Demystifying Syrian Foreign Policy under Bashar al

I Demlstifying Syria Samir Aita, 'The Political Economy of the Banking Sector in Syrial unpubllshedpaper,zoo 8. 8. Aiman Abd al-Nur, Syrian Viewsof an AssociationAgreementwitb the EuropeanUnion,EuroMeSCoPaperno. r4, Lisbon zoor. Mtanious Habib, 'The SyrianEconomyand rhe Conditions of the EuroMediterraneanPartnershiplunpublished paper,zooo (Arabic); Nabil Sukkar,'Economic Reforms and the Euro-MediterraneanPartnershipl unpublishedpaper,zooo (Arabic). IO. SeeAnja Zorob, 'The Syrian-EuropeanAssociationAgreementand its Potenciallmpacr on Enhancing the Credibiliry of Reform',Meditelranean Politics,vol.r3,no. r, zoo8,pp. r-zr. The following accountis basedon the texcofthe draft Syrian-European AssociationAgreementaspublishedon rheEuropeanCommission's official website. Agriculcuralconcessions grantedto most of the other MPCs havebeen renegotiatedand extendedin the meantime.Lebanonwasgranteddutyfreeaccess for all ofits agriculturalexportsexcepra list ofgoodsfor which have quotas beenset. Lj. SeeAnja Zorob, Syrienim Spannungsfeld zwischender Euro-Meditenanen Partnerscbaf und der GrossenArabischenFreihandekzoar,Saarbruecken z oo6. r+. Ibid.; SamirSaifan,'TheServicesSectorin the Syrian-EuropeanAssociation Agreemenrlunpublishedpaper,zoo5. r5 . ln the springof zoo8,a competitionlaw wasissuedafterlongyearsof being drafted.Syrianand foreign expertsdo not expeccchelaw to be implemented in the nearfuture. t 6. SeeAnja Zorob, 'Intraregional Economic Integration: The Casesof GAFTA and MAFTAI in Cilja Harders and Matteo Legrenzi,eds.Beyond Regionalism?, Aldershot zoo8, pp. t69-9. 17. ln February Loo7, a pilot programme called Industrial Modernisation and UpgradingProgrammefor the SyrianArab Republic,sponsoredby cheUnired NacionsIndustrialDevelopmencOrganisationand the Icalian government,startedco be implemented.Ic doesnot appearco be directly connecredco the AA. 7.

N IN E

DemystifyingSyrianForeignPolicy underBasharal-Asad Bassel E Salloukh

Almost two decadesago Itamar Rabinovich noted chat Syrian policy in Lebanon can be seen'asa refection of the regimet priorities and capabilides and as an insrrumenr calculated ro accomplish addicional, far more ambitious, purposes'.'Syria'sregional infuence under Hafiz al-Asad was to a large measure due to Damascust successin subduing Lebanon and deploying ic in the serviceof Syria'sgeopolitical objecrives,but especially the president's perennial quest to demonstrate to both \X/ashington and Tel Aviv Syriat indispensability to any viable peace process.'The madein-Lebanon Syrian regional'empire'r also served to bolster the stability of the regime in Damascus.After all, both Hafiz and larer Bashar al-Asad assumedthat there is a causalconnection between rhe weight of Syria'srole in its immediate environment and the srability of rhe Ba'rhi regime.nIn this respecr,Lebanon has servedas both a tool to advanceSyrian regional policy and an advancebuffer against threats to regime srability. Although the manrle of the presidencyhasshifted from father to son and the countryt geopolitical environment has changeddramaricallyfollowing the attacksof Septemberzoor and the Unired Srates'invasion and occuparion of lraq, Syria'sLe banon policy remainsa valid prism rhrough which ro view

Demystifuing Syna irs geopoliticalobjectives.Thewithdrawalof SyriantrooPsfrom Lebanonon Lebanon's udlity to Syrianinterests. z5April zoo5paradoxicallyheightened Henceforth,the batdeoverpost-SyriaLebanonis likely to determinethe outcomeof Syria'sregionaland internationalforeignpolicy contests. Cornpar ing A I ternatiu e Exp lan at ions Srudiesof Syrian foreign policy under Basharal-Asadposit a number of explanatoryvariables.Balance-of-powerexplanationsunderscorethe geopoliticalorigins of the Syrianregime'salignment and foreignpolicy choices.s According to this view,statebehaviourunder Basharis shaped by a set of externalthreatsto Syria'ssecurity,especiallyUS hegemonyin the Middle Eastafterthe fall of Baghdadin April zoo3 andthe persistent Israelimenace.Syriat regionaland internationalalignments,namelythe rapprochementswith Tirrkey,Jordan,EgyP, and Iraq after zooo, along with the opening up to Europe until zoo5, servedto balanceagainsr thesestrategicthreats.Similarly,the Syrianregimet questto diversifyits internationallinkagesrepresentedan attemPt to mobilisenon-\Testern effortsby W'ashingtonand Paristo isolateSyria coalitionscounterbalance of former LebanesePrimeMinister RafiqHariri on afterthe assassination r4 February zoo5.nAnother variant of this rype of systemicexplanarion locatesSyria'sforeignpolicy choicesin the dynamicsof its long-standing alliancegamewith lran.7 politicaleconomy,regime argumentshighlightsectarian, Domestic-level legicimacyand regimesecurityvariables.Sectarianargumenrsemphasise the 'Alawi identity of the regime,especiallyvis-I-visIran and Hizbullah. Proponentsof this view contend that Syria'sforeignpolicy under Bashar

uemlsr{ltng JjrMn horetgnI'ohcyunderBasharal_Asad to attemprsto diversifySyriateconomicrelationsor to ameliorarerhe economy'ssrrucruralcrisisand offsetdemandsfor deepereconomic liberalisarion."The 'openingto the East'- as syrianofficialslabel the policy of cultivaringdensereconomicrelarionswirh china and India makesavailablero rhe regimenew technologyand credit markets rhar are free of N7'estern economicand polirical condicionalicy. conversely, regimelegirimacyexplanarionslink whar is d to be a rejecrion^oresume isr, Arab narionalisrideoiogy vis-).-visIsrael ro the regime'squest for domesticlegirimationin light of its minority secrariansocialbase.,' Such ideologicalexplanationsfail the empirical resr,however.srudies of Syria's posirionsregardingpeacenegoriarions wirh Israel,borh under Hafiz and Bashar,suggesrthat failureshouldbe blamedon Israeli,rarher than syrian,inflexibility.'rMoreover,the steadyopeningtowards Iraq underBasharwasgovernedby balance-of-power andpoliricaleconomic considerarions, nor ideologicalones.'a Finalry,and base d on a cririqueof realism's preoccupacion with externalthreatsro sraresecuriry,,, the regrme securiryperspective explainsforeignpolicy choicesin rermsof rheregime's evaluarionof the impacr rhat overlappingdomesricand exrernalthrears might haveon its survival.'6 Suchargumenrs areimplicit in a numberof studiesof Syriansrarebehaviourunder Bashar,bur rhey generallylack theoreticalarriculation.,T Perhaps themostpopularexplanation for Bashar's foreignpolicychoices, especially in wesrernandArabpolicyandmediacircies,is the idiosyncradc

with the Sunni PalestinianmovementHAMAS, nor doesit accountfor the incompatibleinrerestsand policiesimplementedby Syria,Iran and Hizbullah in the wake of the occuPationof Iraq and with regardto the

variant rhar underscores rhe new Syrianleader'sinexperiencein forergn affairsandhis consequenr stringof miscalculadons, which incurredregional and internarional isolarionand broughtrheBa'thiregimero rhebrink of collapse.'8 comparing Bashartstraregicand dipromaticskillsto thoseof Hafiz,DennisRossarguesrharrheformer'seems ro havenoneofhis farher's guile and appearsto havean exrraordinarycapaciryfor miscalcularionr,, Similarly,EyalZisserblamesthe syrianregime's domesricandinrernarional troublesin the wakeof rhe us invasionof Iraq on'syriat own mistakes, rootedin rhe misreadingand misinrerprerarion of the regionaland international,especially American,politicalscenes] 'failure aswell ason Bashar's

peaceprocesswith Israel.' Political economyexplanationsfor Syria'sforeign policy choicesare often appendedto realist arguments.r'They connectstatebehaviour

... ro srepinro his farher'sshoesand establish himselfasa respected and authoritative leaderboth at homeand abroadl,.Bashar's hosirl. opposition to rhe US invasionof Iraq inhis z7 March zoo3 interviewwith the

a'Shi'i crescent'gathering is driven by Shfi politik, the questto assemble leaderships' Damascus,Tehranand Hizbullah, to pursuetheir respective Yet rhis argumenrneither explainsSyria'salignment secrarianinteresrs.s

ueTnlstr))Lng J))na Lebanesedailyal-Saf.r,Syria'ssubsequentrole in sabotagingthe occuparion

basedon balancing and regime security calculationsrather than on Bashar

of Iraq by funnelling fighters and military suppliesacrossits borders,the

al-Asad'spresumed miscalculations.'5

failureto deliveron promisesmadeto US Secretaryof StateColin Powell in May zo03,the renewalofEmile Lahoud'spresidendaltenurein Lebanon

'Tltis is Not a Stornt'

in SeptemberLoo+ and the ensuingconfrontationwirh cheUS, France and the United Nations SecurityCouncil over United Nations Security are Council Resolutionr559,which culminatedin Hariri's assassination, all presentedasexamplesof the Syrianregime'sgrossmiscalculations. Themiscalculations thesisis basedon the neo-conservative assumption that statestend to bandwagon rather than balancewhen they facesuperior and highly mobile military forceslike the onesmadepossibleby the American army'sRevolution in MilitaryAffairs (RMA)." Regime-change advocares, whether in Washingtonor the Middle East,assumedthat the states' overthrowof SaddamHusseinwould frightenotherso-called'rogue into submissionto Americanpower.Theyforesawa'cascade of democratic dominos',or at leastrhe spreadofliberal democraticinstitutions,throughout the Middle Eastfollowing the fall of Saddam's regime.This,it wasexpected, would end the menaceof terrorism,alterthe regionalbalanceofpower in favour of the US and Israeland secureAmerican interestsin a transformed Middle East." Syriawas expectedto jump on the US bandwagonin a reconfiguredregional order, assistingin, rather t}ran resisting,the making of the prospectivepost-Saddampax Arnericana. As balancingcheorypredicts,however,threatenedstatesrarelylend support in sucha way,either becausethis makesthe threateningstateeven stronger,or becauseconficts of interestbetweenthe two statesareoften irreconcilable.'rRather,realistsbelievethat statesoperateaccordingto balancinglogicand threatenedstateswill pursuea rangeof difterent strateand opposition,includingbalancing,balking, giesin the faceof resistance binding, blackmailand delegitimation.'+Facedwith the prospectof US

The fall of Baghdad representeda dramatic evencfor the Syrian regime. ln his z7 March zool interview with al-Safr, Bashar exaggeratedIraq's ability to withstand the US invasion. 'The United Sratesand Britain will not be able to control all of lraq,' he declared.'There is now a very strong resistanceby the army and the people in Iraq,' he continued, one that would dwarf the resistancethat Israel encountered in Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories.'6 According to his interviewer, Bashar expectedSaddam'sregime to survive for six months and that the Iraqi army would infict heavy casualriesupon the invading rroops.'7This explainsthe unexpected silencewith which Damascus receivednews of the fall of the Ba'thi regime in Baghdad. Yet after a short hiatus, Syria began balancing against the US occupation of lraq. Damascusinterprets the invasion and occupation of Iraq asa direct threac to Syria'sgeopolitical interests and consequently to regime security. 'This is nor a storm] al-Asadcontendedin the aforementionedinterview 'for a storm passesjand one can evadea storm by hiding. Rather, the invasion of Iraq rs a US-Israeli 'plan] one that 'you cannot bow to'; it seeksto 'reorganiserhe region] startingin Baghdad,in a manner that protects US and Israelistraregic interests.lVhether the plan is to divide the region into sectarian states- the Israelioption, accordingto Bashar- or other rypesof grouping congenialto US interests,Damascushas interpreted the invasion and occuparion of Iraq as a severechallenge.A stable,pro-American governmenr in Iraqwould tighten the chain of pro-Western statesaround Syria,ieaving Damascusbreathing spaceonly in Lebanon. Alternatively, Iraqt vivisection along secrarianand

hegemonyin the Middle East,and the threat this posesto Syria'sgeopolitical incerestsand regimesecurity,Damascushasrespondedwith a mix

erhnic lines would expose Syria'sown Sunni-'Alawi cleavagesand encour-

of classicbalancing,asymmeuicbalancingand balking.Iraq andLebanon emergedasthe two principal arenasin which this balancingbehaviourhas

privileges. This would undercut the unity of the Syrian population and con-

the Syrianregime's beenplayedout. The remainderof this chaptertecreaces of securityenvironmentafter the fall of Baghdadand the assassination

collapseof the Iraqi regime made Damascusfearful that a trigger-happyBush

Hariri to offer an alternativeexplanationof its foreignpolicy choices,one

zoor regime-changerhetoric emanating from Washington identifie d Syria as

r 6t

ageits Kurdish community to demand greaterpolitical and socio-economic sequentlythe stability of the regime.'8Moreover, the spectacularand sudden administration might move against Syria.'eAfter all, rhe post-September

T6 J

a priority target in the so-called 'war on terrorism'.'o The fall of Baghdad left

and Syriat reintegrarion into the peaceprocess.Sulaiman'sarticle was not

many capitals and commentators in the Arab world wonderingwho would

without threats,however. Failing to reach a deal and insisting instead on

be next, and in Damascus the genuine anxiety of the regime was palpable,

targeting regime stability or Syrian control over Lebanon, the article sug-

not without cause.r'

gested,could unleash against Israel and US regional interests a number

After the fall ofBaghdad, neo-conservativehawks in the Bush administration gavevoice to their desireto see'regimechange'occur in Damascus,a campaign culminating with Deputy Secretaryof Defense Paul'Wolfowitz's declaration that'There will have to be change in SyriaP and a Penugon memo to the \X/hite House entided'Roadmap for Syria]which outlined punitive options against a recalcitrant Syria.rsCongress reintroduced the SyriaAccountabiliry and LebaneseSovereigntyRestoration Acc on rz April zoo3, which empowered the US president to take punitive economic and diplomatic actions against Syria to 'halt Syrian support for terrorism, end

of Islamist groups that had hitherto been checked by Syrian intelligence networks, namely Hizbullah, HAMAS

and IslamicJihad.l6

By the summer of zoor,Syria concluded that \Tashington was unwilling to bargain wirh Damascusover Powell'sconditions; ir insteadexpected unconditional compliance.lTThis meant that the US was determined to emasculateSyria regionally, and consequently undermine, if not change, the regime. After all, Damascus assumedthat compliance with Powell's conditions, especiallyagainstwhat rhe US administration consideredterrorism in Iraq and Lebanon,would changeSyria'sregionalrole and alliances

its occupation of Lebanon, and stop its development ofweapons of mass

substantially,threatening the stabiliry of the regime.rsMaurice Gourdault-

destruction'.'o On 3 May zool, Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Damascus and presented Bashar with a long list of demands with which 'Washington expecred him to comply forthwith. The US demanded full

Montagne, French President JacquesChirac's presidential adviser,paid

co-operation from Damascusin the'war on terrorism'and in Iraq - and

accommodate the new US-dominated regional environment. The Syrian

hence strict monitoring of the Syrian-Iraqi border, a clampdown on money laundering, the repatriation oflraqi funds from Syrian banks, an end to

In the Syrianregime'sgeopolitical president remained obstinate,however.3e calculations,bandwagoning is not an option; it would threaten rather than

support for HAMAS

protect regime survival. Consequencly,Syrian-American confronration

and IslamicJihad and the closure of their offices in

Damascus a secretvisit in November zoo3, carrying a messagefrom the leadersof France, Germany and Russia.The emissary advised Bashar to

Damascusand verification of Syria'sarsenalof weaponsof massdestruction

in Iraq escalated.

(WMD).

Basharcalculatedthat protecting the regime entailedsabotagingthe US occupation of Iraq and rurning the country into anorher Vietnam.a' The

Powell's demands with regard to Lebanon included the with-

drawal of all Syrian troops, an end to Syrian interference, the demobilisation and disarmamenr of Hizbullah and the dismantling of irc rocket batteries in southern Lebanon, and the deployment of the LebaneseArmy over all Lebaneseterrirory, including the border with Israel." The Syrian regime responded with an offer to reach an understanding with $Tashington on a number of common interests. Brigadier General Bahjat Sulaiman's astonishing article in al-Safr best represenrsthis line of thinking. Sulaiman, rhen chief of the General lnrelligence Directorate's

substantialSyrian intelligence co-operation with the Central lntelligence Agency against al-Qa,ida cells in Europe and the Middle East, aimed at mending reladons between the two statesand paving the way for co-operatlon on regional issues,was suspendedafter the fall of Baghdad.n'Syrian intelligenceagencies'expertisein penetrating radical Islamistcellsin chesuburbs of European capicalswas then retooled and placed at the service of the

(GID) internal branch and a powerful figure inside the security establish-

asymmetric campaign against US troops in Iraq.a' On this interpretation, funnelling foreign fighters and weapons acrossthe Syrian-Iraqi border was

menr, suggestedobliquely that Syria would help control Hizbullah, Palestin-

neither a miscalculation nor apuzzlingchoice. Rather,it consriuted Syria's

ian armed groups andiihadi Salafisin Lebanon, would addressrhe issueof

responseto the combined rhreatsposed by the US-led occuPation of lraq.

Palestinian offices in Damascus and would contribute ro the stabilisation

Not unlike other Arab regimesthat feared the regional consequencesof a

of Iraq in exchangefor US guaranteesregarding the security of the regime

democratic, stable,pro-Western regime in Baghdad, Damascussabotaged

164

fi5

ucttur t!Jtlr E

!t

tu

the occupationwirh a mix of classical and asymmetricbalancinqin order to prorecr irs regionalinteresrsand regimesecurity.Lebanon *J.rld ,oo' becomea secondfront in the battlero prorecrthe Syrian regime. 'A War bl Stages' syria'salmost total control over Lebanon since r99o not only advanced the regime'sregionalinrerests,especiallyvis-i-vis rhe peaceprocess,but alsoprovideda securesourceof much-neededrenrs,o fi.r.rr.. ,he regime,s neo-parrimonialnetworks and offserpressurefor economic reform.The invasionand occupationof Iraq heightenedLebanon's valueto Syria.By cheend of zoo1,however,Damascus's hold over Lebanonwasno longer secure.a3 Ti-oublesin Lebanon climaxedasLahoud,srenureas president camero an end.A growing chorusof heaqrveight Lebanes. poli,i.i"r,r, including the Druze leaderlTaridJumblarrand Rafiq Hariri, oppor.d th. renewalof Lahoudt term. on r septemberzoo4 the Maronite church weighedin, publicly opposinga renewalof Lahoud,srenure. EvenSyrian vice PresidentAbd al-Harim KhaddamadvisedBashar againsrrenewing Lahoud'spresidency,urging him ro serecrone of syriat other Maronite alliesto avoid inrernarionalretriburion.aa On z September, SecurityCouncil Resolutionr559waspromulgared. It 'for declaredsupport a free and fair electoralprocessin L.i"r.,or', irp.o-ingpresidentialelecrion,conducredaccordingto Lebanese consrirutional rulesand devisedwithour foreigninterference or infuence,.Theresolurion alsocalledon 'all remainingforeign forcesro withdraw from Lebanon, and mandatedrhe 'disbandingand disarmamenr of all Lebaneseand non-Lebanese militias'in the counrry.+t Snubbingthe inrernadonal communicy,Damascusinstructedits Lebanesealliesro pass a consricutional amendmenrthat renewedLahoud'srenurefor anorher threeyears.Hariri, who had earliervowednor ro renewLahoud'srerm,was strong-armedby Damascusinco supporringthe decision.o6 The constiturionalamendment waspassedin parliamenton 3 Sepremberzoo4. \was this another exampleof Bashar'smiscalcurations?or was the decisiongovernedby balancingand regime-securiry considerarions ?A reconsrrucrion of syria'ssecuricyenvironmenranddecision-making calculus on the eveof Resolutionr559tpromulgarionoffersan answ€r. t 66

DemystifuingSyrian L'oreignPoltcyunderlTasharat-Asad

As late asAugust zoo4, Basharstood againstrenewingLahoud'sterm.a' Khaddam claimsthat on r8 August he was reassuredby Basharthat Lahoud's tenurewould not be extended.otln fact, cheregimesentsignalscopro-Syrtan Maronite politician Jean Obeid, then minister of foreign and expatriace affairs,that he had been selectedto succeedLahoud.*' Only when the regime in Damascus became convinced, in lare August, thac Resolucion rj59 was going to be promulgated did Bashar decide to renew Lahoud's tenure.so Unlike cheSyrian Accountabiliry Act, which was consideredmore a nuisance than a threat,t' r559ended the posr-Iraq guessinggame in Arab capitals:Damascusconcluded that the US and rhe EuropeanUnion, the latter represented by Chiract France, had set rheir sighrs on rhe Syrian regime.t' Resolution r559 signified a US-French convergencedirected against Syria, ivhich was reached on 6 June Loo+, on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the Allied landings at Normandy." It signalled to Damascus the beginning of a concerted international effort to evict Syria from Lebanon, thereby threatening its regional position and consequently the survival of the regime. Lebanon would now be used as a beachhead against Syria to undermine the latter's geopolitical interesrs,namely, its control over Lebanon, influence wirh Hizbullah, alliance with Iran and and Islamic Jihad. A beleagueredSyria would then be forced to accept the US-dominated spoiler role in the peace process through HAMAS

regional order, offer assistanceto the US occupation in Iraq and end its obstructionist role in the peaceprocess. The timing of Resolution r559coincided with the emergenceof what from Damascuslooked to be a perilous alliance among Syria'sadversaries in Lebanon, one that included for the first time the Maronite Church, representedby Pariarch Mar Nasrallah Butrus Sfeir,rhe Druze ofJumblatt and, albeit behind the scenes,Hariri.5+Basharand his principal lieutenants in Lebanon were already suspicious of Hariri's growing threat to Syriat position in Lebanon. From their perspective,he had consolidated the Sunni community in Lebanon behind his leadershipin the zooo parliamentary elecdons and had, moreoyer, made suspicious inroads into the Syrian regime's inner circle, co-opting high-ranking Sunni insiders such as Khaddam and long-serving Chief of StaffGeneral Hikmat al-Shihabi and befriending Syria'sintelligenceprefect in Lebanon undl October LooL, Maior GeneralGhazi Kan'an.ttDamascussusoectedrhat Hariri was involved

DemystifuingSyria

Demlsttfying Syrian ForeignPolicyunder BasbaraL-Asad'

in the makingof ry59because ofhis personalconnectionwith chirac and becauserhe resolutionwas tailor-madeto addresshis demands,aswell as 'w'ashington thoseof and Paris.Hariri wantedfreepresidentialelections to ensurethe elecrionof anyonebur Lahoud; Pariswanredrhewithdrawal of Syrian ffoops from Lebanon; and rx/ashingtonwanted Hizbullahb

to withsrand international and regional retriburion.66Two versionshave been advancedto explain rhe motives behind Hariri's assassination.One view, propounded by the r4 March Alliance in Lebanon and adopted by

disarmamenrand demobilisation.j6 Bashardescribed Resolutionr559asanorher'stage' in an ongoing'warby

was meant but also to the security of the Syrian regime.6tThe assassination to neucralisean overlappingexrernaland domesdcrhreatto regimesecuriry:

stages'againstSyria'sregionalrole,one rharpredaredrheinvasionoflraq.57 Its aim wasnor ro prorecrLebanon'ssovereignty, he argued;ir wasrather a tool usedby the uS and Francero shift Lebanonfrom one geopolitical camp to another and compel Syriato disarmHizbullah in exchangefor a stagedSyrianwithdrawal from Lebanon.5s After all, the international community had led the Syrianregimeto believerhat a parrialwithdrawal

Lebanesealliance,including he was organisinga powerful cross-secrarian Hizbullah, which aimed at extricatingLebanon from syrias grip.u'Advo-

would havebeenacceptable.5e From rhis perspecrive, renewingLahoud's term waspart of a sffategyto ensurethe regime'ssurvivalar a moment of greatregionaltransformation,and to do so from Damascus's first line of defence:Lebanon.6o Lahoud'spro-Syrianloyaltieswereunquestionable and Damascus reasoned tharonly he couldmainrainthepro-Syriaorienrationof the Lebanese armyin the eventofa Syrianwithdrawal.6'Khaddam sugges$ that Bashar's advisers and Lebanese alliespersuaded him rharonly a rusted military commanderof Lahoudt calibrecould block future investigations

its regional and internarional allies,suggeststhat Damascuseliminated Hariri becauseof chethreat he posed not only to its position in Lebanon

caresof this view nore rhat the Syrian regime'scampaign to eliminate and terrorise irs rivals in Lebanon commenced oniy after the promulgatron This underscoreshow serious a rhreat ro regime of Resoludon rySg.nt survivalDamascusconsideredrt59 ro be. The withdrawal from Lebanon following Haririt assassinationand the domestic consolidation at home, by eliminating potential alternarivesto rhe regime, in particular Kan'an,7o 's and carrying out a clampdown againstdissidents,underlined the regime determinarion to eradicarereal or potencial threats.Any miscalculation involved the regime's failure to organise its withdrawal from Lebanon immediately after rhe fall of Baghdad.''Orherwise, irs foreign policy choice adheresro balancingand regime-securitypredictions' An alternative expianation advancedby many of syrias Lebaneseallies

of the syrian regime'sactivitiesover the precedingfifteen years.6'The renewalof Lahoud'srerm wasfollowed by rhe formation on z6 october

that Basharwas preparingro redeploysome I4,ooo Syriantroops suggests out of Beirur and irs environs to rhe Biqa'Valley shordy after rhe renewalof

zoo4 of a thoroughly pro-Syrian cabinet under rhe premiershipof the trusted'Ilmar Karami.This'madein Syria'cabinet,asir wascalledby uS

Lahoud's term. Redeployment - the preferred euphemism for withdrawal used by the Syrian regime - had been broached by Bashar as early as 20oI and was communicated to a number of Lebanesepolidcians. Syriahad also

Depury secretaryof state RichardArmitage,6s wasmskedwirh preparing for a full-blown confrontation wirh the inrernarionalcommunirv.Ir did not havelong to wait.

Suruiuing the Regimei Darkest Hours The regimein Damascusexperienced its darkesthoursin rhe aftermathof RafiqHaririb assassination. Someof its memberswereconvincedrharrcwas indeedpassingthrough irs dying days.6o The popular mood in Damascus wasof a regimethar had commitred a deadlymistakeand wason irs way out.65A chorusof voicespredictedimminent collapse,givenirs inability

receivedguaranreesrhar a partial wirhdrawal in compliance wich Resolurion r559would be received favourably by the international community'" on this view, the decision to wirhdraw fully, rarher rhan partially, from The consequentdomestic Lebanon was a resPonseto Hariri's assassination. consolidationwas meanr to insularethe regimefrom rhreatsemanatingfrom Lebanon,and alsofrom challengesarisingfrom insidethe party (Khaddam). the army (al-Shihabi)and the securityaPParatus(Kan'an)'" Be that as it may, Syria'stroop withdrawal opened a new phase in its relarions with Lebanon. In addirion to lraq, the \rest Bank and the Gaza Strip, Lebanon was now a principal arenain a grand geopolitical batcle

ucrttJ)tu)/tltg

!na

that pirted the us, Franceand rhe so-called'moderate'Arabstaresled by saudiArabiaagainstsyria,Iran, Hizbullah,HAMAS and IslamicJihad. In much rhesamewaythat rvashingronwasbent on usingLebanonro isolate the syrianregime,Damascuswasdeterminedto useLebanonto aborrthe new regionalorderandchoreographits reintegracion into the regionaland internationalarena.It did soby spoilinganypoliticalsetdementin Lebanon that jeopardisedits own interests.Damascusrhusdeployeda mix of asymmetric balancingstrategyand balkingin rhe srruggreoverLebanon. Syriaoursouicedits Lebanonpolicy to allied local acrors,principally Hizbullah. The allianceberweenHizbullah and Nabih Birri'sAMAL was engineeredby Damascusro guaranreepolitical coverasHizbullah waged syriat polidcal battlesin Lebanon.?* Hizbullah consequendyspearheaded the effort to block Lebanon'stransformationinro a pawnservingrVashing_ ton andthe'moderate'Arabstatesin the confrontationwith SyriaandIran. The signingof the Memorandum of understandingwith Michel Awn,s FreePatrioticMovemenron 6 February zoo6 createda balancewirh the r4 March Alliance.It insisredon the depoliticisationof the international

Syian ForeignPolicyunderBasharal-Asacl Demysttfying by leadersof cher4 campaignand an anti-syriandiscourse anri-regime MarchAlliancethat borderedon racism,enabledrheregimeto rallysubcreated suspicions stantialsecrorsofthe populationand evadesecrarian by Hariri'sassassination.s' policy in Lebanoncollidedwith a uS-Saudi decisionro denyits Syria's d Riyads acquiescence considere alliesa politicalvictory.Damascus Lebanese in the JuIy zoo6Israeliwar againsrHizbullah, and irs refusalto offer overflight rights to Iranian supply planes,to be part of a co-ordinated effort ro defearHizbullah and subsequentlyencircleSyriawirh hostile sectorsof the Sunnipoliticaland alsoralliedsubstantial regimes.8'fuyad in Lebanonin an actemptto neutraliseHizbullah's religiousesrablishment Lebanonpolicy.Hizbullah's politicalandmilitary weighrandderailSyria's on 8 May zoo8endedrhepoliricalstand-offinBeirut, militaryoperations Sunni-Shi'i tensions.Although the but at the expenseof aggravaring Syrianregimefacilitated Qarar'smediation ro reacha swift resolution Riyad of checrisis,for fear of sectarianconf icr spillingoverinto Syria,sr

investigationinto Hariri's assassinarion, demandeda yero over domesric and foreignpolicy decisionsin a nationalunity governmentand markeda refusalto supplythe parliamenraryquorum necessary for anypresidenrial

border. respondedwith dangerousliaisonsalongrhe Lebanese-syrian of pro-Hariri armedSalafigroupsin northern Lebanon The emergence coupled with Sunni- Alawi skirmishesin Tiipoli served to sporlightthe

candidatewho might be insensitiveto Syria'sinterests.Ti Damascus wasespecially apprehensive oflebanont role asa beachhead to destabilisethe regime.uS demandsfor a changein the Syriangovern-

vulnerabiliriesand remindit of rheproximity of syrianregimetsecrarian explosivesectarianconflicts.t*

ment'spoliciesweretakenascamoufagefor moresinisterintendons.T6 Syria,s exit from Lebanonhad emboldenedits rivalsto seekregimechangemore forcefully''7 Damascus accuse d Riyadof engineering conracrsbetweenJum(who blatt wasnow callingopenlyfor regimechangein Syria),?8 Khaddam and rheMuslim Brothers;it alsoaccused SaudiArabiaof supportingfuf,ar al-Asadtanti-regimecampaigninsideand outsidethe country,of financing Islamistgroupsinsidesyria, of insdgatinganti-regimesenrimenrsin the armedforcesand of inviting foreign interventionagainstSyria.?e The clampdownon syriandissidenrsin March zoo6, andthenagainfollowing the publicationof rhe nMay zoo6 Beirut-Damascusmanifesro,signalled the regime'sintolerancero domesticdissent,and its apprehensions lesrthe syrian oppositionsucceedin building bridgeswith anti-Syrianforcesin Lebanon.so Dormant anti-Lebanese sentiments,animatedby a slanderous

Conclusion Thezr May zoogDohaAccordrharendedthepoliticalstand-offinLebanon in a mannerfavourablecoSyria'sallies,followedby the z5May zoo8 a figuresensitive electionof armycommanderGeneralMichelSulaiman, formarion and the subsequent securityinrerestsin Lebanon,8t to Syria's in which the opposition on rr July zoo8 of a nationalunity governmenr in Syrianforeignpolicy.To be acquiredvetopower,closeda difficultchapcer attackagainstan haveinjuredthe regime.Israel's sure,thesedevelopments mysterizoo7,86 Syriaon 6 Seprember allegednuclearfacilityin norrheasc insidetheliont denttandrumoursof an abortedcoupin ousassassinadons dererrent havebruisedthecounrry's in Februaryzoo88s Damascus Posture in accepted has Syria arrangement of kind aboutrhe andraisedquestions

Demystrfying $trra exchangefor regime security and a partial reinregration inro inrernational and regional polidcs.

Dernlsttfying Syrian ForeignPolicyunder BasbaraL-Asad

5.

Nevertheless,rhe image ofa confidenr president Basharal-Asad artending tle Union for the Mediterranean summit in paris on r3 July zoog, hosting French PresidentNicolas Sarkozyon August zoog and then gathering 3 in Damascus the leaders of France, and Turkey on eatar 4 september zoo8 underscored the dramadc close ro Syriat regional and internacional isolation. The summits appear ro confirm Syriat central role in Lebanon and orher regional affairs.Jumblatrt expressedhope for an ignominious collapseof the Ba'rhi regime have proved whimsical;sr rhe .moderate,Arab states'efforts ro osrracisesyria and draw ir away from Iran have exacerbated

afford to signal accommodation towards a future US adminisrrarion: syria has once again increased its co-operation with us forces to secure che border with Iraq and declared irs readinessro engagein direct talks wirh Israel provided there is US-French sponsorship for the implementadon of a prospective agreement.e'syria's Lebanon poricy played a central role in this rehabilicadon and perhaps Damascus learned belatedly that its Lebanese proxies can be far better assersrhan rhe hear.y-handed tactics deployed by its own army and intelligence services.Bashar can take solace rhat, against all expectations,the Ba'rhi regime has survived and overcome challengesthat, for the ruler of Damascus, musr have felt like more than

Notes r.

L. 1. +.

thes,'The SyrianSoludon',ForeignAfairs, vol.85,no. 6, zoo6' pp' J)-+o; DanielL. Byman,'Syriaand Iran: 'Whatt Behindthe EnduringAlliance?l oo 6/ o7 rymtddleeast-byman' . For an accountofthe behind-the-scenes deliberarions betweenr€presenrativesof the threesides,seeBkasini,,4/-Tariq ila al-Istiqlal,pp.169-77.The consequentMemorandum of UnderstandingbetweenPatriarchSfeir, Jumblatt and Hariri calledfor disarmingHizbullah and de-linking the party from its popular Shi'i basein an actemptro undermineits abiliry to negoriatea solucionto its weaponsarsenal.The first objectivewould be achievedby convincingIsraelro withdraw from the Shib'aFarmsin

rt6

55. 56.

57. 58. 59. 6o.

6r.

exchangefor a SecuriryCouncil resolutiondeployingUN troops in th farmspendinga setdemencof rhe Syrian-lsraeliconf ict. The secon, objecriveentailedproactivepopulistsocio-economic statepoliciesaimeda replacingHizbullah'sown socialservices nerworkand thusdelegitimisrn the party insidethe Shi'i community.Seethe text of rhe memorandumir Bkasini,Al-Tariq ila al-Istiqlal,pp.17+-7.This versionof eventsconrra dicts the one suppliedby Hizbullah SecretaryGeneraiHasanNasrallah who disclosedrhat in meetingswith Hariri beforethe larter'sassassina tion, Hariri pledgedto safeguardl{izbullahs weaponsarsenalunril , comprehensive setrlemenrof rhe Arab-Israeliconflict wasreached.Se, Nasrailah's commenrsduring rhesession wirh Michel Awn hostedbyJear 'Azizon OTVscation, 6 Februaryzoo8 andJean'hziz,'AzmatThiqa?Ba Sira'man YabqaHayan',al-Akhbar,r6 Februaryzoo8.Blanfordt accoun confirmsNasrallah's version,but addsa caveat:that the Hariri-Nasrallal compromiseincluded a pledgeby Hizbullah to 'actwiselyand not resor, to actionsthat seriouslyjeopardise[sic] the nationalgoodl SeeBlanford Killing Mr Lebanon,p. r9r. SeeKhaddamtinterviewreproducedrn al-IVnhar,3rDecember20o5anc Blanford, Killing Mr Lebanon,p. 88. SeeBlanford,Killing Mr Lebanon,p. rol; Ibrahim Hamidi, 'SuriyafilMashhadal-Faransi', al-Hayat, zzFebru.ary zoo6.[n fact,Hariri! biographer confirms the Syrianregime'ssuspicionsof a Hariri hand in chemakinp of 1559.He revealsthac three daysafter cheNormandy summit, Hariri calledhim, declaringche'commencemenr of ILebanon's]independence l that during cheNormandy summit Chirac succeeded in elicitingBusht support for the twin objectivesof blocking cheextensionof Lahoud's term and pressuring Damascusto withdraw its troopsfrom Lebanon.See Bkaslnl,Al-Thriqila al-Istiqlal,pp.r68-9. Both Harris,'Basharal-Assads LebanonGamble' and Zisser,'Syria,the United States,and Iraq',make similarallusions. SeeBashar'sspeechreproducedin al-Saf.r,rr Novemberzoo5. Ibid. Interviewwirh Karim Pakraduni.SeealsoBashar's speechreproducedin al-Faransii al-Safr,rr Novemberzoo5;Hamidi,'Suriyafil-Mashhad \XzhichexplainsBashartcommentsto a RegionalCommand meecingof the Ba'th Party in early zoo5. Khaddam quoresBasharcommentingat the meetingthar when the decisionto renewLahoud'stenurewastaken, he assumedthat his decisionwascorrecrby a 5o per cent ratio; afterrhe promulgadonof Resolutionr559,Basharbecameroo per centconvinced thache had takenthe right decision.SeeBkasini,,4l-Tariqila al-Istiqlal, p'Lr 9' Interviewwith Karim Pakraduni.

Derry/st,Jttng \tna See the inrerview with Abd al-Halim Khaddam in al-Sbarq al-Awsat, 6 Janaaryzoo6. 61. Seehis commentsin al-Hayat, z7 October zoo4. al-Lubnaniya64. Commentsby PaulSalemat the workshopendcled'AJ-'Ilaqat by the IssamFares al-Suriya:Hal min Majal Li-'Ilaqat Sahiha?'organised 62.

Center for Lebanon,Beirut, r5June zoo8 and the author'sconversation with Salem,Beirut, z6 August zoo8. 65. lnterview with Talal Salman. 66. See,for example,Michael Young, A PerfectStorm of Syrianlrrelevance', Daily Star, r5 Septemberzoo5; EIi Lake,'Policy on SyriaMovesToward Policytoward YorkSun,8Junezoo5;and Ross,'U.S. RegimeChange',New 67.

68.

a Nfeak Assad'. See,for example,Bkasini, Al-Tariq ila al-Istiqlal; Blanford' Killing Mr Lebanon; Marwan Iskandar,Raf'q Hariri and theFateofLebanon,Betwt zoo6; and Flasan Sabra,'Dahiyat al-Haqudtn',al-Sbira', rz February z oo6. SeeAlexandreAdler, 'Pourquoi a-t-on tud Rafic Hariri ?',Le Figaro,16 with NasFebruaryzoo5.Jean'Aziz alsosugges$thar in his discussions join forces men could the two rallah in earlyzoo5, Hariri suggestedthat 'Azmar to resolvenoc just local but regionalproblemsaswell. SeeAziz,

Thiqa?' attempt againstMarwan Himadah on r October 69. \X/ith the assassination that zoo4. Evidencegatheredby LebaneseMilitary Intelligencesuggests ' the assassination of GeorgeHawi on zr Junezoo5mayhavebeenthe work of an Israeli-affiliatedintelligencenetwork in Lebanon.Seeal-Safr, 6 May 70. 7r.

7L. 7j. 74. 7s.

76. 77.

z oo8. On rz October zooi, Syrian authorities announcedthat Kan'an,then interior minister,had committed suicidein Damascus. Hencethe differenceberweenHafiz and Bashar.SeeJihadal-Zain,Al-Talaqi al-Sa'udi-al-Suri'alaal-Iraq',al-Nahar, zz Septemberzoo5 and aI'Zarn, 'Al-Ra is al-Asadma' CNNI Including Lahoud and Hariri. lnterview with Karim Pakraduni.Seealso Blanford,Killing Mr Lebanon,p. r99. Interviewwith Karim Palraduni. Interviewwith Karim Pakraduni. For a detailed analysisseeBasselF. Salloukh,'Democracyin Lebanon: System'in NathanBrown and EmadEI-Din The Primacyof the Seccarian Shahin, eds. Tlte Strugglefor Dernocracyln the Mlddle East, London forrhcoming. Interviewwith Karim Pakraduni. SeeJean 'Aziz,'Limaza kana al-AsadYadhakli-Nikat al-Lubnaniyin?1 al-Akhbar,r July zoo8.

Demystrfling Syrian ForeignPolicl under Basharal-Asad

28.

79.

SeeDavid Ignatius,'Mob'W'arin the Mideasr',Washington Post,4Januaryzoo6.Incerestingly,Jumblatt would larerclaim that he had calledfor regimechangeduringhisvisir to rhe US in Marchzoo6,but rharSecrerary of StateCondoleezzafuce informed him that rhe Syrianregimeshould changeicsbehaviour.SeeJumblattk off-rhe'recordcommenrsquoted in al-Akhbar,rr August zoo8. Iacerviews with Karim PakraduniandThlalSalman;NqoulaNasifl'Lahoud la Yastaqilila li-Awnl al-Nahar,lo Ocroberzoo5;Khudur Talib,'Muna-

washatSa'udiya-Suriya'ala Khar al-Tamas al-Lubnaniial-Safl, 6 February zoo8; and the anonymousarticleentitled'Al-AsadYattahemal-Sa'udiya bil-Ta'amur'alaNizamehlal-Akhbar,z8 May zoo8. 8o. SeeJoshuaLandisandJoe Pace,'TheSyrianOpposirion',I4/ashington Pgarnrly, vol. 3o,no.u zoo6-7,p. 6r. 8r. Interviewwich Tilal Salman. 82. See Nqoula Nasif,'Dimashq-al-fuyad: Al-'lnaq Nusf al-Tariqwal-lraqwa Lubnan Nusfahaal-Alharl al-Akbbar, i March zoo7. 8t. Interview with Karim Pakraduni. 84. See Nadir Fawaz, 'Arqala Sa'udiya lil-Dawha Istad'at Inzar Hizbullahl al-Akbbar,z4 Junezoo8. 85. Damascus wasbehindSulaiman's appointmentasarmycommanderduring Lahoudt tenure.Lahoudt candidarefor the posr,GeneralAs'adGhanim, was overruledby Damascus.SeeNqoula Nasif 'Imtihan al-Mu'asasa alAskariya:Tasyisal-Jaysh am Th'yin Qa'id Musayas', al-Akhbar,z3August zoo8 . 86. SeeDavid E. Sangerand Mark Mazzetri,'IsraelSrruck SyrianNuclear Project,AnalyscsSay',I{ew YorkTimes,r4 October zoo7. 87. Namely,Hizbullah commander'ImadMughninzahin Damascuson rz Februaryzoo8 and GeneralMuhammadSulaimanin Tarruson z August zoo8.For detailsseeSundayTimes,ry FebruarytooS; Guardian,5August zooS;andal-Sharqal-Awsar,5 August zoo8. 88. By Head of Milicary Incelligence(and Bashartbrorher-in-law)Asif Shawkac.SeeHaaretz, ro June zoo8, quoting from the Die Welt,7 Jtne zoo 8;' The MysteriousDownfall of Asif Shawkac',Mideast M onitor, v oI. Shawkar's demorioninsidecheSyrian J, no. L, zoo8. Reportssuggesting intelligenceestablishmentmay haveproved premarure.Inrerviewswich journalistsin Beirut,Augustzoo8. 89. WalidJumblatt,'TheSuugglefor FreedomandDemocracyin Lebanonl Washingronlnsricutefor Near EascPolicy,r9 Occoberzoo7. BostonGlobe,z1 9o. MichaelBergman,'RealismMust Rulein EngagingSyr\al, Guardian,z7 JuIy July zoo8;JamesDenselow,'TheAxis of Pragmarism', zoo8; David lgnatius,A Syrian-lsraeliBreakrhrough?', Post, trl'ashington z7 August zoo8; and al-Saf.r,z8 August zoo8.