determinants of candidate selection - Novodrustvo.net

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V O L 1 0 . N o . 1 pp. 25–47

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DETERMINANTS OF CANDIDATE SELECTION The Degree of Centralization in Comparative Perspective Krister Lundell ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to examine whether party characteristics and contextual variables explain varying degrees of centralization of intra-partisan candidate selection methods. By means of statistical analyses and a larger dataset than in earlier studies, possible associations are studied. In order to carry out the study, an index of the degree of centralization is constructed. Of the party characteristics, only party size affects the dependent variable: large parties tend to apply more centralized selection methods than small parties. None of the institutional variables determines the degree of centralization of candidate selection. For instance, earlier assertions about the importance of the electoral system and territorial organization are falsified. However, some distinct regional patterns emerge: Southern European parties apply centralized selection methods, whereas candidate selection in Nordic countries is decentralized.

KEY WORDS ! candidate selection ! centralization ! decentralization ! selection methods

Introduction Recruitment to legislative office is one of the core functions of political systems. A great deal of attention is paid to parliamentary elections, the preceding election campaign and the subsequent process of government formation (in parliamentary democracies). The selection of candidates, on the other hand, usually takes place far away from the glare of public scrutiny. Nevertheless, it is a crucial part of the political process with far-reaching 1354-0688[DOI: 10.1177/1354068804039119]

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consequences. According to Gallagher (1988b: 1), the quality of candidates selected determines the quality both of the deputies elected, of the resultant legislature, and sometimes also of a country’s politics, especially if drastic changes in the parties’ selection procedures are in hand. Endorsing these statements, Bille (2001: 364) says that we can hardly classify a regime as democratic if the organizational structure of the parties lacks mechanisms for civic participation and influence. The decision-making process reflects the internal democracy of a party and, among these processes, candidate selection is one of the most important. The importance of candidate selection has been well acknowledged ever since democratic politics began to flourish. A hundred years ago, Ostrogorski (1902) pointed out that the distribution of power within the party is highly affected by the methods of candidate selection. Several authors, among them Michels (1915: 183–4), Schattschneider (1942), Kirchheimer (1966: 198), Jupp (1968: 58) and Ranney (1981: 103), have later stressed the centrality of candidate selection in the life of any political party. Candidate selection is, in Katz’s (2001: 278) words, ‘one of the central defining functions of a political party in a democracy’. Much research on candidate selection has dealt with the distribution of power within party organizations, the selecting organs and formal rules governing the process (Katz and Mair, 1992; Lovenduski and Norris, 1993; McKenzie, 1955; Panebianco, 1988; Ranney, 1965; Rush, 1969; Sjöblom, 1968; Ware, 1996). Another major stream of literature has been concerned with understanding the consequences of the composition of elites for political representation and decisive criteria in selecting candidates (Esaiasson and Holmberg, 1996; Eulau and Wahlke, 1978; Narud and Johansson, 2001; Norris, 1997; Pitkin, 1967; Putnam, 1976). However, surprisingly few authors have been interested in why control over candidate selection varies between parties and countries. Some authors have argued that the degree of centralization is affected by the electoral system (Czudnowski, 1975: 221; Epstein, 1980: 225–6; Hermens, 1972: 51–8; Matthews, 1985: 35–7). Candidate selection in plurality systems with single-member districts tends to be decentralized, whereas large multi-member districts require more centralized selection methods. Territorial organization is another influential factor; federalism is, according to Epstein (1980: 31–4) and Harmel (1981: 86), related to decentralized candidate selection. One of the most comprehensive studies of candidate selection is Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988). In this volume, both determinants (legal provisions, governmental organization, the electoral system, political culture and the nature of the party) and effects of candidate selection in nine countries are studied. As to determinants, the only strong association is found between federalism and decentralized candidate selection. The reasons why candidate selection methods vary are, on the whole, still wrapped in mystery. By means of statistical analyses and a larger dataset 26

L U N D E L L : D E T E R M I N A N T S O F C A N D I D AT E S E L E C T I O N

than in previous studies, I therefore re-examine determinants of candidate selection methods.

Purpose and Method The purpose of this study is to examine whether party characteristics and the political context explain differences between parties and countries on one central dimension of candidate selection methods: territorial centralization versus decentralization. I apply a mixed strategy of both induction and deduction, which enables an examination of a rather large set of independent variables – important factors emphasized by other scholars as well as possible determinants not previously observed. Strengths of associations are measured mostly by correlation and regression analysis. As for the qualitative variables, mean values are compared. In order to carry out the study, candidate selection methods prior to parliamentary elections (the lower chamber in bicameral assemblies) are classified according to a scale that measures the degree of centralization. Another minor purpose is to observe candidate selection in some Western democracies that have, to my knowledge, been previously ignored, namely Switzerland, Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus. Selection methods are observed at different points in time. The earliest data included in the study are from 1981 and the latest data concern candidate selection prior to the last elections. Measuring all selection processes at a specific point in time is not necessary because selection procedures in political parties tend to be stable over time and radical changes are rare (Bille, 2001: 365–8). A general view of candidate selection practices reveals that selection methods vary considerably between countries, which suggests that contextual factors might determine varying degrees of centralization. Consequently, a mainly contextual approach, including several aspects of the political system as well as other country characteristics, is applied. Calculation of specific values of centralization for each country is precluded, however, given that there is substantial variation of the dependent variable within countries. The selection process is the unit of analysis in this study. In addition to contextual variables, some party characteristics are included. Primary as well as secondary data are used. The former consist of correspondence with party officials, party statutes and other formal rules governing the selection process. The most frequently used secondary sources are Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988) and Party Organizations – A Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western Democracies, 1960–1990 (Katz and Mair, 1992). In some cases, several sources have been available, and they do not always correspond with each other. In these cases, I have given precedence to the volumes mentioned above. 27

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The Dataset The dataset is determined by several factors. First, only democratic countries are included. Formal rules governing the selection process cannot be regarded as important and reliable in parties operating in undemocratic systems. There are, however, different levels of democracy. In order to avoid a biased collection of parties and countries, I limit the dataset to advanced democracies in the developed world. The long-term democracies in Patterns of Democracy (1999) by Lijphart constitute a point of departure for selecting countries. His study of government forms and performance consists of 36 countries that in 1996 had been democratic for at least 19 years. In deciding which countries qualify as democracies, he relies to a great extent on Freedom House’s ratings since 1972 (http://www.freedomhouse.org). In these surveys, all countries are rated as free, partly free or not free, and Lijphart regards the ‘free’ countries as democratic countries (1999: 50). Eleven of these are developing countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and are consequently excluded from my dataset.1 Furthermore, parties without parliamentary representation are omitted. My ambition is to include parties that seriously struggle for parliamentary mandates. Candidate selection is not necessarily one of the core functions in parties without realistic chances of winning any seat. In addition, parties without parliamentary representation are often new, and so may lack established selection procedures. By excluding marginal and recently formed parties, we have a good sample of the main relevant cases. I also exclude Germany, Finland, Norway and the United States, because candidate selection in these countries is legally regulated (Gallagher, 1988a: 257). If the constitution or other specific laws determine the selection process, the political system or party characteristics cannot affect the selection process. The exclusion of these countries may seem contradictory, considering that most of the independent variables included in the study assume that parties are capable, more or less rationally, of adapting to their environments. The notion of political parties as rational actors implies that they might pass laws according to their candidate selection preferences, which, in turn, means that the law cannot be a decisive and independent influence on parties’ behaviour. However, after having noticed that all these four countries apply decentralized selection methods, Gallagher (1988a: 257) points out that: Once a law exists, the process it prescribes may come to acquire a certain legitimacy, and the parties in each of these countries would court unpopularity if they attempted to change the law to permit a more centralized . . . form of candidate selection.

Hence, legal provisions affect parties’ behaviour as well as being affected by it, and the exclusion of the countries mentioned above seems justifiable. 28


Of the remaining countries, Portugal is omitted, since detailed information on candidate selection in any Portuguese party is lacking. On the other hand, Cyprus has been rated as ‘free’ by Freedom House since 1981, and is therefore included in the dataset, which thereby embodies 21 developed countries with a minimum of two decades of democratic experience. The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Data on every significant party in each country have not been accessible. Some countries, e.g. Australia, Luxembourg and Malta, are represented by only one or two parties, whereas others, such as Sweden and Belgium, are represented by practically all parliamentary parties. In most countries, the major parties are included, and this sample of countries and parties may to a large extent be regarded as a representative collection for the purpose of the study. Nevertheless, some caution is needed – interpretation of the results must be carried out in a Western context. The dataset consists of a total of 94 candidate selection processes in 90 parties. In New Zealand, a mixed electoral system is used, which implies that two separate selection processes are carried out – one for single-member districts in the plurality (nominal) tier and the other for national party lists in the proportional (list) tier.2

Classifying Candidate Selection Methods In the present study I am concerned with one central dimension of intrapartisan candidate selection: territorial centralization versus decentralization, i.e. the question of where selection takes place in the party hierarchy. According to Gallagher (1998b: 4), candidates might, at one extreme, be selected in primaries open for all eligible voters; at the other, they can be picked by the party leader alone. Other possibilities are selection by all party members in the constituency; by delegates at local conventions; by a constituency committee; by the regional organization; by national organs or by a few national faction leaders (1988b: 4; Norris, 1996: 202). There are, however, other dimensions as well. Rahat and Hazan (2001: 297–9) present four dimensions: candidacy, i.e. possible restrictions on the eligibility for candidacy; party selectorates, i.e. inclusiveness versus exclusiveness of the selectorate in the selection process; decentralization, i.e. the locus of control; and voting/appointment systems, i.e. how candidates are nominated. Norris gives due attention to still another dimension: the degree of institutionalization (formal/informal) in the selection process (1993: 321–7). In formal systems, the selection process is characterized by detailed, explicit and standardized rules which are relatively clear to outside observers, whereas an informal selection process is less bureaucratic and rarely made explicit. 29

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Considering the four elements discussed by Rahat and Hazan, party selectorates and decentralization are directly concerned with the distribution of power within the party, and may in this respect be regarded as more important than the other two elements. The candidacy dimension is mainly relevant to those applying for candidacy rather than the selecting body. The distinction between voting systems and appointment systems, notwithstanding, bears some relevance to the distribution of power, since appointment probably implies a higher level of party control over candidate selection than voting. However, I believe that party selectorates and appointment/voting systems to a great extent overlap – a voting system is most likely more inclusive than an appointment system. The dimensions of centralization versus decentralization and inclusiveness versus exclusiveness also to some extent overlap. A more centralized process often implies more exclusive candidate selection. However, this is not always the case. For instance, a system in which 1000 party members select the candidates nationally is, of course, more centralized than a system in which each candidate is selected by one local leader. At the same time, the former is probably more inclusive than the latter. On the other hand, a system in which a few national leaders select candidates on the basis of proposals from party members is, in my opinion, not particularly inclusive, because the decision is made by a few. In this sense, I regard these two dimensions as somewhat overlapping. A bird’s-eye view of the literature on candidate selection indicates that these are the most frequently discussed and, consequently, most important dimensions of candidate selection (e.g. Bille, 2001; Epstein, 1980; Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Gallagher et al., 1992; Hopkin, 2001; Katz, 2001; Pennings and Hazan, 2001; Ranney, 1981). In this study, I prefer decentralization to party selectorates, because I regard the first mentioned as a more straightforward tool for classifying candidate selection methods. Moreover, I focus exclusively on the territorial dimension of decentralization. Inclusion of the functional dimension, which is concerned with ensuring representation for groups such as trade unions, women and minorities, would render the classification of selection methods more complex. The primary selecting agency may often be difficult to locate, because several organs are often involved in the selection process. The final selection may be the result of interaction between several party agencies. By using an index of the degree of centralization, this task does not, however, constitute an insurmountable problem. The classification of candidate selection methods presented below is based mainly on Bille’s categorization (2001: 365–7). He measures the level of final decision regarding candidate selection in 57 Western European parties around 1960 and 71 parties around 1990. His analysis refers to the stipulations in the formal rules for candidate selection described in Katz and Mair (1992). He is actually concerned with democratization rather than decentralization, but his 30


categorization measures the level of decentralization as well. In addition, an element of inclusiveness of the selectorate is included, since the sixth category notes whether a membership ballot is applied or not.3 A fundamental distinction in his classification is drawn between national party organs and subnational organs. At one extreme, national organs completely control the selection process (category 1); at the other, subnational organs are in charge of the process and make the final decision (category 5). Different forms of interaction between national and subnational organs constitute the intermediate categories. My classification differs in some respect from that of Bille. First, I do not include his third category ‘national organs provide list, subnational organs decide’, since this category consists of only one case at the latter point of time. In my classification, this selection method is placed on a level with selection by district organs under the influence of regional or national organs. Second, a primary distinction is drawn here between the district level and the national level. The classification of selection controlled by regional organs depends on what other organs are involved in the process.4 Third, local candidate selection, either at local party meetings or by membership ballot, represents the lowest degree of centralization, whereas national primaries imply a centralized form of candidate selection. This measure is taken in order to avoid the fusion of decentralization and inclusiveness of the selectorate. Finally, my index runs in the opposite direction, because I measure the degree of centralization, whereas Bille is more interested in democratization (and the extent of inclusiveness). The dependent variable of the present study is operationalized on an ordinal scale and consists of five categories. The meanings of the values are as follows: 1 Selection at local party meetings, by local selection committees or by primaries open for all party members. 2 Selection at the district level by a selection committee, by the executive district organ or at a convention (congress, conference) by delegates from the local parties. 3 The same as 1 or 2 but regional or national organs exercise influence over the selection process, e.g. add names to the lists or have veto power. The decision, however, is taken at the district level. Formal approval by regional or national organs without actual involvement in the process belongs to the second category. 4 The same as 5, but local, district or regional organs exercise influence over the selection process, e.g. party members, the local parties or committees at the constituency or the regional level propose candidates. The decision, however, is taken at the national level. 5 Selection by the party leader, by the national executive organ, by a national selection committee, or by primaries at the national level. The indices of all parties are given in the appendix. 31

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The Independent Variables In this section, the independent variables and their operationalizations are presented. Altogether nine variables are included. Three of them are party characteristics: ideology, size and age. The effective number of parties represents varying degrees of party system fragmentation. Two variables characterize the electoral system: district magnitude and preferential voting. Another three variables at the macro-level are included: territorial organization (federalism versus unitarism), area and region. Ideology First, I distinguish between right, centre and left parties, according to following categories: far right, conservative, Christian-democratic, centre/ liberal/agrarian, green, social-democratic, socialist and communist parties. One may assume that extreme parties are more ‘authoritarian’ and therefore apply more centralized selection methods than other parties. Party Size Vote share in the preceding parliamentary elections determines the size of a party. I consider vote share a better measure of size than seat share, because the former reflects the relative party size according to the opinion of the electorate. Small parties may apply more decentralized selection methods than large parties, because the appeal of a small party is so limited that it has to rely on the drawing power of local notables. Consequently, local and district organs are probably best placed to select candidates. The complexity of large party organizations might have a centralizing effect on candidate selection. Party Age The age of a party is measured at the time of elections following the candidate selection observed. For each party, I try to determine the birth of the party organization. A renovation of the ‘old’ party organization or a change of party name is not considered a birth of a new party. Secessionist parties from larger party organizations, on the other hand, are regarded as new parties, because the party of origin is still in existence. Concerning the association between age and centralization, contrary assumptions can be found. Younger parties might respect internal democracy to a greater extent than older ones, and might thus apply more decentralized selection methods. However, one can also expect old parties to be more ready to open up to member participation, on the one hand, and decentralization, on the other, as they have a more solid support base, and might therefore be less afraid of losing control of the party organization. 32


The Effective Number of Parties The most widely used measure of party system fragmentation is the effective number of parties, created by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera (1979). The index is calculated according to the following formula: 1 N = —— !si2 where si refers to the seat proportion of the ith party. Political parties may be in need of different strategies in different party systems. Stiff competition for the power positions among the parties may have a decentralizing effect on candidate selection, because every single ‘surplus’ vote is needed. A party system with only a few parties and fairly stable positions might, on the other hand, mean that there is little need for the national party organization to worry too much about the district and local branches in selecting candidates. The effective number of parties is calculated on the basis of the results of the preceding elections. District Magnitude The electoral system is often held to exert great influence on many features of a country’s politics – candidate selection is one of them. In this respect, the common distinction between majoritarian, proportional and intermediate forms of electoral systems is not necessarily the crucial point, but rather the number of candidates running for election and the number of representatives in a constituency. Besides, most countries in the dataset apply proportional electoral systems. We may assume that candidate selection is decentralized in electoral systems with small constituencies because of the local knowledge of potential winners needed. According to the same logic, the central party organization can be expected to have a greater influence on the selection process in large multi-member constituencies – partly due to the coordination needed in compiling party lists, partly because voters are not expected to have as good a personal knowledge of the candidates as in small constituencies. I use the same index of district magnitude as Lijphart (1994), i.e. the average district magnitude calculated by dividing the total number of seats in the legislature by the number of districts. Preferential Voting Concerning the ballot structure, the crucial point is whether the voters can choose between several candidates of the same party or not, i.e. preferential or non-preferential voting. There are, however, different kinds of preferential voting, and I apply an ordinal scale with three categories: (1) non-preferential voting, (2) preferential voting without rank-ordering and cumulation, and (3) preferential voting with rank-ordering or cumulation. 33

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Non-preferential voting takes place in electoral systems with closed party lists (e.g. Iceland, Israel and Spain); in most systems with single-member districts (Canada and the United Kingdom); and in mixed systems (which in the only relevant case, New Zealand, implies a mixture of closed lists and single-member districts). The second category consists of list systems where preference votes are the sole basis on which candidates are elected (e.g. Cyprus, Greece and Finland) and list systems where the election of candidates is determined by both list order and preference voting (e.g. Belgium, Denmark and The Netherlands). The single non-transferable system in Japan until 1995 also belongs here. I regard list systems that, in addition to preferential voting, allow cumulation, i.e. to cumulate two personal votes on one candidate, as a stronger kind of preferential voting. These systems (Luxembourg and Switzerland), along with the alternative vote (Australia) and the single transferable vote (Ireland and Malta), constitute the third category. Preferential voting is assumed to have a decentralizing effect on candidate selection. In picking candidates, local knowledge of potential winners may be needed. Local agencies can argue that the party ticket must be assembled carefully, with sensitivity to the voters’ opinions, and that only the local organization is in a position to know what ticket will be of most appeal to voters in the constituency. In electoral systems without preferential voting, the national party organization may want to exert influence on the compilation of party lists and perhaps guarantee some candidates representation by placing them at the top of the list. There is also a contrary hypothesis. Parties in non-preferential systems might actually be more open to decentralization and participation as ‘compensation’ for the lack of voters’ influence in the elections. Territorial Organization Several authors have argued that general party decentralization, and consequently decentralized candidate selection, is quite strongly related to decentralization of power within the polities where the parties operate. In federal systems, the national party organization often plays an insignificant role in the selection process, compared to parties in unitary systems. In this study, the territorial organization variable is trichotomized on an ordinal scale: (1) federal states, (2) unitary states with decentralized features, and (3) unitary states. Area The importance of physical size in explaining political phenomena is well known (e.g. Anckar, 1998; Dahl and Tufte, 1973; Lijphart, 1977: 68). Both area and population are indicators of size. A high degree of multicollinearity between them implies that only one of them should be chosen. As for 34


population, any realistic assumption of possible effects on selection methods is hard to think of. Concerning area, on the other hand, two opposite assumptions are made. First, a large territory requires an extensive party organization, often characterized by hierarchy, complexity and bureaucracy, which might have a centralizing effect on candidate selection. Second, candidate selection at the local or district level might be a simpler solution for the national party organization rather than centralized selection methods, which in large territories require extensive arrangements and knowledge of potential winners in a large number of districts. Region Since 16 of 21 countries in the dataset are European countries, and the other 5 belong to 4 different continents, I deal primarily with Europe. Three European regions are distinguished: Nordic countries (Denmark, Iceland and Sweden), Central Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), and Southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain). The second category is, nevertheless, miscellaneous in terms of tradition, diffusion and political culture. In Vesteuropeisk politikk (1998), Heidar and Berntzen regard the United Kingdom and Ireland as a distinct region, brought together by the Westminster model. The Westminster category can here be enlarged with Australia, Canada and New Zealand, not on grounds of regional affiliation but of political culture and imitation, which are the main reasons for classifying countries on the basis of regional division. I therefore analyse two slightly different models of regional division.

Empirical Findings By way of introduction, I examine the dispersion of all parties along the scale of centralization of selection methods. The results are given in Table 1. The value 5 denotes the highest degree of centralization, whereas 1 denotes extreme decentralization. As we can see, a normal distribution is formed, and the arithmetical average is close to the centre of the scale. Bivariate Patterns We are now ready to proceed with the empirical analysis of the associations between the independent and the dependent variables. In Table 2, parties are classified according to ideology. No substantial differences exist between right, centre and left parties. A detailed classification, on the other hand, indicates that parties at both extremes of the ideological scale apply centralized selection methods. The differences between other ideologies are small, however, and the model is not statistically significant. 35

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Table 1. The degree of centralization of 94 candidate selection processes Index of centralization

Selection processes (N)

Dispersion (%)

1 2 3 4 5

10 19 36 22 7

10.6 20.2 38.3 23.4 7.4

Note: Arithmetical average: 2.97. Standard deviation: 1.08. Sources: Bille (2001); Gallagher and Marsh (1988); Gallagher et al. (1992); Katz and Mair (1992); Norris (1996); Norris (1997); Rahat and Hazan (2001).

Table 2. Ideology and average degree of centralization Ideology

Average degree of centralization

Right Centre Left Eta2 Sign. Far-right Conservative Christian-democratic Centre (liberal, agrarian) Green Social-democratic Socialist Communist Eta2 Sign.

N

Std. dev.

2.86 2.57 3.17 0.042 0.112

28 23 35

1.05 1.08 1.12

4.00 2.88 2.70 2.59 2.50 2.86 3.33 4.20 0.142 0.090

1 17 10 17 6 21 9 5

1.22 0.48 1.18 0.84 1.11 1.00 0.84

Sources: Heidar and Berntzen (1998); Political Resources on the Net [http://www. politicalresources.net/].

In Table 3, effects of party size and age as well as institutional determinants are studied. Of all seven independent variables, only party size affects the degree of centralization. Large parties tend to apply more centralized selection methods than small parties. Furthermore, the degree of centralization seems to be slightly higher in younger parties, in party systems with few parties and in small countries. However, these associations are not 36

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Degree of centralization Party size Party age Party system District magnitude Preferential voting Territorial organization

Party size

Party age

Party system

District magnitude

Preferential voting (a)

Territorial organization (a) Area

0.214*

–0.147 0.357**

–0.192 –0.310** 0.083

0.057 0.006 –0.221* 0.044

0.063 –0.162 0.061 0.092 0.096

0.022 –0.104 0.082 0.166 0.083 0.173

–0.121 0.128 0.231* –0.283** –0.159 –0.137 0.481**

Note: Pearson’s r except for (a): Spearman’s rho. * Significant at the 0.05 level. ** Significant at the 0.01 level. Sources: Anckar (2002); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections; CIA World Factbook 2002 [http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html]; Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1999); Inter-Parliamentary Union [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp]; Karvonen (2000).


Table 3. Associations between party size, party age, party system (effective number of parties), district magnitude, preferential voting, territorial organization, area and the degree of centralization

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Table 4. Region and average degree of centralization Region

Average degree of centralization

Nordic countries Central Europe Southern Europe Eta2 Sign.

2.12 2.87 3.81 0.348 0.000

N

Std. dev.

17 38 16

0.70 0.91 0.66

statistically significant.5 With reference to earlier statements concerning the effects of federalism and the electoral system, the lack of correlation is surprising. The last variable, region, is qualitative and needs to be treated in the same way as ideology. As can be seen in Table 4, there are large differences between different parts of Europe. Southern European parties apply centralized selection methods, in Nordic countries the selection process is decentralized, and the Central European parties are found in the middle of the centralization scale. The Eta2 value is as high as 0.348 and the model is significant at the 0.01 level. Moreover, the Nordic and the Southern European regions are distinguished by small standard deviations, i.e. variations within these groups are small in comparison to Central European parties. In the alternative model with four regions (Nordic countries, Central Europe, Southern Europe and Westminster countries), the explained variance (Eta2) is smaller (27 percent compared with 35 percent in the former model) and the average degree of centralization in Westminster countries is 2.88. This group is fairly heterogeneous – both decentralized and centralized selection methods are frequently represented. The model is nonetheless significant at the 0.01 level. When all regions are transformed into dummy variables, Nordic parties correlate negatively (–0.396), and Southern European parties positively (0.378), with the degree of centralization. Both associations are significant at the 0.01 level. In this respect, Central European parties and ‘Westminster’ parties are of no importance. Multivariate Patterns The correlation analyses suggested that only party size and region (Nordic parties and Southern European parties) affect the dependent variable. No other significant interactions between determinants and the degree of centralization of candidate selection methods were found. These three variables are consequently included in the regression. The results are given in Table 5. The model indicates that the importance of party size is considerably 38


Table 5. Party size, two regions and the degree of centralization. Multiple regression analysis Independent variables

Degree of centralization

Party size Nordic countries Southern Europe Adjusted R2 Sign.

0.138 (1.475) –0.290** (–3.047) 0.278** (2.945) 0.211 0.000

Note: Standardized beta-coefficients. T-values in parentheses. ** Significant at the 0.01 level.

smaller than that of the Nordic and Southern European regions in explaining different candidate selection methods. If we exclude party size, the explained variance decreases by only 1 percent, from 21.1 to 20.1, and the F-value increases from 9.28 to 12.67. The importance of party size is, on the other hand, strengthened when several variables are included in the regression analysis, but the general picture is not altered. Accordingly, region is the most important determinant of the degree of centralization of candidate selection. However, in statistical analysis, region is marred by a serious problem. I return to this matter in the discussion below.

Conclusions In this study, I have examined determinants of candidate selection methods put forward by other authors as well as some variables not recently studied in this context. According to the statistical analyses, region is the most important determinant of candidate selection in the developed world. Two regions distinguish themselves: Nordic parties apply decentralized selection methods, whereas candidate selection in Southern Europe is centralized. The Nordic countries have to a great extent a similar historical development; they introduced parliamentarianism and universal suffrage about the same time, and they have all been democratic for almost a century. They have a long tradition of participation, and local government is regarded as a fundamental part of democracy. Although the Nordic countries are unitary states, the principle that decisions should be made at the lowest possible level has often been the practice (Petersson, 1995: 13–15).6 The Southern European countries also have a number of important cultural, social and historical characteristics in common, and their political systems are often regarded as a ‘Mediterranean model of democracy’ (Heidar and Berntzen, 1998: 245). Contrary to the Nordic countries, they have experienced serious setbacks on their road to stable democracy. Italy has been democratic since World War II, but the transition from dictatorship 39

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to democracy in Portugal, Spain and Greece did not occur until the 1970s.7 Compared to Scandinavia, politics in Southern Europe is characterized by strong and charismatic leadership, centralization and authority. These characteristics may explain the differences between candidate selection methods in Nordic parties, on the one hand, and Southern European parties, on the other. The influence of religion on political culture might also be of some importance in this respect. The Catholic Church, which is predominant in Southern Europe (with the exception of Greece), is said to be more dogmatic, hierarchical and powerful than Protestantism. Perhaps the foremost reason for studying region is to bring closely located countries with common political traditions and political culture together. However, classification on the basis of region also implies the inclusion of other elements that these countries have in common. The problem in studying region as a separate variable is, accordingly, that it consists of several values that together explain more than variables representing separate characteristics. Hence, the importance of region must not be overemphasized at the expense of other determinants. In the following, I briefly discuss some of the other independent variables. Concerning party ideology, far-left and far-right parties apply, as expected, centralized selection methods, but the model is not significant. The categories at both extremes of the ideological scale consist of only a few parties; a more even distribution of parties might have reinforced the importance of ideology. There are several dimensions of party type as well. One could consider a distinction between ‘catch-all’ parties (see Kirchheimer, 1966), ‘horizontal’ parties (Seiler, 1986), ‘programmatic’ parties (Wolinetz, 1991), ‘modern cadre’ parties (Koole, 1994), ‘cartel’ parties (Katz, 2001), and so on. However, such a classification would require neat descriptions of how they differ from each other and to what extent they overlap. Party size appears to be a variable of some significance for the degree of centralization of selection methods. In general, large parties apply more centralized methods than small parties. One reason for the decentralized pattern among small parties might, as already mentioned, be that because of their smaller popularity, they have to rely on the drawing power of wellknown aspirants at the local level, which, in turn, calls for local knowledge. Moreover, small party organizations are often characterized by open and flexible political processes, which offer better opportunities for participation. Large organizations, on the other hand, are often marked by complexity, hierarchy and bureaucracy, which is associated with a higher degree of centralization. Perhaps the most frequently mentioned determinant of candidate selection is the electoral system. The statistical analysis suggests, however, that the electoral system in terms of district magnitude does not affect the degree of centralization. Nor does preferential voting have a decentralizing effect 40


on candidate selection. Several authors have emphasized territorial organization as a decisive factor – federalism is said to coincide with a low degree of centralization. Again, the assumption is proven wrong. The degree of centralization in federal states is practically the same as in unitary states. The party system seems to affect selection processes to some extent. Candidate selection is more centralized in party systems with few parties than in countries with a fragmented party system. However, the association is not statistically guaranteed. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that party size correlates positively with the degree of centralization, and that there is naturally always a positive association between large parties and a small number of effective parties. The higher degree of centralization in systems with few parties might thus be explained by the presence of large parties. By way of conclusion, there are no really strong associations between explanatory variables and the degree of centralization. The regional factor is of some importance but it is only relevant in those regions where selection methods are noticeably centralized or decentralized, that is, the Nordic countries and Southern Europe, respectively. As a determinant, region does not explain different selection processes in general. On the basis of this study, there are no contextual determinants or party characteristics that would, to any great extent, explain varying degrees of centralization. One could argue that the theoretical basis for examining the effects of institutional determinants on candidate selection is weak. Notwithstanding, some of the theoretical assumptions are rather far-fetched. On the other hand, several of these variables have been discussed before, and one interesting finding is that the earlier assertions concerning the impact of federalism and the electoral system on the degree of centralization are, in the light of statistical evidence, not true. Considering the use of statistical analyses, it would have been desirable to operate with a larger number of cases than has been available. A dataset of, for instance, all significant parties at a given point of time in all advanced democracies in the developed world would perhaps have produced different, and more reliable, results but I do not think that the overall pattern would have changed much. A contextual approach does not seem fruitful in explaining why candidate selection methods vary between parties and countries. While the regional factor offers some explanation at the macro-level, a different approach, mainly based on party characteristics, might shed some more light on relevant determinants of candidate selection methods.

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Appendix. Countries, parties, election year and index of the degree of centralization Country

Party

Election year

Index

Australia

Labor Party* Liberal Party* SPÖ* ÖVP FPÖ Grüne CVP PSC PS SP PRL PVV PCB Agalev VU Ecolo LPC* NDP PC* Reform Party AKEL* DISI* SF SD RV Venstre CD KF* KrF* FrP* RPR UDF PS PCF ND PASOK SDP FSF* FF FG PD WP Lab

2001 2001 1999 1990 1990 1990 1991 1991 1985 1985 1991 1991 1981 1991 1991 1991 2000 1993 2000 1993 2001 2001 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1998 1998 1998 1986 1986 1986 1986 1985 1985 1991 1999 1989 1989 1989 1989 1989

4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 2 2 5 4 3 2 3 3 1 1 4 3 3 3 1 2 3 1 3 3 4 4 3 4 5 5 1 2 3 3 3 2 3

Austria

Belgium

Canada

Cyprus Denmark

France

Greece Iceland Ireland

42


Appendix continued Country

Party

Election year

Index

Israel

Meretz Likud Labour DC PCI PSI MSI PR DP PSDI PRI PLI LDP SDPJ DSP Komei-to JCP DP* CSV* MLP* CDA PvdA VVD D66 GL NP, nom. tier* NP, list tier* NZLP, nom. tier* NZLP, list tier* ACT, nom. tier* ACT, list tier* NZFP, nom. tier* NZFP, list tier* Alliance PSOE* CDC* Vp* S* C* M* FpL MP KD

1999 1999 1999 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1993 1986 1986 1986 1986 1999 1999 1998 1989 1989 1989 1989 1994 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1993 2000 2000 1998 1998 1998 1998 1988 1988 1988

5 5 1 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 3 3 4 3 3 4 1 2 2 4 4 4 1 4 3 4 2 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

Italy

Japan

Luxembourg Malta Netherlands

New Zealand

Spain Sweden

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Appendix continued Country

Party

Election year

Index

Switzerland

CVP* SPS* GPS* EVP* Conservative Party Labour Party Liberal Party SDP

1999 1999 1999 1999 1987 1987 1987 1987

2 4 2 2 3 3 3 3

United Kingdom

Note: *Analysis of candidate selection methods is based on party statutes and/or correspondence with party officials. The abbreviations are similar to those in Political Resources on the Net [http://www.politicalresources.net/], Katz and Mair (1992) and/or Gallagher and Marsh (1988). Sources: Bille (2001); Gallagher and Marsh (1988); Gallagher et al. (1992); Katz and Mair (1992); Norris (1996); Norris (1997); Rahat and Hazan (2001).

Notes I thank David M. Farrell and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. They are not responsible for any faults that remain. 1 A practical reason for limiting the dataset to the developed world is the relative inaccessibility of data on candidate selection in other parts of the world. Among Third World countries, my correspondence with party officials resulted in data on candidate selection in PRI, PAN and PRD from Mexico, DP from Ecuador, NE from Uruguay, RN from Chile, PL and PCC from Colombia, ANC from South Africa, NNP from Grenada and PNM from Trinidad and Tobago. 2 Nowadays, Italy and Japan also use mixed systems, but data on candidate selection in these countries belong to the period prior to the electoral reforms. 3 Bille does not, however, mix the elements of decentralization and inclusiveness, since all parties that apply membership ballots are also found in one of the categories (1–5) that determine the level of decentralization. 4 In none of my units of analysis is the selection process completely controlled by regional party organs. 5 The negative relationship (–0.283) between area and the effective number of parties suggests that this dataset is, as far as these variables are concerned, not representative of the entire democratic world. Anckar (1998: 292) has proved that the larger the size of a country, the higher the number of parties. Some possible effects of the party system and/or area on candidate selection methods may thus be blurred by these conditions. 6 Candidate selection in Norway and Finland, which are not included in the study, is also decentralized. 7 According to Gallagher et al. (1992: 131), the national executive is the most important selecting body in Portuguese parties, which are not included in the study.

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KRISTER LUNDELL is a doctoral candidate at Åbo Akademi University in Finland. His research interests include democratization, candidate selection and electoral systems. His forthcoming doctoral dissertation deals with determinants of electoral systems. ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, Åbo Akademi University, Biskopsgatan 15, FIN-20500 Åbo, Finland. [email: [email protected]] Paper submitted 27 September 2002; accepted for publication 29 April 2003.

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