Digital Campaigning in a Comparative Perspective

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  Digital  Campaigning  in  a  Comparative  Perspective:  Online  Strategies  in  the  2012  Elections  in   France  and  Québec       Thierry  Giasson,  Université  Laval   Fabienne  Greffet,  Université  de  Lorraine   Geneviève  Chacon,  Université  Laval   enpolitique.com                           Paper  presented  at  the  Biennial  Congress  of  the  International  Political  Science  Association   Montreal,  19-­‐24  July,  2014       Please  do  not  cite  without  authors’  permission.      

Over   the   last   ten   years,   research   on   web   politics   has   mostly   focused   on   the   transformations   online   technologies   have   imposed   on   political   actors   (parties,   lobbies,   activists,   governments,   candidates)   in   the   way   they   engage   and   communicate   with   their   stakeholders.   Research   has   only   more   recently   started   to   investigate   how   social   media   platforms   specifically   impact   electoral   strategy   and   organization   (Karlsen   2009;   Vaccari   2010;   Kreiss   2012;   Bor   2013;   Chadwick  2013),  and  very  little  of  it  has  engaged  in  comparative  studies.  This  paper  looks  at  the   extent   to   which   campaign   organizations   have   integrated   online   platforms,   including   social   media,  in  their  strategy,  organization  and  communication  to  achieve  their  electoral  goals  during   the  French  presidential  and  Quebec  general  elections  of  2012.  Built  on  preliminary  analysis  of   37   experts   interviews,   this   exploratory   research   represents   the   enpolitique.com1  project’s   initial   phase  in  revealing  first  what  strategic  objectives  grounded  these  organizations’  online  campaign   efforts   and,   second,   if   these   discourses   on   strategic   goals   differ   according   to   variables   of   electability  or  partisan  ideology.     Investigating  the  intersection  of  online  platforms  and  elections   The   2008   American   presidential   campaign   has   often   been   presented   in   the   literature   as   a   turning  point  in  how  online  platforms  became  a  fundamental  tool  to  post-­‐modern  campaigning.   More   specifically,   lots   has   been   written   about   the   transformative   aspect   of   mybarackobama.com,  a  website  built  on  the  format  of  a  social  networking  site  and  created  in   2008  to  help  the  Obama  camp  harness  the  efforts  of  internet  users  interested  in  taking  part  in   the  candidate’s  campaign.  This  volunteer  mobilization  platform,  more  commonly  referred  to  as   MyBO,  has  been  described  by  some  scholars  as  a  transformational  approach  to  online  campaign   as  it  was  designed  and  used  to  mobilize  online  users  so  they  could  carry  offline  activities  such  as   canvassing,   neighbourhood   rallies   and   get-­‐out-­‐the-­‐vote   (GOTV)   initiatives   in   their   electoral   districts   (Kreiss   2012;   Nielsen,   2012:   56-­‐57;   Chadwick   2013:   136).   It   also   allowed   the   Obama   campaign   to   collect   an   impressive   database   of   sociodemographic   and   political   information   of   those   millions   of   individuals   who   registered   on   the   site   or   were   contacted   offline.   Some   have   claimed   that   MyBO   was   instrumental   in   the   candidate’s   victory   (Vaccari   2010:   319;   Kreiss   2012:   18-­‐21)   and   a   model   to   be   followed   for   other   campaign   organizations   wishing   to   harness   the   power  on  online  volunteers  to  contribute  efficiently  to  offline  electoral  success.    

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 Data   presented   in   this   paper   are   part   of   a   larger   research   project   funded   in   France   by   the   Agence   Nationale   de   la   Recherche   (Programme   de   collaboration   France-­‐Québec   en   SHS)   and   in   Québec   by   the   Fonds   de   recherche   du   Québec  –  Société  et  culture  (Programme  de  collaborations  Inter-­‐Agences).  This  project  called  “webinpolitics.com:   Strategies,  Contents,  and  Perceptions  of  Online  Electoral  Campaigns.  Comparing  the  2012  French  Presidential  and   Québec  legislative  Elections”  is  directed  in  France  by  Fabienne  Greffet  (Université  de  Lorraine)  and  in  Québec  by   Thierry   Giasson   (Université   Laval).   The   authors   wish   to   acknowledge   Gildas   Le   Bars   and   Mélanie   Rembert   at   Université  Laval  for  their  important  contribution  in  research  assistance  to  this  project.  

 

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However,  that’s  is  just  one  side  of  the  story.  Other  researchers  rather  indicate  that  the  much-­‐ hyped   MyBO   may   be   more   of   an   outlier   in   post-­‐modern   electioneering   (Vaccari,   2013:   ix,   50;   Enli   and   Moe,   2013).   Online   communication   innovations   developed   for   the   American   presidential   system,   with   its   dual   contest   of   candidates   fighting   for   independent   voters   in   a   relatively   limited   regulatory   framework   over   expenses   and   communication,   are   seen   as   not   generalizable  to  many  other  electoral  contexts.  These  academics  are  calling  for  investigations  to   be  carried  on  “less  obvious”  cases  of  multiparty  systems  and  legislative  elections  where  partisan   identification   and   electoral   regulations   remain   strong   in   order   to   better   understand   the   similarities   and   differences   institutional,   social   and   cultural   factors   may   play   in   why   and   how   political  parties  adopt  or  resist  to  technological  innovations  (Enli  and  Moe,  2013,  Gibson,  2013).       Indeed,   no   two   campaigns   are   similar.   Volunteer   mobilizing   platforms   similar   to   MyBO   have   been  developed  by  parties  in  other  systems,  including  the  UK  and  Canada,  with  varying  levels  of   longevity  and  effectiveness  and  organizations  around  the  world  are  now  using  social  media  to   communicate   with   voters.   Institutional   factors   such   as   the   difference   in   electoral   systems,   in   party   organizations   (member   or   elite-­‐based)   or   on   spending   regulations   during   elections   have   also   been   presented   as   potential   explanations   for   these   differences   in   online   practices   (Anstead   and   Chadwick   2010;   Gibson   2013:   9;   Vaccari   2013).   Albeit   for   a   few   rare   exceptions   (see   for   instance   Jackson   and   Lilleker,   2009;   Karlsen   2009;   Lilleker   and   Jackson,   2013)   investigations   looking   at   the   association   of   2.0   campaigning   and   election   strategy   have   been   concentrating   predominantly  on  the  American  context  in  general  and  the  2008  Obama  campaign  in  particular   (Vaccari  2010;  Kreiss  2012;  Chadwick  2013;  Blor  2013).  Rune  Karlsen  (2009)  examination  of  the   2005  Norwegian  parliamentary  election  probably  represents  the  only  non-­‐American  case  study   investigating   these   questions   directly   through   expert   interviews.   Therefore,   little   remains   known  about  how  social  media  are  beeing  integrated  in  the  strategic  organization  of  campaigns,   implemented   to   mobilize   volunteers   and   collect   voter   information   for   political   marketing   purpose  in  other  national  contexts  as  well  as  about  the  elite  discourses  that  sustain  the  uses  of   social  media  in  web  campaigning.       Hybrid  campaigns   Whether  research  consider  the  MyBO  experience  of  2008  as  the  trailblazer  or  the  exception,  the   fact   remains   that   digital   technologies   have   imposed   changes,   in   varying   degrees,   to   the   way   parties  organize  for  elections  and  campaign  during  them.  Recent  contributions  seem  to  indicate   novel   practices   of   web   2.0   platforms   which   are   modifying   the   way   campaign   preparation   and   electioneering  is  conducted  in  the  US  and  elsewhere  (Karlsen,  2009;  Jackson  and  Lilleker  2009;   Vaccari,  2010;  Kreiss  2012;  Chadwick  2013,  Gibson  2013).  These  practices  impact  the  campaigns   in   two   ways:   first   they   provide   strategists   and   campaign   managers   with   tools   to   gather   resources,  better  understand  and  segment  the  electorate  and  target  communication  audiences  

 

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(Lilleker  and  Jackson,  2013;  Kreiss  2012;  Nielsen  2012),  and  second  they  can  help  organize  the   ground   campaign   by   mobilizing   online   users.   In   both   instances,   these   changes   have   been   depicted  as  a  form  of  hybridization  of  campaigns  (Chadwick  2007,  2013;  Karlsen  2009;  Vaccari   2010)   where   new   tools   and   practices   contribute   to   the   modification   of   the   way   electoral   strategy  is  conceived  and  implemented.  These  hybrid  campaigns  often  give  way  to  a  significant   input  of  online  party  activists  and  supporters.  However,  this  online  empowerment  is  managed   or  guided  by  electoral  organizations  who  do  not  which  to  lose  control  of  their  campaigns  and   want  to  insure  efficient  coordination  with  offline  activism  (Kreiss  2012;  Vaccari  2010).     Karlsen,  citing  the  works  of  Plasser  (2002)  and  Schmitt-­‐Beck  (2007)  on  hybridity,  reminds  that   the  transformation  of  campaign  practices  and  their  adoption  of  new  techniques  “depend  on  a   range  of  contextual  factors”  (2009:  185)  and  that  there  are  never  revolutionary  modifications  in   approaches   but   rather   an   amalgamation   of   older   and   newer   campaigning   practices   at   play   in   hybrid   organizations.   Campaigning   is   coloured   culturally,   politically,   socially   and   therefore,   technologically,   which   in   turn   creates   “distinct   national   patterns   of   campaigning”.   This   echoes   Chadwick’s  model  of  hydrid  campaigns  that  depicts  the  intricate  integration  of  online  and  offline   communication  channels  as  well  as  the  more  novel  compromise  of  grassroots  activism  and  elite   control   in   the   organization   and   implementation   of   electoral   strategies   (2013:   113).   Looking   at   the  Obama  campaign  of  2008,  Chadwick  highlighted  how  the  candidate’s  team  accurately  used   social  media  and  voter  information  databases  to  generate  500  millions  dollars  in  contributions   that  were  dedicated  to  purchasing  television  advertising  time.  Online  media  logic  and  traditional   media  logic  were  therefore  cohabiting  hand-­‐in-­‐hand,  enhancing  each  other  (idem:  116-­‐122).     Finally,  the  analyses  of  Vaccari  (2010),  Blor  (2013)  and  Gibson  (2013)  reveal  how  parties  present   online,   and   especially   on   social   media   platforms,   must   now   reach   a   compromise   between   the   strategic   importance   of   staying   on   message   and   the   increase   demands   from   internet   users   to   take   an   active   part   in   the   campaign’s   implementation   both   online   and   offline.   As   Blor   indicates,   “the   ability   of   citizens   to   participate   in   politics   using   social   networking   sites   has   compromised   the   traditional   top-­‐down   communication   style”   of   political   parties   during   elections   (2013:   6).   Having   to   deal   with   the   coproduction   and   dialogic   principles   inherent   to   social   media,   parties   have   had   to   open-­‐up   to   “citizen-­‐initiated”   campaigning   (Gibson,   2013),   where   user   generated   electoral  communications,  comments,  questions  and  reactions  must  found  their  way  in  a  party’s   official  campaign.  Organizations  must  now  accept  some  loss  of  control  over  many  elements  of   their   communication   strategies   such   as   ads,   posters   or   slogans   which   will   be   modified,   commented,  ridiculed  and  shared  numerous  times  over  the  course  of  a  campaign.       However,  as  MyBO  revealed,  there  is  an  electoral  silver  lining  to  this  loss  of  control  which  comes   in   the   form   of   volunteer   mobilizing   sites,   used   by   parties   to   rally   online   party   activists   and  

 

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supporters  and  provide  them  with  tools  and  tactics  to  campaign  online  and  offline  for  a  party.   Many   parties   around   the   world   are   now   using   these   devices   that   contribute   to   message   cohesiveness,  resources  collection  and  voter  mobilization.  Citing  an  Obama  strategist  from  his   2008   campaign,   Vaccari   indicates   that   MyBO   was   designed   to   stimulate   online   users   participation   and   maintained   message   cohesiveness.   The   platform,   which   gave   the   impression   of   a   bottom-­‐up,   grassroots   initiative,   was   in   effect   a   centralized   operation   destined   at   providing   internet  supporters  with  scripts,  tools  and  arguments  to  organize  events  and  carry  the  Obama   message   online,   but   mostly   offline.   It   was   in   effect   “carefully   controlled   citizen   participation”   where  the  energy  of  individuals  was  channelled,  guided.  “When  you  are  guiding  something,  you   are  not  controlling  it,  you  have  people  who  are  following  you  willingly  to  that  message”  (Vaccari   2010:   332).   Consequently,   organizations   must   trust   internet   users’   abilities   to   conform   to   the   provided  strategy  when  they  campaign.  A  leap  of  faith  that  may  actually  not  be  too  difficult  to   take   since   parties   also   closely   monitor   how   voters   carry   their   activities   online   and   offline.   Therefore,   hybridity   has   been   said   to   express   itself   in   campaign   design,   in   communicated   contents  and  on  how  the  strategy  is  implemented  on  the  internet  and  on  the  ground.       A  comparative  method   As  mentioned  earlier,  the  bulk  of  the  literature  on  web  campaigning  has  been  dedicated  to  the   study   of   the   American   context.   The   numerous   electoral   contests   where   unlimited   election   spending,  high  levels  of  professionalization  and  of  technological  innovation  are  the  norm  explain   why   so   much   attention   has   been   dedicated   to   US-­‐based   web   campaigns.   However,   a   more   recent   trend   in   the   web   campaigning   community   have   brought   together   in   special   issues   of   journals  (see  for  instance  Vergeer  2012;  Enli  and  Moe  2013;  Gibson,  Römmele  and  Williamson,   2014)  contributions  investigating  among  others  the  UK,  France,  Italy,  Poland,  Germany,  Spain,   Denmark  or  Norway.  Some  earlier  edited  volumes  have  also  contributed  to  this  trend  (such  as   Ward   et   al.   2008   or   Greffet   2011).   Unfortunately,   these   collections   are   not   comparative   in   approach   with   each   of   the   assembled   contributions   built   on   distinct   theoretical   frameworks,   research   questions   and   methods.   However,   these   juxtapositions   of   individual   national   case   studies  do  reflect  the  internationalization  of  different  web  campaigning  practices.       Some  studies  have  engaged  in  comparative  research,  looking  at  European  nations  (Lilleker  et  al.   2011),   Commonwealth   countries   (Chen   2010)   or   at   comparisons   between   the   US   and   other   nations  (see  Norris  2001;  Anstead  and  Chadwick  2010;  Vaccari  2013;  Lilleker  and  Jackson  2013).   However,   very   little   work   has   been   comparing   online   campaigns   in   French   speaking   nations   (with   the   exception   of   Bastien   and   Greffet   2009)   and   none   of   it   has   focused   on   strategic   objectives.  The  enpolitique.com  project  aims  specifically  at  bridging  this  gap  as  it  looks  at  how   online   campaigns   were   conceived,   implemented   and   received   by   voters   during   the   French   presidential  and  Quebec  legislative  elections  of  2012.  The  project  investigates  common  research  

 

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questions   by   using   similar   methodological   tools   allowing   for   a   comprehensive   and   cohesive   description   and   explanation   of   similarities   and   differences   in   online   campaigning   in   the   two   contexts.  Comparisons  between  these  two  nations  are  common  in  political  science  as  they  both   share   a   common   history,   a   common   language   as   well   as   fair   number   of   similar   political   institutions  (multiparty  system,  left-­‐right  ideological  cleavages,  strong  electoral  regulations).  In   both   contexts,   voters   cast   their   ballot   for   a   single   candidate   affiliated   to   a   party   and   the   declared  winner  has  gained  a  majority  of  votes.  Being  a  province  of  a  federal  state,  there  are  no   presidential  elections  in  Quebec.  However  legislative  campaigns,  as  it  is  observed  in  many  other   parliamentary   regimes,   are   strongly   personalized   affairs   with   party   leaders’   tours   being   the   central  activity  covered  by  the  media  during  the  election.  Furthermore,  not  unlike  the  president   of  France,  Quebec’s  Premier  heads  the  executive  branch  of  provincial  political  system.  Decision-­‐ making   is   highly   centralized   within   the   ministerial   cabinet   with   the   Premier   controlling   the   priority  of  the  government’s  policy  agenda.       Case  study,  research  questions  and  method  design   In  order  to  better  understand  the  strategic  goals  in  online  campaigning,  this  study  compares  the   Quebec   general   and   French   presidential   elections   of   20122.   The   these   two   contexts,   on   their   own   and   together,   fit   the   profile   of   those   “less   obvious”   cases   to   research   that   recent   contributions  have  been  calling  for.  These  elections  were  effectively  the  first  2.0  campaigns  in   both   France   and   Quebec.   All   contending   organizations   had   official   presences   on   most   social   media   platforms   such   as   Facebook,   Twitter,   Youtube   or   Tumblr,   which   had   not   been   the   case   in   the  previous  contests  of  2007  in  France  or  of  2007  and  2008  in  Quebec.  The  two  elections  share   similarities  (francophone  nations,  multiparty  systems,  highly  regulated  electoral  communication   context,   ideologically   distinct   formations,   close   pre-­‐electoral   standings   according   to   polls)   and   also   have   their   distinctive   characteristics   (different   levels   of   electoral   contest   and   of   electoral   systems).  However,  their  shared  commonalities  in  institutional  and  cultural  factors  do  warrant   in  favour  of  a  comparative  investigation  and,  according  to  the  literature  (Gibson  2013;  Enli  and   Moe  2013),  could  impact  the  extent  to  which  online  platforms  and  social  media  may  become  an   integral  part  of  electoral  communication  strategies  in  the  two  nations.                                                                                                                     2

 In  Québec,  our  study  focuses  on  the  online  campaigns  of  the  governing  Liberal  Party  of  Quebec  (PLQ,  center-­‐right   and  federalist),  the  Parti  Québécois  (PQ,  social-­‐democratic  and  pro-­‐independence)  which  was  the  official   opposition,  Québec  Solidaire  (QS,    anti-­‐liberal  left  and  pro-­‐independence),  as  well  of  the  two  newly  formed  Option   Nationale  (ON,  social-­‐democratic  and  pro-­‐independence)  and  Coalition  Avenir  Québec  (CAQ,  conservative  and   federalist).  In  France,  our  sample  includes  the  campaigns  of  outgoing  President  Nicolas  Sarkozi,  candidate  for   l’Union  pour  un  Mouvement  Populaire  (UMP,  conservative),  of  the  Socialist  Party  (PS)  candidate  François  Hollande,   of  the    Mouvement  Démocrate  (Modem,  centre-­‐right)  candidate  François  Bayrou,  of  the  candidate  for  Europe   Écologie-­‐Les  Verts  (EELV,  green)  Eva  Joly,  of  the  Front  National  (FN,  right-­‐wing  nationalist)  candidate  Marine  Le  Pen,     and  of  the  Front  de  Gauche  (FDG,  anti-­‐liberal  left)  candidate  Jean-­‐Luc  Mélenchon.

 

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Two   general   questions   are   guiding   this   research.   First,   we   are   interested   in   uncovering   the   strategic   objectives   underlying   the   use   of   online   platforms   by   political   organizations   in   both   elections.   For   what   purposes   were   these   organizations   campaigning   on   the   web,   on   social   networking,  microblogging  and  files  sharing  sites?  Which  kind  of  beliefs  do  web  strategists  share   when   talking   about   social   networks   and   online   communication?   The   literature   indicates   that   parties  usually  focus  on  three  broad  categories  of  strategic  goals  in  their  social  media  presences:   communication   goals,   political   goals   and   marketing   goals.   These   objectives   are   not   mutually   exclusive   as   parties   often   aim   to   achieve   all   three   categories   simultaneously   in   the   course   of   an   online   campaign.   Communication   objectives   refer   to   a   party’s   will   to   broadcast   its   electoral   messages,   to   personalize   its   leader   and   team,   to   correct   or   “spin”   coverage   of   its   campaign   and   to   attack   its   opponents’   campaigns   (Karlsen   2009;   Vaccari   2010;   Bor   2013).   Political   goals   are   associated   with   winning   the   election,   mobilizing   supporters,   getting   out   the   vote,   gaining   visibility,  generating  resources  (such  as  donations  and  volunteers)  and  promoting  an  ideology  or   political  project  (the  core  political  values  of  the  party,  not  its  electoral  platform)  (Karlsen  2009;   Vaccari   2010;   Bor   2013).   Finally,   parties   use   social   media   for   marketing   purposes   such   as   collecting  voter  information  data,  creating  a  relationship  with  voters  by  managing  a  community,   micro-­‐targeting  voters  and  to  adjust  their  strategy  (Kreiss  2012;  Nielsen  2012;  Chadwick  2013).     Second,  we  look  at  the  potential  impact  of  contextual  and  institutional  factors  on  the  way  web   strategists  talk  and  think  about  online  electioneering.  The  literature  has  shown  early  interest  in   investigating   how   institutional   factors   may   affect   parties’   and   political   organizations’   level   of   technological   adaptation   and   innovation   in   online   campaigning   (Norris   2001;   Anstead   and   Chadwick   2010).   Past   research   have   indicated   that   incumbency   could   affect   the   interactive   dimension  of  online  campaigning,  with  challenger/opposition  parties  engaging  more  actively  in   online   campaigns.   However,   this   hypothesis   was   not   confirmed   by   Vaccari’s   recent   comparative   work   (2013:   119).   Membership   based   parties   as   well   as   non-­‐radical   left-­‐of-­‐center   organizations,   especially  socialist  and  green,  have  also  been  identified  as  more  active  online  campaigners  then   liberal   or   conservative   formations   (Vaccari   2013:   104-­‐109,   118).   These   questions   have   not   been   addressed   so   far   in   any   comparative   work   dealing   with   both   francophone   nations   and   past   research   has   also   studied   the   impact   of   institutional   factors   on   actual   outputs   of   online   campaigning,   not   on   the   strategic   decision   making   process   and   the   discourses   of   key   actors   involved.   Therefore,   we   will   look   at   how   incumbency,   ideological   positioning   and   electability   impact   strategic   decision   making   regarding   online   campaigning.   Are   challengers   more   active   then   incumbents   in   online   electioneering?   Are   left-­‐of-­‐center   formations   more   engaged   then   liberal   and   conservative   parties?   Does   higher   degree   of   electability   increase   cautiousness   in   online  campaigning?    

 

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These   questions   deal   directly   with   the   organizational   aspects   of   campaign.   In   order   to   better   answer   them,   we   therefore   conducted   semi-­‐structured   expert   interviews   with   48   individuals   who  were  directly  involved  in  the  design  and  implementation  of  the  parties’  online  campaigns.   This   qualitative   interview   method   has   rarely   been   done   in   past   research   on   social   media   and   politics,  different  forms  of  content  analyses  being  the  usual  data  collection  process.  We  talked   to   campaign   chairs,   communication   directors,   social   media   advisers   and   online   content   and   community  managers  from  the  five  leading  parties  in  the  Quebec  election  and  from  the  six  main   presidential   candidates   organizations   in   France.   Our   questionnaires   contained   36   open-­‐ended   questions   covering   7   topics   dealing   with   aspects   of   the   conception   and   implementation   of   online   campaigns,   including   strategic   goals,   target   audiences,   e-­‐political   marketing   practices,   budgets,   labour   management,   openness   to   internet   users   generated   contents   and   organizational  hierarchy.  In  France,  34  individuals  were  initially  contacted  and  29  participated  in   the  study,  for  a  response  rate  of  85%.  In  Québec,  we  invited  29  individuals  and  19  completed   the   interviews,   for   a   response   rate   of   65%.   However,   this   paper   uses   a   subsample   of   37   interviews  composed  of  the  19  Québec  interviews  and  of  18  French  interviews.  It  includes  the   narratives   of  2   national   campaign   chairs,   6   national   communication   directors,   17   online/social   media   campaign   directors/managers/developers   as   well   as   12   content   and   community   managers   all   closely   involved   in   different   phases   of   strategic   development   or   tactical   implementation   of   their   organizations   respective   online   campaigns.   As   Vaccari   (2010:   323)   acutely   states   in   his   account   of   the   2008   Obama   campaign,   including   members   from   different   levels  of  decision  making  and  campaign  management  in  our  sample  of  respondents  should  allow   us   to   “minimize   the   risk   of   overestimating   the   role   of   technology   and   neglecting   other   crucial   organizational   and   political   variables”.   Interviews   were   conducted   in   person,   by   the   lead   investigators  and  research  assistants,  from  October  18  2012  to  February  27  2013  in  France  and   from   May   8   to   June   4   2013   in   Québec.   They   ran   an   average   of   75   minutes.   They   were   each   transcribed  in  text  format  to  facilitate  content  analysis.     In   order   to   identify   the   strategic   objectives   each   campaign   associated   to   its   use   of   online   platforms,   we   analyzed   the   transcripts   of   respondents’   answers   following   a   deductive   approach   with   the   software   QDA   Miner.   The   process   is   simple.   The   analytical   tool   searches   in   the   interviewees’   narratives   for   specific   expressions   and   key   words   (or   “codes”   in   QDA   Miner   lingo)   listed  in  a  predetermined  dictionary  that  represent  our  analytical  categories.  Our  dictionary  was   designed   in   order   to   measure   the   importance   respondents   gave   to   different   aspects   of   the   communication,  political  and  marketing  objectives1.  The  analysis  was  carried  in  three  iterative                                                                                                                   1

  The   detailed   sixteen   dictionaries   can   be   provided   on   demand.   However,   we   list   here   the   categories   associated   with  each  of  the  three  types  of  objectives:  1.  Communication  objectives:  Broadcast  a  message,  Events  and  leader   tour,  Control/Spin  the  message,  Broadcast  media  content.  2.  Political  objectives:  Generate  resources,  Promote  an   ideology,   Getting   known/increase   notoriety,   Get   votes/GOTV,   Online   mobilization,   Offline   mobilization.   3.   Marketing  objectives:  Collect  voter  data,  Market  intelligence,  Targeting,  Relationship/community  building,  Modify  

 

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phases.  We  initially  did  a  qualitative  analysis  of  all  37  interviews  to  highlight  recurrent  terms  and   expressions  used  by  respondents  to  depict  their  strategic  objectives.  This  initial  process  allowed   us  to  identify  the  numerous  and  distinctive  ways  political  strategists  in  France  and  Québec  refer   to  the  same   notions   in   each   of  their   countries.  We  then   created  the   dictionary   of   codes  and   ran   four   waves   of   tests   (3   on   the   Quebec   corpus   and   one   on   the   French   interviews)   during   which   keywords  in  codes  were  added  or  modified  to  make  our  analytical  categories  more  inclusive  and   accurate.  Finally,  each  mention  identified  by  the  software  was  reviewed  individually  within  its   original   context   to   insure   it   had   been   appropriately   coded   and   that   it   represented   adequately   what   the   respondent   meant   to   say.   Additional   adjustments   will   be   made   to   our   coding   scheme,   therefore   the   results   presented   in   this   paper   must   be   considered   as   preliminary   and   exploratory.  The  final  stage  of  the  analysis  will  begin  in  the  fall  of  2014  and  will  cover  the  entire   corpus  of  48  expert  interviews.     Results   Unsurprisingly,   aggregate   data   indicate   that   in   an   electoral   context,   all   political   organizations   state  communication  goals  as  a  key  strategic  objective  for  using  online  platforms,  especially  as  a   way   to   broadcast   messages   to   audiences  :   nearly   half   (48.7%)   of   the   objectives   mentioned   by   the  interviewees  were  associated  to  communication  activities.  Political  objectives  came  second   and   were   mentioned   quite   frequently   (34.7%),   whereas   marketing   goals   were   more   rarely   expressed   (16.8%).   However,   distinct   patterns   of   campaign   strategies   can   be   observed   between   countries  and  between  parties.     Figure  1.  Percentages  of  strategic  objectives  mentioned  in  expert  narratives,  France  and  Québec     Poliqcal   34,7  

48,7   Communicaqon  

16,8   Markeqng  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        the  strategy.  For  each  of  these  categories,  a  list  of  codes  (keywords  and  expressions)  has  been  produced.  These  lists   of  codes  are  the  constituents  of  the  dictionaries.  

 

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    Communication  Objectives   Election  campaigns  are  communication  campaigns,  whether  the  message  is  broadcasted  online   or   offline.   In   that   sense,   online   strategists   are   probably   not   that   different   from   other,   offline   campaign,   strategists.   According   to   their   narratives,   online   technologies   appear   to   be   particularly   efficient   on   specific   communication   aspects,   such   as   disseminating   the   messages,   the  most  frequent  of  the  communication  objectives  mentioned  (26%,  see  annexes  1,  2  and  3  for   the   detailed   distribution   of   the   three   categories   of   objectives   for   parties   in   each   country).   As   an   example,  an  interviewee  from  the  Parti  Québécois  underlines  the  role  of  Facebook  and  Twitter   in  getting  people  informed  about  the  party,  compared  with  the  limited  impact  of  party  websites   previously:     "The  website  remains  what  we  call  the  niche.  It's  our  landing  place.  So  within  it,  we  put   some   content,   it's   a   bit   of   a   dumping   site:   pictures,   information,   news,   releases,   material   to   be   shared,   become   a   member   of   the   party,   make   a   donation.   It's   our   house.   Except   that  we  don't  expect  people  to  type  pq.org  so  we  have  many  external  tools,  around  it,   surrounding   our   niche   –   Facebook,   Twitter,   "The   Workshop3"–   and   all   these   tools   that   reach   people   more   allow   us   to   bring   them   to   the   information,   to   the   pictures,   the   content,  to  the  niche  we  want  to  share."     Similar  points  of  view  on  the  communication  role  of  social  networks  associated  with  more   traditional  websites  when  broadcasting  the  electoral  message  is  found  in  France.  A  French   Green  strategist  from  the  EELV  party  describes  how  the  message  was  adapted  to  Twitter  so   that  it  is  easily  sent  and  circulated:       "E.4  had   conceived   a   tool   where   we   tried   to   sum-­‐up   many   arguments   about   various   political  issues.  Each  issue  was  summarized  on  a  single  page  presenting  our  position  and   a   link   to   different   documents,   with   a   lot   of   information,   such   as   answers   from   online   surveys  we  were  doing.  With  also  a  "tweetable"  version,  with  a  link  to  the  page."       Other   important   aspect   of   communication   objectives   with   social   networks   is   to   control   the   message.   Even   though   most   strategists   admitted   this   could   become   very   difficult   given   the   viral   features  of  online  communication,  they  still  considered  that  it  is  possible.  This  shared  position   was   expressed   in   10%   of   all   mentions   to   communication   objectives.   The   Internet   is   actually   a   mix  of  online  spaces  where  the  level  of  control  over  the  political  message  varies.  For  instance,  a                                                                                                                   3

 The   Workshop   (or   “L’Atelier”   in   French)   was   a   online   mobilizing   platform   dedicated   at   managing   the   PQ’s   community  of  online  supporters.  The  website  was  launched  in  early  2012  and  it  allowed  supporters  and  activists  to   register  online  to  exchange  information  and  take  part  in  partisan  activities,  both  online  and  offline.   4  A  colleague  from  the  interviewee’s    team  of  online  strategists.  

 

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Socialist  strategist  makes  a  difference  between  "institutional  spaces",  where  the  message  is  very   controlled   and   official,   an   other   "more   free"   spaces,   like   "TousHollande"5  on   Twitter,   where   there  more  spontaneity  and  freedom  was  accepted.       "On   official   campaign   accounts,   for   instance   François   Hollande   on   Twitter   and   Facebook,   which   were   very   institutional   accounts,   nothing   frivolous   was   going   on   there,   we   were   not   taking   any   risk.   Then   we   had   accounts   linked   "TousHollande",   especially   the   "TousHollande"   Twitter   account   which   was   re-­‐tweeting   all   the   contents   of   the   "TousHollande"   website   and   there,   because   it   wasn't   François   Hollande's   personal   account,  we  actually  had  a  bit  more  freedom  of  speech."     This   is   quite   similar   to   the   situation   analyzed   by   a   Parti   Québécois   strategist   who   reveals   the   existence  of  non-­‐official  partisan  spaces  which  facilitated  the  circulation  of  messages:       "Real   Facts,   I   don't   actually   remember   the   exact   name   we   gave   it,   but   they   were   entities   officially  outside  the  party  which  were  there  to  set  the  record  straight.  And  we  also  had   some  internet  websites  which  were  already  popular  so  that  we  could  think  outside  the   box.  And  disseminate  the  message  everywhere."       Respondents   also   said   their   campaigns   promoted   reactive   uses   of   social   network.   A   strategist   from  the  French  Modem  indicated  that  the  web  was  used  to  correct  what  was  said  in  traditional   media:  "Community  Managers  were  replying  during  TV  programmes.  When  we  were  attacked  in   a  TV  programme,  they  were  replying  to  people,  saying  ‘no,  no,  this  is  not  true,  have  a  look  at  our   manifesto’.  When  someone  didn't  understand  something,  we  were  sending  a  link  to  the  election   platform,   or   a   link   to   a   story   on   the   website."   Another   strategist   from   the   Liberal   Party   of   Quebec   indicated   that   social   media   were   great   tools   to   monitor   the   campaign   and   to   carry   attacks:   "Third,  there  were  attacks.  In  the  evening,  we  were  looking  at  quotes  from  our  political   opponents,   or   from   journalists   attacking   opponents,   we   were   analyzing   what   they   had   said   and   then   we   used   Twitter   to   reminded   the   media   and   our   followers   about   opponents’  inconsistencies,  factual  errors,  the  figures…"       Social   networks   are   therefore   conceived   as   both   complementary   of   and   specific   to   other   online   and   offline   communication   tools.   They   were   used   in   combination   with   other   traditional   communication   devices   to   broadcast   and   control   the   official   message   but   also   in   an   independent   way   to   allow   more   direct   and   quicker   contact,   and   potentially   more   freedom   of   expression   and   opportunities   to   attack   counterparts.   In   that   sense,   they   are   part   of   a                                                                                                                   5

 "TousHollande"  is  an  online  tool  created  to  engage  people  in  François  Hollande's  campaign.  It  was  mainly  oriented   towards  online  and  offline  activities,  especially  canvassing.  

 

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hybridization   process,   where   communication   opportunities   are   both   expanded   and   modified   by   technologies.     Political  and  Marketing  Objectives   Political  objectives  come  second  in  the  discourses  of  the  strategists,  with  36%  of  the  mentions.     Contrarily   to   communication   objectives   which   are   quite   diverse   and   shared   between   dissemination,   control   and   attack,   political   objectives   are   clearly   focused   on   activism   and   online   mobilization  (19%  of  the  mentions,  other  types  of  political  objectives  are  expressed  on  average   in  less  then  6%  of  mentions  from  that  category).    As  a  strategist  from  Québec  Solidaire  pointed   out:       "We   did   some   drag-­‐to-­‐action.   You   will   get   people   to   your   website   through   different   ways,   and   you   have   to   think   of   what   you   will   do   with   these   people.   For   instance   you   can…   As   for   us,   we   had   built   an   online   platform   where   people   could   leave   their   availability   in   specific   ridings.   So   you   register   your   postal   code,   you   say   ‘I   have   two   hours   this  week’,  you  fill  in  the  form,  and  then  someone  from  the  national  campaign  dispatches   people  among  local  riding  associations.  It  can  be  a  way  of  reaching  more  activists".             Digital   campaign   tools   are   conceived   as   getting   people   active,   "strategic   action"   being   crucial,   as   pointed   out   by   a   UMP   French   strategist   :   "[t]he   objective   is,   first,   recruit   a   maximum   of   people.   And   second,   once   we   have   recruited   people,   make   them   move   from   non-­‐strategic   actions   to   strategic   activist   actions.   A   non-­‐strategic   action   is   an   action   that   doesn't  bring  any  new  vote".     Here,   the   MyBO   model   seems   to   operate:   web   communication   and   social   networks   are   tools   that  allow  citizens  to  engage  and  support  their  candidate;  they  are  described  by  respondents  as   stimulating   activism.   Online   mobilization   comes   first   as   an   expected   outcome,   but   offline   mobilization   is   also   the   second   most   frequently   mentioned   political   objective.   Conversely,   donations   appear   to   be   quite   marginal,   with   1.4%   of   the   mentions.   This   makes   a   major   difference   with   the   US   context   where   generating   financial   resources   is   a   central   objective   to   online  and  offline  campaigns.  Marketing  objectives  are  also  far  less  frequently  mentioned  than   communication   and   political   objectives:   18%   of   mentions   are   associated   to   them.   They   cover   two   main   aspects:   collecting   data   (4.8%   of   the   mentions)   and   managing   online   communities   (4.5%).  Collecting  data  refers  to  building  databases  of  e-­‐mail  addresses  of  supporters  in  order  to   circulate  messages  and  promote  activism.  As  a  Coalition  Avenir  Québec  respondents  puts  it:       "We   were   a   bit   inspired   by   the   Obama   campaign   as   well   as   by   the   Conservative   campaign,   they   had   impressive   databases.   Each   person   who   was   attending   an   event   when  we  were  still  just  a  political  committee  and  not  yet  an  official  party,  we  were  asking  

 

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them   if   they   was   interested   in   being   contacted   by   the   CAQ   for   further   information.   Most   people  filled  the  form,  which  allowed  us  to  build  a  nice  database."     The  French  Socialist  party  also  collected  email  addresses  during  its  primary  campaign:       "Getting  600,000  people  who  are  not  party  members,  who  would  get  some  non-­‐filtered   campaign  information  from  the  party,  this  analytical  item…  if  I  add  phone  numbers  and   emails,   we   got   the   information   of   about   700,000   people   during   the   primary   campaign   only".       Clearly,   the   aim   is   to   open   the   boundaries   of   the   parties   and   to   expand   the   supporter   networks   through   regular   contact   with   people   using   online   platforms   and   tools.   Databases   and   community  management  are  ways  web  campaign  teams  achieved  this  goal.  Collection  of  data  as   well  as  online  community  management  therefore  becomes  a  central  campaign  task,  like  in  the   case   of   Option   Nationale.   One   of   their   strategists   revealed   that   :   "web   2.0,   clearly,   is   a   question   of  communication  and  of  mass-­‐management  with  our  community.  It  really  is  a  relationship  and   a  discussion  we  have  with  our  community". However,  contrary  to  what  has  been  written  about   the  American  case,  collecting  data  is  often  presented  by  respondents  in  France  and  Québec  as  a   more   difficult   task   to   achieve,   both   because   of   lack   of   staff   and   legal   restrictions.   A   Québec   Solidaire  respondent  notices  that:       "We  can  collect  information,  but  the  information  collected  through  Facebook  or  Twitter   isn't   used   for   in-­‐depth   analysis,   as   far   as   I   know.   This   is   because   it   is   a   lot   of   work,   of   collection   and   analysis,   I   think   we   didn't   have   enough   staff   to   do   it.   That   said,   it's   true   that  thanks  to  data  and  canvassing,  we  could  see  we  were  reaching  a  certain  population   profile".     As  well,  a  French  strategist  from  the  UMP  indicated  that:  "the  difference  with  the  USA  where   everything   is   based   on   targeting   and   segmentation   is   that   in   France,   commercial   databases…   cannot   be   bought   and   used   by   political   parties."   Such   specific   legislation   forbidding   data   acquisition  by  political  organizations  does  not  exist  in  Canada.  Furthermore,  The  Chief  Electoral   Officers  of  Canada  and  of  Québec  grant  parties  access  to  their  respective  voters  registry  prior  to   an  election  call  to  help  them  better  communicate  with  voters  during  the  campaign.  Therefore,   in   addition   to   voter   information   they   gather   themselves   through   online   and   offline   contacts,   parties   in   Québec   get   direct   access   to   personal   electors’   data   such   as   addresses   or   phone   numbers.     Following  our  first  research  question,  we  can  conclude  that  the  discourses  of  strategists  focus   mainly  on  communication  objectives  as  well  as  political  objectives.  Marketing  objectives  are  less  

 

13  

frequently  mentioned.  Communication  objectives  are  the  most  diverse,  with  uses  of  digital  tools   to  disseminate  and  control  the  message  toping  the  priority  list  for  online  campaigning.  Political   objectives   mainly   refer   to   online   and,   to   a   lesser   extent,   offline   mobilization.   Marketing   objectives   are   not   as   developed   in   France   and   Québec   compared   to   the   US,   even   though   community   management   and   data   collection   exist   to   some   extent.   This   shows   that   a   more   contextual   approach   is   useful   to   take   into   account   the   features   of   each   country   and   parties   organizational  structure.       Contextualizing  campaign  objectives   Moving  to  our  second  research  question,  we  have  examined  to  what  extent  contextual  factors   explain   differences   expressed   in   the   objectives   promoted   by   respondents   in   their   discourses.   Three  types  of  contextual  factors  have  been  analysed:  the  country  were  the  election  was  held,   the   ideological   orientation   of   the   organization   and   its   positioning   within   the   electoral   competition  (incumbent/challenger).       Differences  between  countries   Figure   2   presents   the   average   scores   for   our   three   categories   of   objectives   by   country.   The   results   show   that   the   communication   objectives   dominate   in   Québec   (61%)   while   they   proportionally   come   second   in   France   (38.4%).   Conversely,   political   objectives   come   first   in   France   (45.7%)   while   they   are   less   frequent   (21.4%)   in   Québec.   Finally,   the   weight   of   marketing   objectives  is  almost  similar  (16.2%  in  France,  17.6%  in  Québec).       Figure  2:  Average  score  per  objectives,  by  country  –  France  and  Québec    

100%   90%   80%   70%   60%   50%   40%   30%   20%   10%   0%  

Communicaqon   Markeqng   Poliqcal  

Quebec  

 

 

France  

 

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This  significant  distinction  between  the  proportion  of  mentions  to  communication  objectives  in   Québec   and   France   is   constant   on   several   sub-­‐categories   of   goals   we   identified.   For   instance,   32%  of  communication  mentions  in  Québec  interviews  expressed  broadcasting  the  message  as  a   goal   when   it   was   said   in   20.2%   of   mentions   in   France.   Fourteen   per   cent   of   mentions   to   communication   goals   in   Quebec   also   highlighted   the   importance   of   message   control,   but   this   goal  came  up  in  only  5.9%%  of  mentions  in  France.  Similarly,  carrying  attacks  online  was  present   in  6.3%  of  communication  mentions  in  Québec,  but  only  in  2.6%  in  France.  Campaign  events  are   more   marginal   and   almost   equally   mentioned   among   objectives   in   both   countries   (5.5%   in   Québec,  6.9%  in  France).  In  Québec,  web  campaigning  is  used  dominantly  for  broadcasting  the   party’s   message,   particularly   through   social   networks.   The   2012   elections   had   two   new   political   formations  (ON  and  the  CAQ)  running  their  first  campaign  and  they  used  the  web  massively  to   gain  visibility  and  to  counteract  their  relative  absence  in  traditional  media  coverage.  In  France,   circulating   the   message   and   attacks   are   less   frequent.   This   may   result   from   a   cultural   explanation:   in   the   French   context,   direct   political   attacks   against   other   candidates   are   often   considered  too  aggressive  and  are  therefore  not  very  popular  in  traditional  electoral  discourse.   In   addition,   broadcasting   a   candidate’s   official   message   online   appears   less   important   than   mobilizing  supporters  and  pushing  them  to  do  something  for  the  candidate  and/or  the  party.       This   could   partly   explain   why   political   objectives   dominate   in   the   narratives   of   French   strategist   who  talk  frequently  about  online  (20.7%)  as  well  as  offline  mobilization  (11.4%).  Combining  both   dimensions  is  seen  as  one  of  the  main  objectives  of  web  campaigns,  as  indicated  by  a  Front  de   gauche   respondents   who   declared:   "you   have   to   develop   mobilization   habits",   that   are   linked   both   to   permanent   contact   with   supporters   on   social   networks   in   order   to   keep   them   active   both  online  and  offline,  as  well  as  the  organization  of  events  such  as  candidate  meetings.         Ideological  differences   The   second   dimension   we   tested   is   ideological.   As   Figure   3   reveals,   a   clear   trend   in   favour   of   political  objectives  was  expressed  from  left-­‐leaning  organizations  (38.7%  as  opposed  to  29.8%   for   right-­‐wing   campaigns)   whereas   communication   objectives   were   more   frequently   mentioned   by   respondents   from   the   right   (54.3%   and   44%   from   left-­‐wing   respondents).   This   difference   might  be  explained  by  the  important  role  bases  of  party  members  have  played  traditionally  in   the   decision-­‐making   processes   of   left-­‐wing   political   formations,   both   in   France   and   Québec.   These   parties   have   strong   democratic   inner   structures   that   welcome   member   participation   in   administration,   policy   orientation,   candidate   selection,   and   electioneering.   It’s   therefore   not   surprising  to  hear  strategists  from  these  organizations  mention  more  openly  in  their  narratives   the   importance   of   online   mobilizing   tools   and   supporter   networks,   as   well   as   to   adhere   to   a   more   "citizen   initiated"   model   of   campaigning   that   provides   space   for   party   members   and   volunteers  to  self-­‐organize  and  be  active  in  the  election  campaign.  

 

15  

Figure  3  :  Average  score  per  objectives,  by  ideological  stand  –  France  and  Québec     60,0   50,0   40,0  

Lex  Wing  Parqes  

30,0  

Right  Wing  Parqes  

20,0   10,0   0,0   Poliqcal  

Markeqng  

Communicaqon  

    In   Québec,   The   Workshop   created   by   the   Parti   Québécois   was   built   on   such   a   model.   Put   online   several  months  prior  to  the  election  call,  the  platform  helped  the  party  constitute  and  manage   its  online   community  of  supporters.  The  PQ’s  online  strategists  then  organized  a  selected  few   into  a  team  of  Internet  activists,  called  “Supermilitants”,  who  were  tasked  daily  at  keeping  the   party’s   message   cohesiveness   on   all   social   media   platforms.   Similar   initiatives   were   carried   in   the   campaigns   of   Option   Nationale   and   Québec   Solidaire,   the   other   two   other   left-­‐wing   member-­‐based   opposition   party   in   Québec.   In   France,   the   French   Socialist   Party   and   the   Radical-­‐Left   Front   de   gauche   developed   many   initiatives   to   mobilize   their   communities   both   online   and   offline.   The   website   "toushollande.fr"   organized   a   canvassing   operation   that   got   massive   traditional   media   coverage.   The   Front   de   gauche’s   website   "Placeaupleuple"   also   created   numerous   initiatives   such   as   the   opportunity   for   supporters   to   share   photos   of   them   online   with   the   mention   "I   vote   Mélenchon".   This   is   hardly   surprising   for   the   French   left   since   it   has  dominated  the  political  cyber-­‐space  in  France  since  2007  (Greffet,  2011).       Position  in  the  electoral  competition   Finally,   an   organization’s   position   in   the   electoral   competition   could   be   another   contextual   factor   that   explains   differences   between   campaigns   in   their   online   strategies.   Figure   4   shows   that,   at   the   aggregate   level,   the   governing   organizations   in   our   study   (the   PLQ   in   Québec   and   the   Sarkosi-­‐UMP   candidacy   in   France)   were   expressing   communication   goals   more   often   than   their  opponents.       Respondents   from   these   two   organizations   recognized   that   being   an   incumbent   complicates   online  campaigning  for  two  reasons.  First,  they  were  said  to  be  constantly  scrutinized  by  (new  

 

16  

and   old)   media   as   well   as   opponents   and   every   misstep   came   with   negative   consequences.   Second,   interviewees   said   they   could   not   attack   the   same   way   as   their   opponents,   since   their   institutional   position   as   head   of   State   or   of   government   cast   them   automatically   in   a   more   deferential   and   respectful   role,   forcing   them   to   remain   “above   the   fray”.   For   instance,   a   PLQ   respondent  underlined  that  social  networks  could  be  a  trap  for  governing  politicians:       "We   can   see   traditional   media   using   social   media.   Yes,   they   use   it   to   speed   up   the   transmission   of   information,   but   at   the   same   time,   they   use   social   networks   to   point   out   mistakes  that  can  be  made  by  authority  figures  in  political  parties.  Like  me  for  instance.   They   would   have   reported   on   any   errors   we   could   have   made   in   using   the   medium.   In   that  sense,  we  have  to  be  much  more  careful  before  doing  anything".     Figure   4:   Average   score   per   objectives,   by   position   in   the   electoral   competition   –   France   and   Québec    

100,0   90,0   80,0   70,0   60,0   50,0   40,0   30,0   20,0   10,0   0,0  

Communicaqon   Markeqng   Poliqcal  

Governing  parqes  

Opposiqon  parqes  

 

  A  point  of  view  supported  in  France  by  this  UMP  strategist  who  noticed  it  was  more  difficult  to   lead  the  campaign  online  and  get  positive  media  coverage:  "There  were  many  things  we  didn’t   do.  Them  [opponents],  no,  it's  incredible,  and  no  one  said  a  thing.  Us,  when  we  were  moving,   we  couldn't  say  the  press  was  on  our  side,  we  couldn't  say  that.  (…).  It  was  difficult."  Attacking   also   appeared   to   be   delicate   while   in   government.   As   another   Sarkozi   strategist   revealed:   "They   (the  Socialists)  ran  an  anti-­‐Sarkozy  campaign,  and  they  were  open  about  it,  but  we  were  doing  a   pro-­‐France   campaign,   France   will   do   better   etc."   Using   another   strategy,   the   Liberal   Party   of   Québec  was  attacking  other  competitors  on  its  own  website,  while  the  leader's  Facebook  page   was  more  neutral  in  tone:      

 

17  

"We   tried   to   stay   above   cheap   attacks,   however   during   an   election   campaign,   it's   always   a  struggle,  obviously.  We  tried  to  make  the  content  of  the  party’s  Facebook  page  more   adapted  to  the  message  we  wanted  to  send  every  day.  The  website  of  the  Liberal  Party   was   a   little   more   devoted   to   attacks,   we   were   comparing,   using   data,   statistics,   corrections.  The  leader's  Facebook  site  was  focused  on  the  message."   However,   taken   individually,   data   from   each   nation   do   tell   another   story,   with   the   PLQ   respondents   predominantly   expressing   communication   goals   in   their   narratives   (75.4%   of   all   mentions)  and  our  UMP  interviewees  rather  predominantely  leaning  towards  political  objectives   when   speaking   of   their   online   campaigns   (46.6%   of   all   mentions,   see   annexes   4   and   5   for   detailed   distributions   per   objectives).   Therefore,   the   PLQ   and   Sarkosi/UMP   organizations   followed   distinct   strategies   when   conceiving   and   implementing   their   web   campaigns.   This   somewhat  confirms  Vaccari’s  (2013)  previous  comparative  work  which  found  no  clear  support   for  the  incumbency  hypothesis  in  his  analysis  of  8  elections  in  six  countries.  Depending  on  the   context   of   an   election,   from   country   to   country,   or   even   from   one   election   to   the   next   in   the   same  country,  governing  parties  do  not  necessarily  engage  in  somewhat  more  cautious  online   campaigns   focused   on   communicating   and   controlling   their   message   than   opposition   formations,  as  this  hypothesis  claims.         Even  though  respondents  from  both  the  PLQ  and  the  UMP  mentioned  a  strong  preoccupation   for   communication   goals   in   their   narratives   of   their   online   campaigns,   this   was   expressed   in   different   proportions   in   each   party.   It   is   hardly   surprising   when   studying   an   electoral   context   to   see  government  strategists  mention  broadcasting  and  controlling  their  campaign’s  message  as  a   key  feature  of  their  campaign  efforts.  It  is  worth  noting  that  these  two  incumbents  were  both   quite   unpopular   and   facing   very   strong   oppositions   when   elections   were   called   in   France   and   Québec.   Coherent   and   effective   communication,   staying   “on   message”,   may   have   therefore   become   an   important   goal   to   achieve   for   these   two   campaigns.   What   is   more   surprising   however   is   that   French   respondents   from   the   Sarkozi/UMP   camp   mentioned   that   voter   mobilization  was  more  important  to  their  online  strategy,  a  goal  that  was  virtually  absent  from   the  PLQ    strategists’  narratives.     Conclusions   Our   analysis   of   37   expert   interviews   with   campaign   strategist   from   the   leading   political   organizations   in   the   2012   Québec   parliamentary   and   the   French   presidential   elections   reveals   the  dominant  strategic  objectives  grounding  their  respective  online  electioneering.  Respondents   from   all   types   of   organizations   in   both   nations   indicated   that   campaigning   now   combines   integrated   old   and   new   media   approaches   as   well   as   increase   levels   of   openness   to   user-­‐ generated  content  and  activism.  The  two  campaigns  we  compare  were  more  hybrid  and  open   than   any   previous   one   in   each   country.   Whereas   Jackson   and   Lilleker   (2009)   spoke   of   “web   1.5”  

 

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campaigns   in   the   past,   the   narratives   from   our   respondents   indicate   that,   in   principle,   all   organizations   were   aiming   higher   this   time   around.     Some,   mostly   in   Québec,   also   expressed   their   growing   interest   in   the   political   marketing   potential   associated   to   social   media   campaigning,  especially  in  regard  to  voter  data  collection  and  community  management.  In  this   respect,   2012   may   have   been   a   transformational   election   that   modified   how   campaign   were   (and  will  be)  organized  and  implemented  in  both  countries.     However,   hybridity   took   different   forms   and   reached   varied   levels   depending   on   various   contextual   factors.   These   factors   include   the   organization’s   ideological   leaning   as   well   as   its   position  in  the  electoral  competition.  Incumbents  and  opposition  contenders  do  not  campaign   online   exactly   the   same   way.   Strategists   from   incumbent   camps   in   both   France   and   Québec   frequently  mentioned  the  public  scrutiny  their  online  campaigns  were  under  and  the  potential   risks  associated  with  errors  they  would  make.  Incumbents  have  been  presented  in  the  literature   as  usually  more  risk-­‐averse  and  more  prone  to  running  cautious,  controlled  and  cohesive  online   communication  strategies  (Strömer-­‐Galley,  2000;  see  also  Vaccari  2013  for  a  more  nuanced  take   on   this   argument).   It   seems   to   have   been   the   case   in   the   Quebec   election   studied   here,   but   not   the   approach   of   the   outgoing   Sarkozi   camp   in   France.   Although,   strategists   from   both   incumbent  organizations  insisted  on  the  importance  of  communication  objectives,  especially  of   broadcasting   and   controlling   their   message,   respondents   from   the   French   incumbent   team   of   Nicolas   Sarkozi   predominantly   expressed   political   goals,   such   as   voter   mobilisation,   as   the   driving  principles  of  their  online  presences.  This  strategic  consideration  was  echoed  by  many  the   strategists   from   opposition   parties   who   also   expressed   political   objectives   more   frequently   in   their  narratives.       Our  interviews  also  revealed  that  respondents  from  left-­‐wing  organizations,  in  both  countries,   were   also   more   likely   to   mention   the   importance   of   supporter   mobilization   in   their   online   campaigns.  The  logic  being  to  first  attract  ‘manpower’  online  to  then  shepherd  it  offline  to  carry   partisan   activities   such   as   canvassing,   resource   collection   or   information   distribution.   Our   preliminary  data  show  that  contextualization  of  discourses  and  online  campaigning  objectives  is   essential  to  their  understanding.  Our  study  seem  to  indicate  that  according  to  national  cultural   traditions  as  well  as  institutional  factors  such  as  an  organization’s  ideological  position,  strategic   goals  for  online  campaigning  may  vary  from  one  country  to  another.  Something  a  comparative   method,  such  as  the  one  used  for  this  research,  helps  bring  to  light.     However,  the  results  presented  here  are  preliminary.  They   were  generated  during  the  final  pre-­‐ test  phase  of  our  automated  dictionaries  and  are  based  on  a  subsample  of  18  of  our  29  French   interviews.   The   next   phase   of   the   research   will   be   dedicated   at   running   our   comprehensive   dictionaries  on  the  entire  sample  of  48  transcripts  in  order  to  see  if  the  trends  highlighted  in  this  

 

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paper   are   confirmed.   The   final   part   of   the   research   will   then   compare   these   strategic   goals   with   results   from   the   content   analysis   of   the   political   organizations   online   campaign   components   such   as   their   official   websites,   Facebook   pages   and   Twitter   feeds   in   order   to   investigate   how   online  electoral  strategy  transferred  into  actual  tactical  implementation.         References     Anstead,  Nick  and  Andrew  Chadwick  (2010).  “Parties,  election  campaigning,  and  the  internet:   toward  a  comparative  institutional  approach”,  in  Andrew  Chadwick  and  Philip  N.  Howard  (eds.)   The  Routledge  Handbook  of  Internet  Politics,  New  York,  Routledge,  56-­‐71.   Bastien,  Frédérick  et  Fabienne  Greffet  (2009).  “Les  campagnes  électorales  à  l’âge  d’internet:  une   comparaison  des  sites  partisans  en  France  et  au  Québec”.  Hermès,  54,  209-­‐217.   Bor,  Stephanie  E.  (2013).  “Using  Social  Networking  Sites  to  Improve  Communication  Between   Political  Campaigns  and  Citizens  in  the  2012  Election”,  American  Behavioral  Scientist,  Published   online  before  print  June  7,  2013,  doi:  10.1177/0002764213490698,  1-­‐19.   Chadwick,  Andrew  (2013).  The  Hybrid  Media  System:  Politics  and  Power.  Oxford,  Oxford   University  Press.     Chadwick,  Andrew  (2007).  “Digital  Network  Repertoires  and  Organizational  Hybridity”,  Political   Communication,  24(3),  283-­‐301.   Chen,  Peter  John  (2010).  “Adoption  and  Use  of  Digital  Media  in  Election  Campaigns:  Australia,   Canada  and  New  Zealand”,  Public  Communication  Review,  1(1),  3-­‐26.   Enli,  Gunn  and  Hallvard  Moe  (2013).  “Social  Media  and  election  campaigns  –  Key  tendencies  and   ways  forward”,  Information,  Communication  and  Society,  16(5),  637-­‐645.   Flanagan,  Thomas  (2010).  “Campaign  Strategy:  Triage  and  the  Concentration  of  Resources”,  in   Heather  MacIvor  (ed),  Election,  Toronto,  Emond  Montgomery  Publications,  155-­‐172.   Gibson,  Rachel  K.,  Andrea  Römmele  and  Andy  Williamson  (2014).  “Chasing  the  Digital  Wave:   International  Perspectives  on  the  Growth  of  Online  Campaigning”,  Journal  of  Information   Technology  and  Politics,  11(2),  123-­‐129.   Gibson,  Rachel  K.  (2013).  “Party  Change,  Social  Media  and  the  Rise  of  “Citizen-­‐Initiated   Campaigning”,  Party  Politics,  Published  online  before  print  30  Januray  2013,  doi:   10.1177/1354068812472575,  1-­‐15.   Greffet,  Fabienne  (ed.)  (2011).  Continuerlalutte.com.Les  partis  politiques  sur  le  web.  Paris,   Science  Po.   Jackson,  Nigel  and  Darren  Lilleker  (2009).  “Building  and  Architecture  of  Participation?  Political   Parties  and  Web  2.0  in  Britain”,  Journal  of  Information  Technology  and  Politics,  6(3-­‐4),  232-­‐250.   Karlsen,  Rune  (2009).  “Campaign  Communication  and  the  Internet:  Party  Strategy  in  the  2005   Norwegian  Election  Campaign”,  Journal  of  Elections,  Public  Opinion  and  Parties,  19(2),  183-­‐202.  

 

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Kreiss,  Daniel  (2012).  Taking  our  Country  Back:  the  Crafting  of  Networked  Politics  from  Howard   Dean  to  Barack  Obama.  Oxford,  Oxford  University  Press.   Lilleker,  Darren  G.  and  Nigel  A.  Jackson  (2013).  “Reaching  Inward  Not  Outward:  Marketing  via   Internet  at  the  UK  2010  General  Election”,  Journal  of  Political  Marketing,  12(2),  244-­‐261.   Lilleker,  Darren  G.,  Karolina  Koc-­‐Michalska,  Eva  Johanna  Schweitzer,  Michal  Jacunski,  Nigel   Jackson,  and  Thierry  Vedel  (2011).  “Informing,  engaging,  mobilizing  or  interacting:  Searching  for   a  European  model  of  web  campaigning”,  European  Journal  of  Communication,  26(3),  195-­‐213.   Norris,  Pippa  (2001).  Digital  Divide.  Civic  Engagement,  Information  Poverty,  and  the  Internet   Worldwide,  Cambridge,  Cambridge  University  Press.   Nielsen  Rasmus  K.  (2012).  Ground  Wars.  Personalized  Communication  in  Political  Campaigns.   Princeton,  Princeton  University  Press.   Plasser,  Fritz  and  Gunda  Plasser  (2002).  Global  Political  Campaigning.  London,  Praeger.   Schmitt-­‐Beck,  Rüdiger  (2007).  “New  modes  of  campaigning”,  in  Russell  Dalton  and  Hans  Dieter   Klingemann  (eds),  Oxford  Handbook  of  Political  Behavior,  Oxford,  Oxford  University  Press,  744-­‐ 764.   Vaccari,  Cristian  (2013).  Digital  Politics  in  Western  Democracies.  A  Comparative  Study.   Baltimore,  Johns  Hopkins  University  Press.   Vaccari,  Cristian  (2010).  “Technology  Is  a  Commodity:  The  Internet  in  the  2008  United  States   Presidential  Election”.  Journal  of  Information  Technology  and  Politics,  7(4),  318-­‐339.   Vergeer,  Maurice  (2012).  “Politics,  elections  and  online  campaigning:  Past,  present…and  a  peek   into  the  future”,  New  Media  and  Society,  15(1),  9-­‐17.  

 

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Annex  1.  Percentage  of  Mentions  per  objectives,  by  parties  (France-­‐Québec)       Objectives  

CAQ  

ON  

PLQ  

PQ  

QS  

FDG  

FN  

MODEM  

PS  

UMP  

EELV   Mean  

Political  

17,4  

42,6  

7,0  

23,5  

16,7  

61,6  

31,3  

46,9  

51,0  

46,6  

36,6  

34,7  

Marketing  

21,7  

5,6  

17,5  

18,1  

25,0  

25,0  

10,9  

9,6  

25,0  

19,4  

7,0  

16,8  

Communication  

60,9  

51,9  

75,4  

58,4  

58,3  

13,5  

57,8  

43,7  

25,0  

33,8  

56,8  

48,7  

    Annex  2.  Percentage  of  Mentions  per  Types  of  Objectives,  by  parties  (Québec)     Objectives   Political   Political   Political   Political   Political   Political   Marketing   Marketing   Marketing   Marketing   Marketing   Communication   Communication   Communication   Communication   Communication   TOTAL  

 

Codes   CAQ   ON   PLQ   PQ   QS   Mean   Generate  resources   1,4   0,0   0,0   0,7   0,0   0,4   Promote  ideology/values   0,0   0,0   0,0   0,0   0,0   0,0   Getting  known   0,0   0,0   0,0   0,0   1,0   0,2   Get  votes   1,4   5,6   0,0   2,0   3,1   2,4   Mobilize  online   involvement   14,5   37,0   7,0   20,8   12,5   18,4   Mobilize  offline   involvement   0,0   0,0   0,0   0,0   0,0   0,0   Collect  voter  data   10,1   0,0   5,3   4,0   9,4   5,8   Market  research   4,3   0,0   7,0   2,0   5,2   3,7   Targeting   0,0   1,9   3,5   1,3   0,0   1,3   Relationship/community   building   7,2   3,7   1,8   10,7   10,4   6,8   Strategy  adjustment   0,0   0,0   0,0   0,0   0,0   0,0   Broadcast  messages   30,4   27,8   29,8   35,6   37,5   32,2   Events  and  tour   5,8   11,1   1,8   2,7   6,3   5,5   Attack  opponents   7,2   1,9   12,3   6,0   4,2   6,3   Control/Spin  messages   15,9   5,6   29,8   13,4   5,2   14,0   Share  media  content   1,4   5,6   1,8   0,7   5,2   2,9     100   100   100   100   100    

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Annex  3.    Percentage  of  mentions  per  Types  of  objectives,  by  parties  (France)   Objectives   Political   Political   Political   Political   Political   Political   Marketing   Marketing   Marketing   Marketing   Marketing   Communication   Communication   Communication   Communication   Communication   TOTAL  

Codes   Generate  resources   Promote  ideology/values   Getting  known   Get  votes   Mobilize  online  involvement   Mobilize  offline  involvement   Collect  voter  data   Market  research   Targeting   Relationship/community   building   Strategy  adjustment   Broadcast  messages   Events  and  tour   Attack  opponents   Control/Spin  messages   Share  media  content    

FDG   FN   MODEM   0,0   0,0   3,2   9,6   10,9   1,0   0,0   3,1   0,0   17,4   0,0   5,4   23,0   12,5   24,5   11,6   4,7   12,8   0,0   0,0   2,2   1,9   0,0   1,0   13,5   1,6   3,2   0,0   3,1   9,6   6,3   7,7   39,1   1,9   4,7   0,0   0,0   0,0   9,4   3,9   4,7   100   100  

3,2   0,0   24,5   6,4   1,0   6,4   5,4   100  

PS   UMP   5,2   1,1   0,6   4,0   1,9   1,7   2,7   2,9   23,1   23,6   17,8   13,3   11,8   8,0   0,0   0,0   6,6   5,1   3,3   3,3   13,8   2,7   2,7   5,2   0,6   100  

2,9   3,4   18,4   5,1   6,3   3,4   0,6   100  

EELV   5,4   2,7   1,4   1,4   17,6   8,1   1,4   1,4   1,4  

Mean   2,5   4,8   1,4   5   20,7   11,4   3,9   0,7   5,2     1,4   2,3   1,4   4   17,6   20,2   20,3   6,9   5,4   2,6   10,8   5,9   2,7   3   100    

    Annex  4.  Percentage  of  mentions  per  objectives,  governing  parties  

 

Governing  Parties   PLQ   UMP   Mean  

Political   7   46,6   26,8  

Marketing   17,5   19,4   18,5  

Communication   75,4   33,8   54,6  

Total   100   100   100  

Communication   56,8   13,5   57,8   43,7   25   60,9   51,9   58,4   58,3   47,4  

Total   100   100   100   100   100   100   100   100   100   100  

    Annex  5.  Percentage  of  mentions  per  objectives,  opposition  parties  

  Opposition  Parties   EELV   FDG   FN   MODEM   PS   CAQ   ON   PQ   QS   Mean  

Political   36,6   61,6   31,3   46,9   51   17,4   42,6   23,5   16,7   36,4  

Marketing   7   25   10,9   9,6   25   21,7   5,6   18,1   25   16,4  

 

 

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