Dewey and Vygotsky: Incommensurability ... - Karger Publishers

Commentary Human Development 2013;56:128–133 DOI: 10.1159/000346536

Dewey and Vygotsky: Incommensurability, Intersections, and the Empirical Possibilities of Metaphysical Consciousness Commentary on Clarà

Aria Razfar University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, Ill., USA

Key Words Incommensurability · Intersection · Metaphysical consciousness · Sociocultural theory

Since the dawn of sociocultural theory in the US and Western European academic contexts around the late seventies, many scholars have attempted to bridge the gap and make connections between Vygotskian-inspired theories of human development and learning and the US and Western European cognitive traditions. I am including both sociocultural theory (SCT) and cultural historical activity theory (CHAT). Prior to this period, US and Western European psychological traditions competed on several fronts with the Marxist-inspired perspectives of learning and human development grounded in dialectic materialism. Furthermore, the broader political and ideological context also frames the debates. On the one hand you have cognitive traditions embedded within nations based on the ideals of capitalism: minimal government interference, free enterprise and markets, individualism, and a laissez-faire economy. On the other hand, you have a cognitive tradition anchored in a nation state superstructure that believes in greater government interference, regulated markets, shared governance, and a communal economy. While these dichotomies are somewhat simplistic and essentialist, they nevertheless inform the broader context through which these respective cognitive traditions emerged. The discursive and ideological tensions that exist between nation states inevitably or inherently, depending on the perspective, mediate what transpires within microgenetic levels of life. The fundamental question here is: how do macroideological framings of the nation state mediate the tug of war of ideas with respect to learning, cognition, and human development? It is the tension between an individual mind, an embodied mind

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Aria Razfar Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago, 3428 EPASW 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147, Chicago, IL 60607 (USA) E-Mail arazfar @ uic.edu

versus a social mind or a situated mind. It is the schism between cognitive psychology and linguistic approaches to language and learning versus social psychology and sociocultural approaches to discourse. It is the tension between the voice of the individual versus the voice of the collective. It is the tension between individual feelings and thought versus collective ethos and solidarity. To this complex discussion comes Marc Clarà’s valuable contribution ‘The concept of situation and the microgenesis of the conscious purpose in cultural psychology’ [this issue]. Furthermore, it is important to note 4 tensions that inform the discussion between SCT/CHAT and cognitive psychology: (1) the relationship of learning between the individual and the social, (2) the nature of development, (3) human agency (or lack thereof), and (4) the role of language in learning and development. For the most part, the US and Western European psychological traditions on cognition emphasized individual traits and abilities, learning as biologically induced, a more passive learner, and a minimal role for language. Furthermore, ‘language’ was narrowly defined in terms of its physical properties, not intrinsic to human cognition. In contrast, SCT/CHAT psychological traditions have emphasized the individual as a subject nested within cultural activity systems that are defined by situated goals, mediated by rules, and embedded within broader communities. Furthermore, learning induces development, and the learner displays greater agency by initiated movement with more capable others through the zone of proximal development. The role of language, in the broadest sense (i.e., signs and symbols), also plays a significant role in mediating learning. Given the binaries mentioned above, how can SCT/CHAT be engaged within US and Western European paradigms and discourses of human development? One of the attempts to intersect these two discourses was through the ideas of the late John Dewey. Dewey’s notion of experiential learning, borne out of instrumentalism, provides a flashpoint for connecting Vygotskian-inspired constructivism and learning through cultural mediation. Within the USA, it was Dewey who championed nascent models of ‘hands-on,’ active, and interactive learning environments. While in seemingly polarized nation state ideologies, Dewey and Vygotsky shared an anti-elitist approach to ‘academic’ schooling. Both repositioned the learner as an active agent in his or her development. They both rejected rote learning that hampered higher-order abstract cognition while advocating for an active learner engaged in creative construction of knowledge through collaboration. They both believed in more student or learner-centered learning contexts where the ‘teacher’ needed to somewhat release the absolute reigns of epistemic authority. Instead, teachers should organize activities that reposition learners to assume greater responsibility for learning and authentic problem-solving. Clarà has opened a theoretical link between Dewey and SCT/CHAT on the microgenetic level. This can serve as a launching pad for future scholars to make more nuanced and empirically informed investigations. Clarà provides an interesting perspective on the development of conscious purpose in SCT/CHAT especially at the microgenetic level. In developing this perspective, he builds the argument by considering the ideas of environment as an integration of physical things and cultural means, cultural means as distributed within systems of activity, circumstances as constraints on activity, coexisting circumstances, and situation. All of these lead to formation of conscious purpose. These notions are taken from Dewey in order to address what he argues is the gap in SCT/CHAT. In developing this position, Clarà moves through layers of analysis of Scribner’s milk plant example.

Possibilities of Metaphysical Consciousness

Human Development 2013;56:128–133 DOI: 10.1159/000346536

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Clarà somewhat overstates the dearth of research in this area. There is a substantial body of work by neo-Vygotskian researchers who look at microgenetic processes, especially in the fields of anthropology and learning sciences. While Clarà dives into microgenetic processes, my concerns are more ontological. In comparing Dewey with the theoretical tenets of SCT/CHAT, one cannot help but revisit the issue of what Thomas Kuhn called ‘incommensurability.’ Clarà has begun to address this issue through the extant literature, especially in making a connection with Hegel. The ‘elephant in the room’ remains whether or not Dewey and SCT/CHAT are incommensurate at the ontological level. One might even posit that there is an ideological incommensurability as well. SCT/CHAT is grounded in dialectical materialism while Dewey brings together metaphysics, pragmatism, and instrumentalism. These are fundamental ideological differences that should not be casually dismissed even though what appears to transpire in practice is more similar. We should appreciate the theoretical push, and it is important to see this core assumption addressed in a significant way. Clarà suggests that CHAT does not account for how the ‘specific environment’ affects microgenetic psychological processes [Clarà, this issue]. This assertion might be more accurate with first- and second-generation SCT thinking. However, it would be considered problematic in light of more recent neoVygotskian work. This is especially the case with work that is predicated on life-long, life-wide, vertical, and horizontal understandings of learning and development. In addition, this body of work explicitly draws on ethnographic methods that account for an expanded ecology of learning with multiple spaces and time scales. The environment is paramount to understanding microgenetic psychological processes. The other major point of divergence is between Dewey’s idea of ‘experience’ and the CHAT notions of synchronic and diachronic history(ies) in learning and development. Where is the starting point for experience and where does history begin for CHAT? For Dewey, experience is both physical and metaphysical, and the absolute sum of movement is toward meaning or truth. Thus, truth is the origin and the destination, and this experience is unfolding within the individual through empirical inquiry. While this individual experiences within the world, he or she is not of the world. This is not the case with CHAT where the individual is never abstracted from socially organized activity systems. Activity systems are historically grounded at several levels and the Marxist idea that codifies the tension between individual sovereignty and the weight of historical circumstances: ‘Men make their own history, but … they do not make it under selfselected circumstances … The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living’ [Marx, 1852/2001, p. 7]. Thus, activity systems are bound by historical circumstances, and individuals both act on and are acted upon as they move toward relative concrete objects and goals. In contrast to the metaphysical idea of meaning that Dewey presumes, meaning-making is not the goal but the means toward solving concrete problems and achieving objects and outcomes. It is a dialectical process that unfolds in physical time and space. There are no interpersonal constraints in Dewey’s experience since it unfolds within the individual. Here we must take a step back and consider the broader objective for Dewey. Dewey’s goal was to provide an empirical philosophy of education. It was an approach that combined the aesthetic and the scientific to produce new beliefs and/or meanings. This is where the issue of incommensurability comes up again [Lantolf & Thorne, 2007]. If Deweyan psychology is pushing us toward the nonmaterial (the

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metaphysical), how is this handled by a theory such as SCT/CHAT with roots in dialectical materialism, a theory that categorically rejects the metaphysical? Semiotic approaches that emphasize meaning would be just as powerful, although I do not think intentionality is dealt with adequately there either. For Dewey, empirical evidence is tantamount and the ability to falsify claims essential. It is difficult to apply this standard to Clarà’s analysis. In presenting the concept of whole-circumstance-event in relation to conscious purpose, the Scribner example does not appear to be sufficient. For example, Clarà states that the constraints on the activities (circumstance) lead to conscious purpose. This claim is to be taken a priori. There is a need to see this empirically developed, and perhaps this is the limitation of drawing exclusively on Scribner’s example. Clarà suggests that SCT/ CHAT does not account for tensions or constraints within the activity system. Vygotsky clearly explicates tensions and constraints in learning and development and, recently, neo-Vygotskian approaches have built on this idea in terms of ‘third space’ and ‘sociocritical’ learning [Gutiérrez, 2008; Moje et al., 2004; Razfar, 2011]. Other examples of incommensurability appear where Dewey’s ‘organism-environment’ is equated with ‘subject-object.’ My question here is what explanatory power is gained through this equivalence? This is further illustrated with the introduction of the concept of ‘perezhivanie’ (loosely translated ‘lived experience’) and the lack of historical and institutional analysis in Dewey (something acknowledged by Clarà [this issue]). Should Deweyan psychology even be considered a collective theory of learning and development in the same way SCT/CHAT is? If not, then what do we learn from the intersection of the two discourses? How does Dewey help us with affect and consciousness? Perhaps additional data examples and other conceptual frames are necessary for engaging productively some of the conceptual tensions with SCT/CHAT. With regard to the question, how can we empirically study conscious purpose as opposed to goals (a distinction made by Clarà) in situ? Another way to frame this question is: where would motive be in an activity triangle? This might be a better way to frame the analysis and discussion. How might motive be positioned within an activity system? I would agree that intentionality and motive, especially in the Searlian and Piagetian sense of the word, are less discussed. I believe this is due to the history of the construct of intentionality and motive, which for the most part has been discussed in intrapersonal terms. The larger question is the position of the individual (i.e., subject) in a social theory of learning such as SCT/CHAT. This does not include philosophical considerations of motive (i.e., the question of why). The theoretical bridge is supposed to be Dewey’s notion of situation and event. While Clarà meticulously shows the layers of purpose in the milk plant example, an alternative explanation is to view the same practices as layers of activities rather than discrete acts. The other issue here is: what is the evidence for the preloader’s consciousness? A limitation of the analysis is the reliance on a secondary analysis ex post facto. While the analysis of the Scribner milk plant study provides some insight, it is inaccessible for further analysis. This is particularly an issue for something like consciousness. In order to strengthen the argument regarding SCT/CHAT and microgenetic processes, it is critical to apply Clarà’s insights to face-to-face interactions and use ethnographic and discourse analytic methods to examine the same questions in a wider range of contexts and activities.



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Finally, how would Deweyan psychology define culture and ideology in relation to SCT/CHAT, and how would Clarà reconcile some of the axiomatic differences? It is necessary to situate Dewey’s psychology within the broader philosophical tradition of pragmatism and the philosophy of science that aims to find undoubtable truths through repeated trial and error as well as the process of falsification. These undoubtable truths are always open given that they are contingent upon current events. Conceptual shifts occur through testing and retesting of facts until doubts are removed which is a continuous cycle. Thus, undoubtable facts are not really absolute in the positivistic sense since they are subject to change based on future attempts to reexamine them. This gives rise to a continuous tug of war of ideas at the microgenetic level. At the microgenetic level, meaning is relative since absolute truth cannot be directly accessed by the instruments that we have. While Dewey accepts the metaphysical reality of ideas and truth, meaning-making is necessarily partial and subjective because of our positioning of truths vis-à-vis the Truth. Of course, the ontology of SCT/CHAT is dialectic materialism, so it rejects an abstract reality beyond temporal and spatial parameters. Nevertheless, within socially constituted activity systems, meaning-making is also relative, subjective, and partial. The truths constructed by participants are subject to change and redirection through mediational tools and artifacts. This would suggest that even if both perspectives place similar importance on meaning-making, the goals are divergent. It could even be argued that the ethos of the activities is also divergent. Through this complicated terrain of convergence and divergence of ideas, Clarà opens the possibility for empirically examining an understudied issue in SCT/CHAT discourse, namely consciousness and metaphysical experience. A bigger conceptual issue is the challenge of juxtaposing the nuances of two thinkers from different contexts who undoubtedly struggled with the tensions of conflicting ideas, positions, and the multiplicity of confounding ideological stances. Furthermore, there is a tendency for contemporary scholars to selectively reframe the words and ideas of iconic figures to suit their intellectual and/or ideological objectives. Like Dewey, Paolo Freire is often presented as a strict dialectical materialist by critical pedagogy scholars. This is undoubtedly a selective and partial picture of his work that similarly ignores the influence of spiritual aspects of his educational thinking, a position influenced by, amongst others, Hegel and liberation theology. A lecture delivered on Hegel’s Philosophy of the Spirit in 1897 is emblematic of Dewey’s philosophical commitments and open-ended dilemmas, dilemmas that remain open until today [Gronda, 2010]. It shows the emergence of Dewey’s attempt to combine empiricism with spirituality. Furthermore, he was very deliberate about his use of the term spirit instead of mind. While some have argued that he moved away from Hegel’s idealism, this lecture, in combination with much of his work from the time that he spent in Chicago in the late 19th century, shows otherwise. So much of the discussion surrounding Dewey in recent years is focused on his empiricism and ignores this philosophical struggle that explicitly and consciously invoked the spirit. For example, Dewey uses spirit rather than mind in order to express the German word geist. This is deliberate in order to prevent any mentalistic reading of Hegelian philosophy. This is more confirmation of Dewey’s philosophical struggles and the tensions he was delving into and aiming to resolve. Clarà’s paper reopens the door to consider longstanding philosophical conundrums and ideological tensions. These are tensions which modern scholars of learn-

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ing, human development, and identity should also embrace. It is clear that Dewey was determined to develop an empiricism not only grounded in body and embodiment (i.e., hands on and concrete everyday experiences), but also in spirit and its lexical equivalents across cultures (soul, heart, stomach, liver, etc.). One might say that he was not only concerned with embodied cognition that is limited to physical and material experience, but also with inspirited cognition that acknowledges the reality of metaphysical and spiritual experience. Thus, idealism for Dewey was real and pragmatic, not a detached metaphor or idea. He advocated a philosophy of cognition that was not simply bound by flesh, but also transcendent in heart. These are philosophical and ideological tensions that need continued re-examination in light of modern scientific developments and assertions of the death of metaphysics. This question helps us navigate through the secular-sacred dichotomy that has produced polarized epistemologies, intellectual spaces, and a type of ideological apartheid that has dominated education since the time of Dewey and Vygotsky.

References Gronda, R. (2010). John Dewey’s philosophy of spirit, with the 1897 lecture on Hegel. New York: Fordham University Press. Gutiérrez, K. (2008). Developing a sociocritical literacy in the third space. Reading Research Quarterly, 43(2), 148–164. Lantolf, J., & Thorne, S. (2007). Sociocultural theory and second language acquisition. In B. van Patten & J. Williams (Eds.), Explaining second language acquisition (pp. 201–224). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marx, K. (2001). 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. London: ElecBook. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/berkeley/docDetail.action?docID=2001665&ppg=5 (original work published 1852). Moje, E., Ciechanowski, K., Kramer, K., Ellis, L., Carrillo, R., & Collazo, T. (2004). Working toward third space in content area literacy: An examination of everyday funds of knowledge and discourse. Reading Research Quarterly, 39(1), 38–70. Razfar, A. (2011). Ideological challenges in classroom discourse: A sociocritical perspective of English learning in an urban school. Critical Inquiry in Language Studies, 8(4), 344–377.



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