The aim of this article is, first, to provide a justification for the continued usefulness of the his- torical term 'civil society', and second, to examine in this context the ...
PO LITICS: 2003 VO L 23(1), 38–45
Democracy or Civil Society? Dorota I. Pietrzyk University of Krakow
The aim of this article is, first, to provide a justification for the continued usefulness of the historical term ‘civil society’, and second, to examine in this context the challenges arising ahead in the postcommunist European societies which, after the collapse of communism, have adopted the model of liberal democracy. One of their crucial goals is the renewal of civil society, which is one of the main conditions of a properly functioning democratic order. I argue that the development of civil society in postcommunist countries is one of the major pre-conditions for their political stability. It should be stressed that civil society is not only a descriptive category but also a normative one for it presupposes a certain level of civic culture and civic consciousness. Historically, if we look at the theories of Smith, Hegel or Marx, civil society was understood as a bourgeois society. At present, what is at stake in the debates animating political and social theory in both East and West, is the question of what version of civil society should prevail. I shall argue that the development of civil society and the democratisation of the social and political spheres should be seen as a mutual process leading to political and economic stability. The actual experience of postcommunist societies in East-Central Europe, attempting liberalisation and democratisation, shows that this mutual process needs a more comprehensive understanding and theoretical explanation.
Introduction: usefulness of the classical concept The idea of civil society is deeply rooted in the tradition of political thought. In modern philosophy it emerged along with the rise of capitalism and liberalism. Primarily understood as a political society by thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke, in the eighteenth and especially in the nineteenth century, the notion of civil society was used to describe a sphere of social activity distinguished from the state. The contemporary revival of the concept of civil society raises questions about its current conditions, relevance and usefulness. At the same time it is a question of the usefulness of political ideas in changing the social and political world and their applicability to societies that are slightly different from those in which they have their origins. The revived concept of civil society has a great explanatory potential for the theory of the political as well as for the theory of transition in postcommunist countries. On the one hand, it refers to an attempt to theorise about a specific historical experience, the tradition of a core of political and economic institutions (Pérez-Díaz, 1995, p. 81). On the other hand, it refers to a new experience of societies in Eastern and Central Europe, where, after its absence, civil society has been placed as one of the main issues for public attention, and as a goal of the struggle against the totalitarian state. What makes civil society ‘civil’ is the fact that it is a sphere within which citizens may freely organise themselves into groups and associations © Political Studies Association, 2003. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
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at various levels in order to make the formal bodies of state authority adopt policies consonant with their perceived interests. Adopting the model of civil society can be said entirely to support the maintenance both of a strong constitutionaldemocratic system and a more humane and equitable version of the market economy (Gellner, 1994, p. 213). The attempt to reconstruct the discourse over the politics of civil society becomes important for both postcommunist countries and stable Western democracies, though the debate about the role of civil society seems to be different in each political context. Accordingly, the notion of civil society can be seen as a hermeneutic key to the social complexity of orientations, rights, associations, and the public sphere. The distinction between civil society and the state provides a meaningful instrument for the analysis of social and political complexity. The impetus of that conceptual dichotomy comes particularly from East-Central Europe where civil society has become a major weapon in the ideological arsenal of opposition forces against state oppression. Although civil society is strongly connected with democratisation and liberalisation, it is a far more comprehensive and deeper concept than liberal democracy since the latter gives us little indication of the state-society and intersocietal relations (see Gellner, 1994; Chandhoke, 1995, p. 25). The concept of civil society which, in my view, should prevail, embraces a dynamic range of assumptions, values, and institutions, which are indispensable as the pre-conditions of democracy, such as political, social and civil rights, the rule of law, a public sphere and above all a plurality of associations. Such a concept stretches back to Alexis de Tocqueville and partly to the Scottish moralists and refers to a public space between household and the state, aside from the market, in which citizens may associate for the prosecution of private interests within a framework of law guaranteed by the state. This variant of civil society ‘affirms the self-organisation of society, rejects the state-dependency of citizens and treats civil society as an activity in its own right which is not reducible to economic structures’ (Bryant, 1994, p. 71). To this I would also attach the idea of civility as developed in the Scottish and English tradition over three centuries, as well as the concept of political culture, giving us a profound tool of analysis. The contemporary usage of civil society generally refers to economic and other social arrangements that are apart from the state and the private sphere of the family. For some theorists, such as Victor Pérez-Díaz (1993) or Darrow Schecter (2000), the economic sphere remains one of the central components of civil society. On the other hand, Antonio Gramsci, whose concept provides a very good link to the current discussion, took civil society, economy and the state to be distinct aspects in the social fabric. In this view, civil society is juxtaposed not only with the state but also strikingly with the economy and the private sphere of the family. I would argue that the three-part concept of civil society is theoretically more constructive than the two-part model as it allows one to consider civil society, based on voluntary associations, social movements and forms of public communication, as a sphere of social interaction between the economy and the state (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. x). The economic mechanisms can be just as inimical to social solidarity, autonomy and social justice as the administrative power of the state. As argued by Habermas, the current meaning of the term ‘civil society’ no longer © Political Studies Association, 2003.
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includes the economic sphere regulated by labour, capital and commodity markets (Habermas, 1992, p. 453). Considered as a three-part model, it allows us to distinguish between the ‘civil’ and the ‘bourgeois’, between the autonomy of the market and the autonomy of civil society. In other words, the two-part model, where civil society identified with bourgeois society, represents only one version of the concept and is consequently problematic as a model of analysis of democratic politics. Two centuries ago in the West, where the modern concept of civil society developed, burgher and citizen were supposed to be the same members of society, whereas now in Eastern and Central Europe these roles very often do not overlap with each other. The middle class is virtually absent and the role of citizens is often played by the intelligentsia. The institutional core of civil society is constituted by voluntary unions outside the realm of the state and economy. Yet civil society cannot be viewed as opposed to the state and economy by definition. These three spheres of liberal democracy are strictly interconnected, although their roles are different. The market economy and the state, based on the rule of law, are pre-conditions of liberty and thus civil society. But at the same time both corrupted state and corrupted economy can be the greatest danger for civil society. The liberal democratic order should involve equilibrium between those three sets of factors: adequate government, a properly functioning market economy and a civil society that can balance the two other factors. Paradoxically, the concept of civil society developed in East-Central Europe in the 1980s conceived it as a sphere opposed to the illegitimate communist state – civil society was to be rebuilt against the state whereas along with the democratic transformation it was the state that played a crucial role in setting up the legal boundaries of civil society activity and of the market economy. Thus if liberal democracy cannot flourish without civil society, and civil society cannot emerge spontaneously along with new democratic institutions, but is the result of a longer process, what should be done in order to strengthen both civil society and liberal democracy? What is at stake in such countries as Poland or Hungary where democratic institutions need a stronger civil society? Is this just a vicious circle which it is impossible to overcome? What are the necessary conditions that must be met if civil society is to be a real stipulation for democracy and liberty?
Civil society as a condition of freedom Ernest Gellner views civil society as a ‘natural’ condition of human freedom and this is a crucial point for supporters of the notion. What seems to be substantial for Gellner is that civil society cannot just be identified with the existence of plural institutions which are able to counterbalance the state, but it must also be accompanied by at least two factors: a civic spirit, which binds citizens to their obligations and responsibilities, and economic prosperity (Gellner, 1991, p. 500). In asking ‘democracy or civil society?’ Gellner stresses that the term ‘civil society’ is much more useful than ‘democracy’ although the latter seems to describe the only conceivable basis for social authority and the only possible source of political legitimacy (Gellner, 1994, p. 184). Historically, civil society was a pre-condition for well-functioning democracy in countries such as Great Britain, France and the US © Political Studies Association, 2003.
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whereas in nineteenth-century Germany, Italy and Portugal a wide array of associations and social forces was not followed by lasting democracies (Bermeo and Nord, 2000). These examples suggest that neither the density of associations nor the voting rights in themselves can support democracy everywhere since prodemocratic civil society must be based on tolerance and plurality of views and interests. It is not a high level of associationism but the virtue of civility, responsible citizenship, and strong political institutions that are the measure of a well ordered democratic civil society. Thus, I would argue that these two terms, democracy and civil society, although their connotations are different, overlap with each other. On the one hand, civil society is most often understood as a democratic society; on the other hand, democracy presupposes the existence of civil society and civic culture which precede politics in its institutionalised aspect. An awkward question arises here as to whether civil society is a given good or rather, as it was considered by Adam Ferguson or Hegel, the result of a long historical process. The major conditions that enabled civil society to emerge in Europe in the eighteenth century were the division of labour and commercialisation. These two factors made the liberalisation of social and political life possible. Adam Ferguson, who wrote at the beginning of the development of the market economy, anticipated what capitalism might entail for the embedded moral community that served as his model of civil society, but it was Adam Smith who first articulated a specifically bourgeois concept of civil society. He located economic activity and the market process – based on the division of labour and the distribution of skills, resources and wealth – at the heart of civil society, which as the self-interested realm of freedom, production and exchange can develop spontaneously provided that the political authorities do not interfere. According to Ferguson civil society can only prosper along with the disinterested love and concern of the public, not simply of our own well-being, since these two things are strongly connected. The rule of law and a good form of government appropriate to a particular society assures individuals’ participation in public life as well as the opportunity to practise their skills and virtues, to develop their moral sentiments, and hence to be free (Ferguson, 1966, p. 163). In many aspects this normative approach seems still to be relevant, although one can argue that real freedom might at times also mean a rejection of participation in public life – freedom from politics. Major problems that the postcommunist societies face today and that generate political instability can be considered, on the one hand, as a result of a weak civic culture or even its absence and, on the other hand, as the lack of spirit typical for homo economicus. A selfish attitude towards the economic and political transformation leads to indifference towards public life and public matters. Disharmony of interests in liberal democracy is more visible and audible to all parts of society and thus it calls for institutions and public liberties through which the demands of classes and groups could be made public (Shils, 1997, p. 75). Civil society is the arena where different interests can be met through mediation and discourse. Civility understood as an ethos of this conduct is a necessary condition of a real democracy. A flourishing market economy makes liberal democracy stable but what makes a society truly liberal and democratic is a wider range of aspects than the market economy. Not all individuals’ wants and desires might be satisfied in the market institutions; particular interests, such as the striving for status, the © Political Studies Association, 2003.
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collection and transmission of information, and scholarly and scientific knowledge, require such institutions as political parties and the formation of public opinion. According to Edward Shils, civility is ‘an attitude and a mode of action which attempts to strike a balance between conflicting demands and conflicting interests. Liberal democracy is especially in need of the virtue of civility because liberal democracy is more prone to bring latent conflicts into actuality, simply because it permits their open pursuit’ (Shils, 1997, p. 76). Civic culture should strengthen democracy as it makes people recognise their responsibility towards their communities as well as themselves; the lack of it in Eastern European democracies generates political instability and calls for supporting legislation which would provide better opportunities for active and responsible citizenry.
The need of the political and the need of the public What are the conditions under which the modicum of civility can be achieved? It cannot be created ab ovo; institutions of civil and political society are indispensable in this process. Habermas, in one of his latest works, stresses that a public sphere requires more than the institutional guarantees of the constitutional state since it also needs ‘the supportive spirit of cultural traditions and patterns of socialisation, of the political culture, of a populace accustomed to freedom’ (Habermas, 1992, p. 453). The idea of civil society in Eastern Europe bore within itself Ferguson’s view of civil society as a society of ‘polished manners’ that meant respect for members of society’s dignity derived from their humanity and from their membership in the political community. Such a community, which is not only an assemblage of individuals, is constituted by common views, rights, obligations, and responsibilities. They manifest themselves through debate and the confrontation of different perspectives within the public sphere, which is the necessary arena for mediation between political institutions and different individual and group interests and views. The public sphere is understood here as an explicitly political and communicative network within civil society that might challenge state authority (Schecter, 2000, p. 81). Although there is a significant role for political parties to be played in representing social interests and mediating between the civil and the political, they are not sufficient in the long term. Political parties, which in reality do not entirely belong either in civil society or the state, tend to represent particular interests in a slightly technical way, closing down different perspectives in favour of one opportune option, as the main goal they seek is the access to institutional power. Hence, the formation of a genuine public sphere, which assures a space for the articulation of different and sometimes incommensurable visions of public life and public issues, is essential in the process of the development of civil society. Within that sphere citizens not only express their standpoints but also gain a better understanding of public and explicitly political issues. What is at issue here is a question of the very nature of civil society. Does it have to be apolitical or anti-political? Two decades ago oppositionists from East-Central Europe found ‘anti-politics’ the only possible response to the abuses of state power. ‘Because politics has flooded nearly every nook and cranny of our lives, I would like to see the flood recede. We ought to depoliticise our lives, free them from politics as from some contagious infection. We ought to free our simple everyday © Political Studies Association, 2003.
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affairs from considerations of politics’ (Konrád, 1984, p. 229). ‘Anti-political politics’ was seen as ‘practical morality, as service to truth, as essentially human and humanly measured care for our fellow-humans’ (Havel, 1988, pp. 396–397). And it was civil society against the state where this ideal was to be sought but it had very little in common with civil society in developed democracies with a long tradition of social autonomy. The concept of ‘anti-politics’ seems to be a little sinister and destructive in the long term, especially in the countries that chose the way of liberal democracy in 1989. The enlightened citizen can be characterised as an active and open-minded member of society, who participates not only in the process of decision-making which is confined to a small range of local or even private issues but, also, finds the sphere of politics as a domain of their interests and influence. De Tocqueville was the first theorist of democratic order who conceived apathy and indifference of citizens as a main threat for democracy. Civil society is not only a sphere of articulation of self-interest by different social groups, but also the necessary arena for political education and political preference-shaping. It is the space of social activity that enriches democracy and a way of life to the individual citizen in the societies born out of modern democratic revolutions. ‘Anti-politics’ might function as a good option only in very specific circumstances, when access to the political activity and political involvement is open only to supporters of an authoritarian regime. But it is very dangerous in a liberal democracy, which ex definitione is based on the active participation of its citizens in decision-making. The liberal principle of autonomy can be fulfilled through the system of decision-making and the extensive involvement of citizens in different forms of public issues that affect them (Held, 1999, p. 310). They must have adequate opportunities to form their preferences and to place questions on the public agenda. It seems to be inevitable that the destiny of civil society will continue to be inseparably intertwined with the success of liberal democracy but we must remember that they are mutually contingent upon one another. In Eastern and Central European countries it was relatively easy to establish institutional democracy after 1989, but it is much more difficult to introduce democratic customs and political culture. The lack of public debate generates a redoubtable obstacle to the development of democracy, since major political and social issues are not discussed or well understood by citizens. There is an irony here: people have regained freedom, but they do not know what to do with it (Krol, 1999, p. 72). It was much easier to introduce from above democratic institutions than civil society, which in Western Europe developed spontaneously as a result of a long historical process. In the Eastern European context an active role of democratic state and political institutions seems to be inevitable in the mutual process of democratisation. The struggle for civil society and against the state left behind the question of what kind of civil society is most desirable. The ideal of anti-political, united and moral civil society turned out to be illusory and unattainable and its usefulness disappeared (Smolar, 1996, p. 29). Nevertheless, success of the radical change introduced from the top rests upon creative forces of open society with genuine public space, although, on the other hand, a strong civil society may flourish only within a strong state – in the sense of the efficacy of its political institutions, rules and orders. A weak and contested state can be a major impediment for the development of an active citizenry, which calls for the restoration of trust in public institutions and © Political Studies Association, 2003.
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political elites, as well as in the viability of new political and economic arrangements (Sztompka, 1998, p. 195).
Conclusion It seems to be evident, especially when we look from an Eastern European perspective, that a properly functioning democracy must be complemented by civil society. There is no citizenship without civil society. The reconstruction of democratic institutions and political society does not entirely provide the conditions for a truly liberal society. But the movement from civil society against the state to civil society in a constructive relationship with the democratic state in Central and Eastern Europe is a slow process. The adoption of democratic and liberal institutions and new constitutions calls for civil society within which they should be rooted. However, although it seems to be a vicious circle and the process of the development of civil society might last many generations, the very fact of both the theoretical and practical mutuality of democracy and civil society needs to be emphasised. The Western model of civil society is not necessarily suitable for Eastern societies, but at the same time, without further exploration in the theory and practice of Western liberal democracies, the adaptation of their institutions without the practices that should follow them might lead to the whole project being frustrated.
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Smolar, A. (1996), ‘Civil Society after Communism: From Opposition to Atomization’, Journal of Democracy 7(1), pp. 24–41. Sztompka, P. (1998), Mistrusting Civility: Predicament of a Post-Communist Society, in J.C. Alexander (ed.), Real Civil Societies: Dilemmas of Institutionalisation, London: Sage.
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