Jul 5, 2014 - Private-Public Cyberspace Partnership in Poland. 4. .... As John Kerry, US Secretary of State, noted, âThe term digital diplomacy is ...... involved in attempting to measure both organized crime activity generally and cybercrime.
Copyright by © Kolegium Europy Wschodniej im. Jana Nowaka-Jeziorańskiego we Wrocławiu, 2015 ISBN 978-83-7893-073-0 KEW Publishing Kolegium Europy Wschodniej im. Jana Nowaka-Jeziorańskiego we Wrocławiu Zamkowa 2, 55-330 Wojnowice Poland
Contents Judy Dempsey. Foreword Preface Part One: e-Governance and Cybersecurity 1. E-Governance in the Post-Soviet Space: A Conversation with Tarvi Martens and Andrew Wilson 2. Michael Yakushev & Veni Markovski. Internationalizing Internet Governance in Eastern Europe 3. Szymon Marcinów. Private-Public Cyberspace Partnership in Poland 4. Leslie Holmes. Cybercrime in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe Part Two: Ukraine 2014: The Crisis Online 5. Ilami Yasna. Ukraine-2014: Which Way Will the Digitalization Pendulum Swing? 6. Andrea Chalupa. #digitalmaidan: United Ukrainians Everywhere over Social Media 7. Katya Gorchinskaya. YanukovychLeaks 8. Katie Kuksenok. Multilingualism on Social Media in the Maidan Movement Part Three: Separatism and De Facto States Online 9. Matthew Luxmoore. Digital Separatism: E-Diplomacy in Ukraine’s Rebel Republics 10. Giorgio Comai. Post-Soviet De Facto States Online 11. Marcin Kosienkowski, William Schreiber & Joyce Hahn. Social Media in the Service of Territorial Reintegration in the post-Soviet Area Part Four: Democracy and Authoritarianism Online 12. Maeve Shearlaw. Guardian New East: Social Media Freedom and the Post-Soviet States 13. Marta Poślad. New Europe, New Technologies and Old Politics 14. Andrei Aliaksandrau. How Free Is Internet in Belarus? 15. Alex Rubin. Runet: An Ambiguous Political Force Part Five: Digital Diplomacy 16. Victor Guzun. E-diplomacy: A Practitioner’s Perspective 17. Sergey Utkin. Digital Diplomacy and Russia’s Image Problem 18. Hristofor Hrisoskulov. #Ukraine: A Good Chance for e-Diplomacy. A View from Eastern Europe 19. Radu Cucoş. Social Media Bridges between States and Diasporas: The Case Study of Moldova Endorsements
Judy Dempsey. Foreword When I began reading this important book, I was immediately taken back to the late 1970s and 1980s. This may seem strange given that this book is about the 21st century and how the social media and digital age is having a profound impact on civil society and governments throughout Eastern Europe. Yet there is a special connection, if not a continuity between the dissidents in Central and Eastern Europe back then and the civil society movements that are today springing up throughout the region. It is the power of the word. Over 35 years ago, in Poland and the then Czechoslovakia, in Hungary and Romania, brave people toiled away on their typewriters. Using the flimsiest of paper, each page was separated by worn sheets of scarce carbon paper. The manuscripts were distributed by hand at great personal risk. Samizdat made their way to the West. Underground universities made do with copies of books and articles and carboned copies of essays and speeches. British academics came to lecture in Julius Tomin’s Prague apartment. That was the way to spread truth and knowledge. It was a way to present the “other” view of the world. It was a way to dent the monopoly of information exercised by the ruling communist regimes. The impact of samizdat varied. But one thing was and is certain. It protected a special alternative space. With the digital age, this space has expanded to an extraordinary degree. The authors are right to devote a chapter to the Maidan, the independent popular movement that in early 2014 shook Ukraine’s political elites, and the Kremlin. And no wonder. It was the power of Twitter and of YouTube that galvanized civil society. Despite those who believe that the digital age has a tendency to atomize, Maidan proved the opposite—as indeed did the first few years of the Arab Spring. People were not alone. This is important. In Eastern Europe, social and political movements have sprung up as a result of the digitalization of information. But as the authors of this book argue, the impact is patchy—to say the least—and the efforts by governments to use the social media as a tool for communicating ideas and promoting their interests is mixed. The chapters on Democracy and Authoritarianism Online and Digital Diplomacy explain in detail how the challenges facing those regimes that want to control information, such as the Kremlin, and those that have yet to use the digital tools to reach out to their opponents or separatists, such as the government in Chisinau vary. In short, the possibilities are enormous. So are the challenges. Governments and society in the post Soviet space face three challenges. The first is cyber security and cyber crime, about which the Estonians have ample experience. The second is the ability of civil
society to harness social media so that it develops into a coherent political movement. And the third is the reflex of authoritarian regimes to suppress social media and how the West should respond. With few exceptions, governments in Eastern and Central Europe have been slow to deal with cyber security, as the chapters on Private-Public Cyberspace Partnership in Poland and Cybercrime in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe show. Maybe the Ukraine crisis but also the sheer cost to the security of the economy has finally jolted Warsaw and other capitals in the region into taking the issue seriously. On this point, the opening essay E-Governance in the Post-Soviet Space: A conversation with Tarvi Martens and Andrew Wilson, is fascinating about how Estonia pioneered the use of the internet, making it an essential tool for governance and for security but also for democracy. The social media’s impact on democracy cannot be underestimated. As Ukraine’s Maidan movement has shown, it is possible to move the social media from the realm of cyber space to concrete political demands. And not only that. The social media in Ukraine (excluding the rebel-held parts of Eastern Ukraine) has become a powerful tool for exposing corruption. Even more importantly it is a reminder to the government in Kyiv that it is being monitored scrupulously. This time round, the supporters of Maidan do not want their revolution to be squandered. These vibrant civil movements in Ukraine have yet to take hold in other parts of Eastern Europe. One reason is the regime’s grip on information despite the access to the internet. But the ubiquity of the internet across Eastern Europe should not be taken for granted. Yes, it is spreading, as the authors argue. But the power of television and the power of authoritarian regimes to limit the use of the internet poses immense challenges to non-government organizations, fledgling opposition movements and brave individuals that challenge the regime. Just consider how the Azeri regime has over the past several months clamped down on any opposition. It is all the more reason that Western governments, advocacy groups and defenders of democracy should support and engage with these individuals and movements. Indeed, these individuals and movements need as much support as those who helped Poles print the smudged Robotnik bulletin or who assisted KOR, the predecessor to the Solidarity trade union movement or who smuggled books to Czechoslovakia’s Charter 77. The means are different but the struggle is the same. Judy Dempsey Editor-in-Chief of Carnegie Europe’s Strategic Europe
Preface Thinking about the Internet’s impact on our world by way of area studies can be a tricky business. For many, interpreting a project that from its inception endeavored to be a fundamentally World Wide Web, amounts to admitting a sort of failure. Yet if any region deserves special attention, perhaps it is the political, social and intellectual cauldron of Eastern Europe, the etymological birthplace of balkanization itself. Of course, defining Eastern Europe itself is an equally problematic endeavor; and although a rich literature of argumentation warns against such simple solutions, this volume chose to define the region as the post-Communist space. In reality, the primary subjects of these essays range from Brussels to the eastern reaches of the Russian Taiga. The word “digital” might also raise concerns for some, since technology has become such a seamless element of modern life. As John Kerry, US Secretary of State, noted, “The term digital diplomacy is almost redundant—it’s just diplomacy, period.” Jarno Limnéll, Director Cyber Security at McAfee, expressed a similar sentiment: “There is no such thing as #cyberwar or #cyber conflict. There is a war and there is a conflict.” This approach, assuming that digital tools too far integrated into daily life to warrant analysis, has been found insufficient. Shortly before leaving her post heading efforts to create a Digital Agenda for Europe, Neelie Kroes wrote a message expressing her frustration with the overall lack of willingness to engage on digital issues: “To leaders at all levels: Digital is a fact now. It’s not a choice, it’s a fact. And it is no longer acceptable to ignore it.” We concur that in policy, as well as in political sociology, the influence of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is understudied. The nearly simultaneous fall of communism in Eastern Europe and rise of online communications has left an unmistakable impression on the development of the societies formerly behind the Iron Curtain. At the same time, these post-Communist communities have made their own unique contributions to the worldwide web: from Skype and online elections to scammers and SORM surveillance. ICT has emerged a double-edged sword in the development of Central and East Europe. Digital Eastern Europe brings together activists, diplomats, programmers, scholars and experts of the region to untangle this complex web of informational influence and, perhaps, to better know the whole Web through understanding one part. In particular, we chose to focus on digital opportunities and challenges related to the development of these nations, their democracies and the ways they interact globally. Finally, no book written on this subject in 2014 could discuss the influence of the Internet in Eastern Europe while ignoring the central role of social media in Ukraine’s EuroMaidan Revolution and the subsequent information war with the Russian Federation that paralleled months of brutal fighting over separatism in the Donbas region. We postponed this publication to add two sections tailored to current events.
More than anything, this collection stands as a forum for serious thinking and conversation about a medium that often lends itself to haste and dismissal. We owe a debt of gratitude to Adam Reichardt, our editor at New Eastern Europe, for his long-enduring support of this ambitious project and Igor Lyubashenko, whose blog of the same name birthed the idea. Another thank you goes to Maeve Shearlaw and The Guardian team for their important initiative at the New East Portal. Finally, our thanks to Anna Solopova for her superb translation.
William Schreiber Kyiv, Ukraine Marcin Kosienkowski Lublin, Poland
Part One: e-Governance and Cybersecurity
1. E-Governance in the Post-Soviet Space: A Conversation with Tarvi Martens and Andrew Wilson Tarvi Martens Chairman at the Estonian Electronic Voting Committee, and the principle developer and advocate of Estonia’s e-ID and online voting system. Andrew Wilson Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and author of, among others, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World William Schreiber (ed.): Tarvi, you’re called the father of Estonia’s online voting system. E-voting has to be the quintessential e-governance project. And today, many see Estonia as a leader in egovernance, not just in the region, but worldwide. Where did it all start? Tarvi Martens: It’s a long story, but it all started with an electronic ID system, or e-ID. In 1997, we started to think about a new identity document—and a passport as such was boring. We came up with an ID-card with an electronic chip that would be used for authentication and digital signing. We had hoped to launch it in 14 months, but in the end it took five years. So it was in January 2002 when we launched the first e-ID cards. E-voting is just one application for these e-ID cards. This was first used in 2005, although the project was started in 2003. But yes, 2005 was the first time when everyone had an opportunity to vote electronically. The keyword at the time was equal opportunity. By then 80 percent of voters had an eID card. Perhaps they didn’t know how to use it or had never used it, but anyway they had it. So the first time that we tried this, we had less than 10,000 voters. But we worked on it and today close to one-third of total votes cast in elections are online. Schreiber: Can you speak to the benefits for Estonia regarding the security of voting electronically— is there greater transparency or greater confidence in the online vote? Martens: It has always been hard to discuss those matters because you don’t want to push one method of voting over the others. There are some thirteen different legitimate mechanisms for voting and e-voting is only one of those. I once made a major mistake on television by saying that electronic voting was safer than a paper vote, which caused me quite a lot of problems. Schreiber: Why was it scandalous to say that? Martens: There are many known tricks with paper voting that you can use to commit fraud, like carouselling, where the voter brings in a pre-marked paper ballot and exchanges them for fresh ones. We have done a thorough security analysis on the Internet voting system and we know all the threats. But I haven’t seen a proper security analysis done for paper voting. Schreiber: Andy, you’ve written quite a bit over the years on how political elites in Central and Eastern Europe have managed to cheat electoral systems and the process at large. What’s your take—
comparing voting security in the paper and the digital eras? Now that we have digital servers and online voting in some places, is there a new set of methods for cheaters? Andrew Wilson: Estonia is a great country. It is so different from the rest of the post-Soviet world. What Tarvi just described sounded like a kind of Neverland as far as the possibilities elsewhere in post-Soviet states. If you set about building a system like that it would be easily corrupted. The context anywhere else in the region is completely different. You have corruption at every stage of the system and thus very little confidence in any system. In a state like Belarus, for example, the process is so closed that the corruption is all in the electronic counting, which is completely non-transparent—and that’s assuming there is any actual counting. In any case, that’s certainly where the results are cooked up. In Ukraine, you have famous examples. Particularly in 2004, part of what sparked the Orange Revolution was a computer hacking of the official servers of the Central Election Commission. People went to bed the evening of Election Day with such a percentage and when they woke up, there were a million more votes in one column. So in this case it was crude, it was simplistic and it was hubristic. These guys thought that they could simply add a million votes overnight and that’s part of what sparked the protests. In Russia, you kind of have an interesting battlefield. Particularly in the 2011-2012 election cycles, whereby on one side you have government hackers—well, hackers is the wrong word, because they’re Kremlin-organized—and on the other you have these nerdish election monitors equipped with a background in sociology, who can do very in-depth math to look at the figures. In other words, you may not catch people in the act, but when you see figures clustering at, say, an 80 percent turnout rate, or you see 80 percent of voter misdirects going a certain way, that’s either statistically improbable or simply impossible. So you can show, by statistical cluster analysis, where the fraud was carried out, presumably because of an order to deliver a vote of 80 percent. But then, the next stage of the fraud may be less static, where the authorities try to make it look more random, more difficult to detect. Schreiber: This is a question for both of you, but I’ll turn to Tarvi first with the question Andy raised. Is Estonia really unique? Is it one of the only post-Soviet states able to open such a system? Or can you use a system like this to force change, maybe in a country like Ukraine or Georgia, where you have more of a grey zone in terms of democracy and transparency? Martens: Well, I certainly have had many visitors from Ukraine and elsewhere. It is important to keep in mind, however, the size of the country. Estonia has around 1.3 million people. It’s like a large village where everyone knows everyone. So basically you cannot really cheat on a large scale—you get caught immediately that way. The second thing, what I always want to stress, is having a good eID, guaranteed by the government, which gives you a real kind of electronic identity that you can use. Without that, forget about online voting. Wilson: Tarvi is right. Start by gaining leverage over the corruption in the system. Whereas if you simply have an electronic housing for the same system, the corruption in the system will stay the same. We started out by talking specifically about electronic voting. But if you think about e-government more generally, then that does have an important role to play throughout the post-Soviet space.
Georgia could be a good example here. There’s a cliché in Georgia that every government official will spout to you: Computers don’t take bribes. A big part of the reform drive during the Saakashvili administration was to depersonalize interactions between citizens and the state. To make everything online and transparent. To take the face-to-face opportunities, where corruption is facilitated, out of the process. There has been some backsliding in the last couple of years under Ivanishvili, but still in many ways Georgia is still a leader in terms of general transparency. Procurement is online. Hiring is online. You have a system for declaring officials’ incomes online. You have a general company registrar online, even the justice system is online—the list goes on. Martens: I was in Georgia for several months in 2008, sharing my experience. It’s unbelievable what they are doing. They have an ID card out, they are making everything transparent, even police stations —in the most literal sense—they’re all made out of glass. The Interior Ministry is all glass. They decided after the 2008 war with Russia, and I was there right after the war, that, okay, we’re spending so much already on defense expenses, but not much on building society. So they decided to cut defense spending and invest some of that toward transparency and infrastructure. Wilson: There has been some backsliding under Ivanishvili, but actually the defense sector, that’s one area where procurement has been extended online, under [Irakli] Alasania one of the few reformist ministers today. And yes, those police stations are weird—because they can also look out at you, it’s quite unnerving. Schreiber: Transparency sometimes goes both ways. Is Georgia proof that what matters isn’t wealth, socioeconomics, or democratic development—but simply population? You need a small country to implement a system where you can assign numbers to each citizen and then go back and check the ballot by hand if needed? Martens: Well, we cannot compare Georgia to Estonia, because of Georgia’s opposition, historically, to different sorts of centralizing powers, it’s sort of like the United Kingdom in that way. Definitely, the smallness and unitedness of Estonia has helped to push through online voting. Again, you need two things: first, a good electronic identity system, the size of the population doesn’t matter, and second, political will. If you have those two things, it can go through. If you don’t, forget about it. Wilson: Yes, Georgia is an interesting counterexample, because it does show you don’t have to be rich. Georgia is a very poor country, and it has used technology to make leapfrog gains by going online in so many areas. But I like this idea that there’s a federation of clowns behind this. Saakashvili’s guys were suspicious of traditional politics—not that they didn’t use them themselves— but that was one reason why they wanted to keep everything online. What’s happened in the last couple of years, it isn’t that the new guys aren’t pro-Russia or greedy or inherently corrupt. But they are much more traditional, and they think face-to-face interaction works, and that it’s their job to deliver patronage. So you are seeing a recreation of traditional client networks. The technology is still there and I think the reformers were right. But e-governance can be bypassed by more traditional social ties. Schreiber: So there’s no guarantee that once you achieve electronic governance it will stick. We usually think of this single-track evolutionary process toward e-governance, but here’s evidence of backtracking or at least turning elsewhere. What about the other Baltic states? Have there been efforts to implement online systems there?
Martens: In Lithuania they’re doing good work, they do have an ID card out, and mobile ID is available. But I don’t know about their usage side. We’ve been stressing usage for five years now in Estonia. It’s not about the number of e-IDs you issue, but whether people really use it. You might not believe it, but now in my country half of the population has actually used their e-ID in some application, mostly in banking. So the trick is not merely to deliver the e-ID or other online ID method, it’s more about making people use it in daily life, and that’s the tricky part. Schreiber: You mentioned earlier that Estonia’s first election with e-ID showed a low turnout. How big a role does education play? And after you install all these systems—online voting, registry, eprocurement—but people don’t know how to use them, how do you make that education process happen? Martens: We had a special program aimed at this, actually for the last decade. From 2006, we started seeing that everyone had a card, but only three percent of them were using it. So we created a program that was called Computer Security 2009, to try to multiply usage tenfold, meaning that we wanted 300,000 people out of the 1.3 million in Estonia to use their cards. And we actually achieved that. It was a complicated variety of measures we tried, from distributing the smart card readers, to improving the software to comply with all the platforms you can imagine, to convincing banks to start putting pressure by putting transaction limits on code card users. They decreased transaction limits for three years in a row. Now I guess you can transfer something under 200 euros with a code card, but other than that, you have to use the ID card or mobile ID. It’s a carrot and stick method. So we got our society to start using the e-ID card, and again, Internet voting is just one application for the e-ID. Wilson: Education helps. Carrots help. But the general context is important too. Take-up depends on the strength of the local security state. If you have a strongman state and a corrupt internal affairs bureau there are good and legitimate reasons to worry about the other uses electronic ID systems might be put to. Even in the UK, that’s the ground for resistance to introducing such a card system here. We regard it as a fundamental freedom to be able to walk around without identification. That’s a continental thing, as far as we’re concerned. Even voting, you can just walk in. Martens: It’s a deep societal question: How do you manage the transparency and fairness of your government’s systems? In the case of the UK, I’m sorry about this case, it played out entirely the wrong way. They said, okay first we’re going to create a super database that knows everything about you, then, by the way, we’re going to give you a new ID card. That angle is not going to work. PR is an important component. Schreiber: What role does technical culture play? Is there a generational gap in e-governance? Will younger people be more willing to engage as online citizens? Are older generations left out? Martens: That’s a common presumption, but it’s not true. If you go to voting records, the tendency is that the average age of Internet voters is always going up. For example, we recently logged elections for the European Parliament, and it was a top scorer for elderly people voting online. Younger people don’t care about whether they’re voting online or on paper. I don’t agree with the claim that internet voting brings younger people in. I always say it’s more about not losing the voters. The truth is, people are getting more and more lazy about democracy. And they don’t necessarily feel
driven to get out and vote. But if you bring it into their homes, there is different research on the topic and some scientists suggest that 10–12 percent more people would vote if voting is brought to them. People will complain: I can do everything through the Internet. I can do my work, my taxes, my banking, whatever. Why can’t I vote online? And that’s a plausible question, with no good answer, other than let’s try it. Wilson: On the other hand, voting has to be operationalized in the kind of environment where it’s more important than just a click or a like. If someone is voting in the same way that they click on twenty other products in an hour, it rather devalues the process. More generally, I think you have to go with the grain of Internet take-up. There was a problem in Georgia because the government was using e-governance to drive people into Internet usage. In practice, we had people in rural areas saying this is unfair, we don’t have access, we’re not getting the benefits. In some ways it drove them back into a traditional patronage-client relationship: Look, I haven’t got a computer, so can you get X or Y service for me? There is a real danger of moving too fast, faster than the growth of Internet connectivity across society in general. Schreiber: There is a sort of ritual to voting, that differs from country to country. Maybe that cultural ritual can play a negative or a positive role, depending if that ritual is more patriotism or patronage? Wilson: That’s an interesting point. I wasn’t in Ukraine during the presidential vote, but apparently a lot of people dressed up in their national costume, as a public show of solidarity, given the other problems Ukraine has at the moment. People were in national costume, girls had blue and yellow fingernails to write their ballots. There are dangers to making voting impersonal. Martens: I remember living in Soviet times. There was a kind of ritual, but not such a democratic one. First off, people would meet each other at the polling station and chat, it was social. But the most important thing was that there was put on sale some good stuff not generally available, like oranges or special treats. So yes, ritual is very important to any system. We don’t want to ruin that experience for anyone. We’re saying it’s all very well if you want to vote on paper, if you want to come in national costume on Sunday and check your ballot, there’s nothing wrong with that. A lot of people still do that. Even some of the savviest ID card users, when it comes to elections, they want paper. Schreiber: To conclude, how optimistic are you about digital technology—can it change democracy in the post-Soviet space for the better? Is it just a matter of time and political will, or are there more deep-seated problems facing this area that need to be solved first? Wilson: There are dangers about being too evangelical about technology. It’s not always only a benefit to the goody guys. As [Evgeny] Morozov and others have written, authoritarian regimes are growing more and more skilled at using technology to stay in power. But if you compare Ukraine to Georgia, if you look at how transparent things have become in Georgia, how it used technology to leapfrog—its ratings are much higher now in terms of good governance than its GDP per capita might predict. That’s the kind of thing that a country like Ukraine could benefit massively from. They’re talking about introducing similar e-government, transparency standards, but the fact that they haven’t yet made much progress is depressing to me. Schreiber: Tarvi, you actually describe yourself as an evangelist of this stuff. What’s your take? Martens: Estonia is a small country. We’re not rich enough to support all the public sector in an old-
fashioned manner with lots of offices and staff. We had needed something to make our public sector more efficient. So Estonia is a leader when it comes to e-governance. And again, Estonia is naturally transparent, you cannot cheat without getting caught by your neighbors in the end. But of course, there is a question of transparency and security when it comes to other countries, when it comes to some of the post-Soviet states. If the dark forces behind them are trying to sell some murky e-service that’s not so secure, then yes, we still need to be cautious about what we’re endorsing. But on the whole, it’s all moving onward and upward. I can’t see any serious obstacles for the other postSoviet countries.
2. Michael Yakushev & Veni Markovski. Internationalizing Internet Governance in Eastern Europe Michael Yakushev Vice-President for Global Stakeholder Engagement, covering Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia at the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Veni Markovski Vice-President for UN engagement at ICANN[1]
Introduction and Terminology Since the World Summit of the Information Society (WSIS) 2003, the term “Internet Governance” (IG) has been widely used, but regardless of its existing definition,[2] there have been both attempts to change the definition and to keep it out of the public domain for a number of reasons. We would like to remind the readers what it says: Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.[3]
One of the main challenges we have confronted in our discussions on the topic of IG is something very easy to understand—if you are from Eastern Europe. But it is very difficult to understand if you are from the Western part of the continent: how to translate the term “governance.” The Internet Society (ISOC) in its online course[4] quotes the Oxford University Press: “The term ‘governance’ received a higher visibility in international relations through the work of the Commission on Global Governance, which published the report Our Global Neighborhood.” ISOC further describes the differences in different languages. For our own purposes we will use the Spanish, where “it is usually translated as governanza, in order to differentiate it from gobierno which relates to governmental functions,” and the French, “The reference to government/public activities is also noticeable in French (gestion des affaires publiques, efficacité de l'administration, qualité de l'administration and mode de gouvernement).” In Russian the term is translated as управление интернетом (upravleniye internetom; the closest English equivalent can be “management of the Internet”[5]), or—less frequent, mostly in U.N.generated texts—as управление использованием интернета (upravleniye ispol’zovaniyem interneta; “control, management of the use of the Internet”[6]), which, of course, adds a lot of unnecessary ambiguity. The term in Bulgarian is translated as управление на Интернет (upravlenie na Internet), which has little to do with governments, but mostly with the way different structures are governed. These examples show the complexity, but also the authors are pointing the attention of the readers to the simple fact that different cultures may simply not understand the concept of governance in circumstances where the government is not in charge.
How Governance of the Internet Is Currently Done Bulgaria Since 1999 the Bulgarian telecom laws have established a long tradition of lacking any regulation, or even registration for Internet services, and domain names and IP addresses are left outside of the regulatory framework.[7] These Internet-friendly texts in the Law for Electronic Services have not been changed since the case that the Internet Society of Bulgaria filed in 1999 against the government’s desire to implement licenses over the Internet Service Providers.[8] Most recently the attitude of the government towards Internet governance was explained in the signed MoU[9] between the Ministry of Transport, IT and Communications and ICANN, where there are text, recognizing the multi-stakeholder model of governance of the Internet. Russia In the Russian Federation (which can also be seen as a quite good example for the other post-Soviet countries, but with certain time lag of 3–5 years), legislators initially paid little attention to the regulation of Internet services, with the only exception being numerous attempts to equate the legal status of the Internet Service Providers to that of “traditional” telecommunications operators. This was done in the very awkward manner of qualifying the activities of the ISPs as so-called “telematics services”—a concept that had disappeared from other legislative systems many years ago. More important is the fact that in terms of numbering resource, the federal laws always separated IP numbering from “traditional” phone networks (mentioning the common practice of self-regulated international organizations in this field, but not specifying exactly which organizations should be taken into consideration). Until 2012 this was the only positive regulation of legal issues related to the Internet, and as it is widely known that since 2012 there were a great number of bills, laws and government regulation restricting or prescribing certain behavior online. In any case, the concept of “Internet governance” (however it can be translated into local languages) is not used in the legislative acts of Russia and its bordering countries. As a result, we can observe now that two different concepts—“regulation of the Internet” (mostly in the local laws) and “Internet governance” (mostly in tribute to the international agenda)—coexist, but neither intersect nor interact.
What Is There to Be “Internationalized”? While the issue has been discussed for more than a decade, there are also different understandings of what it means to internationalize the governance of the Internet. At different times, sometimes the same people have understood the concept differently. Through our discussions at various levels with all stakeholders (governmental officials, diplomats, Internet users, businesses and civil society representatives), a conclusion slowly formed that no matter the common understanding, when people talk about Internet governance in the international arena, different cultures will understand it differently. Some believe that the internationalization of IG can be achieved only by engaging the United Nations or one of the UN agencies (and some argue, it should be the International Telecommunication Union, ITU) as the future “intergovernmental body to deal with Internet governance.” Others share[10] their views on a World ICANN (WICANN). Overall, different views on the “internationalization” (or “globalization”) of Internet governance are reflected in four different models, proposed by the Working Group on Internet Governance in 2005.
[11] What we have observed around Eastern Europe is a lack of understanding of why it is necessary to “internationalize” something that is international enough already, and which is subject to the controls and regulations that exist in each country. And the next question is what exactly is to be internationalized. For example, the “purist” position of the Russian Federation is simple, or can be simplified as such: Most of the “critical Internet resources” are either based in or managed from U.S. territory, and this situation should be changed. However, who exactly should implement such changes and assume responsibility remains unclear. Some believed that ICANN as a body needed internationalization (or globalization). But ICANN has changed in that direction a long time ago, first by selecting a Board of Directors who come from around the world, and then by expanding its global presence with hub offices in Singapore, Los Angeles and Istanbul, and adding engagement offices in cities like Beijing, Washington, Geneva, Montevideo and Brussels. Still, some have maintained the thesis that ICANN is international enough, but that Internet governance is much bigger than just ICANN. Finally, many states in the region are still neutral about the core issues of global Internet governance, either because these issues do not affect their domestic policies, and/or the local level of the penetration of Internet technologies is not sufficient to participate in substantial discussions on these matters.
Governance versus Regulation The East European countries have two models to follow: The European Union’s model, which basically accepts that regulation is needed only for service and products dangerous to health and life, or for scarce resources. Or the second model, which calls for more centralized control, where the center of the regulation is not necessarily access to the Internet, but what is accessible online (i.e. content control). Both countries under case study in this article, have tried regulation in the form of licensing, with differing levels of success. Bulgaria introduced it in December 1998, but after the above quoted case at the Supreme Administrative Court, the government backed down and decided to abandon any licensing, and even registration or regulation of Internet access. Conversely, in the Russian Federation, licensing was introduced since the early 1990s to regulate the activities of the ISPs in the same manner as other telecom operators were regulated. This was not a success story in many aspects. First of all, the topology and technical standards of the data transfer networks have little in common with the fixed telephone networks of the incumbent operators. This is why instead of conceptual regulation of Internet-related activities, we observe a number of isolated legislative acts, starting in 2012, that regulate limitations in accessing certain (“dangerous”) information, activities of certain “bloggers,” countering online piracy, etc. All of this has nothing in common with the traditional understanding of online governance based on the equal participation of existing stakeholders or interested parties. We have to note that the fact that the two different models of providing Internet services in both countries did not limit the investigative powers of the police in their attempts to crack down on cyber criminals. In both countries, law-enforcement is able to investigate and process cases, without
depending on the presence or lack of governmental regulation.
Governance of which Internet (Global vs. National) The laws of a country govern everything that happens on its territory. There may be exceptions—under international regulations or conventions. The Internet is not outside of the legal framework of individual countries. The issues become murkier when people start talking about governance in the context of governments “taking over” certain (oversight or other) functions of the global Internet. It becomes even more of a juridical jungle when the discussion enters international telecommunications regulations.[12]
Why It Really Matters The question about the way the Internet is governed became far bigger than just a matter for discussion by a group of engineers, as was the case in the beginning of the Internet’s development. The usual participants in Internet governance—the technical and, later, the business community, have been confronted with more and more scrutiny, and by the desire for participation by civil society and governments across the globe. But governments are also facing an unusual twist on their attempts to govern—if only a few decades ago their authority to draft, accept and execute public policy was unquestioned, today—at least in the field of Internet-related public policy, the situation is different. The successful model of governing the Internet includes equal participation by all stakeholders. Of the many organizations that tried to establish a working multi-stakeholder model, ICANN is perceived as one of the most inclusive, which provides a platform for all parties to meet and discuss how the domain name system will evolve.
Milestones (Some Historical Reminiscences) Some milestones can be enumerated in the history of what is currently known as Internet Governance. In the beginning, it was the Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society (2000).[13] Then came the Final Report of the Working Group on the Internet Governance under the United Nations Secretary General (2005). Since then we have at least three streams of discussion, not mentioning the WSIS process itself: Constellation of the global, regional and national Internet Governance Forums (IGFs); Discussions on Internet Governance within the framework of ICANN-led activities (and attempts to involve the International Telecommunications Union in such type of discussions); The NETmundial Process[14] and the transition of the US government stewardship role over the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) function.[15] Internet Governance in Eastern Europe before WSIS Before WSIS, Internet governance in Eastern Europe was limited to a larger extent by the existing mechanisms aimed at providing police controls over the Net, for example the Russian system SORM. Thanks to WSIS,[16] though, things have started to change. Governments turn more and more toward the private sector and citizens for real input and not just formal consultations. Countries like Armenia and Bulgaria have excelled in using civil society and private sector experts to help the government draft their policies.
The Impact of WSIS over National Legislation (Russia, Bulgaria) In Russia, the WSIS documents have had little impact on the legislative process. The wording “Internet governance” itself is avoided in any Russian legal and regulatory documents (it is no surprise that before 2012 the word “Internet” was successively replaced by a euphemism “informational and communicational networks,” in the plural). In Bulgaria, by contrast, the WSIS documents were widely accepted and the local legislation has already changed towards more Internet-friendly texts. In some ways, as was noted by Swiss diplomat Markus Kummer,[17] Bulgaria became one key factor in the discussions at the Preparatory Committee meetings before WSIS 2003 in Geneva, by providing key arguments for inclusion of all stakeholders in the discussions, and also for helping to reach an agreement for the establishment of the Working Group on Internet Governance. Recent Developments Recent developments in Eastern Europe has been marked with accepting stricter legislation in Russia, including as of August 1, 2014, the so-called blogger law, which requires all sites that attract more than 3,000 users per day to register as mass media.[18] It is important to note that regulation within the borders of any country is not subject to any international treaty.[19] The authors have seen through the years continuous efforts to delegate the responsibility for the Internet content to ICANN, or another international organization. The very nature of the Internet, though, does not allow it.
Conclusions: Policy Prescriptions, Addressing the Challenges Ahead As we write this article (late summer, early autumn of 2014), the Internet governance world is in the midst of a process that today includes more organizations, more participants from different places than ever before. Recent ICANN meetings are, on average, attended by about 3,000 people. The Internet Governance Forum took place in Istanbul, with record-breaking number of sessions and meetings, including at the highest-level. The World Economic Forum announced its own NETmundial Initiative. Different groups, headed by dignitaries like the President of Estonia Toomas Hendrik Ilves, the Swedish politician Carl Bildt are discussing the future of the Internet. The ICANN President and CEO has announced that after being actively involved in some of these discussion, it is time for ICANN to step back and focus on the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) transition and its accountability, and other organizations are taking now more active roles. These organizations are of all kinds—international, intergovernmental, private, non-profit, etc., and they are discussing regularly the state of the Internet and ways to evolve the current model. Ideas are shared; debates take place, some of which are quite heated. It seems like there is a window of opportunity, in which the current multi-stakeholder model will continue to evolve and develop. It becomes more inclusive and opens to even broader participation. But not everyone is happy with this development. For Internet governance in Eastern Europe, as well as across the globe, what will happen in the near future very much depends on multiple, international factors and not events in any given country or region.
The authors are certain that the current multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance is the one that brings more people together to create better policies, which are then implemented by a variety of organizations, each responsible for a small segment of the Internet. This bottom-up structure seems in harmony with the way the Internet was initially designed and later updated. The very fact that ICANN has grown from a small non-profit organization based in Los Angeles to a global international organization with offices around the world, an international staff and a Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) board with more than 140 governmental members, is a sign that this experiment was successful. Now it is up to Internet users worldwide to build on this success together.
3. Szymon Marcinów. Private-Public Cyberspace Partnership in Poland Szymon Marcinów Lieutenant, Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland[20]
In many countries, cybersecurity has become a national security priority. This means new organizations, strategies and procedures must be created. Scholars and strategists are determining new vulnerabilities and their possible solutions. The issue of maximizing cooperation between private and public sectors is one issue that is extremely difficult to resolve. Both parties have different priorities at stake and rarely trust each other. However, such cooperation is crucial for effective cybersecurity. In Poland, cybersecurity was acknowledged as a significant, however not top-level, national security priority. Despite this, some organizational changes occurred and cyber problems are included in almost every strategic document. Unfortunately, there is little or no discussion of private-public partnership within this new domain. This approach creates a strategic gap. Poland, based on the examples from other countries, as well as consideration of its own unique geopolitical realities and capabilities, should create a private-public sector cooperation strategy that would focus on four elements: 1) Sharing information between industry and government agencies, 2) Reaching out to universities for talent and expertise, 3) Building of a patriotic hacking community, and 4) Creating Standard Operational Procedures in response to attacks and other threats. The beginning of this article will focus on private sector potential for cybersecurity and the problems that accompany it. Next, I will look how other states deal with the issue and examine the situation in Poland. Finally, I will present possible solutions to improve the private-public partnership in cyberspace. This article will base its appraisal of the Polish cybersecurity structure primarily on primary open-source documents and on interviews with practitioners in cybersecurity and the telecom industry.
The Private Sector: Potential and Problems The private sector possesses a lot of advantages when it comes to cybersecurity. First, it owns most of the IT infrastructure. It means that government agencies are “guests” in cyberspace, and that communications companies like AT&T in the United States or Orange in Poland enjoy a large share of influence. They control the traffic of information, which means that technically they can slow data flows or even cut off entirely a given source of malicious activity. They also store large amounts of data on users and their activity, which could be used in an investigation to discover the source of the attack. Secondly, IT companies have built up their own defensive capabilities. They invest in experts who constantly monitor networks in order to quickly react to any type of danger. Many times, the
experience and knowledge of the private-sector experts is larger than that of the staffs working for the government. Such expertise should be used to benefit national security. Furthermore, the findings of these experts regarding the development and trends of harmful activities could be also important for government entities. Thirdly, hardware and software products are mostly produced by the private sector. This makes the public sector dependent on commercial producers. A dialogue must be established in order to minimize the risk of built-in vulnerabilities that could put government or military networks in jeopardy. The rapid improvement of technology caused by competition, gives another advantage to the private sector, at the same time forcing the public sector to constantly play catch-up. Governments create their own research and development organizations and they use their own software to monitor networks and respond to threats. However, in most cases, the technologies used by the government are also used by privately owned enterprises. The hardware and the software purchased by public entities must be of the highest quality and must be provided by a trusted source. All the advantages mentioned above are also the reasons why private-public partnerships are essential for a successful cybersecurity strategy. Another important reason is the fact that many energy or financial companies, ventures critical to national security, are majority or partly owned by private sector investors. Public-private cooperation in such cases is not only required, but also unavoidable. However, there are many barriers that make real partnerships extremely challenging. The private and public sectors have different priorities. The first wants to profit, the latter must provide security. Private companies tend to minimize their investment in cybersecurity in order to maximize their profit. This creates a risk of bandwagoning, when responsibility for protecting clients is placed entirely on the government. Cyberspace is too vast and complex to make this a realistic paradigm. It is important to remind businesses that sufficiently funded cyber defense is their responsibility and that government agencies are only auxiliary units. A lack of trust is another issue that creates barriers to cooperation. Private enterprises are afraid of losing valuable data due to bureaucratic negligence in government institutions. Such a situation would create tremendous losses for businesses and could decrease their market share. Many companies thus perceive risk of cooperation with the government as higher than the possible benefits, and they are reluctant to cooperate. On the other hand, both military and civilian agencies have their own secrets to protect. Sharing information creates risk for national security and, many times, it is simply impossible due to legal and bureaucratic restrictions. The procedure to receive the necessary security clearances is long and tedious. In many instances, permission from a higher ranking official is required to share certain information and acquiring this permission is usually extremely timeconsuming. New procedures for public-private communication should be established that would satisfy the legitimate concerns of both sides. The trust of their clients is also a valuable asset for businesses. Many clients would not be happy to know that their personal data and information about their online activity are shared with the government. Clients need to be sure that their privacy is protected. Therefore, companies are unenthusiastic about sharing user data. There will always be a dilemma between the right to privacy and the need for security in cyberspace. The private sector’s imperative to build its users’ trust in its services generates another problem—false reporting of the number and severity of attacks.
Companies, especially in the financial sector, need to foster the perception that they are absolutely safe and that their clients’ assets are completely secured. In order to do so, they minimize the amount of attacks in their official reports. If they shared this information with the government and other financial institutions more accurately, it could help improve cybersecurity through a more efficient recognition of threats. A final problem that lays ahead in the path to partnership is the constant competition for talent between government institutions and private enterprises. Unfortunately, cybersecurity experts are a scarce resource. The problem of a qualified workforce is bigger for the government, because the recruiting process is much longer and more complex than in the private industry. Additionally, the work environment in government agencies is usually less attractive for cybersecurity experts, which typically prefer flexible working hours and more task-oriented jobs. Money could also be an issue, since large corporations are generally willing to pay more to the best candidates. The traditional public sector methods for finding and hiring talent must be changed as well. Many of the best candidates did not finish college and treated hacking as a hobby. Some were recruited while they were still in high school. Cybersecurity requires the change of mindset within the military and civilian government organizations.[21] Every state must take all of these factors into consideration while creating their own strategy for private-public sector partnership in cyberspace.
Different Approaches The United States recognizes the importance of private-public sector cooperation in the cyber-domain and constantly improves the relationship between government, corporations and citizens. The government of the United States has acknowledged the potential of the private sector for national cybersecurity. The main focus is to share the knowledge about threats and vulnerabilities between government agencies and privately owned companies. President Barack Obama issued an Executive Order on February 12, 2013, which sought “to increase the volume, timeliness, and quality of cyber threat information shared with US private sector entities so that these entities may better protect and defend themselves against cyber threats.” It gives a precise timeline and guidance for government agencies and authorities to achieve that goal. It also orders the Secretary of Homeland Security to “expedite the processing of security clearances to appropriate personnel.” Lastly, it talks about bringing “private sector subject-matter experts into Federal service on a temporary basis.”[22] This Executive Order is an attempt to address problems in cooperation and to help private sector in protecting its networks. The need for information sharing was recognized, but for many the level of partnership is still not sufficient.[23] Another significant way the United States tries to work with the private sector is by building its relationship with the hacking community in order to find support and talent. Army General Keith Alexander, head of Cyber Command and National Security Agency, in 2012 gave a keynote speech at Defcon, a hacker convention, wearing casual civilian clothes.[24] He demonstrated the change of mindset in government institutions. Such efforts create a chance to improve the image of government entities in the cyber community, but they also increase the level of competition for talent. Nonetheless, both outcomes positively influence state’s cybersecurity. The Russian Federation represents a different approach than the United States. However, the Russian
government proved to be successful in using their cyber capabilities in foreign and internal conflicts. Their approach is to build a cyber-movement of “hacker patriots” and to hire private organizations of hackers that, outside of working for the government, participate in a criminal activity.[25] These assets are used to fight with the opposition within the country. Among others, websites of independent radio Ekho Moskvy and newspaper Kommersant were shut down by DDoS attacks in 2011. They were critical of the government and decided to cover the voting fraud during the Parliamentary elections, which provoked the authorities’ reaction.[26] The war in Georgia presents another, much more significant, example. For the first time, cyber-attacks were coordinated with a kinetic military operation. Their goal was to disrupt communications and to confuse the population. They were precise in targeting and timing, which could be an indication of advanced coordination. Many of these attacks were performed by “hacker patriots,” but such an operation could not be possible without a well-organized group. Interestingly, Georgian hackers spontaneously tried to attack Russian government website in retaliation.[27] This indicates that every state has a potential to create a popular cyber movement through the mobilization of political and national identity claims that could be extremely useful during a conflict. China tries to create a relationship with educational institutions and uses their manufacturing capabilities in order to improve its cybersecurity capabilities. In 2010 some of the attacks on American corporations, including Google, were traced to two Chinese schools: Shanghai Jiaotong University and the Lanxiang Vocational School. These schools have close relationship with the Chinese military and successful computer science programs. Their best and most talented graduates are recruited into the People’s Liberation Army. It is possible that computers in these schools were hijacked and used by a third party or that students hacked into these websites to test their skills without any guidance from higher up. Some experts suggest that these schools are used as a cover up espionage and intelligence operation.[28] However hard it might be to determine the real source and motives of an attack, it is clear that Chinese government uses educational institutions to promote the concept of “patriotic hackers” among students and as recruiting hubs. China might also try to exploit the capability of built-in vulnerabilities in hardware manufactured by Chinese corporation. In 2012 the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence published a report after a year-long investigation concerning possible threats from Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. and ZTE Corp., which are the largest telecommunications equipment manufacturers in China.[29] The report’s first recommendation is to exclude Huawei and ZTE products from any government system or program and to “view with suspicion the continued penetration of the U.S. telecommunications market by Chinese telecommunications companies.” The report also encouraged private businesses to avoid using equipment produced by these companies. [30] Some experts believe that the risk from Chinese manufacturers is not based on facts, exaggerated and mostly motivated by a political and financial agenda.[31] However, the real capabilities to influence the hardware or software for malicious practices cannot be fully known. Countries that manufacture computer equipment possess an advantage and in the realities of globalization and free trade it might be necessary for states to implement a closer verification of hardware and software bought abroad.
The Situation in Poland
Poland is at the beginning of creating its national cybersecurity strategy and is not currently prepared for a major attack. This state of affairs is acknowledged by high-ranking officials of the government. In 2012, the Head of the National Security Bureau, Stanisław Koziej, said in an interview: Despite all these efforts, there is no doubt that we are not yet ready to repel cyber aggression on a large scale, if such occurred. In the event of cyberwar we would suffer large losses. Even smaller cyberwar operations or acts of cyber diversion would be very dangerous.[32] Poland is far behind in the global cybersecurity race. The definition of cyberspace was introduced into the legal system just three years ago.[33] The Cyberspace Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland was announced in June 2013, which provides the main guidance for government institutions and is part of a larger Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022.[34] However, the Policy does not adequately respond to the challenges that Poland is already facing. It does not create new institutions or consolidate the old ones. The aim is to build up already existing organizations. Furthermore, it did not introduce any additional funding.[35] One of the main problems with cybersecurity in Poland is the fragmentation of authorities responsible for it. The need for more centralized organization is necessary for a better cooperation with the private sector. Unfortunately, the policy talks very little about the public-private partnership. In just few paragraphs it gives directions to improve the information sharing process with businesses. However, the description of methods is quite vague and it lacks a concrete timetable.[36] Cooperation is not integrated into a system, but exists only on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, there are no government programs in place to positively influence the partnership.[37] The current situation is simply bad for Poland’s cybersecurity and must be changed. However, not being in the vanguard of reforms also provides Poland with an opportunity to create a better strategy, because it can be built based on others’ experiences and empirical knowledge of their shortcomings. Recently, the National Security Bureau organized a meeting with representatives of public administration, private sector, non-government organizations, and educational institutions in order to create a cybersecurity doctrine. This initiative presents a great opportunity to create successful relationships between the private and public sectors. The document should be ready by the end of 2014.[38] The greatest test of cybersecurity defenses in Poland were hacktivists’ undertakings related to protests against ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement) in January 2012. Multiple .gov.pl websites including the official sites of the president, the prime minister, the parliament, the ministry of foreign affairs, the police, and others were shut down due to the DDoS attacks.[39] According to the after incident report prepared by the Governmental Computer Security Incident Response Team— CERT.GOV.PL “only around seven percent of portals in the gov.pl domain have an acceptable professional level of security, however 18 percent are portals with unacceptably low level of security.”[40] Furthermore, not more than 20 percent of institutions developed appropriate procedures in case of a cyber-attack. Additionally, already over 25 percent of government organizations offered e-services at that time.[41] The report shows that Poland was completely unprepared for such an attack. Many recommendations were made after the ACTA protests and one of them was the improvement of cooperation with private IT services providers.[42] If a real partnership would be established, authorities could also ask teleinformatic companies for assistance.
These companies possess the ability and tools to significantly minimize the effects of a cyber-attack. For instance, Maciej Witucki, the CEO of Orange Polska, recommends DDoS Protection, which he describes as a service that “makes, in spite of a carried out attack, the victim’s website still available to Internet users.”[43] The private sector has an enormous potential to support national security in a cyber-domain and policymakers cannot afford to waste it. Despite the lack of an overall strategy or system of private-public partnership, there are initiatives that build and promote the cooperation. The first is the creation of an early warning system for internet attacks called ARAKIS-GOV. It is used by CERT.GOV.PL and its creation was possible due to the collaboration between Internal Security Agency (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego) and Research and Academic Computer Network (Naukowa i Akademicka Sieć Komputerowa).[44] The project began in 2005 and the system is so effective that, according to the Cyberspace Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland, it will be expanded.[45] Another key initiative is the Cyber-Exe Poland exercise, which brings various participants from private and public sectors. They are presented with a scenario and try to defend their networks. All their actions are observed and evaluated. The goal is to test their ability to respond to cyber-attacks and the effectiveness of communication between parties. Most importantly, it promotes cooperation between private sector and authorities. The first Cyber-Exe exercise took place in 2012 and the scenario included an attack on gas and electricity sectors. Besides companies from these sectors, many government institutions took part in the event including Military Communication and Information Security Agency, the Government Center for Security and the National Police Headquarters. Another important participant was the CERT Orange Polska. The exercise demonstrated problems with communication and proposed many recommendations in order to improve the cooperation between private entities and government institutions.[46] The second edition, Cyber-Exe 2013, focused on financial sector and teams of specialists from six banks participated. Unfortunately, government institutions did not actively partake in the exercise.[47] Cyber-Exe initiative is a right step forward that offers an opportunity to share experiences, test procedures and methods of cooperation.
Private vs. Public The private sector in Poland is open for partnership and encourages government entities to increase cooperation. This attitude is clearly visible in Maciej Witucki’s statement: Experiences with the turmoil surrounding ACTA and Cyber-Exe exercise prove that broader cooperation on matters of teleinformatic security is essential. Teletransmission services operators should play a more important role. Previous experiences show that this is possible and more efficient.[48]
However promising this might sound, it does not mean that all of the obstacles are created solely by the government institutions. The private sector would like to increase cooperation, but there are certain limitations that include protection of sensitive data and funding. Stanisław Koziej described these concerns: Also worrying is the general unwillingness of some entities to disclose information about security breaches in their networks. The scale of revealed attacks can be learned from reports of CERT Poland, prepared on the basis of reported violations of the virtual space, and the protection of own resources and incurring expenditures for improvement of security systems is the responsibility of the economic entities themselves. In the case of small and medium-sized enterprises to free resources for network security, combined with the very low awareness of the potential risks, becomes a critical component of the entire infrastructure that can be used in planning cyber-attacks on a large scale.[49]
Private entities, especially from the banking sector, are interested in providing false or incomplete reports about attacks in order to preserve consumers’ trust. The protection of customers’ data from the government would also be a problem. Other issues mentioned by Stanisław Koziej are awareness and funding. Small enterprises do not possess the necessary knowledge and capabilities to protect themselves. While large corporations already started to invest vast amounts in cybersecurity, small companies do not even realize the danger. These businesses might refuse to cooperate with the government, because they would not see that the benefits are worth the cost. The authorities in Poland are very strict when it comes to protecting sensitive data. This might be an obstacle in sharing information with the private sector. Many companies are partly or majority owned by foreign investors, which might create a problem with getting necessary clearance. Despite good strategy and doctrine, there is a huge risk of destroying all these efforts by bureaucratic procedures. In Poland, the concepts of “security versus freedom” and “security versus speed” are clashing. Future solutions must address these issues and create clear areas of responsibility and boundaries between private and public sector.
Ideas for the Future The strategy for private-public partnerships in Poland is vital to improve national cybersecurity. The foundation for cooperation is good communication and improvement in information sharing should be the first step in building an effective relationship. One way to do it is for the government to create a platform, where different agencies and companies would engage in an exchange of information. Private entities would voluntarily participate in the project and would have to be cleared to receive otherwise unavailable data. Other solution would be to create a network of liaisons, where selected personnel would be responsible for communication process with certain number of private entities. Both solutions have their pros and cons. First one is easier and cheaper. Furthermore, it is more open, which encourages an also very important cooperation within the private sector. However, the control over the data is smaller and an increase of the information noise is almost inevitable. Second one allows for a more direct communication and better supervision. However, it is more expensive, more complex and practically eliminates the possibility of multilateral collaboration. Additionally, the government should establish an emergency hotline between critical infrastructure enterprises and appropriate agency in order to quickly report about an incident and to receive proper assistance. If necessary, a variation of cyber quick reaction forces (QRF) could take control over the attacked network and take charge of defending it. This could be extremely useful for businesses that do not possess enough expertise and resources to defend themselves. Hotline would also be used for the authorities to inform businesses about a potential threat, when situation required a rapid action. As of right now, companies can report incidents to CERT.GOV.PL, but there is no officially created way of communication that goes from government to private enterprises. Good communication about the threats and incidents is the foundation of cooperation, but it is the proper reaction to attacks that makes the partnership effective. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) have to be established and strictly followed by private and public sectors. Companies participating in the cooperation through the platform or liaison system have to know their rights and responsibilities in case of an attack. They need to know what to do and how to do it. The necessity for
SOPs was acknowledged in the recommendations after Cyber-Exe 2012[50] and by private sector, as mentioned by Maciej Witucki, the CEO of Orange Polska: I believe that the so-called Standard Operating Procedures are missing, fully regulating the principles of cooperation and exchange of information between the various institutions and companies.
SOPs would allow the cooperation system to be better organized and prepared. The possible response would be quicker and more effective. Such regulations would also make the partnership clearer, simpler and ultimately more attractive for both sides. However, it is necessary to continuously evaluate and improve the SOPs in order to minimize the possibility of perpetrator finding a gap or vulnerability within the procedures. Creating levels of alert similar to the ones for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that would be correlated with appropriate SOPs, is another idea to consider. In case of a danger to multiple networks, such a solution drastically improves the effectiveness and responsiveness of the system. For example, when intelligence agencies report about a possible attack on the financial sector, the level of alert is increased from green to yellow or red, which automatically initiates certain actions by authorities and private companies. Obviously, this makes businesses’ actions dependent on government’s decisions, which could be problematic for some corporations. However, it is crucial to present the enormous benefits for their and their clients’ security that come from this solution. Next step would be for the government to increase the cooperation with higher education entities. Cybersecurity research programs should be promoted among faculty and students. The most promising should be sponsored and taken under the protection of appropriate governmental institution. The easiest would be to put these projects under the military’s R&D department. However, it would require bringing new personnel with a proper level of expertise to validate and manage such programs. The security of research would be another issue that would necessitate additional workforce and attention from intelligence agencies. Poland has the potential to be the hub of cybersecurity research in Europe and authorities should not miss that opportunity. New methods of searching candidates and hiring must be established. The highest potential for Poland’s cybersecurity is in its pool of talent. In Poland, there are many college graduates with a degree in computer science, information technology, cybernetics, etc. The best of them work abroad, many in large international corporations like Microsoft or Google. However, the searching process should not solely focus on college graduates with proper degrees, but others that present impressive skills. Many times the most talented did not yet finish high school or treat hacking only as a hobby. It is necessary to participate in hacking conventions and observe hacking competitions, or even create one. Additionally, it is crucial to incentives working for the government in order to keep the talent within the country. Military and other government agencies should consider changing the working environment and creating different organizational culture in cybersecurity units in order to make the job more appealing. The wages will also have to be higher, adequate to the qualities. It will be expensive to hire the best personnel, but Poland cannot afford to lose the talent. Finally, the government should promote patriotism in cyberspace and create a relationship with other professional or amateur hackers and computer specialists. It is impossible to employ every talent one wants and even so, there would be still a lot of computer users that could be beneficial for national
cybersecurity. Government must get engaged with hacker communities and promote good habits in cyberspace. It is important for authorities to invest in public relations to present a positive image of organizations that protect cyberspace in Poland. It might be also useful to train computer users how to respond to cyber threats and support the overall effort in combating a major cyber-attack. This could be done by implementing cybersecurity into schools’ curriculum or through government sponsored computer games that would be interesting and educating at the same time. The possibilities to promote cyber patriotism are countless, but should be exploited by the government for the benefit of Poland’s cybersecurity.
Conclusions Poland is at the beginning of creating its strategy for cybersecurity and the private-public partnership must be one of its main elements. The private sector has an enormous potential to benefit national cybersecurity. Businesses are at the forefront of technological development. They own most of the IT infrastructure and already possess well-trained staff and enormous experience. Government cannot afford to waste such capabilities. However, there are many obstacles in building a successful partnership. Private and public entities have different objectives, capabilities and mindset. Authorities need to provide security, while businesses’ major concern is profit. Other barriers for cooperation are lack of trust and competition for talented workforce. Different countries presented different approaches to cybersecurity and the relationship between private and public sectors. The United States focuses on improving the sharing of information between the government and companies. It also tries to promote the positive image of authorities among computer users in order to gain support and increase the chances of hiring the most talented individuals. The Russian Federation allegedly hires private hackers and uses “hacker patriots” for its internal and foreign purposes. China works closely with educational institutions and probably possesses the capability to influence Chinese hardware and software producers. Poland must draw from other countries experiences, while creating its own framework for partnership. The situation in Poland is extremely poor since there is no real private-public partnership established and the need for a proper strategy is enormous. The strategy should focus on creating Standard Operational Procedures in order to collectively and effectively respond to any attack, as well as on sharing information about threats between businesses and authorities, and within the private sector itself. Another important area is the cooperation with educational institutions for expertise and to search for a talented workforce. Lastly, it is important to create a community of “hacker patriots,” that would support the authorities in safeguarding Poland’s cyberspace. In terms of cybersecurity, Poland is already behind other states, so it is vital to act quickly. However, even more important is to act thoroughly and holistically. Future strategy for private-public partnership in cyberspace must address all concerns from every party in order to build a true consensus, which is required for the partnership to be successful.
4. Leslie Holmes. Cybercrime in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe Leslie Holmes Professor, University of Melbourne According to many analyses, the two fastest growing activities of organized crime since the mid1990s have been human trafficking and cybercrime. In both of these, a number of post-communist states have been major players; the focus here is on the latter form of criminality, with particular reference to Russia and the rest of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). This part of the world has been identified as one of the principal sources of this type of crime. Indeed, in one of the most popular recent books on cybercrime globally, Misha Glenny argues that the original home of cybercrime is Ukraine,[51] while Will Gragido et al. maintain that the “Russia and Eurasian nations carved out of the former USSR have long been (and remain today) the arguable leaders [globally] of malicious cyber activity and cybercrime.”[52] A recent analysis by Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies claims that more than one third of the world’s cybercrime, as measured by income generated, is based in Russian-speaking countries[53]— while a 2012 analysis reported in the Russian media comes up with a similar, if slightly lower, figure. [54] Moreover, one of the most effective pieces of equipment for completely removing data from computer disks is the Russian-designed Raskat. Clearly, any analysis of cybercrime globally will need a dedicated section on the role of the post-Soviet and other post-communist countries in this activity.
What Is Cybercrime? While there is widespread agreement that the term “cyber” refers to computers, computer networks, and information technology, the precise meaning of cybercrime is disputed. Some jurisdictions use very narrow definitions. For instance, the Australian government uses the term to refer only to offences committed against computer data and systems.[55] But most analysts use the term in a broader way, to refer to any crime that is committed online—whether against computers or against those who use the computer. Thus, in its November 2001 (effective July 2004) Convention on Cybercrime, the Council of Europe includes under the term cybercrime not only activities designed to harm computer systems and data, but also those such as computer-related fraud, forgery, child pornography and copyright infringements.[56] Similarly, the EU equates cybercrime with any form of computer crime: The terms “computer crime,” “computer-related crime,” “high-tech crime” and “cybercrime” share the same meaning in that they describe a) the use of information and communication networks that are free from geographical constraints and b) the circulation of intangible and volatile data. The main offences covered by existing European and national legislation are: Privacy offences: the illegal collection, storage, modification, disclosure or dissemination of personal data; Content-related offences: the dissemination of pornography, in particular child pornography, racist statements and
information inciting violence; Economic crimes, unauthorised access and sabotage: offences relating to unauthorised access to systems (e.g. hacking, computer sabotage and distribution of viruses, computer espionage, computer forgery, and computer fraud); Intellectual property offences: violations of the legal protection of computer programs and databases, copyright and related rights.[57]
This is a useful, but rather long definition. One of the best-selling books on cybercrime, by Robert Moore, provides a simpler but still appropriate definition that will be used here—“cybercrime actually refers to computer-related crime.”[58] There is a wide variety of criminal activities that occur on the web. Among the most common forms of such malware are: Botnets (robotic networks, in which criminals infect a group of computers and use this group or network to distribute viruses, spam, etc.). Phishing (a type of online deception geared towards identity theft, often committed by encouraging computer users to provide credit card, password and other details to what looks like—but is not—an official site, such as that of a bank or an Internet service provider). Trojans (also known as ransomware; these lock a computer, claim the user has accessed improper or even illegal material such as child pornography, and demand payment to free the computer). Viruses (malicious software designed to spread from computer to computer, and to interfere in a negative way with those computers’ operations; these are most frequently transmitted as e-mail attachments, and require victims to do something, such as clicking on the attachment, to be activated). Worms (similar to viruses, in that they spread from one computer to others—but unlike viruses, worms do not require any action by the victim in order to reproduce themselves and spread).
Measurement Problems in Analyzing Cybercrime According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), at least 80 percent of cybercrime acts are estimated to originate in some form of organized activity, and organized crime is seen to be a major player in cybercrime.[59] This sub-section will therefore consider the problems involved in attempting to measure both organized crime activity generally and cybercrime specifically. It should be noted at the outset that whereas organized crime was traditionally structured hierarchically and with strict internal codes, modern organized crime—whether engaged in more conventional activity or cybercrime—increasingly has flexible network structures;[60] this renders it even more difficult to identify and locate. As with other forms of organized criminal activity, numerous problems arise in attempting to measure the scale of cybercrime. This relates in part to the more flexible and even amorphous nature of such criminality already noted. But many other factors are involved. All too often, victims do not report crimes committed against them by what are perceived to be criminal gangs. One reason for this inaction is ignorance that a particular type of activity is in fact criminal, a problem compounded by the fact that definitions of crimes vary across jurisdictions. Related to the first point, many victims despair that the authorities will be unable to act against the criminal perpetrators, especially if the criminals are based in another country (jurisdiction). Many victims do not report because of a sense of embarrassment at being so easily duped, while others fear revenge by those they have reported.
Finally, many victims of cybercrime are unaware that they have been targeted, since the malware has been embedded in their computer but is dormant, or else is a botnet infecting others’ computers unbeknownst to the original victims. Given the problem of non- or underreporting, official statistics on organized crime activity, including on cybercrime—where these exist at all—must be treated as merely the tip of the iceberg, the overall dimensions of which are unknown. This point is borne out by the fact that the recent draft UNODC report on cybercrime noted that “Two-thirds of countries view their systems of police statistics as insufficient for recording cybercrime.”[61] Various alternative methods of measuring organized crime have therefore been devised; we shall here consider methods for assessing the scale of organized crime activity generally, before focusing specifically on cybercrime. One of the most popular methods for assessing the scale of organized crime activity is to survey the experience and perception of it by both citizens and businesspersons. Thus the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, which in 2012 surveyed businesspeople in 144 countries, includes the question “To what extent does organized crime (mafia-oriented racketeering, extortion) impose costs on businesses in your country? [1 = significant costs; 7 = no costs];” Of the postcommunist states, the one least affected by organized crime was Estonia, with a score of 6.6 and a worldwide ranking of 8th least affected in the world, while the worst was Bulgaria, with a score of 3.9 and a global rank of 127 (Russia scored 4.2 and ranked 114).[62] Unfortunately, other surveys that could be expected to solicit views and experiences are often highly circumspect in doing so. For example, the World Bank’s BEEPS (Business Environment and Economic Performance Survey) did include an explicit question on this in 2005 (“Do firms in your line of business pay for protection payments [e.g., to organized crime to prevent violence or property damage]? If yes, what percent of total annual sales are customarily paid?”), but then replaced this with a much more general and ultimately less useful pair of questions in the 2009 survey (apart from the Russian figures, results of the 2012 survey were not yet publicly available at the time of this writing; the published Russian results suggest that the latest BEEPS was concerned only with corruption, not organized crime[63]). Another approach is Jan van Dijk’s creative—if not fully convincing—Composite Organized Crime Index (COCI), in which countries are given a score out of 100 based on five variables: perceived prevalence of organized crime; number of unsolved murders; scale of grand corruption; scale of money-laundering; extent of black economy.[64] Van Dijk has reported the aggregated results of his classification for all regions of the world for the period 1997–2003, according to which West and Central Europe—unfortunately, these were not disaggregated in his published assessment—were the least subject to organized crime activity, with a score of 35; Southeast Europe came next among the post-communist regions, with a score of 58, while East Europe (mainly Russia and the Slavic Soviet successor states), together with Transcaucasia and Central Asia fared worst, with a score of 70 each. In some West European states, including Belgium and Germany, the severe problems involved in attempting to measure organized crime activity have led police authorities to move away from attempting to assess it directly, and instead focus on risk assessment. Since 1999, for example, the German police have been regularly considering five variables in assessing the “organized crime potential;” a key component of this approach is to analyze changes in illicit market demand as a way of assuming changing priorities for criminal organizations.[65]
Unfortunately, none of these methods is specifically oriented toward measuring cybercrime. Moreover, in addition to the numerous problems involved in compiling statistics on organized crime, there are problems peculiar to cybercrime. These are summarized in a paper by Fafinski et. al: . . . the distributed nature of the Internet makes it challenging to examine the specific geographies of cybercrime. Given the comparatively recent rise of criminal threats online, there are few agreed standards over the best ways to map and measure the nature and incidence of crimes perpetrated over the Internet.[66]
Fafinski et al. go on to highlight the problems of both under-recording cybercrime (largely because of under-reporting by victims and disagreement on definitional boundaries) and over-reporting it (largely a product of sensationalism). One of the principal reasons for under-reporting by business victims is that many companies fear the economic impact of negative publicity if they admit that their payment systems have been compromised, while the popular media tend to exaggerate the scale of cybercrime to increase sales, in line with the old adage that “bad news is good news” for the mass media. Given these problems, the recent UNODC report cited above notes that crime statistics published by police forces in various jurisdictions are based only on events that are reported to the police.[67] Moreover, the report notes that both national and international crime victimization surveys have so far not included standardized questions relating to cybercrime. The current dearth of reliable statistics on the precise scale of cybercrime does not mean that our knowledge base is essentially non-existent and will not improve in the future, however. While, for reasons already cited, it will never be possible to have comprehensive statistics on this type of criminality, the UNODC’s advocacy of standardized definitions, dedicated cybercrime reporting centers, and far greater use of technology-based cybersecurity information would, if implemented, greatly enhance our knowledge of the misconduct occurring in cyberspace.
Evidence on Russia and CEE As already noted, Ukraine is often cited as the home of cybercrime, and it was there—albeit in the Russian-speaking city of Odessa—that the first global conference of carders, cybercriminals who illegally acquire and trade credit card details, was held in June 2002. In terms of being host countries to cybercrime, post-communist states collectively constitute the worst region of the world. The 2013 UNODC draft report notes that: Locations showing a high level of cybercrime activity with potential links to organized crime are found, amongst others, in countries in Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia. The ZeuS malware, for example, originated in Eastern Europe in 2007, and notable hubs for cybercrime have also been reported elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Interestingly, this pattern matches well with data showing the location of botnet command and control servers.[68]
One agency that does use sophisticated technology and techniques to track cybercrime is HostExploit. According to their 2012 Global Security Report, and contrary to popular belief, the available evidence suggests that Russia is not the worst culprit in the post-communist world when it comes to hosting cybercrime; that dubious “honor” belongs to a CEE country that has been in the European Union since 2004, Lithuania. According to this report,[69] the next worst countries for hosting malware are, in order of the worst first: Azerbaijan, Latvia, the British Virgin Islands, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Russia, Luxembourg, Moldova, Romania, the United States and Ukraine. In other words, of the top twelve host-countries of cybercrime, eight are post-communist; of these eight, six are Soviet successor states. This said, the very nature of cybercrime is such that we usually
cannot be certain about the geographical origin of cyber-attacks. It must also be emphasized that bad host countries may not intentionally be fostering cybercrime; it is in many cases more a matter of them having lax security systems. Nevertheless, there is widespread agreement that parts of CEE and the FSU are major hubs of global cybercrime. The “top twelve” list just cited is based on aggregated cybercrime. In fact, there is much evidence to suggest that criminals from different CEE and FSU countries specialize in different types of computer-based crime. Thus, while Lithuania figures prominently in the use of botnet C and C (command and control) servers, phishing servers, and botnet hosting (especially ZeuS), Belarus is far more significant in generation of Spam. But the very nature of cybercrime—its flexibility and virtuality—means that gang members are not necessarily located in one place or even one country. Thus, the powerful Gozi virus that was used to steal millions of dollars and attacked numerous sensitive US sites, including NASA, was said to have been masterminded by a Latvian, a Romanian and a Russian.[70] While other post-communist countries have been identified as major sources of cybercriminal activity, much of the focus in recent years has been on Russia and other countries where there are high concentrations of Russians; this helps to explain Lithuania’s poor reputation. Gragido et al. claim that the first well-publicized instance of Russian cybercrime was the attack on Citibank in 1994 by Vladimir Levin and his team; since then, there have been numerous cases either proven or strongly suspected.[71] One of the best known cases is of the highly sophisticated ZeuS trojan that creates botnets, the origins of which have been traced to the Russian-speaking world, and in particular a criminal codenamed Slavik.[72] While it does not appear to be a major player among the worst sites of all types of cybercrime, Poland does fare poorly in terms of botnets; according to a report delivered on Polish Radio at the end of April 2013, Poland was ranked second in Europe and seventh in the world in terms of the number of botnets originating there.[73] One of the most disturbing aspects of CEE and FSU-based cybercrime is how quickly it adapts to changes in technology and consumer patterns. Recently, there have been allegations that Russian cybercrime gangs have been focusing on Facebook in their continuing attempts to raid bank accounts. [74] And in the past two years, Russian cybercriminals have shifted their focus somewhat from computers to mobile telephones, and have been heavily involved in SMS (text-messaging) fraud schemes.[75] In analyzing the cybercrime situation in CEE and FSU, it would be remiss not to point out that the region is not merely a major source of cybercriminals, but is also home to a disproportionately large number of victims. In April 2007, Estonia became the victim of the first real countrywide attack when its parliament, banks, media, and many other agencies were all subjected to assaults.[76] And, according to Eurostat, in 2009 CEE businesses recorded some of the highest rates of cybercrime attacks in Europe, with Slovakia, the Republic of Macedonia, Romania and Lithuania being particular targets (these data exclude the FSU apart from the Baltic States).[77]
Factors Explaining the Attraction of Cybercrime to Russian and CEE Criminals
In attempting to explain the attraction of cybercrime to Russian and CEE criminals, it makes sense to begin by focusing on factors that have encouraged the growth of serious criminal activity generally, following which attention will focus specifically on cybercrime. One of the salient features of early post-communism was the moral vacuum created by the collapse of communist power. Communism can be described as a totalitarian rather than merely an authoritarian system, in part because it purported to provide the citizen not only with a particular type of political and economic system, but also an ethical code, in the form of the “new socialist person.” This was meant to replace religion as the basis of morality. With the collapse of communism, this code was rendered redundant; while some were able to turn to religion, many others could not, and found themselves with at best a patchy and often contradictory or confused ethical code. Thus, Misha Glenny[78] cites the infamous Ukrainian carder “Script” (Dmitry Golubov), who argued that it was not immoral to syphon funds from banks, since the individuals whose accounts are targeted do not have to pay; this is either naïve or disingenuous, since the banks simply pass on the cost of their losses to their customers. This problem was compounded by the very nature of early post-communism. One highly troubled area was a socioeconomic one. On the one hand, all post-communist states in the 1990s had severe economic difficulties, including high inflation, negative growth and rapidly rising unemployment rates. On the other hand, this problem was compounded by the fact that these states had grossly inadequate welfare systems. During the communist era, welfare had been administered primarily by state-run enterprises, and the collapse of that system left a void that took time to fill. An important effect of weak economies in the early post-communist era was that the state itself was weak. Not only do low state revenues help to explain the poor development of the welfare state in these countries, but so does the limited capacity of law enforcement agencies. It is a truism that crime will thrive where law enforcement is weak. But the whole situation was further compounded by the high levels of corruption in many post-communist states in the 1990s and into the 2000s.[79] As a report in the UK’s Telegraph noted, “Gangs in Eastern Europe are thought to rely on incapable and corrupt officials to continue their operations unhindered.”[80] This corruption-organized crime nexus undermined the legitimacy of states, with negative knock-on effects for trust in the authorities and hence crime rates.[81] Another aspect of early post-communism was that many state elites were determined to jettison the totalitarian image their countries once had. One ramification of this was that most dramatically downsized their security (secret) police forces. Hence, one group that felt particularly aggrieved in early post-communism was former security police officers, who often found themselves out of work. Given their resentment at their treatment by the authorities coupled with their expertise, their knowledge of how security agencies operated and of the corruptibility of former colleagues still in law enforcement, their weapons training, and sometimes their improper access to weapons, such people were highly attractive to criminal gangs, who often tempted them with high potential earnings. One of the features that distinguished early post-communist transitions from transitions in Southern Europe, Latin America, South Africa, Indonesia and elsewhere was that the former had to overcome the problem of essentially having no capitalist class (bourgeoisie) that could play a significant role in the massive privatization program that typified so many FSU and CEE states in the 1990s. The
problem was compounded in the early-1990s by the recession that affected many Western states, which consequently had less than usual to invest in external markets. In this context, post-communist governments devised various methods to promote privatization. These sometimes encouraged the accumulation of wealth in illicit ways. An example of the questionable approach employed by some politicians to stimulate the accumulation of private funds so as to create a source of domestic investment was Prime Minister Václav Klaus’s alleged statement to the effect that the source of funding of investments in the Czech Republic was irrelevant, and that all that really mattered was that the investments were made quickly.[82] It is obvious that such basically amoral—some would say immoral—approaches by senior politicians could act as incentives to criminal activity. The sort of pragmatism and moral relativism displayed by some post-communist political elites could be interpreted as indicating their willingness to turn a blind eye to corruption as well as organized crime. It appears that citizens in Russia and many other post-communist states also have a higher tolerance of corruption than most Westerners have; it is not necessarily that they approve of it— surveys reveal they do not—but rather that they accept it as something about which they can do little or nothing. If so many of the state’s officials are regularly and brazenly cheating the system, why should ordinary citizens not take advantage of cheap counterfeit goods and other opportunities offered by criminal gangs, and why would potential criminals restrain themselves in such a moral climate? Some post-communist state elites were not merely setting a bad example, but were also interfering with the independence of the judiciary. According to Van Dijk, the most important correlate with organized crime levels is judicial independence: the less of the latter there is, the higher the organized crime rate.[83] The rise of organized crime in CEE and FSU is also on one level a ramification of the new consumerism of post-communism. One of the biggest failings of communist states—and one of the many reasons for their collapse—was their inability to meet the rising consumer expectations of the population. As Michael Ellman so neatly expressed it as early as the 1960s, what the citizenry in communist countries wanted was not Marx and Engels but Marks and Spencer.[84] Once the old system collapsed, people were hungry for consumer goods. But given the economic problems of early post-communism, many could not afford the full prices, and were prepared to acquire—or attempt to acquire—these through questionable channels. In line with opportunity theories of crime, the confluence of a weak state and high demand for goods and services at unrealistically low prices encouraged the growth of organized crime. Some gangs provided cheap goods they advertised online that were either fake or illegally acquired, while others simply noted credit card details and delivered nothing. Many of the factors isolated above can be seen as different aspects of one underlying feature of early post-communism—a widespread sense of insecurity. But what of more recent times? After all, most post-communist systems are by now somewhat more stable and functional than they were in the 1990s. Unfortunately, once a criminal culture has been established in a society, it can be difficult to change. This problem has been compounded by the insecurity that was engendered by the global financial—or, more accurately, the global economic—crisis that erupted in 2008. Unemployment rates in several countries climbed once again, thus intensifying the sense of financial insecurity, while simultaneously reducing respect for and trust in the state, and hence its popular legitimacy.
Having briefly considered the reasons for the growth of organized crime activity in post-communist states, we can hone in on the factors explaining the rise of cybercrime in particular. At a global level, the communications revolution—the rise in the use of computers and mobile telephones, both generally and specifically for payments (e.g. online banking)—plus the dramatic increase in the use of automated banking and credit cards in the past quarter century has greatly expanded the opportunities for cybercrime. The low probability of being detected, and even lower likelihood of being convicted, have been major stimulants. Yet this still does not tell the whole story of why criminals based in the FSU and CEE have featured so prominently in cybercrime. Having already considered why crime has been attractive to so many in post-communist states, there is one additional variable that still needs to be factored in and that provides much of the additional explanation being sought: education and training. Among those particularly subject to unemployment or underemployment in the early days of post-communism were many young people who had been well-educated in scientific disciplines, including computer science; while Russia and other communist states had a poor reputation internationally for encouraging critical thinking in their education systems, they were widely acknowledged to have provided excellent training in technical and scientific subjects, such as physics and mathematics.[85] Alienated but highly computer-literate young people have played a significant role in the rise of post-communist cyber criminality.
Official Responses to Cybercrime Countering cybercrime can be analyzed from the perspective of three types of agency—the state, International Organizations (IOs), and civil society. The State While some maintain that globalization has sidelined the state, this argument typically goes too far. There is no question that the state has had to reconfigure itself in the light of mighty transnational corporations, the growing powers of International Organizations, the blindness of the Internet to state sovereignty, environmental challenges that take no notice of territorial boundaries, etc. Nevertheless, it is still primarily states that pass, implement and enforce laws; tax citizens; provide defense and welfare; set visa regimes—and decide which international conventions to sign, ratify and abide by. And although various international agencies are tasked with countering transnational organized crime, including cybercrime, states continue to play a significant role in fighting all forms of criminality. For instance, they can determine how much to spend on fighting organized crime, which aspects of it to target in particular, how severe penalties will be—and whether or not it is worth attempting to censor or monitor the Internet. Like most states around the world, post-communist states have in general been rather slow to respond to cybercrime. But some CEE and FSU states have been praised for making serious attempts to tighten up legislation and adopting other measures relating to cybercrime. An example is Poland, which amended its Penal Code in 2004 so as to address directly a number of types of cybercrime; Estonia tightened its approach considerably following the 2007 attack.[86] And it was claimed in 2012 that the size of the cybercrime market in Russia had declined some 6 percent in comparison with the previous year as a direct result of a crackdown on cybercrime gangs by the Russian authorities.[87] Unfortunately, the increasingly transnational nature of organized crime—and this particularly applies to cybercrime—renders it ever more difficult for individual states to counter it. One significant issue
here is that a potentially powerful weapon, the international collaboration of law enforcement agencies, is often much less effective than it could be because of the unwillingness of sovereign states to compromise on definitions, or trust each other with data-sharing. While there have been signs recently that a number of states are now prepared to cooperate more closely with others to counter cybercrime—Commonwealth of Independent States Interior Ministers announced their intention to do this in early 2011,[88] while Russia announced in January 2013 that it was collaborating with China, and in June 2013 with the US, on new bilateral cybercrime agreements[89] —there is still a long way to go. All too often, declarations of intent result in little practical follow-up. One issue that plays into the hands of cybercriminals is that a number of post-communist states will not extradite citizens accused of criminal activity. Russia refuses to extradite under any circumstances, and in 2013 it publicly criticized the US for extraditing Russian nationals—some accused of cybercrimes—from third countries. Other countries do not have such absolute policies, but have shown themselves to be difficult for other states to deal with in practice. For example, while both Estonia and Latvia have on occasion reacted positively to US requests to extradite their citizens accused of committing cybercrimes against US targets,[90] Lithuania in 2007 refused to extradite one of its citizens to the US accused by the American authorities of defrauding American online retailers, on the grounds that the Lithuanian’s alleged offences were committed in Lithuania; it should be noted, however, that the Lithuanian authorities did arrest and charge the young man accused by the Americans.[91] In fairness to the CEE states, however, even the EU has not set a particularly good example in combating cybercrime, having had lenient sentencing policies until now. This said, a June 2013 proposal to the European Parliament designed to increase the severity of penalties was passed on its first reading in the European Parliament in July; this set a minimum penalty of “at least five years’ imprisonment” for criminal organizations involved in various forms of cybercrime.[92] The focus so far has been on what CEE and FSU states themselves can and have been doing to counter cybercrime. But other states can also adopt measures designed to fight this. One of the key objectives of the new National Crime Agency that commenced work in the UK in October 2013 is to combat Russian organized crime, including Russian cybercrime;[93] it has a dedicated unit for cybercrime (the National Cyber Crime Unit or NCCU). International Organizations In many ways, and certainly within Europe, the earliest international organization to really focus on cybercrime was the Council of Europe, whose Convention on Cybercrime (also known as the Budapest Convention) was referred to above. This was developed between 1997 and 2001, and a total of 21 CEE and FSU states have signed up to it. But while it has entered into force in some of them (all three Baltic states, Albania, Croatia, Hungary and Romania) as early as 2004, others have been slow to ratify it; the Czech Republic did so only in August 2013, while Poland has still not done so. Of the Slavic post-Soviet states, Ukraine ratified the Convention in 2006, while Russia has not even signed it; Belarus has not signed either—but it is also the only European state not a member of the Council of Europe. Unfortunately, the fact that many states have taken their time in ratifying the Budapest Convention helps to explain why implementation of its provisions has been slow. Turning to the EU, in 2007, building on 2001 guidelines, the Council of the EU (not to be confused
with the Council of Europe) identified three basic objectives for responding to cybercrime: To improve and facilitate coordination and cooperation between cybercrime units, other relevant authorities and other experts in the European Union. To develop, in coordination with Member States, relevant EU and international organizations and other stakeholders, a coherent EU Policy framework on the fight against cybercrime. To raise awareness of costs and dangers posed by cybercrime. These objectives were to be met by strengthening operational law enforcement cooperation and EUlevel training efforts; strengthening the dialogue with industry; harmonizing legislation across the member states; and improving—partly through standardizing data collection methods—statistics on cybercrime.[94] But this approach does not appear to have been as successful as was hoped, and in 2012, the Council of the EU announced its intention to establish a new European Cybercrime Centre (“EC3”) attached to Europol—the EU’s law enforcement agency—which commenced work in January 2013. This center is to focus on three principal areas: Cybercrimes committed by organized crime groups, particularly those generating large criminal profits such as online fraud; Cybercrimes which cause serious harm to their victims, such as online child sexual exploitation; and Cybercrimes (including cyber-attacks) affecting critical infrastructure and information systems in the Union.[95] Unfortunately, EC3 was still too new at the time of this writing to assess its effectiveness. But one observation that can be made is that EU agencies are essentially limited to exerting pressure on EU member states; while there are now eleven post-communist states in the EU, and another three at reasonably advanced stages on the path to membership, this still leaves just as many CEE and FSU states outside; since several of these have been identified as primary culprits for hosting cybercriminal gangs, the reach of the EU policy, even if it proves to be reasonably effective, will be limited. Europol has also cooperated with various national police forces to counter cybercrime emanating from CEE and the FSU. In February 2013, it launched a joint operation with the Spanish police that resulted in the arrest of a gang of eleven cybercriminals (Russians, Ukrainians and Georgians) accused of launching a trojan that had allegedly netted them at least €3 million; and in September, it again cooperated with the Spanish police to arrest two Ukrainians accused of selling criminals access to compromised computer servers for “anonymising their Internet activities.”[96] In light of the limitations of the EU approach to a global form of criminality, Interpol is potentially more powerful; all of the states considered here are members and hence, in principle, subject to Interpol pressure. Interpol has recently stated that cybercrime is now conducted much more by organized crime gangs than it was a few years ago, in line with the argument above. However, the Interpol website does not refer to any major cooperative effort with the Russian police vis-à-vis cybercrime, and mentions only one item relating to this form of criminality in the Russian context—a meeting with a Russian private sector organization in March 2013. There are no references on the Interpol site to collaboration against cybercrime with the Lithuanian police. Moreover, the Interpol
factsheet on cybercrime, “Cyber Innovation and Outreach: Partnering against cybercrime,” is ultimately vague, and much of it oriented to what should happen in the future. Given the rapidly growing reach of cybercrime, if Interpol really is taking it as seriously as it should, the Lyon-based organization is not making its approach very obvious to the public. It can only be hoped that the new IGCI (Interpol Global Complex for Innovation) that is due to open in Singapore in 2014, and is “dedicated to becoming a global center in the fight against cybercrime” according to a September 2013 speech by Interpol Secretary General Ronald Noble, will enhance Interpol’s role in combating cybercrime, including in CEE and the FSU.[97] Civil Society and the Citizenry Various civil society agencies can play a significant role in combating cybercrime. One of the most important ways in which they can do this is to raise awareness of the risks and dangers; banks, the media and online businesses can all do this in various ways, including encouraging citizens to have more secure passwords and to change these regularly, to use personal identifiers when engaging in online transactions, to be more careful when using ATMs, and to be selective in admitting others to one’s social media sites. In addition, banks and businesses can tighten their own security systems—practice what they preach—while the media can give much greater publicity to the dangers of cybercrime, citing actual cases to scare readers and viewers into improving their own online security measures. Arguably the most powerful weapon of all against cybercrime is the market. As with most other forms of organized criminal activity, much cybercrime responds to market demand; it is a form of enterprise. [98] Of course as with the licit market, the relationship between supply and demand is complex and interactive; suppliers of any good or service do not passively await customers, but seek to create demand through advertising, product changes, etc. Cybercrime is no different. Given this, one of the most effective ways of addressing deceptive selling online is for internet users to be wary of promotions—of consumer goods, pharmaceuticals, weapons or even marriage partners—that are being offered on what appear to be literally incredible terms. If greater caution results in an on-going drop in demand, the potential market will shrink. But not all cybercrime relates to fraudulent online sales. Another major form is identity theft and credit card fraud. It is difficult for ordinary citizens to protect themselves completely against this form of crime, though many people do not take the many cautionary steps that can reduce susceptibility to criminal attack. There are the obvious ones, such as keeping anti-viral software upto-date and being wary when using ATMs. Less well-known is that one should not allow a credit card out of one’s sight; if a waiter in a restaurant or a sales assistant in a shop seeks to go off with a card, the customer should insist on going with them; otherwise, the card details can be almost instantaneously copied, and immediately used online to make purchases. In short, ordinary citizens— who area often the primary targets of cybercriminals—need to be much more tech-savvy and less gullible.
Conclusion A 2012 report based on more than thirteen thousand respondents in twenty-four countries (including two post-communist states—Poland and Russia) claimed that two-thirds of the world’s adult online population had been affected at some time and in one way or another by cybercrime,
while the figure for 2011–2012 amounted to more than half a billion victims;[99] although this figure had decreased somewhat by 2013, the average cost to each victim soared by some 50 percent between late-2012 and late-2013.[100] More than 90 percent of Russians who use the internet have been victims of cybercrime.[101] It is clear that this is a highly significant and rapidly growing problem; the more people go online, the more opportunities there are for cybercriminals. Indeed, there are now considerably more victims of cybercrime than of conventional crimes such as robbery and theft.[102] Addressing this issue requires a holistic approach, with all the agencies identified in this article playing their part. Ultimately, as with so many problems, only genuine commitment to combating cybercrime will reduce its impact. At present, a combination of relative indifference and procrastination by many agencies; the ignorance and slackness of many computer users (for instance, in installing or upgrading computer defense systems); misguided concerns about sovereignty by state authorities, who need to compromise and cooperate more with other authorities; and a lack of political will are all playing into the hands of an increasingly sophisticated and determined community of cybercriminals—many of them based in the FSU and CEE.
Part Two: Ukraine 2014: The Crisis Online
5. Ilami Yasna. Ukraine-2014: Which Way Will the Digitalization Pendulum Swing? Ilami Yasna President, Donetsk Regional Association for Philosophy and Religion Studies On August 24, 1991, Ukraine, a former Soviet Republic, became an independent state. At that moment, Ukraine gained the possibility to create its own political system based on the European development model of democratization, liberalization, and establishing freedom of speech and the press. In 1991 Ukraine won this freedom easily, practically with no effort, just as did the other fourteen Soviet Republics. Perhaps that is the reason this freedom was taken for granted. But today, after twenty-three years, Ukrainians now face the prospect of having to struggle for their independence and their right to choose their own way of development. That is not to say they have not had some successes. According to a report by the human rights organization Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2014, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova are the only post-Soviet countries (excluding the Baltic ones) that have managed to achieve the status of transitive political regimes, whereas the other post-Soviet countries are still under various stages of authoritarian regime.[103] The 2013 Freedom on the Net ranking rates Ukraine a free country and awards it 16th place. Of all of the post-Soviet countries, only Georgia (which is in 12th place) scores higher than Ukraine.[104] It could be argued that one of the most important reasons for this success was the intensive involvement of Internet-media and mobile technologies in organizing the population and disseminating information during the political turmoil of 2013 and 2014. Nevertheless, though digital media are acknowledged to be an instrument for democratization and the establishment of a civil society, they are not a panacea that can, at one stroke, establish democratic regimes around the entire globe. Like any other powerful instrument, digital technologies can be put to both good and evil uses, like a pendulum that can swing in both directions, such as: societal consolidation or digital dissidence; democratization or the strengthening authoritarian regimes; awakening civil activity or “stay-at-home” or “couch” activism; state informational sovereignty or vulnerability to external aggression, and others. Such ambivalence to digital technologies appears to be particularly acute in so-called transitive societies, which are in the process of transforming from authoritarian to democratic. Such hybrid political regimes are a field of increased instability, as they combine both democratic and autocratic features, and may easily transform from one regime into another. According to Freedom House’s classification, Ukraine is precisely this kind of country.[105]
In this chapter there is an analysis of existing digital technologies and their development inside Ukraine in the instances mentioned above.
Societal Consolidation or Digital Dissidence? At first sight new, low-cost, high-speed, broadly accessible communication and informational channels would appear to facilitate the integration of society, educating huge groups of like-minded people and forming a unified technological space. But in practice, digital media are able not only to consolidate and integrate, but also to explode unstable communities from the inside. In a society with distinctive stratification, different access to information technologies and strong regional heterogeneity, these media can exacerbate existing divisions. This is the current situation in Ukraine. Digital Inequality The problem discussed most is what is called digital inequality—unequal opportunity to access digital technologies among various social groups that have different levels of education, earnings, location, etc. However, this problem is not acute in Ukraine. Despite the rather late arrival of informational technologies in comparison with many other countries, Ukraine is developing this sector extremely quickly. In 2014, Ukraine was in 32nd place in the Internet Live Stats rating among 198 countries in terms of the quantity of internet users, which as of July 1, 2014 was reckoned to be 16.8 million people or 37.49 percent of the Ukrainian population. This is close to the average world index of about 40 percent.[106] The annual growth in the number of users is nine percent, putting Ukraine in 83rd place among the 198 countries surveyed. During 2013, as gemiusAudience indicates, the number of Ukrainian internet users increased by 1.5 million people.[107] Step by step, the digital discrepancy between cities and villages is being evened out. As of the beginning of 2014, one of four Internet users lived in the countryside;[108] gender discrepancy: 51 percent of Internet users are women; age discrepancy: more than a half of million children “have friended” their parents within social networks.[109] There is another important factor: The price of Internet access in Ukraine remains one of the cheapest in the world: The average monthly fee for home Internet use is less than $10.[110] Another positive trend is the increasing extension of the mobile devices sector, which by the end of 2013, according to Kyiv International Institute of Sociology research, covered 88 percent of the Ukrainian population. According to one mobile operators’ poll conducted by Capital magazine in July 2014, the percentage of Internet-capable smartphones is 20 percent of the total number cell phones,[111] and the percentage of mobile traffic, according to Yandex.Metrics exceeded 20 percent.[112] Regional Heterogeneity Significantly more difficult is the problem of regional digital divide, which shows itself as radically different worldview inherent to inhabitants of different regions. Such polarization of opinions between regions exists for decades, but in the spring of 2014, it had reached its maximum level.
On the one hand, this situation—the result of artificial creating of regional structure of Ukraine, which was set up during the Soviet period. But today it is also a result of intentional informational policy (both internal and external), that is directed at undermining and weakening the country from the inside. Despite the tendency to divide Ukraine into West and East, with their respective citizens being considered radically different, it is more relevant to mention the ideological discrepancy between relatively unified central part of Ukraine, the Donbas and Crimea. The Donbas, in this sense, is the most complicated region. According to a survey by the Razumkov Center, the majority of the population does not trust the traditional media: 56 percent do not trust Russian media, and 68 percent do not trust Ukrainian sources. The majority simply do not trust anyone: neither the present government, nor the Party of Regions, which brought voters deep disappointment, but especially the politicians who lead the Maidan.[113] At the same time, the Donbas (and Crimea also) is characterized by the lowest levels of Internet penetration in Ukraine[114] and the maximum prevalence of traditional media supporters; which greatly reduces the influence of new digital media in these regions. The situation in Crimea is not much better. The broadcasting of many Ukrainian State TV channels was stopped here in summer 2014. And since August 1, 2014, the Roskomnadzor communications authority of the Russian Federation began placing Ukrainian Internet resources on its list of forbidden sites.[115] The first on this list was the site RIA “Novyy Region,”[116] and after that more sites joined the list, such as the Kharkiv Internet publication Glavnoe,[117] the all-Ukrainian Censor.net[118] site and others. The reaction of Glavnoe was: “We consider this decision of Roskomnadzor to be the highest praise for our work for the benefit of Ukraine!”[119] This gap can be bridged only with the help of informational methods. Given such a difficult situation, Ukraine needs to form a non-contradictory national information field, something that it has failed to do in almost a quarter century of independence. It is important to understand that it should be a united, single image of reality that would still include the specificities of each region—in various forms, in several languages, for different target audiences and using both traditional and new media.
Democratization, or New Instruments of an Autocratic Regime? Speaking about the influence of digital technologies on the democratic transformation of a society, we usually refer to just one of the possible directions of such a transformation. The optimists say information technologies faciliate an inevitable and rapid flourishing of democracy, because it is practically impossible to manipulate people accessing unlimited online information sources. The opposite view is that the World Wide Web provides almost unlimited possibilities for control, propaganda and the manipulation of people’s minds, which can actually strengthen autocratic regimes. In modern Ukraine such fears are quite justified. The Ukrainian media, both traditional and Internet ones, started to gain their independence after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and after the Orange Revolution of 2004. But in the first decades of the twenty-first century the new media have become an object of influence for political and government structures and for oligarchs again. During the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych, the political development of the country was directed towards strengthening the government regime and tightening state controls.[120] In other words, the Soviet Union totalitarian regime was substituted by the totalitarian Yanukovych regime. In particular, the
country’s leadership demonstrated an absolute intolerance of opposition media.[121] It was not long before Ukraine started to slip in the international rankings. In 2004, according to the evaluation of Freedom House, “Ukraine overcame a huge barrier and managed to step on the democratic way of development, which is a significant story of successful democracy in Eastern Europe.”[122] But in their 2011 report, the same experts noted “a worsening political situation connected with the reduction of the democracy level and the ensuring of human rights.” The Ukrainian political regime was placed in the autocratic category.[123] Similarly, in the World Index of Press Freedom, Ukraine dropped from 90th in 2009[124] to 126th in 2013.[125] The Revolution of Dignity The situation started to change on November 21st 2013—it is no exaggeration that the events that happened were a turning point in Ukrainian history, and they generated a wave of irreversible social change. On that day, a few days before the EU’s planned Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit, at approximately 15:00, the Ukrainian government announced its decision “to stop negotiations with the EU on association,” despite the fact that these negotiations were being expected by the entire country since 2007. From this very moment, the development of events was rapid. “Within 15–20 minutes of the announcement being published in all of the top Internet media, the information immediately appeared on the social nets. Within an hour, the Internet news media traffic reached its peak—for instance, the hosts of news website Ukrayinska Pravda saw a doubling in traffic (according to Liveinternet data). Close to 16:30, the government’s announcement started to be discussed on social networks.”[126] The seeds of the protest movement were sown in cyberspace. Evidently, the first person to summon people to Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) was journalist Mustafa Nayyem. Approximately at 21:00 he published on his Facebook page a short message that became the historical genesis of the EuroMaidan: “Meeting at 22:30 near the Independence Monument. Bring warm clothes, umbrellas, hot tea, coffee, a good mood and you friends. Reposts are kindly welcome.” As people came to the Maidan, activity appeared on Twitter, where the hashtag #euromaidan became one of the most popular in Ukraine during the period of November 21–28; with the intensity of tweets reaching 1,500–3,000 messages per hour.[127] According to the founder of the watcher.com.ua, Maksim Savanevskyy, “on the basis of EuroMaidan, one can say with confidence that it is in this situation that digital communications began to play an important role in the political life of the country,”[128] while the authors of the report Freedom of the Media in the Countries of the Eastern Partnership – 2013, prepared within the framework of the project ENP East Media Freedom Watch wrote that “it is thanks to online media that Ukrainian society managed to resist the information dictatorship,”[129] the efforts in late 2013 stemming from the rise to power of the Yanukovych government. In turn, further democratic reforms in Ukraine, as Director of Military Programs of the Razumkov Center Mykola Sunhurovskyy said, “were made possible precisely because, as a result of the Maidan in Ukraine, civil society has finally emerged. Precisely that became the basis of Ukraine’s survival.”[130] The EuroMaidan, also known as the Revolution of Dignity at the end of 2013, following months of Ukrainian’s joint fighting for their country—in both physical and virtual space— launched a process of changing the consciousness of Ukrainians, evolving it beyond the “post-Soviet” and prompting self-consciousness as the subject of a historical process.
From Streams to Public Television The revolutionary events on Independence Square have ended, but the trends that they generated continue to spread through Ukrainian society. One major change was the emergence of a new independent mass media, including Ukraine’s first public television projects. It all started with the independence movement streamers, dozens of whom protested on the EuroMaidan from the earliest days, armed with cameras and mobile phones, providing almost continuous online broadcasts from the scene of events. Spontaneous video broadcasts quickly escalated into fully-fledged online broadcasting projects. One of the first was Hromadske.tv, created immediately after Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Vilnius agreements. Live video was broadcast only on the Internet, via the facilities of YouTube, and often collected up to 100,000 simultaneous viewers.[131] In a matter of days there appeared other such broadcast channels, such as Spilno.tv, Espreso.tv and many others, while similar projects like Ukrlife.tv that had existed before also gained popularity. The Streamers of Ukraine Association was also created. Such rapid growth was made possible by broadcasting through web services such as Ustream.tv and YouTube, which allowed the activists to broadcast online and gave them access to an audience totally for free, without their having to purchase expensive equipment. For viewers, it was a unique opportunity to observe the revolution live, without having to be at the scene, and without waiting for the airing of the next news program from the state broadcasters. It is not surprising that a large number of Ukrainians at this time discovered the benefits of this alternative television, and that they are unlikely to want to abandon these new sources in future. The result is obvious: Today’s young independent Internet TV channels have started to rival the popularity of the traditional channels. For example, viewers of Divan.tv, Espreso TV and Hromadske.tv watch these channels more than any of the traditional ones, apart from 1+1. Thus, the share of Espreso TV accounted for 24.95 percent of the viewing time of all the channels on the Divan portal, and the share Hromadske.tv was at 20.55 percent, while the share of 1+1 was 23.53 percent. The conventional channels now lag behind by a considerable margin: Channel 5 has 11.59 percent, Inter—5.91 percent, and so on.[132] From Entertainment to Political Activism There have also been changes in the map of interests of Ukrainian Internet users. From a place for relaxation, entertainment and communication with friends, social networks have become a source of reliable civic and political information. In particular, with the advent of the public Internet TV channels, up to 90 percent of the notable online media (including non-core media) started to include a EuroMaidan masthead search box.[133] According to Gemius Ukraine, since the beginning of 2014, the top ten websites of television channels are those that provide news content—Channel 24, ICTV, STB, Hromadske TV, ZIK, 112, Channel 5, and 1+1. The First Channel of Russia is also among the most popular sites.[134] According to the Socialbakers analytical platform, in August 2014 the top ten popular Ukrainian pages on Facebook now also include the pages of news resources and Ukrainian politicians: after the football page CheFootball from the makers of Chernigіvske beer, and the official website of
Ukrainian rock band Okean Elzy, the rating of pages with more than 200,000 subscribers featured TV channel TSN, news portal Ukrayinska Pravda, EuroMaidan, Channel 5, 1+1 and Hromadske.tv, along with the public pages of Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and President Petro Poroshenko. [135] Similarly, according to Google Trends, the top ten search queries in Google coming from Ukrainians in August 2014 were all associated with the current political situation: “Right Sector,” “humanitarian convoy,” “Mig-29,” “Yasinovataya,” “Slavyansk,” “Strelkov,” and others.[136] The events of the autumn of 2013 and early 2014 gave rise to a number of other trends and phenomena related to information technology. But most importantly they have clearly demonstrated that Ukraine, teetering at the end of 2013 on the verge of becoming an authoritarian state with full control by the state over the Internet sphere, managed not to cross this line and, moreover, continues to move further and further in the direction of a free Internet and a free society.
Awakening of Civil Activity, or Online Surrogates? There is another controversial issue related to the proliferation of digital media: Will online activists graduate to similar offline processes? Will digital media contribute to the establishment of real democracy, or always remain at the level of a simulated, virtual or fictitious democracy? Among the Internet audience there have long been jokes about “Couch Warriors,” “the Office Company” (referring to the companies formed to protect the EuroMaidan protests), and “Fighters on the Internet Front,” hinting at the exclusively virtual activity of many patriots. Evgeny Morozov, the U.S. journalist of Belarusian origin, in his book The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom termed this kind of activity “slacktivism” (from slack, or lazy, and activism—activism, i.e. “lazy activism”).[137] In his view, “social networks have given us a false sense of belonging: allowing us to disseminate ‘socially useful’ information, sign an online petition—which is very simple and is done by thousands of Internet users—allowing them to feel that they have done something important. However, there are often no tangible results in practice, no matter how many retweets a post gets. The main problem is the fact that such civil activities in social networks for many have replaced actions in real life.”[138] Indeed, social networks can be used as a tool for the rapid mass mobilization of activists,[139] but the presence of this feature does not mean that users, discussing this or that problem on the net, will then close their laptops and go to the town square to take real action. It is equally likely that the outcome may be the opposite: People’s energy is diverted from active offline protests to a safer and more comfortable “Sofa Activism.” Exactly this kind of online democracy can serve as a cover for authoritarian regimes, a kind of diversion from popular discontent. However, this is not a view that is shared by all. According to the director of the MIT Center for Civic Media, modern society (at least in the West) “has reached such a stage of social development, when there is no point in holding on to the distinction between online and offline areas. Therefore, we see what can be called a hybrid of political activity that combines both online and offline components.”[140] Moreover, many online activities do have a real impact in the physical world. Examples are crowdfunding projects undertaken voluntarily by the public to raise funds to tackle the financial problems of the Ukrainian army, protest actions and other socio-political needs. For
example, at the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in the few days after the launch of a national campaign to raise funds for the army managed to attract tens of millions of hryvnias. The purses of the people supported the EuroMaidan.”[141] In particular, the collection of funds for the Maidan was joined at the beginning of December 2013 by the famous crowdfunding platform Velyka Ideya (Big Іdea).[142] Within a week of the start of the campaign, the amount of funds raised amounted to almost 300,000 hryvnia. Start-up capital for the national television project Hromadske.tv was also raised on this platform in April 2014 and it collected 1.24 million hryvnia, or 124 percent of the amount requested. Similarly, reporting of the financial and material needs of servicemen, along with fundraising, is actively carried out through social networks by groups like “Army SOS”[143] (to raise funds for the needs of individual units of the Ukrainian Army), “Donetsk SOS,”[144] which coordinates national headquarters to assist the residents in the Donbas in the current difficult situation (victim assistance, assistance in temporary relocation to other regions, military assistance, co-operation and security of the citizens of Donetsk, etc.), “Crimea SOS,”[145] and others. On average, each of these groups has from 2,000 to 5,000 participants or more, and some of the projects also have offshoot sites. Specialized platforms for political crowdfunding have also been created, such as the “Narodnyy proekt” (National Project) set up by the Mykolayiv Region Charitable Foundation.[146]
Information Sovereignty, or Defenselessness against External Aggression? Modern Ukraine can be considered—given the foreign policy context in which it has existed since early 2014—a state in physical and information confrontation with Russia. In this situation, the information space of all parties to the conflict becomes the object of aggressive action against the enemy (or enemies). And today’s information wars are often more damaging than physical armed attacks. The main goal here is to ensure there is a kind of immunity, or protection for the information space, from possible external aggression and internal fluctuations. One of the factors aggravating the situation is the historically rooted bilingualism of Ukrainians (and in some areas, the clear dominance of the Russian language). This can be seen in the Ukrainian segment of the Internet. The first Internet sites appeared in the Soviet Union in 1990, with the domain .su (an acronym for the Soviet Union) and were, of course, also in Russian. After the collapse of the USSR the .su domain ceased to exist, and all resources posted on it were automatically moved to the .ru registered domain in 1991. Ukraine’s own domain was delegated a little later, in 1992, but the vast majority of Ukrainian users continued to favor Russian-speaking Internet resources. According to the Yandex newsletter, in 2010 the share of requests in the Ukrainian language made by residents of Ukraine in the Yandex search engine ranged from 3–10 percent of all searches for the residents of the eastern areas, to 19–33 percent for those in western regions.[147] According to Andriy Peleshchyshyn, the Head of the Department of Social Communications and Information of Lviv Polytechnic National University, “this situation conceals a serious threat: the Uanet (the abbreviation for the Ukrainian segment of the Internet) does not ensure the development of the Ukrainian nation, but on the contrary, contributes to the spread of a foreign culture and language.”[148] Add to this the fact that, according to a study conducted by the recruiting company Head Hunter, only 10–15 percent of the population has even a basic knowledge of English, and no more than 5 percent of Ukrainians speak one or more foreign languages fluently.[149] Because of this, only a few people
can access information from foreign-language resources. Thus, the majority of the population of modern Ukraine are in effect enclosed in an information space dominated by the Russian-language, and to a large extent this is the information space of Russia. Moreover, given that unlike the Ukrainians, Russians rarely speak the Ukrainian language, the channel works only in one direction, providing the influence of Russia on Ukraine. It is unlikely that many were aware of the enormity of the problem before the start of the Russian information attacks on Ukraine, but today the result of such negligence is that Ukraine’s Internet space is completely open to external influence from Russia. The Rejection of Russian Social Networks One positive trend that should be noted is the mass exodus of Ukrainian users from Russian social networks, which intensified due to the adoption by the Russian Federation on August 1, 2014 of the so-called Law on Bloggers. On the eve of the adoption of the law, an appeal to Ukrainians was made by Head of the Security Service of Ukraine Valentyn Nalyvaychenko, advising users of the Internet “to be less open on social networks.”[150] As a result, according to StatCounter Global Stats, while in August last year the VKontakte (In touch) social network accounted for 34 percent of the pages viewed by Ukrainian users of social networks, this share has now dropped to 20.9 percent. Ukrainians also became less active users of the Russian social network Odnoklassniki (Classmates)—in the summer of last year, it accounted for ten percent of the views of social networking pages, while now this is down to 2.5 percent. However, there was an increase in activity in social networks in the United States: The share of Facebook page views increased this year from 34 percent to 46 percent, while the share of Twitter page views was up from 9.1 percent to 16.6 percent.[151] The increased activity on Facebook can also be associated with the mounting interest of Ukrainians in political news, since, as noted by the press secretary of the Internet marketing agency Promodo, Margaret Berger, the Facebook audience is more mature and more interested in news than VKontakte users.[152] The Emergence of Ukrainian Social Networks Domestic Ukrainian social networks could become another alternative to VKontakte and Odnoklassniki and, according to AIN.ua, more than a dozen of these have appeared since the beginning of 2014. The creators of the WEUA.info Ukrainian social network very clearly stated the need for a move to Ukrainian social networks in their presentation: “The WEUA team on March 19, 2014 announces a boycott of the Russian social network sites VKontakte and Odnoklassniki. We ask all concerned to join in.”[153] After WEUA, the social networking market saw the appearance of Druzi (Friends),[154] Antiweb.com.ua (a social network for residents of Rivne), Ukrface.net (the stated purpose of which is to unite the east and west of the country in the fight against foreign antiUkrainian propaganda), Tse Ukrayina (This is Ukraine)[155] and other projects that have had varying degrees of success. Older projects continue to work, such as Ukrayintsi (The Ukrainians),[156] which was established in 2009 and which has the mission of “unifying the nation, raising the national spirit, and popularizing the Ukrainian language, culture, and customs.”
Conclusion
Summing up, we note the most important point: In the difficult foreign-political situation facing Ukraine since the start of 2014, in the conditions of brutal information aggression, in the face of citizens’ need to daily, if not minute-by-minute, defend their right to freedom and independence, the Ukrainian public is finally beginning to awaken to political activity, personal responsibility and consciousness of the present and future of their country. Yes, political views are so divided that the situation today is similar to a civil war—but the main thing is that these views do exist. Almost one hundred percent of the population has assumed a well-defined position, overcoming the inherent postSoviet passivity and indifference to politics. There are no “undecided and indifferent” remaining now. These changes are immediately reflected in the media space, primarily on the Internet, which, from a medium of entertainment, relaxation and fun, has mutated into a zone of elevated political activism, mobilizing people and synchronizing social action and protests; mass charity, and the promotion of national unity; acting as a springboard to combat terrorism and the lies of unethical journalists; and a platform for debate between politicians and citizens. In other words, the Ukrainian Internet has begun to take on the characteristics of an information space for civil society, which greatly increases Ukraine’s chances and with it the chances of the entire Western world to see a victory of democracy —not only in Ukraine, but also in other post-Soviet countries. At the same time, we must not forget that digital technology is not a guarantee of democracy, but only one of its tools. The risk is that this instrument is a double-edged sword, which with equal probability could become an effective tool for an authoritarian regime. Society, which has been able to create a fairly uniform and consolidated information space and a unified national idea, thanks to the development of digital communications and information transfer, will rally together even more. In a society torn by internal divisions, the pendulum will swing to side of the digital division, exacerbating it and destroying the society from within. In societies with sufficiently mature democracies, this pendulum seeks the democratic pole, and digital technologies contribute to the further democratization of society. Where a political regime tends toward authoritarianism, the opposite swing of the pendulum creates conditions for establishing totalitarian controls and effective propaganda. In societies where there is a potential for political and social activity, the online environment is an effective arena for preparing and organizing offline processes; where this potential is lacking, the pendulum will swing in the direction of online escapism and political passivity, distracting people from reality with the help of the comfortable illusion of no-risk activism. Finally, a society needs to create not only such an information space, but also the tools to protect it from possible external aggression or internal turmoil, a sort of informational immune system, which in an emergency will rally and strengthen. In contrast, for societies that have not taken care to build up such immunity, the Internet becomes a zone of vulnerability—an open door for information aggression. Translated from Russian by Anna Solopova.
6. Andrea Chalupa. #digitalmaidan: United Ukrainians Everywhere over Social Media Andrea Chalupa Founder, DigitalMaidan
What is DigitalMaidan? DigitalMaidan is a social media movement that organizes Twitter storms to turn up the volume of EuroMaidan. The Twitter storms target members of the media and world leaders to inform them of the human rights crisis in Ukraine and many tweets provide links to credible sources that factcheck and expose Russian propaganda. The movement was started in late January 2014, as the violence escalated after former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych illegally passed sweeping anti-democracy laws, and injured activists were regularly kidnapped from hospital beds. At the time, mainstream media was not paying close attention to the crisis in Ukraine. Instead, the arrest of Justin Bieber in Miami was the top story. That is why DigitalMaidan came to be: To pressure Western leaders and media to help Ukraine. This chapter will explain how DigitalMaidan launched, why it mattered, and what is next for the movement.
What is a Twitter Storm? Twitter is a powerful tool that lets you communicate with the world. Having worked in newsrooms, I know that journalists consider Twitter to be the pulse of the people. A busy reporter or television news producer will use Twitter to research a hot issue, discover people to interview, and tweets are often cited in articles and news shows. For these reasons, people united on Twitter to create discussions about an urgent cause can greatly influence the media. What about world leaders? Given the popularity of Twitter, even politicians want to seem “connected to their times” by tweeting. It makes them seem accessible and perhaps even “hip”. The traditional channels set up to communicate with government leaders—writing a letter, making a phone call—are all filtered by staff; but sending a tweet nearly always guarantees that your message will end up in the politician’s email inbox. The allure of Twitter then is direct communication: You can send a message to any of its 645,750,000 users. As long as your Twitter account is set to private, then you are communicating with the world— anyone with an internet connection can discover and read your tweets. The more messages you send, the louder the message. And that is the nature of a Twitter storm. First a note on how Twitter works, for the uninitiated. A Twitter account lets you post messages of 140 characters or less. These messages can be directed at certain people by placing their Twitter handle at the start of the message. For instance, if someone were to send a tweet to active Twitter user Carl Bildt, the Foreign Minister of Sweden, he or she would write: “@carlbildt Stronger sanctions against Russia! Now! #Ukraine #digitalmaidan.” That message would pop up into Bildt’s email inbox, and anyone searching “Ukraine” on Twitter would see it—that’s what hashtags (#) do—they
allow you to easily search trending topics and they help make topics trend. In the case of DigitalMaidan, we created the hashtag—#digitalmaidan, and our thousands of tweets made this hashtag trend.
Why Twitter? If you are tired of yelling at ignorant pundits on television, then Twitter is for you. By using Twitter, I have seen popular pundits change their tone from ambivalence to sensitivity at what is at stake in Ukraine after conversing with them on Twitter. Before DigitalMaidan started, I was one of many who was glued to following events in Ukraine through social media, and having these kinds of conversations on Twitter. But we did not just go after pundits privileged with airtime on cable networks. DigitalMaidan began in part due to the sludge of misinformation flooding social media. “CIA-paid protesters.” “US should stop meddling in other countries.” “Fascist protesters.” These types of messages attached themselves to the popular hashtags #Ukraine and #Euromaidan used to track conversations about the uprising in Kyiv. It was impossible to follow the news out of Ukraine on Twitter without becoming upset over these messages continuously popping up. People with thousands or tens of thousands of followers would hijack the truth of what was really happening on the ground. And it seemed like all of mainstream media was covered in a haze when it came to Ukraine. Even the usually funny Stephen Colbert did a segment that mocked his confusion over not knowing what the Ukrainians were fighting for. Why was the West so misinformed? Of course, many of the links being shared came from Russia Today (RT). The $400 million Kremlin-funded English-language television channel was popular in the West, benefiting from the Edward Snowden scandal which it had devoted a great deal of coverage to. As a result, many in the West, who see their governments turning into Orwellian systems, mistrust mainstream media and turn to alternative news sources like they are Promethean sages daring to speak the truth. These seemingly intelligent people share a blind spot to the fact that even alternative media sources can have agendas. So the few mainstream media outlets that at that time devoted relatively little coverage to the crisis were not trusted. Ukrainians were on their own.
Mobilizing the Troops A message had to be sent, and it had to be loud. A woman by the name of Ina Kirsch brought the initial group of DigitalMaidan activists together. Kirsch, the director of the European Centre for a Modern Ukraine—an organization in Brussels that funneled Party of Regions money into Washington, DC lobbyists Mercury Public Affairs and the Podesta Group; the centre claims to be actively working on Ukraine’s EU integration. It was famously involved in paying bloggers at alternative media sites RedState and Breitbart, among others, to write favorable stories about the Party of Regions during the 2012 parliamentary election that kept them in power. Kirsch was on Twitter. So I posted a message on Facebook and Twitter asking people to join me in letting her know that she had blood on her hands. She of course responded by showing her loyalty: “You should believe in facts and not in rumors. This makes you a tool in the hands of the people looking for violence.” On January 24th 2014, I created a Facebook event page launching DigitalMaidan. Earlier that week, I had participated in my first Twitter storm to raise awareness of Japanese fishermen hunting and kidnapping dolphins in a social media movement inspired by the Academy Award-winning
documentary The Cove and Blackfish. I saw how that twitter storm earned dozens of media mentions, a statement of support on Twitter from Ambassador to Japan Caroline Kennedy, and it turned celebrities into activists including Kirstie Alley and Ricky Gervais. (A love for animals unites people across all walks of life; if you want to learn innovation in social media activism, look to animal rights activists.) So why could not a Twitter storm do the same thing for Ukraine? The initial Facebook event page invited 99 people on Friday January 24; by Monday morning, over 30,000 people had been invited. News of the event spread quickly, partly because Ukrainians in the diaspora were already mobilized from coming together to honor the 80th anniversary of the Holodomor, Stalin’s famine in Ukraine, in November 2013, just as EuroMaidan erupted. Let me explain: I had the advantage of having given presentations of my Holodomor book, Orwell and The Refugees: The Untold Story of Animal Farm, to Ukrainian communities across Canada, in New York, London, Washington, DC, and Chicago; so I initially sent the Facebook event link to leaders in these communities. But largely people were drawn to the event, because they were desperate to do something to help Ukraine and stop the constant bloodshed. In the days leading up to the first Twitter storm, people from all over the world—mostly Ukrainian diaspora—“hung out” on the Facebook event page, sharing news links, asking each other how to use Twitter, what the storm would be like. People offered suggestions of celebrities and media outlets to target. Messages and news links to share. It created a powerful crowdsourcing energy. While writing the initial list of tweets, I thought it would be important to include messages targeting major newspapers around the world; when I needed a tweet translated into Hebrew, Dutch, Spanish, or German, I posted this request on the Facebook event page and someone provided it within minutes. It seemed as though we were all glued to the Facebook event page that weekend. Then on Monday morning, our site hosting the list of 90 tweets crashed from the surge of traffic. We posted a link to our spreadsheet on the Facebook event page in order to not lose time waiting for the website to come back after getting used to the number of visitors. Within minutes, we made #digitalmaidan the number one trending topic on Twitter, beating out Justin Bieber and the Grammys, which had taken place the night before. The popular blog GlobalVoices posted a video of all of our tweets flooding Twitter. Our messages targeted dozens of leaders to sanction Russia. We tweeted at major celebrities and news outlets. Most of our messages said simply: “Ukrainians are being killed fighting for democracy. Sanctions now!” We shared an online video we found on YouTube by university student Nataliia Bartosik called “The Price of Democracy,” a montage of footage set to music that shows the peaceful EuroMaidan protests being invaded by Berkut violence. We wrote different messages to Western reporters who had been covering Ukraine: We asked them to investigate Russian-backed violence in Ukraine. At the time, Russia was the elephant in the room, and we needed them to investigate why Dmytro Bulatov and other kidnapped and tortured Ukrainian activists had been interrogated by people speaking in Russian dialects. Russia’s role in the violence of EuroMaidan was not a major issue in the mainstream media. We sent over 60,000 #digitalmaidan tweets in that first hour, according to Topsy. The tweets continued throughout the day, and people contributed their own tweets and not just the ones that we had prepared for the storm. We reached 3,671,491 people, and our tweets appeared 11,605,417
times, according to social media analytics site Keyhole. Our messages were retweeted by actors Russell Brand and Katheryn Winnick, Bianca Jagger, Garry Kasparov, and Jean-Marc Ayrault, the Prime Minister in France, used our hashtag by sending the message: “La France espere que les aspirations democratique du peuple ukrainien seront entendues #digitalmaidan #euromaidan.”
The Impact Our goal was to grab the mainstream media’s attention, and we did. We earned press coverage from Huffington Post France, Huffington Post Quebec, The Daily Beast, CTV News— Canada’s nightly news program, Foreign Policy, and London Evening Standard. The universities of Syracuse, Columbia, and Wharton also wrote about the campaign. When they were writing about DigitalMaidan, they were really writing about the human rights crisis in Ukraine. We achieved our goal, and what is more, we came together as a global community. The connections we made—strangers living in Norway, Japan, Argentina, Canada, the US, Germany—stayed in regular contact helping spread important news coming out of Ukraine and promote urgent fundraisers for EuroMaidan. We continued to organize storms once or twice a week. The talented graphic designers Mark Matla (Canada) and Katya Mischenko-Mycyk (US) regularly created powerful graphics promoting the latest storm. Our activists were regularly creative: Corey Rakowsky started the popular Yanukovych parody account @ViktorinEnglish and Andrew Mandzy runs the hilarious Berkut Guy Twitter account. The creativity was endless. Every time help was needed, someone on Facebook and Twitter would volunteer. We helped hundreds of people get on Twitter for the first time and learn how to use it. Twitter storms continue, as needed, and we will always have a core group of organizers ready to mobilize online actions. The experience of DigitalMaidan made it clear that because of the Ukrainian diaspora, Ukraine would never be alone.
7. Katya Gorchinskaya. YanukovychLeaks Katya Gorchinskaya Co-Founder, YanukovychLeaks On February 22nd 2014, I woke with a startle as the phone rang early in the morning. It was a colleague who said “The parliament is about to sack the president and appoint a new one.” The previous night, Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych fled the country after months of tense and deadly protests of the EuroMaidan Revolution. His escape set off a rapid change of power in Kyiv to fill the vacuum. As these events unfolded in the capital, a related drama was taking place in the fugitive president’s lavish residence, just ten kilometers north of the city. The estate stretches over 120 hectares of gorgeous land on the bank of a fresh-water reservoir. It is this murky lake that was intended to become the grave of many presidential secrets when hundreds of folders of documents were dumped into it that fateful night. Some documents, however, escaped from their folders and rose to the surface, floating along with the shrapnel of ice that broke off from the frozen fringe along the shore. Early that morning, all of the estate’s staff ran away and the doors of Mezhyhirya, one of the most guarded and secretive places in the country, were flung open to the public for the first time. A group of journalists, including investigative journalists who had reported extensively on corrupt schemes associated with the president’s residence, were among the earliest visitors. One of these journalist, Oksana Kovalenko, happened to spot the floating documents. A clever companion of Kovalenko dragged a large plastic road barrier into the water to use as a makeshift raft, got onto it and fished out the first wet lump of documents. The journalists were stunned with what they found. These were papers documenting the cash flows of the president, internal accounting of transactions that would be impossible to get to in any other way. It was precious. “I started checking these documents and realized that now my task was to protect them until other journalists arrived,” Kovalenko later recalled. A couple of hours later, professional divers were plunging into the freezing lake and resurfacing with an impressive haul. Dozens of folders were piled on the embankment, and the journalists, hungrily, started to peel the sticky papers apart. Pretty soon it became clear that, among hundreds of day-to-day meaningless papers, there were real pearls, papers that proved embezzlement, extortion and bribery by the former president, his family and his inner circle. For example, one document said that $12 million in cash was given by an anonymous person to the president. Another documented the “donation” of UAH four million (about $500,000) from a bank associated with the president’s son. By way of comparison, Yanukovych declared earnings only totaled $2.5 million in 2012—not even
enough to buy some of the luxury items in his residence, the bills and contracts for which were also found in the water. One contract documented a request to sign an agreement with a German company to supply close to €1.6 million (nearly $2 million) worth of furniture for the billiards room. Another set aside UAH 915,000 (about $125,000) to create a “Running boar” decoration. There was plenty of evidence of Yanukovych’s excess and imperial lifestyle found by the journalists in those murky waters. The documents were moved to the massive yacht hangar—the closest building to the reservoir. The journalists on hand started to dry, sort and repack the documents. But there were so many that a cry for help went out and volunteers started arriving, delivering hair dryers and extension cords to aid the process. Others brought kettles and boxes filled with food to keep the work going. It was also decided to photograph every document—the quickest way to make a copy. By evening, the buzz about Yanukovych’s secret papers had spread far and wide. Several television journalists came out live on air via their iPads to tell the amazing story from the very hangar that now housed presidential secrets alongside luxury yachts. Some of the juiciest findings were tweeted through the day to give the public a taste, but by and large, the group of volunteers agreed to keep the original documents in the hangar—it was clear that they could become crucial evidence of the former president’s many crimes. By night, the whole floor of the massive boat hangar was plastered with drying documents. Papers hung off boat railings and spread over every surface available. Some people knelt over them to take pictures, others sat on the ground with hair-dryers, mechanically peeling the papers apart and drying them, one after another, hour after hour. Another interesting catch from the river was a number of assault rifles, as well as about half a dozen boxes of ammunition. The weapons were taken away by the palace’s new guards. The hangar where the journalists worked was secured by armed members of the EuroMaidan’s selfdefense, the volunteer units that came about during the revolution to protect the protesters’ camp. Selfdefense volunteers, along with another group called AutoMaidan took over the president’s estate after the official guard force scattered that morning. The new guards, clad in an assortment of pseudo-military uniforms, faces covered with balaclavas, were guarding the entrance to the hangar heavily, only allowing newly arrived volunteers in after a phone call from someone inside. These and other precautions were taken because some of the journalists started to fear that the people who featured in the documents, Yanukovych’s caretakers and bribe-givers, might send in a boatful of assassins to gun them down and destroy the documents. Such a plan seemed conceivable in those dark days of turmoil because it looked like the alternative for those people would be years in prison. Moreover, it would have been easy enough to execute such a plan because the yacht hangar stands next to the water. The risk was first voiced by Oleksandr Akymenko, a former staffer of Ukrainian Forbes magazine and an investigative journalist who was used to dealing with rough characters and thinking in their style.
There was little doubt that people close to the president would have no hesitation to use weapons: just a couple of days prior, hundreds of peaceful protesters had been shot by professional snipers close to Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square), in the heart of the protests, where the revolution’s main camp was set up. The nation was still trying to come to grips with the deaths and the fact that its leaders had no qualms about unleashing killers against ordinary people. In Mezhyhirya, the drying and photographing of documents continued through the night. Some people took breaks and lay on the floor snoozing, as others continued to labor. A trailer that had been parked in the hangar was also put to good use as volunteers took naps inside it. By the morning there was a consensus among the journalists that the papers should be moved from the hangar. One of the guards suggested a small guest house—warm, light and easy to guard because it was tucked away deep inside the estate and fenced off in its own garden. By 7.00 the next morning, all of the documents, dry and wet, were packed into large, black bin bags, and moved to the new location. By then, 174 fat folders had already been discovered. The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), an international journalistic organization, had agreed to design a website specially for making these documents public. The deal was negotiated by Vlad Lavrov, OCCRP’s coordinator in the region. The project was eventually called YanukovychLeaks, and so was the core group of 15 journalists who coordinated the effort. The name seemed appropriate for several reasons: It incorporated the word Yanukovych; it had a reference to WikiLeaks, the world-famous whistle-blowing project; and it had a pun. We loved the “leaks” part of it. It was a perfect word to describe our soggy findings. The next morning, more help arrived to sort out the documents. Volunteers were coming to work in a much more comfortable setting, but there was a completely new set of challenges to meet. On the first day, it had seemed silly that the president would choose to get rid of his precious documents by dumping them into the river. There was an attempt to burn some of them, but it was only a fraction of the lot. It seemed easy enough to fish all the documents out and dry. Preserved by the plastic of the folders, even the ink stamps and scribbling in ball-point pen were easily decipherable. But as of day two of the project dawned, it became clearer that the drowning strategy was not as foolish as it might have originally seemed. The paper became mushy and began disintegrating, and was easily torn when volunteers tried to separate the sticking pieces. It took increasingly longer to peel documents from each other. A sense of greater urgency and anxiety appeared as journalists and other volunteers realized they were racing against time—and as it turned out, in more than one sense. There were an estimated 25,000 documents in the folders. Journalists calculated that if each document takes a minute to process, it would take 17 days of non-stop work to get them all done. But they were told they did not have 17 days. They had 72 hours because the prosecutors wanted the papers, too. Thankfully, as journalists called for volunteers through social networks, plenty of people answered the call. From librarians to students, dozens of people arrived to help. There were an estimated 60 volunteers working to save the documents that week, but nobody really counted. People worked side by side, without knowing each others’ names. Some stayed a couple of hours, others—a couple of
days. Some volunteers brought their own home scanners. Others lent their work scanners to the project. At one point, the project had 17 scanners working to produce high-resolution images of the documents. There were enough volunteers for the work to continue day and night, and in the meantime some of the journalists negotiated with the prosecutors for more time. Dmytro Hnap, an investigative journalist from the Slidstvo.info production studio, was the chief negotiator. He managed to persuade the prosecutors to give the volunteers enough time to dry, scan and repack every document in each folder. The resourceful volunteers discovered many inventive ways to dry documents. It was found, for example, that the heated floors in the basement were an extremely efficient and fun way to do it. Also, the sauna was put to a good use—with temperatures reaching 100 degrees Celsius, documents dried in no time at all! An industrial fan came in handy as well. Meanwhile, journalists combed other locations for documents, and found precious notes of Yanukovych’s chief guard, as well as a number of other documents stashed in various offices the expresident used to occupy. The bulk of the papers, however, documented transactions that were several years old, suggesting that Yanukovych managed to either destroy or ship out much of his archive. A few weeks later, when video footage was released from surveillance cameras, it became clear that Yanukovych was packing for days ahead of his escape. Although the footage only showed the packing of valuables, such as pictures, vases and guns, documents could have been a part of what the former president took away. Despite that, journalists continued to find odd lots of documents months after Yanukovych fled. In May, while preparing for #MezhyhiryaFest, the first-annual conference of investigative journalism and activism hosted in the estate, we found a pile of shredded papers in an administrative building; they appeared to be internal surveillance documents. Journalists took them away and they have yet to be processed. On the second day of the project, the YanukovychLeaks team got a bit of a fright. Someone had set up a website, yanukovychleaks.org, and was posting the photos of documents that we released through social networks. It seemed that somebody beat us to registering the domain name we wanted and had usurped our idea. The team was very upset—that is until we realized that the site was set up by OCCRP and the documents were posted to test its functioning as the programmers ploughed through the code. The idea behind the site was quite complicated: We needed to make the digitized documents searchable, so the programing team started early. A week into the project, a team of prosecutors arrived to pick up the scanned and dried documents and take them to permanent storage. Hnap, who took the investigators to the storage room, recalls that they were not ready to see what they saw. “Representatives of the prosecutor’s office thought we wanted to give them just three or four folders. They arrived with a small bag. And we had about 20 packed boxes ready for them. We said: ‘Go ahead and pick up these 20 boxes.’ They were startled: ‘Gracious!’ One of the investigators, the senior of the group, said ‘We will need a minivan here.’ ”
At that point, the YanukovychLeaks team had to make a serious decision, and the group nearly split in half over it. Some journalists wanted to keep the documents to themselves to study and eventually release them once they had done their investigations. They felt they were entitled to this privilege because of all the hard work they put into preserving the papers. Others felt that the documents should be made public as soon as possible to allow anyone to dig around and investigate the ex-president’s deeds; a form of crowdsourcing that would both involve the public and speed up the analysis. After a long and heated debate one night, the final decision was made by a vote. The second group in favor of the public platform won. “For me, it was one of the most important moments of this project,” remembers Lavrov of OCCRP. Overnight, Natalya Sedletska posted the first hundred documents, and the YanukovychLeaks website started living its own life. On the first day, it was visited by 600,000 people and received close to two million hits—an unbelievable result that showed just how incredibly valuable the project had been to the public. This popularity was further proof for the team that the decision to release the documents immediately was a good one. The papers recorded extortion of millions from businesses and individuals—but most of those records bore code names, abbreviations, or no names at all. Between September 2006 and the end of December 2008, for example, “incoming cash from investors,” in one record that stretched across four sheets of paper, stood at UAH 155 million, $8.66 million and over €1 million. Yanukovych was obsessed with security. Apart from a 5-meter fence around his estate, and a wrought-iron fence inside, to protect his main residence, he had thousands of well-equipped guards and his company, Tantalit, spent top bucks to finance them. He also tracked people, from muck-raking journalists and activists, to his own lover, Lyubov Polezhay. Extensive reports on her daily movements were kept even at the height of the revolution, when hundreds of thousands rallied in below-freezing temperatures in Kyiv. Plenty of documents recorded what investigators alleged was money-laundering. From using charity organizations as fronts for some activities, to paying astronomic sums for made-up services, to depositing cash into his pocket banks—Yanukovych apparently used every trick in the book. He also bought an impressive amount of residential and commercial realty, land plots and businesses in Kyiv and beyond. Some of the cash donations were deposited to the banks he controlled. YanukovychLeaks and the documents it hosted online became crucial proof at the fingertips of the worldwide public of something that many Ukrainians had suspected all along: the nation had been run by a greedy, highly corrupt, suspicious and selfish man.
8. Katie Kuksenok. Multilingualism on Social Media in the Maidan Movement Katie Kuksenok Computer Science and Engineering Department, University of Washington In November 2013, a revolution began in Ukraine. Viktor Yanukovych, Ukrainian president at the time, had backed out of an EU deal. A peaceful protest formed in Kyiv’s Independence Square, or Maidan Nezalezhnosti. It was met with brutal government-ordered dispersal. This, in turned, caused another clash on December 1, 2013. For several months, punctuated with increasingly violent clashes, protesters camped in the center of Kyiv. February 18–20, 2014 were the most violent days, with almost a hundred deaths—“the heavenly hundred”—as a result of fire by Berkut, Ukrainian special forces. After this, Yanukovych was driven from power and the story of Ukraine’s crisis moved to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March and then to separatist/terrorist activities in the east of the country. In this study, I investigate language use in social media during the course of the Maidan movement, which is the broader phenomenon beyond the EuroMaidan events, characterized by a civic awakening aimed at the ideal of Ukrainian unity. Social media played important roles in this movement, facilitating organization and communication during rallies, and supporting social filtering of misinformation. Ukraine is a multilingual society, where many people speak both Ukrainian and Russian. The linguistic situation in Ukraine has changed since its independence in 1991, and then following protests during the 2004 election—the Orange Revolution, an earlier Maidan event—that lead to a vote recount. The linguistic situation in its historical and political context is discussed in the background. In the Results section, I focus on describing which language best fits which audience, and how an audience depends on a complex ecology of existing social networks and social media platforms. This view of the Maidan movement, the role of social media in it, as well as the model of deliberate language use online, is grounded in interviews with 15 participants and a month of participant observation in Kyiv surrounding the May 25, 2014 presidential election. This report contributes a model of deliberate language choice informed by (1) existing scholarship on language in Ukraine and (2) study of language use in online discourse during EuroMaidan in particular. The Methods section explains the 15 interviews and participant observation in Kyiv in April and May 2014 that form the basis of this work.[157] The results of this study inform a research agenda for large-scale analysis of social media data, specifically a large longitudinal Twitter dataset, which are motivated in the Conclusions and Future Work section.
Background This section places the events of EuroMaidan in its historical context. Linguistic and ethnic differences have developed between east and west Ukrainian regions, exacerbated by Soviet policies. These differences were one source of tension after Ukraine’s independence in 1991—in addition to the question of the Soviet Union’s remaining nuclear arsenal on Ukrainian soil, the issue of
Crimean sovereignty or lack thereof, and growing economic difficulties. The Orange Revolution took place in 2004, and the Ukrainization policy that followed exacerbated the differences. The events of the EuroMaidan included primarily two violent clashes from November 2013 to February 2014 and a mass encampment of protesters on Kyiv’s Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti). During these events, the questions of Ukrainian identity, language, and culture remained at the forefront. In the wake of the EuroMaidan, a “spirit of Maidan” remains as the war in eastern Ukraine unfolds. As I will describe in greater detail in the Results section, the “spirit of Maidan” is a combination of civic awakening and the desire for a unified Ukraine. This is not associated with a specific campaign, and manifests differently in different regions of Ukraine. Political movements have made heavy use of social media in recent years, and researchers of social technologies have studied the role of these tools for communication and information dissemination. In analyzing retweet dynamics during the 2011 Egyptian Uprising, Starbird and Palen discovered bias toward retweeting English-language tweets, and broad-appeal tweets, including “messages of solidarity with the Egyptian cause, as well high-level news,” rather than breaking news or in-depth analyses.[158] Twitter can be seen as “a multilingual space”[159]; during the Tunisian revolution, posts in different languages were aimed at different publics, playing different roles. People sometimes tweeted in Classical Arabic, rather than Tunisian, so that “the rest of the Arabs understand us, and our actions . . . if we think it’s a matter that concerns all Arabs.” The use of English in that context focused on just “news and facts, no debates . . .” and “human rights, since this issue makes a lot of noise in the West.” There is extensive empirical and theoretical research in multiple disciplines on the role of social media in these events, but few focused on deliberate language choice. As the focus of this work is hinged on the unique and evolving ethno-linguistic situation in Ukraine, that is the primary focus of the background section. In the following sections, I first offer a discussion of complementary scholarships on the historical and ethno-linguistic situation in Ukraine. Then, I synthesize this discussion with EuroMaidan and post-EuroMaidan events into an integrated, contextualized timeline. Historical and Ethno-linguistic Situation in Ukraine There are ethnic, historical, cultural, and language differences across the either regions of Ukraine. In popular discussions of the EuroMaidan events, and the crisis and war that followed, these varied regions are reduced to east and west. The east has a greater population of Russian-speaking Ukrainians and ethnic Russians; in the east, a more Soviet historical narrative is presented. The west has a greater population of Ukrainian-speaking ethnic Ukrainians, and the Ukrainian nationalist narrative is presented. Kyiv, the capital and the core of the EuroMaidan events that initially captured international attention, is predominantly Russian-speaking, though this has been changing since the Orange Revolution, but it is also aligned at least in equal measure to the Ukrainian nationalist narrative and the Soviet one. Scholarship on the ethno-linguistic situation in Ukraine paints a complex picture that helps to understand the differences and tensions among Ukrainian regions, especially the differences between the east and the west of the country. Ethno-linguistic differences were used in English-speaking online discourse to contextualize the ongoing violence in February 2014. The map of the “divided Ukraine” typically highlighted three things—ethnicity, language use, and voting pattern or political affiliation—
showing political preferences as different between the mostly-Russian east and the mostly-Ukrainian west. One of the first viral examples of it was The Washington Post’s “this is the one map you need to understand Ukraine’s crisis” which overlaid the 2010 election results with ongoing protests.[160] Barrington and Herron argue that regionalism in Ukraine is more complex than the compositional effects of ethnic, linguistic, and historic divides.[161] Pavlenko provides a thorough review of the history of “russification” practices and policies since the beginning of the Soviet era and the “derussification” that followed after the USSR’s demise.[162] This review combines different strands of scholarship into a coherent view, and selects the aspects salient to the ethnic, cultural and linguistic context of Ukraine’s latest Maidan movement. These policies are important for understanding both the cause and progression of the movements, and for conceptualizing their outcomes. In the beginning, around the 1920s, Soviet policies followed a “dual imperative” of “nativization and russification,” and the regime aimed to support and develop national and ethnic languages on the assumption that the new regime will be best understood and accepted by various minority groups if it functions in their own languages. By the 1930s, due to administrative difficulties, Russian became the language of state consolidation. As a result, later, following the fall of the Soviet Union, “derussification” campaigns in the newly-sovereign states were made difficult by the often monolingual population of Russian speakers and ethnic Russians. During the year 2000, the Ukrainian government introduced a language policy which angered the Russian government, resulting in a “language war.” Bernsand argues that language use and conceptualization of Ukrainian and Russian as distinct languages, despite arguments of their closeness or widespread use of Ukrainian-Russian pidgin (or Surzhyk) throughout Ukraine, is connected to contemporary Ukrainian nationalist language ideology. [163] Both Bernsand and Kulyk[164] discuss a concept of the Ukrainian nationalist language ideology, which has two core characteristics: (1) a language corresponds to a nationality, and viceversa and (2) an individual has a responsibility to his/her nation/language. When considering political movements in post-Soviet Ukraine, this lens suggests that (1) reasserting the dominance of the Ukrainian language is more about reasserting Ukrainian sovereignty and (2) this is enabled by individual Ukrainian citizens, who have a duty to speak Ukrainian. This ideology is present in Ukrainian language educational materials and policies.[165] For example, one 1993 Ukrainian university textbook presents Ten Commandments, “followed by calls for the students to reflect upon how the commandments are being realized by individuals in Ukraine today.”[166] These commandments include, for example, “The language is the heart of the nation: if the language vanishes, the nation vanishes, too;” “A person who denounces his native language hurts his nation in its very heart;” and “Every conscious citizen has to know in practice his united standard language, its pronunciation and united orthography, as well as recognize and fulfil the native language obligations to his nation.”[167] Kulyk has reported on a content analysis of the Ukrainian popular press as a “mechanism of collective memory,” demonstrating that “different outlets proposed radically different contents of Ukrainian history and identity, in particular of Ukrainians’ relation to Russia and the USSR as either that of brotherly cooperation and common struggle against enemies, or imperial subjugation and independence-oriented resistance.”[168] These different narratives arise out of different histories and ethno-linguistic make-ups of regions; “in the western provinces . . . many people view the period of Ukraine’s belonging to Russia and the USSR as one of foreign occupation. For their part, the residents
of the south-east tend to see this period as one of common statehood of two kindred people, which many would like to see restored.” After Yushchenko’s election to the presidency in 2005 following the Orange Revolution, he tried to “make his version of historical memory a foundation of state policy,” which had the effect of alienating Russian-speaking and ethnic Russian Ukrainians in the east of the country. Kulyk suggests a need for further anthropological research on the sense-making process of Ukrainian people of contradictory discourses. This work attempts to begin to address this open question, through the lens of a simple but key act: the deliberate choice between the two languages online by bilingual Ukrainians and the perception of that choice by participants in the online Ukrainian political discourse. Integrated Timeline of EuroMaidan Events in a Historical Context This timeline pulls together the Kulyk and Pavlenko texts, as well as a timeline of Ukraine crisis events published and updated on the BBC News website. 1991 Independence (90 percent vote); Ukraine has largest population of ethnic Russians of all former Soviet republics: 11.4 out of 47 million Ukrainian citizens, or 24 percent. Also, 72 percent of eastern Ukrainians speak Russian as their first language. (Pavlenko) 1996 In Article 10 of the 1996 Constitution, Ukrainian is the only state language of Ukraine. Russian is taught as a foreign language. “The choice of a single, rather than dual, language policy can be understood as a strategy of resistance to the high degree of russification.” (Pavlenko) 2004 Orange Revolution; vote-rigging in presidential election won by Yanukovych; Yushchenko leads mass street protests. Supreme Court annuls result of poll. Yushchenko tops poll in election re-run. (BBC) Orange administration is introducing policy that aligns with the Ukrainian nationalist narrative, rather than the Soviet narrative—a change from the previous president Kuchma’s strategy of reflecting in his words whichever narrative is favored by his target audience. (Kulyk) 2010 Yanukovych declared winner in presidential election, judged fair by observers. Nov. 30th – Dec. 1st, 2013 Yanukovych announces abandonment of association and trade agreements with the EU, seeking closer ties with Moscow; 100,000 protest in Kiev; raids begin, 35 jailed. The following day, activists seize Kyiv City Administration Building. Occupied buildings are abandoned in return for release of 234 protesters jailed by this point mid-February, 2014. February 18–20, 2014 Kyiv Maidan is on fire. At least 88 people killed in 48 hours. Footage shows government snipers shooting at protesters from rooftops. Afterward, Yanukovych signs compromise with opposition leaders; but shortly thereafter he flees the country. March, 2014 Annexation of Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation on March 18, after “unidentified, uniformed gunmen” are seen around Crimea, and military vehicles seen around eastern Ukraine. Since then, there are ongoing, increasingly-violent clashes in eastern regions of Ukraine bordering Russia. April, 2014 Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic formed based on referendums and are supported by local insurgent militias. May 26–27, 2014 Anti-terrorist operation launched in the east of Ukraine after the May 25 presidential election, when most polling stations in the east remain closed. President-elect
Poroshenko vows to bring “peace to a united and free Ukraine.” The Ukrainian National Guard has been engaging with separatist forces since then until the time of writing (August 21). (BBC) Ukrainian media coverage is noticeably optimistic of events in the east; Russian media coverage includes publicly-debunked misinformation campaigns to portray the activities of the Ukrainian National Guard as violent toward civilians. Summary. Ukraine can be seen as going through in a succession of periods: Soviet Ukraine (1922– 1991); post-Soviet independent Ukraine (1991–2004); post-Orange Revolution Ukraine (2004– 2014); post-EuroMaidan Ukraine (2014+).
Methods This report synthesizes 15 interviews with individuals involved in some way with the Maidan movement. Interviews were semi-structured, taking place in person, as well as over Skype or phone to include non-Kyiv participants. Recruitment took place primarily through in-person contact and online. The time I spent in Kyiv—one month around the May 25 election—helped make connections with casual social media users in addition to online activists. In order to prevent individual interviews from being identifiable, only summary of the sample is reported. Eight of the 15 are male. Three were living in Kharkiv, one in Odessa, and seven in Kyiv at the time of the interview; the remaining three were based outside Ukraine. In terms of self-identified ethnicity, one participant was an ethnic Russian, one was Polish, one was French, and one was British; the rest were Ukrainian. These participants spanned a variety of audiences: 8 of the 15 were involved in various online groups to help identify trustworthy news in Ukraine and Russia, and in some cases to provide information to the EU and the US. I interviewed people from three distinct new groups. One created an online campaign to help support the idea of Ukrainian unity online. The rest were casual social media users. The interview protocol included three major questions: impression of social media and how its role in society and political discourse had changed in the last 15 years; typical language use, difference of language use on social media, perception of language use; how to determine false facts. The protocol was designed in a way to allow individuals to refrain from disclosing political alignment while still addressing research questions around role of social media and language. The question about falsehood identification online was meant to elicit really specific stories rather than potentially prepackaged narratives. With language and with social media, we cared about the narratives; having communicated the research aims through those questions, we could then ask more for specific instances. As is typical of semi-structured interviews, follow-up questions were a key method of probing for additional detail and information. If information production online was mentioned, for example, there were follow-up questions about the perception of online audience, and the difference between different social media platforms, etc. Names have been changed for anonymity, no identifying information was associated with individual interviews. Interviews were recorded and transcribed into English by the PI. Casual conversations were part of establishing rapport, but only recorded interview data are quoted in this research. Because a signed consent form would be the only identifying piece of information for the participants, written consent was waived in favor of verbal consent.[169] I conducted interviews in Ukrainian and Russian as well as English. Out of the 15, three were in
English. All were translated into English as literally as possible during manual transcription from an audio recording of each interview. After translating these interviews—which lasted between 30 and 90 minutes—I segmented the data into 318 sentences or paragraphs of stand-alone statements. Iterative coding, informed by existing literature, was used to construct a theory grounded in data. [170] There were two iterations of an axial coding scheme following an initial round of open coding. The major themes covered in this manuscript are introduced using illustrative examples, but each of these themes—“unity,” “cultural display,” “firsthand experience,” “language for aesthetics,” “Russian for inclusion” and so on—was applied in at least three interviews. The sample is not representative, but it has a wide reach, and it provides, as a whole, basis for the initial model presented. As noted in the Conclusions and Future Work section, additional interviews would help refine—or maybe change altogether—the proposed model of deliberate language choice.
Results The Role of Social Media in Maidan Maidan is not just the Ukrainian word for “square” or “plaza” or a short-hand for “the protesters’ encampment in the square.” In in the aftermath of the EuroMaidan, it has taken on an additional meaning, referring to the spirit of civic awakening aimed toward the desire for Ukrainian unity. This broader movement persists after the events of EuroMaidan through the ongoing events, and is enabled by the indispensable and central service provided by social media platforms, especially Facebook. Vira, another participant and journalist in Kharkiv, spoke about the role of Facebook in connecting people and facilitating the “civic awakening” on Kharkiv’s Maidan: We had discussions, we saw there were many of us. Facebook gave you the sense that not only do you have like-minded people, but that you have many of them. Before, everyone sat in their respective flats, some in their 30s, some in their 40s, not just the young people, all are unhappy about the state of affairs, that the country is being robbed by its government that no one listens to us. That’s what Facebook gave us: a brotherhood and a sisterhood. We didn’t know that there would be a revolution, that there would be Maidan, but when Yanukovych was being indecisive with the agreement, it was one of many events that contributed to this feeling that this is the end, now or never. Even before Yanukovych headed out, Kharkiv organized a rally about the EU over social networks. This was on 19 to 20 November, no one knew that he wouldn’t sign the agreement yet, there was still hope. And you could sense that there would be many people there, but when I came out there—Wow! It was as if all of Kharkiv had come out. This was when everyone woke up.
Social media and social networks were prominent in the Maidan movement, not just as tools to broadcast information outside of Ukraine but, crucially, to organize and to collectively police misinformation. In the words of Marina, one of the participants in this research: “for many people in Kyiv, EuroMaidan began with journalist Mustafa Nayyem’s call to go to the square in protest” on Facebook. Tonia, a student in Kyiv who participated as a medical assistant during the EuroMaidan clashes, said that “it was hard to get there because nothing was working, the metro was not working, but on Facebook there was a group “Get to the Maidan” where people who were headed to the Maidan announced it so people could coordinate and get there together.” All participants emphasized the speed of information and the capacity to connect to more “firsthand” or “eyewitness” stories as the benefit of social network use. Jakub, an ethnically Polish, US-based volunteer, who became involved in helping a Ukrainian news site translate into English, reflected on the power that social media provided regarding information access, relative to his own experience in the Polish Solidarity movement leading up to the fall of the Soviet Union: “That was just not possible when martial law was imposed in Poland on December 13, 1981 as an attempt to suppress the prodemocracy movement. The communists chopped down the phone lines and cut the country off from the
rest of the world.” Social networks connected people in a political event that swept the entire country. A constant stream of breaking news mixed with propaganda also flowed through those networks, leading to information fatigue, especially as events in the east of Ukraine began to be seen as outright ongoing war. Speed was on one hand a key advantage of social media, but it also provided the challenge of processing a huge volume of contested narrative about ambiguous, ongoing events. Tonia, who had been involved from the beginning and was engaged in political discussion online prior to Maidan, says of months following EuroMaidan: I was purposely not writing about politics because, due to the situation in the east, people are writing many points of view and I am following many journalists on Facebook. It’s overwhelming to have so much negative information. I don’t want to contribute the whining of some student to the news feed of my friends.
The wide availability of information has facilitated a development of political discourse and level of civic participation in that discourse that was not previously seen: “ten years ago, we had one simple political opinion: ‘the government is bad, it has always been bad, and that’s it.’ Now, there are more nuanced, left-wing views, right-wing views, political ideologies, parties, more political literacy,” says Anna, who lives in Odessa. In addition to the spirit of civic awakening fueled by—but not limited to—social media, the Maidan movement is associated with the desire for Ukrainian unity. During casual interactions and participant-observations on Kyiv’s Maidan, the revolution was explained to me as follows: “what is important about the Maidan is that people came out not for Poroshenko or against Yanukovych or about language or politics, but for their freedom and human worth. That is what’s so important about the Maidan.” In interviews, people explained the need to connect with other Maidan supporters, as well as to be inclusive. Especially with separatist activities in the east turning more violent, and an escalating bombardment of propaganda in the media, interview participants talked about efforts attain a sense of unity and inclusion through online actions. One person told me about using “not just language, but content. Lately, maybe for the last month, I repost about events much more rarely, because you can just watch the news. I’m posting more analytical links. And for the last two months I have been making a deliberate effort not to spread any information that is divisive of one part of the society against the other.” Modes of Deliberate Language Choice Ukrainian for Group Membership The use of the Ukrainian language can be, as Marina put it, “the mark of your kind of person”—referring to delineating membership in this Maidan movement. In Kharkiv, she said, people were afraid to use Ukrainian during ongoing EuroMaidan events. I asked when they stopped being afraid, and she said “probably just now, when most of the residents sport yellow-blue ribbons and there are Ukrainian flags in their cars.” The use of the Ukrainian language for group membership is part of other displays of Ukrainian culture. Group pride and the attitude of being “no longer ashamed” attitude stem from shifting beliefs about language. Anton, who ran an online campaign whose end goal was to enable people to publicly affiliate themselves with the movement for Ukrainian unity, comments on making visible the existence of a group as a goal in itself:
A lot of people asked, “So what? What now? To what end?” This is my answer, such as it is: this entire political situation is influenced a great deal by the environment. Our opinions are influenced by what the mass media writes, our mood is influenced by the weather outside. Similarly, our worldview and the Ukrainian situation is influenced by public project and public movements on our territory. Projects like this contribute to the zeitgeist, get into the heads of our friends, help form a spirit of patriotism, and provide hope for unity and for a brighter future. In some sense, these projects unite people, even though there is no direct action. It’s like people making their avatars patriotic in VKontakte—in reality, nothing happened. However, [when you look at a collection of these] yellow-and-blue avatars, you see how many of them there are, you understand that, wow, we’re all together anticipating a brighter future.
Visual elements of Ukrainian culture, such as the flag and the embroidered folk-style clothing, are prominent both online and off. In addition, the Ukrainian language—in poetry, songs, and signs—is used as part of the cultural response in reaction to the events of the Maidan was used to express political views. One participant mentioned, speaking about following Ukrainian-language pop bands on Facebook: “it feels good that they exist.” Vira, a resident of eastern Ukraine, praised a local Kharkiv poet who “did the impossible: about eight years ago, he created a social circle for young people where speaking Ukrainian was hip and cool, and now there are people of 18 or 20 or 25 or 30 years [old] who actually think that speaking Ukrainian is cool. In cultural circles, where there is art, they speak Ukrainian,” helping “change the perception of the language.” Enacting culture in a political time can be perceived as a politicized act. Harry, a British man living in Kyiv, said that “about four years ago a man in the street told me to speak a ‘human language’ when I said ‘thank you’ in Ukrainian. I find it difficult to imagine that happening now. This change is one result of EuroMaidan events.” Meanwhile, Marina, speaking about Kharkiv—which is more eastern than Kyiv—said the opposite: “before EuroMaidan, no one beat you or put you down for speaking Ukrainian. This was provoked by the previous government and by the Russian Federation. During the Maidan, they beat you for your tongue and for Ukrainian symbols.” The degree of politicization of cultural displays is ambiguous, in part a group membership identification mechanism, and in part a personal expression or experience that “feels good” without political aim. Russian for Inclusion of Eastern Ukrainians Most of the interview participants noted a change in the character of online discourse after the end of the EuroMaidan events and particularly following the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea in March. Several participants indicated that during or after that time, they became more engaged, and cited different motivations than those who had joined previously. Viktor, a Kyivan and a casual social media user, said that “the mask was finally ripped off of Russia and its actions, when it became not an internal matter—which was relatively understandable and predictable—but a global, ambiguous situation. So I started being more active and posting more information.” He is among several informants who noted this as the key moment when they began contributing online, posting pro-Ukrainian content deliberately in Russian in order to be inclusive of Russianspeaking Ukrainians in the east. Marina, a Kharkiv resident: “In the beginning of EuroMaidan, I had about 30 friends on Facebook. Now I have more like 100. In one argument with a [Western Ukraine] resident I managed to convince her that there do exist Ukrainians in Kharkiv, and that Kharkiv is a Ukrainian city. This happened many times.” Part of being inclusive involved at least refraining from appearance of aggression, as another participant noted: “I generally used Ukrainian, but the situation changed in the end of February. On my own page I continued to use Ukrainian, but in other groups, in Russian-speaking group like from Luhansk, I spoke primarily in Russian because the situation changed, and speaking Ukrainian raises unnecessary questions and can be seen as aggressive.”
Russian for Engagement with Russia Few interview participants had time or energy to engage with residents of the Russian Federation online, though one, Volodymyr, a Kyivan, was actively maintaining an intentionally Russian-speaking presence on VKontakte about military activities in the Ukrainian east. His personal connections in the Ukrainian National Guard and his military background allowed him to speak authoritatively. Furthermore, he was one of few people who approached the issue of misinformation in Russia media by directly trying to engage with Russians: “Currently there is a context of aggression and strategic misinformation, so it is vital to use social media to spread truthful information.” It was precisely the experience of misinformation tactics and panic strategies that made it an emotionally unpleasant but available strategy to compare Russian and Ukrainian popular press, and try to reconcile their respective distortions into a coherent picture. Most people I spoke to reported being too overwhelmed to engage with this, and relied on trusted sources of eyewitness information or “information brokers” with ties to eastern Ukraine or Russia for getting a more unbiased view. Anton, a Kyivan with Russian roots, puts it this way: No matter what is written, if someone wrote this, then this person was influenced by the facts he consumed filtered through his own worldview, so in the end I am reading someone’s subjective opinion. This is always the case. The most intense moments that are spun one way by the Ukrainian media and another way by the Russian media, so when I really want to figure it out, I analyze the differences. There are the opinions and then there are additional analytical resources . . . For a long time I was reading [site], but after a time I realized they are pro-Ukrainian after all, and they write from the Ukrainian side. I was looking for news on Russian sites, but there can be really obviously unreasonable information sometimes. If there are some loud remarks, they must be held to additional skepticism, like with Luhansk, about the Ukrainian plane shot down over the center. You have to consider the Ukrainian side and the Russian side, because they spin this in different ways. In the end result you form your own opinion about it, on the basis of some additional facts and video materials. You understand nothing, but you’ve got some opinion on the basis of some facts.
Volodymyr’s online writing is intentionally Russian-oriented, and takes place on VKontakte where there are more Russian-speaking or pro-Russian users: “I decided to write in Russian on this group in order to include Russian-speaking people in my audience. Even though a lot of Ukrainians say that Russian is very similar to Ukrainian and that it’s difficult not to understand Ukrainian, many Russians really don’t understand it, and it’s too much work to translate Ukrainian stories into Russian. So the Russian-speaking segment of the Internet is not top-of-mind for many.” As a result of running the VKontakte group, he tells how he has encountered “many Russians, strangers, writing to me, asking me to explain to them what is happening: ‘Do you have a civil war there? Why are you killing one another?’ And, of course, I do not refuse these requests although they come from strangers, if I have time I try to respond personally and paint a more realistic picture of the events here.” He credits the timeliness of his reports, which contribute to Ukrainian-oriented news feeds, to his willingness to engage with Russian media content Because I have been monitoring the situation in the east through Russian sources as well, I knew about this situation just as it had become available in Russian media, and for this reason my [recent report] was more complete and was probably the first one to appear among the Ukrainian news groups, because I was analyzing information from a Russian source, applied reasoning to consider what may be true and what may be fabrication, and presented it in a better, more adequate context. As it turned out, [a Ukrainian National Guard member] there was also present at this event, so I got information from him as well. Language as Needed: Neutral Choice in Multilingual Spaces
The dynamics between Ukrainian and Russian languages do not hold at the level of international campaigns, which employ a variety of other languages. Among the interview participants, English, French, and Polish were all languages of international campaigns to explain the situation in Ukraine. Belarusian was considered a “mutually-intelligible language” so it was not necessary to translate. International outreach campaigns sometimes involved the use of Russian, but this was not a well-covered subject in the interview. The choice between Ukrainian and Russian can also be sometimes neutral in a Maidan online space, in a manner orthogonal to the model as it has been presented thus far. It is unclear when the choice can be apolitical, though from the context of these comments that it is possible in more multilingual and progressive environments, like Facebook and largely unlike VKontakte (excluding progressive and multilingual groups). More research is required to refine the crucial point of when the choice of Ukrainian over Russian is not associated with the enactment of a political stance. When speaking about posting in the progressive, overwhelmingly pro-Maidan environment of Facebook, Vira mentioned that “the Ukrainian language has a sense of humor and you can express in Ukrainian things that are very difficult to articulate in Russian” and Anton said “sometimes it is more colorful, in Ukrainian it just sometimes sounds more interesting or prettier or more relevant to say some particular phrase specifically in Ukrainian.” Both are native Russian speakers with Russian-speaking family backgrounds and citing aesthetic reasons for language choice were not unique to them. Most often, when asked about language choice on social media, all Ukrainian-based interview participants first explained that it depended on the audience, on the original poster, and on the social norm to match language choice to interlocutors—as well as to be understanding of people who do not speak Ukrainian and can only contribute in Russian. After follow-up questions about specific events, a majority went into more explicitly politicized and self-aware deliberate language practices, which inform the rest of the deliberate language choice model presented in this work. This also suggests that further research is needed to better understand deliberate neutral versus deliberate politicized language choice. Social Media and Intended Audience Several major social media platforms were discussed in the interviews. Facebook was consistently described as less popular than VKontakte, or VK, which is the Russian-based, Russianlanguage Facebook-lookalike. As a result of Facebook becoming more popular only recently, its constituency was self-selected to be relatively more aligned with pro-EU, pro-Ukrainian sovereignty and unity the values of Maidan. Several participants had deliberately left VK. Several participants also mentioned Odnoklassniki (literally: classmates) as a service not popular among youth and primarily associated with conservative, Russian-leaning views. Marina noted, for example, that “young people mostly use VK, but once people found out that it is controlled by the FSB, they stared migrating to Facebook.” Of the younger, casual users that I spoke to, the main reason for using Facebook was to receive timely information about ongoing political events, and to be involved. In parallel, some people I spoke to left VK because it was simply too much a drain on their time and, in some cases, had too much unconstructive political debate and negativity. Twitter was only used by a few participants. Its constituency was described as activists, politicians,
journalists, and so on—rather than casual users who are more on Facebook or VKontakte. Maria, an activist from Kharkiv, described her Twitter audience as follows: “European politicians, EU officials, NATO, USA—and other politicians who have Twitter accounts. Secondly, the other audience besides politicians, are active foreign journalists, who write about Ukraine, and third, Russian politicians which have some online presence . . . there are three of us and between us we can get in contact with real people, including parliament members, politicians, and so on, which allows some degree of influence on Ukrainian politics.” Besides these four widespread platforms for information dissemination along social networks, a crucial role of social media was connecting people to firsthand accounts. Here, video livestreams, as well as video and photographic media were crucial. Indeed, personal connections were the first thing mentioned by almost every participant when I asked about how they determine the truthfulness of information: Skype, Google Plus, phone calls, and SMS messages provided the trust signal that was lacking from the rapid information flow through social networks. From this perspective, it is understandable that between Facebook and Twitter, Facebook won out as the platform for rapid news dissemination. In Maria’s words: “Facebook is pictures, that’s the main thing that works on Facebook.” Volodymyr also spoke on the value of video and photographs in Russian media for getting information about current events in eastern Ukraine faster: If you ignore the commentary, you can see rather interesting things. They had these video reports of the capture [of a Ukrainian soldier], in the context that “our brave warriors were able to capture and torture bandits from the Ukrainian junta.” The Ukrainian media, meanwhile, found out about this information at two days later, via LifeNews. In the Ukrainian media, they were showing these images from LifeNews but with their own audio commentary and their own explanation.
The variety of available social networks differed in how their constituency was perceived. Twitter was the most professional, for journalists, politicians, and a mix of European and Ukrainian stakeholders. Facebook was reported to still be very well used by journalists with lots of information, and it was a major information source for the consumers that I interviewed, but it was more for communication with other Ukrainians and building bridges across the East and the West. VK was very popular but more for “social stuff” and Odnoklassniki was used by very few people and its constituency was described as one more at odds with Maidan’s message and values than Facebook.
Conclusions and Future Work Understanding, on a large scale, the shifting language dynamics in online discourse in the Maidan movement requires a model of deliberate language choice. Based on interviews, I constructed the following model of language choice based on audience and, in turn, social media platform: Ukrainian for group membership (VKontakte in specific groups, Facebook) Russian for inclusion of eastern Ukrainians (VKontakte) Russian for engagement with Russia (VKontakte) Language as needed: neutral choice in multilingual spaces (Twitter; Facebook) In the Results section, I explained the nuance of this choice and how it depends on audience. Additional data collection and analysis, over time and including more participants from eastern Ukraine, from other members of the former Soviet Union, and from Russia, would help refine this model.
I downloaded and analyzed public Tweets associated with #EuroMaidan, and the corresponding Ukrainian and Russian hashtags, since February 2014, and this collection is still ongoing. On February 21, 2014, there were nearly as many Ukrainian tweets about #EuroMaidan and related terms as Russian. By March 4, 2014, and since, there were about ten Ukrainian tweets for every 100 Russian tweets. Each day, between 10,000 and 100,000 tweets were gathered; before March 4, only ten percent to 15 percent of all tweets were in either Ukrainian or Russian. After, the proportion of Ukrainian tweets remained steady at three percent to five percent of daily total, while the proportion of Russian tweets increased. What are possible explanations for this? On the one hand, Twitter is a multilingual space and one of the goals of using different languages deliberately is to communicate with a broader international community. From this perspective, the use of Ukrainian on Twitter is expected to be lower than Russian—which is the lingua franca of many post-Soviet states and a more inclusive language—and the occurrence of more Ukrainian than usual is the surprising phenomena to attempt to explain. On the other hand, as noted in the Results section, Twitter is a platform for online campaign building for proUkrainian groups, and there is a history of pro-Ukrainian campaigns associating themselves with using the Ukrainian language. The synthesis given in the Background does not alone explain this, but the model presented in the Results section can lead to the following explanation, regarding specifically tweets in either Russian or Ukrainian—excluding those that might be aimed at the US or the EU. During the height of violence, pro-Maidan Twitter posts were aimed at raising a sense of unity within the pro-Maidan group, and within people who might be swayed to join the Maidan movement. For this audience, the Ukrainian language was chosen. After building sufficient momentum, the audience of pro-Maidan Twitter activity shifted to Russian-speaking eastern Ukrainians, Russians, and other former-Soviet residents. The social norm to conform to the language of the original speaker suggests that, when considering the change of language over time, it must be tested if this change can be explained by a change in the language of viral content being shared at that time. This provides a basis for strategic sampling of tweets from the dataset to reject, or fail to reject, hypotheses about the stated location of users engaging in conversation; of content created by users who shifted language use from Ukrainian to Russian; and of the relationship between languages of overall media coverage to language of pro-Maidan posts. State-of-the-art analysis methods on social media data sets span both social network analysis and analysis of content topic and sentiment. This dataset does have unique challenges, particularly the use of multiple languages that are very similar in short decontextualized posts. However, the multilingualism of the dataset also provides an opportunity to study language dynamics of deliberate online activist campaigns changing over time. In addition to analysis of content, this dataset can be used to develop and refine automated mechanisms for tools that could be used in other similar situations in the future. For example, a combination of manual categorization by the crowd and machine learning can help identify Twitter posters reporting “on the ground” during a mass disruption event.[171] This kind of tool could be useful for identifying the trustworthy eyewitness information that was so valued in Maidan news reported online. The exploratory work reported in this chapter is the starting point both for the analysis and for the design of technology to support grassroots online activism.
Part Three: Separatism and De Facto States Online
9. Matthew Luxmoore. Digital Separatism: E-Diplomacy in Ukraine’s Rebel Republics Matthew Luxmoore Freelance Journalist The ongoing standoff between pro-Russian separatists and government forces in Ukraine’s east has been accompanied by one of the most assiduous wartime information offensives ever witnessed. Western analysts have been quick to assign responsibility for the dangerous polarization of views that has exacerbated tensions in Ukraine on the propaganda campaign orchestrated by Russian state media. The rival versions of truth advanced by Russia and the West have ushered in what some see as a new Cold War, punctuated by a climate of suspicion and mutual denials made even more toxic by the rapid rise of social media as a means of political expression. Yet the all too common preoccupation with the geopolitical ignores the fact that this campaign has been most aggressive within Ukraine itself, and particularly in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR/LNR), the two unrecognized states whose declaration of independence following illegal referenda in May 2014 sparked the bloodshed that continues to destabilize the entire country. [172] The Internet has played a pivotal role in the breakaway states’ campaign to gather public support and legitimize their fight for independence from Kyiv. The campaign is targeted predominantly at the local population, whose support is seen as key for the success of the insurgency. Not only is the campaign largely confined to a Russian-speaking audience, it is also closely intertwined with and supported by Russian-language media. It cooperates closely with a parallel information campaign in Russia, which is seen in the West as a patron and major sponsor of the uprising, painting the image of a people fighting for the right to self-determination. Examining their use of so-called digital diplomacy, or e-diplomacy,[173] this chapter analyses three online platforms that the two rebel governments in eastern Ukraine use to spread their message: social media (Twitter, Facebook, the Russian-language VKontakte and YouTube); online news portals, including digital versions of physical publications; and the official websites of the self-proclaimed governments and of movements affiliated with their cause. Contrasting the successes of the DNR and LNR on this front, the chapter identifies a positive and a negative dimension to the online information offensive. The positive focuses on building a pretence of legitimacy for the self-proclaimed republics and for Novorossiya (New Russia), the state envisioned by way of their future federation; the negative, by contrast, works to distance the separatist republics and their support base from Ukraine by painting the latter as an aggressor. By restricting access to pro-Ukrainian media, the information campaign in rebel-controlled territory works to condition viewpoints by disseminating a narrative at odds with the version of events
advanced by Kyiv. It will have a lasting effect on Ukraine’s ability to forge a collective identity and a common political vision once the dust settles.
Digital Diplomacy on Three Fronts A closer look at the breakaway republics’ online activity brings to light clear differences in the level of organization between the DNR and LNR governments and a lack of coordination on the information front. While numerous social media accounts and websites claiming to represent the selfproclaimed states exist, few official platforms can be found. Social Media[174] Social networks have been the primary tool used by the rebel governments to spread their message online, functioning as a medium for the rapid exchange of views and information. By far the most used of these is VKontakte, the largest social network in the post-Soviet space. The VKontakte page of the DNR’s official press service posts regular updates relating to incidents of shelling in rebel-held towns and cities, allegedly by the Ukrainian army, as well as information concerning the day-to-day running of the government and its humanitarian aid scheme for refugees who arrive in Donetsk from nearby towns. As of late August 2014, it had 8,149 subscribers. It also has a Facebook account, which more or less mirrors the coverage on VKontakte, although its following is much smaller.[175] On its Facebook and VKontakte profiles, the DNR leadership also posts video clips of official addresses and motivational speeches. Its YouTube profile, which had 5,265 subscribers, functions as an aggregator for these clips.[176] All posts and videos are in Russian. Twitter does not play a substantial role in the DNR’s digital diplomacy. Its Twitter presence is limited to only one non-personal account, which is run by its press service. @DNRPress is a thorough and well-coordinated operation. The account is followed by most international journalists focused on Ukraine and is widely cited in foreign press. Posts are in Russian and largely restricted to updates on the military situation. Most directly counter claims made by pro-Ukrainian sources, and function as a counterweight to official Kyiv’s Twitter presence. It had almost 50,000 followers at the time of this writing.[177] The LNR’s social media footprint is small by comparison. Its page on VKontakte is rarely updated (as of August there had been no posts for almost a month) and has only 851 subscribers. Its Facebook account has 131 “likes.”[178] No official LNR YouTube or Twitter accounts appear to exist. Online Newspapers and News Portals Posts on social networks are the most active medium through which the separatist republics of the Donbas disseminate their narratives. However, a range of news portals and online newspapers have been created to provide more nuanced, in-depth analyses of developments and enable a more persuasive case to be made. In the DNR, a state-run press industry is emerging with an accompanying presence online. At its headquarters in the former Donetsk city administration building, the DNR publishes two free newspapers: Novorossiya and Golos Naroda (Voice of the People). Each irregularly published issue includes articles calling on the people to join the fight against the “fascist junta” in Kyiv and its
campaign of “genocide” in the Donbas. Both papers are accessible online: the latest issue of Golos Naroda is available through the website of the DNR’s press service, while Novorossiya runs a fully independent website with several articles updated to the page every day.[179] One article posted to Novorossiya’s website accuses the Ukrainian side of instating a cruel, retributive regime in Slovyansk, the city of 130,000 which served as the DNR’s northwestern outpost until it was recaptured by government forces on July 5, 2014. “What is the regime of the Kiev junta doing on the temporarily occupied territory of the DNR? It’s clear—it is engaging in persecution, harassment and acts of terror against all those who disagree,” the article begins. Several other news portals work in concert with these two publications. Available mainly in Russian, most of these information agencies operate under the banner of the Novorossiya concept and have an international—although mainly Russia-based—readership. The DNR’s own dedicated news feed, DNR news, provides regular reports aimed at discrediting the Ukrainian leadership and its military. [180] One of the largest of these portals, Russkaya Vesna (Russian Spring), was launched on March 15, 2014, according to its website. It operates English, German and French-language sections, although the German section is not updated very regularly. Another portal, Information Agency Novorossiya, has a regularly updated website and is active on all major social networks. The portal was created in order to provide “objective coverage of events in the southeast of the former Ukraine,” its website says. It had 36,800 subscribers on VKontakte and almost ten thousand followers on Twitter.[181] Government Sites and Official Websites The rebels’ digital diplomacy is least developed in what can be described as the “official sphere”: websites representing state organs of the self-proclaimed republics. While the DNR is in the process of creating its own set of ministries, little information is available as to how this process is taking place. For example, the DNR established an interior ministry on July 17, 2014, but it has no website or official mission statement online. In the meantime, the website of the DNR’s press center functions as the official source for information relating to government activity in the rebel republic. It is also the most professional-looking site, with a smart interface and links to social media. Updated regularly, it publishes transcripts of speeches and comments by the state’s self-proclaimed leaders, as well as updates on the condition of infrastructure, water supply and other practical concerns affecting Donetsk and the surrounding rebel-held towns. Its “contacts” section lists telephone numbers (all of them mobile numbers) for a wide range of departments and agencies affiliated with the republic, with a few email addresses listed as well. [182] The only DNR ministry for which an official website could be found at the time of writing was the Foreign Ministry. The website is simple and rudimentary, and by all appearances aimed at gathering donations for the republic. Various links direct the visitor to external websites listing the details of the DNR’s account with Sberbank, Russia’s largest state-run bank, and instructions on how to make a donation.[183] The contact information provided on the website is for the ministry’s Moscow-based press service. Little information is available online about the LNR’s leadership structure and what ministries it has
succeeded in creating so far. One website claims to be the official site of the LNR. It functions as a news portal much in the same way as the website of the DNR’s official press center, but updates are few and far between. The contacts section of the LNR’s official site contains only a few numbers. [184] At the time of this writing, no website could be found representing Novorossiya, the federal state declared through the merger of the two rebel republics on May 24, 2014.
The Russian Factor Since the start of the military conflict in mid-April, Moscow has been consistently accused of funneling arms and military personnel into Ukraine through rebel-held sections of the border. In late August, a surge of material support to an insurgency on the verge of defeat initiated a major separatist counter-attack, which many Western analysts identified as the start of direct Russian military involvement in Ukraine. As Moscow continues to deny its role in destabilizing the Donbas, what is even harder to quantify is the extent to which the success of the rebel republics’ digital diplomacy depends on Russian support. Nevertheless, signs of Russia’s hand in the LNR and DNR’s online information offensive are not hard to find. The campaign carried out on social media is the clearest example. Sites on VKontakte and Facebook representing the rebel republics contain links to Russian news agencies and other Russian initiatives supportive of the separatist movement’s aims. A vast array of affiliated, but unofficial profiles, most of them in Russian and Russia-based, supplement the rebel republics’ online activities by spreading pro-separatist, anti-Kyiv views across cyberspace. They belong to pro-Russian military units active in Ukraine’s east and pan-Slavic movements supportive of the separatist cause. Several such accounts represent the envisioned state of Novorossiya. On separatist news portals, news briefs link to and cite articles published on the websites of Russian state-run media outlets, most often from the news wire RIA Novosti and the international channel Russia Today. Videos posted are either recorded by the rebel fighters themselves or taken from Russian-backed and owned TV channels such as ANNA news, an outlet from the Georgian breakaway republic of Abkhazia, and LifeNews, which is officially banned in Ukraine. Alongside links and videos, official websites and news portals tied to the DNR and LNR encourage closer political and social integration with Russia. The front cover of a recent edition of Golos Naroda, available online, shows a group of smiling female graduates from the Donbas holding their Russian university diplomas. The headline reads: “Russian schools have thrown open their doors for school-leavers from Novorossiya.”[185] In addition, NTV, an outlet held by the Russian state-owned energy giant Gazprom, recently broadcast a lengthy profile of the DNR’s official television channel. [186] Although their information offensive functions alongside a parallel campaign taking place on Russian state media, the rhetoric used by separatist outlets is far more aggressive. Open references to the “fascist” or “Nazi” government in Kyiv and its “brutal” efforts to “ethnically cleanse” the Donbas are frequently used, stirring up a feverish atmosphere among the inhabitants of rebel-held territory.
Conclusion With the conflict in eastern Ukraine becoming entrenched and rebel forces regaining lost territory, digital diplomacy is taking on a major role in the separatist republics’ campaign to win
public support and discredit the leadership in Kyiv. However, the two rebel republics have shown little cooperation in developing their digital diplomacy, with clear differences existing in the level of organization displayed by each side. The LNR’s online footprint is very small in comparison to that of the DNR. At the time of writing, Luhansk, a city with a pre-war population of 400,000 and capital of the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic, was recovering from a protracted siege by Ukrainian government forces during which its inhabitants were left without electricity or water. The likelihood of the LNR developing its state structure and expanding its information offensive to the level of the DNR looks unlikely in such circumstances. It is therefore not surprising that such disparities exist in the online footprints of the two rebel states. It is also evident that digital diplomacy is targeted predominantly at inhabitants of the Donbas and the insurgency’s Russia-based supporters. The vast majority of sources are available exclusively in Russian, and the use of VKontakte over Facebook, as well as a limited presence on Twitter, also suggests a focus on a local, Russian-speaking audience over an international one. A more localized campaign also allows for this digital diplomacy to be supplemented by a parallel information offensive launched from Russia, and Russia’s involvement is clear in both new and old media. Forging closer links with their enormous eastern neighbor, the rebel republics are encouraging their populations to integrate more closely with Russia and to cut their ties with Ukraine. Links to education and job opportunities in Russia, displayed on social media accounts, news portals and official websites tied to the rebels’ campaign, contribute to the positive dimension of the information offensive by adding to the legitimacy of the separatist cause. The separatist leadership is aware that securing the backing of the local population is crucial in determining the fate of the insurgency. While Russian backing is necessary for the rebel republics to survive, winning the hearts and minds of Donbas residents is an aim at the forefront of the information offensive. On a broader level, it functions as part of a greater propaganda campaign engaged in by both sides in the military conflict, splitting allegiances across Ukraine and cutting off parts of the population from alternative narratives. However, the rhetoric used by the rebel leadership and the aggressive anti-Ukraine sentiment which drives its propaganda is likely to have the most lasting effects. Should Kyiv succeed in suppressing the insurgency, the rift that is being created between residents of the Donbas and the rest of Ukraine, punctuated by opposing views on Russia and its role in the crisis, is likely to present a major challenge for the country and serve as an obstacle to the development of a collective vision going forward.
10.
Giorgio Comai. Post-Soviet De Facto States Online
Giorgio Comai Dublin City University, School of Law and Government[187] Even if not apparent at first sight, national borders and the issue of international recognition are embedded in the way the internet works. So if you are, for example, an Internet user living in Abkhazia, who believes that Abkhazia is a sovereign and independent state, you might have some disappointments on the World Wide Web. If you take a picture at the seaside in Sukhumi and post it on Facebook, the site will suggest you tag it as taken in “Sokhumi, Georgia.” The same suggestion appears when you try to add your place of birth, or education, or workplace, or any other information that is geographically determined.[188] Mapping services like Google Maps will be at best ambiguous for what concerns borders and street names. Indeed, the toponymy of Sukhumi and Abkhazia more generally as currently presented in Google Maps is a curious combination: Soviet-era street names are mixed with those given by the current de facto authorities, Georgian script is often included and in some instances establishments that have been destroyed or closed since the war in the early 1990s are shown.[189] If you want to make your own website, you will not have the opportunity to use an own top-level domain name, like “.it” for Italy or “.pl” for Poland. Instead, you will probably have to settle for Russia’s “.ru” or a geographically neutral option like “.org.” You might choose instead the neverextinct “.su” domain, accorded to the Soviet Union when the USSR was dying and the Internet was just coming into being. This is not a common choice, but certainly not unseen in Abkhazia or the other post-Soviet de facto states: South Ossetia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as its Central Electoral Commission have websites with a “.su” domain, as do a few private initiatives in Abkhazia.[190] Indeed, Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh all face rather similar user issues when dealing with the Internet and social media. Yet, in spite of these discomforts, residents of de facto states are increasingly using the Internet and joining social networks like Facebook and Twitter, or their analogues popular in the post-Soviet space, in particular Odnoklassniki.ru (“Classmates”) and VKontakte.ru (“In touch”). The Internet has become a place where information is distributed and where public discussions take place. Local companies promote their businesses online and news agencies use the Internet to publish their stories. State institutions of the de facto governments are putting information about their activities online. Some politicians actively use social media to promote their points of view both domestically and internationally, or simply to debate current events with their constituents. But are the governments of de facto states using the Internet as an instrument of public diplomacy, to reach an international audience directly and promote a positive image of their country? This form of digital diplomacy seems to be particularly important for entities that for years have been known as informational “black holes,”[191] that have been object of negative stereotypes and are still largely
excluded from the world of official diplomacy. This chapter presents the online outlets of governments and their representatives in all four postSoviet de facto states, focusing in particular on Abkhazia’s online world, including initiatives sponsored by the government or created by supporters of independent Abkhazia and aimed at an international audience. The final section is dedicated to the debate on the online activities of de facto governments and highlights how these can be considered an indicator of the external priorities of de facto governments.
De Facto Governments Online With the demise of the Soviet Union, four entities achieved de facto independence and managed to keep it to the current day through wars in the early 1990s that caused tens of thousands of deaths and more than a million IDPs and refugees: Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. In the following years, in spite of international isolation and lack of official recognition, these de facto states[192] engaged in state building and established institutions that delivered to the resident population many of the key services expected from a modern state.[193] Abkhazia and South Ossetia were recognized as independent states by a few countries (most importantly by Russia) in 2008, while Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria obtained no international recognition. This means that in spite of claiming sovereignty, they are located within the internationally recognized borders of Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh). While the passports issued by these de facto states give very limited opportunities for travelling, local residents and authorities can connect to the Internet and establish their own websites without intrinsic limitations. Indeed, the president, the parliament, the government, and at least a few key ministries in all four post-Soviet de facto states have their own websites.[194] Some of them are very basic, with limited information provided in an extremely bureaucratized manner. Others are instead frequently updated and offer information in various languages. Increasingly, they include links to social media profiles. Only some of them are explicitly aimed at an international audience, while the large majority use their website as if it was a local bulletin board. The websites of the ministries of foreign affairs are usually among the most active of all governmental websites.[195] Broadly speaking, the websites of the MFAs of Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh[196] share a similar structure. All of them have Russian as the default language and use the website mostly to publish news about the most recent activities of the MFA as well as to share official statements on current events. For example, following the referendum held in Crimea on its status on March 16, 2014, all four de facto states issued a statement on the issue that was made public through their official website.[197] Clearly, these websites are meant to give visibility to all instances of international interaction in which the respective governments engage, including not only international meetings or reports on conflict negotiations, but also more mundane communications with foreign diplomats and governments, such as congratulations for national holidays or birthday wishes. Such messages are also among the means used to highlight the activities of emissaries of the MFAs around the world, as well as proof of good relations among the de facto states themselves. For example, in April 2014 both the MFA of Abkhazia and South Ossetia issued birthday wishes statements in occasion of the
birthday of Transnistria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Nina Shtanski.[198] However, such messages are not the only sign of reciprocal interaction among de facto states to be found online. The representation offices of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Transnistria, for example, have their own websites that are updated practically daily, with news stories reposted from other websites about current events or any kind of meeting or agreement that relates to bilateral relations. [199] Such online activities extend also to other countries where de facto states have official representatives. Abkhazia and South Ossetia have opened websites for their embassies in Moscow, [200] while Abkhazia has a Spanish-language website for its embassy in Venezuela.[201] NagornoKarabakh seems to be less interested in this type of online presence, and makes an exception only for the United States, where they have a representation office with its own website.[202] Besides updates and press releases, all these websites include information about consular activities, visa regulations and other practical matters. All four de facto states have their own websites dedicated to the promotion of tourism in their territory,[203] even if the difference in touristic potential and tradition is well evident. Only Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh’s websites are available in English and actually target international tourists who are not necessarily from neighboring countries. All post-Soviet de facto states have public news agencies,[204] along with privately owned news outlets. Local broadcasters, including public TV stations, have their own websites.[205] Interestingly, Transnistria’s state TV publishes all of its news content and some general interest programs, including in the Moldovan and Ukrainian languages, on its YouTube channel.[206] Concerning conflict-related issues, the website of Transnistria’s MFA has a section dedicated to the negotiation process, Nagorno-Karabakh’s MFA features publications on the conflict, while the MFAs of Abkhazia and South Ossetia do not have a dedicated section.[207] However, all four websites include regular statements and information about negotiations and meetings related to their respective conflicts. Individual politicians and government representatives in de facto states are increasingly using social media to communicate with the public, including by responding to comments or questions raised by other users. Their messages seem to be mostly targeted to local audiences, but in some cases social media postings anticipate or substitute for official statements on current events and are picked up by news agencies.[208] Social media is also used by activists, politicians and common Internet users to debate current events, either via personal profiles or through dedicated online groups.[209]
Abkhazia’s Online Outposts The online activities of Abkhazia’s MFA are worth special attention because, in particular since 2013, they seem to be purposefully structured to reach a wider audience and target an international public in multiple languages. As described in detail in their yearly report on activities, [210] the information department increased its operations significantly in 2013 over previous years (1,037 publications, against 233 in 2012) and the number of visitors to the website doubled and reached 40,000 unique visitors during the year. The Abkhaz MFA’s website and its profiles on social networks are now active in Abkhaz, Russian, English, Turkish, German, Italian, Arabic and Spanish. In 2013, Abkhazia’s MFA contributed to the establishment of a Turkish-language website,[211] and
started an Arab-language information website,[212] hiring two Syrian repatriates in their information department.[213] Starting in 2013, Abkhazia’s MFA has created Facebook pages in all the languages for which it has a website. As of April 2014, most of them have a rather small number of page “likes” (in the low hundreds), but interestingly, the most successful is the Turkish-language version, with about 2,500 page “likes” reached in about one year. It is worth highlighting the efforts by the Abkhaz authorities to reach out directly to their diaspora in Turkey and the Middle East. They are aimed at fostering a positive image of contemporary Abkhazia among their ethnic kin abroad, at increasing awareness about its territory and its society, as well as presenting the possibilities that Abkhazia offers to those who decide “to return to their historic motherland.” Abkhazia’s MFA has also started its own profile on Flickr and on YouTube. Their most significant achievement to date on YouTube is a four minute video clip published at the time of the 2014 winter Olympics in Sochi that reached more than 40,000 views within two months of its publication. In the short video, young Abkhazians present the natural beauties of Abkhazia in multiple languages and invite the viewers to visit the territory.[214] As openly stated in their yearly account of activities for 2013, Abkhazia’s MFA aims to make active use of “digital diplomacy,” in order to fight negative stereotypes about the territory and “obtain new friends and supporters for independent Abkhazia.”[215] Besides small websites and Facebook pages created by individual users, special mention is due to a series of English-language websites targeting an international audience and established by Metin Sönmez, a supporter of the Abkhaz cause based in the UK. Abkhaz World[216] collects news, comments, reviews and offers original material related to Abkhazia. Abkhazia in Vision[217] presents a collection of video materials related to Abkhazia, both historical and new. InstAbkhazia[218] took advantage of the hype surrounding Instagram, a smartphone app that allows users to apply filters on pictures, to collect photos taken in Abkhazia with the app, presenting to the world a more “pop” version of the territory. Reflections on Abkhazia[219] is another online project that collects thoughts on Abkhazia by experts, scholars and public figures who are familiar with the territory and its people. Most of these projects have their own pages on various social media. The “about” page of AbkhazWorld.com makes clear that these websites aim at spreading information on Abkhazia “especially for the benefit of non-Abkhazians” and at “enabling Abkhazians, their supporters and any other competent individuals to address and counter the huge amount of false information purveyed across a wide range of media-outlets by those who do not have the best interests of Abkhazia and its peoples at heart.”[220] There are also other private initiatives aimed at a Russian speaking audience, including Apsnyteka, an online digital library where publications both new and old dedicated to Abkhazia are collected and made freely available to the public.[221] It is difficult to establish how influential all of these initiatives actually are. But at the very least, they contribute to the fact that websites with content offering an Abkhaz-friendly perspective of the situation on the ground will pop up first in online searches. Similarly, the more content available and
shared online, the easier it is that even a casual web user will hear about Abkhazia through an Abkhaz-friendly online outlet. This is important not only because it might catch the attention of random Internet surfers, but also because in the age of quick online news this increases the likelihood that journalists will include references to the Abkhaz perspective in their writing.
A Matter of Priorities Most state structures of de facto states have their own websites to provide basic information or, even more simply, to demonstrate that they actually exist and work, for the benefit of both local and international audiences. This is in itself important for the governments of territories that have been called “places that don’t exist”[222] and whose authorities still lack widespread international recognition. Indeed, a considerable part of the online publications of the MFAs of post-Soviet de facto states is dedicated to reporting all the forms of international interaction in which they engage, no matter how apparently insignificant, in order to demonstrate that they exist and are capable of engaging in international relations. With the partial exception of ministries of foreign affairs, it is clear that most of the online activities by these governments are not part of a structured strategy to reach the outside world and create a positive image about their territory. There is no concerted effort to present these entities as accomplished democracies to an international audience, as might be expected if local leaderships were actually engaged in showing to the world that they deserve to be recognized, in line with the principle of “earned sovereignty.”[223] They do, as previously argued,[224] use these websites as a way to show that they have functioning institutions (without substantiating their claims). But the structure, content and design of these websites, as well as the fact that most materials are offered exclusively in Russian (or Armenian), hint at the fact that they are mostly aimed at a domestic audience or, at most, at a Russian-speaking audience in the post-Soviet space. Indeed, in most respects they do not differ substantially from the websites of regional authorities within the Russian Federation (e.g. North Ossetia or Adygeya) that have no specific reason to try to impress international observers. Abkhazia’s MFA has recently started to work on its own strategy of digital public diplomacy aimed at both Western countries and ethnic kin abroad. Understandably, the outreach of such activities is limited by the scarcity of both domestic resources and international interest toward the region. Yet, it is worth noticing that all such activities are not dependent in any way on support from Russia. In the online world, unlike with the vast majority of their external interactions, authorities of de facto states can reach out to the outside world without the needing to rely on their patron. This is particularly important for the Abkhaz,[225] who tend to support actual independence for Abkhazia as its longterm status more than other de facto states.[226] While it is not surprising that Abkhazia is a frontrunner in this enterprise, it is not to be excluded that other de facto states will follow suit, considering the increased self-awareness and capabilities of de facto governments, as well as the fact that place branding is becoming more popular in the region. [227] Language barriers continue to be an issue. The fact that for many representatives of de facto states Russian remains the main language of communication significantly limits the possibilities for reaching out to an international audience outside of the post-Soviet space, in spite of the widespread
integration of automatic translation systems on various platforms or directly through the browser. An effective online outreach strategy needs diversified content tailored to different audiences; producing quality content in multiple languages and formats might be considered as an overtly costly and time-consuming enterprise for small entities largely dependent on external support for their economic development and still preoccupied with state and institution building. Yet for post-Soviet de facto states, the internet can undoubtedly be a key element in a strategy of public diplomacy aimed at changing stereotypes and improving the image of their territory at the international level. Should we thus expect all of the de facto states to engage in structured efforts of digital public diplomacy? Much depends on their foreign policy priorities. As long as they see the key to their political and economic future in further integration with their patron state, there is no actual need to increase online activities and address the public in their “far abroad.” If, on the contrary, they wish to diversify their international interactions beyond their patrons and promote their territory to potential tourists, investors and political partners, it is reasonable to expect from the post-Soviet de facto states increasingly self-aware efforts at digital public diplomacy and possibly a new focus on place branding.
11. Marcin Kosienkowski, William Schreiber & Joyce Hahn. Social Media in the Service of Territorial Reintegration in the post-Soviet Area Marcin Kosienkowski The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland William Schreiber Yale University Joyce Hahn Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government Three former Soviet republics—Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova—have struggled with a specific brand of secessionism for over twenty years. Their separatist regions—Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Transnistria—managed to detach from their parent states and create their own state-like entities or de facto states that, however, lack international recognition or enjoy it only at a minimal level.[228] Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova used various political, economic and military means to restore control over their breakaway regions. At present, they can also use a new, supplementary tool—social media, such as Facebook or Twitter—to facilitate reintegration of de facto states. These three protracted conflicts of post-Soviet succession are known for prolonged periods of conflict with limited violence. They are also notable because each of the de facto states contests the right of governance with its parent state. These political and informational aspects may make them interesting case studies for those who wish to examine the political capabilities and limitations of social media. Andreas M. Kaplan and Michael Haenlein define social media as “a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content.”[229] Following this expansive definition, this chapter surveys not only the social networks commonly understood as social media, but also of forums and blogs that promote User Generated Content and online interaction broadly writ. Generally, social media can be used by parent states in at least three ways: information warfare, conflict resolution and public diplomacy. The target audience may also be threefold. It is not only within the de facto state itself, but it also seeks to influence the domestic public opinion of the parent state and the international community, in other words, social media can target all of the main stakeholders involved in the dispute and its mediation. Information warfare is “the use of information or information technology during a time of crisis or
conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries.”[230] Brett van Niekerk and Manoj Maharaj point out that social media can be harnessed to sway a target audience’s perception and behavior, to instigate and manage disturbances in virtual or physical reality, to gather intelligence and so on.[231] Conflict resolution is about facilitating the peaceful end of a dispute. Daniel Wehrenfennig notes that social media can be used at all stages of a conflict and its management, although with varying intensity.[232] Using the four-stage concept of Eytan Gilboa for classifying conflicts based on their principal intervention goals and media involvement, it can be determined that at present the Caucasian de facto states are at the late escalation–management phase, whereas Transnistria is stuck following the de-escalation–resolution phase (the first stage is onset–prevention and the final stage is termination–reconciliation).[233] The latter stage gives far more opportunities for the use of social media. Wehrenfennig notes social media may be used to disseminate peaceful message to wider public, to stimulate e-dialogue between peoples on both sides, to form online groups in favor of peace or to counter misinformation in order to limit the alienation effect, to promote understanding, create trust or mobilize the public in the conflict resolution process.[234] Additionally, it might be added that social media give a good opportunity to hear citizens’ concerns and receive feedback to improve peace process in real time. Finally, public diplomacy concerns the informing and influencing of publics by governments about their policies, interests, values, etc.[235] In contrast to information warfare, public diplomacy is more concerned with persuasion, credibility and dialogue rather than propaganda and domination. It is also practiced in “peacetime.” To be sure, parent states and their de facto states are in permanent confrontation (that is why these conflicts are also called frozen or protracted), but there are periods of détente and the level of tension varies over time. The difference between public diplomacy and conflict resolution is that the latter targets rather adversary, focuses mainly on the issues of the dispute, and is more concerned reconciliation than portrayal or influence. This article examines how state authorities in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova have utilized social media to achieve policy outcomes in all three areas. However, due to asymmetries between these countries and their conflicts, the authors will not rely on any standard formula of analysis.
Azerbaijan toward Nagorno-Karabakh[236] For the past two decades, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh has been ambiguous. Although the international community recognizes the enclave as being a part of Azerbaijan,[237] the 1994 ceasefire agreement left control of the area and seven adjacent districts—amounting to roughly nine percent of Azerbaijan’s territory[238]—in the hands of Armenian troops. Without the ability to exercise power in the region,[239] President Ilham Aliyev has resorted to words, declaring that “Azerbaijani lands [must] be liberated from the occupational forces and our fellow citizens [must be allowed to] go back to their native homes.”[240] Attempting to persuade the global community to intervene more strongly in his favor—and perhaps prolong the conflict for his own political gain— Aliyev has pushed his administration to wage information warfare against Armenia through both traditional media and diplomatic efforts. With the recent rise of the Internet in Azerbaijan, he has also begun encouraging non-state actors to join the fight and to help shape the course of the NagornoKarabakh conflict through individual efforts of information warfare. The aim of this section is to
explore and analyze this activity. Background of the Conflict Territorial ownership of Nagorno-Karabakh has been hotly contested since the early 1900s, when Armenia and Azerbaijan declared independence from Russia and asserted their respective claims over the enclave. Although control was ultimately granted to the latter by the Soviet Union, the ethnic Armenian majority in Karabakh increasingly pressed for reunification with Armenia—and thus secession from Azerbaijan—after Stalin’s death. As political disagreement between the secessionist movement in Karabakh, Azerbaijan and ultimately Armenia, intensified in the late 1980s, Armenians in Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis in Armenia were forced from their homes when full-fledged fighting broke out in the Karabakh mountains in 1992. Although a cease-fire was brokered two years later, the conflict led to over 30,000 people killed, more than one million individuals displaced,[241] and numerous reports of rapes, beatings and destruction on both sides. While leaders of both Armenia and Azerbaijan have intermittently met for peace negotiations over the past two decades, the outlook for agreement remains bleak. Talks have broken down as recently as 2011. Defense spending has increased by 25 percent over the past year in Armenia and by 30 times over the past decade in Azerbaijan.[242] Moreover, rhetoric has become increasingly combative, with Azerbaijan pushing for a “military solution” and Armenia talking of a “preventive strike.”[243] Although war in the near future seems highly unlikely, attitudes in both countries appear to have hardened against peace. International news agencies covering the talks frequently attribute this stalemate to “domestic politics,” stating “leaders risk an angry domestic reaction if they are seen as conceding” and lack “the political will to present a deal to their citizens.”[244] While public opinion is certainly an obstacle, the current administration in Azerbaijan has not hesitated to use the conflict “to stoke the fires of nationalism to boost . . . support at home.”[245] Having created a historical and ethno-cultural narrative of Nagorno-Karabakh that “strikes an emotional chord with military and political leaders, including members of the opposition,”[246] Aliyev has often used the conflict to detract attention away from internal discontent and rally citizens around a shared Azerbaijani identity where Armenia, and not his administration, is the enemy. He consequently has a vested interest in either winning or extending the conflict, but not necessarily in resolving it through compromise. Regardless, Aliyev has pushed his administration to wage information warfare against Armenia through both traditional media (e.g. newspapers, television broadcasts, and books) and diplomatic efforts (e.g. international conferences, workshops and seminars). He has also increasingly called upon non-state actors to join the fight as a part of their civic duty, declaring in 2013: The state undertakes the fundamental task here, of course. But representatives of the media should also try to inform the international community about our fair position, in particular, on the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is necessary to create online resources in different languages. It is necessary to inform the world community of the historical truth about Nagorno-Karabakh.[247]
Use of Websites in Information Warfare In response, dozens of websites presenting information about the conflict from an Azerbaijani point of view have sprung up[248] with many non-profit organizations devoting a page or two of their websites to similar content as well (table 1). A small sample of Internet resources found by a simple Google search reveals they are fairly well-constructed, with easy-to-navigate menus and
simple, readable designs. The most commonly used language is English, followed by Russian, indicating that the websites are targeting foreigners, particularly those in countries who wield significant voting power in international organizations like the United Nations. Yet, despite their clear intent to inform, it is difficult to determine if these websites and pages are being read. Increasingly, Internet users are receiving links and advertisements that take them to websites, rather than searching for websites themselves. As a result, simply making online resources available is no longer enough to ensure that people will visit and read the content, much less find it persuasive and become motivated to take action. Social media is consequently being used by more sophisticated websites to draw traffic and increase the number of readers. The most prominent of these is Justice for Khojaly,[249] which was started in May 2008 by Aliyev’s eldest daughter, Leyla Aliyeva. While Aliyeva actively promotes the website at international conferences and consequently receives worldwide press coverage, she and her staff have also used the power of social media to attract visitors on a micro-level.
Table 1. Websites presenting an Azerbaijani point of view on the conflict have arisen in the past several years
Organization/Website
Declared Mission
Language
Armenian Terror human.az
None stated
English
Azerbaijan America Alliance azerbaijanamericaalliance.org/nagorno-karabakh
The Alliance is a nonpartisan, non-profit organization providing information broadly English about the people, culture, society, industry, history and current events of the Azeri people.
Azeri Genocide www.khojaly.org.az
None stated
English
The European Azerbaijan Society (TEAS) is a UKregistered pan-European organization dedicated to raising awareness of The European Azerbaijan Society Azerbaijan and fostering English teas.eu/nagorno-karabakh closer economic, political and cultural links between that country and the nations of Europe. The Heydar Aliyev Foundation was created in memory of the founding father of Azerbaijan and seeks to Heydar Aliyev Foundation teach new generations English azerbaijan.az/portal/Karabakh/General/generalInfo_e.html about their country’s rich cultural heritage, the importance of its philosophy, and ideas of
Justice for Khojaly justiceforkhojaly.org
Karabakh.org karabakh.org
national statehood. The Campaign is aimed at raising international civil awareness through demonstration of creative photos and images of suffered people in the Karabakh conflict and Khojaly Massacre in particular and reaching out globally via Media, Internet and Live events . . . The Campaign is also aimed at raising English awareness on grave situation of oppressed people (due to total ethnic cleansing, only Armenians remain at these territories) under the military regime of occupation forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and on necessity for promotion of liberation of this ancient cradle of civilization. Karabakh.org is independent nonprofit community aimed to increase public awareness about Karabakh and NagornoEnglish Karabakh conflict providing wide range scholarly information reflecting various aspects of Karabakh, the region of Azerbaijan. As a Society we would like to see the NagornoKarabakh issue given
Karabakh: Through History and Facts www.karabakh.co.uk
more prominence in global diplomatic circles . . . It is disappointing to English us that despite countless UN resolutions . . . the Minsk Group and other nations are letting the illegal occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia to carry on.
Karabakh www.karabakh-doc.azerall.info
None stated
My Azerbaijan myazerbaijan.org/index.php
Web Studio ACCESS announces the launch of the beta version of the electronic library MyAzerbaijan.ORG. This Russian site is created for users who are interested in what is happening in Azerbaijan and the TransCaucasus region.
Xocali khojaly.preslib.az
None stated
Russian
Azerbaijani
Justice for Khojaly has accounts on Facebook,[250] Twitter,[251] and YouTube,[252] which have almost 53,000 likes, 42 followers, and 147 subscribers respectively.[253] Facebook clearly dominates as the website’s main social media platform and while it is difficult to determine whether visitors found the website first and then liked it or vice versa, it is clear that the website has been able to keep the attention of Facebook users. A steady number of people were “talking about” it at the beginning of 2014 and new likes have continued even five years after its creation (figure 1).[254] Figure 1. Facebook is the main social media platform for Justice for Khojaly with almost 53,000 likes
Use of Social Media in Information Warfare While the demographic profile of visitors to Justice for Khojaly and similar websites remains unknown, a fair assumption can be made that most of them are not the intended foreign audience, but actually Azerbaijani youth taking advantage of increased access to the Internet. Although the great majority cannot afford the computers and modems that would enable them to have high-speed Internet in their homes, Azerbaijanis are increasingly finding Internet at schools, work, local NGOs and Internet cafes. The number of individuals using the Internet has consequently soared to over half of the Azerbaijani population—roughly five million people—in 2012,[255] essentially doubling from 27.4 percent in 2009 and rapidly surging from 8.0 percent in 2005 (figure 2). Although estimates by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers suggest much lower levels of Internet penetration at roughly 23.0 percent in 2012, their data also finds frequency of use has increased— albeit slowly—with the percentage of daily and weekly users doubling between 2009 and 2012 (figure 3). Figure 2. Access to the Internet has Figure 3. . . . with daily and weekly been rapidly increasing over the last frequency of use slowly going up. decade . . .
Once online, these users spend more than half of their time searching for information (figure 4), which is unsurprising given that the government has frequently prosecuted and imprisoned traditional media journalists who criticize authorities[256] and newspapers and TV newscasters consequently cover stories on an extremely superficial level. This recent rise of Internet use presents a unique opportunity for Azerbaijan in its efforts to wage information warfare in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. With the Internet in general and social media in particular, information is easy to pass along instantaneously. Figure 4. Most users go online to search for information typically ignored or distorted by traditional media
On Facebook, for instance—where more than one-third of users go when on the Internet, individuals cannot only share websites, “like” posts, and comment on each other’s walls, but also have their actions broadcasted on Newsfeeds where friends and friends of friends can see them multiple times. This provides an avenue for websites to be promoted by any individual—not necessarily just the creator of the online resource—to a social network that extends beyond their closest contacts. Additionally, individuals concerned with a particular topic can form groups with members who have similar interests and thus spread content to many people through one centralized hub. As a result, social media provides Facebook users with a channel to quickly and easily share news articles, videos, and websites featuring Azerbaijan’s point of view through posts on their own wall as well as group walls. While no statistics on the number of posts, likes and shares about Nagorno-Karabakh exist, a simple search for “Karabakh” on Facebook results in a list of hundreds of pages and groups that call for war and brutality against Armenia.[257] Names of these groups range from “DO NOT RECOGNIZE THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH REPUBLIC!!!!” with over 12,000 likes to “Karabakh is Ours!!! (Karabakh is Azerbaijan)” with more than 3,000 likes to “Karabakh + Azerbaijan = Love” which
features a profile picture declaring “F*** U Armenia.” Activity levels and exact content vary by group, but on the whole, subscribers are Azerbaijanis with social networks that rarely extend to foreigners. In fact, the most commonly used language of these groups is Azerbaijani. Those groups using English have far fewer members and less frequent posts by members. Specific events have also added fuel to the fire. When a small skirmish broke out on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, tensions were heightened, but did not result in any armed escalation. Nevertheless, rumors abound and Twitter users instantly began spreading their understanding of what happened through tweets, such as “Çiraqlı village liberated” and later “a state of emergency, troops going places, all out war” and “Armenia and azerbaijan [sic] got into a war and russia [sic] is bombing azerbaijan [sic]. RIP to the 54 armenians [sic] who lost their lives.” Although some users cautioned against making hasty statements without proof, Twitter appears to some to “run the risk of potentially becoming a new instrument for increasing [tensions] further.”[258] Although President Aliyev called on non-state actors to engage in information warfare in order to gain the attention of the international community, their efforts appear to have primarily attracted the attention of Azerbaijanis. With social media bundling information about Nagorno-Karabakh into a form that can be quickly and easily reposted, re-shared and re-liked, individuals are increasingly waging information warfare on a micro-level, but in doing so, their efforts are frequently aimed toward those in their own social network who happen to be also Azerbaijani and well-acquainted with the Azerbaijani narrative of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As such, these efforts ultimately end up reaffirming the Azerbaijani perspective and further entrench Azerbaijanis against making the concessions necessary for any viable peace settlement. Information warfare efforts waged through social media by Azerbaijanis have consequently turned into a self-indoctrination that heightens tensions and prolongs the conflict. What Does the Future Hold? With the information and communications technology sector developing at such a rapid pace in Azerbaijan—second only to energy—the government has increasingly focused on developing Internet accessibility. Over $500 million has been allocated by the Ministry of Communications and Information Technologies to install fiber-optic cables and satellite communications[259]—so that all the regions of Azerbaijan can have access to high-speed Internet by 2017[260]—and the price of unlimited, high-speed Internet has decreased from 500 Azerbaijani manats ($700 US) per month in 2008 to 10 manats ($12) in 2013[261]—registering one of the biggest increases in affordability in International Telecommunication Union’s ICT Price Basket between 2008 and 2011.[262] The use of social media in Azerbaijan is thus poised to take off over the next five years and while social media has yet to substantially change the official status of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it could significantly alter the conflict in the future. On the one hand, it could increasingly be used by Azerbaijanis who feel that part of their civic duty is to engage in information warfare and attempt to “enlighten” foreigners and international communities about the conflict from an Azerbaijani point of view. On the other, it holds the promise of engaging more and more Armenians and Azerbaijanis in direct dialogue, with the hope that increased communication and cooperation could lead to conflict resolution and peaceful co-existence. Activists from both Armenia and Azerbaijan have therefore begun making presentations about the use of social media tools for youth and starting multilateral
efforts like Conflict Voices[263] to battle “negative perceptions and stereotypes, perpetuated by nationalists and often amplified by the local media”[264] that prevent both sides from entertaining ideas of peace. A growing number of Facebook groups are also pushing a new path forward with eloquent statements such as “Join this group if you’ve had enough . . . Join this group if you believe the region’s leaders should do the right thing, lay down their shields, and affect real, positive change.” While there is room for one or both trends to grow, there is also potential for online progress to stagnate or reverse course. Particularly worrisome is the fact that while the government has yet to censor social media to the same degree as traditional media,[265] it is increasingly cracking down on online efforts, particularly after 2011, when the Arab Spring inspired a series of pro-democracy protests.[266] International organizations and Azerbaijanis may therefore have a very short window of opportunity should they wish to use social media for conflict resolution rather than information warfare.
Georgia toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia[267] Historically, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been two ethnically and culturally distinct regions, but both were long-linked to their Georgian neighbors. During the Soviet period, the two territories experienced autonomy with caveats—their self-governance was subordinated to the central authorities and contained within the framework of the Georgian Soviet Republic. This included policies that disadvantaged the Abkhaz and Ossetian languages in favor of Georgian and Russian, particularly during the regime of Joseph Stalin, né Dzghugashvili. As the Georgian SSR declared its independence in the early 1990s, two consecutive but overlapping conflicts broke out that would cement the de facto independence first of South Ossetia (1992) and then of Abkhazia (1993). The conflicts were notable for their ethnically charged component, the lack of military organization, equipment and training on both sides, and the involvement of the Russian Federation. Later, the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, also known as the Five-Day War, was ignited by tensions and skirmishes in South Ossetia, but the conflict was quickly broadened to a second front in Abkhazia. It resulted in the occupation of both territories by Russian troops, and, subsequently, in the partial recognition of the two territories’ authorities by Russia and five other UN member states. Significantly, information warfare formed an integral front in the Russian-Georgian conflict—and it operated in several dimensions of public opinion. Most prominent was the well-documented battle for international public opinion, which was linked to the efforts for recognition of the two quasistates and to the role of international mediators.[268] Second, there were internal campaigns in the two contested regions to morally discredit the other side, although in marked contrast to the 2014 conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas region, these internal efforts were secondary, perhaps because the societal division between Georgia and the territories was already quite deeply rooted. Finally, there was an information campaign within the Russian Federation itself to portray the involvement of its own military as a humanitarian intervention to protect Russian citizens, which led to then-President Dmitry Medvedev’s highest approval rating while in office and may have augured, as the New York Times argued, the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.[269] Georgian political scientist Kornely Kakachıa describes the constant desire to raze and rebuild between administrations, as one of the great tragedies of Georgian politics.[270] While he spoke in
terms of presidential palaces, the same might well be said of social media strategy, which requires an equally lengthy construction period to both build an audience and focus an effective long-term messaging strategy. Georgia under President Mikheil Saakashvili was replete with young western-educated officials open to implementing digital solutions. Certainly, the administration’s track record in e-governance initiatives suggest a breeding ground for digital policy innovation. So why did the peace process fall outside the scope of online governance? A partial answer may lie in the many reincarnations of the state institution responsible for reintegration of the territories. As early as 2007, the then-titled State Ministry on Conflict Resolution Issues discussed the possibility of using online resources and social media as a cost-effective method of reaching residents of the territories and breaking the information monopoly of Russian-language media.[271] Interestingly, this strategy was conceived primarily in terms of the track-two diplomacy, that is to say the Georgian state’s social media efforts were designed primarily to facilitate unofficial, organic contact between ordinary citizens in Georgia and its breakaway provinces.[272] Initially, these efforts primarily targeted news websites and forums read by Abkhaz residents—official Georgian efforts mainly involved sponsoring bloggers and pundits sympathetic to the Georgian narrative of the conflict, many of whom were based in Tbilisi. In the admission of one former official, these efforts were rarely effective persuasion, but simply inserting the Georgian perspective into online discussions. Following the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, much attention was paid to Russian policy of passportization in Georgia’s breakaway republics, which used soft-power incentives, including free education, to incentivize residents to claim a Russian passport. According to one report, in 2009, half of all South Ossetian graduates received free education and a stipend to study in Russia. In 2010, Abkhazia was unable to produce enough qualified graduates to meet the number of full-ride scholarships offered by Moscow.[273] Itself rebuilt in early 2008, the Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Reintegration of South Ossetia and Abkhazia led government efforts to structure incentives for residents to adopt the Georgian passport, offering free access to healthcare and higher education. The program did not achieve its desired results and research showed that public awareness of the initiative in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was low. To address this, a YouTube video was developed to promote the offer of free higher education associated with claiming a Georgian passport. Students of Abkhaz and Ossetian background were filmed speaking about the project in front of universities and landmarks across Tbilisi. The video was filmed, produced and edited, but never uploaded. Instead, there were several changes in leadership and the project was suspended. The ministry’s new administrators were skeptical of social media’s actual reach in the breakaway regions and it decided instead to pursue a brass PR strategy, one relying on word of mouth and traditional methods of information, such as distributing pamphlets at the border. According to officials in August 2013, this more targeted approach reached residents of the breakaway regions already traveling to Georgia, who were more likely to be receptive to the program. Under the direction of Paata Zakareishvili, the ministry has changed course on social media in the reintegration process, at least with regard to Abkhazia. Part of the reason for this may be that
Zakareishvili has remained in place long enough to start a social media presence, avoiding a cabinet reshuffle the June 2014 local elections.[274] On January 1, 2014, the Office of the State Minister for Reintegration was renamed and rebranded to the Office of the State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality. On May 20, 2014, the same office launched Facebook and Twitter accounts in the Abkhaz language aimed at reaching residents of the breakaway region. The government-run portal Agenda.ge explained the decision as follows: As the majority of Abkhazians did not understand the Georgian language and had no access to Georgian resources, the Georgian Government decided to expand its social media reach and have its words translated into the Abkhaz language. This would help residents in Abkhazia gain a better understanding of the goings-on in Georgia. “Unfortunately our countrymen living in Abkhazia is only provided with information in Russian on the Internet and in the media, which in many cases, does not reflect the truth,” said the press office of the Georgian Government. Meanwhile, Georgia is the only country that has taken liability to protect the Abkhazian ethnicity, culture and language.[275]
The first Tweet of @govgeoabkhaz came nearly a month after this official announcement, on April 30, 2014. Since then, the account has garnered a pitiful 116 followers[276] and a thorough analysis of these followers showed that the vast majority were based in Tbilisi. Close to half of the followers had identifiably ethnic Georgian surnames; a significant percentage of profiles were official Georgian government accounts. Only two followers had profiles indicating their users were actually residents of Abkhazia. Ironically, one of these was the official outreach Twitter account of the Government of Abkhazia, @Abkhaziagovge, which tweets primarily in Georgian, English and Russia—but never Abkhaz.[277] The Abkhaz account has been in operation two years longer and, at the time of this writing, its 158 followers outnumbered the Georgians’ account. It is worth noting that the Georgian government did not return the follow. The new Facebook page aimed at Abkhazians has a slightly more robust following of some 512 likes, reflecting the wider usage of Facebook across the region.[278] The content on the Facebook page is also updated on a more regular basis. Although the page’s privacy settings do not allow users to view other subscribers, unsurprisingly, the Facebook analytic tool Most Engaged Insights, lists Tbilisi as the most-reached geographic area. While the official websites and news portals of the Georgian government do offer versions in the Russian language, it is worth noting that the Abkhaz outreach accounts from the Reconciliation have not been complemented by Russian-language versions. Nor have official accounts been opened on popular Russian social networks like VKontakte. The spirit behind these efforts seem like a good first step, but only that. There is an overall lack of effort behind the Georgian government’s social media campaign. The question then arises as to why the ministry would devote any resources at all to maintaining social media accounts on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Flickr.[279] One possible explanation is that the true audience for these social media accounts is not the Abkhaz population at all—but the international community. A Potemkin social media strategy may lie at intersection between public diplomacy and information warfare. Demonstrating before the international court of public opinion that the Georgian government is proactively and culturally engaged in its breakaway provinces is one way to deny the quasi-states’
claims to solely represent their constituencies. By doing so, they deny them their most desired resource: legitimacy. In the ongoing battle over the international recognition of these breakaway territories, the perception of cultural outreach has gained strategic value in its own right. In other words, the ministry is not just tweeting to be on Twitter, but to occupy the moral high ground. Yet, as the adage holds, anything worth doing is worth doing right. After the violence of the onset stage subsided, Georgia found itself in a contest with other actors to govern in its breakaway territories. The example of passport politics is the most obvious case of two states bidding to attract the citizenship of residents. Like traditionally understood forms of insurgency, Georgia’s protracted conflict can be understood in terms of competition with its de facto states. As with any so-called beauty contest, marketing matters, and a social media campaign focused on genuine engagement could accomplish exactly this. Even in the absence of hard data, we can infer that social media has the potential to reach not only ordinary citizens of Georgia’s breakaway states, but those capable of determining politics there. In the spring of 2014, Abkhazia saw mass protests that led to the successful ouster of President Alexander Ankvab. The mobilization of these protests was an interesting hybrid of traditional and new media: On the one hand, the protests followed a controversial interview about formal association with Russia in the traditional mainstream press.[280] On the other hand, Liana Kvarchelia, a civil society activist in Sukhumi, notes the “war of words in social media” that accompanied the political crisis and describes the role that closed (non-public) Facebook groups play in organizing factions of dissidents.[281] It is true that activists in Sukhumi might not use social media tools the same way as activists in Kyiv: Given the smaller populations of both Georgian breakaway states, ten thousand may achieve what takes 100,000 in Ukraine. Given less incentive to broadcast calls for mobilization and with regimes less accustomed to plurality, it is not surprising that Abkhaz social media networks are often inviteonly. But the Georgian government can ill afford to wait for its invitation. Until the parent state commits to building a consistent social media strategy, one durable across administrations, one that takes into account local languages and usage patterns, it will continue to undersell its potential to residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Moldova toward Transnistria[282] Transnistria declared its independence from Moldova in September 1990, but de facto its independence was gained only in the aftermath of the brief war in mid-1992. There have been no armed clashes since then, but the conflicting parties have been unable to resolve the dispute. Negotiations are held in the so-called 5+2 format with participation of the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, the EU and the US, all formally supporting Moldova’s territorial integrity. No UN member state recognizes Transnistria. Current factors behind the dispute are similar to the initial ones. First, it is a politico-economic conflict over power and assets, which the parties do not want to share. Second, it is a geopolitical and socio-cultural dispute. Moldova is a more Western and Latin region while Transnistria is more Russified and still Sovietized. Moldova cooperates more closely with the European Union, the United States and Romania (which included Moldova in the interwar period), whereas Transnistria cooperates with Russia, even declaring its desire to join it. Moreover, Moscow
uses Transnistria as a lever over Moldova and keeps the separatist region alive giving it comprehensive support. Finally, it should be underlined that the Transnistrian conflict is not ethnic. Both the parent and de facto state are inhabited by the same ethnic groups: Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians, although the proportions are different. Unlike its predecessor, the present Moldovan government, which took power in 2009, does not wage an information war against Transnistria, at least not overtly or on a large scale. There may indeed be some activities in this area, including social media. It is quite likely that the Moldovan intelligence agency penetrates social networks in order to gain primary source information about Transnistrian users, as well as the situation on-the-ground in various areas such as public opinion, which is not monolithic. It cannot be excluded that employees of the Moldovan state institutions and/or people paid by them engage incognito in domestic and foreign Internet discussions about Moldova and Transnistria, using various tactics such as trolling and propaganda. Importantly, until the spring of 2013, the Moldovan services may have worked with internet forums of the de facto state. The most popular of these—the Transnistrian Social Forum—had 10,000 unique visitors per day, although the region is inhabited by no more than 500,000 people. Because of content critical of the Transnistrian authorities, however, the forums were closed down by the authorities of the breakaway region.[283] Most likely, many forum users migrated to foreign social networks. For example, the popular group “Pridnestrov’ye” (Transnistria in Russian) on Facebook.[284] Moldova does not use social media for conflict resolution. There are no such initiatives run by the government and there are most likely no such initiatives backed by the state either organizationally or financially. Admittedly, there is an account on Facebook of the Moldovan Bureau for Reintegration— the institution responsible for the promotion and realization of the governmental policy of state reintegration—but its activity should be considered public diplomacy.[285] The profile was set up as late as August 2013. In most cases, posts by the bureau refer to other online sources: a government news agency or interviews with Moldovan officials and articles by the local media. It means there is little original content, but the profile may be useful to people who enjoy working with social media and who want an aggregated source of information on Moldova’s take on the Transnistrian conflict. However, information is posted almost exclusively in Romanian, Moldova’s official language (termed “Moldovan” in the 1994 Constitution). This limits its audience worldwide, especially in the predominantly Russian-speaking Transnistria, and even partially in Moldova itself, where not everybody can (or wants to) speak Romanian. It also contributes to the alienation of the Transnistrian region, taking into account that the language problem has been one of factors behind the conflict since its very beginning; Romanian is seen by many as the language of the enemy. Furthermore, the bureau’s profile has few comments, no outside posts on its wall and no discussions. Interactivity via messaging is doubtful: The bureau did not respond to this author’s inquiry in English related to the preparation of this section. All of these characteristics may explain why the profile was liked only 692 times as of October 30, 2014 (and 431 times as of January 26, 2014). It should be added that the Moldovan Bureau for Reintegration runs its website in Romanian, English and Russian. [286] It functions within the official website of the government and does not have an original Internet address. There is no link on the website to the bureau’s Facebook profile. The page is old-fashioned and not fully translated from Romanian into other languages, but it still has more original information than the Facebook account.
Finally, it ought to be mentioned that the senior officials responsible for the Transnistrian issue do not use social media. Eugen Carpov, the Deputy Prime Minister with prerogatives in the territorial reintegration of the country, is not present on social media. Gheorghe Bălan, the Head of the Bureau for Reintegration has a profile on Facebook[287] with public access but there is no personal activity except for materials shared by other Facebook users, related mainly to the Transnistrian conflict. His profile in Odnoklassniki is apparently abandoned. Similarly, if other officials have accounts on social media, they do not use them or limit their activity to non-political issues. Interestingly, many experts interested in the Transnistrian problem were very active on social media before they started working for the government. Their own citizen diplomacy did not transfer into social media work for the state. However, it cannot be excluded that officials use social media to gather information related to the Transnistrian conflict and for private communication connected to their work. There may also be nonpublic accounts. As a whole, the digital public diplomacy of Moldova is better developed than its “Transnistrian element.” Although it offers little information on Transnistrian issues, it may improve the knowledge of foreign and domestic audience about Moldova and its policies and help shape the country’s positive image. This, in turn, may facilitate the Transnistrian settlement process. However, it ought to be added that Moldovan digital public diplomacy, with some exceptions,[288] is still in its foundation phase. It is poorly personalized, it has low levels of interactivity, it is imitative in many cases, it heavily prefers Romanian, ignores the Russian language and Russian social media, and it often serves for the promotion of individual politicians. Additionally, Moldova’s public presence on social media contrasts to Transnistria’s robust activity on the Internet, which was initiated by its president, Yevgeniy Shevchuk, who came to power in December 2011, and led by its foreign minister, Nina Shtanski.[289] Some explanations—provided in September 2012, but likely to be repeated today—as to why Moldova neglects the use of social media within the Transnistrian conflict settlement were given by Moldovan officials dealing with the Transnistrian problem. Discussing the active use of social media by Transnistria, he said it should be perceived in terms of propaganda and added that it would be better for Moldova not to copy the Transnistrian online policy and start an information campaign on social media, since it would end up with unnecessary verbal confrontation. He referred to the many negative stereotypes that had appeared during the twenty years of the conflict and added it would be hard to refrain from reacting negatively to certain adversarial actions. He said that the campaign to prepare people from Moldova and Transnistria for a conflict settlement should be launched only when the political agreement between the conflicting parties was on the horizon. Thus, social media is seen, at the current stage of the conflict, as a useless tool or even a threat rather than enabler. While Transnistria has adopted an aggressive online policy, the position expressed by the official is debatable. It seems it would be reasonable to square up against Transnistria’s social media activity and, at least selectively, target stereotypes and propagandistic statements. Furthermore, a well-prepared information campaign could help negotiate, reach and implement a resolution to the conflict, making it more viable. There is another, deeper reason why Moldova ignores social media as a tool for facilitating reintegration. The problem predominantly results from its general approach toward the Transnistrian conflict. The authorities push the problem of the country’s reintegration into the background. While
the resources of such a small state are limited, almost all their energies are devoted to European integration. It is enough to recall the name of government coalition—the Pro-European Coalition (earlier the Alliance for European Integration)—to understand its top priority. Moreover, although this is not overtly admitted, the pro-Russian and authoritarian Transnistria is identified by the Moldovan authorities as an obstacle on Moldova’s road to the European Union. It seems Moldova would prefer to follow the path of Cyprus: to approximate and integrate into the EU without its breakaway region, although it is quite unlikely the EU will accept another territorially divided member. Additionally, as a diverse, internally incoherent structure and under constant pressure from the opposition, the government apparently finds it reasonable to leave aside the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict (but this does not mean that nothing is done on the matter). The unconstructive policy of Transnistria and its patron state, Russia, is another important, discouraging factor. Finally, there is almost no pressure on the government from society to deal with the Transnistrian conflict, because the people living in one of the poorest European states are preoccupied with their socioeconomic problems.[290] But the past has proved that the people may be mobilized against a resolution, just like in 2003, when pressured mainly from the West but also from protesters made, at the last moment, then-Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin forgo signing the Russian settlement plan, the so-called Kozak Memorandum, which was negotiated behind the public’s back. As a result, the Moldovan Bureau for Reintegration is a weak structure,[291] it faces a problem in identifying a coherent message to spread,[292] and Moldova does not have a comprehensive reintegration strategy with an action plan,[293] except for some general policy assumptions.[294] The main assumption is that the Europeanization of Moldova—leading to a significant increase in its standard of living, democracy and free-market economy—will make the parent state more attractive to the Transnistrian population and its politico-economic elites and will encourage them to support the idea of reintegration with Moldova. Despite the fact that Moldova is a leader in the Eastern Partnership—the European Union’s initiative to assist six states from Eastern Europe and the Caucasus with nearing and integrating into the EU—there have been few achievements perceptible by ordinary people so far. Thus, Moldova cannot tell Transnistrians much about its attractiveness. However, social media could be harnessed into a balanced and well-argued campaign in favor of the EU itself, which at present is associated, by the conservative population of Transnistria, but also by many in Moldova, with the propagation of homosexuality and economic crisis. Common values might be found and highlighted via social media. Moreover, Moldova could challenge these elements of Transnistrian propaganda. There is also an objective factor limiting the use of social media by Moldova in its reintegration policy. There exists no ethnic or religious hatred between people living in Moldova and Transnistria, they even have a common football league and Olympic team,[295] and many people have relatives on the other side of the Dniester River. The internal border can be crossed with relative ease, there are about thirty direct buses daily between the capitals—Chisinau and Tiraspol. This means that physical interaction between ordinary people and programs facilitating reintegration can be implemented in the real world, although there are some limitations imposed mostly by the Transnistrian authorities. However, social media could still be used to organize events, inform about them, presents their results and maintain contacts between their participants after the events have ended. Non-
governmental initiatives could also be presented and given wider publicity. It should be added that despite the abovementioned contact, a majority of Moldovans are indifferent to what happens in and with Transnistria, while many Transnistrians are prone to believing the anti-Moldovan/Romanian propaganda, mistrustful of any Moldovan authorities and partially of the Moldovan people themselves. Social media could be a supplementary tool to challenge the attitude of the de facto state’s inhabitants and to build trust between the two banks, the more so as it is another objective of Moldova’s reintegration policy.[296] Furthermore, social media could help Moldovan officials—very often unknown, misinterpreted or demonized in Transnistria and its sponsor, Russia—to spread their message without middlemen, to present their more accurate and human face by posting photos from informal situations, and maybe to show their positive attitude toward the Russian language and literature, etc.[297] Interestingly, the most liked post on the Facebook page of the Moldovan Bureau for Reintegration is a photo of its head planting a tree during the National Day of Greenery.[298] A former Moldovan official, talking in September 2012 generally about digital diplomacy, pointed out that Moldovan politicians and diplomats—unlike their Transnistrian counterparts—were too busy to personally run social media accounts, while profiles managed by communication teams or institutions were very boring. However, some work in social media could be done by other, even lower-ranking officials and diplomats, ideally those who are the most tech-savvy. In the present circumstances, the Moldovan Bureau for Reintegration and embassies could be more active on social media. If needed, it is likely that support could be granted by the more digitized Western partners of Moldova. The former official also underlined that top Moldovan politicians work with traditional mass media, which reaches a greater audience both in Moldova and abroad, than a smaller subset of social media users. Yet social media gives an opportunity to quickly transmit information, to speak at any time of the day directly to the people, without reliance on traditional media. While the number of people who read a given message posted on social media is hard to determine, it is very likely that it will be noted by various experts, scholars and journalists, and then repeated by the traditional media. Some other officials dealing with Moldovan and Transnistrian issues may also pay attention. It can be added that while the de facto state’s authorities have tightened their grip on the local media,[299] the inhabitants of Transnistria have had unhindered access to non-Transnistrian sources of information, including the Internet, so far. Its penetration rate is about 20–40 percent.[300] The first step to improving Moldova’s presently weak activity on social media related to the Transnistrian conflict settlement could be to introduce languages other than just Romanian. First of all, messages should be spread in Russian to influence Transnistrian and East European constituencies, mainly in Russia, which are rather more favorably inclined towards Transnistria than Moldova. It would be better for Moldovan officials to tell the story themselves than leave it to others. It would not be an economically or politically costly step, because Russian is widely spoken in Moldova, it dominates in Transnistria, and it has been an official language of official MoldovanTransnistrian negotiations since their beginning. Another step could be to target Russian social media networks—such as VKontakte and Odnoklassniki—the most popular in the post-Soviet republics. But work with Facebook—ideally if complemented by the use of other Western social media networks, such as Twitter—should not be abandoned. It has the greatest number of users worldwide and is quite popular among experts, journalists, and politicians in the post-Soviet area, including in both Moldova
and Transnistria. As it has been argued, despite certain constraints and limitations social media could, in some cases even should be used by Moldova to facilitate the Transnistrian conflict settlement process, or at least to contribute to the stabilization of the region and the improvement of Moldova’s image. Additionally, new activity can be launched if Moldova redefines its policy toward Transnistria. To be sure, social media efforts may not cause robust effects, they may be even risky if these activities are not handled carefully. Transnistria may also take some countermeasures to impede their effectiveness such as trolling, hacking, and slander campaigns. But it is still worth trying, taking into account that social media is a low-cost tool and used with increasing intensively by more and more states. The Moldovan government has also achieved important e-government reforms. Interestingly, social media already has a place in the history of Moldova: The current authorities came to power in 2009 in the aftermath of events known worldwide as the Twitter revolution, although most likely the role of social media was not decisive.[301]
Conclusion The long-perpetuated conflicts in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova all exhibit the importance of public information and communications strategy. Similarly, the reach of the Internet in general, and of social media networks in particular, is also on the rise in each of these cases. Yet none of the parent states examined have developed social media strategies in pursuit of the reintegration of their respective de facto states. Azerbaijan leaves much of its online activity to non-state actors. They focus on information warfare with the aim of presenting Azerbaijani narrative on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to the world community. However, it turns out that the main audience is Azerbaijanis themselves what deepens their entrenchment and prolongs the conflict. Georgia, which may have taken the most promising first steps in social media strategy, still seems more concerned with reaching the international community than the citizens in its breakaway republics. Its activity on social media lies at the intersection between public diplomacy and information warfare. Finally, Moldova harnesses social media for the purpose of public diplomacy but, overall, focuses mainly on the Romanian-speaking audience and mostly ignores the use of online tools within the Transnistrian conflict settlement. The main reason for this is that Moldovan elites push the country’s reintegration into the background and, instead, prioritize European integration. With the 2014 conflict in eastern Ukraine polarizing opinions between the Russian-speaking world and the rest, the distinct lack of social media efforts in the Russian language seem especially shortsighted. The emerging prospect of another de facto state in the Donbas region highlights how poor governance and information warfare can tragically divide societies. It may also illustrate an incentive for those states seeking to regain full territorial reintegration to ease their reliance on information warfare and engage in conflict resolution in earnest, including genuine efforts to engage the residents of de facto states through social media. Eytan Gilboa, a renowned expert on international communication, wrote in 2009 that “Actors that do not employ the Internet rob themselves of a highly useful tool for engaging in foreign policy and
diplomacy.”[302] The countries in this chapter seem not to have taken this advice to heart. Although social media has been successfully applied by states in the areas of public information and information warfare, its potential as a tool in conflict resolution has yet to be tested. The protracted conflicts of the post-Soviet space, with low levels of violence and high informational components, could be ideal proving grounds for mediation by way of social media. However, greater political will when it comes to conflict resolution is a necessary pre-requisite.
Part Four: Democracy and Authoritarianism Online
12. Maeve Shearlaw. Guardian New East: Social Media Freedom and the Post-Soviet States Maeve Shearlaw Community and Social Editor, Guardian World Networks “We’re now living in a new world,” said Mikhail Gorbachev, stepping down as the last leader of the Soviet Union on Christmas Day 1991, bringing one of the most powerful and feared empires of the twentieth century to an end. By this point most countries that made up the USSR had declared independence, but now they could truly come into their own. The political, economic and social challenges—and opportunities—they faced were monumental, and each has trod their own path ever since. Some embraced capitalism, others remain collectivized. Some enshrined free elections, others live under dictatorship. Some have grown wealthy, others are mired in poverty. Some live in peace, others are at war. But what they all share is an element of their past, that—whether celebrated or lamented—still informs events that take place today. The current crisis in Ukraine, and the knock on effects on the region, offer a stark reminder of that today. Freedom of the internet is just one indicator of how the political and social landscape varies from country to country in the post-Soviet world. Depending on where you log on, the information and networks you can access, and how you can use them, vary dramatically. Estonia, the birthplace of Skype, has one of the freest online spaces in the world, whereas countries such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are some of the most limited. In Russia, authorities have recently rolled out a series of measures tightening controls the country’s blogosphere, a move condemned by critics as an attempt by the Kremlin to intimidate and silence opposition voices. It is not surprising that the countries that fare badly on internet freedoms, also do so on political rights and civil liberties. The latest ranking from Freedom House, which promises a “standard-setting comparative assessment of global political rights and civil liberties,” categorizes Russia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as “not free” in its 2014 report, which highlighted the eighth year-on-year decline of political rights and civil liberties around the world. In a recent study of the evolution of the internet in the post-Soviet states, New Eastern Europe magazine found growing evidence that government attempts to regulate state media are being extended to social media and blogs in some countries. “Tools of control, surveillance and propaganda are more than up to the task of hindering online sources that promote democratization,” researchers said. Yet whether it is dissent over YouTube, or campaigners organizing protests on Twitter (or its alternatives), internet users across the post-Soviet world have shown their determination to overcome the limitations. We took a look at how people across the 15 countries are internet active. How they connect with friends. Who is experiencing government crackdowns and who is using the internet for
democratic gains. Here is a snapshot of each country from the freest to the most oppressed:
Estonia Estonia has one of the least restricted internet spaces in the world, according to Freedom House, who rank the country “free” and credit the internet with helping to rebuild democracy after the Soviet occupation came to an end in 1991. The quick online pick up earned the country the nickname “E-stonia.” It was the first country to use evoting for parliamentary elections in 2007, and in 2011 e-ballots accounted for more than 20 percent of the vote. And then there is Skype, an Estonian start-up now helping millions connect around the world.
Latvia Latvia is considered “free” by Freedom House, with the watchdog pointing out that the “constitution protects freedoms of speech and the press, and the government generally upholds these rights in practice.” Like Russia, Latvia has a home grown social network called Draugiem.lv, which boasts more than 2.6 million users, the site is also widely used in Hungary, accessed through Baratikor.com. English speaking users can log on at frype.com.
Lithuania Similarly, the Lithuanian constitution protects freedom of the speech and the press, and the country is categorized as “free” by Freedom House. Internet penetration is at 65 percent, and in 2011 Pando Networks, said it had the fourth fastest connection speed in the world. The Lithuanian State Department of Tourism has recently embraced the most common function on all social media sites: the like button. Through Likeable Lithuania, authorities are asking people to share their favorite parts of the Baltic country on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google+—“liking” everything from hot air balloons rides to bike rides. People can also vote for their favorite town to host “the biggest LIKE sculpture in the universe.”
Armenia Armenia has “considerably improved” its internet freedoms over the past few years, says Freedom House, ranking the country “free.” Armenians are logging on to hold their government to account, for example using the crowdsourcing platform iDitord.org, meaning iObserver, to monitor the 2012 parliamentary elections. Citizens could report problems directly to iDitord.org, via text or on Twitter using the hashtag #iditord. The site suffered a cyber attack on the day of elections but the project was broadly considered a success and was rolled out to the presidential elections in 2013.
Photograph: screenshot iDitord.org
Georgia Georgia’s internet is also considered “free” by Freedom House, who says that slow connection poses a bigger problem than any type of government crackdown. Georgia first got the internet in the late 1990s, with broadband coming in 2004. A decade on there is a growing trend of senior politicians using social media to connect with citizens, with bloggers and social media activists savvy in using these platforms to hold leaders to account. For example, the protests dubbed “the broom revolution” saw thousands of protesters take to the streets to protest against sexual and physical abuse in prisons after footage was leaked on YouTube. At the time GlobalVoices reported that while similar abuse had been previously reported, this was the first time Georgians had seen it with their own eyes.
Ukraine In 2013 Freedom House said internet usage in Ukraine was “free,” adding that “while there was an increase in pressure on mainstream journalists toward self-censorship on political topics, there was also an increase in the use of ICTs for political mobilization.” Facebook, Twitter and Instagram have played a pivotal role documenting the recent Ukrainian uprising, called EuroMaidan, as many took to their smartphones to document the Kyiv protests. But social media reporting from the conflict has not been without its problems. A photograph of a morgue full of dead bodies supposedly in Slovyansk published on a Russian website turned out to have been taken five years earlier in Mexico by a journalist covering the drug war. Websites such as StopFake have come to the fore to monitor news reports and social media rumors because of widespread misinformation being bandied about.
Moldova In 2009 Moldova had a so-called Twitter revolution, which saw thousands of protesters take the authorities by surprise by demanding an election recount. Using Twitter, Facebook and text messages, the protests were organized by 25-year-old Natalia Morari. The Moldovan had originally
envisaged a flash mob which turned into 20,000 people storming the parliament building. Freedom House ranks Moldova’s press as “partly free.” Media outlets in the separatist Transnistria region are severely restricted, and Freedom House says residents are increasingly using social media to anonymously discuss politics with other Moldovans.
Russia Russia is Europe’s fastest-growing internet audience, according to a 2013 report by industry group comScore. VK (or VKontakte) is Russia’s most successful social network, boasting 100 million users worldwide. Translated as “In Contact,” the website known as Russia’s Facebook gained notoriety in the English-speaking world when it offered Edward Snowden a job. VK is very similar to Facebook and even allows users to sign in with their Facebook profiles. For many, its selling point is that it allows to users to watch and share films and download video using the VK tracker app. The site has been surrounded by controversy in recent months. Its 29-year-old founder Pavel Durov, often described as Russia’s Mark Zuckerberg, left the company in April 2014 after a dispute with its Kremlin-linked owners. That debate continued recently when the president, Vladimir Putin, told an audience of internet startups that new restrictions were mainly intended to protect children from obscene content. The notorious “bloggers law” makes it mandatory for websites enjoying more than 3,000 daily visits to register with a watchdog. VK’s closest competitor is Odnoklassniki, or “school mates,” which is Russia’s second most popular site and has an active audience in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Belarus. Instagram has also become a cultural phenomenon in Russia, with journalists, celebrities and even the prime minister sharing filtered portraits from their lives. It is also popular with Russian free climbers, who taking selfies on the buildings they have scaled with no ropes.
Azerbaijan Freedom house ranks Azerbaijan as “partly free” in terms of internet usage. State media dominates the news landscape, and students are required to “like” official government policies on Facebook. In 2011, the chief state psychiatrist said that people who wanted to communicate online had mental health problems, according to Azerbaijan news website Trend. Embed video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Aaecvg7xCIk Bloggers also face routine intimidation, the most famous case being the “donkey bloggers” who made a video in 2009 making fun of the government for spending thousands to import donkeys from Germany. The pair behind the video spent 17 months in jail for charges of hooliganism for their
troubles. Emin Milli spoke to Radio Free Europe after his release, saying he believed a media revolution was taking place, with activists using social media to expose government abuses.
Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan is also considered “partly free” in terms of internet use. One of the more innovative applications used here is a Twitter-based Russian-language text service to support Muslims fasting during Ramadan time, created by a group of enterprising young women. Subscribers to @RamazanTime receive reminders about prayer and meal times, as well as the importance of love and loyalty in the time of Ramadan (or Ramazan, as its known in Kyrgyzstan), all in 140 characters.
Kazakhstan Odnoklassniki proved so popular here that a Kazakh version called On has emerged, used by local pop stars. Freedom House rates Kazakhstan’s internet as “partly free,” adding that the government sees it as a potential source of growth but is wary of its “democratizing potential.” EurasiaNet have reported that Twitter has yet to take off in Kazakhstan, although the prime minister, Karim Masimov, “runs an active blog and the rest of the government is following his orders to do likewise, with mixed results.” Rulas (or “tribemate”) is another social network that has sprung up in Kazakhstan. It is similar to Facebook, but with a difference—it asks users to add their “zhuz” (horde) and their “ru” (tribe)—a clan system which has existed since the days of the Mongol empire. Rustem Kadyrzhanov, an expert on Kazakh tribal relations, told EurasiaNet that Rulas could be the ideal platform to modernise clan loyalty.
Photograph: screengrab/Rulas
Tajikistan The press is “not free” in Tajikistan according to Freedom House. Although only 15 percent of people regularly used the internet in 2012, the government extended its authoritarian presence to online platforms. In the last few months Transitions Online reported on another wave of internet interference with sites such as Google and Gmail being unavailable, just a few days after YouTube was taken offline. This crackdown follows a series of outages since 2012, including blocks to Russian social media and Facebook in 2012, which Transitions Online says that “many saw as an effort to muzzle dissent ahead
of the 2013 presidential elections.” YouTube was taken off air for several days in May 2013 after a video surfaced of President Emomali Rahmon dancing at his son’s wedding. Embed video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-5XS5o744-Q
Turkmenistan Campaign group Reporters Without Borders ranks Turkmenistan 178 out of 180 in the 2014 World Press Freedom Index, just above Eritrea and North Korea. Freedom House categorizes the press as “not free,” and says the government controls Turkmen Telecom with sites like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube suffering sporadic interference. Sites popular in Turkmenistan include E-Dostluk, meaning “online friendship,” which provides an online widget that allows users to send free text messages worldwide, and Ertir, a Turkmen site popular with young people that has also experienced service disruption.
Photograph: Screenshot/Ertir.com
Belarus In countries where political organizing is restricted, social media can be a tool to mobilize resistance. So it is in Belarus. Hundreds of people were detained after demonstrations in 2011, dubbed the “revolution through social networks.” President Alexander Lukashenka vowed to quell a revolution plot, blocking the opposition’s online presence in the process. The government has since extended regulations to enforce rules of conduct on social networking sites, which critics say is merely a way for the government to tighten its grip on its citizens.
Uzbekistan The internet is tightly controlled in Uzbekistan. The official message is that western culture is harmful and must be contained, yet plenty of familiar websites are available. For example as an alternative to Facebook, welcome to YouFace.uz.
Photograph: screengrab/YouFace.uz Uzbekistan has also recently rolled out an answer to Twitter, called Bamboo, with the strapline “One Country, One Network!” Despite having a similar interface, Bamboo allows for 700 character updates, a feature some Twitter users might approve of. Twitter is also used, not least by Gulnara Karimova, the president’s daughter, who took to the site to air a family feud last year.
13. Marta Poślad. New Europe, New Technologies and Old Politics Marta Poślad Senior Policy Analyst at Google and social scientist at the University of Cambridge In digital language, what happened in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) since 1989 can be compared to the life cycle of a start-up. The transition was kicked off by enthusiastic leaders who had no fear of taking risks and playing va banque. Their success has been determined by a passion for bringing change and the courage to challenge the status quo with ideals. In a year when we celebrate the 25th anniversary of the fall of communism in the region, CEE faces a reality check that will determine its way forward. This uncertainty could and should be addressed by innovation opportunities brought by the Internet and new technologies. One could say that the innovation is key rule is applicable to all societies and markets. However, there are specific circumstances that make young democracies more susceptible to benefiting from innovations without massive social and financial costs. Firstly, flexibility—introducing disruption to well-established markets often happens at a cost to traditional set-ups, which are resistant to change. Secondly, starting fresh—various mechanisms may be built from scratch, taking advantage of what is the newest at a given time, unlike those adapting to change. This poses a great chance for the CEE markets to leapfrog the established economies of the established democracies of the European Union. Last but not least, democratic transition in the region started in parallel to the beginning of a crisis in confidence with liberal democracy elsewhere. As exemplified by Estonian appetite and efforts for leveraging democratization through new technologies, it is Central and Eastern Europe that could overcome the shortcomings of the mechanisms of democracy as we know it. Benjamin Barber wrote in the mid-1980s that “liberal democrats have little sympathy for the civic ideal that treats human beings as inherently political.” These words, though harsh, reveal some truth about political systems and cultures. The “game” of being elected and staying in power—as expressed through political campaigns and the spin that surrounds them—have subverted the very ideals which the “game” was created to serve. In the first decade of the 21st century, we find ourselves somewhat confused by the system of political parties, where some adopt the views of their opposition and where everyone centers on compromise. These compromises are the result of, for example, elements of global governance, or at the very least transnational processes. We live in a century in which logistical barriers—like means of communication—which originally contributed to rendering direct democracy impractical are no longer a barrier. Improvements in this area have been vast and reflected in various aspects of social life, highlighting the shortcomings and incongruities of modern liberal democracies. Refocusing the political imagination using the prism of the ideals of democracy is one way forward in seeking socio-political alternatives. Outside the theoretical foundations of this argument, there are tangible examples of its occurrence. In early 2012, hundreds of people in Poland demonstrated on the streets for several days in a row to
oppose the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). ACTA was meant to set international intellectual property standards, however, its critics saw a high risk of the treaty imposing online censorship. The protests were followed by attacks against governmental websites. Although Donald Tusk, Poland’s Prime Minister at the time, first declared the government would make no concessions in response to these actions, along with the government he quickly reversed course. Not only did Poland refrain from ratification of the treaty, but it has since become a vocal supporter of a free and open Internet. Many Poles remember the curious live-streamed conference held by the Prime Minister with representatives from the protests and various Internet experts that went on for multiple hours. The anti-ACTA campaign unexpectedly revealed the existence of a group of young, engaged citizens who stay away from formal politics on traditional fronts, but do stand up against attempts to regulate the spaces that are dear to them. Most importantly, a number of researchers have noted that this young Internet community does not take advantage of traditional means of exercising democratic mechanisms, such as voting. This suggests yet another argument that liberal democracy as we know it has not proven to be an efficient way of engaging the newly democratic societies, especially in case of those citizens born around the time transition started. Analyzing the voter turnout records of the member states of the European Union reveals a clear pattern in post-Communist countries. Briefly, their current voter turnout rates are low or very low and the majority show a decreasing trend. Likewise, the majority had a very high turnout in their first free and fair electoral contest. This particular outcome was the result of the hopes and expectations of regime change to democracy, which these societies had long desired. Central and Eastern European countries show the pure correlation between social change and electoral participation. Societies within these states have not experienced gradual social and global changes similar to those in established democracies between the 1960s and the 1990s. This excludes the possible factor of socialization; citizens of established democracies may, for example, be more accustomed to voting and this could explain why the decline in their electoral participation rates are not as sharp as those of the new member states of the European Union. Speaking of socialization, once citizens of the socalled New Europe became accustomed to electronic means of communication and digitally driven services, like the very popular online banking, they may become more reluctant to embrace stiff modes of formal participation in public life, like punching a ballot box. The implementation of democratic regimes and the transition to capitalism in the early 1990s happened at a time when the majority of the other European states were already established capitalist democracies. Societies previously associated with the former USSR or its allies suddenly found themselves in a globalized world, which contrasted to their pre-transition experiences. The new Central and Eastern European democracies promptly started applying to and joining intergovernmental organizations and altering various dimensions of their legislation to adjust to the international arena. Besides making significant economic transitions, they also joined the ranks of the liberal democracies. The efficiency of these transitions could easily be called into question, partly because it was at this time that the first concerns were raised regarding the efficacy of electoral democracy, considered
from the participatory angle. Many political observers optimistically expected the revival of class politics and the arrival of a new breed of democracy, but the post-communistic countries failed to define their own democratic models. The legacy of Soviet-style regimes and social arrangements— such as social policies—found few reflections in these new constellations. These disappointments were expressed through voter attrition, especially as the transition itself had raised expectations. The latter expectations, especially these targeted at fighting negative phenomena such as corruption, may be effectively addressed through new technologies. Transparency is at its heyday thanks to the Internet, which enables the easy tracking of records, gives anonymity to whistleblowers and independence from those who are being judged. Outside of Internet tools used on a daily basis, such as e-mail, comment sections and social media platforms that leverage general communication, there is a great number of tools specifically aimed at enhancing the democratic process. Many of these disruptive ideas are already successfully invented or applied in Central and Eastern Europe. ManaBalss.lv (My Voice) is a Latvian social initiative platform currently used by fifteen percent of the population, with a record number of forty percent who used it at least once to pursue or support a regulatory grassroots initiative and currently, seven legal reforms developed there were introduced. Another example is Demagog.sk, which monitored the campaign promises of Slovak politicians since 2010. The site pursues an innovative way of political analysis through constant fact checking and data analysis. So far the team behind the project has verified over eight thousand statements. The CEE may also pride itself on anticorruption initiatives such as the Hungarian K-Monitor and the Slovak Fair-Play Alliance, which use new technologies to monitor, analyze and expose illegal actions touching the public sphere. From the perspective of democratic ideals and in the light of the digital disruption that has reimagined many aspects of our social life, traditional political systems are democratic only to some extent. Giving the many a real say, and by these means reassuring them real equity in shaping their environments, is the most powerful promise of the Digital Age, which stands a very high potential of fulfillment in Central and Eastern Europe.
14.
Andrei Aliaksandrau. How Free Is Internet in Belarus?
Andrei Aliaksandrau Vice Chairman, the Belarusian Union of Journalists Modern information technology, especially the Internet, has provided new opportunities for free speech. Nowadays, literally everyone has access to instruments and platforms for delivering information and sharing ideas, unheard of—even unthinkable—before. But digital freedom has a flip side—technology provides opportunities not only for the freedom of expression and the search for knowledge, but also for surveillance and censorship. Edward Snowden’s revelations of the NSA spying programs have been proof of this. His story has raised concerns that even democracies spy on their citizens—but what about authoritarian states? Belarus, a country often referred to as “Europe’s last dictatorship,” has its own story to tell. Tight control over the information field has always been one of the pillars of President Alexander Lukashenka’s internal policy, and a key to preserving his power. Belarus is one of the world’s worst places for media freedom. It is listed as 193rd out of 197 in the 2014 Freedom of the Press rating by Freedom House. Reporters without Borders ranked it 157th out of 179 countries in their 2013 Press Freedom Index. The country does not have a single national TV channel (Belsat, a channel that broadcasts in Belarusian from Poland, is only available via satellite and does not have official accreditation in Belarus). Non-state press has been working for years in conditions of economic discrimination; independent journalists face limitations in their access to information and sometimes they experience even more severe problems such as detentions, administrative arrests and criminal prosecution. No wonder such a tight grip offline has compelled Belarusians to go online more and more. According to gemiusAudience research by Gemius (as of June 2014), about 4.89 million inhabitants of the country aged over 15 use the Internet at least once a month and 93 percent of them go online every day. After a significant growth over the past few years, the overall number of Belarusians online has stabilized, but the demographics of users are becoming more and more diverse. For instance, more and more seniors use the web, the share of users aged 55–74 was 8.7 percent in October 2013, and in May 2014 it increased to 10.4 percent. The Internet in Belarus is also spreading to the country’s regions—five years ago 45 percent of users lived in the capital city of Minsk, while today they account for only 28 percent. Broadband is also becoming increasingly common, while mobile use is still not than high, only around 6.5 percent of all Internet traffic in Belarus is from mobile devices. Increasing Internet usage could hardly go unnoticed by the country’s authorities, especially in the era of “Twitter-revolutions” and social networks. As Internet is becoming a more and more powerful source of information, the Belarusian government is using different methods to keep it under control. The first method is control over the technical infrastructure. Beltelecom, a state-owned telecommunication company, has a monopoly over the country’s external Internet gateway, and the
previously announced plans to open up international connections to other operators were eventually put on hold. Second of all, there is legislation in place that regulates activities of Belarusian citizens on the Internet. One of the most important pieces is Presidential Decree No. 60 of February 1, 2010, “On Measures to Improve the Use of the National Segment of the Internet Network.” Today, it is the most notorious legislative act to provide the state with tools for online surveillance and censorship. But in fact, even before the Decree was introduced, there were legal mechanisms that affected free speech online in the country. In 2008, a new media law first introduced the notion of online media, but it gave no clear definition of it and there is still none. No further governmental decree on the regulation of online media has ever actually been published, despite the law being in force for five years. The regime has effectively used laws aimed at offline media to attempt to curtail the online media in Belarus—in particular the articles of the criminal code on defamation. It is a crime in Belarus to insult a state official—and the most serious such offence, punishable with up to five years in prison, is defaming or insulting the president. In 2007, the writer and opposition activist Andrey Klimaw was sentenced to two years in prison for publishing critical articles on the Internet, he was later released in 2008. The journalist Andrzej Poczobut was convicted of libeling the president in July 2011 and given a three-year suspended jail sentence for articles and blog posts he published online. In summer 2012, Belarus made international press headlines with a scandal after two representatives of a Swedish PR-agency flew over the territory of the country on a small plane and parachuted several hundred teddy bears with little posters in support of free speech. Anton Suryapin, a young photo journalist, took a picture of one of the plush paratroopers and posted it on his blog. He was arrested immediately and charged with conspiring to allow the illegal crossing of the state border. He spent a month in a KGB detention prison in Minsk, before he was released. Later all charges were dropped—still, he was a suspect in a criminal case just for posting a teddy bear picture online. As for Decree No. 60, it in fact provided for surveillance of any activity online in Belarus, as well as for the filtering and blocking of content. The decree most directly affects Internet service providers, but it was also aimed at facilitating the tracking of Internet users and controlling their access to online material. It introduced a technical system for search and surveillance of the Internet, SORM (System for Operative Investigative Activities), similar to one used in Russia, and it obliges ISPs to store data on their users (such as IP address, length of session, visited URLs, search queries made openly) for one year. The Belarusian secret services and other law enforcement agencies received the legal right to have direct and constant access to the systems tracking users’ online activities that ISPs were obliged to install at their own expense. Visitors to Internet cafes must produce their passports before they can go online—and the data about the websites they visit are also stored. Moreover, the decree introduced so-called “lists of restricted access,” i.e. lists of websites that are banned from access by computers at state-owned enterprises and public institutions. It should be noted that, in fact, there are two lists like this in Belarus. Both of them are official and both of them are placed on the website of the State Inspection of Electrical Communications (BelGIE). The first is free to access, meaning it is supposed to be public—but it is empty, there are no entries in it. The second one is closed, and only appointed employees of Internet service providers have access to it.
According to information leaked to the press, two popular independent news websites, Charter’97 and Belarusian Partisan, are included on that list, as well as the website of Human Rights Centre Viasna, the organization chaired by Ales Byalyatski, a well-known human rights defender who was recently released from prison. Of course, there should be no wrong impressions about the mass blocking of opposition websites in Belarus. Independent online media and sites of opposition parties or civil society organizations are available from home computers or mobile phones; and only some of them are blocked in state institutions or public offices. Only a few of those go further in selectively blocking some content. For instance, the local network of the Institute of Journalism of the Belarusian State University blocks access to almost any independent online news media sites—the “ideological purity” of future journalists in Belarus depends on it. At the same time, during major political campaigns, especially presidential elections, the blocking of opposition websites and cyber-attacks against these sites have become commonplace in Belarus. That was the case during the last presidential election on December 19, 2010, as the access to independent sources of information online was restricted; some news websites went down. Some experts argue that it was not a sign of any wrong-doing by the authorities—just that the overall national Internet gateway of Belarus is relatively small (540 Gb/s as of June 2014), so when a lot of people started to go online to learn news, it was not possible for them to access some web resources hosted outside of the country for security reasons. But there were other facts that prove there was some intrusion in normal activity of the Belarusian internet. For instance, there was no access to Gmail or Facebook through secure https:// protocol—one could only use a non-secure http://, risking loss of passwords and other information. New censorship technology was also tried out in Belarus on that date with regard to content manipulation. When some users tried to access a certain website with independent information, they were secretly re-directed to a copy of the site, hosted on .in domain (for instance, instead of the zapraudu.info, the website of the “Tell the Truth” campaign, users arrived at the fake zapraudu.in website). If one did not pay attention to the address line in the browser, it was not easy to identify that the website was a fake—until you started scrutinizing the information it contained. The fake site duplicated all the information from the original, but distorted some of it, for example changing the place and time of a post-election protest rally, etc. Some of methods of Belarusian law enforcement are much less “technological.” The recent years saw numerous cases of online activists and moderators of oppositional groups on social networks being detained on trumped-up charges. In August 2012, “We Are Fed Up With Lukashenko” («Надоел нам этот Лукашенко»), one of the most popular Belarusian oppositional groups on VKontakte, a Russian social network, was hacked. Paval Yewtsikhiyew and Andrey Tkachow, the group administrators, were charged with minor hooliganism offenses and sentenced to five and seven days’ detention respectively. Their homes were searched and their computer equipment confiscated. One more online activist, Raman Pratasyevich, was detained and reported later that law enforcement officers beat him in order to get hold of passwords to a group on VKontakte dedicated to a free concert by Lyapis Trubyatski, a popular rock band known for its sharp criticism of Lukashenka.
A more recent story is that of Alyeh Zhalnow, a civic activist and a blogger from Babruysk. He writes about corruption and abuse of power by the local police and faces persecution for these activities. In February 2014, a criminal case on defamation was opened over a post in Zhalnow’s blog that criticized the police; in September 2014 his son Alyaksyey was sentenced to three years of “limitation of freedom” for his alleged attempt to attack a police officer. We should point out that Internet in Belarus still remains a relatively free domain of information flow. People can access independent news; social networks are getting more and more popular, especially the Russian ones, VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, which are among Top 10 websites visited by Belarusians. But there is a whole set of censorship and surveillance tools in place to be used by the authorities whenever it is needed, and it is one of the major threats to free speech online in the country that lacks freedom elsewhere. Another question is whether the relative freedom of information flow on the Internet can be used to bring changes to Belarusian society. The latest surveys by Gemius show that young people tend not to read news online. The two most-visited websites in Belarus are the Russian portals Mail.ru and Yandex. People mostly seek entertainment and some other services online—not stories about government corruption or human rights abuses in their country. And this is the challenge that remains to be addressed by independent journalists and civil society organizations.
15.
Alex Rubin. Runet: An Ambiguous Political Force
Alex Rubin Contributor to the Digital Eastern Europe column for New Eastern Europe Following revolutions sparked by social media in Egypt, Moldova and Ukraine, commentators have asked if something similar could occur in the most prominent state of the postSoviet space, namely Russia. This chapter seeks to address whether such a development is likely to happen by focusing on the question: “Can the Internet be dubbed as a unique tool capable of breeding political liberalization and unseating the undemocratic regime in Russia?”[303] In response to this question, the chapter will challenge the typical generalization that an undemocratic regime can be unseated by “Internet savvy” anti-regime activists by focusing on the political impact of the Internet. Unlike such a generalization, this chapter does not rush into simplistic and decontextualized assertions. Instead, by drawing on primary sources from social media platforms[304] and website environments, it presents the online political environment as a contradictory force in Russia. On the one hand, it can provide individuals opposed to the Russian regime with a valuable tool to challenge the repressive political status quo, but, on the other hand, it can serve to strengthen the political rule of the Kremlin. This chapter will refer to the Internet in Russia as Runet. It is a term which is often coined by journalists, politicians and political commentators to describe the Russian language environment online. Over the last decade, Runet has vastly expanded across Russia, with more than 48 percent of the population now connected online.[305] This has coincided, as will be demonstrated throughout this work, with Runet becoming an increasingly scrutinized social space, which previously, was relatively lightly regulated.
Challenging the Regime: Alexey Navalny Unlike traditional forms of media, Runet has become an increasingly developed political landscape for opposition activists to criticize the status quo. Whether this has been exposing government corruption, police brutality or criticism of the Kremlin, the blogosphere, Twitter and other social media platforms have enabled users to publish and share regime critical information which directly influences the offline political environment. The anti-corruption blogger and prominent Kremlin opposition figure Alexey Navalny is a key online personality that will be examined as a case study to highlight the increasing interconnectedness of online and offline politics. Alexey Navalny is one of Runet’s most prominent anti-government corruption bloggers. His LiveJournal blog,[306] which is constantly updated with numerous posts detailing government and business criminality, has accumulated tens of thousands of readers inside Russia.[307] Navalny’s political influence, however, has clearly not been confined to the Russian blogosphere. His crusade against corrupt state officials and the corrupt practices within the state-owned oil transport monopoly Transneft has transformed him into a vastly popular opposition figure offline.[308]
In particular, Navalny has successfully targeted members of United Russia, the ruling party closely associated with Vladimir Putin. One of the most discussed cases within the Runet blogosphere related to the head of the Duma Committee on Ethics, MP Vladimir Pekhtin, who was accused by Navalny of failing to declare property he owns abroad in Miami. Navalny’s investigation into Pekhtin stems from documents he uncovered, not only in Russia but also in Israel and in the US, which certify that Pekhtin purchased a property in Miami in April 2012 for the sum of $1,275,000. This property, however, was not declared by Pekhtin in his annual declarations as an MP.[309] With this in mind, Navalny published a warranty deed signed by Pekhtin on his blog highlighting Pekhtin’s ownership of the Miami property.[310] Immediately hundreds of readers of his blog began to spread the word on LiveJournal.[311] The attention this case received online also filtered to traditional media outlets,[312] and even to international news services such as the BBC and France 24.[313] As a result, Pekhtin felt his position was untenable and resigned. Similarly, in March of last year, Navalny began targeting another corrupt lawmaker, Senator Vitaliy Malkin, for unethical behavior. His investigation into Malkin relates to the Senator’s ownership of an Israeli passport, which is illegal for a Russian state official, and his failure to declare ownership of 111 apartments in Canada.[314] As can be seen on Navalny’s blog from March 14, 2013, a number of documents have been uploaded, including a property detail report from Canada highlighting Malkin’s ownership of an apartment and an office block in Toronto and proof of his dual citizenship.[315] Although these revelations concerning Malkin were not new, the extent to which Navalny managed to expose the Senator on his blog through the various uploaded documents and the subsequent attention brought to the story by the mainstream Russian press[316] meant that Malkin was forced to resign from the Federation Council at the end of March 2013. Alongside corrupt officials, Navalny’s crusade against corrupt state practices has centered on the oil transport monopoly Transneft. This began as far back as 2007, when he bought shares in the stateowned companies of Gazprom, Rosneft and Transneft to find out how transparent state-owned companies were in Russia. After learning that Transneft had contributed around 10 percent or more of its profits to charity while issuing low dividends in a year marked by high oil prices, he began to investigate where this “charity money” had gone.[317] As can be seen on his blog and personal website Navalny.ru, the investigation and discussion into the corrupt practices of Transneft has spanned over numerous posts with comments from other Runet users reaching the two thousand mark on certain blog posts.[318] More importantly, however, Navalny’s online investigation of Transneft has had increasing impact in the offline political arena. Notably, the daily business newspaper Vedomosti embarked on its own campaign to investigate the location of the suspect charity money. This involved an investigation into two agencies, the Kremlin-9 Fund and the Assistance Fund, which the newspaper believes channeled the funds.[319] Similarly, Navalny’s website RosPil.info has projected his political influence and broadcast his criticisms of the political status quo offline with increasing effectiveness. The website has attracted around a thousand users[320] who post and share information regarding state corruption, particularly in relation to the national budget and state contracts.[321] Due to its online popularity, the website received donations within the first few weeks of its creation amounting to over $100,000.[322] The
project also spawned other similar “crowdsourcing” websites on Runet.[323] For instance, Roskomvzayatka.ru, a website geared toward exposing bribery, enables users to anonymously post and share information along similar lines to RosPil.[324] The growing popularity of RosPil has successfully translated into growing political influence offline. Since 2001, corrupt schemes involving some 1.6 billion roubles have been exposed and 337 million roubles of corrupt payments have been prevented.[325] In particular, the website has prevented highlevel government officials from obtaining exorbitant luxuries—this was the case with the finance minister of Dagestan, a Russian republic, who requested that an Audi 8L car be bought for him with public money.[326] The case of Alexey Navalny provides evidence for what Clay Shirky has termed the Internet’s ability to “alter the dynamics of the public sphere.”[327] His political presence both online and offline undoubtedly represents a critical challenge to the Russian regime. Furthermore, the ability of Navalny to shape the anti-regime discussion online, to maintain online communities organized against government and business corruption, and even to influence the offline political environment (forcing the resignation of state officials or preventing cases of state corruption) highlights the advantages the Internet can provide as a tool of opposition activists.
Challenging the Regime: Exposing the Young Guard Alongside the work of Navalny, the blogosphere is also utilized by other anti-regime activists to expose the truth about the regime and its political activities to a vast audience.[328] One particular example that highlights this development is related to the online propaganda campaign of the Young Guard (Molodaya Gvardiya), the youth wing of Russia’s ruling party, United Russia. The online campaign featured a video showing members of the Young Guard fighting fires in the region of Ryazan, which is near Moscow. Accompanying the clip is audio commentary featuring Ruslan Gattarov, the leader of the Young Guard, congratulating the group for putting out the fires. As noted by Claire Bigg of Radio Free Europe, Gattarov stated on the video [SIC]: Without us, I think there would have been a serious blaze, although fire engines and vehicles with water are constantly arriving. If we had not intervened literally seconds after the first flames arose— and these flames were two times higher than us—several minutes, or several dozen minutes more, and several fire brigades would have been unable to control the blaze.[329] The blogosphere, however, believed the video to be a fraud. Blogger Valeriy Nazarov was able to identify that the Young Guard had used computer editing to fake the fire extinguishing. Another blogger reported that other photos posted by the youth group, supposedly to highlight similar instances of other firefighting by the group were also demonstrably untrue, as the blogger discovered there had been no actual fires taking place at the supposed location.[330] As a consequence of such online discussion and criticism within the blogosphere, high-ranking officers of the group were relieved of their positions[331] and members of the Kremlin were deeply criticized for these propaganda stunts. [332] Vladislav Surkov, then the Kremlin’s First Deputy Chief of Staff, was noted for his harsh criticism in an article published by Vedomosti, while United Russia member Alexey Chadayev openly condemned the group as having “nothing to show off about.”[333] Such an embarrassing case for the Young Guard and United Russia again illustrates how online
political discourse within the blogosphere can have a direct impact on the political mainstream. Although, in a similar vein to that of Navalny’s online and offline influence, such discussions and investigations within the blogosphere are not posing as a revolutionary challenge to the regime, but are, in light of Shirky’s remarks made earlier, altering the dynamics of the social sphere to have an increasing impact on the mainstream political sphere.
Challenging The Regime: The Decembrists A further avenue increasingly utilized by opposition activists on Runet pertains to the ability of individuals to organize and mobilize offline via social media platforms against the Russian regime. The opposition movement known as For Fair Elections has extensively utilized the social networking websites VKontakte and Facebook and also the micro-blogging website Twitter to challenge the repressive status quo by organizing protests following the 2011 Duma election. Prior to the movement’s largest protest event on December 10, 2011 the group had amassed a vast following on both Facebook and VKontakte. The group’s VKontakte page had just fewer than 16,000 members, while on Facebook this number had reached 30,000 for the planned Moscow protest.[334] A quick browsing of event pages on both VKontakte and Facebook shows how members shared not only criticism of the regime and videos of alleged electoral fraud committed by United Russia during the election, but also discussed tactics for the planned protest.[335] Such examples relate to one user encouraging others to bring a “respirator, goggles and helmets” in case of police aggression.[336] Alongside this, the use of Twitter by members of the group and other high-profile activists was of paramount importance to the successful mobilization of various protests proceeding the Duma election in December 2011. A key example of this is a tweet from Alexey Navalny about the December 5, 2011 protests telling his followers to meet at the Clean Ponds in Moscow at 19:00 and to send a text message to five of their fellow activists with this information.[337] Similarly, the use of hashtags in Tweets, key words or phrases that can be easily searched for by Twitter users, has enabled activists within the movement to be updated increasingly in real time, with minute by minute developments at particular protests. These hashtags range from focusing on the particular date of each protest in Moscow to the location or meeting place. For instance, the December 5 protests were marked with the hashtag #5дек, the December 10 protests with the hashtag #10дек and the December 24 protests with the hashtag #24дек. In terms of location hashtags, activists used both #чп (Clean Ponds) and #триумфальная (Triumfalnaya Square) for the December 5 protests and December 6 protests respectively.[338] Further to this, the website of Yandex also played an important role in mobilizing activists by helping individuals locate protests across the country. Yandex, the online search engine, provided activists with a live development of the protests throughout the month of December. The data, compiled from the location of people’s Tweets, was transferred onto a live-motion map which pinpointed the location of individuals at protests according to their Tweets. This enabled activists to pinpoint the protest nearest to them in cities such as Moscow, Vladivostok and Nizhniy Novgorod.[339] The For Fair Elections movement has demonstrated the use of what Steve Cole deemed “efficient tools for organizing protests.”[340] While this suggests these online tools can increasingly be used to challenge the status quo, they can, however, also be proactively used by the regime itself to counter
such actions and strengthen its political rule offline.
The Regime Strikes Back: The Blogosphere The Runet blogosphere represents a significant online arena in which the Russian regime is increasingly employing legal measures and other more informal techniques to diminish opposition activities. In order to illustrate these developments, the online regime-led campaign against Navalny will be the first of such case examined before moving on to further examples within the Runet blogosphere. The campaign against Alexey Navalny has consisted of an increasingly sophisticated online offensive combined with offline criminal charges[341] and instances of intimidation of his supporters.[342] At the centre of the crusade has been the direct targeting of Navalny’s online mouthpiece, his LiveJournal blog. During the first half of 2011, Navalny’s criticisms of the regime, notably his labeling of United Russia as “the party of crooks and thieves” appeared to force the hand of the regime.[343] During March 2011, Navalny’s blog was targeted with two DDoS attacks (distributed denial-of-service attacks) which were later described by SUP Media, the holding company of LiveJournal, as “the worst in the service’s history.”[344] Although the sources of such cyber attacks are difficult to pinpoint, Runet blogger Anton Nossik indicates that forces under the command of the aforementioned Kremlinologist Vladislav Surkov were responsible.[345] Navalny’s blog has also come under pressure from another form of cyber attack from forces loyal to the regime, so-called “human bots.”[346] This involves the posting of negative comments to opposition blogs, carried out indirectly by the regime through a vast team of bloggers, with the intent of distracting users from the initial blog post and engaging them in the spam left by the regime’s commenters. In the case of Navalny’s blog, around 120,000 negative comments were posted. These ranged from short derogatory statements such as “the author of this post is an idiot” to more substantial responses stating “this navalny doesn’t have any information and is too lazy to check the facts.”[347] Political commentators have suggested that due to the sheer scale of such an attack, an “automated script” had been created by regime forces to generate such comments.[348] Two weeks later, however, it was noted that each of the users that left comments on Navalny’s blog had their own user profile picture and unique information.[349] Either way, such a sophisticated attack was aimed at temporarily diminishing Navalny’s online presence and it successfully accomplished this. Navalny’s blog became overloaded and was subsequently brought to a temporary standstill. Alongside such cyber attacks, online anti-Navalny propaganda videos have also been utilized by forces loyal to the regime in order to further discredit, undermine and diminish Navalny’s influence within the blogosphere. As highlighted by Alexey Sidorenko, two videos have received particular attention in the blogosphere, both with viewing figures over the 150,000 mark.[350] The first of such videos depicts Navalny as a mentally ill individual who requires help from a well-known Russian television personality, Dr. Kurpatov. The second posits Navalny is an American spy funded by the American intelligence services. While the content of both videos may seem humorous, the production quality and style of propaganda increasingly suggest that they are part of a concerted effort to discredit Navalny.[351]
In addition to the regime’s online efforts to neutralize the political influence of Navalny, legal mechanisms have been utilized across the blogosphere to directly limit the activities of opposition activists.[352] In particular, Article 282 of the Criminal Code is increasingly being used by the regime to create such a restricted environment. According to Firstname Kozlovsky, id tag: A number of bloggers have been prosecuted for criticizing the government or its institutions in their posts and comments. In most cases, they are charged with Article 282 of the Criminal Code: extremism, or inciting hatred or hostility towards a social group. In these cases “social groups” have been almost anything: from police force (for bloggers criticizing police for brutality or corruption) to regional administration (for those upset by their local government’ policies).[353]
A notable example is blogger Savva Terentyev from the Komi Republic who received a one year sentence for his comments on a journalist’s blog in February 2007. The comments harshly criticized the police by labeling them as “trash,” “rednecks” and “thugs.”[354] As a consequence, Article 282 was brought against the blogger for inciting hatred and hostility towards a social group—in this case the social group was the police. Similarly, Tatarstan blogger Yuriy Yegorov and Oborona (a non-violent youth movement opposed to the regime) coordinator Dmitriy Solovyev have been subjected to legal prosecution for blog entries and comments deemed critical of the authorities. In the case of Yegorov, the blogger was charged with defamation and libel for critical comments about an ombudsman. He subsequently received a six month sentence with six months probation.[355] Solovyev, on the other hand, although not arrested, was accused of “inciting hatred, hostility and degrading the police and [security service] FSB” on his LiveJournal blog.[356] A criminal case was brought against him in August 2008 which included routine searches of his home and workplace, along with the confiscation of his computer.[357] The regime’s approach to the blogosphere, however, has not stopped here. It is adopting an ever-more proactive approach—the fostering of pro-Kremlin blogs to enhance its online propaganda campaign. At the heart of this approach has been the development of a network of pro-government bloggers funded directly and indirectly by the Russian regime. As identified by the blogger Roman Dobrokhotov, the Kremlin employs teams of bloggers to project a flattering image of the authorities in the blogosphere. An investigation undertaken by Dobrokhotov indicates how the Ministry of the Interior outsources such activities to an organization known as Garin Studio. This organization recruits individuals to blog about issues that present the regime in a flattering light, such as positive coverage of the police. Dobrokhotov also indicates that those users who are willing to be a part of the various networks are paid up to $50 a blog post. So far, 38 bloggers have been identified as part of this sophisticated “police campaign,” which aims at attacking top-ranking Kremlin-dissenting blogs such as that of Maxim Aleksandrov.[358] Alongside this network, members of the Young Guard have formed an additional team of bloggers who remain an integral part of the regime’s blogosphere propaganda campaign. Notably, in April 2007, 170 opposition activists were arrested at a demonstration and soon after started blogging about the regime’s actions. Pavel Danilin, a popular pro-Putin blogger and member of the Young Guard simultaneously began blogging with other members about an upcoming pro-Kremlin demonstration. The Young Guard team posted numerous blog entries linking them to each other in an effort to crowd out opposition posts detailing the demonstration and the subsequent repressions. Consequently, the team’s blogs gained vast coverage within the blogosphere and became ranked within Yandex’s top five Runet blog posts. It thus successfully neutralized the opposition’s posts.[359]
The Regime Strikes Back: Social Media The pro-active campaign against For Fair Elections has centered on various informal methods of control including arrests and intimidation, as well as the blocking and the harnessing of social media by the regime itself. Since the movement’s first protest, the arrest and intimidation of activists across the country has formed an increasing part of the regime’s actions to counter the operations of the group. In particular, the regime is utilizing the group’s Facebook page as a hit list to arrest individuals during and after protest actions. For instance, in January 2012 the creator of the group’s Facebook page, Ilya Klishin, was visited by the security services and subsequently arrested.[360] Human Rights Watch notes that prior to his arrest, Klishin’s parents were contacted by the FSB at their home in Tambov, 450 km from Moscow. Klishin’s father was later summoned to appear as a witness at an unknown court case. After undergoing questioning at the anti-extremism unit by local officials, his father realized that it the case involved Ilya’s political views and activities. He was grilled on a number of questions, but officials refused to mention anything regarding Ilya’s supposed “suspicious behavior.”[361] Klishin’s case is not in isolation. On January 27, 2012, the activist and protest leader of For Fair Elections in Volgograd, Alevtina Dyupri, was asked to visit the local Volgograd Extremist Prevention Unit. On her arrival, two unknown officers began questioning her about her political activities. Dyupri was then obliged to sign a document acknowledging that she had been “warned about criminal liability for extremism under article 16 of the Federal Law on Extremism.”[362] In Nizhny Novgorod on February 19, 2012, the leader of the For Fair Elections protests, Alexey Sadomovskiy, was attacked outside his apartment. The attacker was waiting outside his apartment in a car before striking Sadomovskiy in the face and kicking him to the head. Later that year, Sadomovskiy was questioned by the FSB at his former university after receiving a phone call from a deputy dean. On the same day, his mother was also interrogated by the FSB who demanded that she must stop Sadomovskiy from engaging in online anti-regime activism.[363] Another component of the regime’s proactive strategy against the movement pertains to the utilization of social media itself in an effort to directly monitor, neutralize and manage the group’s activities. This took place, in particular, during the December 6, 2011 protests, when pro-Kremlin activists engaged in so-called Twitter warfare by launching an attack on the protestors via Twitter using bots. [364] As outlined above, opposition activists utilized Twitter to a vast extent during the protests, especially with the use of hashtags, to share developments in real time with one another. Attempts, therefore, were made to disrupt this communication by spamming the hashtags of #триумфальная and #навалный (Navalny) at “a rate of up to ten messages per second.”[365] Overall, it is estimated that over two thousand bots managed to spam both these hastags.[366] A typical example is illustrated by the user Polinski Leinen whose message contains abusive language towards Navalny but also includes the hashtag #триумфальная. Other examples included nationalist slogans and further abuse of Navalny, but it must be noted that they also fostered a pro-Kremlin narrative through an abundance of users with randomly generated accounts.[367] Although the success of such online interventions may be difficult to gauge, Maxim Goncharov, a microblogger, emphasises that the Twitter exercise “succeeded in blocking the actual message feed” of the protestors.[368]
The regime’s actions against For Fair Elections, however, continued. A few days prior to the Duma elections in 2011, the founder of VKontakte, Pavel Durov, highlighted how the FSB contacted him directly in relation to blocking opposition groups on the social media platform.[369] In a blog post uploaded by Vladislav Tsyplukhin, which can also be found on VKontakte, Durov responded to the FSB by stipulating that the platform cannot merely block a group because of their violent intentions, but that it could monitor them.[370] Beyond this, however, it appears that the regime is contemplating the introduction of legislation requiring the data of Russian users on social networks to be stored inside the country. Notably, in April 2014, Moscow councilman Alexey Lisovenko pushed forward this previous Government idea to Duma deputy Sergey Zheleznyak on the pretense that since the Edward Snowden revelations, Moscow should be fearful of the American intelligence services monitoring the country’s social media space. This alleged need for the regime to “expand Russia’s digital diplomacy” would enable it to store such data in Siberia, utilizing the region’s energy supplies and complementing Moscow’s long term goal of developing the sparsely populated region.[371]
The Website Environment Many of Russia’s online radio stations and television channels have also felt the wrath of the regime or forces loyal to the regime when they are perceived as being too critical of the Kremlin. In particular, the well-known online radio broadcaster Ekho Moskvy, a keen critic of the Kremlin that hosts regular video interviews with individuals opposed to the regime, notably Alexey Navalny and Viktor Shenderovich, was targeted by a severe DDoS attack on December 4, 2012. The radio station reported the incident to the Investigative Committee of Russia via the Central Election Commission, but in February 2012 the Committee reported back, issuing a statement indicating that there are “no grounds” for the complaint.[372] Also in December 2012, the online opposition independent television channel Dozhd was subjected to immense pressures from the state authorities. In response to the channel’s support of the For Fair Elections protests, and the subsequent funding of the Moscow protests in December 2011, the Zamoskvoretskiy district prosecutor’s office scrutinized the organization and its finances. Although the case has seemed to have fallen off the Kremlin’s radar, Dozhd’s owner, Natalya Sindeyeva, indicates that Robert Schlegel, a member of the Duma from the United Russia party, instigated this demand.[373] Online independent newspapers have also experienced similar legal attacks and DDoS attacks since the December 2011 protests. The online newspaper Vedomosti is a typical example, which, after being targeted by a DDoS attack in July 2012, became inaccessible for two days.[374] In addition to this, legal mechanisms put forward by the Kremlin in 2012 look set to increasingly regulate the online environment. New regulations concerning the registration of domain names, under the auspices of RU-CENTRE, means the Kremlin can now shut down any website if the content is deemed “contrary to public interest.”[375] This has overhauled the previous regulatory system which only enabled courts to issue such orders.[376]
Runet: A Bleak Future? With an ever increasing stranglehold online, both technologically and financially, the
Kremlin is holding its own against Internet-savvy opposition activists. Whether in the blogosphere or via social networks, the regime is not missing any of the opposition’s tricks. Does this mean relegating the future of Runet as bleak for opposition activists? The case of Alexey Navalny has demonstrated that Runet can be an extremely important tool for individuals opposed to the regime. With the popularity of his LiveJournal blog and his investigations into members of the Duma and state controlled companies, Navalny’s online activities catapulted him into the mainstream political environment. His share of 27 percent of the vote in the most recent Moscow mayoral election in September 2013 demonstrates attests to this. Similarly, Runet has provided the For Fair Elections movement with an invaluable tool. The ability for anti-regime activists to communicate with like-minded individuals, whenever and wherever, via VKontakte, Facebook or Twitter. This has enabled the movement to mobilize and oppose the regime on a national scale. Undoubtedly, the online environment has therefore played a key part in efficiently and innovatively aiding the functioning of the protests following the Duma election in December 2011. Subsequently, it would be best to describe Runet as a “double-edged sword”—a medium that can be utilized by opposition activists but also manipulated by the regime itself to further its own political aims.[377] This dual purpose of Runet, however, will increasingly be tested, especially with the onset of increasing legal mechanisms and the oversight of Russia’s Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communications (Roskomnadzor). Bleak days lay ahead for opposition activists on Runet, but the political presence of activists like Navalny, both online and offline, will remind the Kremlin it is not all plain sailing[378].
Part Five: Digital Diplomacy
16. Victor Guzun. E-diplomacy: A Practitioner’s Perspective Victor Guzun Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Moldova to the Republic of Estonia My job as Moldova’s ambassador to Estonia involves a large amount of communication with both internal and external actors from all spheres, and thus consistent and thorough communication is essential for good planning and successful organisation of activities. Although we primarily use a wide range of official communication tools, in the digital era, the input and coverage that can be obtained via social media should by no means be neglected. When I started my diplomatic career working in Tallinn, the first challenge was to analyse objectively which information technology (IT) tools to use and where they will bring the highest added value. I was fully aware that I was acting in one of the most developed countries globally in terms of egovernance, IT-solutions and cyber security protection. Obviously, not using social media to further our diplomatic aims in the country with the greatest number of start-ups per capita in the world, the home of Skype, an X-road with high-security encryption and digital government, would mean a complete disregard for the realities of the local environment. As required by my diplomatic post, I use all major communication channels. My personal Facebook page consists of posts in Romanian, English and the Estonian language and it is my main communication tool with private individuals, aiming to exchange opinions in a non-formal format and to describe briefly my non-diplomatic life. The Facebook page of the Embassy of the Republic of Moldova to Estonia is used mainly to disseminate the official press-releases, public information, announcements and main interviews on bilateral agenda. The page currently has 1,048 followers, while the number of daily visitors is much higher than average for a Mission’s official website. The third tool is my personal Twitter account, which I mainly use to keep informed of current events in the quickest possible way, directly from world leaders. I receive timely information on global political, economic and social developments, but also on security issues. Twitter also turned out to be a very effective tool in disseminating the information on major events in the Moldovan-Estonian agenda. Last but not least, my personal blog serves as a long-term database for me and for everyone interested in bilateral relations and related technical information. Past announcements about project proposals, projects’ descriptions and all major interviews can be found there easily via a search engine. There are a number of reasons why I use social media to achieve my diplomatic goals, and inevitably, new reasons continue to appear. Our embassy is a two-diplomat mission, which is nevertheless charged with fulfilling a large amount of responsibilities. The most crucial of these is the promotion of my country among Estonian citizens. Moldova is facing a decisive period: its integration in the European Union gradually acquiring a concrete form and a huge number of transformations are currently taking place. Informing our partners and friends about these developments is crucial for us,
as well as receiving their feedback and constructive criticism, when needed. Social media considerably facilitates this process, by informing a greater number of people than conventional tools, and sometimes providing immediate feedback. I strongly believe in “differentiation” and “more-formore” principles should be applied to social media use and that informing the public on positive news and successful reforms via social media can serve as the basis for new, even more significant results. Even if the amount of Moldovan products on the Estonian market is not very large, each year brings more positive trends. Social media is a great platform to promote our goods to the outside world. It becomes much easier to find Moldovan business people interested in the Estonian market, as well as for them to contact our staff or their counterparts in Estonia. Greater information exchange means more predictability and less wasted resources, which lead to more result-oriented actions from our embassy. As a result, we single out and invite only those Moldovan companies truly interested in the market to participate in international fairs and to make presentations in Estonia. A majority of them have already established business-to-business contacts prior to their arrival. We also created a special Facebook page: “Products of Moldova in the world – Moldovan Products Worldwide,” where we post information about Moldovan products that can be found on the Estonian market (including product photos, shops in which it can be purchased, the manufacturer, price, etc). The page serves as a guide for Estonian customers interested in our products, as well as for Moldovan producers to analyse Estonian public preferences. The page has 679 followers right now. The amount of bilateral projects between Moldova and Estonia is permanently growing. An increasing number of state institutions, local authorities, cultural and social groups, non-governmental organisations and individuals are developing inspiring projects of cooperation. Without social media, this development would not be possible at such an advanced degree. People from Moldova are learning about success stories and are encouraged to apply for new projects. More interest from my country triggers more openness from Estonian citizens as Moldova is a priority country in the Cooperation for Development Strategy of the Republic of Estonia. On my social-media channels, I publish not only official positions and statements, but also examples of best practices observed daily, whether in Tallinn, small villages or the local newspapers. Frequently, these stories, followed by discussions with interested people from Moldova, lead to the successful implementation of similar projects. For example, using this tool, we managed to launch a road security campaign on the Moldovan motorway, to increase the capacity of the Neighbourhood Watch program in Moldova, to establish dozens of partnerships between interested organizations and individuals in Moldova and Estonia, and even to sign cooperation agreements between local authorities in our two countries. The distribution and effect of public announcements are clearly enhanced via social-media. A record number of applications for projects were submitted in 2013, as a result of online promotion. Taking into account that all the applications were submitted on the basis of Moldovan-Estonian partnerships, even those projects that are not financed can be considered examples of successful bilateral cooperation, as they frequently result in groups from Moldova and Estonia later developing common projects via alternative sources of financing. Public announcements remain on our social-media channels, and are later used by potential applicants in comparative studies. Using the same method, a greater number of potential students at Estonian universities are informed about admission
possibilities and conditions. Communication with officials, business people and opinion leaders from Estonia and Moldova is essential to my job, in order to highlight initiatives and bilateral projects. As time and resources are always limited, the use of conventional tools of communication cannot cover the enormous amount of information. Communication through social media channels is very fast, friendly, it can occur at any time and day, it does not require special technical platforms and it connects people worldwide. World events are a constantly changing dynamic and one should always be informed from multiple sources. The speed of information movement is outstanding, and while it has been proved that any important information will reach the public in fifteen minutes, worldwide; Twitter manages to do this within two minutes. I use my Twitter profile to have a clear picture of the situation in a quick and efficient way, as it provides the reactions of senior officials to foreign policy issues. I follow the profiles of about one hundred heads of state, EU officials, foreign ministers and leaders from around the world. In crisis situations, the officials’ reaction time may be vital. In this regard, we have established a mechanism for forwarding telephone calls from our institution to the mobile phones of our employees 24/7, ensuring full-time access to our staff for every person within the territory of Estonia. The reasonable use of social media and the advantages of the transfer speed of information serve as an additional crisis management platform. The case of the twenty-six Moldovan citizens stuck at Riga airport is a very good example in this regard. To some extent, the use of social-media channels by diplomats is changing the traditional ways of thinking about the role of diplomatic missions. An embassy connected to people via these tools is widely present, functionally non-stop, less expensive and more effective. The use of online instruments is gradually becoming an indispensable part of modern diplomacy and I am quite sure that those who neglect the importance of social media now will need to learn it in the near future to be connected to the realities of the modern world. Even if there are still people who prefer to work in more traditional and conservative ways, the speed of the information flow is increasing so rapidly that the use of modern communications, platforms and tools is simply becoming unavoidable.
17. Sergey Utkin. Digital Diplomacy and Russia’s Image Problem Sergey Utkin Head, Centre for Situation Analysis of the Russian Academy of Sciences
The Image The linkage between Russia’s image and the art of diplomacy has a long history. At a time when the majority of world politics was essentially European, Russia was, at first, far away and insignificant. Then, with its imperial rise—it became ever-more important, but still no closer. Most of the educated in Western Europe would only know of the country from writings by diplomats and travelers, such as the Austrian Ambassador Sigismund von Herberstein[379] in the sixteenth century, or the German scholar Adam Olearius[380] a century later. Because of Peter the Great’s reliance on foreign help to build a stronger, more modern state, the number of foreign dwellers in Russia soared, and the tsar himself intervened as the most senior diplomat, “cutting a window to Europe,” as Aleksandr Pushkin famously described it. Judging by the large number of European nationals who opted for careers in the service of Russian monarchs, who, in their turn, were often coming to the throne from abroad, Russia’s image was less of a problem in the eighteenth century, when the absolute monarchies across the continent all seemed quite similar. But Russia’s catch up stumbled during the age of revolutions in Europe, when Nicholas I tightened the screws and its image problem returned, as illustrated by the notorious memoirs of Marquis de Custine.[381] Since that time, the affliction receded only rarely. The retarded tyranny refused to see itself as such. Conservative ideologists, supported by the Tsar, insisted that a symphony of absolutism and Orthodoxy, the only true way of preaching God, was the eternal recipe for Russia. If others criticized the country, it was only natural, since the critics did not hold the right faith and did not respect Russian traditions. Glimpses of gradual economic and political changes to this vision were eventually swept away by the Great Revolution of 1917, which claimed to produce the most modern state on the planet, a model for humanity. The Bolshevik government needed to be viewed favorably by the masses abroad, in order to push them all toward worldwide revolution. At the same time, established foreign political regimes and their supporters, the bourgeoisie, were openly proclaimed as the enemies of the working people, producing a predictably hostile response. This ideological bias only complemented the radical, often brutal policies inside Soviet Russia, another source of bad image. Again, Russian officials refused to acknowledge the deficiencies of the regime until it reached the brink of collapse in the mid-1980s. In the meantime, the propaganda machinery developed to explain the benefits of communism to the world, worked full-steam. As everything else in the Soviet Union, the system was run by the state, a part of the very same apparatus as the diplomatic service. The state knew exactly what messages needed to be delivered on every aspect of domestic policies and external relations of the USSR. Internal tensions and accidents needed to be suppressed before they
entered the public realm. This produced the picture of a calm and stable socialist camp confronted by the chaotic capitalist world drowning in criminality and never-ending disaster. This careful censorship still was unable to hide everything, with bits and pieces of real-life information permeating into rumors, jokes and private kitchen talk. Foreign broadcasters, whose radio programs could sometimes be received, despite efforts to block them, were considered a breath of truth. In many respects, the Soviet propaganda system ended up working in idle—neither the locals nor the foreigners took its messages for sincerity. The USSR kept some of its fans in the international communist movement, but even there a sense of disillusion could be felt. The war in Afghanistan, along with economic troubles, left no space for the old ways. Mikhail Gorbachev’s very first message, as the new Soviet leader in 1985, was precisely a change of image. It was transmitted not through texts, but in the way he openly talked to people, a striking contrast to the gerontocracy of previous years. The change was soon felt across Soviet media, culture and foreign policy. The propaganda machine was still in use but for the different purpose—to communicate readiness for dialogue and debate. Perestroika (Rebuilding) was, paradoxically, the biggest success of Soviet PR-efforts and the system’s swan song. The state-run information campaign was finally complemented by actual change, observable by citizens and foreign broadcasters. State propaganda happened to be much less important in this more open environment. But the collapse of the regime also had negative consequences. Economic chaos, ethnic conflict, and administrative weakness were certainly bad for the image of the post-Soviet states, and this time, the locals were not separated from foreigners by the floodgates of propaganda. This time, the image problem became an internal problem. No more was it only a limited number of intellectuals who cared about the negative perception of the USSR abroad, but many tens of millions of citizens, for decades told that they lived in the planet’s most advanced country, and suddenly saw themselves in the complete misery of the 1990s.
The Internet In the 2000s, with gradual economic improvement, many Russians rapidly developed an interest and taste for the Internet. Unlike many other examples in the course of Russian history, here the state lagged significantly behind private initiatives. In information policy, President Vladimir Putin was mainly, if not exclusively, concerned with television, including television for external audiences, ordering the creation of the RT (Russia Today) English-language channel in 2005, which was later complemented by Arabic and Spanish versions. When in 2008 the Internet-loving Dmitry Medvedev took the presidential post in Russia, he seemed a very timely asset, finally allowing for the modernization of the state apparatus. External image problems, meanwhile, were recurrent. In the eyes of many, the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008 showed Russia’s inability to push its arguments through the fog of an information war. Medvedev noticed the rise of social networks across the world and was quick to start using them. In November 2008, he started a blog on Livejournal.com, a platform that originated in the US, but became most popular in Russia. In November 2009, Medvedev joined Facebook. He started a Twitter account and an English-language mirror account in June 2010. All of this was complemented by accounts on YouTube, Instagram, and the Russian social network VKontakte. Unlike many other officials, he did not see it all as a business purely for his press-service, adding a personal touch to
many entries. Meeting the plenary of the Russian ambassadors in 2010, the President hinted that they should not to retell in encoded telegrams what he could learn instantly by checking the news on his smartphone.[382] For many, this statement sounded obvious, but for an aged bureaucracy with Soviet roots, it was quite revolutionary. The Russian MFA followed the President’s style, gradually establishing its presence on social networks and learning to work more efficiently with Russian and foreign news agencies. The embassies were ordered to open Twitter accounts, even though some of them could hardly grasp the concept. The list of the Russia’s diplomatic presence online is readily available on the website of the Ministry. The online proliferation of the MFA is an obvious tactical success. The accounts of the Ministry are well read,[383] dynamic and sometimes used to provide exclusive information (this mainly happens on Facebook, when the official website experiences technical difficulties). The full array of media available—photos, videos, hashtags—are employed. The woman behind the Ministry’s digital efforts—Mariya Zakharova, Deputy Director of the MFA Information and Press Department—is also present on social networks in a personal capacity, often using her accounts to add unofficial commentary to the Ministry’s statements. Zakharova believes one of the biggest problems is that the MFA’s information can be broadcast without being heard.[384] The widening audience was probably one factor behind the changing language of ministerial communications. The calm, often boring diplomatic formulae were complemented by bright, sometimes even rude expressions that were picked up by other users’ profiles and by news agencies, helping to spread the message. Coincidentally or not, one can often taste the flavor of Soviet propaganda in those spicy passages. This trick is as efficient as it is controversial, since the barely appropriate language is inevitably attributed to the Ministry and the Russian state.
Soft Power In the last few years, with the most frequent criticism of the Russian diplomatic corps and its old-fashionedness, the notion of “soft power” has become omnipresent. Social media happens to be the easiest way to broadcast to the world that Russian diplomacy thinks in a modern way and understands the major trends in foreign policy. Few refer directly to the ideas of Joseph S. Nye,[385] developing instead an understanding of the term based on their own experience. As the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is one of the most conservative such institutions in style, this understanding was mainly borrowed from the Soviet past. “Soft power” became a euphemism for a multi-tiered propaganda machine that includes state-run “civil society” structures, media, publishing and opinion-makers. The hypothesis above suggests that the Soviet system was efficient, but then accidentally broke down due to the lack of money. As efficient propaganda is hard to ensure, this in practice meant that the people involved in the system felt good about it—they were part of a well-paid, highly-qualified cadre with good career prospects. If the state is to provide the same kind of benefits to its information class today, it needs to be sure that the message promoted by this “soft power” apparatus is the one it wants delivered. And, if the model of the propaganda machine is indeed the Soviet one, it has to work both for domestic and external audiences, conferring the correct, state-approved vision of reality. This holistic approach was adopted soon after the Russian presidential elections of 2012, and exhibited its full might during the Ukrainian crisis of 2014. In April 2013, RT Television established
a separate news agency called Ruptly, to produce and sell the raw video material used for reporting. In December 2013, the respectable news agency RIA Novosti was liquidated to make way for the significantly more biased International News Agency “Rossiya Segodnya,” led by the scandalous TVhost Dmitriy Kiselev. A number of leading print and Internet media experienced serious reshuffle of editorial teams and management. The government message could then be delivered in unison, save for a number of weak dissenting voices. Civil society has been simulated by the Civic Chamber, which was created back in 2005 as a body loyal to the President. Now the Chamber plays a role in delivering the same governmental messages to their non-governmental counterparts in other countries. More importantly, members of the Chamber usually represent “civil society” at foreign policy debates inside Russia, assuring observers that the people support their President. It is important to note that the message the state wants propaganda to deliver is usually not the one found in government statements. Pushing in the same direction, propaganda messages usually go much further, sometimes frighteningly further, than the official line, underlining the moderate character of the latter.
The Battle Digital diplomacy can easily be used to enhance mutual understanding by bringing more people into the conversation on a regular basis. But digital tools are not bound exclusively to the task of fostering understanding. When the task is to win a conflict, digital instruments happen to be just the right tool. This has become strikingly clear in the course of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. Russian “soft power” managed to create an alternative universe of established facts and conclusions, which revealed Russian policy as the only rational and balanced course, at a time when the rest of the world has seemingly gone mad. Digital media tools are significantly decentralized. It is often impossible to clearly determine if a particular social network account is affiliated with the government. The battle waged by state organs melts into the sea of personal opinions, which are by default biased and filled with emotion, making it easier to promote one side of a conflict. The adversaries in the conflict do not stay idle. Propaganda is faced with a counter-propaganda and third-party propaganda. The source of any “information” is increasingly hard to establish. Increasingly, in public debate, people refer to “facts” from the Internet without being able to clearly identify their source and reliability. If a piece of “information,” however unreliable, benefits a conflicting party, it will probably be posted and disseminated. The most horrifying pieces of information seem to be the least checked. Domestic and foreign audiences are again intertwined. The barriers to the spread of information are more linguistic than based on citizenship. Even the widely spread English language is a high-enough hurdle to significantly limit the spread of information to Russian-speaking audience. Attempts at create Russian-language sources of alternative information inevitably lose when confronted by the massive influence of state television. Even with the MFA present across social networks, a choice of information sources is there for those who want to explore them. Most readers tend to pay more attention to the conflicting party whose side they support. Therefore, messages from the official agency of an adversary rarely change opinions.
The “factual” nature of messages can be supported by a video or photo, which sometimes helps penetrate the wall of distrust. Finally, digital tools act as a catalyst. If Russia and Ukraine are in an escalating conflict, the escalation will be accelerated by the voluntary or not-so-voluntary help of the “sofa-warriors.” If, on the contrary, the countries were to reach a diplomatic solution, it could be easier to implement with online support. It shows diplomacy is not allowed in the driving seat, because the governments behind the diplomats are unwilling to drop confrontation. There is a risk that a government can become victim of its own propaganda, and again this is easier on social networks. When a politician sees numerous messages of support for even the most radical actions, he must find it harder to compromise. In the past, the same phenomenon happened in the newspapers. Apart from the speed and higher interactivity of digital media, the nature, difficulties and dangers of communication remain the same.
The Diplomacy As digital instruments spread, the notion of “digital diplomacy” will lose its sense. As in any other sphere of life, the use of digital tools will become natural and unremarkable. Digital media is faster and more comprehensive, but it does not change human nature—nor does it even try to. All bureaucracies work in a similar way. In every office, there may be those who care more about Twitter-presence than others, as happens with every aspect of the job. For a state bureaucracy it is, logically, far more important to keep good contacts with compatriots than winning the hearts and minds abroad, even if the agency is tasked with international outreach. It is also a more easily achievable goal. Whatever the attitude of foreigners, our Foreign Ministry defends our interests—this is the message most people want to hear. The energetic, sometimes rough Russian MFA communicates to Russian citizens, and even more importantly, to the higher levels of the state apparatus, precisely this message of defending Russian interests. According to the Russian Constitution, foreign policy is determined by the President. The Ministry is left to implement policy accordingly. Implementation includes some opportunities for creativity, but the more you respect the President’s vision, the safer you are. If there is no chance the West might like and share your vision, it might be wiser, bureaucratically speaking, to spend time courting the post-Soviet space, Latin America, Asia and Africa, which have less of a hang-up on democracy. For Russia’s relations with much of these countries digital diplomacy will not be a game changer. Russia’s image problem, contrary to the belief of many in the Russian state machinery, is about policy formulation rather than policy explanation. The MFA’s successful delivery of messaging across borders by way of computer screens may even make things worse, when those who earlier abstained from arguing with the Russians finally enter the debate on the “wrong” side.
18. Hristofor Hrisoskulov. #Ukraine: A Good Chance for eDiplomacy. A View from Eastern Europe Hristofor Hrisoskulov Data Analyst Web & Social Media, Wunderknaben Kommunikation GmbH[386] No country can act wisely simultaneously in every part of the globe at every moment of time Henry A. Kissinger Technology in the 21st century is changing everything—even maxims. One hundred and forty characters on Twitter, a post on Facebook or a video on YouTube can be an unpredictable platform for developing new foreign policy. What political leaders want to tell the world is no longer dependent on local media channels and the various restrictions on press freedom in autocratic countries. There are no closed doors or confidentiality. Yes, technology itself is driving foreign policy. Welcome to the new world of e-diplomacy, digital diplomacy, diplomacy 2.0 or 21st century diplomacy. Welcome to “Twitterverse.” For sure, there are many labels for the use of different social media networks and tools to further foreign policy. Fergus Hanson from the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, describes this term as “the use of the web and new ICT to help carry out diplomatic objectives.”[387] It is evident that we live in a different world with 24/7 news feeds, immediate crisis response, and these new realities have an ability to shape foreign policy as it is being made. “We live in a post-Westphalian system in which the Nation-State has lost the monopoly of international power and information and is no longer the sole entity that determines how countries and societies relate to one another on the world stage.”[388] In this new world, the most powerful leader may no longer be the one with the most nukes, but the one with the most followers. This new leader’s influence is measured by the reach of tweets or posts, by connections and network or even by the depth and engagement of those connections. And the new maxim is: The winner is the one whose tweet or post originally wins and goes viral. The new kind of diplomacy complements traditional diplomacy, changes the way political leaders monitor, listen and engage with their followers. And Twitter is probably the best platform to transmit intentions. The 140 character limitation helps to focus messaging: short, informative, unique, direct and efficient. By using social media, political leaders “are entering a world more different than many realize, and changing, possibly even unwittingly, how public diplomacy will work.”[389] They communicate with new counterparts: social media users represent individuals, associations, non-profits or other political leaders. And they are facing new challenges and have been confronted with new #Hashtags. For example, the crisis in Ukraine created new hashtags like #VilniusSummit, #EasternPartnership, #Euromaidan, #Automaidan, #Antimaidan, #Ukraine, #Crimea, etc. “Twitterverse” has been tweeting all the time about these tensions in the eastern part of Europe. But what happened in Ukraine?
#Euromaidan Emerges on Twitter Since November 2013 Ukraine faced probably the most turbulent times in its young independent history. In Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych suspended the long prepared Association Agreement and a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union, in order to pursue closer economic ties with Russia. The same day in Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital, a wave of demonstrations arose. The same day a new word appeared to describe this wave of demonstrations: Euromaidan. The #Hashtag was created: #Euromaidan.
According to New York University’s Social Media and Political Participation Lab the #Euromaidan protests on Twitter or Facebook emerged “to organize help when needed and to motivate other people to join the protest.”[390] Meanwhile, one political development in Ukraine followed another, Ukraine entered a spiral of violence: protests and clashes, deaths, economic agreement with Russia, compromise deal with Ukrainian opposition leaders, President Yanukovych disappeared, Crimea held a referendum to join Russia, Crimea and Russia signed a treaty on the adoption of Crimea to Russia, EU imposed sanctions—travel bans and asset freezes on several official from Russia, Crimea and Ukraine. The infographic below gives a short overview of these developments as of the writing of this analysis.
Eastern European Leaders and E-diplomacy Fears circulated that Russia, an important player in Eastern Europe, would go even further
and annex parts of Eastern Ukraine, or parts of Moldova and the Baltic states, where a large minority of Russians live. The eastern European countries who were members of the European Union and NATO had come a long way in distancing themselves from the Kremlin’s sphere of influence. For Russia, it was evident that once a country left the Russian sphere of influence, there was no chance of it returning. The following statements from Edgars Rinkēvičs (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Latvia), Dalia Grybauskaitė (President of Lithuania), Radosław Sikorski (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland), Toomas Hendrik Ilves (President of Estonia) and Linas Linkevičius (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania) on Twitter underline this assumption:
By making such statements on Twitter for the broader and relevant audience regarding their role in NATO and EU and underlining their distance from Russia all the mentioned politicians promote their foreign policy on current threats and defend their current roles and activities in the area of European foreign policy.
Since the Ukrainian crisis emerged, Eastern European leaders have regularly tweeted on the developments on the Eastern border of the European Union. Based on the following parameters: Audience (number of followers on Twitter) Popularity (number of retweets per 100 tweets) Engagement (replies per 100 tweets) User mentions (average number of mentions) Replies (% of replies in the total of analyzed tweets) I identified five Eastern European leaders among of which acting foreign ministers, prime ministers and presidents mostly ranked in the top ten: Linas Linkevičius (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania): @LinkeviciusL Dalia Grybauskaitė (President of Lithuania): @Grybauskaite_LT Edgars Rinkēvičs (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Latvia): @edgarsrinkevics Toomas Hendrik Ilves (President of Estonia): @IlvesToomas Radosław Sikorski (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland): @sikorskiradek This short list shows that leaders from Poland and the Baltic States are most influential on Twitter. But there is also a difference between these two regions: Politicians from Poland attract many more followers than politicians from the Baltic states, suggesting that geography and, especially, demography play a crucial role. When the Ukraine crisis emerged in November 2013, e-diplomatic influence rose faster in Poland than in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia (picture below, data source: http://ediplomacy.afp.com/, accessed April 6, 2014). In global rankings of E-diplomacy presence Poland reaches no. 48, Latvia —no. 80, Lithuania—no. 87, and Estonia—no. 97. This ranking certainly highlights that, “[t]here is, however, a big discrepancy between using digital technologies to communicate about one’s public diplomacy initiatives, and integrating these technologies and the resulting changes in citizens’ behaviors to shape the decision-making process at diplomatic level.”[391] It is hard to find a balanced role for new communication alternatives such as social networks in overall public diplomacy initiatives.
For sure there is no clear definition of influence. Just counting the followers of these politicians does not define their influence. This is why I used all these five parameters in order to measure their influence on Twitter. Only open conversation and interaction with followers contribute to an increase in public diplomacy’s relevance to a broader audience without replacing the tools (dispatches, confidential phone calls, etc.) of traditional diplomacy. However, a study published by the public relations firm Burson-Marsteller[392] reveals that only some 30 out of the 264 world leaders on Twitter actually do their tweeting themselves. According to the mentioned study, and my personal experience, the six selected politicians tweet personally on Twitter since they do not only tweet on political events, international meetings and EU policy decisions but also family issues (Radosław Sikorski), historical events (Dalia Grybauskaitė), various national holidays (Linas Linkevičius), and even develop Twitter feuds (for example, Toomas Hendrik Ilves with Paul Krugman, an American economist[393]). The question is not what the message is, but the intention behind it: listening, communicating and engaging with followers and influencers. The infographic below outlines how the six leaders perform on Twitter.
But what role does e-diplomacy play in the #Ukraine crisis? I directly asked some of the selected leaders on Twitter and their answers were not surprising:
So what are they doing with Twitter? They are able to respond to an evolving crisis even before official statements have been made, transparency and efficiency motivate Eastern European leaders to tweet and to post on Facebook or another social media platform. They communicate with others. They interact with and engage their network and potential new followers. Communication and interaction that have attracted much attention are helping politicians on Twitter to expand their follower’s base; audience from all over the world is displaying a real interest in conversation of and reflection on current topics in the Ukrainian crisis. The fellow users most often mentioned in their tweets and the users most replied to are either other politicians from the European Union and NATO, the Baltic countries and Poland, and representatives of political institutions or journalists and researchers. The infographic below gives deeper insight into their communication behavior.
Further, it is not particularly surprising that the most retweeted and favoured tweets are related to the crisis in Ukraine (data source: mytoptweet.com, accessed April 1, 2014).
3 Top Tweets on #Ukraine
Is there a communication problem with Russia? The selected officials do not communicate directly to their counterparts in Russia and Crimea by direct tweet (@username). Because of the rising threat to European security after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, NATO decided to cancel NATO-Russia cooperation on April 1, 2014. Regarding this news item, Toomas Hendrik Ilves and Radosław Sikorski posted some interesting retweets: namely, provocative statements of Dmitry Rogozin (Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, Head of the Military-Industrial Commission and Special Envoy of the President: @DRogozin) regarding NATO’s decision and the Crimean annexation.
Where Is E-diplomacy Heading? “We’re living in a monitory age. People feel they have the right to monitor decisions . . . The modern world has so many actors, and issues are so complex, that the notion that bureaucrats have all the answers and information is absurd,”[394] argued Daniel Korski, special advisor on communication to EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Catherine Ashton. Indeed, Eastern European leaders do not have all the answers on the Ukrainian crisis. They cannot predict further developments. But they already have an all-new set of communication tools to better transmit their reactions on often complex topics. “In this landscape, fast diplomacy is certainly not the goal, but rather a lapse in the search for a stronger presence in social media and a better engagement with all social diplomacy actors, traditional and less-traditional.”[395] E-diplomacy will not solve the Ukrainian crisis. Traditional diplomacy will be in ever greater demand today and in the future. However, traditional diplomacy and faster conflict resolution in Ukraine can be facilitated by social media. Social media can also reveal the current common European, and in particular Eastern European, position on developments in Ukraine, updating it, first and foremost, with a reference to personal statements.
19. Radu Cucoş. Social Media Bridges between States and Diasporas: The Case Study of Moldova Radu Cucoş Deputy Chief of Mission, Counselor, the Embassy of the Republic of Moldova to the Kingdom of the Netherlands For many years, governments around the world have searched for the best ways to connect to their nationals who migrated abroad for different reasons. Some have been successful in this endeavor, others less successful, depending on the efforts and resources invested. The development of the Internet and its adoption by governments worldwide for the implementation of different policies represented an important milestone for the relationship between state institutions and their citizens who reside abroad. The Internet quickly became a tool through which diaspora members could obtain information about the political, economic, social and cultural developments in their countries of origin, something that was not possible with paper media or regular TV programs. Nevertheless, communication policies implemented through regular websites were not engaging and appealing enough for end users. Without any doubt, social media has revolutionized the way people and institutions communicate and interact. If communication was previously local or regional, social media platforms created a new global communication society by uniting all those local and regional nodes. Never before could a simple post or announcement reach such a huge number of people who can react and comment as they wish. One big question for governments worldwide became how to use current innovative IT tools to engage diasporas in a permanent, sustainable, result-oriented and cost-effective dialogue. Although opening a Facebook or Twitter account takes a matter of minutes, creating an efficient and interactive environment between state institutions and citizens abroad is no easy task. Before discussing the building blocks that need to be put into place in order for governments to efficiently engage with diasporas using social media, one has to be aware of some of the most important advantages of this virtual cooperation. This is important as the behavior of governments on social media has limitations and cannot be the same as that of a regular user. Social media allows for better participation of diasporas in policy making. A vast majority of national legislation obliges governments and legislative branches to promote the transparency of policy-making process by consulting legislative initiatives with their population. The goal of this consultation is to ensure that policies are accepted by society and that useful feedback from citizens is reflected in the proposed policy initiatives. Since, in some countries, a large proportion of population has migrated abroad, state institutions had to look for the best ways to consult their decisions with those nationals who left the country. This is the case of my country, the Republic of Moldova, where it is considered that out of a population of almost 3.6 million, up to one million are living abroad. This number is too big to be overlooked, and therefore, the authorities in the Republic of Moldova had to think of an efficient way to engage the nearly one million Moldovan migrants in policy making. We
understood that using social media is a perfect solution, since most of our citizens abroad are active online and have interest in participating in Moldovan political life. Therefore, we used social media to build online communities, which were gradually became involved in the policy making process. A remarkable example I could give is when the Moldovan Government was adopting transport fees (vigneta) for cars with foreign license plates that were entering or transiting through Moldova’s territory. The Government adopted fees which subsequently had to be revised under the pressure of the Moldovan diaspora abroad, which used social media to express their frustration with the high amount of fees. The engagement of Moldovan citizens abroad was very strong on this point since many migrants travel back to Moldova using cars with foreign license plates during vacations. Social media allows governments to “discover” the most prominent and successful members of diasporas whose knowledge and expertise could be used in the government’s interest. State authorities, especially in developing countries, have to invest considerable financial resources to acquire outside expertise on certain subjects of interest. I am sure that everyone knows the price tags of consultants from companies such as McKinsey and Company, Deloitte or Ernst and Young and not many countries can afford their fees. As an alternative, governments can use the expertise of prominent members of diaspora who are willing to assist their home country based on patriotism and a desire to help fellow countryman. In this process, the greatest challenge for authorities is to be able to identify those diaspora members whose knowledge and expertise could be used in government’s interest. Social media turned out to be one of the best ways to solve this lack of information problem. It was social media that helped the Moldovan public sector discover that there is a group of prominent Moldovan economists and financial experts working for the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, private banks and teaching at important U.S. and European universities. The Moldovan Government, through the Bureau for Diaspora Relations, was wise enough to initiate a dialogue with these talented members of the Moldovan communities abroad and currently some of them are serving as advisers within the Economic Council of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova and are providing expertise in fields such as the national budget, fiscal reform and discipline, investment attraction and financial markets. It is a win-win situation, since governments are benefiting from top nudge expertise at a low cost and diaspora members have a unique opportunity to access high-ranking national politicians and to have a positive impact on the development of their country of origin. Social media helps to solve the collective action problem faced by governments when it comes to projects involving diasporas. The majority of countries allow their citizens to vote abroad at diplomatic missions or consular posts. This process involves a great effort of coordination and awareness raising by state authorities since the members of diasporas as individuals do not have sufficient incentives to insure wide participation among migrants in national elections. It is especially difficult to organize elections in countries such as Russia, the U.S. or Canada, because of their enormous size. One of the biggest challenges is to inform nationals and diaspora members about the election process and to keep them up-to-date with new developments. From my personal diplomatic experience in the United States, it was especially difficult to inform Moldovan communities about parliamentary elections using traditional information sources such as paper media and TV channels, because Moldovan communities are located in clusters on the West and East coasts. Under these circumstances, social media is of great help because it allows governments to easily and directly
communicate with their diasporas. Of course, this is only true provided that governments have built social media communities or are able to use such communities already established by diasporas. Social media allows diaspora members to have access to government officials and politicians, even if this access is virtual. Politicians, members of parliament or ministers were in the past and still use many different methods to interact with their constituencies, such as town hall meetings, TV and newspaper interviews and other types of gatherings. Although these methods had and still have a degree of success, they are time consuming, costly and not always allow a personal and direct interaction between people and politicians. In the case of citizens abroad, this is even more critical, because being in another country makes it almost impossible to engage in dialogue with government officials from their country of origin. Nowadays, social media gains more and more ground and it is impossible to imagine a politician, government official or state institution whose public relations strategy does not include social media. Therefore, by having an active presence in social media, statespersons give opportunities to their electorate, especially the electorate based abroad, to engage in dialogue, voice their concerns or signal different problems. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. Frans Timmermans, is an excellent example of an important European politician who is using social media to interact with people and engage in dialogue. Being very active on Facebook, Minister Timmermans had personally managed his profile and many times responded to feedback provided by his followers. It is difficult to imagine a Dutch citizen residing abroad able to call the Dutch Foreign Minister on the phone and voice his concern or satisfaction with Netherlands’ foreign policy, nevertheless, it is a fact that he or she could contact Timmermans through social media with a significant probability that the Minister will respond to the message. In my experience, I had a similar situation. While a student at the University of Chicago and studying economics, I was following economic reforms in my home country of Moldova. Since the head of Moldova’s Parliament Commission on Economy, Budget and Finance is active on social media I had the chance to discuss with him about different policy initiatives and express my opinion about the economic reasoning of these initiatives. The possibility to engage in serious conversation with one of the most important members of the Parliament of Moldova while being abroad gave me great satisfaction and made me feel to be a part of the national policy making process, although I was thousands of kilometers away from home. Limitation of social media use can have political costs. Limiting access to social media platforms can have negative impact on the relationship between governments and their diasporas since social media is seen nowadays as one of the most important “bridges” that connects diasporas with their home country. More than that, the importance of social media for diasporas is constantly growing since these virtual platforms do not serve only for communication, but also provide critical services such as international money transfers, through which diaspora members are able to send money back home to their relatives. In the case of a limitation of the rights of citizens to make use of the advantages of social media, without a doubt, this decision could lead to a decrease of political support for governments from diaspora members. Without discussing other theoretical aspects of this situation I would like to refer to the recent developments in Turkey, where the state authorities have decided to limit the access of people to one of the most popular social media platforms. This decision has been widely criticized internally and internationally and put pressure on the state authorities in Ankara.
As I mentioned previously, opening a Facebook or Twitter account takes a matter of minutes but creating an efficient and interactive environment between state institutions and citizens abroad is no easy task. Thus, before building a social media strategy and action-plan vis-a-vis diasporas, governments and other state institutions have to be aware of some standard building blocks that need to be put in place beforehand. First of all, governments have to map their diasporas and possess information about diaspora distribution around the globe. This is extremely important for determining which social media platforms ought to be used by governments for engaging communities of migrants. Odnoklassniki and VKontakte are the most appropriate platforms to be leveraged for dialogue with diasporas established in Russia and the former Soviet Union countries. Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn are popular among users in the United States, Canada, Australia and Europe. In China, governments should use QZone or Weibo. The diversity of social media platforms also requires the use of different languages for communication. Diaspora mapping means not only classifying people by their place of residence abroad, but also by their occupation, which is useful in identifying clusters of diaspora members working in the same industry or engaged in similar economic activity. For example, at the Moldovan Foreign Service, we identified that there is a group of Moldovans working for IT companies on the US West Coast. Possessing this information allows the government to target individual communities involved with particular subjects of interest to the government. Governments have to nominate an existing agency or to create a new one which will be responsible for promotion of social media use within state authorities. The adoption of social media for cooperation, including with diasporas, should be a well-organized process and coordinated by a single institution. Otherwise, in the absence of a unique coordinator, different institutions could use social media in different ways and some of them could not use social media at all, especially if one takes into account the natural tendency of bureaucracies to be resistant to innovation and institutional changes. In the Republic of Moldova, the leadership role was given to the e-Governance Center, which was established by the government in order to promote e-Transformation in the country. The e-Governance Center developed regulations and guidelines related to social media use, which helped other state agencies to better understand how social media platforms could be leveraged for communication and daily operations. In my former capacity as Chief Information Officer of the Moldovan Foreign Service, I was coordinating my ministry’s activities to implement the social media guidelines developed by the e-Governance Center, thus ensuring that policies adopted at top-levels have logical continuity at lower levels of administration. Moldova has an institutional model that might be different from other countries, but what is really important is that governments set up institutions that have enough legal and budgetary mechanisms to incentivize other state agencies to embrace social media as a platform for cooperation, including with citizens located in other countries. It is mandatory for governments to adopt legislation related to the use of social media by state authorities and to develop special guidelines and trainings for those officials who are responsible for engaging diasporas in the interests of their country. Legislation, guidelines and training are necessary in order to ensure that government employees responsible for interacting with communities abroad through social media on a daily basis follow standard rules of communication and respect professional ethics. The behavior of state authorities on social media platforms has to be impeccable
in order to earn the trust of virtual communities and not to damage the government’s reputation. Legislation and guidelines are also necessary for establishing standard rules of social media use across all state institutions. There should not be great differences between how various ministries or agencies interact with communities established abroad through social media. In addition, legislation should set the boundaries of how governmental employees can behave in the virtual space. Facebook or Twitter can be used for expressing either the private or an official opinions of the same person. Therefore, it is very important to implement regulations which prevent situations where a private but controversial opinion is regarded as a public one, thus damaging the reputation of state institutions. One of the most important elements of engaging diasporas on social media is to consistently provide feedback and not respond to provocations from other participants in the virtual space. As mentioned above, social media allows diaspora members to have access to government officials and politicians and engage in direct conversations on various subjects. It is important that the state employees responsible for managing social media platforms acknowledge that the interaction between individuals and governments will not always be a smooth one. Users might voice their discontent about governmental policies or the performance of a certain statesperson in an aggressive and impolite manner and even with insults or inappropriate language. Lately, the public has witnessed cases when important public personalities had to close their social media accounts because of massive insults from users and even because of death threats. In these cases, state authorities should not respond to provocations, but on the contrary, should respond in an educated and professional manner to set an example for others. Providing feedback to questions and initiatives of a diaspora is highly important for a government’s reputation. There will not be serious and efficient engagement between diasporas and state authorities unless the latter takes diasporas requests seriously and responds accordingly. This is especially important when communication ethics differ across countries. For example, in the United States, citizens are accustomed to receiving a prompt answer to their inquiries from state institutions. That’s why if, for example, a state institution in Moldova receives a project proposal from the Moldovan diaspora in the United States, it is highly recommended that officials from the relevant institution take into account the communication ethics existing in the US and respond promptly. In conclusion, it must be mentioned that social media will play an increasingly larger role in the relationship between governments and their diasporas abroad. The capacity of social media platforms to serve as a tool for service delivery and not only for communication and community building will provide new opportunities for strengthening the relationship between migrants abroad and state institutions in their home country and for developing mutually beneficial projects in different areas. That is why governments, especially in countries with high out-migration rates, must invest in this relationship—the gains are too important to be underestimated. Risks exist, and many of them are not related to information technologies, but rather the human factor. Therefore, special attention must be paid to adopting regulations and guidelines related to social media use and the training of civil servants.
Endorsements This impressive volume examines the wide range of opportunities and challenges that the Internet has created for the countries of East Central Europe and Eurasia, most of which are still struggling to overcome difficult legacies of communism. The book presents an extraordinary variety of perspectives, including local and foreign, policy-oriented and academic, journalistic and activist. Some authors are enthusiastic advocates of the Internet’s power to democratize, while others are more circumspect, warning that authoritarians, too, have proven proficient at mobilizing it to their own advantage. Anyone interested in the role of the Internet in politics will find this book fascinating, and there is nothing else like it in bookstores today. —Henry E. Hale, professor of political science and international affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC. With relations between the West and Russia at their lowest point for fifteen years, new information technologies provide a particularly judicious lens for observing socio-political processes in Eastern Europe. Schreiber and Kosienkowski’s timely book breaks new ground in our understanding of the political implications of digital technologies in that region, as well as it fills a gap in the literature by bringing together area studies with information technologies studies. —Julien Nocetti, Research Fellow at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI)
This edited volume is an in-depth study on what I call the New “Internetional” System. In redrawing the old geopolitics with the “digital” rules of the game, “Digital Eastern Europe” provides the reader with an interdisciplinary framework including insightful accounts on a myriad of country cases and subject matters such as net governance, social media, cybercrime, mobile technologies, digital diplomacy and digital civic engagement. The chapters of the book are written by top-level practitioners, policy-makers and researchers. Thus, Digital Eastern Europe is a major contribution to develop a research agenda and roadmap for digital affairs. Now, Schreiber and Kosienkowski’s work can easily inspire others to address regional politics and international relations from a digital standpoint. —Gökhan Yücel, President at the Istanbul Center for Digital Affairs / Yenidiplomasi.com
[1]The information and views set out in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion or views of ICANN or any of its employees. Neither ICANN nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use of, or any errors or omissions in, the information contained herein. [2] Find the report of the Working Group on Internet Governance here: http://www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf. Full disclosure:
one of the authors of this article, Michael Yakushev, was a member of the WGIG (see p. 22 in the report). [3] The definition is given in point 10 of the document. The next two points are also relevant to it: 11. This working definition reinforces the concept of inclusiveness of Governments, the private sector and civil society in the mechanisms of Internet governance. This working definition also acknowledges that with respect to specific issues of Internet governance each group will have different interests, roles and participation, which in some cases will overlap.
12. It should be made clear, however, that Internet governance includes more than Internet names and addresses, issues dealt with by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN): it also includes other significant public policy issues, such as critical Internet resources, the security and safety of the Internet, and developmental aspects and issues pertaining to the use of the Internet. [4] See (registration required): http://www.internetsociety.org/what-we-do/learn-online-inforum.
[5] E.g.: http://d-russia.ru/mezhdunarodnoe-pravo-i-internet-dvizhenie-navstrechu-ili-protivostoyanie.html. [6] E.g.: http://www.itu.int/wsis/outcome/booklet/tunis-agenda_Cru.html. [7] See Information Document #7 by the Government of Bulgaria to the ITU Plenipotentiary meeting in 2010, published also by the Internet Society of Bulgaria here: http://isocbg.wordpress.com/2010/10/20/bg-itu/. The authors would be happy get feedback from other countries, where similar laws may exist. [8] See http://isoc.bg/kpd/index.shtml for more information on this case.
[9] See blog entry by Veni Markovski here: https://www.icann.org/news/blog/relations-between-bulgaria-and-icann-mark-majormilestones. [10] See French proposal: http://www.domainmondo.com/2014/07/icann-and-internet-governance-french.html.
[11] See footnote no. 2 above. [12] They were last changed and accepted by the International Telecommunications Union, the ITU, at their World Conference on International Telecommunications, WCIT: http://www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/Pages/itrs.aspx. [13] Read the full text here: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2000/documents/charter.html.
[14] http://netmundial.br, http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-internet-governance. [15] Relevant documents are published here: https://www.icann.org/stewardship. [16] One of the WSIS Preparatory Committee meetings took place in Bucharest: http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all.asp? lang=en&c_event=rc|pe&c_type=all|. [17] See article and interview with Mr. Kummer for the Bulgarian Capital weekly, November 19, 2005, here: http://www.capital.bg/biznes/tehnologii_i_nauka/2005/11/19/233844_i_vulcite_dovolni_i_internet_cial/. [18] See Michael Birnbaum, “Russian blogger law puts new restrictions on Internet freedoms,” Washington Post, July 31, 2014, http://wapo.st/1uLVmrm. [19] ICANN is not responsible for the online content in any particular country.
[20] The opinions, findings and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Polish
Ministry of National Defense. [21] Eric Beidel and Stew Magnuson, “Government, Military Face Severe Shortage of Cybersecurity Experts,” National Defense, August 2011, accessed May 19, 2014, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2011/August/Pages/Government,MilitaryFaceSevereShortageOfCybersecurityExperts.asp [22] Barack Obama, “Executive Order -- Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” February 12, 2013, accessed May 19, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity. [23] Jonathan Masters, “Can Government Safeguard the Internet?,” interview with Council on Foreign Relations, June 6, 2013, accessed May 19, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/can-government-safeguard-internet/p30860. [24] Elinor Mills, “NSA director finally greets Defcon hackers,” CNET, July 27, 2012, accessed May 19, 2014, http://www.cnet.com/news/nsa-director-finally-greets-defcon-hackers/. [25] Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, “Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets in Cyberspace,” October 2011, accessed May 19, 2014, http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf. [26] Andrei Soldatov, “Vladimir Putin’s Cyber Warriors,” Foreign Affairs, December 9, 2011, accessed May 19, 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136727/andrei-soldatov/vladimir-putins-cyber-warriors. [27] David M. Hollis, “Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008,” Small Wars Journal, January 6, 2011, accessed May 20, 2014, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/639-hollis.pdf. [28] John Markoff and David Barboza, “2 China Schools Said to Be Tied to Online Attacks,” The New York Times, February 18, 2010, accessed May 20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/technology/19china.html. [29] Joel Snyder, “The Huawei security risk: Factors to consider before buying Chinese IT,” SearchSecurity, January 2013, accessed May 20, 2014, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/The-Huawei-security-risk-Factors-to-consider-before-buying-Chinese-IT. [30] Mike Rogers and Dutch Ruppersberger, “Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE,” Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, October 8, 2012, accessed May 20, 2014, http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/Huawei-
ZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20%28FINAL%29.pdf. [31] Snyder, “The Huawei security risk.”
[32] Stanisław Koziej, “Nie jesteśmy przygotowani na cyberwojnę. Nawet mniejszy atak przyniósłby duże straty,” interview with Polska Times, September 1, 2012, accessed May 22, 2014, http://www.polskatimes.pl/artykul/648683,gen-koziej-nie-jestesmyprzygotowani-na-cyberwojne-nawet-mniejszy-atak-przynioslby-duze-straty,id,t.html. [33] Michał Grzelak and Krzysztof Liedel, “Bezpieczeństwo w cyberprzestrzeni. Zagrożenia i wyzwania dla Polski – zarys problemu,” Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe 22 (2012): 132, accessed May 22, 2014, www.bbn.gov.pl/download/1/11469/str125139MichalGrzelakKrzysztofLiedel.pdf. [34] “Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022,” April 9, 2013, accessed May 22, 2014, http://mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2014/01/ENGLISH_SRSBN_RP_do_pobrania.pdf. [35] Ministry of Administration and Digitization, Internal Security Agency, “The Cyberspace Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland,” June 25, 2013, accessed May 24, 2014, http://www.cert.gov.pl/download/3/162/PolitykaOchronyCyberprzestrzeniRP148x210wersjaang.pdf. [36] Ibid.
[37] Szymon Marcinów, interview with Maciej Witucki, the CEO of Orange Polska, September 5, 2013. [38] National Security Bureau, “W stronę doktryny cyberbezpieczeństwa RP,” April 15, 2014, accessed May 26, 2014, http://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/5451,W-strone-doktryny-cyberbezpieczenstwa-RP.html. [39] Grzelak and Liedel, “Bezpieczeństwo w cyberprzestrzeni,” 135.
[40] CERT.GOV.PL, “Raport kwartalny CERT.GOV.PL styczeń–marzec 2012,” 3, accessed May 26, 2014, www.cert.gov.pl/download/3/136/RaportCERTGOVPLzaIkwartal2012.pdf. [41] Ibid.
[42] Grzelak and Liedel, “Bezpieczeństwo w cyberprzestrzeni,” 136. [43] Marcinów, interview with Witucki. [44] Małgorzata Schwarzgruber, “Walka z niewidzialnym wrogiem,” Polska Zbrojna, October 27, 2013, accessed May 26, 2014, http://www.polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleinmagazineshow/10157?t=WALKA-Z-NIEWIDZIALNYM-WROGIEM. [45] Ministry of Administration and Digitization, “The Cyberspace Protection Policy.”
[46] Fundacja Bezpieczna Cyberprzestrzeń, “Cyber-Exe Polska 2012. Raport,” accessed May 26, 2014, http://cybsecurity.org/pdfy/RaportCyber-EXE2012.pdf. [47] Fundacja Bezpieczna Cyberprzestrzeń, “Cyber-Exe Polska 2013. Raport,” accessed May 26, 2014, http://cybsecurity.org/cyberexepolska/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/CYBER-EXE2013_REPORT-PL-vFIN.pdf. [48] Marcinów, interview with Witucki.
[49] Koziej, “Nie jesteśmy przygotowani.” [50] Fundacja Bezpieczna Cyberprzestrzeń, “Cyber-Exe Polska 2012.” [51] Misha Glenny, Dark Market (London: Bodley Head, 2011), 69. [52] Will Gragido et al., Blackhatonomics: An Inside Look at the Economics of Cybercrime (Waltham, MA: Elsevier, 2013), 75. The title of the book—Blackhatonomics—is derived from a term used to describe hackers (people who illegally access computers and their contents), viz. blackhats. [53] Jarrod Rifkind, Cybercrime in Russia (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2011).
[54] “Russia accounts for almost one-third of world cybercrime – official,” RIA Novosti, cited in BBC Monitoring International Reports, April 4, 2012. [55] Australian Government (Australian Institute of Criminology), “Cybercrime Key Links – Definitions and General Information,” 2011, accessed October 24, 2013, http://www.aic.gov.au/crime_types/cybercrime/definitions.html. [56] Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2001), 4–7.
[57] European Union, “Fight against Cybercrime,” Europa: Summaries of EU Legislation, 2000, accessed October 25, 2013, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_organised_crime/l33193b_en.htm. [58] Robert Moore, Cybercrime (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2011), 4.
[59] John Sandage et al., Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime: Draft – February 2013 (New York: United Nations, 2013), xvii, 39, 44.
[60] Carlo Morselli, Inside Criminal Networks (New York: Springer, 2010).
[61] Sandage et al., Comprehensive Study, xviii. [62] Klaus Schwab, ed., Global Competitiveness Report 2012–2013 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2012), 403. [63] See Gregory Kisunko and Stephen Knack, Policy Note. Russian Federation: National and Regional Trends in Regulatory Burden and Corruption (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013). [64] Jan van Dijk, “Mafia markers: assessing organized crime and its impact upon societies,” Trends in Organized Crime 10, no. 4 (2007): 39–56. [65] For a critique of this approach see Klaus von Lampe, “Making the second step before the first: Assessing organized crime – The case of Germany,” Crime, Law and Social Change 42, nos. 4–5 (2005): 227–59, esp. 242–44; on Belgian methods, which also focus on market demand, see Tom Vander Becken, “The Belgian Methodology for Reporting Organised Crime,” in Tom Vander Becken et al., Measuring Organised Crime in Europe, 2nd ed. (Antwerp: Maklu, 2006), 37–46. [66] Stefan Fafinski et al., “Mapping and Measuring Cybercrime,” OII Forum Discussion Paper 18 (2010): 2.
[67] Sandage et al., Comprehensive Study, 259, 263. [68] Sandage et al., Comprehensive Study, 49. See too Chloe Albanesius, “U.S. Busts $3M ‘Zeus Trojan’ Cyber Crime Ring,” pcmag.com, September 30, 2010, accessed November 4, 2013, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2370013,00.asp. [69] Jart Armin, ed., Global Security Report May 2012 (n.p.: HostExploit), 6, 10–11.
[70] “Latvia Frees Gozi Computer Virus Creator from Prison,” RIA Novosti, October 11, 2013, accessed November 7, 2013, http://en.ria.ru/crime/20131011/184049553/Latvia-Frees-Gozi-Computer-Virus-Creator-From-Prison.html. [71] Gragido et al., Blackhatonomics, 80–81.
[72] RSA, “The Current State of Cybercrime 2013,” 3, accessed November 2, 2013, http://www.emc.com/collateral/fraudreport/current-state-cybercrime-2013.pdf. See too Ian Steadman, “The Russian underground economy has democratised cybercrime,” wired.co.uk, November 2, 2012, accessed November 4, 2013, http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-11/02/russian-cybercrime; Max Goncharov, Russian Underground 101 (Cupertino, CA: Trend Micro, 2012), 11–12. [73] Danuta Isler, “Cybercrime Attack!,” Polskie Radio, April 30, 2013, accessed October 25, 2013, http://www.thenews.pl/1/6/Artykul/134397,Cybercrime-attack-. [74] John Casaretto, “Zeus Lives! Russian Cybercrime Gangs Draining Bank Accounts from Facebook,” silicon angle, June 5, 2013, accessed November 2, 2013, http://siliconangle.com/blog/2013/06/05/zeus-lives-russian-cybercrime-gangs-draining-bank-accounts-fromfacebook/. [75] Kelly Jackson Higgins, “Anatomy of a Russian Cybercrime Ecosystem Targeting Android,” dark reading, August 3, 2013, accessed November 3, 2013, http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/anatomy-of-a-russian-cybercrime-ecosyste/240159365.
[76] Cédric Laurant, “Cybercrime in Europe: Recent Legal and policy Developments” (paper presented at 2nd Congress on Cybercrimes and Protection Measures, Sao Paolo, September 27–28, 2010), 21. [77] Eurostat data cited in Sandage et al., Comprehensive Study, 31.
[78] Glenny, Dark Market, 56–57. [79] See Leslie Holmes, Rotten States? Corruption, Post-communism and Neoliberalism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Tatiana Kostadinova, Political Corruption in Eastern Europe: Politics after communism (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2012). [80] Christopher Williams, “Cybercrime gang ‘responsible for a third of data thefts,’ ” Telegraph, January 27, 2011.
[81] On trust and corruption see Eric Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). [82] Steve Kettle, “Of Money and Morality,” Transition 1, no. 3 (1995): 39.
[83] Van Dijk, “Mafia markers,” 46. [84] Michael Ellman, Economic Reform in the Soviet Union (London: PEP, 1969), 358. [85] Mark Galeotti, “Why are Russians excellent cybercriminals?,” Moscow News, November 21, 2011. [86] Laurant, “Cybercrime in Europe,” 45, 51. [87] “Russian Cybercrime Market Fell to $1.93 Billion in 2012 – Expert,” RIA Novosti, September 10, 2013, accessed November 7, 2013, http://en.ria.ru/crime/20130910/183338519/Russian-Cybercrime-Market-Fell-to-193-Billion-in-2012.html. For a highly detailed analysis of Russian laws on and methods for investigating cybercrime, and a comparison of these with US laws and methods, see Galina Borisevich et al., “Comparative Review of Cybercrime Law and Digital Forensics in Russia, The United States and Under the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe,” Northern Kentucky Law Review 39, no. 2 (2012). [88] “CIS Interior Ministers Agree to Fight Cyber Crimes,” RIA Novosti, October 14, 2011, accessed October 24, 2013,
http://en.ria.ru/world/20111014/167692047.html. [89] “Russia, China Seek New Cybercrime Agreement,” RIA Novosti, January 28, 2013, accessed October 24, 2013, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20130128/179080434/Russia-China-Seek-New-Cybercrime-Agreement.html; “Putin-Obama meeting in Northern Ireland to set tone for Russia-US relations for next few years,” ITAR-TASS, June 13, 2013, accessed October 24, 2013, http://www.itartass.com/en/c154/769870.html. [90] David Mardiste and Basil Katz, “Estonia to extradite cyber fraud scam suspect to U.S.,” Reuters, March 16, 2012; “ ‘Miami’ vice hacker fights extradition to U.S.,” Baltic Times, April 17, 2013, accessed November 2, 2013, http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/32831/; “Latvia Frees Gozi.” [91] “Lithuania refuses extradition to US for cyber-crime suspect,” Sydney Morning Herald, July 25, 2007.
[92] “Pulling the plug on cybercrime: Europe is working on stricter penalties,” European Parliament News, June 6, 2013, accessed October 25, 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20130603STO11023/html/Pulling-the-plug-on-cybercrimeEurope-is-working-on-stricter-penalties; European Parliament, “Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 July 2013 with a view to the adoption of Directive 2013/…/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on attacks against information systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA,” accessed November 3, 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0321&format=XML&language=EN#title2. [93] “New secret service in UK to fight Russian mafia,” ITAR-TASS, October 7, 2013, accessed November 10, 2013, http://www.itartass.com/en/c32/903331.html. [94] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the Committee of the Regions – Towards a general policy on the fight against cyber crime (Brussels: European Commission, 2007), 4, 6–8. [95] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – Tackling Crime in our Digital Age: Establishing a European Cybercrime Centre (Brussels: European Commission, 2012), 4. [96] Europol, “Police Dismantle Prolific Ransomware Cybercriminal Network,” February 13, 2013, accessed November 11, 2013, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/police-dismantle-prolific-ransomware-cybercriminal-network; Europol, “Spanish Police and Europol Arrest Cybercrime ‘Service Providers,’ ” September 27, 2013, accessed November 11, 2013, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/spanish-police-and-europol-arrest-cybercrime-service-providers; “Russian Press at a Glance,” RIA Novosti, February 15, 2013, accessed October 24, 2013, http://en.ria.ru/papers/20130215/179479601/Russian-Press-at-a-GlanceFriday-February-15-2013.html. [97] Interpol, “Partnerships key to protecting cyberspace, Head of INTERPOL says,” September 3, 2013, accessed November 3, 2013, http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2013/PR101. [98] Some individuals are simply malicious hackers; but the focus here is on profit-oriented organized cybercrime.
[99] Norton by Symantec, 2012 Norton Cybercrime Report, 5, 27. [100] Symantec, “2013 Norton Report: Cost per Cybercrime Victim Up 50 Percent,” October 1, 2013, accessed October 25, 2013, http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20131001_01. [101] Norton by Symantec, 2012 Norton, 22.
[102] Sandage et al., Comprehensive Study, 28. [103] Nations in Transit 2014 (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2014), 8, accessed August 10, 2014, http://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2014#.U-cPJNx_v2F. [104] Freedom on the Net 2013: Summary of Findings (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2013), 17, accessed August 19, 2014, http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%202013%20Summary%20of%20Findings_1.pdf. [105] Nations in Transit 2014.
[106] “Internet Users,” Internet Live Stats, accessed August 11, 2014, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/. [107] Aleksandr Gundlakh, “The way Ukrainian internet auditory grew (infographics)” [Russian], 15 minutes, March 4, 2014, accessed August 11, 2014, http://15minut.org/article/kak-rosla-auditorija-ukrainskogo-interneta-infografika-2014-03-04-20-17-00. [108] Ol’ha Minchenko, “Every fourth Ukrainian internet user lives in the village” [Ukrainian], Watcher, July 19, 2013, accessed August 17, 2014, http://watcher.com.ua/2013/07/19/kozhen-chetvertyy-ukrayinskyy-korystuvach-internetu-zhyve-v-seli/. [109] “Ukrainian digital revolution – 2” [Ukrainian], YouTube video, 2:43, posted by “Plus One,” August 15, 2014, accessed August 15, 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SKHmf6sFbsM&feature=youtu.be. [110] Vitaliy Moroz, “Internet, social and new media,” in Ukrainian media-landscape – 2012 [Ukrainian], ed. Valeriy Ivanov, Oksana Voloshenyuk, and Andriy Kulakov (Kyiv: Conrad Adenauer’s Fund in Ukraine, 2013), 38–43. [111] Viktoriya Vlasenko, “The number of smartphones inside of Ukrainian mobile operators has increased 20 percent” [Russian], Capital, July 21, 2014, accessed August 19, 2014, http://www.capital.ua/ru/publication/25275-shag-vpered-chislo-smartfonov-v-setyakh-
ukrainskikh-operatorov-prevysilo-20. [112] “Yandex. Metrics Summer 2013: Ukrainian users of mobile devices” [Russian], SlideShare document, posted by “Watcher,” September 6, 2013, accessed August 19, 2014, http://www.slideshare.net/WatcherUA/yandex-metrika-mobileukraine0913. [113] Mykhaylo Mischenko, “Donbas citizens don’t trust anymore either Ukraine or Russia” [Ukrainian], interview with Dzerkalo tyzhnya, May 19, 2014, accessed August 12, 2014, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/article.php?news_id=1122. [114] Elina Shnurko-Таbakova, “As Ukrainian events prove, it is practically impossible to manipulate people who are using unlimited on-line informational sources” [Russian], Dialog.ua, May 19, 2014, accessed August 7, 2014, http://www.dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/page162-2523.html. [115] Anatoliy Vasiliyev, “ ‘New Region’ became the 1st independent resource blocked in Crimea” [Russian], RIA “Novyy Region,” August 9, 2014, accessed August 19, 2014, http://nr2.com.ua/News/politics_and_society/Novyy-Region-stal-pervym-nezavisimymresursom-zablokirovannym-v-Krymu-77743.html?fb_action_ids=541588542634330&fb_action_types=og.likes. [116] RIA “Novyy Region”—http://nr2.com.ua.
[117] Internet Source “Glavnoe”—http://glavnoe.ua. [118] Internet Media “Censor.net”—http://censor.net. [119] “ ‘Glavnoe’ is forbidden in Russia” [Russian], Glavnoe, August 19, 2014, accessed August 19, 2014, http://glavnoe.ua/news/n185938. [120] “Evolution and revolution of media in Ukraine” [Russian], Innabtys.com, March 30, 2014, accessed August 2, 2014, http://www.innabtys.com/blog/evolyutsiya-i-revolyutsiya-media-v-ukraine. [121] Arif Aliyev et al., Freedom of the Media in the Countries of the Eastern Partnership – 2013 [Russian] (Kyiv: EaP Media Freedom Watch, 2014), 63, accessed August 13, 2014, http://mediafreedomwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/EaP-Media-FreedomLandscape-2013_RU1.pdf. [122] Freedom House, “Nations in Transit: Ukraine 2004,” accessed August 18, 2014, http://freedomhouse.org/report/nationstransit/2005/ukraine#.U_GIt9x_v2E. [123] Freedom House, “Nations in Transit: Ukraine 2011,” accessed August 18, 2014, http://freedomhouse.org/report/nationstransit/2011/ukraine#.U_GOHtx_v2E. [124] Reporters Without Borders, “Press Freedom Index 2009,” accessed August 18, 2014, http://en.rsf.org/spip.php? page=classement&id_rubrique=1001. [125] Reporters Without Borders, “Press Freedom Index 2013,” accessed August 16, 2014, http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index2013,1054.html. [126] Maksym Savanevs’kyy, “#євромайдан: Ukrainian digital revolution and last chance to analog politicians to became digital” [Ukrainian], Ukrayins’ka Pravda: Blogs, November 29, 2013, accessed August 19, 2014, http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/savanevsky/5298980715e65/. [127] Ibid.
[128] Ibid. [129] Aliyev et al., Media freedom, 65. [130] Mykola Sunhurovs’kyy, “Ukrainian society is against of Putin’s aggression” [Ukrainian], Radio Svoboda, July 15, 2014, accessed August 12, 2014, http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/25457938.html. [131] “Evolution and revolution.”
[132] “ ‘Espresso TV’ became more popular than ‘1+1’, and ‘Hromadske TV’ is more often watched than ‘Inter’ ” [Russian], Divan.tv, January 24, 2014, accessed August 18, 2014, http://divan.tv/posts/view/espreso-tv-stal-populjarnee-11-a-gromadske-tvsmotrjat-chasche-intera-2206. [133] “Evolution and revolution.”
[134] “Gemius has defined a leader among Ukrainian TV channels’ sites” [Russian], WebAwards, 2014, accessed August 18, 2014, http://www.webawards.com.ua/gemius-opredelila-liderov-sredi-sajtov-ukrainskix-telekanalov. [135] “Facebook Pages Statistics & Number of Fans: Ukraine,” Socialbakers, accessed August 18, 2014, http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-pages/country/ukraine/. [136] Google Trends, accessed August 17, 2014, http://www.google.ru/trends/.
[137] Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012), http://books.google.com.ua/books?id=ctwEIggfIDEC. [138] Vitaliy Vasilchenko, “New word: Slaсktivism — the way social nets distract our attention from reality” [Russian], Apparat, July
28, 2014, accessed August 18, 2014, http://apparat.cc. [139] Elina Shnurko-Таbakova, “Social net is a soft utility, it can’t make a revolution” [Russian], Dialog.ua, April 11, 2013, accessed August 6, 2014, http://www.dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/page150-2303.html. [140] Etan Zuckerman, “It’s easier to organize a protest than to reach the results of it” [Russian], Terra America, November 18, 2013, accessed August 18, 2014, http://terra-america.ru/%C2%ABseychas-legche-organisovat-protestnoe-dvijenie-no-namnogo-slojneezastavit-eto-dvijenie-dostigat-zrimyx-resyltatov%C2%BB.aspx. [141] Pavlo Mandryk, “Political crowdfunding: how much you can earn of public financing and how to do it?” [Russian], Forbes Ukraine, April 1, 2014, accessed August 18, 2014, http://forbes.ua/business/1368324-politicheskij-kraudfanding-kak-i-skolko-mozhnozarabotat-na-narodnom-finansirovanii/1368464. [142] Crowdsourcing platform Big Idea—http://www.biggggidea.com.
[143] Facebook Group “Army SOS”—http://www.facebook.com/groups/armia.sos. [144] Facebook Group “Donetsk SOS”—http://www.facebook.com/groups/donetsksos. Project’s website—http://donbasssos.org. [145] Facebook Group “Crimea SOS”—http://www.facebook.com/groups/crimeasos. [146] Internet-campaign “National Project”—http://www.narodniy.org.ua. [147] Yandex, “Internet search – what is in search and what are the ways of search for Ukrainian users: Informational bulletin” [Russian], 2010, accessed August 18, 2014, http://company.yandex.ru/researches/reports/ya_search_ua_10.xml#toc2. [148] Andriy Peleshchyshyn, “Web 2.0 – second chance to Uanet” [Ukrainian], blog, March 29, 2006, accessed August 12, 2014, http://it.ridne.net/uaweb2. [149] “What languages do Ukrainians speak?” [Russian], Dsnews, June 18, 2014, accessed August 18, 2014, http://www.dsnews.ua/society/na-kakih-yazykah-govoryat-ukraintsy--18062014172000. [150] “Ukrainian Security Service advise Ukrainians to keep the distance in social nets because of entry into force of Russian ‘law about bloggers’ ” [Russian], Interfax Ukraine, July 30, 2014, accessed August 18, 2014, http://interfax.com.ua/news/general/216129.html. [151] StatCounter Global Stats, accessed August 12, 2014, http://gs.statcounter.com/.
[152] “Russian social nets loose the popularity in Ukraine” [Russian], Segodnya.ua, July 30, 2014, accessed August 12, 2014, http://www.segodnya.ua/economics/business/rossiyskie-socseti-teryayut-populyarnost-v-ukraine-540631.html. [153] Timur Vorona, “Five Ukrainian social nets created within last two weeks” [Russian], AIN.UA, April 4, 2014, accessed August 18, 2014, http://ain.ua/2014/04/04/518701. [154] Ukrainian Social Net “Friends”—http://www.druzi.org.ua.
[155] Ukrainian Social Net “This is Ukraine”—http://ц.укр/. [156] Ukrainian Social Net “Ukrainians”—http://www.ukrainci.org.ua/. [157] We thank the individuals who participated voluntarily in this research. The activities in the course of this research were supported by the NSF Graduate Research Fellowship Program, and by Central European University’s Center for Media and Communication Studies pre-doctoral fellowship program. [158] Kate Starbird and Leysia Palen, “(How) Will the Revolution be Retweeted? Information Diffusion and the 2011 Egyptian Uprising,” in Proceedings of the ACM 2012 conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work (New York: ACM, 2012). [159] Thomas Poell and Kaouthar Darmoni, “Twitter as a multilingual space: The articulation of the Tunisian revolution through #sidibouzid,” European Journal of Media Studies 1 (2012). [160] Max Fisher, “This is the one map you need to understand Ukraine’s crisis,” The Washington Post, January 24, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/01/24/this-is-the-one-map-you-need-to-understand-ukrainescrisis/. [161] Lowell W. Barrington and Erik S. Herron, “One Ukraine or Many? Regionalism in Ukraine and its Political Consequences,” Nationalities Papers 32 (2004). [162] Aneta Pavlenko, “Russian as a Lingua Franca,” Annual Review of Applied Linguistics 26 (2006): 78–79.
[163] Niklas Bernsand, “Surzhyk and National Identity in Ukrainian Nationalist Language Ideology,” Berliner Osteuropa Info 17 (2001).
[164] Bernsand, “Surzhyk;” Volodymyr Kulyk, “Language and Identity in post-Soviet Ukraine: Transformation of an Unbroken Bond,” Australian & New Zealand Journal of European Studies 5, no. 2 (2013). [165] Kulyk, “Language and Identity.”
[166] Ibid.
[167] Ibid. [168] Volodymyr Kulyk, “The media, history and identity: competing narratives of the past in the Ukrainian popular press,” National Identities 13, no. 3 (2011): 287–303. [169] This research is approved by the University of Washington Human Subject Division #47351.
[170] Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory (London: Sage, 2006). [171] Kate Starbird, Grace Muzny, and Leysia Palen, “Learning from the Crowd: Collaborative Filtering Techniques for Identifying Onthe-Group Twitters during Mass Disruptions,” in Proceedings of the 9 th International ISCRAM Conference – Vancouver , Canada , April 2012 (Vancouver: Simon Fraser University, 2012). [172] DNR and LNR claim territory corresponding, respectively, to Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. These are the country’s two easternmost regions, collectively known as the Donbas.
[173] Fergus Hanson, “A Digital DFAT: Joining the 21st Century,” Lowy Institute Policy Brief, November 2010, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/hanson_a_digital_dfat_web.pdf. All online materials referenced were last accessed August 20, 2014. [174] The focus here is on non-personal social media profiles representing pro-separatist groups and organizations, not individuals tied to the leadership structures. [175] See https://vk.com/newsdnr and https://www.facebook.com/newsdnr. These accounts are referred to as “official” insofar as the official website of the DNR’s press center, http://dnr.today/, contains links to them. [176] https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCYTOEBNGYjJSVws2-fJ9mAA
[177] https://twitter.com/dnrpress [178] https://vk.com/luganskrepublic; www.facebook.com/pages/Луганская-народная-республика/293588840817991. These are accounts bearing the official name of the self-styled republic. Its official website—http://lugansk-online.info/—does not link to any social media. [179] See http://tinyurl.com/nyayq58 and http://novopressa.ru/.
[180] http://dnr-news.com/ [181] See http://rusvesna.su/ and http://novorossia.su/. Both websites link to Facebook, VKontakte and YouTube accounts. [182] See http://dnr.today/contacts/. [183] See http://mid.donr.su/. [184] See http://lugansk-online.info/. [185] See http://dnr.today/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/%D0%93%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0-%E2%84%963.pdf. This is the most recent edition at the time of writing. [186] See http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1039017.
[187] This chapter was supported by a Marie Curie Initial Training Network within the 7th European Community Framework Programme (grant no: 316825). [188] As a workaround, at least a few dozen Abkhaz chose to indicate the town of Suhum, in Ghana, as their place of birth and education, see “People Who Live in Suhum, Ghana,” Facebook.com, https://www.facebook.com/search/109497005736650/residents/present. [189] Of course, this does not apply to users relying instead on mapping services based in Russia, like Yandex Maps, which will instead disappoint those users who support Georgia’s territorial integrity. Such situations can also be creatively approached by service providers, some of which show different versions of their contents based on the preferences of the user or the Internet access location. After the recent annexation of Crimea to Russia, for example, Yandex officially introduced a “doublethink” policy for the region: users based in Russia will see Crimea as part of Russia on Yandex maps and Crimean news in the “domestic news” section, while Yandex will adapt to users based in Ukraine in order to present Crimea as an integral part of their country. See “Izmeneniya na servisakh Yandeksa,” Yandex.Ru Official Blog, March 21, 2014, http://blog.yandex.ru/post/77678/?ncrnd=16. All links referenced in this chapter have been accessed on April 30, 2014 and are available as they appeared on that date on Archive.org. [190]Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Ossetia, http://www.mfa-rso.su/, Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of South Ossetia, http://cik.ruo.su/; see also Abkhaz news website Aiaaira.su, http://www.aiaaira.su/ and Sberbank Respubliki Abkhazii, http://www.sbra.su/. Websites related to Nagorno-Karabakh tend to use the “.am” domain. [191]For a debate on the “black hole” rhetoric, in particular on Transnistria, see Michael Bobick, “Profits of Disorder: Images of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic,” Global Crime 12, no. 4 (2011): 241–43, doi:10.1080/17440572.2011.616048. [192] De facto states have been defined as territories that have achieved de facto independence and maintained it for a substantial period, have not gained widespread international recognition (or are “not full members of the international system of sovereign states”),
and “have demonstrated an aspiration for full, de jure independence,” see Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield, eds., Unrecognized States in the International System (New York: Routledge, 2011), 3. [193] See Charles King, “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States,” World Politics 53, no. 4 (2001): 524–52, doi:10.2307/25054164; Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, “Living with Non-Recognition: State- and Nation-Building in South Caucasian Quasi-States,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 3 (2008): 483–509, doi:10.1080/09668130801948158; Helge Blakkisrud and Pål Kolstø, “From Secessionist Conflict Toward a Functioning State: Processes of State- and Nation-Building in Transnistria,” Post-Soviet Affairs 27, no. 2 (2011): 178–210, doi:10.2747/1060-586X.27.2.178. [194] In order to avoid heavy phrasing, the qualifier “de facto” will not be repeated each time the institutions of these territories are mentioned. [195] In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the key position played by the MFA in the online activities of the local government emerges also by the domain name structure: technically speaking, the website of the president (http://www.president.nkr.am/) and of the government (http://gov.nkr.am/) of Nagorno-Karabakh are sub-domains of the MFA’s own website (http://www.nkr.am/). According to Archive.org web-history, it seems that the website was established at this address in 2000. [196] Their addresses are: http://www.mfa-pmr.org/ for Transnistria; http://www.mfaapsny.org/ for Abkhazia; http://www.mfa-rso.su for South Ossetia; http://www.nkr.am/ for Nagorno-Karabakh. [197] For a summary, see Giorgio Comai, “Post-Soviet de Facto States Official Reactions to Events in Crimea,” blog, March 21, 2014, http://www.giorgiocomai.eu/2014/03/21/post-soviet-de-facto-states-official-reactions-to-events-in-crimea/. [198] See “Viacheslav Chirikba Congratulated Foreign Minister of PMR Nina Shtanski on Her Happy Birthday,” Abkhazia’s MFA, April 10, 2014, http://mfaapsny.org/en/information/index.php?ID=2165; “Pozdravitel’noye poslaniye i.o. Ministra inostrannykh del Respubliki Yuzhnaya Osetiya D.G. Sanakoyeva Ministru inostrannykh del PMR N.V. Shtanski po sluchayu Dnya rozhdeniya,” South Ossetia’s MFA, April 10, 2014, http://www.mfa-rso.su/node/1052. The head of the representation office of South Ossetia in Tiraspol sent a separate message, “Glava Ofitsial’nogo predstavitel’stva Respubliki Yuzhnaya Osetiya v PMR, Chrezvychaynyy i Polnomochnyy Poslannik Sergey Vladimirovich Surago pozdravil Ministra inostrannykh del Pridnestrovskoy Moldavskoy Respubliki Ninu Viktorovnu Shtanski s Dnem rozhdeniya,” website of the official representative of South Ossetia in Transnistria, April 10, 2014, http://ryuopmr.org/news/38-glava-oficialnogo-predstavitelstva-ryuo-v-pmr-chrezvychaynyy-i-polnomochnyy-poslannik-sergey-vladimirovich-suragopozdravil-ministra-inostrannyh-del-pridnestrovskoy-moldavskoy-respubliki-ninu.html. [199] http://abkhazia-pmr.org/; http://ryuo-pmr.org/
[200] http://www.osembassy.ru/; http://www.emb-abkhazia.ru/ [201] http://abjasia.org.ve [202] http://www.nkrusa.org/ [203] http://tourism.mfa-pmr.org/; http://abkhazia.travel/; http://minmol.org/ru/; http://karabakh.travel/ [204] http://novostipmr.com/; http://apsnypress.info/; http://cominf.org/; http://artsakhpress.am/ [205] Pervyy Pridnestrovskiy, http://tv.pgtrk.ru/; Abkhazskaya Gosudarstvennaya Teleradiokompaniya, http://www.apsua.tv/; OSTV, http://www.ostv.ru/; Artsakh TV, http://www.artsakh.tv/.
[206] User “Tvpmr,” YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/user/tvpmr. [207] In the case of Transnistria, the Transnistrian delegation in the Joint Control Commission has an own website, used to publish news related to the activities of the commission or to specific events along the de facto border (http://www.okk-pridnestrovie.org/). South Ossetia’s presidential plenipotentiary for post-conflict regulation has an own website (http://www.080808.su/); it is available in multiple languages but only the Russian version is regularly updated. [208] The Twitter and Facebook profiles of Nina Shtanski, Transnistria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, are the clearest example of this trend. See in particular Marcin Kosienkowski, “Transnistria’s Model of Facebook Diplomacy,” New Eastern Europe, September 18, 2014, http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/component/content/article/20-eastern-europe-50/369-transnistria-s-model-of-facebookdiplomacy. [209] For a summary listing of profiles and pages related to post-Soviet de facto states on Facebook and Twitter see Giorgio Comai, “Social Media in Post-Soviet de Facto States,” blog, April 30, 2014, http://www.giorgiocomai.eu/2014/04/30/social-media-in-post-sovietde-facto-states/. There are also groups dedicated to these territories counting thousands of members in the social networking website VKontakte.ru. [210] Abkhazia’s MFA, “Otchet o deyatel’nosti MID Abkhazii za 2013 g.,” January 22, 2014, http://mfaapsny.org/news/index.php? ID=1867. [211] http://www.altinpost.org/
[212] http://marhabaabkhazia.com/
[213] Abkhazia’s MFA, “Otchet o deyatel’nosti.” [214] “Enchanting Abkhazia,” YouTube video, 3:54, posted by “MFA APSNY,” February 7, 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=ZDyi-3FybBQ. [215] Abkhazia’s MFA, “Otchet o deyatel’nosti.”
[216] http://abkhazworld.com/aw/ [217] http://abkhazia.co.uk/ [218] http://www.instabkhazia.com/ [219] http://reflectionsonabkhazia.net/ [220]“About AW,” Abkhaz World, http://abkhazworld.com/aw/about. [221] http://apsnyteka.org/ [222] “Places that don’t exist” is part of a BBC series on unrecognized states that included episodes on all four post-Soviet de facto states, broadcast in 2005. [223] In recent years, authors have referred to the possibility that de facto states had “caught on to what they perceive as a normative change in the international arena,” accepting that “recognition might be awarded to entities that have succeeded in building effective, democratic institutions.” By proving their viability, they could claim that they “earned” their sovereignty. See Nina Caspersen, “Separatism and Democracy in the Caucasus,” Survival 50, no. 4 (2008): 114, doi:10.1080/00396330802329014. [224] See Nina Caspersen, “The Politics of Getting Online in Countries That Don’t Exist,” The Conversation, January 14, 2014, http://theconversation.com/the-politics-of-getting-online-in-countries-that-dont-exist-21399. [225] Abkhazia is a multi-ethnic territory, but ethnic Abkhaz have a dominant role in the political system of contemporary Abkhazia and by all evidence shape the territory’s foreign policy. [226] Cf. John O’Loughlin, Gerard Toal, and Rebecca Chamberlain-Creangă, “Divided Space, Divided Attitudes? Comparing the Republics of Moldova and Pridnestrovie (Transnistria) Using Simultaneous Survey,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 54, no. 2 (2013): 227–58, doi: 10.1080/15387216.2013.816619; John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gerard Toal, “Inside Abkhazia: Survey of Attitudes in a De Facto State,” Post-Soviet Affairs 27, no. 1 (2011): 1–36, doi:10.2747/1060-586X.27.1.1; Gerard Toal (Gearóid Ó Tuathail) and John O’Loughlin, “Inside South Ossetia: A Survey of Attitudes in a De Facto State,” Post-Soviet Affairs 29, no. 2 (2013): 136–72, doi:10.1080/1060586X.2013.780417. [227] After the efforts of Mikheil Saakashvili to re-brand Georgia, and the attempt to establish “Tbilisi—the city that loves you” as a brand in 2010, Armenia has also given signs of interest in creating its own brand by inaugurating in early 2014 a partnership with an American PR company with expertise in nation branding, see Siranuysh Gevorgyan, “Country Branding: New York-Based Company Working on Armenia’s New Image,” ArmeniaNow.com, February 26, 2014, http://armenianow.com/news/52298/armenia_country_branding_company. [228] See more on de facto states: Nina Caspersen, Unrecognized States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Modern International System (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012). [229] Andreas M. Kaplan and Michael Haenlein, “Users of the world, unite! The challenges and opportunities of Social Media,” Business Horizons 53, no. 1 (2010): 61. [230] WordNet Search 3.1 (Princeton University), s.v. “information warfare,” accessed December 29, 2013, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=information+warfare. [231] Brett van Niekerk and Manoj Maharaj, “Social Media and Information Conflict,” International Journal of Communication 7 (2013), 1162–84. [232] Daniel Wehrenfennig, “From an Analog Past to a Digital Future: Information and Communication Technology in Conflict Management,” in Cyberspaces and Global Affairs, ed. Sean S. Costigan and Jake Perry (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012), 23–49. Wehrenfennig focuses predominantly on use of information and communication technology in conflict resolution by non-official actors but these tools can be utilized in a similar way also by state actors. Moreover, he underlines governments use them even more actively. [233] Eytan Gilboa, “Media and Conflict Resolution: A Framework for Analysis,” Marquette Law Review 93, no. 1 (2009): 93–97.
[234] Wehrenfennig, “From an Analog Past to a Digital Future,” 35–36. See also: Sheldon Himelfarb, “The Real eHarmony,” Foreign Policy, January 2, 2014, accessed January 3, 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/01/02/real_eharmony_virtual_exchanges_peace. [235] See more on public diplomacy and social media: Nicholas J. Cull, “The Long Road to Public Diplomacy 2.0: The Internet in US Public Diplomacy,” International Studies Review 15 (2013), 123–39. [236] This section was written by Joyce Hahn.
[237] “Statement of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group,” March 2008, accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.osce.org/mg/49564.
[238] Wikipedia, s.v. “Nagorno-Karabakh War,” last modified April 25, 2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nagorno-Karabakh_War. [239] Nagorno-Karabakh is currently self-governed by a de-facto independent entity, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. [240] President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, “Azerbaijan: Karabakh,” 2012, accessed April 23, 2014, http://en.president.az/azerbaijan/karabakh. [241] Zulfugar Agayev and Sara Khojoyan, “Kerry Calls for Karabakh Headway as Azeri-Armenian Talks Resume,” Bloomberg, November 19, 2013, accessed March 15, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-19/kerry-calls-for-karabakh-headway-as-azeriarmenian-talks-resume.html. [242] “The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: A festering sore,” The Economist, October 3, 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/10/nagorno-karabakh-conflict. [243] Ibid.
[244] Ellen Barry, “Azerbaijan and Armenia Fail to End Enclave Dispute,” New York Times, June 24, 2011, accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/world/asia/25karabakh.html?_r=0. [245] The PRS Group, Inc., “Azerbaijan: Country Report,” August 2012.
[246] Ibid. [247] Ilham Aliyev, “Opening speech by President Ilham Aliyev at the Friend of Journalists award ceremony,” November 24, 2013, accessed April 23, 2014, http://en.president.az/articles/10428. [248] “Azerbaijani Official Calls for Information Warfare Against Armenia,” HistoryofTruth.com: Armenian Allegations, January 25, 2011, accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.historyoftruth.com/news/azerbaijani-official-calls-for-information-warfare-againstarmenia#.Ushrm2RDvYc. [249] The Khojaly massacre or tragedy, known as the Khojaly genocide in Azerbaijan, was the killing of hundreds of ethnic Azerbaijani civilians from the town of Khojaly on February 25–26, 1992 by Armenian and Commonwealth of Independent States armed forces during the Nagorno-Karabakh War. [250] http://www.facebook.com/JFKCampaign
[251] twitter.com/Jforkhojaly [252] http://www.youtube.com/user/JUSTICEFORKHOJALYJFK [253] As of April 23, 2014. [254] Justice for Khojaly’s Facebook account was created on June 2, 2009. [255] Shahla Sultanova, “Azerbaijan: Can Facebook Become Substitute for Live Opposition Protests,” Eurasianet, November 19, 2012, accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66201. [256] Freedom House, “Azerbaijan: Key Developments: May 2012 – April 2013,” accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/azerbaijan. [257] Arzu Geybullayeva, “Nagorno-Karabakh 2.0: How New Media and Track Two Diplomacy Initiatives Are Fostering Change,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 32, no. 2 (2012). [258] Onnik Krikorian, “Armenia, Azerbaijan: Nagorno Karabakh Conflict Resumes… on Twitter,” GlobalVoices, June 8, 2012, accessed April 28, 2014, https://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/06/08/armenia-azerbaijan-the-karabakh-conflict-breaks-out-again-on-twitter/. [259] Shahin Abbasov, “Azerbaijan: How to Measure Free Speech on the Internet?,” Eurasianet, November 13, 2012, accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66171. [260] Nigar Orujova, “Azerbaijan may launch production of fiber optic cables,” Azernews, May 31, 2013, accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.azernews.az/business/54725.html. [261] Abbasov, “Azerbaijan: How to Measure.”
[262] Hamadoun I. Touré, “Speech by ITU Secretary-General, Dr. Hamadoun I. Touré presented at the ITU WSIS Forum, Thematic Workshop – Azerbaijan, Opening Remarks,” Geneva, May 15, 2013, accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.itu.int/en/osg/speeches/Pages/2013-05-15-4.aspx. [263] http://www.conflict-voices.net
[264] Onnik Krikorian, “Communication Is Possible: Armenian & Azeri Dialogue with the Aid of Social Media,” Ararat Magazine, June 24, 2010, accessed April 27, 2014, http://araratmagazine.org/2010/06/armenian-azeri-dialogue-social-media. [265] Freedom House, “Azerbaijan.”
[266] Ibid. [267] This section was written by William Schreiber.
[268] Matthew Collin, “Media war flares over S Ossetia,” Al Jazeera, November 24, 2008, accessed October 20, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2008/11/20081122163930714458.html.
[269] Olesya Vartanyan and Ellen Barry, “If History Is a Guide, Crimeans’ Celebration May Be Short-Lived,” New York Times, March 18, 2014, accessed October 20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/south-ossetia-crimea.html. [270] Interview with the section author in Tbilisi, Georgia, August 2013.
[271] Unless otherwise stated, this information is based on a series of interviews in August 2013 with former and current communications officials at the Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Reintegration of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The author would like to thank the Office for its time and transparency. [272] Susan Allen Nan, “Track I Diplomacy,” Beyond Intractability, June 2003, Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track1-diplomacy. [273] Iskra Kirova, Public Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: Russia, Georgia and the EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2012). [274] Olesya Vartanyan, “The political crisis in Abkhazia – expectations in Tbilisi,” July 2014, International Alert, accessed October 24, 2014, http://www.international-alert.org/blog/political-crisis-abkhazia-expectations-tbilisi-en. [275] “Georgian Government’s social media published in Abkhazian,” Agenda.ge, May 2014, accessed October 26, 2014, http://agenda.ge/news/14463/eng. [276] All account usage data is as of October 24, 2014.
[277] Use of social media by the de facto states themselves is outside the scope of this chapter. Please see the description of Abkhazia’s use of digital media in Giorgio Comai’s chapter in this volume, “Post-Soviet De Facto States Online.” [278] https://www.facebook.com/GeorgianGovernmentabkh
[279] As of October 20, according to the official website of the Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Reconciliation and Civic Equality: http://www.smr.gov.ge/index.php?lng=eng. [280] Islam Tekushev, “Maidan comes to Abkhazia,” openDemocracy, May 28, 2014, accessed October 24, 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/islam-tekushev/maidan-comes-to-abkhazia. [281] Liana Kvarchelia, “What Happened in Abkhazia,” September 2014, International Alert, accessed October 24, 2014, http://www.international-alert.org/blog/what-happened-abkhazia-en. [282] This section was written by Marcin Kosienkowski. The author would like to thank all persons interviewed: Dmitri Belan, Denis Cenuşă, Andrey Devyatkov, Krzysztof Kolanowski, Vladimir Korobov, Aurelian Lavric, Leonid Litra, Octavian Milewski, Stanislav Secrieru, Sergey Utkin, Vladimir Vieru, and others who preferred to stay anonymous. [283] Nikolay Pakhol’nitskiy, “Bol’no forumnyye stali,” Kommersant.md, May 15, 2013, accessed December 10, 2013, http://www.kommersant.md/node/16945. [284] https://www.facebook.com/groups/pridnestrovie/
[285] https://www.facebook.com/pages/Biroul-pentru-Reintegrare/1399244030299700 [286] http://www.gov.md/category.php?l=en&idc=600 [287] https://www.facebook.com/george.balan.33 [288] One of exceptions is activity of Moldova’s ambassador to Estonia, Victor Guzun (Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/vguzun; Twitter: @victorguzun). The Twitter activity of the Moldovan Foreign Ministry could also be mentioned (@Diplomacy_RM). [289] See Marcin Kosienkowski, “Transnistria’s Model of Facebook Diplomacy,” New Eastern Europe, September 18, 2012, accessed January 26, 2014, http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/component/content/article/20-eastern-europe-50/369-transnistria-s-model-offacebook-diplomacy; Nina Caspersen, “The politics of getting online in countries that don’t exist,” The Conversation, January 14, 2014, accessed January 30, 2014, http://theconversation.com/the-politics-of-getting-online-in-countries-that-dont-exist-21399. [290] Settlement of the Transnistrian conflict is a top priority just for 1 percent of Moldovans, 3.5 percent calls it the second most important issue, while 7.2 percent—the third one. Institute for Public Policy, “Barometer of Public Opinion (Final Raport),” November 2013, slide 22, accessed 30 January, 2014, http://ipp.md/libview.php?l=en&idc=156&id=666. [291] See Victor Chirilă, “Can Transnistria be reintegrated?,” Analyses of the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova, February 25, 2013, 5–6, accessed January 26, 2014, http://www.ape.md/doc.php?l=en&idc=152&id=1932.
[292] The change of internal (between Moldova and Transnistria) border crossing rules, including the opening of Moldovan migration posts along the Dniester River, is a case in point. The media reported the Moldovan authorities’ plans—inspired by the European Union within the EU-Moldova visa liberalization process—in Spring 2013, while the bill was passed in October 2013. For almost all this period, the authorities found it difficult to give a clear explanation of how the new regulations would look. It was also unclear if some rules had
been implemented even before adopting the law. All of these doubts gave rise to harmful speculations and met with a negative reaction from Transnistria, since it believed in the worst-case scenario. In the end, it turned out that people living in Transnistria were not affected by the new regulations, although one Moldovan official interviewed shortly after bill’s passing, said that nobody knew how exactly a crucial provision would be executed, namely how Transnistrians without Moldovan citizenship and “real” foreigners would be differentiated. [293] See Victor Chirilă, Politica de Reintegrare a Republicii Moldova: Viziune, strategie, mijloace (Chişinău: Cartier, 2013), accessed January 26, 2014, http://www.ape.md/lib.php?l=ro&idc=156. [294] See Marcin Kosienkowski, “The Alliance for European Integration and the Transnistrian conflict settlement,” Sprawy Narodowościowe–Nationalities Affairs 38 (2011): 23–32. [295] Adam Eberhardt, “The Paradoxes of Moldovan Sports. An insight into the nature of the Transnistrian conflict,” Point of View (Centre for Eastern Studies), November 2011, accessed January 26, 2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/punkt_widzenia_26_en.pdf. [296] For example, one interviewee, Octavian Milewski, suggests that “some money from the budget for reintegration (which is not spent properly) could be spent on pilot projects for using social media among high school kids, youth, and teachers as well. The goal would be to transmit messages of commonality, or, if not commonality, then of Europeanness. There could be a contest to bridge Transnistria through social media. Kids would like it. One project could be making Rezina kids reach out to Rybnitsa kids [neighboring Moldovan and Transnistrian towns located on the Dniester]. The OSCE Mission to Moldova [familiar with the use of social media] could flag this.” [297] In a 2007 talk with the section author, a senior Russian expert working at a Moscow-based branch of a Western think tank admitted he changed his mind about expert community unaffiliated with the then-Communist authorities, when he met its representatives in Moldova in a previous year. He was impressed by their Russian and appreciated their moderate views. Even this expert, with ties to the Western world, expected to meet anti-Russian non-Communists. Despite the fact that eight years passed and the non-Communists formed a Moldovan government that includes the mentioned experts, the present situation may not differ substantially. That is why suggested activities in social media—ideally personalized—could be useful. [298] https://www.facebook.com/photo.php? fbid=1426874194203350&set=a.1399754033582033.1073741827.1399244030299700&type=1&stream_ref=10 [299] Nikolay Pakhol’nitskiy, “Obzornoye vedomstvo,” Kommersant.md, January 29, 2014, accessed January 29, 2014,, http://kommersant.md/node/25093. [300] There are no precise and reliable data about number of Internet users in Transnistria. A dominant Transnistrian Internet provider, Interdnestrcom, had seventy thousand wired Internet subscribers at the beginning of 2013. Sergey Ganzha, interview with the Transnistrian television channel TSV, March 13, 2012, accessed January 28, 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch? feature=player_embedded&v=fld6jxTg_Es. While discussing closure of Transnistrian forums in 2013, one Transnistrian official said that “according to statistics, the Internet is used by no more than 0.10 percent of people, this also concerns Transnistria, where our elderly do not sit in front of computers.” Quoted in Andrey Mospanov, “Zapreshchyennyye internet-forumy v Pridnestrov’ye otkryty ne budut,” RIA «Novyy Region» 2, June 24, 2013, accessed January 28, 2014, http://www.nr2.ru/policy/445560.html. While the elderly are numerous in Transnistria, since younger people prefer to leave this poor region faced with unclear prospects, the 0.10 percent figure is heavily understated, even if the speaker considered only the number of users of the aforementioned forums. [301] See Volodymyr V. Lysenko and Kevin C. Desouza, “Moldova’s Internet Revolution: Analyzing the Role of Technologies in Various Phases of the Confrontation,” Technology Forecasting and Social Change 79 (2012): 341–61; Henry E. Hale, “Did the Internet Break the Political Machine? Moldova’s 2009 ‘Twitter Revolution that Wasn’t,’ ” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of PostSoviet Democratization 21, no. 4 (2013): 481–506. [302] Gilboa, “Media and Conflict,” 99.
[303] For instance, Ronald Reagan stated in 1989 that “The Goliath of totalitarianism will be brought down by the David of the microchip.” See Evgeny Morozov, “How the Net aids dictatorships,” filmed July 2009, TED video, 11:54, accessed August 12, 2013, http://www.ted.com/talks/evgeny_morozov_is_the_internet_what_orwell_feared.html. [304] This pertains to blogging on LiveJournal, social networking via Facebook and VKontakte (the Russian version of Facebook) and micro-blogging on Twitter. [305] Damir Gainutdinov, “RuNet: the ‘Shit List,’ ” Open Democracy, May 21, 2014, accessed June 9, 2014, http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/damir-gainutdinov/runet-%E2%80%98sh1t-list-roskomnadzor-censorship-inrussia%E2%80%99. [306] http://navalny.livejournal.com/
[307] Masha Egupova, “The Navalny Case: An Offline Power of Online Activism in Russia,” Vladivostok the city of sea and cucumber cliff (blog), March 19, 2011, accessed August 2, 2013, http://mashavladivostok.wordpress.com/2011/03/19/the-navalny-case-
an-offline-power-of-online-activism-in-russia/. [308] In the most recent Moscow Mayoral Election of September 2013 Navalny gained 27 percent of the vote compared to Sergey Sobyanin, the winner, who received just over 51 percent. [309] “Naval’nyy obnaruzhil u deputata Pekhtina nedvizhimost’ vo Floride” [Navalny found at Pekhtin’s property in Florida], Forbes.ru, February 12, 2012, accessed August 15, 2013, http://www.forbes.ru/news/234207-navalnyi-obnaruzhil-u-pehtinanezadeklarirovannuyu-nedvizhimost-vo-floride; Masha Egupova, “The online effect of online activism in Russia,” Al Jazeera, July 18, 2013, accessed August 12, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/profile/masha-egupova-.html. [310] Alexey Navalny, “The Continuation of ‘Pekhting,’ ” The blog of Navalny in English, February 13, 2013, accessed June 11, 2013, http://navalny-en.livejournal.com/55523.html. [311] For the various comments and reposts, see Alexey Navalny, “Prodolzheniye pekhtinga” [The Continuation of Pekhting], blog, February 13, 2013, accessed June 11, 2013, http://navalny.livejournal.com/2013/02/13/. [312] “Pekhtin poprosil ogranichit’ sebya v polnomochiyakh iz-za razoblacheniy Naval’nogo” [Pekhtin asked to limit himself to the authority because of Navalny’s revelations], Lenta, February 13, 2013, accessed July 19, 2013, http://lenta.ru/news/2013/02/13/pehtin/; “Otkuda u yedinorossa Pekhtina nedvizhimost’ v Mayami” [Where is the United Russia Pekhtin’s property in Miami], Vedomosti, February 13, 2013, accessed August 12, 2013, http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/9021361/deputat_ot_floridy; “Iz Gosdumy po sobstvennomu zhelaniyu” [From the state Duma’s own request], Pravda, February, 20, 2013, accessed August 12, 2013, http://www.pravda.ru/politics/parties/unity/20-02-2013/1145681-pehtin-0/. [313] “Vladimir Pekhtin, Putin ally, quits over foreign homes,” BBC, February 20, 2013, accessed August 12, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21525364; “Russian bloggers expose lavish lifestyles of Putin loyalists,” France 24, March 19, 2013, accessed July 11, 2013, http://www.france24.com/en/20130318-russia-bloggers-reveal-scandals-involving-putin-loyalists. [314] Nikolaus von Twickel, “Navalny Targets Senator Malkin,” The Moscow Times, March 15, 2013, accessed July 8, 2013, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/navalny-targets-senator-malkin/476943.html. [315] Alexey Navalny, “Bye-bye, Mr. ‘Senator,’ ” blog, March 14, 2013, accessed June 1, 2013, http://navalnyen.livejournal.com/61573.html. [316] Twickel, “Navalny Targets;” “Wealthy Russian Senator Quits Amid Accusations,” RIA Novosti, March 26, 2013, accessed July 1, 2013, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20130326/180261127.html. [317] Julia Ioffe, “Net Impact: One Man’s Cyber-Crusade against Russian Corruption,” New Yorker, April 4, 2011, accessed June 18, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/04/04/110404fa_fact_ioffe. [318] Vast number of blog entries pertaining to Transneft. For example, Alexey Navalny, “Bloomberg o Transnefti i sirotakh” [Bloomberg on Transneft and orphans], blog, May 20, 2011, accessed July 1, 2013, http://navalny.livejournal.com/579573.html. [319] Ioffe, “Net Impact.”
[320] Ibid. [321] Mikhail Loginov, “The Navalny effect,” openDemocracy, June 7, 2011, accessed July 4, 2013, http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/mikhail-loginov/navalny-effect. [322] Ioffe, “Net Impact.”
[323] “Russian Anti-Corruption App Knocks Out Angry Birds,” Al Jazeera, April 5, 2011, accessed July 8, 2013, http://storify.com/ajestream/ipad-corruption-app-tops-russias-most-downloaded-l2. [324] Leon Aron, “Nyetizdat: How the Internet is building civil society in Russia,” American Enterprise Institute, June 28, 2011, accessed August 12, 2013, http://www.aei.org/article/nyetizdat-how-the-internet-is-building-civil-society-in-russia/. [325] Loginov, “The Navalny Effect.”
[326] Ioffe, “Net Impact.” [327] Malcolm Gladwell and Clay Shirky, “Do Social Media Make Protests Possible,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2011, accessed August 19, 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67325/malcolm-gladwell-and-clay-shirky/from-innovation-to-revolution. [328] Oleg Kozlovsky, “Democracy: New Tools for the Struggle” (speech at the Ion Ratiu Democracy Award Workshop, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., December 2, 2010), accessed July 16, 2013, https://docs.google.com/document/pub?id=1FmOZDlHLrNJIoxrJn2CUukzuQLet4rh6jwe2SZBknWw. [329] For translation of Gattarov’s audio commentary, see Claire Bigg, “Young Guard Under Attack Over Fake Fire-Fighting Video,” Radio Free Europe, August 26, 2010, accessed July 13, 2013, http://www.rferl.org/content/Young_Guard_Under_Attack_Over_Fake_Firefighting_Video/2138506.html [330] Kozlovsky, “Democracy.”
[331] Ibid.
[332] Bigg, “Young Guard.” [333] Kozlovsky, “Democracy.” [334] Neil Vidyarthi, “VKontakte and Facebook Play Important Social Role in Russian Protests,” SocialTimes, December 8, 2011, accessed July 23, 2013, http://socialtimes.com/russia-protests-powered-by-vkontakte-and-facebook_b86194. [335] Tom Baimforth, “Russian Protesters Mobilize Via Social Networks, As Key Opposition Leaders Jailed,” Radio Free Europe, December 8, 2013, accessed July 13, 2013, http://www.rferl.org/content/russian_protesters_mobilize_online_as_leaders_jailed/24414881.html. [336] Neil Vidyarthi, “VKontakte and Facebook.”
[337] Brad Kim, “2011 Russian Protests,” accessed September 13, 2013, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/events/2011-russianprotests. [338] “Russia Election 2011/12,” GlobalVoices, March 27, 2012, accessed July 9, 2013, http://globalvoicesonline.org/specialcoverage/russia-elections-2011/#twitter. [339] Alexey Sidorenko, “Russia: Analyzing the Possible Scale of Saturday’s Election Protests,” GlobalVoices, December, 8, 2011, accessed July 23, 2013, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/12/08/russia-analyzing-the-possible-scale-of-saturdays-election-protests/. [340] Steve Coll, “The Internet: For Better or for Worse,” New America Foundation, March 18, 2011, accessed August 4, 2013, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/apr/07/internet-better-or-worse/. [341] Criminal charges are ongoing against Navalny. They relate to a fraud case which began in 2009 concerning €25,000 damage to the timber company Kirovles. See “Russia targets anti-graft blogger,” Financial Times, May 10, 2011, accessed July 2, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/265120c6-7b3a-11e0-9b06-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1WK3rCavQ. [342] Several donors were contacted by the pro-Kremlin group Nashi regarding their donations to Navalny’s RosPil website. See Kevin Rothrock, “Yulia Dikhtiar & the Persecution of RosPil,” A Good Treaty (blog), May 6, 2011, accessed July 18, 2013, http://www.agoodtreaty.com/2011/05/06/yulia-dikhtiar-rospil/. [343] “Russian deputy governor calls charges against Navalny ‘nonsense,’ ” May 11, 2011, accessed July 27, 2013, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110511/163970294.html. [344] Maria Antonova, “Russian bloggers accuse authorities of cyberwar,” French Press Agency, April 6, 2011, accessed August 12, 2013, http://bit.ly/eNgJIA. [345] Ibid.
[346] Oleg Kozlovsky in an interview with the author. [347] Vadim Isakov, “Russia: human bots fight opposition,” OWNI.eu, April 6, 2011, accessed August 19, 2013, http://owni.eu/2011/04/06/russia-human-bots-fight-opposition/. [348] Peter Lekarev, “Navalny, RosPil, and the battle of the bots,” The Voice of Russia, April 19, 2011, accessed July 11, 2013, http://english.ruvr.ru/radio_broadcast/36172287/49163430.html. [349] Ibid.
[350] Alexey Sidorenko, “Russia: Propagandist Videos Against Alexey Navalny Flood RuNet,” GlobalVoices, June 29, 2011, accessed July 4, 2013, https://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/06/29/russia-propagandist-videos-against-alexey-navalny-flood-runet/. [351] Ibid.
[352] Oleg Kozyrev in an interview with the author. [353] Kozlovsky, interview. [354] Veronica Khokhlova, “Russia: one year sentence for blog comment,” GlobalVoices, July 15, 2008, accessed July 18, 2013, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/07/15/russia-savva-terentyevs-case-2/. [355] “V Tatarstane bloger osuzhden na 6 mesyatsev za klevetu v adres ombudsmana” [In Tatarstan a blogger is sentenced to six months for defamation against ombudsman], Otkrytoye informatsionnoye agentstvo, June 9, 2011, accessed July 23, 2013, http://openinform.ru/news/unfreedom/09.06.2011/25035. [356] Oleg Kozlovsky, “Oborona’s Activist Faces Criminal Charges for Blogging,” blog, August 17, 2008, accessed August 23, 2013, http://olegkozlovsky.wordpress.com/2008/08/17/oboronas-activist-faces-criminal-charges-for-blogging. [357] Ibid.
[358] Alexey Sidorenko, “Russia: Networks of Paid Bloggers Exposed,” GlobalVoices, June 10, 2010, accessed August 21, 2013, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2010/06/10/russia-networks-of-paid-bloggers-exposed/. [359] Richard Koman, “Putin allies building a pro-Kremlin network of blogs, news sites,” ZDNet, October 29, 2007, accessed August 25, 2013, http://www.zdnet.com/blog/government/putin-allies-building-a-pro-kremlin-network-of-blogs-news-sites/3465.
[360] Baimforth, “Russian Protesters.” [361] Human Rights Watch, “Russia: Harassment of Critics,” March 1, 2012, accessed August 24, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/01/russia-harassment-critics. [362] Ibid.
[363] Ibid. [364] Maxim Goncharov, “The Dark Side of Social Media,” Security Intelligence Blog, December 7, 2011, accessed July 4, 2013, http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/the-dark-side-of-social-media/. [365] Ibid.
[366] Brian Krebs, “Twitter Bots Drown Out Anti-Kremlin Tweets,” Krebs on Security (blog), December 8, 2011, accessed July 17, 2013, https://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/12/twitter-bots-drown-out-anti-kremlin-tweets/. [367] Goncharov, “The Dark Side;” Krebs, “Twitter Bots.”
[368] “Russian Twitter political protests ‘swamped by spam,’ ” BBC, December 9, 2011, accessed September 12, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16108876. [369] Olga Razumovskaya, “Russian Social Network: FSB Asked It To Block Kremlin Protesters,” Emerging Europe Real Time (blog), Wall Street Journal, December 8, 2011, accessed August 15, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/emergingeurope/2011/12/08/russiansocial-network-fsb-asked-it-to-block-kremlin-protesters/. [370] Vladislav Tsyplukhin’s VKontakte page, December 7, 2011, accessed July 28, 2013, http://vk.com/wall93388_66779.
[371] Kevin Rothrock, “A Russian Gulag for America Social Networks’ Data?,” GlobalVoices, April 7, 2014, accessed June 30, 2014, https://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2014/04/07/a-russian-gulag-for-american-social-networks-data/. [372] Human Rights Watch, “Russia.”
[373] Ibid. [374] Lukas I. Alpert, “Russia’s Hacked Media Sites Fight Back,” Wall Street Journal, November 14, 2012, accessed July 15, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204707104578090793159318064.html. [375] Human Rights Watch, “Russia.”
[376] Ibid. [377] Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: How not to liberate the world (London: Allen Lane, 2011), 156. [378] There have been numerous recent developments of the regime proactively utilising the Internet vis-à-vis the recent Ukrainian crisis. For instance, as reported by the Associated Press, Roskomnadzor (Russia’s Internet monitoring agency) closed 13 websites connected to the Ukraine protest movement as they were deemed terrorist propaganda (http://www.salon.com/2014/03/03/russia_blocks_web_pages_linked_to_ukraine_protests/). In March 2014, the Russian regime was reported to have tampered with mobile phone networks in Ukraine, causing Ukrainian politicians to be without sufficient network coverage (http://www.businessinsider.com/the-ukraine-russia-cyber-war-is-heating-up-2014-3). Similarly, in March 2014, the BBC reported that patriotic hackers from Russia and Ukraine were engaging in cyber warfare throughout the crisis (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-26447200). [379] Notes upon Russia: A Translation of the Earliest Account of that Country, Entitled Rerum moscoviticarum commentarii, by the Baron Sigismund von Herberstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). [380] The Travels of Olearius in Seventeenth-century Russia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967).
[381] Journey For Our Time: The Journals of the Marquis de Custine Russia 1839 (London: Phoenix Press, 2001). [382] “Speech at meeting with Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives in international organisations,” July 12, 2010, accessed August 25, 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/610. [383] MFA Facebook—127.8 thousand subscribers, MFA Twitter English—51.2 thousand, MFA Twitter Russian—319 thousand.
[384] “Printsipy obshcheniya gosudarstva v sotsial’nykh setyakh,” interview with Ekho Moskvy radio station, November 17, 2013, accessed August 25, 2014, http://echo.msk.ru/programs/tochka/1198737-echo/. [385] Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005).
[386] All opinions in the article are those of the author. [387] Fergus Hanson, “Revolution @State: The Spread of Ediplomacy,” March 2012, accessed March 28, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/3/ediplomacy%20hanson/03_ediplomacy_hanson. [388] Arturo Sarukhan, “Diplomacy and the Digital Age,” Huffington Post, March 4, 2013, accessed March 28, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arturo-sarukhan/diplomacy-and-the-digital_b_3006716.html.
[389] Jimmy Leach, “Digital diplomacy: facing a future without borders,” The Independent, July 19, 2013, accessed March 28, 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/digital-diplomacy-facing-a-future-without-borders-8714293.html. [390] Marita Vlachou, “Ukraine protests fueled by social media,” Washington Square News, February 25, 2014, accessed April 1, 2014, http://www.nyunews.com/2014/02/25/ukraine-2/. [391] Aurelie Valtat, “A definition of digital diplomacy,” EU Digital Diplomacy (blog), August 21, 2011, accessed April 7, 2014, http://www.digitaldiplomacy.eu/a-definition-of-digital-diplomacy/. [392] Burson-Marsteller, “The Best connected World Leaders on Twitter,” accessed April 7, 2014, http://twiplomacy.com/.
[393] Melissa Jeltsen, “President Of Estonia Slams Paul Krugman: ‘Smug, Overbearing & Patronizing,’ ” Huffington Post, June 6, 2012, accessed April 7, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/06/estonia-krugman-toomas-hendrik-ilves_n_1575937.html. [394] “Digital diplomacy for the 21st Century – A transatlantic perspective,” European Policy Centre, June 26, 2012, accessed April 9, 2014, http://www.epc.eu/themes_details.php?cat_id=6&pub_id=2790&theme_id=49. [395] Andreas Sandre, “ ‘Fast Diplomacy’: The Future of Foreign Policy?,” The Huffington Post, November 6, 2013, accessed April 9, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andreas-sandre/fast-diplomacy_b_3416330.html.
