Results 24 - 48 - contribution in stimulating conversations, suggestions, and encouragement, were ... Furthermore, I would also like to acknowledge the crucial role of the staff of ..... criteria of free and fair elections for an electoral democracy but the ...... http://afrobarometer.org/files/documents/briefing_papers/AfrobriefNo17.pdf.
Democratic Consolidation in Benin A study of socio-economic and political development
JOSETTE K. BOCKELIE SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF BENNINGTON COLLEGE, BENNINGTON, VERMONT, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
JUNE 2013
BACHELOR OF ARTS.
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my deepest appreciation to all those that have supported and assisted me through this process, I truly could not have done it without you. I would like to give special gratitude to my Faculty and Thesis advisor, Mr. Rotimi Suberu, whose contribution in stimulating conversations, suggestions, and encouragement, were invaluable to the research and writing of this thesis. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Geoffrey Pigman, Dr. Noah Coburn, and Dr. Eileen Scully for providing invaluable feedback on my work throughout the process and encouraging me to delve deeper into my work. Furthermore, I would also like to acknowledge the crucial role of the staff of the Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy for hosting me during my stay in Cotonou, Benin, especially Mr. Christian Yetchenou for entertaining me during my stay and educating me on Beninese culture. I would like to extend an extra gratitude towards the Beninese people, especially Kafui André, who welcomed me into their lives, their homes, their culture, and their history during my stay; this thesis would not have been possible without the contributions of Mrs. Michelle Akindele, Mr. Gustave Assah, Mr. Giles Badet, Mr. Charles Badou, Mr. Clotaire Olihidé, Mr. Julien Oussou, Mr. Victor Topanou, and Mr. Didace Zadji. Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family, whose support, contributions, and encouragement has made this process not only possible and tolerable but also fun and inspiring.
BOCKELIE 3
Table of Contents Democratic Consolidation in Benin ..............................................................................1 Acknowledgements .....................................................................................................3 Maps...................................................................................................5 Introduction..........................................................................................6 Part One: Development Theory ...........................................................................13 Chapter One: Political Development, Democracy, and Consolidation .................... 14 What is Political Development? ................................................................................................14 Chapter Two: Drivers of Democratic Consolidation and Decay ............................ 26 Economic Development as a Requisite to Democratic Consolidation .......................................26 Human Development and Democratic Consolidation ...............................................................34 Constraining the Executive through Institutional Design ..........................................................40 Chapter Two Summary..............................................................................................................48 Part Two: History .......................................................................................................51 Chapter Three: Political History of Benin ..................................................... 52 Post-‐Decolonization political and economic turmoil.................................................................52 Democracy in The Republic of Benin .........................................................................................59 Part Three: Analysis ...................................................................................................70 Chapter Four: Consolidating Electoral Democracy in Benin ................................ 71 Socio-‐Economic Advancement and Democratic Political Culture..............................................71 Autonomous and Accountable Political Institutions .................................................................86 Chapter Four Summary .............................................................................................................97 Chapter Five: Transitioning Towards Liberal Democracy ................................... 99 Advancing Human Development Through Public Services ........................................................99 Re-‐Evaluating Independence: Possibilities for Institutional Reform........................................107 Chapter Five Summary ............................................................................................................113 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 115 Appendix ................................................................................................................. 119 Appendix A ........................................................................................ 120 List of Employed Acronyms .....................................................................................................120 Appendix B ........................................................................................ 122 Interview Biographies .............................................................................................................122 Appendix C ........................................................................................ 124 History of the Kingdom of Dahomey .......................................................................................124 Appendix D ........................................................................................ 126 Constitutional Court Decisions Influential for Political Development......................................126 Appendix E ........................................................................................ 127 Addendum: April 2013 Reform of Benin’s Electoral Code .......................................................127 Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 128
4 BOCKELIE
Maps
Western Africa
Source: Ham, A. (2009). West Africa (7th ed.). Footscray, Vic. ; London: Lonely Planet.
BOCKELIE 5
Introduction “Democracy is like everyone’s child because it is the population in its entirety that decided to have democracy and not that the President [Kérékou] said: I impose a democracy on you. It’s the whole population that decided to put it in place and it is the whole population that protects the democracy. We have made all the large decisions of democracy together in a document at the National Conference. Each Beninese is proud to see that we have retained the path of democracy and there are institutions that have guarded the democracy [from decay]” – Julien Oussou, National Director of West African Peacebuilding Network-Benin The Republic of Benin has achieved democratic success against all odds. In fact, Bruce A. Magnusson (2005) describes Benin as a “treacherous” case for democracy due to its French heritage, low Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, low levels of human development, history of ethnic tension, and authoritarian neighborhood. None of these factors, however, have obstructed Benin’s path to democratic rule or its process of democratic consolidation. Benin has defied the odds as a democratic success story in western francophone Africa. The question arises then: what has driven democratic consolidation in an environment traditionally thought to be hostile to democracy? This paper will analyze the theoretical implications of political development and democratic consolidation to develop a theory of drivers of democratic consolidation. These drivers will be considered in respect to Benin’s experience of political development. Finally, it will look at possibilities for the future of political development in Benin to understand how the country can continue democratic deepening so as to transition into a liberal democracy. In August 1960, France granted independence to the countries of the Afrique occidentale française (AOF), including Benin (then known as Dahomey). Left in a power
6 BOCKELIE
vacuum with few working political structures, many countries of the AOF experienced tumultuous
political,
economic,
and
social
situations
immediately
following
decolonization. After independence, military coup d’états plagued Benin until the mid 1970s. Benin did not experience political stability until 1972 when a coup d’état installed a military regime. Then, after years of popular protests, student and labor demonstrations, and economic collapse under an unresponsive regime, Benin made a concerted effort at democratization. In 1990, Benin joined Samuel Huntington’s (1991) “third wave of democratization,” setting the pace for the rest of francophone Africa by organizing the world’s first sovereign National Conference to transition to democratic rule. The Conference gathered members from every sector of society: lawyers, professors, student and labor unions, business owners, and those exiled during Mathieu Kérékou’s regime. The Conference sought to find a way out of political and economic repression and the attendees voted to install a democracy and embark down the path of socio-economic reform. The Conference declared itself sovereign; demoted President Kérékou to a ceremonial position; elected an interim Prime Minister, Nicéphore Soglo; wrote a new democratic constitution with a reconstruction of political institutions; and set a date for presidential and legislative elections. The constitution adopted during the National Conference by the delegates solidified a five-year mandate for the President with a twoterm limit, installed a unicameral legislature, all based off of free and fair multiparty elections. Traditionally, literature on democracy has stipulated that countries must fulfill specific prerequisites to undergo a democratic transition. Since the onset of third wave,
BOCKELIE 7
however, countries have shown this is empirically false. As Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub & Fernando Limongi (1996) state, “transitions to democracy are random with regard to the level of development: not a single transition to democracy can be predicted by the level of development alone” (Przeworski et al, 1996, 40). Benin’s democratic experience demonstrates that a country can complete a democratic transition despite having low levels of development. Following their democratic transition, less developed democracies are in a more volatile position than their more developed counterparts. Three outcomes post-transition can occur: further liberalize to consolidate democracy, remain an illiberal democracy, or slide back into an authoritarian regime. In the years following transition, Benin designed political institutions and promoted socio-economic policies that encouraged a favorable environment for democracy’s survival. Slow and steady growth along with a difficult but consistent adherence to the rule of law defines Benin’s post-transition period. Since its founding elections in 1990, Benin has had six successful legislative elections and five successful presidential elections with three transfers of power. All elections were declared free and fair by the international community. In contrast to Benin’s success, many of Benin’s regional neighbors have endured numerous coups d’état since democratization (i.e. Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali). This vastly divergent outcome in political development following the similar National Conferences, cultural histories, and low levels of development of the francophone countries in sub-Saharan Africa raises the question: What has enabled Benin to successfully consolidate an electoral democracy? The research in this thesis seeks to elucidate the different drivers of democratic consolidation so as to understand what has driven consolidation of electoral democracy in
8 BOCKELIE
Benin. Additionally, it addresses the effect of continued political and socio-economic development in Benin and offers recommendations for how the country could consolidate a liberal democracy. Literature on democratization and political development discusses many potential influences on the process of consolidation. Seymour Martin Lipset (1963) and W.W. Rostow (1960) both suggest that, a stable and well-functioning liberal democracy requires certain levels of social and economic development as pre-conditions for democracy. Whereas current literature proposes that economic development does not catalyze democratic transition, it will help to consolidate a democracy by rendering it more stable. If economic development stabilizes a country, how does socio-economic advancement influence political development? Does a focus on increasing human capital following the transition to democracy, like economic development, generate a positive environment for democratic consolidation? The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) considers Benin to have low human development based on their Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is an aggregate measure of a country’s economic level and quality of life. Benin ranks 167 with an HDI of .427, which has improved from an HDI of .252 in 1980 (UNDP, 2011). Democratization at such low levels of development places Benin into the category of what Renske Dorenspleet and Peter Kopecky (2008) label “deviant democracies.” In these countries, the political system following a democratic transition meets the minimal criteria of free and fair elections for an electoral democracy but the countries lack the developmental “requisites” traditionally deemed necessary for a transition.
BOCKELIE 9
The continuation of poor socio-economic conditions under a new form of government can lead to a harsher review of regime performance by the populace. For a new democracy to have a chance of survival, it must provide for its citizens and meet their political, social, and economic expectations. Benin has continued to improve the socio-economic conditions for its populace by investing in education and health care. In addition, Benin designed political institutions at the time of transition that have been able to provide accountability and transparency; this has ensured the continuation of the democratic process, which has given the democratic political system legitimacy and stability. This paper proposes a multi-faceted approach to democratic consolidation that combines both a political culture and institutional approach. Approaching democratic consolidation from both the bottom-up (political culture) and the top-down (political institutions) takes into consideration the need for internal impetus and will on behalf of the people for democracy to survive and the need to have functioning democratic structures within the political system that protect against democratic decay. Thus, this thesis theorizes that socio-economic development has a positive influence on democratic consolidation through the creation of a democratic political culture. This breeds an environment in which political institutions must be responsive and accountable to the citizenry. Independent and impartial political institutions establish vertical and horizontal accountability, which will make the political system more legitimate and democratic. Furthermore, a democratic political culture builds upon the qualities of trust, equality, and reciprocity; these values, along with well-designed political institutions, minimize the negative repercussions of ethnically divided societies, a trait found commonly in Africa.
10 BOCKELIE
This thesis asserts that the combination of socio-economic and political development along with democratic deepening leads to a consolidated electoral democracy1 and can even advance the transition to a liberal democracy. This thesis consists of three parts divided into five chapters. Part One includes two chapters to present a literature review of prominent theories of political development. Chapter One clarifies the nuances within definitions of political development, democracy and consolidation. Chapter Two discusses the different drivers of democratic consolidation and decay. It examines in detail the implications of economic and human development and key political institutions for consolidation. Part Two gives historical context to the case study of Benin. Chapter Three traces the political history of Benin from decolonization to today. Part Three analyzes how the drivers of democratic consolidation have manifested in Benin. Chapter Four discusses the policies, programs, and institutions that have been fundamental in the consolidation of electoral democracy in Benin. Chapter Five offers recommendations for reforms needed to deepen Benin’s democracy so that it can transition towards a consolidated liberal democracy. The work incorporates a variety of sources. Discussions of political development and democracy offered by prominent political scientists provide a theoretical groundwork for the proposed drivers of consolidation. This thesis also incorporates a variety of development reports issued by international and multilateral institutions. Finally, the research comprises first-hand interviews with Beninese political scientists, lawyers,
1
This minimal conception of consolidation represents a departure from the predominate literature on political development which stipulates consolidation requires a liberal democracy, such as Larry Diamond’s definition. Instead, it relies more heavily on the conception of consolidation advanced by Huntington’s two-‐turnover test or Doorenspleet and Kopecky’s expectation that democracy will last in the future.
BOCKELIE 11
jurists, members of the public service, and leaders of civil society organizations.2 These were conducted throughout January 2013 while spending a month in Cotonou, Benin to conduct field research on the drivers of democratic consolidation in Benin.
2
A list of interviewees with a small biography for each individual is included in Appendix B.
12 BOCKELIE
Part One: Development Theory
BOCKELIE 13
Chapter One: Political Development, Democracy, and Consolidation The discussion of political development, democratization, and democratic consolidation is vast within the social sciences. Yet, none of these terms has a precise agreed upon definition in the social science community. Thus, Chapter One will provide a literature review of these three topics to develop working definitions of political development, democracy, and consolidation to use throughout the remainder of this paper. WHAT IS POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT? As with many concepts in political science, scholars have yet to come to a consensus on how to answer the question: what is political development? Theorists have put forth a plethora of definitions that nuance different aspects of the concept. The Oxford Dictionary of Politics defines political development as the advancement of the “institutions, attitudes, and values that form the political power system of a society.” This definition, however, does little to clarify what policies will achieve positive development upon practical application. Alternatively, to state that political development is democratization seems too narrow of a definition; it oversimplifies the concept. It suggests political development has a static end goal rather than emphasizing the need for a state to continue to evolve and develop post-transition. Understood as a dynamic process, political development continues even after the establishment of democracy. Without a concerted effort at democratic deepening, a state risks political decay and receding back into an authoritarian regime, which has taken place in a number of African countries (e.g. Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso). This chapter will develop a theory of
14 BOCKELIE
political development in relation to the development and consolidation of democratic political institutions. I.I.I A DEMOCRATIC PERSPECTIVE OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, political development has increasingly included the establishment of democratic norms, values, and institutions in its definition. International financial institutions (IFI), such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, emphasize the importance of good governance and often require the government to involve civil society in assistance programs in order to receive funds. IFIs define good governance using qualities typically found in democratic political systems, such as accountability and transparency. Many donor organizations promote democracy even if they do not explicitly state it for political reasons. The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) created in 2002 under United States Agency for International Development (USAID) illustrates the contemporary approach to development: to qualify for funds, a state must demonstrate performance in “governing justly and accountably, investing in human welfare and pursuing sensible economic policies” (Diamond, 2004, 237). Although there has been a convergence of opinion since the end of the Cold War, social scientists have yet to agree on one definition of what constitutes political development, notably around the relative importance of democracy in relation to political development. This section will elaborate on the competing theories of political development. Lucian Pye (1965) recognizes the plurality of definitions of political development in his article “The Concept of Political Development”. He presents ten differing definitions of political development from which he determines three overarching
BOCKELIE 15
principles: equality, capacity, and the differentiation and specialization of institutions. Although Pye recognizes one definition of political development as developing democracy in his review of ten definitions, he does not explicitly include it in his fundamental principles of political development. Equality “means that laws should be of a universalistic nature, applicable to all and more or less impersonal in their operations” (Pye, 1965, 12). Furthermore, societies based on equality use a merit-based recruitment system to fill governmental offices. This requires the standardization of democratic elections with mostly universal suffrage. Free and fair elections ensure that officials are neither handpicked via the government nor via a hereditary system. Successful free and fair elections require a certain extent of institutional and citizen development. Second, the state must have the capacity to act and function as such with a legitimate use of power. Capacity takes into account the “magnitude, scope and scale of political and governmental performance” (Pye, 1965, 12). This alludes to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s theory of “stateness” in which the state must have the capacity to enforce laws, collect taxes, and effectively govern a territory (Villalón & VonDoepp, 2005). Differentiation and specialization requires the development of a web of specialized institutions integrated into the government framework. Each actor within the system has a specific and differentiated task. Samuel Huntington’s (1968) three characteristics of political development overlap with Pye’s definition: autonomy, institutionalization, and domestic order and stability. Autonomy implies the government has the capacity to make independent economic and political decisions. The government also has the task of socializing new political groups into the norms and attitudes of the political system. The institutionalization of political
16 BOCKELIE
organizations and procedures depends on the scope of their support and the level of institutionalization, which can be measured by the “adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of [an institution’s] organizations and procedures” (Huntington, 1968, 394). Lastly, political development requires domestic political order and stability; this can help prevent political decay. In 1987, Huntington revamped his theory of political development to include democracy as another essential component. This marks a shift in development theory, which begins to place increasingly more emphasis on democracy. This became more pronounced after the fall of the Soviet Union; democracy has become the only viable form of good governance. Alan Siaroff (2009) expands Huntington’s theory of political development, denoting five sequences to successful development. First, development begins with the creation or adoption of a national identity to produce unity. Next, the state constitutionally establishes legitimate and effective institutions. Third, elite groups create political parties that compete for power; in ideal situations, this produces an alternation of power. This sequence relates to Dankwart Rustow’s (1970) “habituation phase”, which leads to the acceptance of democratic norms. Subsequently, a responsible and elected government takes over power from the previous regime. Finally, the government slowly expands citizens’ voting rights until universal suffrage exists. Siaroff’s theory, however, misplaces the expansion to universal suffrage by placing it as the final sequence. By today’s standards, to have a legitimately elected government means a government elected by universal suffrage. The international community expects developing countries to grant universal suffrage much earlier in the process of political development than the countries of the first and second wave of
BOCKELIE 17
democratization expanded their suffrage. For example, Article 21 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), states that governments shall be elected “by universal and equal suffrage” (UN General Assembly, 1948). Thus, the establishment of an elected government in Rustow’s phase four would not be seen as legitimate because only a select portion of the elite population elected it. The argument for expanding suffrage slowly, as is the case with Rustow, stems from the need to politically socialize new groups into the political system. Since incremental expansion of suffrage no longer represents a viable option for developing countries, a new structure must fulfill this role. One method includes the promotion of civic education programs both through local community centers and in the formal education system; this method of political socialization will provide stability to the new regime to guard against political decay. Francis Fukuyama’s (2011) conception of political development incorporates three aspects: state building, rule of law, and democracy. State building means the existence of a strong and capable state that provides order, possesses strong administrative capacity, and has a monopoly on violence. Coming out of a revolutionary state, a state must attain a monopoly on violence and ensure the capacity of the state before democracy can have any chance of stabilizing. Rule of law denotes the state’s dedication to act in accordance with the constitution and refraining from extraconstitutional measures to solve conflict within the government or the country itself. Rule of law increases government legitimacy and renders state actions predictable. The government respects and protects the civil liberties of all citizens equally, rather than giving preferential treatment to the highest bidders. Third, Fukuyama stresses the importance of including democracy in the definition of political development. He defines
18 BOCKELIE
a democratic regime as one that demonstrates accountability to its citizenry via free and fair elections. Larry Diamond (1999) presents a strictly democratic theory of political development. He defines it as the transition towards and the consolidation of a liberal democracy. For Diamond, liberal democracy is the only complete version of democracy; it expands beyond just having free and fair elections into the day-to-day lives of the people. Diamond’s version of liberal democracy requires vertical and horizontal accountability, rule of law, equality, and a constitution. Horizontal accountability denotes accountability between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Vertical accountability signifies the accountability of the government to the population through mechanisms such as the Constitutional Court, which offers citizens a method of recourse for human rights violations in Benin. Benin’s electoral management body (EMB), la Commission
électorale
nationale
autonome
(CENA),
also
provides
vertical
accountability by organizing free and fair elections that allow all citizens have equal access to participation in political life. Although each of these five theorists has approached the issue of political development from a unique perspective and each has different theoretical components for their path to political development, common characteristics exist. The three most common underlying themes place importance on (1) designing strong political institutions; (2) maintaining domestic order and stability, which implies a dedication to the rule of law; and (3) political participation in elections, which implies a societal understanding and acceptance of democracy. While democracy has not always been inherent in the notion of political development, since the collapse of communism in
BOCKELIE 19
Eastern Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall, it has become the standard form of legitimate government. The international community implies democracy in their good governance requirements. Taking into account the commonalities between theories discussed above and recognizing the international norm of democratic good governance, this paper will build upon Fukuyama’s vision of political development. Thus, political development represents the dynamic process of state building designing democratic political institutions, such as a constitutional court and electoral monitoring body, based on rule of law, which maintain a goal of further development towards democratic consolidation. I.I.II NUANCES WITHIN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY Democracy exists in many different forms throughout the world today and has existed in many different forms in the past. Democracy traces both its etymological and historical roots back to ancient Greece. Democracy derives from the Greek word dêmoskrátos: dêmos (δῆμος) means "people" and krátos (κράτος) means "power" or “rule” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2013). Thus, one can understand democracy in its rudimentary form as rule by the people. Despite its connotation as the birthplace of democracy, Athens’ democracy bears little resemblance to today’s democratic philosophies. Contemporary democracy rests on the principles of participation and equality consecrated through the election of representatives. Holding competitive free and fair elections to determine political offices provides a procedural definition of democracy. It defines the rules of the political system and the basic mechanisms to attribute power. Schumpeter (1942) advanced the first minimalist definition of democracy as the “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which
20 BOCKELIE
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1942, 269). The minimal definition of electoral democracy places an emphasis on having a competitive electoral process and the institutionalization of democratic rules (the formal institutions) but tends to leave out the institutionalization of democratic norms (a democratic political culture). Often, these regimes fall short of adequate protection of civil and political liberties. A more substantial definition of democracy not only requires that governments attain power through a free and fair electoral process but also places importance on the participatory and deliberative nature of democracy. Liberal democratic regimes fall into this category. Democratic norms permeate liberal societies and the government encourages discussion and debate to improve political decisions to the benefit of all. Individuals in liberal democracies develop through political participation. Liberal democracy incorporates three basic principles: accountability, representativeness, and the promotion and protection of civil and political liberties (Diamond, 1999). Dahl (1989) suggests that liberal democracies are an ideal type and as such cannot be realized in reality. Thus, he proposes the concept of ‘polyarchy.’ Polyarchies possess seven attributes: (1) elected officials are determined by (2) competitive free and fair elections with (3) inclusive suffrage where (4) anyone can run for office in a society that realizes the (5) freedom of expression, (6) alternative information, and (7) associational autonomy both during election cycles and in-between. Polyarchies are “inclusive, fair, and competitive…[and have] political and social freedoms that are minimally necessary not only during but also between elections as condition for elections to be fair and competitive” (O’Donnell, 1997, 42). Similar to liberal democracies, polyarchies go
BOCKELIE 21
beyond the minimal definition of electoral democracy to include civil and political liberties, which are seen as necessary to guarantee the seven essential attributes of polyarchy. When evaluating the democratic experiences in developing countries, adopting a minimal definition of democracy seems to be the most applicable. The standards of liberal democracy tend to idealize the democratic process. Countries of the developing world often struggle to provide the minimal requirements of an electoral democracy and lack the resources to further institutionalize a more western conception of liberal democracy immediately following their democratic transition. In the context of the case study of Benin, this paper will adopt a minimal conception of electoral democracy. Therefore, democracy denotes a political system based on competitive, free, and fair elections and respect for the basic political freedoms necessary to meet this end. I.I.III CONSOLIDATION: DEMOCRATIZATION POST-TRANSITION Conceptualizing political development as seeking to deepen democracy suggests that political development does not end with a democratic transition but rather, after the establishment of an electoral democracy, political development continues to deepen democracy and to institutionalize democratic norms. O’Donnell (1996) defines transition as the time interval between two regimes; the change in political regime type requires the adoption of new rules. Consolidation, therefore, represents the manifestation of the political transformation following the period of transition. Schmitter, and Guilhot (2000) view consolidation as the institutionalization of democracy within in a society. O’Donnell claims that, in reality, countries experience two waves of transition: “the first towards democracy and the second towards
22 BOCKELIE
consolidated democracy” (Schmitter & Guilhot, 2000, 625), where the population and political elite express commitment to democratic norms. These perspectives of consolidation suggest a minimal conception of consolidation, one that stabilizes and institutionalizes an electoral democracy. Thus, a third transition could be added to the discussion of political development—the transition to a liberal democracy from a consolidated electoral democracy. Huntington (1968) also emphasizes the distinction between transition and consolidation by defining transition as the emergence of a political order and consolidation as the stabilization of a political authority. Political stabilization depends upon factors “exterior to the political order...[such as] the social diffusion of comportments and values held by the restrained elite” (Schmitter & Guilhot, 2000, 624). In other words, democracy requires the adoption of a democratic political culture. Similar to the concept of political development, social scientists have yet to agree upon when one can determine a democracy consolidated. Some theorists adopt minimal understandings of consolidation (Doorenspleet and Kopecky, 2008; Gisselquist, 2008; Huntington, 1991) while Diamond (1999), among others, insists on more rigorous requirements to qualify as a consolidated democracy. The most minimal conception of consolidation determines a democracy consolidated if it has persisted in a stable manner for a significant period of time (i.e. 20-50 years) or when a democratic political system “can be expected to last into the future” (Doorenspleet and Kopecky’s, 2008, 702). Huntington (1991) offers a “two-turnover test” to determine consolidation: the transfer of power to the opposition in two democratic elections marks the establishment of a consolidated democracy. Benin meets the requirements of all three of these definitions of electoral democracy.
BOCKELIE 23
Linz and Stepan (1997) understand consolidation in terms of improving democratic institutions and deepening democracy until it becomes “the only game in town” behaviorally, attitudinally, and constitutionally: Behaviorally, democracy becomes the only game in town when no significant political group seriously attempts to overthrow the democratic regime or to promote domestic or international violence in order to secede from the state. Attitudinally, democracy becomes the only game in town when, even in the face of severe political and economic crises, the overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic procedures. Constitutionally, democracy becomes the only game in town when all of the actors in the polity become habituated to the fact that political conflict within the state will be resolved according to established norms, and that violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly. (Linz & Stepan, 1997, 16) Rachel Gisselquist (2008) adopts Doorenspleet and Kopecky’s (2008) definition of consolidation; she emphasizes the need for domestic leadership and institutional incentives to encourage the rule of law in an electoral democracy. O’Donnell (1992), on the other hand, takes a more substantive approach, stating that formal institutionalization of democracy is not adequate; he understands consolidation as the informal institutionalization of democratic norms and regulations. This encompasses the idea that many World Values Surveys3 take into account: the citizenry believe that democracy is the best form of government in general as well as for their country. Almond and Verba (1963), Fukuyama (1995), and Putnam (1993) view the development of a civic culture as an integral step in the process of consolidation. A civic culture based on inter-personal trust allows democracy to flourish and consolidate through participatory democratic institutions. Diamond (1999) elaborates upon the
3
“The World Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of sociocultural and political change. It is conducted by a network of social scientist at leading universities all around world” (WVS, 2013).
24 BOCKELIE
minimal and substantial conceptions of democracy to design the most comprehensive approach to a consolidated democracy. He defines consolidation as: The process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine. (Diamond, 1999, 65) He assigns democratic consolidation three tasks: democratic deepening to render democratic
structures
more
liberal,
accountable,
and
representative;
political
institutionalization to increase the normative commitment to democracy; and regime performance to produce positive policy outcomes. Although the definition of consolidation as the mere survival for a couple decades seems too simple of a definition, Diamond’s understanding of consolidation appears too stringent and restrictive to apply to the majority of countries. A useful definition of consolidation ought to apply to the developing world in addition to developed countries. While consolidation implies a stable democratic political system, it also dictates an understanding that democratic norms and ideals go beyond the electoral process. Citizens ought to interact in a democratic manner that demonstrates their commitment to democratic principles. Adapting Linz and Stepan’s theory of consolidation to an electoral democracy, this paper will employ a minimal understanding of consolidation. Consolidation, therefore, represents the stabilization of an electoral democracy, where democracy becomes the ”only game in town” and democratic norms begin to take hold through the promotion of a democratic political culture.
BOCKELIE 25
Chapter Two: Drivers of Democratic Consolidation and Decay Following transition, a democracy can either deepen to become a consolidated democracy or it can experience democratic decay, falling into a partly-free or illiberal democracy. Chapter two will provide an overview of some drivers of democratic consolidation and decay. The chapter begins with a discussion of the literatures evolution in the understanding of economic development’s role in democratic transitions and consolidation. Next, the chapter will present an argument for socio-economic development’s impact on advancing democratic deepening. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS A REQUISITE TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION While early development theory considered economic development the chief prerequisite for a democratic transition, recent studies have shown that it only stabilizes a democracy post-transition. Economic development in a democratic society seeks to simultaneously increase Gross National Product (GNP) and liberalize the economy, which leads to the rise of an autonomous middle class who champion democratic ideals. This allows for vertical accountability and furthers democratic deepening. II.I.I ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY: FROM CAUSAL TO CORRELATIVE Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) proposed a causal relationship between democracy and economic development in which he includes wealth, industrialization, education and urbanization. Lipset found that “the more well to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset, 1959, 75). Lipset claims that economic development not only catalyzes a democratic transition but also creates a more democratic political culture due to increased education and greater economic security. This permits those in the lower economic strata to “develop longer time perspectives and more complex and
26 BOCKELIE
gradualist views of politics” (Lipset, 1959, 83). Consequentially, citizens value democracy and approach politics from a rational perspective. In addition, a rise in national income leads the business elite to have more respect for the lower classes. This leads to more respect in the political sphere for lower classes and a willingness to share power and offer political rights, which reduces inequality and grows the middle class. This engenders a shift in class structure: from an elongated pyramid with a small political elite and large lower class to a diamond with a large middle-class. Due to the changing class structure, economic development reduces strain on the political power by simultaneously minimizing the need for social services and growing civil society. This, in turn, enhances political participation and overall comprehension of the political system. In their own quantitative studies, the results of Coleman (1960), Russet (1965), and Dahl (1971) seem to confirm Lipset’s theory. Each found that the states with a higher level of development were also the most competitive and democratic. While, this empirical evidence shows an apparent correlation between economic development and democratic survival, it does not offer sufficient force to determine economic development as a single cause of democracy. The third wave of democracy exemplified the fact that economic development is not a pre-requisite for democracy. For example, of the 36 countries classified as having low human development by UNDP, 13 (about 33 percent) are democracies. When looking at the bottom third of countries in respect to HDI rankings, “the proportion of democracies rises to 42 percent (twenty-five of fifty-nine)” (Diamond, 2009, 27). Although Lipset’s statement that the more well to do a nation the more stable the democracy does not appear to still hold weight, improving the economic
BOCKELIE 27
situation in a country will provide a positive environment for the consolidation of democracy. The onset of the third wave of democratization brought a new political reality: not all good things go together. For example, Peter Lewis (2008) cites the African political and economic experience of the late 1990’s; many African democracies were experiencing “slightly lower growth rates, higher inflation, and greater budget deficits than nondemocracies” (Lewis, 2008, 98). Diamond (1992) also counters Lipset’s causal relationship, by providing the example that many European dictatorships had higher economic development than Latin American democracies. Studies completed by David Beetham (1994) and Nicolas Guilhot and Philippe Schmitter (2000) also endorse economic development as one factor that augments the chances of democratic consolidation, while it does not have an impact on democratic transition. Economic development, therefore, brings political stability to both autocratic and democratic regimes; one cannot expect improved economic performance alone to catalyze democracy. II.I.II THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ON DEMOCRACY David Beetham (1994) claims that a market economy characterizes one requisite to democracy because both markets and democracy place power into the hands of the individual and spurs the creation of an autonomous civil society. For example, both the voter and the consumer are “assumed to be the best judge of his or her interests, and the success of parties as of firms depends upon the numbers they can attract to their product in conditions of open competition” (Beetham, 1994, 164). Liberalization of the economy allows for free and fair competition to develop in the marketplace and disperses power
28 BOCKELIE
away from the central state. The transition towards a more privatized economy from a nationalized one facilitates the shift away from neopatrimonialism by minimizing dependence upon the state for “resources, information or organizational capacities” (Beetham, 1994, 165). Economic reform that focuses on minimizing the state’s role is extremely important for countries coming out of authoritarian rule. State rents— patronage gained from natural resources—feed corruption and clientelism. In fact, an abundance of natural resources is “one of the most serious obstacles to democratization in Africa” (Wantchekon & Jensen, 2004). State rents diminish elite accountability because the state does not rely upon citizens’ tax revenue for expenditures. This in turn negatively effects consolidation (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006; Diamond, 2004; Wiig and Kolstad, 2011). Benin’s lack of natural resources has allowed it to avoid many of the problems faced by many of its neighbors, such as Nigerian oil and the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Diamonds. Plentiful natural resources can cause a government to invest solely in one particular sector, while doing little to develop the others. Diversification of the economy, thus, marks an important step in the development and modernization of a country. Diversification involves the movement away from an agrarian society towards an industrialized one, which strengthens the urban working class. A correlation exists between the least advanced countries and their level of industrialization. In many cases, agriculture continues to dominate the economy. For instance, in 2012, Benin continued to receive 35.9 percent of GDP from agriculture (CIA, 2013). Economic modernization includes the movement from a traditional economy to a modern commercial economy. A state’s economic structure breaks down into three sectors: agriculture (primary), industry
BOCKELIE 29
(secondary), and services (tertiary). Industry is much more capital-intense than agriculture, especially in countries like Benin that have adopted very few contemporary farming technologies. Some services, such as telecommunications, are also capitalintense (Szirmai, 2005). Thus, diversification encourages economic development by focusing on capital driven sectors. The process of modernization accompanies a structural transformation of the economy: technological advancement transfers the modes of production from the lower income sector, agriculture, to a higher income sector, industry or services. Thus, agriculture takes a secondary role to industry in terms of its share of GDP. Economic advancement to include more industry and services as a part of GDP has an impact on society as a whole. It leads to “rapid urbanization, demographic transitions with declining death rates followed by a later decline in birth rates, epidemiological transitions, changes in income inequality and changing social institutions” (Szirmai, 2005, 261) as well as changes in attitudes and beliefs surrounding social and economic progress. The economic diversification in South Africa has had positive spill over effects, notably in the development of infrastructure to support tourism. Despite the recent debate over the quality of governance, South Africa remains one of the most deeply consolidated democracies on the continent. Expanded economic opportunity from diversification generates a positive assessment of government performance and the expansion of the private sector independent of the state. The development of a more technologically advanced society with a profitable economy renders democracy more stable. Arne Wiig and Ivar Kolstad (2012) expand upon Lipset’s modernization theory connecting economic diversification to democracy. Diversification through an
30 BOCKELIE
“expansion of industrial activities conducive to democracy” (Wiig & Kolstad, 2012, 6), rather than immobile factors controlled by a small elite, will “improve the chances of a viable democracy” (Wiig & Kolstad, 2012, 8). Ross (2001), however, remarks that economic diversification’s positive impact on democracy depends upon the type of economic activity. For example, income from oil undermines democracy by demobilizing the population socially, fiscally, and politically. Increases in education and occupational specialization shift the workforce into secondary and then tertiary sectors. This produces “a more autonomous workforce, accustomed to thinking for themselves on the job and having specialized skills that enhance bargaining power against elites” (Inglehart, 1997, 163 in Ross, 2001). This structural transformation of the economy renders democracy more accountable by reducing the economic power of the state and political elites. II.I.III GNP AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION Dahl (1971) studied 89 countries at various levels of development to determine the impact of GNP on democracy. The 29 countries with the highest level of economic development were all polyarchies, whereas in the group that ranked second highest, only 36 percent were polyarchies. Bellin (2004) established a similar reciprocal relationship between democracy and a productive economy. Specifically, the per capita GNP of a country correlates with its prospects of democratic consolidation. Bellin explains that: Once a country reaches the threshold of per capita GNP of $4,200, democracy has a better than ever chance of surviving. By $6,000, democracy is nearly invulnerable. (Bellin, 2004, 10). Thus, once a democracy has been established, economic development provides stability and guards against political decay. Przeworski et al. (1996) state that democracy becomes more likely to survive in countries with economic growth and moderate inflation. He
BOCKELIE 31
notes that democracy in countries with a rate of inflation between six and 30 percent have a life expectancy of 71 years versus a life expectancy of “44 years when the annual inflation rate is under [six] percent…[and only] an expected life of about 16 years when inflation is above 30 percent” (Przeworski et al., 1996, 42). Huntington (1996) determines thresholds of per-capita GNP for democracy in terms of a “coup-attempt ceiling” ($3000) and a “coup-success ceiling” ($1000). He notes that Sudan, Nigeria, Haiti, Príncipe, São Tomé and Niger all experienced coups with a per capita GNP under $1000. Economic development encourages democratic stability through the birth of a middle class autonomous from the state and the reduction of extreme inequalities. In this regard, the middle class differs from both the poor (who are dependent upon the state for welfare) and the elite (who are dependent upon the state via corruption). A large middle class benefits the political system because it tends to employ conflict resolution techniques to reform the political process, in comparison to the revolutionary poor or the wealthy elite that benefit from a corrupt authoritarian state. The interests of an organized urban working class align with the goals promoted by democracy. In addition, this group of the population is more inclined to class compromise between capital and labor (Beetham, 1994). Economic development encourages an increase in education to keep up with economic and technological advancements. This diminishes inequality, which reduces class polarization (Diamond, 2009). Furthermore,
Inglehart
(1990)
demonstrates
that
long-term
economic
development and success cultivate a political culture in which democracy can flourish. The shift toward valuing self-expression, a post-materialist value, over security, a
32 BOCKELIE
materialist value, follows better economic and living conditions. Diamond (2009) believes non-materialist values have a “strong causal impact” on the emergence of electoral democracy and can foster change toward a liberal democracy because they “generate associations and civic actions that compel rulers to be more honest, accountable, and respectful of the law” (Diamond, 2009, 101). Economic development accompanies changes in the social structure that produce a transformation in political culture within democratic societies. While economic growth impacts political and societal development, Diamond (1992) notes that looking at the per capita income of a country alone does not tell us anything about the distribution of wealth. Income equality represents an integral determinate of democratic stability in relation to economic growth. Democracy increases its life expectancy when it diminishes its income inequality over time (Przeworksi, 1996). Diamond (1992) states that the most important component of economic development is the reduction of absolute poverty and human deprivation. Rather than economic development having the greatest influence on consolidation, “it is the dense cluster of social changes and improvements, broadly distributed among the population that are vaguely summarized in the term ‘socioeconomic development’” (Diamond, 1992, 486). He suggests analyzing indicators of human development, such as the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) or per capita GNP combined with non-monetary indicators, like HDI, to determine quality of a democracy. In a comparison of human development between regime types, democracy has outperformed authoritarian regimes. In contrast, economic development increases stability of a regime regardless of the type of political system. In a democracy, economic development encourages consolidation insofar as it encourages a
BOCKELIE 33
democratic political culture, a dynamic class structure, and increased state-society relations via civil society. Therefore, a state requires improvements in human development in addition to economic progress to achieve democratic consolidation. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION Economic development, as measured by growth in GNP or GDP and the rise in income, does not paint an accurate picture of the economic state of a country. These measurements do not take into account the degree to which the general population benefits from economic development as opposed to the wealth concentrating amongst the economic elite. Many scholars have suggested that in addition to analyzing the economic growth of a country, one must also take into account human development to understand the extent to which the populace as a whole benefits from economic development. This becomes an even more important perspective to take in consideration for deviant democracies like Benin because their baseline of development is already much lower than that of other nations. Furthermore, unlike economic development, Diamond (1992) suggests that socio-economic development benefits only democratic regimes while having no positive effect for the stabalization of authoritarian regimes. First, this section will discuss HDI and PQLI as alternative measures of development that take into account progress at both the local and national level. Second, this section will look at the impact the advancement of education, a component of HDI, has on democratic political culture. II.II.I HDI AND PQLI AS MEASURES OF DEVELOPMENT The United Nations (UN) introduced the HDI in 1990 to offer an alternative method to measure development. Rather than defining a nation’s level of development solely on the rate of economic growth, the HDI takes into account three different aspects
34 BOCKELIE
of human development to offer a more complete picture: living a long and healthy life (life expectancy), knowledge (literacy and primary gross enrolment ratio), and a decent standard of living (GDP and purchasing power parity). This offers a perspective on how economic growth has influenced development at both the national and local level. In a comparison of HDI rankings and regime type, Diamond (1992) found that the 20 most developed countries fall into the two most democratic regime types: (1) liberal democracy and (2) competitive, pluralist, and partially institutionalized. For example, in 2001, African democracies averaged an HDI score of .59, whereas African autocracies averaged an HDI of .40 (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004, table 1.1). In addition, HDI has a “substantially higher correlation (.71) with the combined index of political freedom than does GNP (.51)” alone (Diamond, 1992, 459-460). The PQLI, designed by Morris David Morris (1996), enables researchers to evaluate countries not on a scale of income but by “real life chances” (Morris, 1996). PQLI summarizes infant mortality, life expectancy at age one and basic literacy on an unweighted scale from zero to 100. When taking into account more than just economic development, the disparities between developed and developing countries become more pronounced. For example, some industrialized states rank highly on both an income scale and a PQLI scale (i.e. Nordic countries), whereas other countries rank highly on an income scale but have very low rankings on the PQLI scale (i.e. many OPEC [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries). Although sub-Saharan Africa remains the region with the lowest PQLI score, it has consistently risen since independence. For example, from 1960-1990 the PQLI rose from 21 to 50 (Morris, 1996). Furthermore, a time-lagged study completed by Diamond (1992) shows that PQLI
BOCKELIE 35
provides a more statistically significant measurement of democracy’s stability than does economic development alone. PQLI, like HDI, exhibits powerful positive effects on political freedom. In addition, while per capita GNP has a positive influence on democracy five or ten years later, PQLI manifests a stronger direct effect than per capita GNP on democracy. Diamond explains that “the direct effects of per capita GNP on democracy were always positive but weaker than those of PQLI and were statistically significant only about half the time” (Diamond, 1992, 466). Thus, it appears that economic development contributes to democracy through the mediation of PQLI. Furthermore,
Diamond
(1992)
highlights
the
components
of
socio-economic
development that contribute the most to the deepening of democracy: Physical quality and dignity of people’s lives; access to potable water, safe and sanitary neighborhoods, and basic health care; literacy and advanced education; sufficient income to provide at least minimally adequate food and clothing and shelter for one’s family; sufficient skills to obtain a job that provides income (Diamond, 1992, 486). These indicators emphasize the importance of education and the need for the state to furnish citizens’ basic needs in the development of a stable democracy. Although alone they do not determine consolidation, socio-economic development manifests as one the most important development variables to ensure democracy’s survival. II.II.II EDUCATION AND A CULTURE OF DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION International development institutions have cited education as one of the most influential features of socio-economic development on democracy. In 2000, the UN proposed eight Millennium Development Goals (MDG) to achieve by 2015. The MDGs seek to alleviate extreme poverty and human deprivations that hinder the ability for
36 BOCKELIE
individuals to live a prosperous and healthy life. The second MDG requires universal primary education for all because: Education creates choices and opportunities for people, reduces the twin burdens of poverty and diseases, and gives a stronger voice in society. For nations it creates a dynamic workforce and well-informed citizens able to compete and cooperate globally – opening doors to economic and social prosperity. (United Nations General Assembly, 2010, 2) Furthermore, democratic education encourages the creation of a political culture that supports democratic norms and values. Clive Harber (1997) found that a strong education system encourages a well-functioning democracy. Cutright (1963) similarly found a correlation (.74) between education and democracy. Democracy inherently includes the participation of the population in electing leaders, making policy decisions through referendum, serving on a jury, etc. In order for citizens to make informed decisions on who to elect or the impact of a policy, they must have an education that promotes the analytical and technical skills a participatory democracy requires. In a democracy, all citizens participate in politics by voting for leaders and referendums. An illiterate population will not be able to make as informed of decisions about its political future as a population with access to education and alphabetization programs. This calls for free primary education open and attainable by all citizens, regardless of social class, ethnicity, religion, or sex (Harber, 1997). Assuring quality education to all citizens helps fulfill democracy’s goal of establishing equality of opportunity between citizens. Democratically oriented education teaches students how to think critically about their social and political reality and emphasizes the importance of participation in their political system. In civic education courses students learn to recognize their civil and political liberties, producing citizens with a democratic orientation and political values
BOCKELIE 37
that admire transparency, constitutionality, representation, elections, accountability, and political participation (Gauchet, 2002). Harber (1997) argues that an education system must teach these norms because they are not genetically known. In much of Africa, they are not historically known either. As Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) state, democracy “is not possible without democrats… [this requires] political learning, under which citizens change their attitudes about political institutions based on their own political experiences” (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, 235). A democratic education system instills democratic norms and attitudes in its students by cultivating knowledge within students on how to participate in a political society. Education of this nature produces a widely adopted political culture. To support the end goal of creating a democratic political culture, Harber (1997) suggests that education ought to be for democracy and not just about democracy. This means that students do not learn one specific viewpoint (i.e. that democracy is good and they should support it). Instead, teachers encourage students to make up their own mind after consideration and discussion of relevant information on how different political systems function and perform. Furthermore, a democratically oriented classroom means that teachers endorse an environment of student participation and class discussion. Harber (1997) believes that skills taught through active learning will encourage democracy, which encompasses "learning by discovery, problem-solving, questioning and thinking skills, the development of initiative, confidence and resourcefulness, ability to collect and analyze data, etc" (Harber, 1997, 59). These active skills in education will produce citizens that can think critically about the world around them and their own political and social reality. Promoting democratic education has been especially helpful in democratic
38 BOCKELIE
consolidation post-apartheid South Africa. Harber (1998) notes that when schools desegregated they democratized their management structure “to teach democratic values through experience and in particular to foster a climate of mutual respect among students so as to decrease racial distrust” (Harber, 1998, 569). Trust and reciprocity are the foundations of interpersonal trust that enable the growth of a democratic political culture. Inglehart (1990) accentuates the importance of creating a “civic culture” based on interpersonal trust, life satisfaction and political moderation, which citizens learn through education. A democratic education of this nature produces a civil culture that brings about high political efficacy (Almond and Verba, 1963). Citizens must believe in democracy for it to consolidate; they must believe that their participation will make a difference (Diamond, 2009). South Africa’s civic education program, which teaches students civic competence, adherence to democratic values, and how to get involved in the political process has translated “directly into increased involvement in the political system” (Finkel, 2003, 140). Inkles (1974) notes the positive influence of education upon democracy, stating that it produces a modern citizen with bureaucratic attitudes. Lipset (1959) highlights the importance of education for democracy and political culture because individuals become more tolerant of opposition and minorities, qualities found in democratic societies. In addition to respect for minority rights, Inkles (1969) adds that education, along with mass media exposure, leads to active citizenship and democratic orientations. Furthermore, with an increase in education, citizens become better informed and are more likely to follow politics and develop into politically active members of society (Almond & Verba, 1963).
BOCKELIE 39
The advancement of human development through socio-economic reforms represents a major step forward in the process of democratic consolidation, especially in the case of deviant democracies. A state that establishes a well functioning and adequately resourced education system will increase its social capital to produce a new generation of informed citizens that have the ability to think critically about their political and social environment and hold their government accountable for its actions. The prioritization of the autonomous individual in democratic education engenders a society that celebrates and seeks to protect the basic rights and liberties of the individual. The respect of these basic human rights is an integral component of deepening and stabilizing democracy. An all-inclusive democratically oriented scholastic program. This deepens democratic processes as more ordinary citizens take part in political society in addition to the political elite. Moreover, the advancement in human development and quality of life makes a significant impact on the daily lives of citizens in deviant democracies. At comparatively low levels of human development, these reforms allow citizens to focus less on basic material needs and physical security. When the state has the ability to furnish the populace’s basic needs and services, such as access to clean water, medical centers, and quality education, citizens can focus more on post-material values, such as the advancement of political and civil liberties and opportunities for personal and economic advancement. CONSTRAINING THE EXECUTIVE THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN While economic development and socio-economic improvement leads to a more stable democracy and fosters a democratic political culture, an integral aspect of whether
40 BOCKELIE
or not a democracy will survive depends upon its institutional design. Without proper institutions, even in a society supportive of democracy, a country would find it difficult to consolidate democracy. Successful consolidation requires a multi-directional approach. Political institutions that restrain the government, specifically the executive branch, and encourage vertical and horizontal accountability to minimize the opportunities and the likelihood of corruption are key for democratic consolidation. In any given political system, “institutions are mechanisms for distributing power and authority, and they are potential resources as well as dangers for given actors. They also constitute the rules that key players must live by, manipulate, or subvert” (Villalón & VonDoepp, 2005, 25). Without effective checks and balances, the executive power will dominate the entire bureaucracy. The trend of monopolistic power and abuse of the executive position has marked African politics. This has ultimately resulted in a “Big Man” paradigm where unchallengeable leaders gain legitimacy through a Weberian charismatic model—one based on the character of an individual leader (Bratton, 2007; Mohiddin, 2008; Posner & Young, 2007). This section will discuss two key institutions that impact the prospects of democracy through their ability to constrain the executive and ensure accountability and transparency in government: the constitutional court, and the EMB. II.III.I EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT Consolidated democracy requires vertical, horizontal, and external accountability. The judicial system plays an integral role in providing horizontal accountability and checking the power of the executive. Diamond (2004) explains that to provide effective horizontal accountability the judicial system must have “significant capacity and independence if it is to be effective in controlling corruption” (Diamond, 2004, 242). This
BOCKELIE 41
requires competent and professionally trained actors that receive competitive salaries to discourage corruption. This necessitates certain institutional arrangements, such as a constitutional court. To effectively restrain the executive, the constitutional court needs an autonomous design that allows it to exert an influence over the political system. It requires the authority to review and determine the constitutionality of laws, regulations, and government actions. In Benin, this includes enforcing the human rights provisions of the state’s constitution, which in most African states includes upholding the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The constitutional court is charged with challenging political elites when conflict arises among government institutions and when government infringes upon individual rights. A constitutional court requires a strong institutional design to effectively restrain the political power of other branches of government and combat corruption. In Benin, the Constitutional Court has been instrumental in ensuring executives respect the constitutionally set two-term limit. For example, in 2005 the Court issued two decisions that declared that economic arguments do not suffice as justification to amend the Constitution or to extend presidential term limits (DCC 05-145; DCC-05-145). The ability of the constitutional court to check the executive depends on capacity, not just in the extent of its authority but also resources, both human and monetary. First, this entails autonomy from the executive branch, which means that the executive should not pick the majority of the Court’s members. Limits on judicial independence plague Africa, where the executive often determines the “appointment of senior judges, magistrates, judicial officials, and ranking civil servants…their remuneration, promotion and working conditions, as well as their budget” (Mohiddin, 2008, 8). Rather than the
42 BOCKELIE
executive branch determining the make-up of the constitutional court, either the legislature or civil society should nominate and affirm those who sit on the Court. Second, non-renewable terms allows for impartial decision making. Members will not feel pressured to rule in favor of one party over another to increase their likelihood of reelection, nor will they be preoccupied with running a reelection campaign. This allows the Court to avoid falling into the “executive-minded” trap in which members seek to appease the wishes of executive in its verdicts (Mohiddin, 2008). Furthermore, “poor remuneration and working conditions have seriously undermined the professional moral and ethical integrity of senior judges and magistrates” (Mohiddin, 2008, 6). This has diluted the capacity of many African judiciary systems. The lack of professionalization of senior judges leads some to succumb to corruption to earn an adequate salary or fill the budgetary gaps. This undermines the integrity of the political system as a whole. II.III.II TRANSPARENCY THROUGH ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES Throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s, Sub-Saharan Africa averaged 28 elections per decade; following the wave of democratization in the 1990s, this number grew to 65 elections (Posner & Young, 2007). The proliferation in number and increased competitiveness of elections in African democracies demonstrates that elections have increasingly begun to matter in Africa. The majority of incumbents now leave power through institutionalized means (such as voluntary resignation, constitutionally defined term limits, or losing an election) rather than a coup d’état, assassination or other violent means. In 2005, only 19 percent of African leaders left power through irregular means (Posner & Young, 2007). Well-designed EMBs guarantee free and fair elections, which
BOCKELIE 43
eliminate corruption at the electoral level and provide horizontal accountability and thus democratic deepening. Similar to the constitutional court, EMBs require an autonomous design to prevent manipulation of the electoral process and its results. To ensure free and fair elections EMBs take part in each step of the electoral process. They require the authority to investigate, penalize and expose any irregularities that occur. EMBs are responsible for preparing, organizing, operating, and overseeing polls and collecting results (Fall, Hounkpe, & Jinadu, 2011). Overseeing these tasks provide an essential aspect of assuring procedural legitimacy and accountability. Shaheen Mozaffar (2002) views EMBs as the “linchpin of effective electoral governance” (Mozaffar, 2002, 91). EMBs can be considered autonomous to the extent that the institution possesses complete authority over the organization and the carrying out of all elections (Mozaffar, 2002). Both Ghana and South Africa have institutionalized autonomous electoral commissions with adequate authority and responsibility. A report by Africa Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project (AfriMAP) on EMBs in West Africa cites Ghana’s Electoral Commission (EC) as “one of the best equipped EMBs in West Africa” (Hounkpé, 2011) due to its independence. The chair of the EC and the two deputies remain on the commission until retirement as long as they fulfill their legal duties. Plus, the tenure of commission members does not depend upon executive support to retain power, which assures political insulation. As an autonomous institution, EMBs do not act in accordance with the instructions given by any other institutional body when fulfilling its responsibilities. They require full independence from other governmental institutions to efficiently plan and
44 BOCKELIE
conduct an election. Autonomy also necessitates political insulation of members from government influence. This suggests the need for the professionalization of EMBs as opposed to the politicization of electoral management. In the political model, an independent EMB carries out electoral tasks but it is fully or partly composed of political party representatives. EMBs of this nature “are adversely affected by the clear political loyalties of their members” (Hounkpé, 2011, 5). The expert or professionalized model, on the other hand, selects members based off of merit. Reason for designation should include: their personal qualities, professional experience, and integrity. Ghana’s EC is a professionalized EMB. Ghana established a precedent of appointing people with recognized expertise, “solid experience, and recognized professional and ethical qualifications” (Fall et al., 2011, 89). In addition, appointments to EMBs should come from multiple sectors of society: those involved in politics and those in civil society. In addition, Diamond (2004) notes that “if a country cannot get high quality, professionals in these positions, all is lost from the start” (Diamond, 2004, 246). Furthermore, members of EMBs ought to enjoy tenure similar to senior judges; if a member’s job security (or perceived job security) is dependent upon a particular candidate winning, the autonomy and effectiveness of the EMB becomes compromised. The permanence of the EMB also impacts its effectiveness. Permanent-standing EMBs can develop technical expertise and have the opportunity to capitalize on previous experiences. In addition, EMBs require adequate resources. Without proper funding, EMBs cannot complete their tasks correctly or efficiently; moreover, they become more likely to surrender to bribery and corruption to perform their assigned tasks.
BOCKELIE 45
The electoral design of a political system can either ameliorate or hinder the chances of democracy’s survival. Villalón & Idrissa (2005) note francophone Africa’s tendency to design electoral systems that maximize group representation In the interest of assuring wide representation to parties and to minorities, and in a context of initial democratization and the attendant proliferation of a multitude of parties and social groups seeking to make their voices heard. (Villalón & Idrissa, 2005, 34) The proliferation of political parties under this type of electoral system can lead to a highly fragmented legislature. Electoral systems that seek to mitigate the harmful affects of ethnic fractionalization will produce a more productive democracy. The minimization of ethno-regional conflict in the political system allows politics to remain political, rather than the political system becoming a tool one ethnic or regional group can use to exert power over other groups. II.III.III MITIGATING CLEAVAGES THROUGH ELECTORAL DESIGN In societies with a high prevalence of ethnic fractionalizations, institutional design that takes into account minority participation within the government can mitigate the likelihood of ethnic-based conflict (Basedau, 2011).
Multiethnic, multicultural and
multinational societies call for “state policies that grant inclusive and equal citizenship and give all citizens a common ’roof’ of state-mandated and state-enforced individual rights” (Linz & Stepan, 1997, 26). Decentralization and proportional representation are two ways in which institutional design can mitigate conflict, both of which have been utilized by Benin to overcome the historic tripartite ethno-regional cleavage. Decentralization increases the contact between the government and its constituents, “increasing opportunities to participate in government, and giving groups control over their political, social, and economic affairs” (Brancati, 2006, 651-652). The same study
46 BOCKELIE
by Brancati (2006) shows that decentralization decreases ethnic conflict and secessionism. Proportional representation increases inclusiveness by ensuring adequate representation to avoid the marginalization of minority groups (Schneider & Wisehomeier, 2008; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Boix, 1999). The political inclusiveness of these two methods increases the prospects of consolidating a democracy and diminishes the likelihood of civil war. Democratic consolidation requires that all citizens experience “the whole ensemble of rights, democratic and liberal” (O’Donnell, 1997) for full political and civil citizenship beyond simply the political right to vote in national elections. Therefore, in societies with many cleavages, democratic consolidation requires a political design that allows for equal opportunities of political participation of both majority and minority groups. Gerald Schneider and Nina Wisehomeier (2008) argue that “political institutions mitigate the conflict potential of diverse societies and that inclusive rules, which enable strong groups to participate in power, alleviate social tensions” (Schneider & Wiesehomeier, 2008, 184). They build upon the works of other “constitutional engineers” to propose solutions that avoid violent civil wars and secessionist movements. Establishing a multiparty system permits more plurality in the political sphere; creating an inclusive political system will allow all major groups to participate (Reynal-Querol, 2002), which can alleviate social tensions; designing a proportional electoral system minimizes intrastate conflict because it ensures no group feels permanently locked out of the political system; and decentralization of policy making allows for more vertical accountability within the government (Brancati, 2006; Cohen, 1997; and Saideman et al 2002). Strong political institutions paired with a strong political society are crucial for the
BOCKELIE 47
democratic process. Political parties allow for representation and legitimatize the political system as a whole. Cohesive parties that crosscut fragmentized portions of the population will help to avoid polarization (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). Institutional design that takes into account the need for minority representation strengthens the whole political system and guards against conflict and secessionist movements. The design of political institutions has a profound impact on democratic survival and quality. Strong institutional design requires autonomous institutions that restrain the power of the executive, demand accountability, and provide transparency. While constitutional designs do not automatically dictate whether a state will achieve consolidation, some versions protect against democratic decay more readily than others. Institutions of this type are especially important for states with a history of of authoritarian rule. CHAPTER TWO SUMMARY While a country can undergo a democratic transition at any level of development, the literature suggests that socio-economic and political development protect against democratic decay following the transition period. For deviant democracies, which transitioned at exceptionally low levels of economic development, democratic survival requires a concerted effort by instituting policies that promote socio-economic advancement and establishing autonomous institutions. States with a history of authoritarian or military regimes must put forth policies that foster a democratic political culture, ensure positive regime performance, and limit the power of the executive office to avoid democratic breakdown. Democratic consolidation is a long and arduous process;
48 BOCKELIE
it requires policies that develop all aspects of society. Political development is a dynamic and continuous process of democratic deepening. Many factors drive consolidation as well as offer possible roadblocks on the way to democratic survival. Once a democracy has been established, continuous political and socio-economic development enables a democracy to become “the only game in town.” Citizens adopt democracy as the best regime in general and for their country in particular and the political elite embraces democratic methods. The increased horizontal and vertical accountability contributes to democratic deepening and institutionalization. Two influential factors appear to determine the prospects for democratic consolidation: improvement in socioeconomic conditions through human development as measured by HDI and constraining executive power through institutional design. The combination of these two factors has bred a successful democracy in Benin. Benin designed independent institutions with the ability to constrain presidential power; the Constitutional Court and CENA have demonstrated adequate autonomy and the ability to enforce good governance. Following the transition, Benin’s newly elected government put in place policies to promote human development, which inspired a positive perception of the democratic government’s performance and bred a democratic political culture. In addition, Benin has successfully managed ethnic and religious differences within the country and the political elite have abided by the rule of law and encouraged democratic progress. The remainder of this paper will provide further analysis of how these drivers have manifested in Benin. The second part will present the political history of Benin to provide historical context. The third part will present an analysis of policies and programs
BOCKELIE 49
that have encouraged consolidation of electoral democracy in Benin. Part three will also discuss what reforms are necessary to deepen democracy, completing the transition to liberal democracy.
50 BOCKELIE
Part Two: History
BOCKELIE 51
Chapter Three: Political History of Benin Chapter three will present the recent history of Benin to place the country in historical context. The first section will discuss the political instability and economic turmoil that Benin faced beginning with decolonization up through Kérékou’s 16-year dictatorship. The second section will expound upon the consolidation of electoral democracy in Benin beginning with the citizen’s coup d’état, the National Conference, ending with the latest presidential election in 2011. POST-DECOLONIZATION POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TURMOIL France granted independence to Dahomey4 August 1, 1960 along with the other colonies of the AOF. Political turmoil defined the immediate post-colonial period in Dahomey. The country experienced six coups d’état and drafted five different constitutions between 1958 and 1972 before Kérékou established a dictatorship. While the dictatorship stabilized the political system, the country continued to experience economic hardship, which eventually led to democratization in 1990. III.I.I COUPS D’ÉTAT OF DAHOMEY Following independence from France, Benin made its first attempt at democratization. In an effort to eliminate the tripartite ethno-regionalism that had plagued Dahomey under the colonial administration, a new constitution established a one-party 4
th
Dahomey was founded in the 17 century, the name of the country changed to the People’s Republic of Benin under Kérékou in 1974. The National Conference modified the name of the country to the Republic of Benin in 1990. For a political history of the colonization of Dahomey and life under French rule, refer to Appendix C.
52 BOCKELIE
system. Hubert Maga from the North was elected President on December 11, 1960 with 70 percent of the vote (Médénouvo, 2011, 93). Maga sought to solidify Dahomey’s independence by replacing the existing uneven power relationships between Dahomey and the former colonial powers with diplomatic representation. Thus, Maga required the former colonial powers to modify their forts into embassies. All of the countries complied except Portugal, which burned its fort and left Ouidah after having a presence for over three centuries. Political stability, however, was short-lived; within three years, social and political upheaval and strikes organized by government employees led to Dahomey’s first coup d’état. Army Colonel Christopher Soglo took power in October 1963 after strikes and protests (La République Française, 2008) and swiftly passed a new Constitution. In January 1964, however, power switched to President Sourou Migan Apithy, who remained in power nearly two years until he decommissioned in November 1965, passing the presidency to Taïou Congakou in December 1965 (Médénouvo, 2011). Congakou remained in power less than a month before Christopher Soglo organized a coup d’état to reclaim power. Christopher Soglo’s second reign was short-lived as Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Kouandété overthrew him with yet another coup d’état in December 1967 (Médénouvo, 2011). Kouandété installed a military regime with Lieutenant Colonel Alley as Head of State. Alley led the country until June 1968, when popular pressure from the Comité militaire révolutionnaire (CMR—Revolutionary Military Committee) of young soldiers led to the governments collapse. The CMR invested power in Dr. Émile Derlin Zinsou, installig him as President of the Republic in July 1968. The following year, December
BOCKELIE 53
1969, Kouandété, like Soglo before him, took back power with another coup d’état. He retained power for only two days before the next coup d’état, led by Paul Émile de Souza. Souza managed to remain in power until May 1970. In May 1970, Dahomey appointed a Presidential Counsel, consisting of “three of the country’s ethnic leaders [whom] had agreed to take turns at the helm after the country had nearly disintegrated into civil war in 1970” (Decalo, 1997, 46), Sourou Migan Apithy, Hubert Maga, and Justin Ahomadégbe were each intended to lead for two years in a rotating presidency. Maga served the first rotation of two years from 1970 to 1972. In May 1972, the power rotated to Ahomadébgé who ruled for only five months before Mathieu Kérékou led the final coup d’état supported by a group of young militaries. The Revolutionary Military Government, installed by Kérékou in 1972, ended political instability in Benin. To solidify his position as Head of State, Kérékou imprisoned the 1970 Presidential Counsel until 1981. Kérékou launched a new era of policies and programs that sought to break all neo-colonial ties with France. Thus, in November 1974, the country officially changed its name to the Popular Republic of Benin and adopted “scientific socialism,” making Marxist-Leninism the official ideology of the state. (La République Française, 2008). Under these policies, state owned enterprises proliferated. Kérékou nationalized the economy and job creation to subdue labor and student unions and used the threat of neocolonialism to address ethnic conflict (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997). The regime began to radicalize in 1975 to follow in the lead of the Chinese example. For instance, Kérékou exiled three political leaders to France including former President Zinsou and had “the Interior Minister of the Revolutionary Military
54 BOCKELIE
Government, Capitan Michel Aïkpé … executed for unclear circumstances” (La République Française, 2008, 2). In August 1977, Kérékou gave his dictatorship a face-lift by passing a new constitution that would allow for legislative elections and the formation of a “Revolutionary National Assembly” in 1979. The Assembly outwardly supported Kérékou and reelected him as President of the Republic in 1980, 1984 and 1989. Under Kérékou’s Marxist-Leninist plan, however, the economic situation in Benin began to degenerate. The Nigerian recession exacerbated the financial difficulties the state faced. By 1989, the state was more than a year behind on salaries of its government employees. The state enterprises built under Kérékou never saw profits and often produced goods more expensive than European imports (Decalo, 1997). For example, the Savé Sugar Society, which cost 69 million U.S. dollars to start, only “operated at 7 percent of capacity… [a level] inadequate to cover [its] operating costs, let alone [its] capital costs” (Decalo, 1997, 49). Student and labor syndicates began to strike and demonstrate against the government. With a failing economy and unprecedented social unrest, Kérékou was obliged to dismantle his one-party regime and to call for a nation-wide discussion about the economic fate of Benin. III.I.II LA CONFÉRENCE DES FORCES VIVES DE LA NATION: A REVOLUTIONARY STEP TOWARDS INSTRUMENTAL CHANGE
Benin’s transition to a lasting democracy finds its roots in this troubled political history. Each previous attempt at democracy ended with a military coup d’état, a dictatorship that limited civil and political liberties of citizens, and a failing economy. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the wind of Eastern economic and political liberalization blew across western Africa. In 1990, Kérékou called a National Conference
BOCKELIE 55
to discuss how to fix the economy, which evolved into an unprecedented mode of democratic transition. On February 19, 1990 Benin began its National Conference under the direction of Mgr Isidore de Souza, archbishop of Cotonou. The Conference called together 488 delegates from all areas of society: student and labor syndicates, civil society organizations and associations, and political parties (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997). The quotas for the National Conference delegates gave 106 seats to ‘political tendencies’: 86 to peasants and artisans representing districts; 70 to development associations; 39 to unions; 31 to ‘personalities’; 30 to state institutions (National Assembly, etc.); 22 diplomats; 13 to professional associations; 12 to the National University of Benin; 11 to the Beninese Diaspora; 8 to economic actors…six to women’s organizations; and four to NGOs [non-governmental organization]. (Gisselquist, 2008, 796) The Diaspora seats allowed those who had lived in political exile to return to Benin and voice their opinion on the creation of the new political system. The Conference was held in Cotonou, taking place February 19 to 28, 1990. Gustave Assah, contributes part of Benin’s success as an electoral democracy to the National Conference, which: Established a certain number of norms that must accompany the regulation of power and the management of the state—the Constitutional Court, the Supreme court, the Institution of Human Rights that were all installed—the freedom of expression, the freedom of press, and above all the freedom and authorization of political mobilization. (Assah, personal communication, 2013) The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa also views the National Conference as an institution that played an integral part in Benin’s democratic transition and orderly exchange of power. The Conference voted for market reforms, the liberalization of political system, and to repeal Kérékou’s 1977 Constitution. The delegates of the National Conference declared themselves a sovereign body and set out to reform Benin’s political and economic system. The Conference allowed
56 BOCKELIE
Kérékou to keep his title as President during the transition process but stripped him of all political power. The delegates then elected Nicéphore Dieudonné Soglo as the transition Prime Minister and created the Haut Conseil pour la République (HCR), which would later become the Constitutional Court. The Conference’s primary objectives were the liberalization of the economy and political system, including the installation of democracy and l’État de droit or Rechtssaat (the phenomenon of the submission of all people, rights, and duties to the law). The Conference drafted a new Constitution and organized founding elections. On December 10, 1990, the Beninese population passed the new Constitution through a referendum by a vote of 93.2 percent. The Constitution of 1990 establishes the Republic of Benin as a Presidential Republic with a separation of the three branches of power: executive, legislative, and judiciary. The President serves a five-year term, renewable one time. The delegates attached an additional clause to block the triumvirate of the Presidential Counsel from reclaiming power: no one over 70 years of age can run for President. The Conference adopted the French two-round majority electoral system. After electors have cast their vote in the first round, the two candidates with the largest percentage of votes move on to the second round if no candidate has won an absolute majority of the vote; the candidate with the largest percentage of votes in the second round is elected. The National Assembly has a term of four years. The electoral system sought to address Benin’s history of ethno-regional cleavages more effectively than the attempt following decolonization. Thus, the Constitution established multi-member districts based on elected on highly proportional representation that “would not guarantee the absolute power to the elected but rather limit [a] rivals’ ability to monopolize the regime... [and]
BOCKELIE 57
makes it extremely difficult for a president to assert ethno-regional political domination” (Magnusson & Clark, 2005, 559-560). The installation of a multiparty system has permitted political parties to flourish in Benin. Bruce A. Magnusson & John F. Clark (2005) note that the National Assembly often has nearly 50 political parties represented, which encourages fluid coalitions. For example, in 1995, the turnover rate was 75 percent (Magnusson & Clark, 2005). In addition, incumbents often lose, which opens the political system to new representatives with fresh ideas and new approaches to solve problems. This eliminates the historical problem or politics being dominated by small ruling elite that continuously seized power. In addition to the erosion of the political and economic system during Kérékou’s reign, the education system also foundered. In 1990, only 53 percent of children were enrolled in primary school and only 27.2 percent of adults (15 years and older) were literate (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2012). In October 1990, a National Conference on education, États généraux de l’éducation, sought to reform the Benin’s education system to allow women and men to attain an equal education to promote the development of the country. In January 1991, the initiative for Education for All was passed which aimed to improve the quality of education and open it to all children without distinction. The Conference scheduled founding elections for March 1991, three months after the passage of the new Constitution. In the first free and fair legislative elections in February 1991, 22 political parties were elected to 64 seats in the National Assembly. March 24, 1991, Nicéphore Soglo of La Renaissance du Bénin (RB- Renaissance of Benin) was elected President by 63 percent of the vote in the second round against Kérékou. With a coalition of four political parties, Soglo was able to form a majority in
58 BOCKELIE
the Assembly. While the elections were a success, Kérékou refused to step down from power for fear of judicial repercussions. April 1991, the HCR offered immunity to Kérékou for all acts committed between October 26, 1972 and April 1, 1991, allowing a peaceful transition to democracy. DEMOCRACY IN THE REPUBLIC OF BENIN The National Conference paved the way for democratic consolidation in Benin. The delegates designed institutions that would protect against democratic decay and defined objectives for the newly democratic regime, such as a renewed emphasis on education. Having successfully completed the transition to democracy, Benin has focused on ensuring the democratic process continues, which places an emphasis on standardizing free and fair elections. By consistently holding free and fair elections, Benin has established itself as a consolidated electoral democracy. Nonetheless, the rate of progress that Benin experienced in the first ten years of democratic rule appears to have plateau-ed since the turn of the century. III.II.I CONSOLIDATING ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN BENIN: THE FIRST TEN YEARS Soglo’s Presidency (1991-1996) began the long road to economic recovery, which was viewed as essential if Benin would have any chance of consolidating its new democracy. Economic collapse led to the breakdown of Kérékou’s and could easily have had the same effect on democracy. Therefore, while Benin still economically suffered, notably from the devaluation of the CFA franc by 50 percent in 1994 (La République Française, 2008), Benin experienced a modest economic growth rate and reduced the deficit from “22.5 percent to 7 percent of gross domestic product” (Decalo, 1997, 57) during Soglo’s first term. Despite the steps towards economic improvement, some groups
BOCKELIE 59
of the population initially felt disenchanted with democracy. Students and labor unions continued to hold protests and demonstrations over the slow nature of economic progress. Soglo met resistance when he attempted to privatize the national industries; the labor unions knew that privatization would mean scaling back the number of employees. Soglo, however, resisted “societal and parliamentary pressures to moderate the harsh economic policies of fiscal stringency needed to stabilize Benin” (Decalo, 1997, 59). Experiencing conflict over the budget, in 1994, Soglo attempted to use an executive decree to pass his budget, which complied with IMF austerity pledges. The Constitutional Court intervened, establishing itself as an influential and fundamental institution that would require the executive to adhere to the rule of law. The Court threw out Soglo’s budget, stating that it was unconstitutionally implemented. Until 1994, the Minister of the Interior organized and ran the elections in Benin. According to Clotaire Olihidé, however, “there were a lot of suspicions that the elections were neither free and fair, nor transparent. So, the political elite designed an administrative structure that would exist independently of the government to organize elections” (Olihidé, personal communication, 2013). The Parliament voted for Law No. 94-013 of January 17, 1995, establishing the CENA, which prepares, organizes, operates and oversees polls, and collates results of the election. The CENA does not, however, have the authority to announce the results of legislative and presidential elections (Fall et al., 2011). The Constitutional Court receives the collated results from the CENA “to check their validity, hear challenge, and announce final results” (Fall et al., 2011, 25). Though there is a permanent administrative secretary (SAP- Secrétariat Administrative Permanant), the CENA is formed and then disbanded before and after
60 BOCKELIE
each election. In addition, the founding law has been amended for nearly every election, thus the designation and the number of CENA members has changed with each election. For example in 1995 and 1996 there were 17 members, seven nominated by the government, seven by the National Assembly, one by the judiciary, and two by the Commission béninoise des droits de l’homme (CBDH- Benin Human Rights Commission) (Fall et al., 2011). For the 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2006 elections, the number of members went up to 25 with 15 of the members nominated by the National Assembly and three by the government (Fall et al., 2011). In 2007, it returned to 17 members and in the 2011 presidential election, the numbers dropped to 11 with nine nominated by the National Assembly, one by the President, and one by “civil society organizations (CSO) with at least five years of experience in the field of governance and democracy” (Fall et al., 2011, 22). The legislative elections of 1995 showed that democracy had not yet eliminated the ethno-regional division that has existed throughout Benin’s history. The RB attained 21 of the 83 seats in the assembly; the Parti de renouveau démocratique (PRD), the party of third place candidate of the 1991 Presidential election, Adrien Houngbedji, won 19 seats. Both of these parties draw their support from southern regions of Benin. The Le Front d'action pour le renouveau démocratique (FARD-ALAFIA—Front of action for democratic renewal) attained 10 seats and was strongly favored in the Northern regions of the country. Economic criticisms of Soglo’s first term led him to defeat in the 1996 presidential election. While Soglo beat Kérékou in the first round of the election, Houngbedji, who came in third, gave his support to Kérékou, allowing Kérékou to beat
BOCKELIE 61
the incumbent in the second round, 52.49 percent to 47.51 percent and reclaim his title as President (La République Française, 2008). To show his appreciation for Houngbedji’s support, Kérékou named him Prime Minister (though he had no effective power). The legislative elections of 1999 demonstrated the strong support of Kérékou’s presidency. The Mouvance présidentielle, the pro-government faction, won 41 seats in the National Assembly. The opposition won 38, only 28 of which were for the RB, Soglo’s party (Médénouvo, 2011). A party from the North, Alliance Étoile (Star Alliance), won only four seats. Despite the clear support Kérékou maintained during his term, he too experienced social unrest. In 2000, protestors demonstrated against the high cost of living due to the increases in petrol prices; in response, the government allowed for more social welfare to disadvantaged segments of society (La République Française, 2008). During the first decade of democracy, Benin experienced an alteration of power through free and fair elections. The Constitutional Court and CENA solidified their role as important political institutions for the continuation of democracy. The Constitutional Court successfully exerted its power over the executive to ensure leaders abided by the Constitution. The CENA organized and executed three successful elections (1995, 1996, 1999) that the international community ruled as free and fair (Olihidé, personal communication, 2013). The government also began to improve access and quality of education through the 1990 initiative for Education for All and the 1996 agreements to improve education of girls in francophone Africa. By 2000, the adult literacy rate rose to 34.7 percent from 27.2 percent in 1990. In addition, female primary gross enrollment rose to 68.8 percent in 2000 from 35.4 percent in 1990.
62 BOCKELIE
III.II.II. DEMOCRATIC STAGNATION OF THE LAST DECADE While Benin demonstrated significant progress in the process of democratic consolidation during the first ten years, political development began to plateau at the turn of the century. The 2001 Presidential election, however, marks the point at which the public begins to critique the quality of Beninese democracy. Leading up to the 2001 election, nearly two-thirds of the members of the CENA decommissioned due to political tensions. Since members of the National Assembly (who have strong ties to political parties) make appointments to the CENA, a significant portion of CENA members belongs to few political camps. This has led to an increased politicization of the CENA. In 2001, “the political interests became very strong, therefore certain members of the CENA had the impression that the other members were corrupted by their parties political interests; thus, they decommissioned” (Olihidé, personal communication, 2013). The National Assembly swiftly replaced the decommissioned CENA members and the new CENA continued to organize the elections. As an additional stress to the quality of the political system, the 2001 presidential election turned into an amicable match rather than an electoral competition. The first round of the election placed Kérékou in the lead with 45.42 percent of the vote; Soglo was the runner up with 27.12 percent of the vote. Soglo, however, contested the election, claiming electoral fraud and rigging. He and the third place candidate, Houngbedji, both withdrew from the election, leaving Kérékou to face his Minister of State for Planning and Prospective Development, Bruno Amoussou, who had arrived in fourth in the first round. Amoussou appealed to the population, asking the electorate to vote for Kérékou, leading him to win reelection with 83.64 percent of the vote (Médénouvo, 2011). In the
BOCKELIE 63
2003 legislative elections, the Mouvance won a strong majority with 53 seats, whereas the RB won fewer seats than ever before with only 15. The PRD won 11 seats, and the Alliance Étoile won the remaining three seats. Benin held its first municipal elections in 2002 after beginning the process of decentralization in 1998. Decentralization divided Benin into 12 départements (managed by a national representative), made up of 77 communes (managed by directly elected local representatives) with 546 districts each (Rota- Graziosi, Caldeira, & Foucault, 2010). In a decentralized state, individuals have the opportunity to “elect deputies, the head of state, and also representatives at the local level; individuals can base their right to vote at the national level, for a representative of parliament, or for those who are sent to local counsels…it gives the people more control over who represents their interests” (Assah, personal communication, 2013). In the first municipal elections of 2002, Soglo became the Mayor of Cotonou and Houngbedji was elected Mayor of Porto Novo. Kérékou placed more importance on socio-economic development during his second term. Following the 2001 election, the Minister of Finances and the Economy organized a national forum on acceleration of economic growth; the World Bank and IMF released reports in July and August 2001, which concluded that Benin has a “healthy economic and financial situation” (La République Française, 2008, 7). In 2002, Kérékou established and presided over the National Committee for the Fight Against AIDS and STDs. In 2003, Kérékou passed a law to ban the practice of female genital mutilation. Women’s rights advanced further in 2004 with the passage of a new family code that “improved women’s inheritance, property, and marriage rights, and prohibited forced marriage and polygamy” (Freedom House, 2010).
64 BOCKELIE
In addition to promoting socio-economic advancement, Kérékou showed initiative for democratic deepening and consolidation by abiding by the rule of law. In 2005, Kérékou announced that he would not attempt to change the constitution to permit him to run for a third term in 2006. The age-clause barred Soglo from running for reelection again. Although this provided Benin with an opportunity to bring in new leadership and ideas and to engage the population in real political discourse on the future of Beninese democracy, technical and financial problems hindered the ability for the political system to advance. The CENA faced difficulties with the organization of the 2006 Presidential election. Some groups believed the presidential elections ought to be put off until the 2008 legislative elections to minimize the cost of elections. Opponents saw this proposition as a threat to the democratic process. Despite the contentions and tensions within the political system, actors maintained a peaceful dialogue, a center-point of Beninese culture, and the elections were held as planned in 2006. Boni Yayi, former President of the West African Development Bank, won the first round of the 2006 presidential election with 35.64 percent of the vote; Houngbedji, who had always come in third, was the runner-up with 24.12 percent of the vote (Médénouvo, 2011). Yayi, without an official political party, was the first candidate able to truly overcome regional cleavages and receive support from throughout Benin. While the previous two presidents relied on the regional vote to send them to the Presidency, Yayi received votes from nearly every region of the country (Médénouvo, 2011). He appealed to the youth and disadvantaged populations on a platform of social development to combat rising unemployment, fighting corruption, decentralizing the local government, and privatizing state companies (Freedom House, 2010). In the second round, Yayi was
BOCKELIE 65
elected with 75 percent of the vote after receiving the support of the candidates who had lost in the first round (La République Française, 2008). In April 2008, the second municipal elections were held, five months late due to technical problems and irregularities, such as voter registration and ballot transportation; it eventually caused the “annulment and rerun contests in 24 districts” (Freedom House, 2010). Despite the irregularities, the opposition did fairly well in the election. Supporters of the President won in a number of municipalities but the Mouvance failed to beat the opposition in the large southern cities, such as Cotonou, Porto Novo, Ouidah, and Abomey. During his first term, President Yayi began the fight against corruption. In 2006, he established an official code of conduct for government officials; this “led to the arrest of an influential petroleum tycoon on fraud charges and the audit of 60 state-run companies as well as overseas Beninese embassies” (Freedom House, 2010). Benin also improved their corruption score, compiled annually by Transparency International, from 2.5 in 2006 to three in 2011. As a trained economist, President Yayi has instituted many reforms focused on the economic system. For example, his administration has worked on reforming the “cotton sector, the autonomous port of Cotonou, and improving business environment and relations with Nigeria” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012 18). The Yayi administration also made a significant advancement in the health sector, when the government began offering funds for caesarean births in 2009. According to a 2010 report by the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), Caesarean sections “can help avoid 120 of 1400 deaths during child birth” (Diallo, 2010, 5). This has led to a significant decrease in the maternal mortality.
66 BOCKELIE
Towards the end of his first term, however, President Yayi’s government came under increasing criticism. Although Yayi abided by the rule of law and continued to strengthen Benin’s market economy, there were signs of increasing disappointment in the Yayi administration. Many consider his “hasty style of decision-making—lacking much in the way of consultation—as too authoritarian” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012, 2). In addition, two financial scandals involving the government occurred during President Yayi’s first term. One involved ministers, two of which the President dismissed, which weakened the government (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012). Then, a financial scandal in August 2010 involving the President undermined the credibility of President Yayi’s anticorruption platform. It resulted in “more than half of the National Assembly’s members call[ing] for Yayi’s impeachment, accusing him of involvement in a high-profile Ponzi scheme in which a large investment firm was found to have stolen $130 million in savings from more than 100,000 people” (Freedom House, 2012). Although the parliament did not have the two-thirds to impeach the President, his reputation suffered and the incident united the opposition. The opposition formed a coalition, which endorsed a single candidate for the upcoming 2011 presidential election, Adrien Houngbédji (PRD). The financial scandal highlights the need for Benin to establish an autonomous anti-corruption monitoring body to ensure politicians and institutions avoid the web of corruption. For his second term, President Yayi ran on a platform of renewing the agriculture sector, developing infrastructure, and fixing public finances. Despite the criticisms of his first term and a strong opposition led by Houngbédji, President Yayi won reelection in 2011 during the first round with 53.4 percent of the vote. Although the opposition
BOCKELIE 67
contested the results, complaining of electoral fraud, the Constitutional Court declared the results official and the international community determined the elections were free and fair. The CENA had installed a new electronic voter list for the 2011 elections, which the opposition criticized for allegedly having left off one million voters (Freedom House, 2012). In addition, Clotaire Olihidé mentions in his interview that some ballots from northern regions arrived days late and were accepted as official and collated into the results, although according to the constitution they should not have been allowed. While Benin has not seen the same rate of progress and democratic deepening as it did during the first ten years of its democracy, the country continues to adhere to democratic norms and the rule of law. The government has continuously respected human rights and has allowed CSOs to operate and organize freely. In Benin, democracy has truly become “the only game in town.” A democratic culture has permeated the Beninese population. Individuals resolve conflict through a democratic method, seek change through the ballot box and lobbying, and political actors abide by the Constitution. In addition, ethno-regional voting has diminished in the last elections. The state has respected the right of unions to demonstrate. In 2012, multiple civil servant unions went on strike “demanding a 25 percent pay increase, halting the strike when the government agreed to negotiate” (Freedom House, 2012). In addition, Benin’s democratic governments have ameliorated the living conditions of the population; Benin’s HDI score has increased from .316 in 1990 to .427 in 2011. The state has initiated reforms in the education and health sector that aim at improving the general lives and welfare of the population. The government has announced that it plans to meet the second MDG and provide free universal primary
68 BOCKELIE
education by 2015. Over the last 20 years, Benin’s political institutions have successfully reined in the power of the executive and established mechanisms of horizontal accountability. Although many proponents within civil society would like to see institutional reforms to allow more independence and professionalization of the Constitutional Court and the CENA, these bodies have adequately held the government accountable for its actions.
BOCKELIE 69
Part Three: Analysis
70 BOCKELIE
Chapter Four: Consolidating Electoral Democracy in Benin Chapter Four will provide an analysis of how these drivers of democratic consolidation have manifested in Benin. First, it will present the policies and programs put in place since the National Conference that have encouraged socio-economic advancement and created a stable environment in which democracy could flourish. Then it will discuss the manner in which Benin’s political institutions have provided a check on executive power to offer vertical and horizontal accountability. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ADVANCEMENT AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CULTURE A positive perception of government performance by the population and the creation of a democratic political culture due to socio-economic development are two powerful drivers of democratic consolidation. Deviant democracies must continue to improve living conditions in addition to offering citizens more access to the political arena if they hope to survive. As Diamond (2009) has emphasized, democratic consolidation requires two integral aspects: (1) decent functioning and gradual deepening of democracy and (2) rising hope for a better life. Benin embarked on a number of reforms immediately following democratization and the years since that have inspired a culture that supports democratic norms and has hope and high expectations for the government’s future performance. IV.I.I EDUCATION FOR ALL As noted in Chapter Two’s discussion of human development, improving quality and access to education can have a profound impact on democracy, notably through the creation of a democratic political culture. A noticeable rise in education occurred after the
BOCKELIE 71
introduction of École Nouvelle (New School) in 1975, which sought to democratize schooling, introduce productive projects into schoolwork, and adapt education to the realities and needs of the job market. While the reform initially saw a positive outcome, the economic and political crisis of the 1980s spilled over into the education sector. The primary gross enrollment ratio (GER) reached 62.2 percent in 1983, but then fell to 49.7 percent by 1990. Along with democratization in 1990, Benin held a National Conference of the États Généraux to discuss education reform. A policy of “Education For All” was announced at the Jomtien World Conference on Education; it stipulated that “each person—child, adolescent, or adult—should have the ability to benefit from a formation that responds to the fundamental educational needs” (UNESCO, 2000, 2). The États Généraux adopted a proposal to reform the education system so that it would perform better and contribute to the development of the country. To this end, Benin established eight objectives for a Beninese education: 1. To guarantee every child (6-15) an equal opportunity to attend school. This prohibits discrimination based on region, gender, religion, or socio-economic status to promote social justice. 2. To reinforce the quality of education so that both private and public institutions can effectively play their role of development through education. 3. To reinforce the institutional character of schooling so that all actors (i.e. teachers, students, parents, and administration) know their roles and responsibilities within the educational system. 4. To develop technical and professional education at all levels to encourage diversification of careers and to strengthen the active population. 5. To develop non-formal education to provide an opportunity for uneducated girls, women, and children that dropped out to receive an education. 6. To improve literacy through offering schooling to adolescents and adults that did not have the opportunity to receive basic knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic. 7. To organize the different levels of public and private schooling as well as the levels of scientific research in order to establish an internal coherence to the educational system.
72 BOCKELIE
8. To provide and manage resources to finance the educational system. (UNESCO, 2000) These eight goals refocused schooling towards developing competency and faculties in students rather than merely accumulating knowledge. Primary education encompasses six subjects to meet these goals: French, math, social studies, scientific and technological education, art, and physical and sports education (Guingnido Gaye, 2003). Beginning in 1993, primary education in Benin became more effective as the reforms agreed to in 1990 were implemented into more schools. In 1999, the program became standard in all of Benin’s primary schools. To implement educational reforms, the state partnered with many NGOs and multilateral institutions. For example, Benin partnered with a Swiss organization to coordinate public alphabetization programs with those offered by civil society. UNICEF also organized a program to strengthen post-alphabetization through informational and educational programs as well as family health communications. In addition, UNICEF’s Education and Community project (EDUCOM) (1994-1998) offered schooling opportunities for girls and marginalized populations. In fact, the GER increased from 25 to 40 percent in the areas covered by the project (Guingnido Gaye, 2003). EDUCOM required the participation of at least 50 percent of the children under six in the villages and sought to train at least 50 women per village each year in revenue-generating tasks. The World Bank designed an alternative method to increase school attendance with their World Food Program (WFP). Benin began participating in the WFP in 1994. Food was given to the school cafeterias to increase school attendance and capacity to learn. Advancements in education were due to the fact that education was one of the focal points of Kérékou’s administration. In 1996, Benin participated in numerous
BOCKELIE 73
regional conferences for the promotion of Education for All, many of which focused on diminishing the disparity between girls’ and boys’ education (UNESCO, 2000). The same year, the government redesigned the Ministry of Education to create the post of Ministère de l’Éducation National et de la Recherche Scientifique (MENRS—Minister of National Education and Scientific Research). The restructuring included revamping educational policies to include a number of specific priorities, such as: Free access to schooling, guaranteeing equality of opportunity for all, the fight against dropping out, generalizing education relative to the population and family life, restructuring non-formal education, and creating a dialogue between employers and educators. (Guingnido Gaye, 2003, 7) This new focus of schooling aims to increase access to education. It also seeks to make education more applicable to daily life by directing the skills learned in the classroom towards the skills required for the job market. Benin utilized financial assistance from bilateral and international institutions to expand access to education and improve infrastructure of schools. For example, in 1998 and 1999, Japan undertook the Project of Primary School Construction. The Japanese government financed the construction of 89 schools throughout Benin with a total of 354 classrooms (UNESCO, 2000). Between 1994 and 2004, Benin made substantial progress to increase school attendance. Access was improved by nearly doubling the number of schools, from 2,984 in 1994 to 5,930 in 2004 (Ministre du Développement de l’économie et des finances, 2006). Infrastructure within schools also improved with the installation of running water and cafeterias in a number of schools. In 2000, the UN announced eight MDGs to achieve by 2015 to alleviate extreme poverty and other human deprivations that hinder an individual’s ability to live a healthy and prosperous life. Benin has achieved the most progress towards the second MDG of
74 BOCKELIE
achieving universal primary education (MDG2). Universal primary education, as defined by MDG2, includes 100 percent net enrolment ratio in primary education, completion rate, and youth (15-24) literacy rate. Improving access to education appears particularly important in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa because, according to the World Bank: Education opens doors and empowers. For people, it opens up a world of opportunities, reduces the burden of disease and poverty, and gives greater voice in society. For nations, it opens doors to economic and social prosperity, spurred by a dynamic workforce and well-informed citizenry able to compete and cooperate in the global arena. (World Bank, 2002, 1) The state officially granted free access to primary education in 2000 when the state education budget assumed the cost of school fees for all students attending public primary school. Granting free access to primary school has had a substantial impact towards Benin’s progress on the MDG2. According to the UNDP, Benin has potential to reach MDG2 as of 2011. Offering free schooling led to a primary enrollment rate of 93.8 percent. It has also increased primary enrollment from 624,778 students in 1994 to 1,319,648 in 2004 (Ministre du Développement de l’économie et des finances, 2006). In addition, the “level of primary completion rate [rose to] 65 percent [in 2007]” (UNDP, 2010, 1). The transition between primary and secondary school continues to improve each year, “passing from 77 percent in 2007 to 78 percent in 2008” (UNDP, 2010, 3). The augmentation of secondary gross enrolment has also been impressive, from only 12 percent in 1990 (UNEACA, 2005) to 51 percent in 2011 (World Bank, 2012). Likewise, tertiary education has expanded in Benin from two percent tertiary GER in 1990 to 13 percent in 2011 (World Bank, 2012).
BOCKELIE 75
In addition to universal primary education, MDG2 promotes literacy in national languages. Although youth (ages 15-24) literacy rose to 60.5 percent in 2008, UNDP (2010) data shows a disparity between males and females; women’s literacy has only reached 50 percent compared to 72.4 percent for men. A larger gender disparity appears when one considers older age cohorts: only 29.1 percent of adult women compared to 51.4 percent of adult men are literate (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012). Increasing literacy is paramount in a democracy. Charles Badou explains that the more people become educated the more they understand democracy and can read about policies and referendums to choose the best option, rather than waiting for a bribe from a politician to tell him or her for whom to vote. Furthermore, education will lead to “a better performing democracy, a more lively democracy because [society] has individuals who can understand what is going on and express whether or not they agree or disagree and not simply watch what is happening on television” (Badou, personal communication, 2013). The more literate the population becomes, the more informed their decisions become during elections. The Afrobarometer surveys5 of 2003, 2008, and 2011 in Benin show that the population has a positive perception of the government’s ability to guarantee access to education. The proliferation of schools in both rural and urban locations has encouraged higher enrollment rates. In 2011, “the lack of school within a reasonable walking distance was only observed in six percent of the study’s zones” (IREEP, 2013, 3). The ameliorated 5
The Afrobarometer is a series of comparative studies of public opinions to measure the public’s attitudes toward democracy, the quality and performance of governance, and the economic situation in African countries. Benin is included in Round 3 (2005), Round 4 (2008), and Round (5). Round 5 (2011-‐2013 covers 35 African countries. The interviews, conducted by Institut de Recherche Empirique en Économie Politique (IREEP-‐ Institute of Empirical Research in Political Economy), consist of 1200 Beninese adults to produce results with a 3% margin of error and a confidence of 95 percent.
76 BOCKELIE
access to schools led 64 percent of the population to believe that the government is addressing educational needs very or fairly well in 2008. In 2005, only 48 percent held the same opinion. The Afrobarometer also demonstrates that the population believes the government will implement the necessary reforms to improve problem areas in the education system over the next couple years. When asked if the Beninese thought their living conditions would improve over the next 12 months, 36 percent of the population responded positively, 27 percent responded negatively, and 26 percent did not know; the remaining 11 percent believed conditions would remain the same. Furthermore, the provision of public services has had a positive impact on the population’s perception of government performance. For instance, Round 4 of the Afrobarometer finds that 62.6 percent of people are very or somewhat more satisfied with the provision of public services (water, electricity, education, and health care) under Boni’s administration than under Kérékou’s regime. Improvements in the education system correlate positively with Afrobarometer democracy and governance indicators. Afrobarometer data indicates a cultivation of democratic norms in Beninese society. The democratic norms that manifest within a democratic political culture, such as rule of law, freedom of expression and association, and transfer of power through free and fair, multiparty elections have become highly valued among the population.
BOCKELIE 77
120
Support for Democracy
100
Reject military rule Reject one-‐party rule
Percentage
80
Reject one-‐man (presidential) rule
60
Patience with democracy 40
Gross Enrollment Ratio
20
Primary Completion Rate Youth Literacy Rate (15-‐24)
0 1990
2005
2008
Adult Literacy Rate (15+)
Year
Figure 1: Indicators of democratic norms and the education system Source: Afrobarometer, World Bank, UNESCO, UNDP, and INSAE
As the data from Figure 1 shows, Benin’s population legitimizes its government through democratic norms, which have grown more prominent throughout the years. In Round three of the Afrobarometer, 94 percent of the population stated that the country ought to choose its leaders through regular free and fair elections. Round 4 Afrobarometer data shows that 91 percent of the population supports democracy not only as the best regime choice for Benin but as the best system of governance in general, 73 percent reject military rule, 76 percent reject one-party rule, and 82 percent would reject the abolition of the National Assembly to allow the president to rule by presidential decree. According to Afrobarometer briefings, out “of all socio-demographics, it is the level of education that induces the greatest variation in the degree of adhesion to democracy. On average, 80 percent of those with a level of education above primary education favors democracy
78 BOCKELIE
over all other forms of political regimes” (Afrobarometer, 2005, 2). Thus, the expansion of the education system and ameliorated access to secondary education could explain the stronger ties to democratic attitudes and increase in democratic norms. The creation of a democratic political culture and increased support for democracy has enabled the population to act as a check on the power of the government to assure vertical accountability and rule of law. Democracy has steadily deepened in Benin along with public support for it. In other words, the public perceptions of democracy match the realities of the political environment. Since 2005, “both the perceived extent of democracy and the level of satisfaction with the performance of democracy have increased very substantially in Benin” (Afrobarometer, 2009). For instance, 76 percent of the population perceived Benin to be a democracy in 2008 as opposed to only 54 percent in 2005. In addition, the population expressed more satisfaction with democracy in Benin in the Round 4 Afrobarometer (2008) than in Round 3 (2005)—69 percent of the population was highly or fairly satisfied with democracy in 2008 versus a minority 48 percent of the population in 2005. In the first 20 years of democratic rule, the government has vastly improved access to education. In fact, the improvement in GER “represents one of the world’s fastest rates of progress over this time period [1989/90 to 2008/09]” (Engel, 2011, 3). The education system has improved in Benin because the newly democratic government made education and literacy a priority. Public expenditure on education more than doubled between 1992 and 2006, “as a result, expenditure per primary student (as a percentage of gross domestic product…) increased slightly between 1996 and 2006, from 11.8 percent
BOCKELIE 79
to 13.1 percent” (Engel, 2011, 4). Combined efforts from the government, substantial aid and donations, as well as effective coordination of outreach between the state and NGOs in rural areas have contributed to Benin’s success. Nonetheless, while Benin will likely meet MDG2 to provide universal access to primary education, the country still has room for advancement in regard to the quality of education. The student-teacher ratio has risen at a steady pace, which will continue to rise with Benin’s current fertility and infant mortality rates. To further complicate the issue, the government has found it difficult to find skilled teachers due to the closing of many teaching schools during the economic recession of the 1980s. These issues reflect the critiques of the Beninese, which focus predominately on the quality of their education system. Afrobarometer Round 5 shows that lack of textbooks and supplies (44 percent), poor infrastructure (46 percent), and over-populated classrooms (65 percent) have continued to pose problems when implementing effective schooling. A section in Chapter Five will be devoted to discussing in more detail potential reforms to improve the quality of education in Benin. IV.I.II EXPANSION OF HEALTHCARE FACILITIES The improvements in enrolment rates correlate with not only an increased tendency to support democratic norms but also “improvements in health and in infant mortality and morbidity rates, and particularly on malnutrition” (Engel, 2011, 3). Benin has improved upon these key indicators since the 1990s. Furthermore, research suggests “a robust relation between democratic institutions and health, resulting in greater life expectancy in democracies” (Besley & Kudamatsu, 2006, 317). In the first 22 years of
80 BOCKELIE
stable democracy, Benin has raised its life expectancy at birth from 48.7 in 1990 to 56.5 in 2012 (UNDP, 2013). Benin has embarked on a number of reforms that have had a positive impact on the health portion of the HDI. The US Global Health Initiative (2011) highlights five influential reforms that have improved health conditions in Benin: (1) offering free cesarean sections, (2) waiving user fees for children under five who take advantage of public services, (3) reinforcing health financing schemes, (4) creating the Indigent Fund to provide free health services to the extremely poor, and (5) increasing the number and quality of community health workers to revitalize primary health care and improve capacity for health workers to treat common diseases (GHI, 2011, 8). By reducing the cost of a number of services to make healthcare more affordable and available, Benin’s health policies have favored the impoverished sectors of society. This has been one of healthcare reforms most important impacts on Beninese society. In addition to its own efforts, the government has partnered with NGOs and development agencies to promote health within the country. The United States Global Healthcare Initiative (GHI) has been an important partner in the reduction of disease and the expansion of healthcare facilities. The GHI in Benin has largely focused on three areas: malaria prevention and control, child health, and maternal health, which includes family planning. Malaria is the number one killer of children under five years of age in Benin and often afflicts mothers and pregnant women as well. In fact, malaria constitutes “40 percent of outpatient consultations and 25 percent of all hospital admissions” (USAID, 2012, 1). Many child deaths and maternal deaths during childbirth in Benin are preventable. Child deaths are linked to illnesses such as “malaria, pneumonia, and
BOCKELIE 81
diarrhea…[while maternal deaths are caused by] hemorrhage, severe infection, eclampsia and obstructed labor, and complications from abortions” (GHI, 2011, 7). The GHI has partnered with the government to create a plan for malady reduction in these areas. Three of the UN’s MDGs relate to health. MDG4 seeks to “reduce the under-five morality rate to 62/1000 live births” (GHI, 2011, 6). MDG5 improves maternal health by “reducing the maternal mortality ratio to 135/100,000 live births” (GHI, 2011, 6). MDG6 focuses on combating “HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases…by reducing half of the estimated annual malaria deaths using the 2006 baseline [125 per 1,000 live births]” and by diminishing the prevalence of HIV/AIDS (GHI, 2011, 6). Benin has made steady progress towards the MDG goals. Since 1990, the under 5-year mortality rate (per thousand) has decreased from 177 in 1990 to 140 in 2000 and to 106 in 2011 (World Bank, 2012). This represents a 40 percent decrease in the under 5-year mortality rate. Maternal mortality ratio has decreased from 770 in 1990 to 498 in 1996 and to 350 in 2011. Benin has effectively reduced their maternal mortality rate by 55 percent. Malaria deaths in Benin have diminished to 109.9 per 1000 in 2010 from 132 per 1000 in 1996 (UNDP, 2010). In addition, Benin has achieved MDG6 indicator of reducing the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in pregnant women ages 15 to 24 to 1.9 percent from 4.9 percent in 1996 (UNDP, 2010). HIV/AIDS prevalence in adults (ages 15 and over) dropped to 1.2 percent in 2011 from 3.2 percent in 1990 (World Bank, 2012). Though Benin will likely not meet all the health related MDGs by 2015, the country has continuously improved the healthcare access and facilities. In 2009, Benin announced a 10-year Plan National de Développement Sanitaire (National Health Development Plan) to achieve “universal access to and improve quality
82 BOCKELIE
and coverage of [health] services leading to significant and lasting reductions in infant, child and maternal mortality” (GHI, 2011, 8). The 2011 GHI report on Benin describes the various government interventions in the health sector aimed at achieving healthrelated MDGs by 2015: Benin’s three-year operating plan for 2010-12… focuses on the delivery of a package of low-cost, high impact interventions… the Cadre de Dépenses à Moyen-Terme, 2010-2012, an attempt to assign costs needed to achieve different scenarios to the achievement of the MDGs… early 2011 by a five-year plan… to bring to scale the PIHI interventions to accelerate reductions in maternal, neonatal and child mortality in time for the deadline on the MDGs. The first phase of PIHI implementation cover[ed] 16 of the 34 health zones in the country by 2012, with the other 18 to be covered by 2015. (GHI, 2011, 8) Improving access to healthcare facilities has had an important impact in Benin not only in the reduction of deaths by diseases but also on political participation. According to Gilles Badet, “it is certain that if people are not in good health, they will not participate [in political life]; they will not engage themselves; they will not advocate for their beliefs with others in different [political] movements and associations” (Badet, personal communication, 2013). Healthy citizens are able to actively engage in political life, which deepens democracy through increased vertical accountability. The increase in education level and general health of the Beninese population have contributed to a more productive and politically inclined society. For example, in the 2005 Afrobarometer, 62 percent of the population responded that they were very or somewhat interested in public affairs. This rose to 68 percent in Round 4 of the Afrobarometer. In addition, 90 percent of individuals responded that they were registered to vote for the 2002 legislative elections (5 percent responded that they were too young to vote) and 89 percent responded that they voted in the election. In 2008, 91 percent indicated that they voted in the 2007 Presidential election. Furthermore, when asked
BOCKELIE 83
about solving community problems and participation in political life, responses were resoundingly positive in 2005: 96 percent participated in a community reunion or would if they had the opportunity, 87 percent gathered with others to raise an issue or would if they had the opportunity, and 69 percent have participated in a protest or demonstration or would if they had the opportunity. Benin has encountered similar issues in its promotion of healthcare as it has education: access increasing faster than quality. Although the government has yet to address issues surrounding the quality of healthcare, access has improved substantially since the “democratic renewal” of 1990. For example, 76 percent of Beninese live within five kilometers of a health center or hospital (70 percent in rural areas and 86 percent in urban areas) (GHI, 2011, 11). The reality of access to healthcare is better than the population’s perception; in the most recent Afrobarometer study (2011) only 59 percent of the population answered that they easily or very easily have access to treatment in a medical center or hospital. A section in Chapter Five will be devoted to a detailed discussion of important future health and sanitation reforms. The HDI has steadily increased since democratization in
Benin
due
to
the
improvements in each of the three
composites:
rising
expectancy,
more
placed
education,
on
life
emphasis and
mounting Gross National Income
84 BOCKELIE Figure 2: Progression of Benin's HDI from 1980 to 2010
(GNI) per capita. Julien Oussou, National Director of West Africa Network for Peacebuilding-Benin, attributes the amelioration of HDI in Benin to three interventions at the societal level. First: Healthcare coverage has improved a lot. Today, there are many more health centers and free cesarean sections have lowered the rate of maternal mortality. [Second,] girls schooling has increased. Rendering primary education free has boosted not only the rate [of enrollment] but also investments in the school system. [In addition], the MCA [Millennium Challenge Account] has had very positive impacts. (Oussou, personal communication, 2013) These statements where echoed amongst other members of civil society, political scientists, lawyers, and public service workers in Cotonou. Each interviewee emphasized the same two reforms when asked about the connection between improvements in HDI and democracy: free access to primary education, which increased girls schooling, and offering free c-sections to the poorest sectors of society, which as decreased maternal mortality. Nonetheless, socio-economic advancement has been disparately appreciated amongst genders. Many women and girls face more health risks than men and boys due to “poor access to health information due to low literacy levels and social barriers that inhibit many women from seeking care on their own” (GHI, 2011, 15). Thus, a combined effort of encouraging girls education, including the expansion of literacy, and the promotion of preventative healthcare through Benin’s National Health Development Plan could have a profound effect on the further advancement of the socio-economic status of women and girls in Benin. Recommendations for health care improvements will be discussed in Chapter Five.
BOCKELIE 85
AUTONOMOUS AND ACCOUNTABLE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS While democracy requires the support of the population and the formation of democratic norms and attitudes, without democratic political institutions that provide horizontal accountability and act as a check on the power of the political elite, democracy cannot survive. This section will analyze the level of executive oversight by the Constitutional Court as well as examine CENA’s role in the continuation of the democratic process in Benin. IV.II.I EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT The judiciary, specifically the Constitutional Court, has been a fundamental institution in the stabilization of Beninese democracy. Established June 7, 1993, Benin’s Constitutional Court has inserted itself into the political system as the guardian of the Constitution. It acts as an entity that ensures political actors abide by the rule of law in Benin. As the highest court of the judicial system, the Constitutional Court “judges the constitutionality of laws, guarantees fundamental rights and civil liberties and [acts as] the regulating organ for the functioning of political institutions and the administration” (La Cour Constitutionnelle, 2007). The Court protects the roots of a functioning democracy by overseeing referendums as well as the election of the President, judges, and members of parliament. Members of the Constitutional Court are named for a mandate of five years, renewable once. Thus, no member may serve on the Court for more than ten years total. According to Article 115 of Benin’s Constitution, the Constitutional Court consists of seven members, selected by the two other branches of government: the President chooses three and the National Assembly picks the remaining four. Members consist of three
86 BOCKELIE
magistrates with at least 15 years experience, two of which are named by the National Assembly and one by the President. Two members are renowned jurists, either professors or practitioners of law also with a minimum of 15 years experience; the President and the National Assembly each name one jurist. Finally, both the National Assembly and the President name one of the final two members; these individuals are personalities of high professional reputation. Once established, the seven members of the Constitutional Court elect two members to serve as the Court’s president and vice president (Magnusson, 1999). While its structure could deteriorate the democratic process, the Constitutional Court has been able to overcome any inherent design flaws through its commitment to its prescribed task: assuring the constitutionality of laws and government actions. In one of the Court’s first decisions in 1994, the Court declares itself as the keystone of the entire politico-legal system and the cornerstone of rule of law in Benin. In addition, the Court has assured its autonomy from the executive through rulings. For example, in 2007 the Court established that the president could not intervene in the judiciary, as this would constitute a breach of judicial independence (DCC 07-175). The self-prescribed autonomy from the executive in the Constitutional Court’s actions combined with a democratic political culture amongst the elite, stemming from the tradition of the National Conference, has permitted the Court to have a positive impact on democratic consolidation in Benin. Although the government designates the members of the Constitutional Court, it has played a fundamental role in checking the power of the executive since its inception in 1993. In fact, the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) cites Benin’s
BOCKELIE 87
Constitutional Court as one of the most progressive Courts in Africa (OSIWA, 2013). Magnusson (2001) describes Benin’s Constitutional Court as having established “its independence from executive and legislative authority early on, holding the other branches of government accountable to the new constitution [of 1990]” (Magnusson, 2001, 211). Acting as an arbitrator to resolve institutional paralysis between the executive and the legislative branch has been one of the most important roles of the Court. The Constitutional Court has provided an alternative avenue for dispute resolution, thereby avoiding military involvement in electoral dispute management. The Constitutional Court not only establishes checks and balances on the government but also offers direct access to individuals to file complaints of human rights violations. This has “empowered [individuals] not only to secure the enforcement of their personal rights but also to challenge the constitutionality of laws and acts of the state, its organs, and agents” (Adjolohoun, 2007, 4). Furthermore, the Court supports the tradition of national consensus derived from the National Conference, which increases vertical accountability and transparency within the judicial process. For example, Horace Sègnonna Adjolohoun (2007) emphasizes the fact that the Constitutional Court does not permit amendments to the constitution without first holding a popular referendum. Magnusson and Clark (2005) describe how the Constitutional Court was able to establish deep public legitimacy soon after its institutionalization with the 1994 budget crisis. The devaluation of the CFA franc by 50 percent in 1994, combined with the growing social unrest instigated by student and labor unions led to a volatile political environment. The unions demanded increased wages and scholarships, while the World Bank and IMF encouraged the state to keep salaries in check. This led to a “budget
88 BOCKELIE
impasse between the president, whose budget proposal limited the growth of salaries to levels negotiated with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and the national assembly, which amended the president’s budget to augment significantly his modest salary and scholarship increases” (Magnusson, 2001, 222). Soglo’s administration warned that National Assembly’s budget risked compromising existing foreign aid as well as access to future financial assistance through IFIs. This would cripple the operational capacity of the state considering that nearly one-third of the state’s budget depends upon external resources. President Soglo reacted on 2 August 1994 by invoking constitutional emergency powers to pass his own budget. Article 68 of the 1990 Constitution grants the President special emergency powers when: The institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of the national territory or the execution of international commitments shall be threatened in a serious and immediate manner, and when the regular operation of political and constitutional powers shall be threatened or interrupted… (Bénin, 1990) President Soglo invoked Article 68 on the grounds that the National Assembly budget would lead to a depletion of foreign aid and monetary assistance that would cause a government shutdown due to lack of funds. Article 69 of the constitution, however, lays out provisions for the employment of Article 68. Article 69 stipulates that Article 68 does not give unconditional authority to the president; rather, it requires the National Assembly “to fix a deadline limiting the validity of emergency powers” (Magnusson, 2001, 225). The National Assembly viewed the President’s invocation of emergency power as an abuse of power and quickly voted on a deadline of August 5. The budget crisis required four Constitutional Court decisions that took place from August to October
BOCKELIE 89
1994. The first two involved procedural aspects of the impasse, while the second two rulings focused on the constitutionality of the affair. While the Court upheld the National Assembly’s limitation of Soglo’s invocation of presidential emergency powers, it also found: The National Assembly’s budget unconstitutional for violating provisions of the constitution that leaves “regulatory” matters (in this case, salary and scholarship levels) to the discretion of the executive. Nevertheless, the court found that the assembly’s budget did not violate constitutional provision mandating a balanced budget (Article 110). (Magnusson, 2001, 225) The fiasco over the budget demonstrated the Constitutional Court’s ability to assert its authority over the executive and the legislative branches to assure the rule of law and constitutionality of government actions. Furthermore, it set an important precedent of abiding by court decisions and officially established a civilian court as the arbiter of political strife rather than the military. The Constitutional Court’s ability to exercise authority over the executive and legislative branches highlights the success of the Court as a neutral arbiter of conflict. The Constitutional Court has solidified a separation of powers in Benin; the President no longer decides whether or not justice will be applied. The constitution requires all legal decisions to be applied in accordance with the constitution, which has reinforced the independence and solidarity of the judicial system. The Constitutional Court has also proved instrumental in assuring the autonomy of other institutions, such as the CENA. Following the creation of the CENA in 1994, the Court decided against the government ruling that: CENA is an autonomous administrative authority, independent of the legislative and executive power’ and its ‘establishment … is linked to the search for a formula to insulate within the public administration a body with real autonomy ... for the exercise of powers regarding the sensitive area of civil liberties, in particular fair elections: regular, free and transparent.’ (Counstitutional Court decision DCC-34-94 translated in Hounkpe, 2011, 30)
90 BOCKELIE
The Court has continuously supported the CENA and has ensured a favorable environment within which it functions. The Court’s decisions on behalf of CENA have promoted the continuation of the democratic process. For example, in 2005, the Court ruled in favor of the CENA once again, requiring the government to release funds within 24 hours so that the CENA would have the necessary resources to begin organizing the 2006 elections (Hounkpé, 2011). In 2007, the Court affirmed the independence and administrative autonomy of the CENA. The partnership between the CENA and the Constitutional Court has permitted the successful holding of free and fair elections during each elections cycle. In addition to assisting the electoral process and ensuring rule of law, Gilles Badet notes that the Constitutional Court has had important spillover effects on the judicial system as a whole. The consistent nature of abiding by the law and requiring the other branches of government to respect the Constitution has Given a rhythm [to the judicial process] and encouraged the submission of political actors and public authorities to the law, which is not a habit they are used to. [Under the previous regime], people did a little of everything and the administrative authority let them do as they pleased. With the [establishment of] the Constitutional Court, they understand that [the Court] will not hand out a blank check [but] will regulate arbitrary decisions that others could take. (Badet, personal communication, 2013) In Benin, the Constitutional Court has led by example through the consistent application of the law and holding the government accountable for its actions. This has encouraged the lower courts to engage in the same quality of behavior, which has strengthened the independence and accountability of the judicial system to advance the process of democratic consolidation. The standard set by the Constitutional Court has “provided a courageous example of judges facing administrative authority and the authorities of
BOCKELIE 91
power, which have helped ordinary justice to address issues and complete its work in a truly independent manner" (Badet, personal communication, 2013). In recent years, the Constitutional Court has also upheld constitutional safeguards in regard to military interventions in political life. For instance, in the 2007 and 2010 elections the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the independence and administrative autonomy of the CENA. During the 2007 elections, the military stepped into help transport materials; the Court, however, limited the role of the military by requiring it to comply with parameters set by the Constitution (DCC 10-116). Ruling against the military, the Constitutional Court ensured that the military would not interfere with the management of elections as was customary in Benin’s political history leading up to the democratic transition. Since its creation in 1993, the Constitutional Court has continuously guaranteed “respect for the Constitution and assure[d] liberty and transparency in the political system and elections” (Oussou, personal communication, 2013). The Court has established itself as a necessary and influential institution in the consolidation of democracy in Benin6. The Court has ruled in accordance with the Constitution, even when that involves findings against the executive or legislative branches. Furthermore, the Court has established itself as a neutral body to mediate and arbitrate political conflict in a peaceful and just manner. IV.II.II CENA’S ROLE IN THE CONTINUATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS In 1995, Benin once again paved the way for other new African democracies with the establishment of an EMB, CENA. The first presidential and legislative elections of Benin’s “democratic renewal” in the 1990s were organized, managed, and carried out by 6
For a list of Constitutional Court decisions that have advanced political development in Benin, please refer to Appendix D.
92 BOCKELIE
the Ministry of the Interior. In a country that has a history of long single-party rule, however, the monopoly of democracy by government bodies “quickly clashed with rising distrust of the government by newly created political parties” (Hounkpe, 2011, 20). Thus, the parliament passed legislation to establish CENA in 1994 to exclude the direct influence of the government in the organization and management of elections. The CENA was understood as a way, “on the one hand, to institute the tradition of independence and impartiality in respect to assuring free and transparent elections, on the other hand, to gain the confidence of electors and political parties and movements” (ARGA, 2012, 4). Assuming authority in 1995, the CENA handles the preparation, organization, operation and oversight of polls and collation results. In legislative and presidential elections, the CENA passes results to the Constitutional Court for validation; in the case of municipal, communal, and local elections, the Supreme Court affirms the results. Mathias Hounkpé has described the CENA as an “ad hoc institution” due to its impermanence7. Leading up to each election, members are selected and then immediately following the election cycle, the body is dissolved. This ad hoc nature is compounded by a lack of established term limits for CENA members. According to the law, a member’s mandate “may not be less than four and half months, or at least 90 days before election day and up to at most 45 days after the announcement of final results” (Hounkpe, 2011, 22). The fact that the CENA was established through electoral law rather than codified in the Constitution adds to its ad hoc nature. The lack of constitutional rigidity has permitted the CENA to act as an ever-evolving body. Each CENA has been composed differently 7
This thesis comprises research completed between August 2012 and April 2013, thus it does not address the CENA reform passed by the Beninese parliament on April 9, 2013. Please view Appendix E to see how the new electoral code strengthens the institutional design of Benin’s EMB.
BOCKELIE 93
with a varying number of members. As discussed in Chapter Three, the number of members has ranged from 11 (fixed in the 2011 presidential election) to 25 (in the elections from 2001 to 2006); the original CENA had 17 members. The designation of CENA members follows a similar system to that of the Constitutional Court. Members of the CENA “are officially appointed by the president upon the proposal of government, parliament (quotas allotted proportionally according to the size of the political parties in the National Assembly), and civil society covering all socio professional bodies or associations” (WANEP, 2011, 25). The representative bodies select members first, followed by the president; next, the Constitutional Court formally appoints the members, who then take an oath. The designation of members at the decentralized level follows the same procedure as the national CENA. Nonetheless, the CENA enjoys autonomy both from state institutions (the executive, national assembly, constitutional court, etc) and in the management of its budget. The Constitutional Court codified this independence in electoral law in 2007 by affirming the independence and administrative autonomy of the CENA (EL 07-001). The CENA, however, has no power of sanction. Thus, if it uncovers irregularities or it suspects electoral fraud, the CENA must refer the case to the relevant judicial authority. The Constitutional Court has jurisdiction in presidential and legislative elections, whereas the Supreme Court handles all elections not at the national level. Following the election, the CENA must draft and submit a final report to the president within 30 days of the results being announced by the proper court. Although the CENA suffers from inherent flaws in its institutional design, it has successfully established its autonomy and has safeguarded the continuation of the
94 BOCKELIE
electoral process by assuring free and fair elections. An important asset for CENA’s independence is “the support that [it] enjoys from politicians, civil society, and the Constitutional Court” (Hounkpe, 2011, 28). In part, this extends from the equal treatment of all political parties and actors throughout the electoral process. The CENA has never favored nor aligned itself with the incumbent regime. In addition, the CENA assures that all candidates, regardless of political party, have equal access to the media to promote their platform during the campaign phase of elections (Hounkpé, 2011). The CENA also handled electoral dispute management following the 2008 municipal and district elections and 2011 presidential elections valiantly, minimizing public demonstrations and securing a timely transfer of power between administrations (Hounkpé, 2011; WANEP, 2011). External donor assistance and aid distribution targeted towards elections highlights the importance of the CENA to consolidate democracy in Benin. Financial assistance was given to the CENA in 2007 and 2011 to support the electoral process. In 2007, funds were aimed at assuring Kérékou would not seek a third term. The 2007 presidential election marks the first election since the transition in which the president was expected to leave office after fulfilling constitutional term limits. For many observers, “the lack of commitment of the government to transfer the funds requested by the CENA was a sign that President Kérékou was not ready to quit” (Gazibo, 2012, 17). Financial contributions from a variety of countries and bilateral institutions enabled the CENA to conduct elections in a timely manner since the government was no longer in a position of power to block their organization. Kérékou did not seek a third term and the elections were deemed free and fair by the international community.
BOCKELIE 95
Financial assistance for CENA also proved vital in the 2011 presidential election. External donors added to the Beninese government’s contribution to create the liste électorale permanente informatisée (LEPI- permanent electronic electoral list). Donors considered the establishment of the LEPI as “a very important step towards fairer elections and that the new list represented clear progress compared to previous elections” (Gazibo, 2012, 18). The UNDP partnered with the CENA to register 4 million voters through the LEPI in addition to providing material resources, such as ballot boxes, sequentially numbered seals, and indelible ink (UNDP, 2011). In all, the switch to a computerized list has helped regulate “problems related to the credibility, transparency, and cost of elections” (Olihide, 2011, 9). The creation of the LEPI has not only streamlined the voter registration process but has also expanded access to national identity cards. For example, UNDP tells the story of Simone, who makes ends meet by selling goods bought in Nigeria in her small shop. Before the LEPI, Simone did not have identity documents and thus needed to pay bribes when crossing the border. As a result of the project, however: Simone was able to obtain a voter card made at one of the collecting centres. This card, which includes information about her identity, fingerprints and a photo, also serves as a national identity card. With it in hand, Simone can now cross the border and has no need to pay additional fees. (UNDP, 2011) CENA’s move to a LEPI has had positive spillover effects in other areas of governance. The LEPI has limited the need to pay bribes with the attainment of an identity card, which will help directly reduce corruption. The fewer instances individuals are asked to pay a bribe, the more the culture of endemic corruption, which plagues so many African societies, will begin to diminish.
96 BOCKELIE
CHAPTER FOUR SUMMARY Benin has successfully consolidated an electoral democracy against all odds and previous literature dictating the requirements for democracy. Emerging from an extensive period of single-party authoritarian rule, Benin was forced to develop transparent and autonomous institutions that were able to hold the executive accountable to both the government and the general populace. Even though Benin’s institutions do not have the strongest institutional design a priori, Benin’s endemic democratic political culture has encouraged accountable and responsible elite behavior. Individuals sitting on the CENA and the Constitutional Court have provided horizontal and vertical accountability and have demonstrated a commitment to the rule of law. Together, these bodies have encouraged democratic consolidation within Benin while granting legitimacy to Beninese democratic practice. The Constitutional Court has consistently ruled in accordance with the Constitution rather than siding automatically with the executive. The CENA has also demonstrated independence from executive influence. The behavior and comportment of the individuals appointed to the CENA has an impact on the effectiveness of the institution as a whole. Thus, although “political leaders and parliament have the power to appoint members of the [CENA], there exist some procedural checks in all cases towards limiting arbitrariness in the appointments” (WANEP, 2011). Thus, legal checks and balances can make up for poor institutional design. Nonetheless, despite the substantial progress Benin has made since its democratic transition in 1990, the country must institute numerous reforms to consolidate into a liberal democracy. The next chapter will include recommendations for Benin to transition to a liberal democracy from a consolidated electoral democracy. These include further advancements in socio-economic development to improve quality of education and health
BOCKELIE 97
services as well as institutional design reforms to render the Constitutional Court and the CENA more autonomous vis-à-vis executive influence.
98 BOCKELIE
Chapter Five: Transitioning Towards Liberal Democracy ADVANCING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT THROUGH PUBLIC SERVICES While Benin has become an electoral democracy over the last 23 years, reforms are needed to continue to deepen democracy. Benin has consolidated an electoral democracy due in part to improved access to public services. To transition to a liberal democracy, however, the government must put more effort into improving the quality of services. This requires a combination of education reforms to boost literacy and completion rates and improvements in health care to meet the MDGs. Focusing on these areas will advance human development, allowing Benin to achieve the classification of medium human development on the HDI. This section will discuss recommendations for the education system and health care to promote the socio-economic development in Benin with an end goal of deepening democracy. V.I.I EDUCATION REFORMS TO IMPROVE QUALITY Access to schooling has drastically increased since the National Conference in Benin. As discussed in the previous chapter, more students are able to attend school, notably girls, due to the abolition of school fees. Plus, the construction of additional schools in rural communities has increased access by minimizing the distance children must walk to school. These two factors have been the predominant drivers of increased enrollment in the school system. The quality of education in Benin, however, still requires attention. Three reforms would improve the quality of Benin’s education system: hiring more and better qualified teachers, requiring all students to take a civic education
BOCKELIE 99
or government course, and placing more emphasis on students continuing through secondary education. In the 2011 Afrobarometer survey conducted by IREEP, 51 percent of those interviewed had experienced problems related to the quality of education. Overpopulated classrooms, lack of necessary reference material and textbooks, and infrastructure suggest the need for the government to allocate more funds to education. Increasing government spending, however, should not be done precariously. In a country with limited cash flow, Benin must make efficient use of its available resources. The government should allocate additional resources to hire more teachers to keep up with the combination of falling infant mortality rates and consistently high fertility rates, especially considering that classrooms are already overpopulated. High fertility rates present another area that education reform ought to focus on: sexual education. Offering comprehensive sexual education courses would empower girls and promote the demographic transition to lower birth rates. It would also improve maternal and child health. Benin has a low prevalence of contraceptive use, 6.2 percent in 2006 (WHO, 2012). This has negative repercussions on both birth rates and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. Advancing the demographic transition of Beninese society also requires more emphasis on the continuation of education. When girls stay in school longer and receive a higher level of education, they will get married and have children later as well as have fewer children. Studies have shown that an increase in the number of years of schooling decreases fertility rates (Glewwe, Maiga, & Zheng, 2007; Gyimah-Brempong, 2011; Nhamo & Nhamo, 2006). The World Bank (2002) found that one-year of schooling reduces a woman’s fertility by about 10 percent and with an additional year of schooling,
100 BOCKELIE
women see a reduction in child mortality by about 15 percent. This will shift the population pyramid to a more balanced stratum, which would benefit Benin. The population in Benin is dominated by youth with 44 percent of the population under 14 years of age (CIA, 2013). Promoting girls education, thus, will encourage Benin’s demographic transition because girls will delay marriage to finish schooling, which leads to lower fertility rates as the women shortens her childbearing years. Providing a quality education requires competent teachers with professional qualifications. This requires an investment in teaching schools, many of which closed in the 1980s. Hiring more teachers with better training will have positive impacts on the areas where Benin requires the most improvement: increasing the literacy and completion rate. Improving literacy is particularly important in Benin due to the country’s low level of economic development. Increasing literacy provides an opportunity to escape poverty as individuals can make their own informed decisions and have the opportunity to seek decent employment. It also will improve the quality of political participation, as individuals will better understand issues presented for popular referendum and have direct access to agendas set by political candidates. Addressing the issue of overpopulated classrooms will address both low literacy and completion rates because teachers will have more capacity to work individually or in small groups with students. This more personalized approach to education will ensure that each child’s academic needs are individually addressed. In order to improve the completion rate in Benin, the Ministry of Education ought to promote education as a long-term investment in life. That way, when families analyze the pros and cons of staying in school, individuals find that staying in school has a higher return on investment than dropping out to join the work
BOCKELIE 101
force. This encourages individuals to take into account short term gains and personal growth received from education in addition to the long-term economic benefits of staying in school. In reflection of the scholarly work on education, offering civic education represents one avenue Benin could utilize to improve the quality of its education and its impact on democratic political culture. The Ministry of Education currently requires students to take ethics courses. According to Victor Topanou, however, these courses do not incorporate learning about the democratic political structure. A civic education or government course would educate students on the mechanics of their political system as well as how to get involved in politics to make a lasting impact on the society. This would deepen democracy by teaching democratic norms to tomorrow’s political leaders. Civic education courses that incorporate methods of political mobilization and organizing will lead to a higher political efficacy as youth begin to believe that their participation in politics will make a difference. This leads to active citizenship amongst youth, which accounts for the majority of the population. Although access to education has improved dramatically since 1990, the ministry of education has yet to place the same emphasis on secondary education as primary education. For example, the government should abolish school fees at the secondary school level in addition to primary school. The government has begun to prioritize secondary education with the Plan Décennal de Développement du Secteur de l’Éducation (2006-2015), which places more emphasis on the need and growing demand for secondary education. For example, in 2010 the government decided to “gradually exempt female students from paying school fees during the first cycle of secondary
102 BOCKELIE
education, a measure which is likely to have a significant effect” (Ministère danois des Affaires étrangères & Agence Française de Développement, 2012, 35). These efforts, however, remain under resourced and according to the Overseas Development Institute (2011) the plan is currently running behind schedule. Secondary education has a more pronounced impact on a democratic society than primary education in terms of economic productivity, intellectual capacity of the populace, and developing a democratic political culture. Placing an emphasis on secondary education would help promote the transition to liberal democracy as that age cohort enters into the electorate upon graduation politically versed and inclined. V.I.II HEALTHCARE: ADDRESSING QUALITY AND ACCESS Benin’s healthcare system and facilities have vastly improved since 1990. The increase in the number of healthcare facilities and the offer of free cesarean sections has had a positive impact on Beninese society. Yet, healthcare still requires significant reforms in regard to both access and quality. According to the most recent round of the Afrobarometer, the majority of people interviewed have experienced long wait lines, lack of medications, and too costly of service. Addressing the low quality and uneven geographic access to healthcare in Benin will help it attain the MDG health goals: reducing
under-five
mortality
rate,
reducing
mortality
ratio,
and
combating
communicable diseases, such as HIV/AIDS and malaria. A number of reforms would address poor quality of and access to health care in Benin: a more efficient distribution of available resources, increases in better trained health care professionals, a new emphasis on primary health care, and the exploitation of external aid.
BOCKELIE 103
With a health budget of only eight percent of GDP in 2010 (WHO, 2012), Benin must ensure that these funds have the most influential impact and highest return on investment possible. To distribute health resources more efficiently, Benin’s Minister of Public Health ought to complete a quantitative and qualitative analysis of services utilized in hospitals and medical centers to attain a more complete picture of which services are vital and which are secondary. The most utilized services should have the most resources available to them in order to maximize their capacity. Redirecting funds to the areas with the most need and heaviest use will minimize bottlenecks within the system. Heavy use services and departments will then have adequate funds to buy more equipment; hire more nurses, doctors and staff; and increase the number of patient beds and rooms. A more efficient management and application of resources also include how they are distributed geographically. A disparity still exists between health care available in rural and urban areas. In general, understaffed medical centers are most prevalent in rural and poor locations. To combat this issue, the government could offer incentives to its public health professionals that are willing to relocate to more rural and poorer locations. In light of the high prevalence of maternal mortality, increasing the number of skilled midwives, nurses, doctors, and obstetricians will minimize a number of present issues in Benin. With more professionals available to assist patients, wait times will decrease. In addition, each physician will have fewer patients, which means more personalized and higher quality care. In a study of health care professionals in SubSaharan Africa, Nancy Gerein, Andrew Green, and Stephen Pearson (2006) link shortages of maternal health professionals to emigration. They found a number of factors
104 BOCKELIE
may lead health professionals to seek employment elsewhere including “salary, social security benefits, job satisfaction, organizational environment and career opportunities, and availability of resources (infrastructure, equipment and supplies)” (Gerein, Green, & Pearson, 2006, 43). To combat this phenomenon, policies ought to ensure health care professionals receive adequate remuneration and comprehensive benefits, as well as opportunities for professional advancement. This will encourage health care providers, once hired, to continue working in the public domain rather than seeking higher paying employment with more benefits in a private health care facility. To improve health care in Benin, the government also needs to encourage citizens to utilize primary health care services. Preventative health reduces health care cost over an individual’s lifetime; it represents a long-term investment in one’s health. Yet, many primary health care facilities have met the same problem as hospitals and emergency care facilities in rural and poor locations, understaffing and lack of highly qualified professionals. Thus, while primary health care centers are more accessible and affordable for most sectors of the population, they are usually staffed by nurses and midwives who are only capable of providing basic care (Gerein et al., 2006). A comprehensive approach to improving the health of citizens in Benin requires the Ministry of Health to implement policies that make primary health care a priority. This includes allotting more resources to underfunded health clinics to ensure they are adequately staffed, have the necessary medications and up to date medical equipment, as well as refocusing family planning services to include both men and women. In recent years, financial assistance from occidental countries and external donor programs have become increasingly available for improving health care in developing
BOCKELIE 105
countries. By taking advantage of external aid opportunities, Benin could supplement salaries, expand training programs, renovate hospitals and clinics, as well as implement awareness campaigns to encourage preventative health and protection against communicable diseases. Benin can partner with programs offered by international development programs, such as the UNDP, USAID, DFID, the World Bank, etc. to address malaria reduction, better access to medications, and more sanitary conditions in health centers. Awareness campaigns can address communicable diseases by promoting the use of bed nets as well as attaining necessary vaccinations and primary health care. This could be done through public service announcements on local radio and television stations and visual campaigns, such as billboards throughout the cities and villages. Working with occidental donors and international organizations will off-set the cost of implementing reforms in Benin because the government does not have sufficient financial overhead to allot more to health care without withdrawing resources from other areas, which also struggle to make ends meet. Putting in place policies that continue to improve and develop the health and education sector will assist in the efforts of transitioning to a liberal democracy. Educational reforms that address the issues of quality and the need for more democratically oriented education will increase literacy rates, boost completion rates, and encourage political efficacy and democratic norms amongst the population. Improving access to health care facilities and the quality of care will help Benin achieve the health related MDGs; this will lead to a more healthy and productive society.
106 BOCKELIE
RE-EVALUATING INDEPENDENCE: POSSIBILITIES FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM The Constitutional Court and the CENA have been integral to the consolidation of electoral democracy in Benin. Their impact, however, has been despite their institutional designs. Both the Court and the CENA would benefit from institutional reform so that each can reestablish its independence from government influence. This section will discuss recommendations to strengthen the institutions, rendering them a priori more accountable and legitimate, which will progress political development and deepen democracy in Benin. V.II.I CENA RECOMMENDATIONS: PROFESSIONALIZATION AND PERMANENCE All interviewees offered recommendations on how to ensure the relevance and accountability of the CENA. Reforming the CENA into a permanent and professional institution, codified in the constitution, would give it legitimacy and increase its effectiveness as a check on the power of the executive8. The democratic process would improve since the CENA would act as a truly neutral body assuring free and fair elections that take place in a timely and efficient manner. While the CENA was extremely influential during its first couple years, it no longer functions as well as it did when Benin first conceived the institution in 1994. According to Charles Badou, a lawyer of human rights and administrative law in Cotonou, the CENA is the “source of the slow dysfunctioning [electoral] system…. [Benin] needs to have permanent personnel [on the CENA]… The more permanent the institution, the better it performs” (Badou, personal communication, 2013). Gilles Badet 8
The suggestions for reform covered in Chapter Five do not take into account the April 9, 2013 CENA reform. Appendix E discusses the April reform of the CENA, which puts in place a permanent body to organize and carry-‐out Benin’s elections.
BOCKELIE 107
also criticizes the impermanence of the CENA. A permanent CENA would have a double benefit: capitalization on previous experiences and more efficient use of time during the organization of elections. Capitalizing on past experiences would permit the CENA to learn from previous mistakes to make the process more seamless and more efficient. A permanent CENA would mean that the first few weeks of the electoral season would focus on the organization of elections and logistical preparations instead of an orientation to familiarize the CENA with the process, required tasks, and available resources. Furthermore, permanent personnel would allow the CENA to address systemic problems with the electoral system between election cycles. For example, the CENA could focus on creating and dispersing national identity cards to prove citizenship in an effort to combat electoral fraud. Currently, to register to vote, people simply have to provide testimony that they are Beninese. Thus, politicians can do "electoral tourism" by travelling from town to town to gain voters. These politicians essentially buy votes by giving electorates basic goods not only within Benin but also border towns and villages in neighboring Burkina Faso, Togo, Niger, or Nigeria (Badet, personal communication, 2013). Another weakness of the electoral process compounded by the CENA’s impermanence is the cost of elections. Each election, the CENA has to recreate a list of electors, buy new material, and hire thousands of electoral personnel. A permanent CENA could reuse materials and build upon the previous election cycles’ list of electors, rather than needing to register each voter every election and start over from scratch. By establishing a permanent CENA, each election would develop upon the advancements and successes of the previous electoral season.
108 BOCKELIE
The professionalization of the CENA would improve the quality of electoral process and strengthen democracy by ridding the CENA of political influence. The CENA originally legitimized the electoral process by taking the task of organizing elections away from the central government, which ensured that the population as a whole would accept electoral results and the democratic political system. While CENA was fundamental to establish confidence in democratic elections, Badet believes that the institution has not adequately progressed and can now be used by politicians to manipulate the electoral process. Over the years, the “CENA has started to decline in quality and neutrality. Political actors want a CENA that gives the opportunity to win elections before the election” (Badet, personal communication, 2013). According to some critics, the CENA has become a body that, if politicians can bring under their control, they have a guaranteed win. This politicization has negatively impacted the legitimacy of the CENA and has impeded the rate at which the body can accomplish tasks. The designation of CENA members ought to be based off of professional merit rather than political ideology. Professionalization of the CENA would seek members based off of their technical abilities rather than seeking to a have an EMB that includes all major political tendencies. Julien Oussou, Benin’s National Director of WANEP, advocates for CENA reforms that focus on improving the credibility of elections by publishing results more quickly. Currently, it takes at least a week for CENA to tally votes and the Constitutional Court to announce the results, whereas in more liberal democracies the electorate knows electoral results 24 to 48 hours after the polls close. A professional CENA with more
BOCKELIE 109
technical capabilities could publish results more quickly because the members would have the technical experience and training required to speed-up the process. V.II.II MINIMIZING EXECUTIVE INTERFERENCE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT The Constitutional Court has inspired judicial responsibility in lower courts, assured the constitutionality of newly proposed laws, and offers a mode of recourse for human rights violations. Despite these achievements, the design and institutionalization of the Court provides an opportunity for the government to interfere with the judicial process. The designation of members and the possibility of term renewal have caused issues with the independence and impartiality of the Court. Due to its institutional design, the Constitutional Court has not been able to establish complete autonomy from the government. Gilles Badet mentioned in an interview that situations where the Court should have condemned the executive and did not have become an increasingly standard practice. He notes that Court does this while not technically in violation of the Constitution: “sometimes the Constitutional Court takes a very long time to respond to a question that one poses; occasionally, the Court never responds or responds with surprising arguments that suggest it does not want to condemn to the government” (Badet, personal communication, 2013). During an interview in January, Gilles Badet gives the following outlook on the timeline for the Court’s renewal: “the CC will be renewed this May [2013] for a second mandate. Thus, I doubt that between [January] and May, the members of the CC will make any decisions that upset the government” (Badet, personal communication, 2013). For Gilles Badet, the Constitutional Court has not shown enough initiative on its own to insulate the institution
110 BOCKELIE
from the government’s interference. To address this flaw, the Constitutional court needs to become a professional body, insulated from government influence. One of the largest roadblocks to consolidating a liberal democracy is the designation of members to the Constitutional Court. Currently, the government selects three members and the Bureau of the National Assembly9 selects the other four. This method, however, compromises the independence of the Court. As Charles Badou elucidates, “if the President has the majority in parliament, it is as if he chose all seven members. From that point on, he controls the entire Court” (Badou, personal communication, 2013). Clotaire Olihidé, head of the SAP/ CENA, mentions that the mode of designation has become increasingly criticized in the last couple years because it has begun to pose more issues for the consolidation of liberal democracy. Since 2007, the National Assembly has been “strongly dominated by the Presidential party” which has translated into a Constitutional Court that supports the mouvance présidentielle. Since political bodies select the members of the Court, it becomes a vessel to promote the political ideologies and positions of the government through the judiciary. This de facto breach of the separation of powers compromises the courts ability to effectively guarantee horizontal accountability. To replace the political model of the Constitutional Court, thereby reducing politicization within the Court, members could be designated by their professional family. Under this method of designation, “The magistrate could regroup amongst themselves to designate a magistrate that would sit on the Court” (Badet, personal communication, 2013). The same process would work for the 9
The Bureau of the National Assembly is one of the organs within the institution. It is elected by the Assembly at the beginning of each legislative session and is composed of the president of the National Assembly, a first and second vice-‐president, a first and second questeur to manage the administration of the Assembly, and a first and second secretary.
BOCKELIE 111
designation of lawyers, university professors, jurists, etc. To ensure complete autonomy, the President should not hand-select any members of the Court. After members have been selected, however, the President and the National Assembly could each have an opportunity to provide input on the selection members but it’s necessary that the whole National Assembly approve the appointment and not just seven-member Bureau of the National Assembly. Gilles Badet suggests using a two-thirds or three-quarter majority vote in the National Assembly to approve designated individuals. The fact that members have the option to renew their term on the Court poses a problem for the impartiality of Court decisions. In his interview, Gilles Badet notes, “it is absolutely necessary to eliminate the possibility of renewable terms.” Interviewees offered multiple options to replace renewable terms. Appointments to the Court could follow the US model of appointment for life, or appointment up until the age of retirement, or a non-renewable term longer than the mandate of parliament (four years) and the president (five years) (Badet, 2013; Badou, 2013; Olihidé, 2013). This would offer political continuity and assure true autonomy from executive influence. Charles Badou specifies that establishing “either a term for life or one single term would assure that [members of the Court] did not try to please the President to become renewed.” This eliminates the risk of members falling into Mohiddin’s (2008) “executive-minded trap,” which increases the impartiality of decisions since members will no longer be preoccupied with their job security based off of case rulings. Adopting these recommendations for the institutional design of the CENA and the Constitutional Court will establish horizontal accountability, which gives legitimacy to the entire political system. By making institutions permanent and adapting the mode of
112 BOCKELIE
designation of members to ensure insulation from political influence, especially that of the executive, Benin will have political institutions that can feasibly maneuver the transition to a liberal democracy. CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY The transition to liberal democracy from an electoral democracy requires deepening and expanding democracy beyond just holding free and fair elections to fill political posts. Once a democratic political culture has been established, democratic norms take hold and become a part of every aspect of society, not just the political realm. Even as a deviant democracy, Benin has positive prospects for the transition to liberal democracy. The policies and programs installed in the first 23 years of democracy have contributed to the birth of a political culture based off of equality, peace, and interpersonal trust. Fostering these democratic attitudes through further reforms will help the country complete the transition from electoral democracy to liberal democracy. The recommendations to advance human development through public services and to reform political institutions to reaffirm their independence would promote the shift to a liberal democracy where civil and political liberties are not only protected by law but also in practice. Improving the quality and access to public services, such as education and health care, advances living conditions of the population. Offering free, quality education for all through secondary school establishes equality of opportunity between all members of society. In addition to the economic advancement and social mobility experienced by students that attain secondary education, they will become more politically inclined individuals. Improving the health care system in Benin will lead to a more healthy and
BOCKELIE 113
productive populace that can contribute to society economically, philanthropically, and politically. Expanding public services and improving their quality should continue to be a focal point of the government. This will lead to a positive perception of the government and encourages relationships of trust and reciprocity. In the last two decades, a democratic political culture has solidified itself in Benin. Nonetheless, a political system requires institutions for the state to function. Without well-designed and accountable institutions, even a country that believed wholeheartedly in democracy could fall into the trap of democratic decay. The institutions installed during the first couple years of Benin’s democracy fulfilled the requirements of the time, but today they lack the progressive momentum of the 1990s. To evolve into a liberal democracy, Benin’s political institutions must be reexamined to address issues of diminished autonomy. As the mouvance présidentielle has become more dominant in the parliament the highly political designation of members for the CENA and Constitutional Court has become problematic. The impermanence of membership, and renewable terms in the case of the Court magnifies the politicization of these bodies. Reforming the member selection process to a method that prioritizes technical and vocational expertise as well as changing term limits to make the bodies more permanent and non-renewable would provide insulation from executive interference. These reforms would establish horizontal and vertical accountability, two essential aspects of a liberal democracy.
114 BOCKELIE
Conclusion The collapse of the Soviet Union led to political scientists and the international community to reevaluate democratization theory in the wake of the third wave of democratization blowing across sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s. Benin, a country with low levels of socio-economic and political development as well as a history of political instability and divisive ethno-regional cleavages, paved the way for lasting democratization in francophone Africa. Hosting a sovereign National Conference, all members of Beninese society were given a stake in the political and economic future of the country and an opportunity to give input on the best way to overcome barriers to development. Benin, along with other deviant democracies, has proven that not only can democratization occur at any level of development but also democratic consolidation can occur at low levels of political, economic and human development if the government promotes successful policies and programs and installs autonomous and accountable political institutions. The literature of democratic consolidation demonstrates that many drivers influence the prospects of consolidating a democracy. Socio-economic advancement, which can be measured using the HDI, includes offering complimentary quality education to all citizens and access to and promotion of health care. Measuring levels of development in terms of socio-economic advancement and not simply economic growth provides a more complete understanding of the distribution of wealth and the breadth of impact government policies have on the populace. Promoting socio-economic advancement leads to a positive evaluation of the democratic government, which renders
BOCKELIE 115
the political system more stable since individuals are more satisfied. Producing positive policy outputs also engenders broad political legitimacy, which leads to a more cohesive society that supports democratic rule. In addition, successful socio-economic advancement in democratic societies will encourage the creation of a democratic political culture, one that tolerates difference of opinions and values inter-personal trust, equality, and freedom. While a democratic political culture is certainly necessary for democracy to succeed, it does not appear to be sufficient on its own to catalyze democratic consolidation. Designing autonomous political institutions fulfills the structural and procedural requirements for a democracy to function. Independent institutions, such as the Constitutional Court and the CENA, encourage consolidation through democratic deepening, assuring horizontal and vertical accountability, protecting civil and political liberties, and providing transparency. To maximize their effectiveness and potential as drivers of democratic consolidation, these institutions ought to be professional, permanent, and autonomous to provide oversight of the executive, assure rule of law, and the continuation of the democratic process through free and fair elections. In the 23 years since establishing democratic rule, Benin has successfully consolidated an electoral democracy, meeting not only the most minimal definitions (democracy can be expected to last into the future or has existed for an extended period of time) but has also demonstrated further democratic deepening with the potential of completing a third “wave of transition” to liberal democratic rule. A web of social, economic, and political policies and programs has helped Benin consolidate an electoral democracy. Offering free primary education has boosted enrollment and literacy rates
116 BOCKELIE
amongst the youth. Expanding access to health care has had an important impact on increasing life expectancy and decreasing communicable diseases. Improvements in the education and health care systems correlate with increased support of democracy and political participation expressed in Afrobarometer surveys. The establishment of the Constitutional Court and the CENA in the first few years of democratic rule has proved instrumental in the continuation of the democratic process and offering legitimacy to the regime. The Constitutional Court has asserted itself as the guardian of the Constitution and rule of law, ruling against the executive when he has attempted to bend the ‘rules of the game’ to his benefit. The CENA has successfully organized and carried out free and fair elections since its inception in 1994, including peaceful transfers of power to a new administration. These reforms and institutions have been vital in the consolidation of electoral democracy in Benin. Benin has set itself up well to continue the process of democratic deepening and political development. The democratic system in the country was founded upon a national discourse that sought to debate central issues and propose solutions that would mitigate the repetition of past failures. For example, the National Conference designed a highly proportional electoral system to combat the tendency of the ethno-regional vote knowing that the one-party system installed immediately following decolonization was not a successful electoral design and would not inspire competitive democratic rule. Benin is at a crucial point in the next phase of its political history; after experiencing rampant political development in the first 10 years of its democracy, democratic deepening seems to have started to plateau. Completing the transition to a liberal democracy will require Benin to reassert its commitment to improve the lives of its
BOCKELIE 117
populace through improving public services and redesigning political institutions to ensure that they act independently of presidential ambitions and to provide an impartial check on executive and legislative power. This will require a concerted effort to improve the quality of education and health care. In addition, the professionalization of the Constitutional Court and the CENA along with eliminating the possibility of renewable terms and changing the length of the term would allow both these institutions to make impartial and autonomous decisions.
118 BOCKELIE
Appendix
BOCKELIE 119
Appendix A LIST OF EMPLOYED ACRONYMS AfriMAP AOF CBDH CENA CFA CMR CSO DFID EC EDUCOM EMB FARD-ALAFIA GDP GER GHI GNI GNP HCR HDI IFI IMF IREEP LEPI MCA MCA MDG MENRS NGO OPEC OSIWA PQLI PRD RB SAP UDHR UN UNDP UNESCO
120 BOCKELIE
Africa Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project Afrique Occidentale française Commission béninoise des droits de l'homme Commission électorale nationale autonome Colonies françaises d'Afrique Comité militaire révolutionnaire Civil Society Organization Department for International Development Electoral Commission Education and Community Project Electoral management body Front d'action pour le renouveau démocratique Gross Domestic Product Gross Enrollment Ratio Global Healthcare Initiative Gross National Income Gross National Product Haut Conseil pour la République Human Development Index International financial institutions International Monetary Fund Institut de Recherche Empirique en Économie Politique liste électorale permanente informatisée Millennium Challenge Account Millennium Challenge Account Millennium Development Goal Ministère de l'Éducation national et de la recherche scientifique Non-governmental organization Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Open Society Initiative for West Africa Physical Quality of Life Parti de renouveau démocratique Renaissance du Bénin Secrétariat Administrative Permanant Universal Declaration of Human Rights United Nations United Nations Development Programm United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNICEF USAID WFP
United Nations Children Fund United States Agency for International Development World Food Program
BOCKELIE 121
Appendix B
INTERVIEW BIOGRAPHIES GUSTAVE ASSAH Assah is the Director of the NGO Social Watch Benin, an international network of NGOs dedicated to eradicating poverty and inequality, ending racism and discrimination, as well as promoting human rights. Assah has worked for over 15 years in various junior and senior positions within civil society organizations. GILLES BADET Badet is a jurist and a professor of law at Université d’Abomey Calavi. In addition, he has done substantial work for AFRIMAP (a project started by the Open Society Initiative for West Africa), Chairperson of Civil Commission for Africa, and acts as a Technical Counselor in Governance for Canada’s Agency for International Development in Benin. Badet responds to questions of governance and development in Benin. Badet has received a Masters in democracy and human rights from Université d’Abomey Calavi as well as a Masters in human rights from the Université Catholique de Louvain in Belgium. In addition, he has a Masters of law and international relations. CHARLES BADOU Badou is a lawyer of administrative law and human rights. Badou has received a Masters (DESS) in Law, a Masters of Advanced Studies (DEA) in Democracy and Human rights, and a Diploma of Common law from the Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3 in France. He prepared his doctorate thesis on counterfeit. CLOTAIRE OLIHIDÉ Olihidé is an electoral questions specialist and political analyst. He is currently a member of the Secrétariat Permanant Administrative (SAP- Permanent Administrative Counsel) of CENA and oversaw the shift to LEPI, the permanent electronic voter list. Olihidé studied at the École Nationale d’Administration du Bénin. JULIEN N. OUSSOU Oussou is the National Coordinator of the NGO West African Peacebuilding NetworkBenin (WANEP), an organization founded in response the wave of civil wars that erupted in Western Africa in the 1980s. Oussou specializes in questions regarding human rights, governance, human security, and reducing the risk of natural catastrophes. VICTOR TOPANOU Topanou is a professor of Political Science and Head of the Department of the Faculté du Droit et de Sciences Politiques (FADESP- Faculty of Law and Political Science). DIDACE ZADJI Zadji is the director of the NGO Groupe d'Etude de Recherche et d'Action pour le Développement (GERADD- Research and Action Group for Development), which raises
122 BOCKELIE
awareness about health and wellness. This includes education programs on sexual transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS, obesity and healthy eating in general.
BOCKELIE 123
Appendix C HISTORY OF THE KINGDOM OF DAHOMEY C.I PRE-COLONIAL DAHOMEY Prior to colonization, numerous tribes and ethnic groups controlled different parts of the area now known as the Republic of Benin. In 1625, one of the chiefs won the right to succession from his brother and settled in Abomey. He then conquered the neighboring Kingdom of the Dan to form the Kingdom of Dan-Homey, which French colonizers shortened to Dahomey. Successive kings continued to enlarge Dahomey by conquering neighboring peoples, such as the Yoruba of Nigeria. Beginning in the mid-17th century, the English (1650), Portuguese (1680), and French (1705), established trading posts and forts in Ouidah, a port town in the west of Dahomey. In 1750, the Portuguese founded Porto Novo (Benin’s current capital) in the East near the coast. Throughout the 18th century, Ouidah was the economic lifeblood of the Kingdom of Dahomey. The Dahomeyan Kings sold slaves from the neighboring lands that they had captured to the European powers in exchange for guns. Ouidah’s slave port—known as the point of no return—shipped about 10,000 slaves per year to the America’s for over a century (Ham, 2009). As one of the leading exporters of slaves to Brazil and the Caribbean, Dahomey became known as the Slave Coast. The slave trade in Dahomey flourished, enriching the kings until it was abolished in 1848. The year 1789, at the height of the Kingdom of Dahomey, King Agonglo “lowered taxes, reformed the monetary system, organized growing plots, and took a second wife, a Dutch metisse. These rare victories accrued the prestige of the monarchy” (Médénouvo, 2011, 53). King Ghezo (1818-1858) caused Dahomey to invest in agriculture. The treaty of amicable commerce King Ghezo signed with France in 1851 marks the beginning of French colonization of Dahomey. French control strengthened with an 1863 agreement that placed the Portuguese city of Porto Novo under the protection of France and the 1868 agreement, renewed in 1878, ceding of the port city of Cotonou to France. C.II FRENCH COLONIALIZATION In 1885, Otto Von Bismark invited the European colonial powers to the Berlin Conference to solidify colonial boundaries in Africa and establish rules of navigation and trade to avoid future conflicts between European powers in Africa. In the following years, France entered into treaties with both Germany and Britain to establish Benin’s boundaries. After a breach of the 1878 treaty that placed Cotonou under French possession, France sent 3450 men to defend its right of possession. Senegal and Gabon’s
124 BOCKELIE
tirailleurs 10 made up the majority of the expedition corps sent to Dahomey. The Dahomey expedition led by France “is the most important expedition ever embarked upon in Africa” (Médénouvo, 2011, 30). The mission began in February 1891 and finished in October 1893 with the capture of King Béhanzin, who was sent to exile in Martinique the following year. The French began to solidify their rule over the territory June 22, 1894, when the Dahomey became the “French colony of Dahomey and its dependents.” Although France placed King Agoli-Agbo on the throne of Abomey in 1900, his rule only lasted until the creation of l’Afrique occidental française (AOF) in 1904 when France placed all of Dahomey under direct French administration. The AOF grouped eight French colonies in western Africa to simplify France’s economic and political administration over the territory: Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Niger, Haute-Volta (present-day Burkina Faso), Dahomey, and Côte d’Ivoire. In 1911, a similar organization, Afrique equitoral fraançaise (AEF) was established, which regrouped the French colonies in equatorial western Africa. After nearly half of century of colonial rule with no option for self-determination, France responded to international pressures to integrate colonial subjects into the political system. In 1946, President Charles de Gaulle of France established the Union française, which included France and her colonies as a means for France to retain her dominance and influence in Africa while appeasing the international community’s call for selfgovernment of African states. The Union française allowed the French colonies to participate in political life through the French National Assembly. The construction of the Assembly, however, was such that the colonies influence in French politics remained limited. First, the Assembly was divided into two colleges: one for whites, the “real” French citizens; and one for blacks, composed of the indigenous population of the current and former colonies of France. In addition, de Gaulle stipulated that everyone who had not previously participated in political life, the majority of the African representatives, must choose a political party that already existed and could not simply create their own. This ensured that that the new African delegates were essentially required to adopt the party platform of a pre-existing French party. While the African college was limited in their influence through institutional design, the deputies passed two important laws in 1946 and 1947. The first law voted by the deputies was the law Houphouët-Boigny (named after the political deputy from Côte d’Ivoire), which reversed the section of indigenous law that permitted forced labor. The second law, the law Lamine Guleye (named after the deputy from Senegal), abolished the third part of the indigenous law that differentiated between the French citizen and the French subject.
10
The tirailleurs are an army corps established by Napoleon III in 1857 to complete French conquests in Africa.
BOCKELIE 125
Appendix D CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISIONS INFLUENTIAL FOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT Decision DCC 33-94 EL 07-001 DC 10-116 DCC 96-067 DCC 07-175 DCC 09-002
DCC 11-047
DCC 06-074 DCC 05-139 DCC 05-145 DCC 03-077 DCC 04-065
Content The Constitutional Court declares itself as the keystone of the entire politico-legal system and the cornerstone of Rule of Law in Benin. Affirms the independence and administrative autonomy of the CENA. In reference to the 2010 parliamentary elections, military interventions to transport materials must remain within the parameters of the constitution. The law must apply equally to all citizens with no categorical discriminations. The president may not intervene in the judiciary; that would constitute a breach of judicial independence. Protection of the rights of political minorities (the party or coalition with the least number of members in parliament) to ensure independence from executive intervention. Overturns decision DCC 09-002 by reframing the minority vs. majority debate as presidential coalition vs. opposition. According to Adjolohoun (2007), critics claimed the Court has become a second chamber of parliament. National Consensus is a principe à valeur constitutionnelle, thus any amendment must pass by national referendum. This was in response to an amendment proposed by parliament to extend their mandate to five years from four. Economic arguments do not suffice as justification to amend the Constitution or extend presidential term limits. Establishes horizontal accountability: the suspensions by the Dean during the election of the Bureau of the National Assembly were declared unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court called the parliament to have a new bureau elected within 48 hours in 2003 and 72 hours in 2004.
126 BOCKELIE
Appendix E ADDENDUM: APRIL 2013 REFORM OF BENIN’S ELECTORAL CODE This thesis comprises research completed from the period August 2012 to the beginning of April 2013. While this thesis does not discuss the CENA reform passed by the legislature in April 2013, this legislation has improved the institutional design of Benin’s EMB. On 9 April 2013, Benin adopted a new electoral code, la loi No 2013-06. The reform in the structure and mandate of the CENA increases autonomy and better insulates the EMB from political influence. Henceforth, the CENA is comprised of five members who serve a seven-year nonrenewable term. In addition, the CENA must be put in place no less than 90 days before the end of the current CENA’s mandate. Further increasing political insulation, the President no longer plays a role in the selection of CENA members. Rather, the minority and the majority parliamentary coalitions each select two members for the CENA; the two tendencies must consensually pick the final member of the CENA. An executive counsel three individuals selected by its peers leads the CENA: president, vice-president, and treasurer. Mirroring the makeup of the CENA, the executive counsel must include one CENA member from the majority, one from the opposition, and one agreed upon by both tendencies. An individual Sécretaire Executive permanent (SEP) has replaced the SAP and is comprised of one executive chosen by the executive counsel of the CENA and confirmed by the council of ministers in the parliament. The SEP must have at least 15 years professional experience. These reforms to the institutional design of the CENA assists in the process of democratic consolidation as the electoral process becomes less political and more professional. The equalization of political tendencies in the CENA will help ensure the continuation free and fair elections in Benin. While the recent reform to the electoral code made the CENA into a permanent body, the national assembly still selects the members. The designation of CENA members ought to be based off of professional merit rather than political ideology to ensure autonomy and political insulation.
BOCKELIE 127
Bibliography Adjolohoun, H. S. (2007). Benin (L.L.M. Human Rights and Democratization in Africa). University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa. Afrobarometer. (2005). Démocratie au Bénin : le point de vue de la population béninoise à partir de l’Enquête Afrobaromètre 2005 (No. 17) (pp. 1–8). Afrobarometer. Retrieved from http://afrobarometer.org/files/documents/briefing_papers/AfrobriefNo17.pdf Afrobarometer. (2009). Popular Attitudes toward Democracy in Benin: A Summary of Afrobarometer Indicators, 2005-2008 (pp. 1–14). Afrobarometer. Retrieved from http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/democracy_indicators/ben_r4_di.pdf Agbaje, A. A. B., & Oyediran, O. (2004). Building a System of Comprehensive Accountability to Control Corruption. In Nigeria’s struggle for democracy and good governance: a festschrift for Oyeleye Oyediran. Ibadan University Press. Alemán, J., & Yang, D. D. (2011). A Duration Analysis of Democratic Transitions and Authoritarian Backslides. Comparative Political Studies, 44(9), 1123–1151. doi:10.1177/0010414011405460 Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. SAGE. American Political Science Association. (2005). Assessing the quality of democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. ARGA. (2012). Evaluation du système électoral et de la Commission Électorale Nationale Autonome (CENA). Alliance pou Refonder la Gouvernance en Afrique. Retrieved from http://base.afriquegouvernance.net/fr/corpus_bipint/fiche-bipint-1020.html Assah, G. (2013, January 21). Entretien avec Gustave ASSAH, directeur du Social Watch-Bénin. (J. Bockelie, Trans.). Badet, G. (2013, January 8). Entretien avec Gilles Badet, professeur du droit. (J. Bockelie, Trans.). Badou, C. (2013, January 8). Entretien avec Charles Badou, l’avocat des Droits de l’Homme. (J. Bockelie, Trans.). Baldé, S. (2001). Niger: Situation institutionnelle. Sciences Po- Bordeaux. Retrieved from http://www.etat.sciencespobordeaux.fr/institutionnel/niger.html Basedau, M. (1999). Niger. In Elections in Africa: a data handbook (pp. 677–696). Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. Basedau, M. (2011). Managing Ethnic Conflict: The Menu of Institutional Engineering. GIGA, Working Paper No 171. Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1883456 Beetham, D. (1994). Conditions for Democratic Consolidation. Review of African Political Economy, 21(60), 157–172. doi:10.2307/4006202 Bellin, E. (2004). The Political-economic Conundrum: The Affinity of Economic and Political Reform in the Middle East and North Africa. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Bénin. Constitution de la République du Bénin (1990). Retrieved from http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b57d4.html Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2012a). BTI 2012- Benin Country Report (p. 24). Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Retrieved from http://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2012/pdf/BTI%202012%20Benin.pdf Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2012b). BTI 2012- Niger Country Report (p. 30). Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Retrieved from http://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2012/pdf/BTI%202012%20Benin.pdf
128 BOCKELIE
Besley, T., & Kudamatsu, M. (2006). Health and Democracy. The American Economic Review, 96(2), 313–318. doi:10.2307/30034665 Boix, C. (1999). Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies. The American Political Science Review, 93(3), 609–624. doi:10.2307/2585577 Brancati, D. (2006). Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism? International Organization, 60(03), 651–685. doi:10.1017/S002081830606019X Bratton, M. (2007). Formal Versus Informal Institutions in Africa. Journal of Democracy, 18(3), 96–110. Bratton, M., & Van de Walle, N. (1994). Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa. World Politics, 46(4), 453–489. doi:10.2307/2950715 Bratton, M., & Van de Walle, N. (1997). Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press. Calingaert, D. (2006). Election Rigging and How to Fight It. Journal of Democracy, 17(3), 138–151. doi:10.1353/jod.2006.0043 Carothers, T. (2002). The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 13(1), 5–21. CIA. (2013a). CIA - The World Factbook: Benin (World Factbook). Central Intelligence Agency [US]. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bn.html CIA. (2013b). Niger. Central Intelligence Agency. Cohen, J. M., Peterson, S. B., & Development, H. I. for I. (1997). Administrative decentralization: a new framework for improved governance, accountability, and performance. Harvard Institute for International Development, Harvard University. Cutright, P. (1963). National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis. American Sociological Review, 28(2), 253–264. doi:10.2307/2090612 Dahl, R. A. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation & Opposition. Yale University Press. Decalo, S. (1997). Benin: First of the New Democracies. In Political Reform in Francophone Africa (pp. 43–61). Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Diallo, S. (2010). Gratuité de la Césarienne au Bénin (p. 11). Dakar: UNICEF. Diamond, L. (1992). Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered. American Behavioral Scientist, 35(4-5), 450–499. doi:10.1177/0002764292035004007 Diamond, L. (1999). Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. JHU Press. Diamond, L. (2004). Building a System of Comprehensive Accountability to Control Corruption. In A. Agbaje, L. Diamond, & E. Onwudiwe (Eds.), Nigeria’s Struggle for Democracy and Good Governance (pp. 221– 240). Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. Diamond, L. (2008, March 1). The Democratic Rollback. Foreign Affairs, (March/April 2008). Retrieved from http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63218/larry-diamond/the-democratic-rollback Diamond, L. (2002). Thinking About Hybrid Regimes. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 21–35. doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0025 Diamond, L. (2009). The spirit of democracy : the struggle to build free societies throughout the world. New York: Times Books/Henry Holt and Co. Diamond, L., Plattner, M. F., Chu, Y., & Tien, H. (Eds.). (1997). Consolidating the third wave democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Doorenspleet, R., & Kopecký, P. (2008). Against the Odds: Deviant Cases of Democratization. Democratization, 15(4), 697–713. doi:10.1080/13510340802191045 Dorier-Apprill, É. (2006). Les échelles du pluralisme religieux en Afrique subsaharienne. L’Information géographique, 70(4), 46. doi:10.3917/lig.704.0046
BOCKELIE 129
Easterly, W., & Levine, R. (1997). Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1203–1250. doi:10.1162/003355300555466 Elde, H. B. (2012, May 31). Literacy rates are rising – but not fast enough. World Education Blog. Retrieved from http://efareport.wordpress.com/2012/05/31/literacy-rates-are-rising-but-not-fast-enough/ Elgie, R., & McMenamin, I. (2011). Explaining the Onset of Cohabitation under Semi‐presidentialism. Political Studies, 59(3), 616–635. Ephraim Yuchtman-Ya’ar, & Yasmin Alkalay. (2010). Political Attitudes in the Muslim World. Journal of Democracy, 21(3), 122–134. doi:10.1353/jod.0.0183 Ethan B. Kapstein, & Nathan Converse. (2008). Why Democracies Fail. Journal of Democracy, 19(4), 57–68. doi:10.1353/jod.0.0031 Freedom House. (2010). Benin- 2010 (No. 2010). Freedom House. Retrieved from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/benin Freedom House. (2012a). Benin- 2012 (No. 2012). Freedom House. Retrieved from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/benin Freedom House. (2012b). Niger- 2012 (No. 2012). Freedom House. Retrieved from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/niger Fuglestad, F. (1983). A History of Niger, 1850-1960. Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press. Fukuyama, F. (1996). Languages of Good and Evil. In Trust: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (pp. 33–42). Simon and Schuster. Fukuyama, F. (2011). Toward a Theory of Political Development. In The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (pp. 436–484). Macmillan. Galor, O. (2010). The Demographic Transition: Causes and Consequences. Brown University, Working Paper O10, J1, 1–35. Gauchet, M. (2002). Démocratie, éducation, philosophie. In Pour une philosophie politique de l’éducation (pp. 11–43). Bayard. Gazibo, M. (2012). Beyond electoral democracy: foreign aid and the challenge of deepening democracy in Benin. Retrieved April 17, 2013, from http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/workingpapers/2012/en_GB/wp2012-033/ Gerein, N., Green, A., & Pearson, S. (2006). The Implications of Shortages of Health Professionals for Maternal Health in Sub-Saharan Africa. Reproductive Health Matters, 14(27), 40–50. doi:10.1016/S09688080(06)27225-2 GHI. (2011, November). Global Health Initiative: Benin Country Strategy. United States Global Health Initiative. Retrieved from http://www.ghi.gov/documents/organization/178896.pdf Gisselquist, R. M. (2008). Democratic Transition and Democratic Survival in Benin. Democratization, 15(4), 789–814. doi:10.1080/13510340802191078 Gisselquist, R. M. (2012). Good Governance as a Concept, and Why This Matters for Development Policy (Working Paper No. UNU-WIDER Research Paper WP2012/30). World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). Retrieved from http://ideas.repec.org/p/unu/wpaper/wp2012-30.html Glewwe, P., Maiga, E., & Zheng, H. (2007). The Contribution of Education to Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of the Evidence. University of Minnesota, 1–50. Guingnido Gaye, J. (2003). Rapport de suivi sur l’Éducation pour tous 2003/04: Cas de la République du Bénin (p. 13). Cotonou, Bénin: UNFPA-Cotonou. Retrieved from http:// unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001467/146771f.pdf
130 BOCKELIE
Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2004). Democratic reform in Africa: the quality of progress. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Gyimah-Brempong, K. (2011). Education and Economic Development in Africa. African Development Review, 23(2), 219–236. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8268.2011.00282.x Ham, A. (2009). West Africa (7th ed.). Footscray, Vic. ; London: Lonely Planet. Hanson, S. (2007). Urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/africa/urbanization-sub-saharan-africa/p14327 Harber, C. (1997). Education, Democracy, and Political Development in Africa. Sussex Academic Pr. Harber, C. (1998). Desegregation, Racial Conflict and Education for Democracy in the New South Africa: A Case Study of Institutional Change. International Review of Education/Internationale Zeitschrift fuer Erziehungswissenschaft/Revue Internationale de l’Education, 44(5), 569–82. Hounkpé, M. (2011a). Bénin. In Election Management Bodies in West Africa: A comparative study of the contribution of electoral commissions to the strengthening of democracy. Open Society Initiative for West Africa. Hounkpé, M. (2011b). Bénin. In Election Management Bodies in West Africa: A comparative study of the contribution of electoral commissions to the strengthening of democracy. Open Society Initiative for West Africa. Huber, E., Rueschemeyer, D., & Stephens, J. D. (1993). The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(3), 71–86. doi:10.2307/2138443 Huntington, S. P. (1965). Political Development and Political Decay. World Politics, 17(3), 386–430. doi:10.2307/2009286 Huntington, S. P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century. University of Oklahoma Press. Huntington, S. P. (1996). Democracy for the Long Haul. Journal of Democracy, 7(2), 3–13. doi:10.1353/jod.1996.0028 Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton University Press. IREEP. (2013, January 17). Disponibilité, accessibilité et qualité des services publics au Bénin. Communiqué de Presse presented at the Dissémination des Résultats du Round 5 des Enquêtes Afrobaromètre au Benin, Cotonou, Bénin. Joseph, R. A. (1999). State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa. Lynne Rienner Pub. Kakai, S. H. F. (2010). Précis sur la société civile béninoise/ A Treaty on Civil Society in Benin. Studia Europaea, LV, 51–70. Kirkby, D. (2009, September). President Tandja’s Referendum - Niger’s Threat to Democracy. Consultancy Africa Intelligence. Retrieved from http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=229:presidenttandjas-referendum-nigers-threat-to-democracy&catid=57:africa-watch-discussion-papers&Itemid=263 La Cour Constitutionnelle. (2007). La Cour Constitutionnelle-Bénin. Cour Constitutionnelle du Bénin. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from http://www.cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org/courconsbj.html La République Française. (2008, July). Histoire : La France au Bénin. Abassade de la France au Bénin. Government. Retrieved January 16, 2013, from www.ambafrancebj.org/spip.php?page=mobile_art&art=276 Lewis, P. (2008). Growth Without Prosperity in Africa. Journal of Democracy, 19(4), 95–109. Lindberg, S. I. (2006). Democracy and Elections in Africa. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Linz, J. J. (1990). The Perils of Presidentialism. Journal of Democracy, 1(1), 51–69.
BOCKELIE 131
Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996). “Stateness,” Nationalism, and Democratization. In Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (pp. 16–37). JHU Press. Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1997). Toward Consolidated Democracies. In Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies (pp. 14–33). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. The American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69–105. doi:10.2307/1951731 Magnusson, B. A. (1999). Testing democracy in Benin: experiments in institutional reform. In State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa (pp. 197–216). Boulder, Colo: L. Rienner. Magnusson, B. A. (2001). Democratization and Domestic Insecurity: Navigating the Transition in Benin. Comparative Politics, 33(2), 211–230. doi:10.2307/422379 Magnusson, B. A., & Clark, J. F. (2005). Understanding Democratic Survival and Democratic Failure in Africa: Insights from Divergent Democratic Experiments in Benin and Congo (Brazzaville). Comparative Studies in Society and History, 47(03), 552–582. doi:10.1017/S0010417505000253 Médénouvo, F. (2011). Histoire du Bénin Moderne. (J. Bockelie, Trans.). Le Perroquet. Ministre du Développement de l’économie et des finances. (2006). Stratégie pour l’atteinte des OMD au Bénin : objectifs No 2 et 3 (pp. 1–47). UNDP. Mohiddin, A. (2008). Unchecked Executive Powers: Lessons in Effective Government Design. South African Institute of International Affairs, 11. Morris, D. M. (1996, August). Light in the Tunnel: The Changing Condition of the World’s Poor. The Brown University Op-Ed Service. Retrieved December 2, 2012, from http://www.brown.edu/Administration/News_Bureau/Op-Eds/Morris.html Mozaffar, S. (2002). Patterns of Electoral Governance in Africa’s Emerging Democracies. International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, 23(1), 85–101. doi:10.2307/1601412 Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2006). Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment. Journal of Democracy. Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1557727 Nhamo, S., & Nhamo, G. (2006). Macroeconomics, (Adult) Education, and Poverty Eradication in Southern Africa. International Review of Education, 52(3-4), 305–322. doi:10.1007/s11159-006-0009-6 O’Donnell, G. A. (1997). Illusions About Consolidation. In L. J. Diamond (Ed.), Consolidating the third wave democracies (pp. 40–57). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Olihidé, C. A. (2011). La Liste Electorale Permanente Informatisée (LEPI) au Bénin: avancée démocratique ou assassinat programmé de la démocratie? Benin: Editions FIPA. Olihidé, C. A. (2013, January 22). Entretien avec Clotaire Olihidé, en service au SAP/CENA. (J. Bockelie, Trans.). OSIWA. (2013). Benin: overview. Open Society Initiative for West Africa. Retrieved April 17, 2013, from http://www.osiwa.org/en/portal/countries/?tpl=12&tpid=2 Oussou, J. (2013, January 14). Entretien and Julien Oussou, coordinateur national du WANEP-Bénin. (J. Bockelie, Trans.). Oxford English Dictionary. (2013). Definition of democracy in Oxford Dictionaries (British & World English). Retrieved from http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/democracy Population Reference Bureau. (2010). Female Genital Mutilation/ Cutting Data and Trends (No. Update 2010) (p. 9). Population Reference Bureau. Retrieved from http://www.prb.org/pdf10/fgm-wallchart2010.pdf Posner, D. N. (2004a). The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi. American Political Science Review, 98(04), 529–545. doi:10.1017/S0003055404041334
132 BOCKELIE
Posner, D. N. (2004b). Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa. American Journal of Political Science, 48(4), 849–863. Posner, D. N. (2007). Regime Change and Ethnic Cleavages in Africa. Comparative Political Studies, 40(11), 1302–1327. doi:10.1177/0010414006291832 Posner, D. N., & Young, D. J. (2007). The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa. Journal, 18(3), 126– 40. Power, T. J., & Gasiorowski, M. J. (1997). Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World. Comparative Political Studies, 30(2), 123–155. doi:10.1177/0010414097030002001 Przeworski, A., Cheibub, J. A., Limongi Neto, F. P., & Alvarez, M. M. (1996). What Makes Democracies Endure? Journal of Democracy, 7(1), 39–55. doi:10.1353/jod.1996.0016 Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R. Y. (1993). Explaining Institutional Performance. In Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (pp. 83–120). Princeton University Press. Pye, L. W. (1965). The Concept of Political Development. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 358(1), 1–13. doi:10.1177/000271626535800102 Quainoo, S. E. (2000). The Search for an African Democracy Model. In Transitions and Consolidation of Democracy in Africa (pp. 125–144). Global Academic Publishing. Reglement Interieur de la Cour Constitutionnelle. Reynal-Querol, M. (2002). Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(1), 29–54. Robinson, P. T. (1994). The National Conference Phenomenon in Francophone Africa. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 36(3), 575–610. doi:10.2307/179297 Ross, M. L. (2001). Does Oil Hinder Democracy? World Politics, 53(03), 325–361. doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0011 Rostow, W. W. (1991). The Five Stages of Growth: A summary. In The Stages of Economic Growth: A NonCommunist Manifesto (pp. 4–16). Cambridge University Press. Rota- Graziosi, G., Caldeira, E., & Foucault, M. (2010). Decentralization in Africa and the nature of local governments’ competition: evidence from Benin (Working Paper No. 201019). CERDI. Retrieved from http://ideas.repec.org/p/cdi/wpaper/1176.html Rotman, A. (2003). Benin’s Constitutional Court: An Institutional Model for Enforcing Human Rights. bepress Legal Series. Retrieved from http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/104 Rustow, D. A. (1970). Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. Comparative Politics, 2(3), 337– 363. doi:10.2307/421307 Saideman, S. M., Lanoue, D. J., Campenni, M., & Stanton, S. (2002). Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1985-1998. Comparative Political Studies, 35(1), 103– 129. doi:10.1177/001041400203500108 Schmitter, P. C., & Guilhot, N. (2000). De la transition à la consolidation. Une lecture rétrospective des ~~democratization studies~~. Revue française de science politique, 50(4), 615–632. doi:10.3406/rfsp.2000.395500 Schneider, G., & Wiesehomeier, N. (2008). Rules That Matter: Political Institutions and the Diversity—Conflict Nexus. Journal of Peace Research, 45(2), 183–203. doi:10.1177/0022343307087176 Schumpeter, J. A. (2008). The Classical Doctrine of Democracy. In Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy: Third Edition (pp. 250–268). HarperCollins. Shugart, M. S., & Carey, J. M. (1992). Premier-presidentialism, President-parliamentarism. In Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (pp. 55–76). Cambridge University Press. Siaroff, A. (2009). Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics. University of Toronto Press.
BOCKELIE 133
Stein, J. M. (1975). The effect of adrenaline and of alpha- and beta-adrenergic blocking agents on ATP concentration and on incorporation of 32Pi into ATP in rat fat cells. Biochemical pharmacology, 24(18), 1659–1662. Stewart, J. (2012). Democracy in Benin: achievements and challenges. UNU-WIDER. Retrieved from http://recom.wider.unu.edu/article/democracy-benin-achievements-and-challenges Szirmai, A. (2005). The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Development: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press. Tanoh, G. (2010, January 7). Eight Tips For Reducing Wait Times In Congested Healthcare Facilities. The Afro News. Canada. Retrieved from http://www.theafronews.ca/2013/01/07/11048/ Topanou, V. (2013, January 24). Entretien avec Victor Topanou, chef du département des sciences politiques. (J. Bockelie, Trans.). UNDP. (2010). Bénin : Progrès vers l’atteinte des OMD (p. 8). United Nations Development Programme. UNDP. (2011a). Benin: Success Story. UN Development Program. United Nations. Retrieved April 17, 2013, from http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/global_programmes/global_pr ogrammeforelectoralcyclesupport/highlights/benin_success_story.html UNDP. (2011b). Le PNUD au Bénin : Les Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement (p. 2). United Nations Development Programme. Retrieved from http://www.bj.undp.org/fr/omd2.html UNDP. (2013). Explanatory note on 2013 HDR composite indices: Benin (Human Development Reoprt) (pp. 1– 5). United Nations Development Programme. UNESCO. (2000). L’évaluation de l’éducation pour tous à l’an 2000: Rapport du Bénin. Porto Novo: UNESCO. Retrieved from http://www.unesco.org/education/wef/countryreports/benin/contents.html UNESCO Institute for Statistics. (2012). Adult and youth literacy, 1990-2015: analysis of data for 41 selected countries. Montreal, Canada. Retrieved from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002174/217409e.pdf UNESCO Institute for Statistics. (2013, January). Primary education (ISCED 1) Net enrolment rate. UN Data. United Nations. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Net+enrolment+rate&d=UNESCO&f=series%3aNER_1 United Nations General Assembly. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml United Nations General Assembly. (2010). Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education (pp. 1–2). New: UN. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG_FS_2_EN.pdf United Nations Population Fund. (2007). UNFPA State of World Population, 2007 : Unleashing the Possibility of Urban Growth. New York: United Nations Population Fund. USAID. (2012, April). President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI): Benin. U.S. Agency for International Development. Retrieved from http://pmi.gov/countries/profiles/benin_profile.pdf Van de Walle, N. (2002). Africa’s Range of Regimes. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 66–80. doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0032 Villalón, L. A., & Idrissa, A. (2005). Repetitive Breakdowns and a Decade of Experiments: Institutional Choices and Unstable Democracy in Niger. In The Fate Of Africa’s Democratic Experiments: Elites And Institutions (pp. 27–48). Indiana University Press. Villalón, L. A., & VonDoepp, P. (2005). Elites, Institutions, and the Varied Trajectories of Africa’s Third Wave Democracies. In The Fate Of Africa’s Democratic Experiments: Elites And Institutions (pp. 1–26). Indiana University Press. WANEP. (2011). Election dispute management: practice guide for West Africa : towards an actionable African solution to African problem. Cantoments-Accra: West Africa Network for Peacebuilding.
134 BOCKELIE
Wantchekon, L., & De La O, A. L. (2011). Experimental Research on Democracy and Development. In J. N. Druckman, D. P. Green, J. H. Kuklinski, & A. Lupia (Eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press. Wantchekon, L., & Jensen, N. (2004). Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa. Comparative Political Studies, 37(7), 816–841. WHO. (2012a). Conférence nationale pour le renforcement de la gratuité des soins de santé au Niger. World Health Organization- Regional Office for Africa. Retrieved from http://www.afro.who.int/fr/niger/pressmaterials/item/4416-conf%C3%A9rence-nationale-pour-le-renforcement-de-la-gratuit%C3%A9-des-soinsde-sant%C3%A9-au-niger.html WHO. (2012b, May). Country Cooperation Strategy : Benin at a Glance- Health and Development. World Health Organization. Wiig, A., & Kolstad, I. (2012). If diversification is good, why don’t countries diversify more? The political economy of diversification in resource-rich countries. Energy Policy, 40(0), 196–203. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2011.09.041 World Bank. (2002). Opening Doors: Education and the World Bank. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications. World Bank. (2009). Knowledge in Developement: Security and Development. Retrieved from http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:22452792~ pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:469382~isCURL:Y,00.html Zadji, D. (2013, January 28). Entretien avec Didace Zadji, directeur du GERADD. (J. Bockelie, Trans.).
BOCKELIE 135
