tragic events of Januaryand February2004, the paper concludes with a postscript that reflects on the fall of the country's ill-fated president and, in keeping with the theme of the article, the role of internationalactors in shaping these events. The global economic parameters Scholars attempting to understand democracy promotion tend to begin by describingthe nature,objectives and range of programmesthat exist. However, in keeping with the argument that the increased appeal of today's wave of democracypromotionprogrammesis linked to the emergenceof an increasingly globalised economy, I begin by briefly reviewing the global economic context within which countries such as Haiti are pursuing democratisationefforts. Governments have been affected by two processes linked to globalisation. First, the internationalisationof authority,which refers to the fact that international organisationsare not only assuming a greaterrole in the management of the global economy but in the managementof individualnation-statesas well. For instance, global agencies and multilateralprocesses have been having a powerful impact on national policy formulation through the imposition of structuraladjustmentprogrammes.Second, and very much relatedto the internationalisationof authority,has been the internationalisationof the state, described by Robert Cox as a process by which the state is convertedinto 'an agency for adjustingnationaleconomic practicesand policies to the perceived exigencies of the global economy'.9This became particularlyapparentduringthe 1980s when Latin America's economies descendedinto the debt crisis and governmentswere forced to introduce structuraladjustmentprogrammes.Collectively known in some circles as the WashingtonConsensus, these polices, advancedby the IMF 1099

YASMINE SHAMSIE

and the World Bank as well as a legion of academics and business leaders, consisted in broad strokes of trade liberalisation, financial deregulation and privatisation.Supportingthis new developmentperspectivewere policy prescriptions which included: significant cuts in governmentspending; fiscal austerity; tightening of the money supply; and drastic reductionsin real wages. The end result was a social crisis of vast proportions,as servicing the debt and fiscal management took precedence over providing for the basic needs of citizens. This neoliberal body of public policy remained pre-eminentuntil the mid1990s, when many of its deficiencies began to surface and some of its elements began to be questioned. In fact, the chief economist at the World Bank at the time, Joseph Stiglitz, questioned the anti-stateorientationof Washington Consensus thinking,calling instead for greatergovernmentinvolvement and greater civil society participation-hence a post-WashingtonConsensus emerged.'0 However, this new Consensus is not very differentfrom the original. It starts from the same assumptionsas its neoliberalpredecessor,that is, 1) that globally integratedcapitalism yields universal benefits; and 2) that globalisation as it is being advanced today, and all it engenders, is compatible with the goal of building democracy. What does distinguish one model from the other, then, is that the post-WashingtonConsensus emphasises the need for an active state and the consent of civil society.11 This is significant because it reasserts the importanceand significance of the political realm, including the realm of civil society, to a successful integrationinto global markets.It is this shift which has made democracy promotion programmes-with their institution-buildingand civil society-strengtheningprogrammes-both attractiveand ubiquitous.It is the recognition that the economic policies being advocatedcan have their intended effect only if they are carried out by strong effective political institutions. The Haiti case The choice of Haiti as a case study is deliberate.Since the fall of the infamous 29-year Duvalier dictatorship,the OAS has played a centralrole in the country's slow but turbulentjourney towards democracy.The organisationmonitoredthe elections which broughtPresidentJean-BertrandAristide to power in 1990 and it was the first to react forcefully, by enacting its defence of democracy Resolution 1080, when he was deposed several months later by the military. Moreover,the organisationhelped negotiate the Haitian army's withdrawaland Aristide's returnto the countryin 1994. During the intervalof militaryrule, the OAS, in collaborationwith the UN, formed a joint civilian mission (MICIVIH) to monitorthe humanrights conditions in the country.Once constitutionalrule was restored,the mission was transformedinto an institution-buildingeffort focusing on judicial and police reform. Although the analysis in this paper focuses primarilyon events which took place between 1990 and 1998, the organisation has continuedto supportthe country's democraticdevelopment.For instance, it monitored the flawed legislative and municipal elections of May 2000. Then, over the course of three years, it sought to broker a solution to the political stalemate between the government and the opposition, which developed as a result of those elections. The organisationalso investigated the 17 December 1100

BUILDING'LOW-INT1ENSITY' DEMOCRACY IN HAITI

2001 armed attack on the National Palace. Finally, in March 2002, the OAS established a new Special Mission to StrengthenDemocracy in order to help move the country towards new elections. In sum, given the organisation's significantrole (second only to that of the USA) in the dramaticpolitical events over the past 15 years, the Haiti experience provides a good example of the democracypromotionefforts of an internationalorganisationover the course of more than a decade.12 The plan for economic recovery Below I arguethat the EmergencyEconomic Recovery Plan (EERP)developed by major bilateral and multilateraldonors, and unquestionablysupportedby the OAS, worked against the establishmentof the more expansive notion of democracy advancedby the country's popularsectors. The plan did not challenge the country's long-time pattern of economic development nor did it confront the traditionalstructuresof economic power in the country. As already noted, simultaneously supporting economic restructuringand political liberalisation(or 'democracypromotion')has become acceptedwisdom among aid officialdom. Nevertheless, several misgivings ought to be noted regardingthis proposition, especially if economic restructuringis being driven by external forces and planned and implemented without popular input or consent. Anita Isaacs has arguedin her work that the impositionof the neoliberal economic model has made democraticdevelopmentmore difficult for a number of reasons: privatisation has often led to corruption; reductions in public spendinghave increasedlevels of poverty and inequality;public participationin politics has become less likely as people strugglemerely to survive;and, finally, neoliberalism has contributedto 'declining institutionallegitimacy and capacities'.3 Adam Przeworskihas made similarobservations,suggesting that neoliberal reforms can weaken representativeinstitutions because of the top-down fashion in which they are conceived and implemented.14 All this was indeed the case in Haiti following Aristide's returnin 1994, when popularsectors regularlytook to the streets to protesttheir lack of input into the policy-making process and their opposition to neoliberal reforms. A survey of the Haitianpress following the president'sreturnreveals a widespreadsense of disillusionmentwith the political process, especially among Aristide's constituency, the country's popular organisations. Their anger and despondence was particularlyevident around the issue of privatisation.In returnfor much needed loans and grants,Aristide had agreedto privatise nine state-ownedenterprisesupon signing structuraladjustmentagreements in August 1994 and January1995. However, the presidentreneged on his pledge as a result of strong domestic opposition, which feared privatisation would simply transfera series of privatemonopolies to the Haitianelites thathad supportedthe militarycoup. The internationalfinancialinstitutionsrespondedby freezing the credits they had pledged.15The clear contradiction inherent in advancing democratic governance while simultaneously dictating economic policy from above was not lost on observers. As Andrew Reding noted: 'Ironically, Aristide's change of mind came about precisely because of the 1101

YASMINESHAMSIE

democratic process that was a prime goal of foreign interventionin the first place' 16 As for the EERP,it was an economic and financialframeworkdeveloped by a host of bilateral and multilateraldonors including the World Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB), the US Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID), the United Nations DevelopmentProgram(UNDP) and the OAS. The plan, which pledged US$1.2 billion over five years, was essentially a structural adjustment programme (SAP) designed to establish a stable macroeconomic environmentand to provide an incentive frameworkfor private sector investment. It focused on the export-manufacturingsector, devoting little attentionto the country's rural sector. In a countrywhere close to 65% of the populationis engaged in some form of agriculturalproduction, assisting peasant farmers would have been the most direct way of alleviating poverty (donors contended poverty alleviation was their overall objective) and addressingthe vast imbalance between rich and poor, therebyfosteringpolitical equality.Yet international donors directed less than 1% of the $550 million in donor aid and loans distributedin FY 94/95 to peasant agriculture.The agriculturalfinancingwhich was made available was aimed at road and irrigation system repair and at promotingexport crops such as coffee and mangoes. The provisionof productive inputs-seeds, tools, fertiliser, credit, marketing co-operatives, land tenure reform-would have been of greaterbenefit to the masses in the countryside.17 What is evident from the post-1994 economic reconstructionplans is that, first, a transformationof Haiti's economic structurewas never envisaged and, second, distributionalequity was rankedfar below other goals, in particularthe overall objective of creatingan enabling environmentfor transnationalcapital.'8 Although democratisationscholarshave forcefully arguedthat the persistenceof wide socioeconomic divides constitutes an obstacle to political equality, which in turn has implications for the prospects of democracy, donors have failed to place equity issues at the forefrontof the economic packages they impose on countries. This is because, in part, the solutions to the profoundproblems of a country like Haiti (including the lack of democracy) are believed to lie in the realm of governance ratherthan in that of socioeconomic organisation. Further, while the Aristide government had been committed to fostering democracy,processes relatedto globalisation,such as the internationalisationof the state and the internationalisationof authority,ultimately made the Haitian state more responsive and accountable to internationalfinancial and political institutionsthan to its own citizens. Haitian leaders became subordinatedto the needs of the global marketand to the demands of the IMF, the World Bank and other internationalinstitutions, upon whom they depended for aid and investment. In the process, Haitian politicians were forced to disregard citizens' demands for redistributivereforms and social services. The implications for democracy in Haiti are plain and were poignantly alluded to by the Secretary General of the Platform of Haitian Human Rights Organizations, when he commentedon the extremely low turnoutfor senate and local elections of April 1997, estimated by internationalobservers to be around5%. The people of Haiti waited a long time for a government that would take into

1102

BUILDING 'LOW-INTENSITY' DEMOCRACY IN HAITI

considerationits demands. It did not expect the governmentwould deliver magic solutions, but it did expect it to listen and respond even in a minimal way to its demands.One has to rememberafter all that this governmentis here today because it promised that henceforth the smallest peasant would be considered and treated like a citizen and that 'the people' would be 'an actor'. So the people placed their demandsbefore the government,and they continue to do this today, but they have the deep-seated sentiment of having been betrayedby their political leaders. That is the principal reason behind the low electoral turnout.'9

As the postscriptwill detail, this predicamentre-emergesbefore the democratic crisis of 2004, when aid conditionality,followed by a complete suspensionof aid to the country after the elections of 2000, preventedthe governmentonce again from carrying out its platform. Institutionbuilding:justice reform While institution building has firmly become part of the standardlexicon of democracypromotion,the actual objectives sought are more clouded than they initially appearin areas such as judicial and police reform.Two points standout. First, while internationaldonors tend to view institutionbuilding as making the state more accountable-a laudableobjective-it is not always clear to whom it is being held accountable.David Moore has astutely observed that, ratherthan the demos being the object of accountability,capital is graduallybecoming the state's principalpartner.20 The questionbecomes: will state institutionsundergoing reform ultimately incorporate,and answer to, the vast majorityof Haitians, or will they remain accountableto a small elite and its partnersabroad, as the notion of 'low-intensity democracy' suggests? Second, a distinction needs to be made between 'institution building' to promote governance and 'institutionbuilding' to promote democracy. Interestingly, includedunderthe rubricof 'governance'are many of the tasks associated with democracy promotion programmes.What distinguishes governance programmes from specifically democracy-orientatedones, however, is that 'governance-type reforms are rooted in the notion that the market needs to be embedded in appropriatepolitical, social, and culturalinstitutionsfor development to occur and remain robust in the long run'.2 Today the line between promoting democracy and governance has become considerably blurred. All donors believe improved governability to be a central aspect of institution building and a key element in the successful transition to democracy. The problem is, accordingto Gerald Schmitz, that there appearsto be more interest in ensuring governing institutions in a society are 'working well', ratherthan ensuring they are working democratically.Hence a focus on governance has meant that 'democratisationas a value in itself is ceasing to be of much interest, because what matters in the governance agenda is to get the politics of development policy right'.22 In the case of Haiti reforming state institutions that historically served to repress and extort from the Haitianpeople became a priorityof local as well as internationalactors.In other words, all believed the judiciaryrequiredsignificant reform if democracy was going to take hold. The judiciary had always been at 1103

YASMINESHAMSIE

the service of the country's oligarchy. In fact the Duvaliers (father and son) considered it a tool of their preservation.The system was subordinateto the armed forces and other security forces, and the law was constantly used as a weapon to oppress and terrify. In the more recent past judges, prosecutors,and lawyers were threatened,beaten and sometimes killed by the armedparamilitary grOUp FRAPH.23 The justice system reflectedand legitimised all the failings of the political system as a whole. According to Haitian sociologist Suzy Castor: The judicial system is... and has been since 1986, a center of conservatism, a resourcefor defendingand reproducingthe practicesof incompetence,arbitrariness, and favoritism. It ensures the impunity of political crimes and of all civil and agrarian injustices committed by elements that are aligned to the oligarchic structure.

Thus, multilateraland bilateraldonors viewed a strong link between advancing the rule of law and promotingdemocracy, and rightly so. In the past the system had always been accountableto the country's oligarchy (the landed class and the import-exportbourgeoisie) or to the one percentof the populationwhich controls44% of nationalrevenue.25Successfully reformingthe judiciary as part of a larger democratisationeffort would require more than making the system efficient and objective. This would fulfil governance goals only. Rather, a comprehensivereform would also entail a reorientationof the justice system towardsthe interestsof the majoritiesin society, ie to the masses rather than to the country's merchant and transnationalclass fractions. (This might entail, for instance, directing resources towards legal aid-type services, ensuring that all proceedings are available in Creole and, more generally, promoting literacy.) Outside actors approachedthe task of judicial reform from differentperspectives. The concerns of multilateralinstitutions,such as the World Bank and the IDB, rested with 'protecting property rights, regulating business activity, and curbingcorruption,therebycreating a secure economic climate'.26 The UN/ OAS MICIVIHfor its partassisted in the trainingof judges, reformingof laws and codes and conflict resolution.27To be sure, these activities contributedto assuringthe functioningof a regime based on the rule of law, making OAS work a significant and importantcontributiontowards advancing democracy. However, the OAS, like other donors, did not see the need to explore more profoundlythe purpose and meaning of justice reform. This was strongly denouncedby Haitian NGOS. Local groups charged the OAS and others with failing to confront the deep-seated structuralproblems within the judicial system. The Haitian human rights movement argued that donors did not address 'the basic question of justice' and that programmesconstituteda face-lift of the existing system which, 'despiteits limits, protectscertaininterestsvery well'. In other words, the human rights organisations argued that reforms would fall short unless structural changes related to resource distributionand equity were addressedfirst. Calling plans for a 'classic reform' insufficient,humanrights organisationsdemandedan 'alternativereform', responsive and responsible to 'the people' or to society as a whole rather that to individual 'citizens'. In an open letter to the government, representatives of the movement outlined their vision of justice reform.

1104

BUILDING'LOW-INTENSITY' DEMOCRACY IN HAMI

Its [the justice system's]laws, structures,procedures,and the languageit uses (Creoleinsteadof French)shouldbe tied to a series of determinedeconomic interests;in this case,the interestsof the majorityratherthanthe minority.In order to achievethatjustice,the struggleto makesocietymoreegalitarianandjust must continue,becauselaws aremerelythe reflectionof politicalandeconomicstruggles wonby the people.A newjusticecannotbe establishedif the systemin the country remainsone of exclusionanddomination.28 Efforts at justice reform were also underminedby the fact that outside actors devoted little attentionto combating impunity and supportingthe work of the National Commission for Truth and Justice (CNVJ). Because impunity prevents citizens from believing in justice, one cannot hope to carry out meaningful judicial reform without addressing this issue. Stated simply, if the law is not respected, and those with power are viewed by the rest of society to be exempt from it, how can ordinarycitizens believe in the principle of the rule of law. In contrastto other donors, the MICIVIHdid provide the CNVJ with advice and technical assistance and transmitted documentary evidence of human rights violations committedbetween September 1991 and October 1994, the period of military rule. The MICIVIHalso publicly called on the US government,through press releases, to return the FRAPH documents seized by US-led multinational forces upon their arrival in Haiti. MICIVIH recognised that the documents contained valuable information which would be crucial to the arrest and conviction of human rights violators. In the end the value and impact of these commendableactions were greatly diminishedby the fact that the OAS (along with the UN and the US government) compelled Aristide to offer full amnesties to members of the Haitian armed forces. As Ian Martin,the formerDirectorof HumanRights of the MICIVIHnoted: negotiatorsobviouslyregardedthe amnestypledge as necessaryto secure the peacefuldepartureof the militarydictatorship.Beyond this, there was a great concernto promotereconciliationand avoid vengeance.Aristide'sreluctance regardinga blanketamnestycame to be regardedas justifyingsuspicionsthathe wouldpromotevengeance;therewas littleunderstanding thatwhenactsof popular vengeancehaveoccurredin Haiti,theyhavebeena symptomof a situationin which severehumanrightsviolationshavebeenperpetrated andthereis no hopeof justice throughdue processof law.2 The full pardonswhich were eventuallygrantedmade prosecutingand punishing the authors of human rights violations impossible, perpetuatingthe cycle of impunity.The consequences of this approachhave become all too evident since it became clear that many of the armedinsurgentswho terrorisedHaitian cities and towns in Januaryand February2004 were implicated in past human rights abuses. Haitian NGOS were well aware of the fragility of their country's democracy and openly acknowledged that limits existed on what could be achieved regarding the matter of impunity. The executive secretary of the Plateforme Haitienne de Plaidoyer pour un Development Alternatif(PAPDA) (a progressive research institute), Camille Chalmers, conceded the limits in an interview. However, he also maintainedthat, without truth and justice, ordinaryHaitians 1105

YASMINESHAMSIE

would continue to view the justice system with contempt and disdain, and the democracywhich Haitianshad painfully fought for would never be realised.30A leading human rights scholar and former member of the Inter-AmericanComJuan Mendez, is in agreement.Mendez has mission on Human Rigths (IACHR), suggested that 'perceived constraints' have relieved governments of their responsibility to seek a fair degree of accountabilityfor past wrongs. He astutely notes: 'In regards to Latin America especially, it has been all too common to think that any attemptto breakthe cycle of impunitywould threatendemocratic stability, as if a lesser form of democracy without equality before the law was all to which Latin Americans could aspire'.3 Civil society: affecting the correlation of forces There is common agreement among democratisationscholars and foreign aid practitionersthat civil society plays an importantrole in the development and promotion of democracy. Some go so far as to equate the increase in certain types of associations and organisationswith the institutionof democracyitself, referring to the growth in civil society organisations (csos) as the key to democratisation.These assertionsare not mistaken.A careful readingof Haitian history reveals that keeping certain sectors of civil society weak and disorganised was one way that the country's elites were able to prevent the establishmentof democracyand to preservea system of surplusextractionwhich enrichedthem while ensuringthat the rest of the countryremainedimpoverished and politically marginalised.32At the same time it was the demonstrations carriedout by a vast numberof CSOs in 1984-85 that contributedto the end of the Duvalier dynasty. Once the dictatorship collapsed, the composition and balance of forces in civil society had importantimplicationsfor the subsequent development of democracy, in this instance the development of 'low-intensity democracy'. Outside actorsunderstoodthe significanceof the civil society arena to the democracy building exercise, and for that reason attemptedto influence the strength of particularcivil society forces through their diplomatic and aid policies. This dynamic developed once again after Aristide was re-elected in 2000, as we shall see furtheron. One reason for civil society becoming so exceptionally popular among democraticassistanceproviderscan be found in the dramaticshift from dictatorships to democratic governments in the region. Civil society has become an importantnew site of power, as authoritarianmethods of social control (Duvalierism) have given way to consensual methods of social control (representative democracy).33In addition,the region-wide acceptanceof post-Washingtonconsensus thinking and neoliberal restructuringhas made civil society groups valuable and useful instruments,particularlyin the areas of aid delivery and implementation. Jean-ClaudeDuvalier's departurein 1986 provided the OAS, and other multilateraland bilateralactors,with the opportunityto influencethe course of change in Haiti by supportingone of three political currentsin civil society: those still connected to the ancien regime of Duvalierism, who unabashedly sought to prevent any change; the commercial bourgeoisie, together with political and 1106

BUILDING'LOW-INTENSITY' DEMOCRACY IN HAITI

religious elites who supportedsome degree of political liberalisationso long as it did not alter the existing social order;and a thirdgroup consisting of the vast majorityof Haitians hoping for a thoroughand complete break with the past.34 The bulk of assistance went to the second group, civil society organisationsthat favoured careful incremental change through the institutions and processes associated with representativedemocracy. In sum, most governments (such as those of the USA, Canada and France) and intergovernmentalorganisations continued their long-standingrelationshipswith the country's elites, expanding it to include the new transnationallyorientated bourgeoisie, who advocated moderatereforms.35 US assistance during this transitional period was both far-reaching and influentialand set the tone for other bilateraland multilateraldonors36.Washington's civil society assistance supportedtwo processes simultaneously:developing a modernisedHaitian elite while counteringand neutralisingthe impact of the growing numberof popularorganisationsin civil society. In short, the USA wished to develop and advance those elite constituencies willing to abandon their authoritarianways, while checking the influence of the country's popular movement, which had been advancing a 'popular' form of democracy that Washington viewed as unpredictableand destabilising.7 Although President Jean-BertrandAristide,backed by his Lavalas coalition, ultimatelywon the 1990 presidentialelection, his governmentlasted less than a year before being ousted by the military. It was duringthis period of militaryrule that the correlationof forces in civil society was significantlyand permanentlyaltered.The USA, the OAS and the UN required three years to dislodge the country's military and restore Aristide to power. During that long and drawn out bargaining process, members and followers of Lavalas were wiped out, killed or forced to flee because of relentless waves of repression, depriving Aristide of a strong and organised movement when he returnedto power in 1994. With the balance of forces in civil society tilted against the popular movement, internationalactors once again supported those sectors most likely to favour and benefit from the economic and political course set by international financialinstitutions,bypassingthose social forces advancingnationalistpolitical aspirationsor supportingpopulardemocratisation.While the OAS did not engage in civil society strengtheningper se, it nevertheless supportedthe EERP and its structuraladjustmentprogrammes,which had the effect of significantlyweakening popularforces and correspondinglyfavouring certain factions of the dominant class.

Conclusions This paper has argued that internationaldonors and lenders view promoting democracyas firmly linked to promotingeconomic investmentand growth, and more specifically to bringing about effective market-orientatedeconomic reforms. Consequently,an analysis of democracypromotionin a particularcountry cannot ignore the socioeconomic reorganisationwhich that country is undergoing. The second point this paper makes is that the OAS and other major donors 1107

YASMINE SHAMSIE

have tackled the challenge of building democraticgovernment,in the midst of economic reformsand social discontent,by promotinga variantof representative democracy which complements structuraladjustment and accommodates its effects. Efforts to establish low-intensity democracy were evident in the scant attentiongiven to social justice concerns(social and economic humanrights), the favouringof elite sectors of civil society over popularsectors (which essentially determinedthe form of democracy which would emerge), and the lack of civil society participationin major political and economic reform efforts. In the economic realm processes linked to globalisation such as the internationalisation of authorityand the internationalisationof the state combined to strip Haitianpolicy makersof influence over domestic politics. Donors co-ordinated to manage and control political and economic change in Haiti throughthe imposition of the Emergency Economic Recovery Plan which essentially dictated the parametersof the politically possible. Moreover, the EERP'S policies reinforced the position of dominant elites, particularlythose associated with transnationalcapital, and weakened popularforces which had been pushing for a more popularvision of democracy. In the political realm donors, including the OAS, directed, planned and implemented reforms to the country's justice system. Unfortunately,the topdown natureof justice reformhad the effect of once again excluding input from the vast majorityof Haitians. As a result, justice reform was of a nominal and mechanical nature, leaving the historical pattern of political exclusion undisturbed. Further, the OAS'S praiseworthy efforts in this area were ultimately underminedby its stand on blanket amnesties for the coup perpetrators,which is consistent with low-intensity democracy's prioritisingof stability and order over other democratic values, such as equality before the law. Finally, the organisation's negotiating strategy while Aristide was in exile, along with its supportfor the EERP, had the effect of favouring and benefiting certain sectors of civil society over others. The transnationalfaction of the elite (those with investments in the export processing zones) which vigorously pushed for elections and the establishmentof representativedemocracywere supportedand strengthenedby donorsin a varietyof ways, while popularorganisationsthathad been pushing for broadersocioeconomic change as part of the democratisation process were sidelined and underminedthrough military repression and economic attrition. On a final note, an analysis of Haitianhistory suggests that efforts to promote democracy are unlikely to be fruitful unless the issue of class structureis addressed.It is broadly accepted that the lack of democracy in Haiti has been intimately linked to how the country's elites have historically enriched themselves and maintainedtheir lifestyle.38Ratherthan creating a democraticstate, Haiti's merchants, rulers and state bureaucratsfashioned a state that could efficiently siphon off the economic outputof the poor majoritywhile guaranteeing (through a myriad of repressive instruments)that this majority would not protest or resist. Clearly, if external actors are serious about reforming the state-a state that was formedwith the express purposeof enrichinga small elite and protectingthat elite from the rest of society through social, economic and political exclusion-then democracy promotion programmesmust address the 1108

BUILDING'LOW-INTENSITY' DEMOCRACY IN HAITI

existing class structurewith the view of reducing inequalities.This is perhapsa fitting moment to underscorethe words of the distinguishedCaribbeanscholar, Sidney Mintz, who has argued that, if policy is geared 'to sustain...the present distributionof economic power in Haiti, hardly anythingcan be done that could have long-range beneficial political consequences.39

Postscript:low-intensitydemocracyundone It seems that donors did not heed Mintz's words. Once Aristide was re-elected in 2000 internationalfinancial institutions and national aid donors insisted the government follow the customary set of neoliberal policies at the expense of policies which would have prioritiedreducing social inequality. Neverthtless, any analysis of Haiti's democratic collapse must begin by describingthe events which led up to the president'sdeparture.In chronological order, they were as follows: * the flawed elections in the year 2000, which led bilateral and multilateral donors to suspend aid to the governmentpending new elections; * mountingcivil society dissatisfactionwith both the substanceand style of the Aristide government,which expressed itself in frequent and gradually more violent demonstrations; * an increasingly unified political opposition which, distrustful of Aristide, resisted the organisationof new elections for late 2003; * the failure of OAS and CaribbeanCommunity(Caricom)efforts to broker an agreementbetween the opposition and the government; * the opposition's rejection of a last-minute power-sharingplan devised by internationalactors; and (the coup de grace) * a violent organisedinsurgencyled by formermilitaryand paramilitarysoldiers who, after taking over several key cities, threatenedto march on Port-auPrince and execute the president and those believed to be his supporters. The unfolding of these events elicits two obvious questions. First, who is to blame for the breakdownof Haiti's democracy?Second, why, after a decade of internationalefforts to promote democratic governance, was Haiti unable to withstand a political crisis? On the first question, opinion is split. While some hold the country's political leadership responsible, President Aristide in particular,others argue that the internationalcommunity must share the blame for democracy's breakdown.To be sure, Aristide's leadership was abysmally deficient. Indeed, there is no shortageof evidence provided by scholars,journalists,and human rights organisations which details the president'sfailings.40As long-time observerof Haitian affairs, Amy Wilentz, neatly summarised'rarelyhas a leader failed so grossly to rise to a historic occasion'.41 However, it would be a mistake to lay all the blame for Haiti's democratic collapse at the feet of its leader. Hemisphericpolitical and economic concerns and the role of internationalactors in general must be positioned at the forefront of any discussion of Haitian democratisationand development. Indeed, Mintz argues that too little 'scholarship has been invested in delineating the inter1109

YASMINE SHAMSIE

national forces that have operatedto keep Haiti poor and backward'.42 For one thing, the dependentnatureof the Haitianeconomy, a factor with a far-reaching history, has been viewed as a definitive factor during each period of Haitian history, and recent events are no exception. In addition,the role of outside actors has always been central to the socioeconomic evolution of the country and its democratic prospects. As we shall see below, the influence of the country's powerful neighbour,the USA, must be given particularattentionwhen considering Haiti's democratictrajectory. On the second question-why afterten years of democracybuildingHaiti was unable to withstandthe political turmoil that engulfed it-two points stand out. First, where low-intensity democracy is present, the internationalisationof authorityis typically profound.One consequence of having internationalorganisations assume a greater role in the managementof nation states is that the bonds of accountabilitybetween governments and their voters, an important markerof democraticgovernance,are inevitably weakened.This was indeed the case before Aristide's departure.To be sure, the Aristide governmentmust take a good measure of responsibilityfor this deterioration.However, the depth of Haiti's dependenceon aid, the high levels of aid conditionalityand the eventual total suspensionof foreign aid, also contributedsignificantlyto the government's inability to meet its commitmentsto Haitians and, therefore,to the weakening of bonds of accountability. As noted earlier, when Aristide was returnedto power in 1994, his administrationadoptedthe usual list of neoliberalpolicies. These were a preconditionto receiving loans and aid. When re-elected in 2000, his administrationcontinued down the same path, ultimately causing hardship for the poorest and most vulnerable Haitians, those who had been Lavalas' original constituency. But conditionsfor the poor were made still worse when the country'smost important donors (the IDB, USAID and the EU) suspendedtheir aid and loans in response to election irregularities.According to one observer of Haitian affairs, the aid cut-off harmfullyaffected the ministries of health and education, causing these .4 Then in May 2003 the Aristide areas to slide 'dramatically backwards' the with IMF, which also resulted in a funding an agreement governmentsigned had been slated for social goals, which The funds, cut to social programmes. the country's debt obligations.44Given that were redirectedtowards servicing Haiti was alreadyon the verge of a humanitariancrisis, it is no wonder that the 1986-91 movement,which had broughtthe presidentto power eventuallyjoined the ranksof those calling for his resignation.By the time Aristide steppeddown he was not only reviled by his long-time political opponents (the country's economic, political and religious elite) but by many in the popular movement that had swept him into office. In sum, in the case of Haiti, the internationalisationof authority and the internationalisationof state are plainly evident in the fact that the country remains more responsive to the demands of outside donors than to those of its own citizens. Clearly, these are not propitiousconditions for the developmentof democracy.The internationalcommunitycould have betterdefended democracy by ensuring that Haiti's fragile government was not immediately forced to discardthe platformon which it was elected. An accountabilitycrisis inevitably 1110

DEMOCRACY IN HAITI BUILDING'LOW-INTENSITY'

leaves voters frustratedand disillusioned with their elected leaders, but also with democracy itself-both are inimical to democraticdevelopment efforts. There are sound reasons for worrying about the perception that elected governments are failing to fulfil their responsibilities,particularlytoday when the citizens of the region are increasinglylinking the failure of governmentsto improve their lives with the failure of democracy.45The fact that democracy is increasingly being perceived as the problem ratherthan as a method to solve problemsis highlightedin a recent UNDP reporton the state of democracyin the region. The 2004 report concluded that 'the erosion of confidence in elected governments' can be attributedto 'slow economic growth, social inequality, ineffective legal systems and social services'.46 Cutting the flow of aid to the Haitian governmentcontributedto all of these. Indeed, an IDB reportattestedto the impact of the aid blockage when it concluded that 'the major factor behind economic stagnation is the withholding of both foreign grants and loans, associated with the internationalcommunity's response to the critical political impasses'.47

The second point that stands out concerns the assistance internationaldonors directed to civil society organisations. As already noted, strengtheningcivil society groups which supportand respect the democraticprocess is crucial to building democracy.In addition,internationalactors can influence the course of democratic development and, as argued earlier, the form of democracy, by supportingcertainsectors of civil society over others. In this instance,Washington's unconditionalsupportof anti-Aristideforces and the significant levels of assistanceprovidedby US-based organisations,such as the InternationalRepublican Institute,served to destabilisethe alreadyfragile Aristide government.48By refusing to use its substantialleverage, Washington allowed the opposition to take an inflexible position over the course of the internationallyled mediation process that sought to resolve the political crisis. Because nothing less than Aristide's resignation was acceptable to his political opponents, mediation efforts were inevitably doomed. For instance, when Aristide finally began to comply with the conditions fixed by the opposition and internationalactors for new elections, agreeing to hold them in late 2003 ratherthan 2006, the opposition was the only sector unwilling to nominate a representativeto the body charged with election preparation,the new Provisional Electoral Council. Without an opposition member, the new Electoral Council could not be formed, elections could not take place, and aid to the governmentcould not be restored. Most importantly,when the Caricom along with the OAS finally devised a solid compromise, which would have requiredthe president to nominate a new prime minister (most likely from the opposition) and the establishmentof a multipartygoverning council, composed of representativesfrom the political opposition,the oppositionagain rejectedthis solution. The reason was that the proposal would have left Aristide as president until elections in 2005. It is not an exaggerationto say that democracyeventually collapsed because of the opposition's complete withdrawalfrom the political process. A final general comment needs to be made regardingthe wider implications of Haiti's democraticbreakdown.Some scholars of inter-Americanaffairs have 1111

YASMINE SHAMSIE

suggested the forced departureof President Aristide represents a worrisome trend.Maxwell Cameronputs it simply; this constitutes,yet again, the unconstitutionalremoval of a democraticallyelected head of state in the Americas.49The UNDP' s 2004 Report on Democracy highlights Cameron'sconcerns when noting that the unconstitutionalremoval of elected leaders is becoming more common. It states that 'since 2000, four elected presidents in the 18 countries surveyed were forced to step down before the end of their terms following steep drops in public support'. Moreover it notes that political apathy is growing across the region, particularlyamong young voters, and that civil unrestis increasing, 'with protest actions challenging elected leaders'.50 Given these disturbingtrends, OAS memberstates should have been much more vigorous in their supportof Haiti's elected leader.Instead,events in Haiti may set a precedentfor what Cameronhas called 'a new US doctrine on "failed elected leaders"', whereby leaders whom Washingtonfinds objectionableare allowed to fall-even given a little shove if needed-with the hope that more amenable replacementswill take their place. This doctrine directly counters the intention of the Inter-AmericanDemocratic Charter,signed by OAS member states in 2001, and developed to help promote and safeguardthe hemisphere's weak democracies. One would have hoped that the OAS and those countries most involved in democracypromotionefforts over the past 10 years in Haiti would have worked hard to prevent the removal of the country's elected leader, regardless of his many shortcomings.Yet, where the opportunityto toss a life preserverto the flailing governmentexisted, the key actors (the USA, Franceand Canada)stood by idle allowing a regiment of well armed paramilitariesto determine the country's fate. Low-intensity democracy, by its very nature, has extremely shallow roots, which are easily ripped out. The model's fragility comes from the fact that the bonds of accountabilityare directedoutwardsratherthan inwards,the pursuitof justice is frequentlypostponedor abandonedpermittingthe cycle of impunityto continue, political power and wealth remainconcentratedin the hands of a small minority, and the social arena (health, education, water, etc) is regularly neglected in order to deal with deficits and loan arrears.There is little in this model for citizens to embraceand strive to protect.How many more times must Haiti's trajectory be repeated before the internationalcommunity pauses to reflect more critically on the form and substanceof democracy it is seeking to promote?

Notes A longer version of this article was presentedat the CanadianAssociation for Latin Americanand Caribbean Studies (CALACS) Montreal,October 2002. The authorwould like to thank Marlea Clarke, LauraMacdonald, and Liisa North for their critical and thoughtful comments and Isabelle Fortin for her valuable research assistance. Some of the researchfor this paper was supportedby a Departmentof National Defence Security and Defence Forum PhD Scholarship and an OAS Fellowship. ' Robert Fatton Jr, Haiti's Predatory Republic: The Unending Transitionto Democracy, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002. 2 Some would argue that Haiti is exceptional since the country lacks even the most rudimentaryconditions

1112

IN HAITI DEMOCRACY BUILDING'LOW-INTENSITY' for democraticdevelopment and therefore does not provide a good case study of democracy promotion. I would argue, however, that the conditions in Haiti are similar to those of an increasingnumberof weak, failing and failed states (states unable to provide for the needs of their citizens). Therefore, a detailed study of the Haitian case could allow us to better understand democratic development work in an increasingly large number of states. Moreover, the less than propitious conditions for democracy have not prevented outside actors from carrying out democratic development work in these countries, thus underscoringthe need to understandand analyse these interventions.Lastly, academic work on democratisation has tended to privilege those countriesperceived as having the necessary conditions for democracy, leaving a gap in the research and literatureon democracy promotion,which this study hopes to address. Thomas Carothersmakes this observationin his work Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, Washington,DC: CarnegieEndowmentfor InternationalPeace, 1999. Carothersis one of the most prolific writers on democracy assistance. His work focuses on practical questions related to aid application.See in particularhis evaluations of USAID's democratic development work, In the Name of Democracy: US Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years, Berkeley, CA: University of CaliforniaPress, 1991; 'The Reagan years: the 1980s', in AbrahamF Lowenthal (ed), ExportingDemocracy: The United States and Latin America, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991; and Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania, WashingtonDC: Carnegie EndowmentBooks, 1996. Other important works which focus on the role of external actors in promoting democracy include P Burnell (ed), DemocracyAssistance. InternationalCo-operationfor Democratization,London:FrankCass, 2001; Mark Malloch Brown, 'Democraticgovernance:towarda frameworkfor sustainablepeace', Global Governance, 9 (2), 2003, pp 144-146; CharlesT Call & Susan E Cook, 'On democratizationand peacebuilding',Global Governance, 9 (2), 2003, pp 233-246; Michael Cox, G John Ikenberry & Takashi Inoguchi (eds), Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; Anita Isaacs, 'Internationalassistance for democracy:a cautionarytale', in Jorge I Dominguez (ed), The Future of Inter-AmericanRelations, New York: Routledge, 2000; AbrahamLowenthal (ed), Exporting Democracy: The UnitedStates and LatinAmerica, Baltimore,MD: Johns HopkinsUniversityPress, 1991; Marina Ottaway & Theresa Chung, 'Debating democracy assistance: toward a new paradigm', Journal of Democracy, 10 (4), 1999, pp 99-113; and Marina Ottaway, Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace, 2000. 4 Neoliberalism refers to a body of thought and an economic project which is directed at increasing and assuringthe mobility of capital on a global scale. Consequently,neoliberalrestructuringaims at eliminating barriersto trade, ensuringmacroeconomicstability and the harmonisingfiscal and monetarypolicies since these are essential to increased transnationalcapital investment. See the work of Barry J Gills, J Rocamora& RichardWilson, Low IntensityDemocracy, London: Pluto Press, 1993; and William I Robinson's densely rich study of US democracy promotion aid, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Interventionand Hegemony,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1996, from which I drew both inspiration and research material. Robinson's work is both formidable and impressive. In sum, he suggests that the US drive to promote democracy world-wide representsa dual objective on the part of Washington:an attemptto prevent more radical forms of democracyfrom taking hold in transitioncountriesas well as a means of advancingAmericaneconomic interestsin those societies. Moreover, he astutely notes that the ability to control the definition of democracy is extremely important given its overwhelming resonance with ordinary people, regardless of their social or political stripes. 6 The fieldwork for this paper was carried between 1997 and 1999. I conducted interviews at OAS headquartersin Washingtonin both April 1998 and September1999, and travelledto Haiti on two separate occasions: from September 1996 to May 1997, and from December 1997 to March 1998. During my stay in the country, I spent time in cities and towns throughoutthe country, particularlywhere observers from the UN/ OAS InternationalMission in Haiti (MICIVIH) were stationed (Jacmel, Gonaives, St Marc and Les Cayes). The Unit for the Promotion of Democracy was established in 1990, The 'Commitmentof Santiago to Democracy and Renewal of the Inter-AmericanSystem' and Resolution 1080, entitled 'Representative Democracy' were crucial to helping manage crises in Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), Guatemala(1993) and Paraguay (1996). Also, the 1992 Protocol of Washington took effect in September 1997, following ratificationby two-thirdsof its signatories.The Inter-AmericanDemocraticCharterwas adoptedin Lima, Peru, on 11 September2001. The OAS applied the newly created Inter-AmericanDemocratic Charterfor the first time during the April 2002 political crisis in Venezuela. 8 Gills et al, Low Intensity Democracy. 9 For a full discussion of this phenomenon, see Robert Cox, 'New policy directions for the state', in D Drache & M Gertler(eds), TheNew Era of Global Competition:State Policy and MarketPower, Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1991, pp 338-339. 10 Brendan Martin, New Leaf or Fig Leaf? The Challenge of the New WashingtonConsensus, London: Bretton Woods Project and Public Services International,2000. Ibid, p2.

1113

YASMINE SHAMSIE Of course, one must also be mindful of the specificity of the Haitian case. The oppressive socioeconomic conditions and the tragically long legacy of authoritarianrule provide particularlyhostile conditions for any and all democratic development efforts. 3 Isaacs, 'Internationalassistance for democracy', pp 278-279. 14 Adam Pzreworski, 'The neoliberal fallacy', Journal of Democracy, 3 (3), 1992, p 56. 15 More than US$100 million was withheld by the IMF and the World Bank and $4.6 million by USAID. Given that the country's entire budget was only $350 million, this sum representeda substantialloss in revenue. 16 Andrew Reding, 'Haiti: an agenda for democracy', a special reportpreparedby the North America Project of the World Policy Institute, World Policy Paper, February 1996, p 223. 17 The IMF, in collaborationwith the World Bank and Haiti's Ministry of Finance, was very specific in its instructionsto the Haitian governmentregardingcredit. While the state was allowed to establish policies enabling others to raise credit funds, the governmentwas instructednot to provide funds for agricultural research, extension and productive credit to the poor. See Lisa McGowan, Democracy Undermined, Economic Justice Denied: StructuralAdjustmentand the Aid Juggernaut in Haiti, Washington,DC: The Development Gap, 1997, p 19. 18 To be sure, the IDB and other donors supported the strengtheningof tax enforcement among wealthy Haitians. But even this policy would not assist poor Haitians if the tax code continued to be regressive in nature. McGowan, Democracy Undermined,p 14. 19 Interviewwith Chenet Jean-Baptiste,SecretaryGeneral,Platformof HaitianHumanRights Organisations, Port-au-Prince,16 February 1998. in 20 David B Moore, 'Development discourse as hegemony: towards an ideological history-1945-1995', David B Moore & Gerald Schmitz (eds), Debating Development Discourse: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, New York: St Martin's Press, 1995. 21 Wendy Hunter, 'Internationalfinancial institutions: changing perspectives and policy prescriptions', in Dominguez, The Future of Inter-AmericanRelations, p 124. 22 Gerald J Schmitz, 'Democratizationand demystification:deconstructing "governance"as development paradigm', in Moore & Schmitz, Debating Development Discourse, p 77 (emphasis in original). 23 National Coalition for HaitianRefugees (NCHR), No GreaterPriority: Judicial Reformin Haiti, New York: NCHR, 1995. The Frontfor the Advancementand Progressof Haiti (FRAPH) was a militantright-wingmilitia thattargetedAristidestrongholds,such as Cite Soleil, Port-au-Prince'slargest slum, in an effort to decimate all opposition to the military regime. Early statements by US officials had referred to the group as a legitimate opposition party. It was later reported that Washington had a hand in its creation. 24 Suzy Castor, 'Democracy and society in Haiti: structuresof domination and resistance to change', in Suzanne Jonas & Edward McCaughan(eds), Latin America Faces the TwentiethCentury,Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, p 163. 25 Ibid, p 159. 26 Isaacs, "Internationalassistance for democracy', p 272. 27 While the focus here is on OAS work in the area of justice reform, it is importantto note that the US governmenthad the centralrole in Haiti's justice reform process. French-speakingcountriesfamiliar with the Napoleonic Code on which Haitian law is based played a minor role. 28 Cited in Haiti Info, 5 (2), 14 December 1996, p 3. 29 Ian Martin, 'Paper versus steel: the first phase of the InternationalCivilian Mission in Haiti', in Martin, Honoring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace, publisher unknown, nd, p 114. 30 Interview with Camille Chalmers, Executive Secretary of the PAPDA, 8 October 1996. 31 Juan E M6ndez, 'Accountability for past abuses', Human Rights Quarterly, 19, 1997, p 258. 32 Michel-RolphTrouillot,Haiti: State Against Nation: The Origins and Legacies of Duvalierism,New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990. 33 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy. 34 Robert E Maguire et al, Haiti Held Hostage: InternationalResponses to the Questfor Nationhood 1986 to 1996, Occasional PaperNo 23, Providence,RI: Thomas J Watson Jr Institutefor InternationalStudies, 1996, p 13. 12

35 36

37 38

39 40

Ibid, p 27.

The largest US democracy aid effort in Latin America has been in Haiti. After the 1994 US-led military intervention,Washington devoted more than US$100 million in democracy aid to the country over the five years that followed. Carothers,Aiding Democracy Abroad, p 43. Castor, 'Democracy and society in Haiti'. See Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation. Trouillot's works (1980, 1982, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995) are widely believed to be some of the most insightful and authoritativeanalyses of Haitian history and politics. See R Fatton, Haiti's Predatory Republic, 2002. Sydney Mintz, 'Can Haiti change?', Foreign Affairs, 74 (1), 1995, p 86. See Amnesty International,Abuse of Human Rights: Political Violence as the 200th Anniversary of

1114

IN HAITI DEMOCRACY BUILDING'LOW-INTENSITY'

41 42 43 44 45

46 47

48 4 50

Independenceapproaches (8 October 2003), AMR 36/007/2003; IACHR, Report on the Situation of the Freedom of Expression in Haiti, OEA. Ser L/ V/ 11.117, Doc. 48, 15 July 2003; Amy Wilentz, 'Coup in Haiti', The Nation, 4 March 2004, at http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i = 20040322&s = wilentz, accessed 16 March 2004; Greg Chamberlain,'Haiti bleeds on an altar of savior politics', Los Angeles Times, 27 February2004; and RobertFatton Jr, 'For Haiti, 200 years of mixed results', New YorkTimes, 4 January2004, Section 4, p 7. Wilentz, 'Coup in Haiti'. Sydney Mintz, Caribbean Transformations,New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p 267. Daniel Erickson, 'The Haiti dilemma', Brown Journal of World Affairs, 10 (2), 2004, p 293. Haitian Platform to Advocate for an Alternative Development (PAPDA) press release, 24 January2004, at http://haitisupport.gn.apc.org/PAPDAstatement.htm, accessed 10 April 2004. Robert Pastor, 'A community of democracies in the Americas: the agonizing journey to instill substance into a wondrous phrase', paper presented at the conference on 'The Inter-AmericanDemocratic Charter: Challenges and Opportunities',University of British Columbia, 12-13 November 2002. UNDP, Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens' Democracy, available online at undp.org. RobertoMarchado& D Robert, 'Haiti:situationeconomiqueet perspectives',Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank, Economic evaluation of Haiti 2001, cited in Paul Farmer,'Haiti: short and bitter lives', Le Monde Diplomatique, July 2003, at http://mondediplo.com/2003/07/llfarmer?var_recherch6 =Haiti, accessed 16 February2004. 'No help for Haiti' (Editorial), WashingtonPost, 19 February2004, p A22. Maxwell Cameron, 'We're failing elected leaders', Globe and Mail, 9 March 2004, at www.theglobeand mail.com/servlet/Articlenews/Tprint/LAC20040309. UNDP, Democracy in Latin America.

1115