Designed to Falter - Right to Food Campaign

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Designed to Falter MGNREGA Implementation in Maharashtra N C Narayanan, Nitin Lokhande

Laudable aims aside, the implementation of India’s largest welfare programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, leaves much to be desired. Taking a close look at its functioning in three development blocks in Maharashtra in the last three financial years, this study emphasises that there is a serious lack of capacities in the agencies tasked with actualising the scheme. A partnership between local non-governmental organisation and educational institutions could offer a way out by bringing in transparency, accountability, and participation to strengthen local governance.

We thank Aroehan, a non-governmental organisation, particularly Anjali Kanitkar and Shraddha Shringarpure for allowing us to participate in the social audit process conducted in Mokhada block in 2012. We also acknowledge the field-level facilitations by Aroehan in all the three blocks selected for the field survey, and the cooperation of the block and panchayat-level officials, and local people. This study evolved since 2011 as a part of an MTech research project in CTARA. The research was extended as a project under the Technology and Development Supervisory Learning course in which 15 students participated. A section is partly written from the data collected by these students. Importantly, we acknowledge the support of Milind Sohoni, head of CTARA, in carrying out these activities. N C Narayanan ([email protected]) and Nitin Lokhande are with the Centre for Technology Alternatives for Rural Areas, IIT Bombay. Economic & Political Weekly

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he Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) is the central government’s response to the constitutionally mandated right to work and a means to promote livelihood security in India’s rural areas. The Act with its demand-driven framework was first implemented in 200 districts in 2006, and was extended to all of rural India in 2008. The guarantee of 100 days of unskilled work is supposed to have generated more than 12 billion person-days of work at a total expenditure of Rs 1,66,760 crore since 2006 (GoI 2013a: 286). With panchayati raj institutions (PRIs) having a central role in implementation, the Act is meant to decentralise governance and institutionalise people’s participation in ensuring wage employment, and thus rural livelihoods. A management information system (MIS) and lateral public accountability systems such as social audits were conceived to ensure transparency and accountability. A recent report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has pointed to issues such as a decline in employment generation, irregularities in work completion, wage payment, and unemployment allowance, and poor utilisation of funds, which threaten the effectiveness and sustainability of the scheme (TOI 2013; IE 2013). The reasons cited for this include a low awareness among people regarding their entitlements under the Act (Bhatia and Dreze 2006); the arbitrariness of work measurements (Sankaran 2011); inadequate capacities at the panchayat level, which hamper implementation (Reddy and Upendranadh 2010); limitations of the social audit process (Gopal 2009); and deeply institutionalised corruption, inefficiency, and non-accountability in governance (Ambasta, Shankar and Shah 2008). A more serious criticism has to do with the intent and necessity of the scheme. Alongside an appreciation for its achievements in ameliorating poverty and preventing acute distress during times of drought, the Twelfth Five-Year Plan document says that there are problems in the MGNREGA primarily because it is a dole that involves a huge expenditure that could have been spent more productively. In particular, it is leading to an increase in the wages of agricultural labour and construction workers (GoI 2013b: 7), even as it does not create permanent assets or a sustained increase in incomes (Aggarwal, Gupta and Kumar 2012). A different view argues that employment guarantee should be linked to the idea of human development with a focus on growth through enhanced labour productivity – that is, growth through a combination of physical capital formation and human capability (Kannan 2005). A 61

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related argument is that the parameters to evaluate the success of the scheme need to be changed from jobs and the number of assets created to those like an increase in the average annual income of households, an increase in the productivity of small and marginal landholdings, and the quality and contribution of productive assets (CSE 2008). Going beyond this debate, this study focuses on the key issue of a failure in governance, which is stifling the effectiveness of the programme. We investigate why this important welfare programme is failing due to a quantitative and qualitative lack of capacity in governance institutions. By this, we are not absolving the structural issues of power, corruption, and transparency, which are deep-rooted. A wider investigation in the future could find the link between the two – is the design, which is a product of the structure of governance, intended to fail the welfare programme because it is unacceptable to some realms in policy circles? This study will not speculate on this question, but examine the issues in the implementation of the MGNREGA in Maharashtra, a state that was a forerunner in implementing an employment guarantee scheme. Though the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Act (MEGA) in 1977 became the baseline for the enactment of the MGNREGA, it was constrained by low wages, a limited number of days of work per person, no upgradation of skills, inadequate community mobilisation leading to low coverage, and insufficient administrative systems for monitoring and evaluation (Shah and Mehta 2008). These issues were reflected in a performance evaluation study in 2009 of 21 states that ranked Maharashtra as low as 18. The utilisation of funds was less than 50% in many of the districts in 2007-08 (NCAER-PIF 2009). The latest CAG report states that Maharashtra has utilised only about 20% of the funds allocated. A performance audit report of the Ministry of Rural Development points out many issues such as those related to job cards, wages, worksite facilities, administrative and technical sanction for works, maintenance of records at the panchayat level, district-level inspection of works, the institutional set-up for audits, vigilance, and technical support, and the non-appointment of adequate technical staff (GoI 2008). A process study by the National Institute of Rural Development brings out deficiencies in the planning and implementation of the MGNREGA in Maharashtra – low fund utilisation, lack of motivation among officials, and inadequate capabilities among gram panchayat (GP) functionaries (Rao, Jadhav, Ambadkar and Jayalakshmi 2010). The state has had a low work completion rate between 2008-09 and 2010-11 with 36.16% falling to 32.20% and further to 22.50%. The average number of days of work per household has lingered between 39 and 50 since 2006 (GoI 2013c: 27). This study analyses both primary and secondary data, while focusing on a micro-level investigation of three development blocks in Maharashtra to understand the reasons for the deteriorating performance. The analysis is done at three different levels. State-level secondary data is examined to understand the differences in performance across districts, followed by a block-level analysis in a selected district – specifically on 62

execution and completion of works. We then try to evaluate how adequate the available technical capacity is and discuss process-related issues at the block and GP levels. At the third level, a field study was conducted in sample GPs with the most number of works to understand the reasons for failure from below. A range of stakeholders, including job cardholders, GP and block-level officials, and technical personnel were interviewed to understand the problems of implementation at the local level. Physical inspection of the completed works was conducted in the sample GPs, including participating in a social audit exercise by Aroehan, a non-governmental organisation (NGO), in one of the sample blocks. A comprehensive field survey with students and Aroehan was carried out to not only discover evidence of failure in implementation, but also to understand the institutional structure and the constraints that stand in the way of the implementation agencies. The study also intends to develop a “protocol” for replication of this exercise in other contexts. Secondary Data Analysis from MIS

A state-level performance evaluation study based on MIS data of the MGNREGA, which was conducted by us in 2011, developed a composite performance index on the basis of five criteria – coverage and distribution of job cards; employment demanded and generated; wage payment through post offices and banks; utilisation of funds; and accountability and transparency. While the coverage and distribution of job cards seem satisfactory on first view, the employment demand was below 10% in a majority of the Maharashtra’s 35 districts, barring seven. It was around 30% in three (Bhandara, Gadchiroli and Gondia) and about 15% in four (Amravati, Nanded, Nandurbar and Thane). Almost 57% of the districts used less than 50% of the funds. It was less than 10% in eight of the 35 districts, and Thane district (ranked 17) was identified as an averageperforming one with a fund utilisation of 29.08% as on 1 April 2011 (Lokhande 2011). There are 15 blocks in Thane, of which 13 were considered for implementation of the scheme. Mokhada, Jawhar and Vikramgad blocks, which have more than 90% tribal population, were selected for the detailed secondary data analysis (CIFE 2009). Work Completion and Execution Ratios

Table 1 (p 63) shows the work completion and execution ratios in the sample blocks for three financial years. The aggregate of spillover work from previous years and approved work in the current year is the total number of works. It can be seen that though there were a substantial number of works in 2010-11, less than 30% were started and less than 20% of them were completed. Even though the situation improved with 70% to 80% of works started in 2011-12, the completion rate remained at 40% to 50%. The number of works started in 2012-13 fell by 10% to 30% compared to the previous year and the completion rate also declined. The average works executed in terms of cost at the GP level in Mokhada and Jawhar blocks were about 15% to 20%, while in Vikramgad block it was about 35%, which was appreciable compared to the other two. In 2011-12, the GPs june 29, 2013

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in Vikramgad executed about 47%, which was near the minimum limit mentioned in the guideline.1 The total number of works in Jawhar block in 2012-13 shows a sharp increase of around 4,300 compared to the previous year. The spillover and approved works in Jawhar block in 2012-13 are 2,981 and 4,285 respectively. But the annual projection of works based on the expected demand for 2012-13 in Jawhar is 1,039, with an estimated cost of Rs 2,559.18 lakh. With less demand and no backlog in the Table 1: Work Completion and Execution Ratios in Sample Blocks Block

Financial Year

Total Number of Works in Current Year (Spillover + Approved)

Mokhada

2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13

1,676 1,771 1,540 2,748 2,892 7,266 1,228 1,613 1,351

Jawhar

Vikramgad

Per Cent Per Cent of Work of Work Started in Completed in Current Year Current Year

15.21 70.69 45.25 20.99 70.12 60.15 27.36 81.89 47.74

9.019 55.19 5.02 7.10 53.30 45.77 17.26 40.27 11.93

Per Cent of Work Execution at GP Level (Per Cent of Expenditure)

16.34 (17.36) 10.67 (9.87) 29.28 (34.17) 13.46 (8.66) 25.76 (10.75) 14.43 (12.81) 22.06 (24.61) 55.67 (46.34) 70.98 (33.84)

Source: MGNREGA website, MIS data (http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/home.aspx).

suspended works category, the approval of 4,285 works seems ambiguous and indicates serious data exaggeration in the MIS. The MIS does not provide reasons for the noncompletion of works and the poor performance of GPs in work execution. These could be identified through interviews with stakeholders – absenteeism among workers, improper guidance, local conflicts, and the inadequate capacities of implementation agencies, which led to poor execution and non-completion. Although a Planning Commission document applauds the MIS of the MGNREGA as the best with more than 80 million muster rolls and over 120 million job cards online (GoI 2013a: 287), our analysis raises the question of the reliability of many of these figures, which partly reflects the institutional constraints of the MGNREGA implementation process. The general problems that we encountered with the MIS during data analysis were data entry errors, data exaggeration, data gaps, mismatch of data between derived entries, incomplete entries, and missing financial and audit reports. The simple logic of spillover is also questionable. Based on the definition in the MIS manual, spillover is an optional field on the data entry form. The data entry operator seems to decide whether a work entered is a spillover or not, whereas it should have been a derived parameter. Next, we look into one of the major elements – the technical capacity at the block and GP levels responsible for implementation. Technical Capacity and Process Issues

It can be seen from Table 2 that eight engineers with two technical assistants (TAs) were expected to handle 560 works in 28 GPs in Mokhada block in 2012-13 at a total cost of Rs 1,395.41 lakh. In Jawhar block, the situation was worse, with eight engineers and two TAs handling 1,039 works in 50 GPs at a total cost of Rs 2,559.20 lakh. In Vikramgad block, four engineers with Economic & Political Weekly

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two TAs were to manage 860 works in 43 GPs at a total cost of Rs 1,227.14 lakh. The data reveals that per engineer workload per year in Jawhar and Vikramgad was substantial, as reflected in the per engineer work cost. Here, we have considered the cost of proposed works, without taking the cost of spillover works into consideration as it is untraceable in the MIS. Jawhar block was selected for a detailed study of technical capacity, and interviews with the engineers revealed that they devote 60% of their working hours to MGNREGA activities. Our calculation illustrated that the available technical capacity at the block and GP levels is grossly inadequate to design, monitor, and evaluate the available works.2 During the interaction with TAs in Jawhar, it was observed that they were generally graduates in agriculture with no prior training in the technical aspects (such as earth moving or construction) associated with the scheme. Since TAs are recruited on a contractual basis, there is a high rate of attrition, which affects the coordination with GPs. This vicious loop continues, and the capacity of the available technical personnel does not mature over a period of time. Even though GPs are the key implementation agencies, there are no engineers posted in them and they are dependent on block-level technical personnel, which in turn affects work at the block level. At the GP level, the two key people for implementation of the scheme are the gram sevak (GS) and the gram rozgar sevak (GRS). The GS is officially the GP secretary who is already overburdened with GP-related activities. The GRS is a dedicated staff member in the GP and appointed on a contractual basis from the village by the gram sabha. With at least one per GP, they are adequate in number, but generally unable to assist and support engineers or TAs due to their non-technical background. It is evident that the absence of any kind of technical staff in GPs as well as their dependence on the block for this hampers their performance. The whole process of implementation has come to rest on the line departments at the block Table 2: Technical Capacity at Block and GP Levels Block

Mokhada Jawhar Vikramgad

No of No of No of No of No of Total No of GPs Engineers TAs at GS at GRS at Works in 2012-13 at Block Block Level GP Level GP Level (As Per Annual Level Projection of Works Based on the Expected Demand)

28 50 43

8 8 4

2 2 2

28 50 43

29 39 43

560 1,039 860

Total Cost of Works (Rs Lakh)

1,395.41 2,559.20 1,227.14

Source: MGNREGA website MIS data (http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/home.aspx); secondary data collected from Mokhada, Jawhar and Vikramgad panchayat samitis.

level. There is clearly a technical capacity deficit at the block and GP levels, which hampers the implementation of the scheme at the ground level (Lokhande 2012). The implementation process is also affected by a lack of awareness, information, and capacity. For instance, the job demand analysis is to be made from the previous year’s data using the MIS. None of the key stakeholders interviewed, such as sarpanches, GSs and GRSs, knew about the MIS or used it, and job demand analyses were simply done on the basis of number of job applications. The prescribed way is to understand the scope and constraints of the natural resource 63

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base (using tools such as transect walks, and resource and social mapping) and plan works under the GP to create durable assets. In the absence of such an exercise, works identified by GP members were included in the GP plan with designs and estimates prepared by line department engineers. The sequence of activities that is expected to be carried out – initial surveys, designs, and uploading of photographs before and after completion of works – was not properly done due to a paucity of staff. It was clear from the interaction with engineers that not all worksites were visited for initial surveys. Previous design and estimation sheets were used as references, making appropriate changes in dimensions and costs. With such a procedure, it is not a durable asset that is designed, but a structure to meet the objective of job creation. Regular visits and progressive measurements of work are to be recorded in a measurement book (MB) by the engineer or authorised technical personnel. However, due to inadequate numbers, the technical personnel relied on the GRS to keep track of the work. The social audit process revealed that the officials normally present incomplete registers, and manipulated MBs and muster rolls. The audit agency then has to rely on the MIS report, which is also incomplete and to some extent flawed, and hence faces difficulty in comparing the available data. At the block level, the engineers and TA s were so preoccupied with the measurement of completed works and the preparation of wage payment orders that they did not have time to design, supervise, and provide technical guidance for ongoing work. The distance of worksites from the line department offices varied, resulting in delayed measurements and wage payments. In some cases, this was done entirely by the GRS. Similarly, computer data entry operators were not able to keep pace with the task of uploading muster rolls and other data into the MIS system. The GPs were dependent on block-level officials for the preparation of plans due to lack of technical training.3 The working group report of the Central Employment Guarantee Council (CEGC) suggests that the crisis in “capacity building” has, in part, been caused by a “demand overload” and in part by “supply-side distortions” due to the complexity of multi-level (from the centre to GPs) implementation. This has further been aggravated by the number of stakeholders, and there has to be a well-defined strategy to develop the capabilities to perform the assigned tasks efficiently (CEGC 2010). Worksite Visits and Local Perceptions

The on-field observations presented here are from the social audit conducted in Mokhada by Aroehan in 2012 and the field survey. 4 The social audit report of pilot processes in six GPs points to many problems associated with the implementation of the scheme. In general, there is a lack of awareness among the people about basic entitlements such as minimum wages, the minimum number of days of employment, the procedure to demand work, and the mode to form a shelf of projects.5 The shelf of projects is not generated by a participatory process involving the people, and this results in the work provided not being viewed as an asset, but only a wage-earning 64

activity. Ironically, according to the line departments, it is difficult to mobilise labour for these activities because “people do not view the work from a development perspective”. The report also points out that the entries in MBs are ambiguous. It was found that wherever there was an exaggerated measurement in MBs compared to the physical structure on the worksite, the corresponding muster roll showed fake names or names of workers who had died or migrated or who had not worked. Some of the MBs lacked critical details such as the dates on which entries had been made, on administrative and technical sanctions, muster numbers, names, and types of work. While workers said that the measurements were taken after the completion of work without anything happening in between, the MBs recorded progressive measurements, which trigger suspicions about the field verification process. The audit (and in some case even the officials) could not identify 70% of the listed structures because of the absence of display boards. There were a number of cases of non-payment of unemployment allowance, and some cases of fake job cards, passbooks, and works. Fake entries in MBs and muster rolls, and money siphoning were also highlighted, which reflected corrupt practices in the system of implementation.6 Works under the categories of rural connectivity (kuccha roads and roadside “gutters”); water conservation (wells, vanrai bhandharas, stone bunds, and farm ponds); land development (mazgi, or terracing); and social forestry (nurseries and tree plantation) were inspected to evaluate their usefulness. The usefulness was calculated by considering attributes such as site selection (from specifications in the manual), estimate preparation (from the estimation sheet available with the GP), measurement (comparing with the estimate), and guidance in work execution and utility of assets (from people’s perceptions). The attributes were given weights to derive an aggregate score. Table 3 shows that in the social audit, on an average, only 40% of the completed works could be counted as useful, which matches the field survey observation of 47%. This low number of useful works can be ascribed to the low participation of the people in planning, and inadequate technical capacities at the block and GP levels to support Table 3: On-field Data of Surveyed Works Activity

Block

GPs

Social audit, Mokhada Aroehan (2012)

Field Survey, IIT Bombay (2013)

Total No of Completed Works Surveyed Works

Saturli Vashala Chas Shivali Gomghar Udhale Mokhada Aase Vashala Jawhar Kasatwadi Borale Sarsun Nandgaon Vikramgad Suksale Onde

58 26 33 32 72 29

44 26 32 32 63 28

10

10

Useful Per Cent of Work Useful Work

– 14 5 25 26 3 4

– 53.8 15.6 78.1 41.2 10.7 40

6

19

19

31.58 4

6

6

66.66

(-) Cannot determine.

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execution. The distance between worksites and frequent change in the GRS also seriously affected the implementation of the scheme in many GPs (like Sarsun and Kasatwadi).7 It was observed during the field survey that in some cases no technical guideline was followed while selecting a worksite or executing the work. For example, in the case of land development work, mazgi can be taken up only if a site meets three prescribed parameters – slope of land (1% to 8%), rainfall (> 1,250 mm), and depth of soil (30 cm-75 cm relative to the slope).8 But terracing of land was carried out without taking into account these technicalities, and the top soil in fields was removed to form soil bunds around them. The bunds are washed away during the monsoon, which gradually accumulates as silt in the river bed downhill, which in turn affects the nearby check dams. Heavy soil erosion was also seen in the case of kuccha roads and roadside “gutters” because of improper technical design. This was despite the MGNREGA including various soil conservation works. Most of the surveyed works had serious limitations due to improper design, execution, and lack of monitoring by technical personnel. Conclusions

The MGNREGA is one of the most controversial acts with many pointing to the allocative inefficiency of a dole that builds up little productive capacity. Though supporters view it as a legitimate societal obligation to those left out of the growth process, there is increasing evidence of failure and sub-optimal performance, the latest being the CAG report that points out serious irregularities in implementation. Beyond arguments of corruption, the maladies run deep in the social and institutional structure and its power relations, and these are reflected in the scheme’s design and implementation. Notes 1

2

3

The GP is the single-most important agency for executing MGNREGA works as Section 16 (5) of the Act mandates that at least 50% of the works in terms of cost under a scheme shall be allotted to GPs for implementation (GoI 2013d: 60). There are 152 person-days per engineer per year (60% of the 252 total person-days available). Considering Jawhar, for eight engineers, this adds up to 1,216 engineer persondays per year. Based on their claim that they visit every worksite two times, and there are (2,981+1,039) = 4,020 works to be taken up in 2012-13 (spillover in 2012-13 from MIS + annual projection of works for 2012-13), and assuming that for each day the engineers can visit four works, we see that the number of engineer person-days required is (4020*2/4) = 2010, which is far greater than what is available. The situation does not improve even if we include 304 TA person-days (considering two TAs in the block). A mere one-day meeting was conducted in 2008 at Mokhada Panchayat Samiti and Jawhar Shramik Janta Sahakar as a part of training the stakeholders at the GP level of the respective blocks. Maharashtra Knowledge Corporation Limited (MKCL), an autonomous government agency with expertise in egovernance, was awarded the task of creating e-learning training content for the GRSs. The

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This study attempted to map the details of governance failure. We first analysed the elements of implementation from secondary data in the public domain. Although with gaps, it gave us a picture of differences in performance across Maharashtra, but helped select a district, blocks and GPs for detailed analysis. The micro-level study clearly revealed the design flaw of not assessing the capacities of the governing agencies responsible for a chain of tasks – demand creation, need assessment, designing works, monitoring and evaluating them, and timely payment. Some serious thinking has to go into such an assessment if the programme is to be designed to yield meaningful outcomes. Replicating such an exercise could help bring out the possibilities of augmenting wage employment and durable assets, and creating additional jobs in governing agencies to ensure proper implementation. However, given the present structure of society and functioning of institutions with their existing power structures, there is no guarantee that such causation is automatic. The way forward is to instill transparency and accountability in systems, which cannot be expected to come from above. There should be a groundswell of critical engagements from local contexts. NGOs, however committed, are limited in number and constrained by multiple pressures (Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin, ed. 2008). A critical mass could likely be generated by engaging local educational institutions. A partnership between local NGOs and educational institutions can bring about analytical rigour, contextual experience, and larger societal participation in engaging with developmental problems. This can strengthen local governance by bringing in transparency, accountability, and participation, which are the current missing links. Developing suitable incentive structures to encourage both to participate needs larger consultation, especially to clarify roles and protocols for engagement.

e-learning training in a private computer institute in Mokhada and Jawhar trained them in online e-muster filling, which actually does not have much to do with their role and responsibilities. Apart from these initiatives, the stakeholders at GP level could not cite any other training to them in context of the scheme. The sample size for the social audit in Mokhada was 250 works and 1,407 households in six GPs (Saturli, Vashala, Chas, Shivali, Gomghar and Udhale). The field survey was conducted by IIT Bombay in eight GPs – two in Mokhada (Aase and Vashala); four in Jawhar (Kasatwadi, Borale, Sarsun and Nandgaon); and two in Vikramgad (Sukhsale and Onde). Thirty-five works (10 in Mokhada; 19 in Jawhar; six in Vikramgad) were inspected and 60 households were interviewed. The academic-civil society partnership brought in complementary capabilities to understand and analyse local-level processes of implementation. We intend to develop a protocol for such studies (with process descriptions, sequential tasks to be undertaken, tools, and so on) for replication in other contexts and thus develop a critical body of knowledge to design suitable intervention strategies to improve governance. The report says out of 1,407 households interviewed, 96.56% claimed that they were not told about the quantum of work and

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corresponding wages; 92.37% claimed that they were not aware about the estimate and labour budget, and 53.56% did not know the departments responsible for the work. In Palsunda-Staurli GP, the work named “Vanrai Bhandhara Chikadi Pada 1 and 2” (with muster roll numbers 62,019 and 62,020, amounting to Rs 32,704) was found to be fake. With fake entries in MBs as well as musters, all the money was siphoned off into post office accounts. Fake job cards with post office accounts in Gomghar in the name of Pooja Raju Gabhale (MH – 02-007-0018-001/181 with passbook No 57505) and Bhaskar Prabhakar Pawar (MH – 02-007-0018-001/180 with pass book No 61882) were used for the payment of wages (Aroehan 2012). In Jawhar, out of 23 households surveyed, 43% were not involved in worksite selection and 71% pointed out that it was the GRS who guided the works with no visits by the TA. On measurement, 29% said it was done by the engineer and 43% that the GRS did it. Sarsun GP has 14 different villages about two km to three km away from each other. Due to this, the GRS’ working hours were mostly taken up by travelling. In Kasatwadi GP, the GRS had changed thrice in the same year, and work execution was substantially slow. Mazgi means terracing of land, where the original slope of the land is flattened and

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SPECIAL ARTICLE converted into fields for farming. This also helps farmers reduce soil erosion, apply fertilisers uniformly, and irrigate their fields properly. Such fields are generally used for paddy cultivation. The three main types of mazgi are the level bench terrace, inward sloping bench terrace, and outward sloping bench terrace (Lokhande 2012).

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CSE (2008): An Assessment of the Performance of The National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme in Terms of its Potential for Creation of Natural Wealth in India’s Villages, available at http://www. ruraldiksha. nic.in/green/ 2008% 20CSE.pdf GoI (2008): Performance Audit of Implementation of National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), available at http://ncst.nic.in/ writereaddata/linkimages/CAGrep722009340.pdf – (2013a): Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2012–17): Volume II (New Delhi: Sage). – (2013b): Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2012–17): Volume I (New Delhi: Sage). – (2013c): “MGNREGA Briefi ng Book – 2013”, available at http://nrega.nic.in/Netnrega/ WriteReaddata/Circulars/Briefi ng_booklet13.pdf – (2013d): “MGNREGA Operational Guidelines”, available at http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/WriteReaddata/Circulars/Operational_ guidelines_4thEdition_eng_2013.pdf Gopal, K S (2009): “NREGA Social Audit: Myths and Reality”, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 44, No 3, pp 70-71. IE (2013): “CAG Slams Government for “Lapses” in MGNREGA”, 24 April, available at http://www. indianexpress.com/news/cag-slams-govt-for– lapses–in-mgnrega/1106797/ Kannan, K P (2005): “Linking Guarantee to Human Development”, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 40, No 42, pp 4518-22. Lokhande, N (2011): “Evaluation of the Performance of MGNREGS in Maharashtra: A MultiCriteria Analysis”, MTech Dissertation Stage I, IIT, Bombay.

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REVIEW OF WOMEN’S STUDIES May 4, 2013 Intersections of Gender and Caste

– Sharmila Rege, J Devika, Kalpana Kannabiran, Mary E John, Padmini Swaminathan, Samita Sen

Revitalising Dalit Feminism: Towards Reflexive, Anti-Caste Agency of Mang and Mahar Women in Maharashtra

– Smita M Patil

Caste and Gender in a Mumbai Resettlement Site

– Varsha Ayyar

Dalit Women as Political Agents: A Kerala Experience

–Rekha Raj

The Mathammas: Gender, Caste and the Politics of Intersectionality – Anandhi S

in Rural Tamil Nadu The Concept of Honour: Caste Ideology and Patriarchy in Rural Maharashtra

–Manisha Gupte

Cultural Gandhism: Casting Out the Dalit Woman

–Swathy Margaret

Ruptures and Reproduction in Caste/Gender/Labour

– Meena Gopal

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vol xlviii nos 26 & 27

EPW

Economic & Political Weekly