DISASTER, CONFLICT AND SOCIAL CRISIS RESEARCH NETWORK NEWSLETTER Vol. 14, N°. 51, September 2013 – December 2013
http://www.dcscrn.org/
The number of natural disasters has always been an issue, though it is widely recognized that climate change impacts on the magnitude of natural disasters and will continue to influence severe weather phenomenona in the future. The number of technological disasters can be seen as a product of the ongoing extension of complex systems and modes of production. Unforeseen social crises also appear, lately ones related to sudden collapse of financial stability, with an extensive influence on the growing proportion of social despair.
C OORDINATOR ’ S R EPORT
Nina Blom Andersen
[email protected]
Among the many contributions in this newsletter you can read about different scholars’ approaches to some of the incidents that research must take into account and deal with. These are gathered in the extended abstracts of some of the presentations made on our biannual conference in Turin, Italy within the European Sociological Association (ESA) back in August (p. 3). The presentations that you can read deal e.g. with the consequences of the debt crisis in southern Europe, concerning problems of crime, discrimination, and new kinds of poverty and exclusion. Further abstracts concern new technological systems, crises concerning the decline in natural resources as well as terrorism. New causes of social crises are described, and well known are scrutinized too, and novel ways of dealing with these matters are discussed. Among the presentations you will also find suggestions for dealing with technical solutions such as surveillance and social media.
Dear Members, Colleagues and Followers of the Disaster, Conflict and Social Crisis Research Network, I am glad to be able to present to you this 51st DCSCRN Newsletter. On behalf of the DCSCRN Coordinating Committee, I would like to send New Year’s greetings to all of you. The beginning of a new year invites most of us to make wishes for the new year – hoping that things that we deal with will become just slightly better. This does of course lead me to make the very simple wish of 2014 with less disasters, social crises, and conflicts, which I believe that we probably all can agree on. This is obviously a bit naïve since the matter is very much out of the hands of us both as scholars and as practitioners. So, a more achievable wish would be to strengthen the research and documentation on matters concerning these severe events. Through research we can contribute just a little bit on making societies better suited to handle disaster events – both by gathering knowledge as well as making theoretically informed reflections on disaster processes and the like.
I wish you a pleasant reading. Best regards, Nina Blom Andersen DCSCRN Coordinator
In the Coordinating Committee of our research network, an excellent term has been discussed in the last months, that of next practices. If we as researchers deal with the next practices of handling disastrous incidents instead of trying to strive for the best practices, we acknowledge the dynamic and evolving character of practices in relation to crises and conflicts. I believe this is necessary since the character of problems that we are dealing with is under constant change.
Contents of this issue
1
C OORDINATOR ’ S R EPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
E DITOR ’ S N OTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
DCSCRN W EB M ANAGER N OTE . . . . . . . . .
2
F ROM DCSCRN M EMBERS . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
R ESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3
A NNOUNCEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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T HE DCSCRN E LECTRONIC N EWSLETTER . . .
28
E DITOR ’ S N OTE
Bill was one of the early Ph.D.’s from Ohio State University when the Disaster Research Center was located there. His doctoral dissertation was on the 1964 Alaska earthquake and his later work included a study of floods in Ohio which led him to identify the concept of a “disaster subculture”. He was one of the first to write about the role of the military in disaster and in 1970 published one of the first social science studies of tsunami warnings. He also co-authored – with Russell Dynes – a study of the 30th of May movement in Curacao.
Antti Silvast
[email protected]
After teaching at Kent State and Arizona state where one of his students was Ron Perry, another distinguished scholar in our field, Bill moved to the National Science Foundation where he was responsible for 26 years of funding US disaster research.
Dear Members and Colleagues of the DCSCRN, Welcome to the December edition of the DCSCRN Newsletter, which covers the period September 2013 – December 2013. As Nina noted above, the focus of this issue will be with last autumn’s 11th ESA Conference in Turin, Italy. We have first collected all the available extended abstracts of the papers presented in Turin, starting from p. 3. Then, from p. 24, you will find photographs taken during the conference. We hope this coverage is interesting both for those attended and those who could not make it this time. The usual contents such as announcements, paper calls, and reports about other conference events are also presented in this issue.
From June 1999 to June 2001, he served as senior advisor in the Disaster Management Facility in the Infrastructure Division at the World Bank while on leave from the NSF. In 2010 Bill was awarded the Charles Fritz award by the International Research Committee on Disasters for a lifetime contribution to Sociology of Disaster. Bill was known for the quite supportive way he dealt with scholars at all levels and he was respected, admired and loved by his colleagues.
I want to wish you a pleasant reading and Happy New Year. Yours, Antti Silvast
A personal note I first met Bill when he was a discussant for the first paper I ever presented in the disaster field. His criticism was sensitively thorough and constructive and he made me feel welcome to what for me then was virgin territory. I got to know him better when we both attended the World Congress in Sweden in 1982 and we have been friends ever since.
DCSCRN W EB M ANAGER N OTE Antti Silvast (
[email protected])
New members The DCSCRN received no new membership applications between September 2013 and December 2013. Anyone who wants to be kept informed of events and current issues regarding our themes can register with the network free of charge by following the instructions at http: //www.dcscrn.org/membership/become-a-member. We look forward to welcoming new colleagues on board!
Joe Scanlon (
[email protected])
Disability and Disaster Networking With some colleagues at University College London, I am trying to set up an informal network of people based in EU institutions who are researching this topic. They could be disaster researchers with an interest in disability, or disability researchers who are interested in emergencies and disasters. The idea of networking is, initially, to share publications and find out about each other’s work and future plans; but in the long term it could lead to joint research projects and more formal partnerships. If anyone is interested, please contact me.
The up-to-date list of all 255 members can be viewed at http://www.dcscrn.org/membership/members.
F ROM DCSCRN M EMBERS In Memoriam: William Anderson William Anderson one of the prominent and admired US disaster scholars died suddenly on December 29 when holidaying in Hawaii.
John Twigg (
[email protected]) 2
R ESOURCES
during the past 3-4 years, criminal activity or law offending behavior does not unquestionably result from economic parameters alone. Neither the increased poverty has “produced” more crime, nor does the country live in a state of violence and anomic chaos.
Books, articles, reports, and recent studies by DCSCRN members and colleagues. Book prices reflect prices at the time of survey. The DCSCRN cannot guarantee the prices informed. Prices are as stated in US dollars, Euros or UK pounds.
The issue of crime rates under conditions of economic crises, poverty, deprivation and austerity is of vast importance among crime specialists, political analysts and media commentators. I do not intend to navigate through all relevant theoretical discussions that attempt to connect economic crises and crime2 but only to repeat the common assumption especially among econometric studies that adverse economic conditions, from unemployment and poverty to income inequality and a sense of relative deprivation, are linked to a growth in crime, especially in property and violent offences.3
Extended Abstracts: European Sociological Association (ESA), 11th Conference, ‘Crisis, Critique and Change’, Turin, Italy, 28-31 August 2013 The DCSCRN is publishing here all the available extended abstracts from our sessions in the 11th ESA conference. The entries were edited by the coordinator and newsletter editor in correspondence with the authors and we thank everyone for their efforts. As a result, we now present you with nine papers about various different facets of disaster, financial and social crisis, and conflict. A few further abstracts are in their final stages of writing and will be published in due time in the next issue of the newsletter in April.
There exist various explanations as to how economic factors impact upon levels and patterns of crime. Unemployment, for example, is thought to strengthen the temptation to offending, but also to enhance the emergence of other positive correlates of crime such as lack of education and housing. It might thus be reasonable to assume that the financial crisis of the first decade of the 21st century triggered off reactions in property and violent crimes in countries hit by the economic tornado. Moreover, within the context of the United Nations Global Pulse initiative on monitoring the impact of crisis on vulnerable populations and on investigating the possible effects of economic stress on crime, it was concluded that whether in times of economic crisis or non crisis, economic factors play an important role in the evolution of crime trends. Out of a total of fifteen countries examined, statistical modelling identifies an economic predictor for at least one crime type in twelve countries suggesting some overall association between economic changes and crime. Both visual inspection of data series and statistical modeling suggest that in eight of the eleven ‘crisis’ countries, changes in economic factors were associated with changes in crime leading to identifiable crime ‘peaks’ during the time of crisis. Violent property crime types such as robbery appeared most affected during times of crisis, with up to
For more information about the papers, please correspond directly with the authors. All papers express the opinions of the authors and not necessarily those of the coordinators, of the coordinating committee, or of the newsletter editor of the DCSCRN.
Economic Crises and Crime By Joanna Tsiganou1 (
[email protected]) Many crime and economy specialists, political analysts and media commentators have much too often insisted on the strong relationship between economic crises and the volume of crime. In the proposed paper I intend to show that the relationship between economic crises and levels of criminality needs further empirical verification. The data available suggest that although the volume of “street crime” (that is mainly, thefts, burglaries and robberies) seems to increase in the middle of financial crises at an international level, strong empirical evidence to prove the linear or the causal character of the above mentioned relationship is missing. On the contrary the Greek experience suggests that economic crises alone do not increase the volume of crime, because criminal behavior has mainly moral that is cultural connotations, as the value system is considered to be an important determinant of behaviour. Although Greece has been undergoing one of the most severe economic crises of its history
2 See
indicatively Quinney R., (1977) : “Class State and Crime – On Theory and Practice of Criminal Justice”, David McKay, New York, USA. Also, Cantor D., Land K.C., (1985) : “Unemployment and crime rates in the post - world War II United States : A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis”, American Sociological Review, τόμος 50, no 3, pp. 317 – 332. Levitt S.D., (2004) : “Understanding why crime fell in the 1990s: Four factors that explain the decline and six that do not”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, τόμος 18, no 1, pp. 163-190. Deflem M., (2011) : “Economic Crisis and Crime”, Emerald Group Publishing, UK. 3 See Xenakis S. & Cheliotiς L. (2012): “The Politics of Crime and the Financial Crisis in Greece”, ESC Newsletter (http://www.escnewsletter.org), Issue 2 / 2012.
1 Dr.,
Director of Research, The Greek National Centre for Social Research – EKKE
3
two-fold increases in some contexts during a period of economic stress. In some contexts, increases in homicide and motor vehicle theft were also observed. These findings are consistent with criminal motivation theory, which suggests that economic stress may increase the incentive for individuals to engage in illicit behaviors. In no case where it was difficult to discern a peak in crime was any decrease in crime observed. As such the available data do not support a criminal opportunity theory that decreased levels of production and consumption may reduce some crime types such as property crime, through the generation of fewer potential crime targets.4
ten over-represented in proportion to their share of the general population, and the fact that immigrant offenders follow the law-offending patterns of the indigenous population is seldom, if ever, addressed.6 Thus, sentiments of punitiveness are running high, still remaining incompatible with the actual levels and patterns of criminal victimization. On the other hand volumes have been devoted to the questioning of the validity of police and other official crime records and/or statistics. In fact there are multiple reasons why police-recorded crime statistics need to be treated with particular caution when used as a proxy for actual crime rates. These range from attitudes of reporting, attitudes of recording and the systematic over-policing of immigrant and other vulnerable social communities.
However, such being the case, the relationship between economic recession, on the one hand, and levels and patterns of crime, on the other, has yet to receive sufficient attention. Examining the Greek case as an example of a country in a deep economic crisis, it is revealed that that the economic recession coupled with severe austerity measures may not be associated with a wide range of typically acknowledged criminal behaviours. The Greek case rather exhibits the means and ways politics have infused perceptions on the connection between crisis and crime the same way it has shaped the financial crisis itself. It is true that Greece, even before the crisis suffered from high levels of income inequality and poverty. With the imposition of austerity, unemployment rose from about 7% in 2008 to over the 25% in 2012 and has reached a peak of about 30% in 2013. Living standards also have dropped sharply particularly from late 2010 onwards. Nevertheless, despite the common tendency of political media to reflect on the relationship between the economic deprivation and ‘a new crime wave’ especially in property and violent offences I tend to disagree with such strong relationship suggestion between financial crises and crime.
At the same time the annual National Survey on Corruption in Greece provides enough evidence supporting the arguments that a) the phenomenon has been vastly present and before the present crisis, b) that the total levels of corruption have been stabilized in this country throughout the years of crisis and c) that the total amounts of money spent for corruption have been decreasing from 2010 onwards which of course may be explicable also in terms of austerity7 . As for the connection between economic crisis and the emergence of anomic phenomena, aspects of disobedience, violence and even organized political violence, strong empirical evidence to support such a connection is lacking. On the contrary according to the data provided by a pilot survey conducted in Athens by the Greek National Centre for Social Research in 2012, in the midst of austerity measures, shows that various forms of disobedience as the refusal to pay taxes considered unfair, physical attacks against politicians and symbolic acts of rage are followed and/or approved only by the 9-10% of the Greek public. It is not valid to assume that the non payment of the annually imposed income tax by the 30% of the Greek population is symbolic. It is actually pragmatic due to income deprivation. Of course the majority (54%) of Athenian public feel that we live in a society without rules, 78% think that the Laws are not properly and justly implemented, 57% believe that the unfair rules should not be followed, and 86% believe that meritocracy is absent. However, people have become less tolerant as 95% believe that the guilty should pay and 83% feel that injustice is nowadays greater and this is something they can no longer tolerate. At the same time they feel insecure and far from certain for their future (79%).
Considering this issue from a broader perspective including the historical dimension one has to admit the following: It is true that within the context of the ongoing financial crisis in Greece, public fears about property and violent crime appear to have risen often in association with heightened concerns about illegal immigration into the country and related offending.5 It is also true that these sentiments have been fuelled by public discourse that refers to police-recorded crime statistics showing a significant growth (30-40%) in thefts, burglaries and robberies during the past 2-3 years. Yet, immigrants are of4 UNODC
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime): GIVAS Final Report: “Monitoring the Impact of Economic Crisis on Crime”, 2011. 5 I agree to this point with Xenakis S. & Cheliotiς L., in (2012): “The Politics of Crime and the Financial Crisis in Greece”, ESC Newsletter (http://www.escnewsletter.org), Issue 2 / 2012.
6 Tsiganou J., et al., (2010):
“Immigration and Criminality: Myths and Realities”, Athens, EKKE. 7 National Survey on Corruption in Greece , 2011. Also, Kourakis N., Spinelli K., Zagoura P., (eds), 2012 : “Transparency and the combating of Corruption”, Athens, Sakkoulas.
4
It is to be noted that although the Greek public has become more suspicious and reserved, social solidarity is still exhibited in various forms. At the same time people feel (48%) that despite the economic crisis people try to help each other.
b) members of the general population as control group in the prefecture of Attica (applying snowball method) (N=306). Vulnerable Social Groups (VSGs) were specified according to the Record of Vulnerable Social Groups held officially by the “Manpower Employment Organization”. In the sample 16 vulnerable social groups are represented. However, the majority are “Immigrants” (35%), “People with disabilities” (19%), “Long term unemployed over 45 years old with low qualifications” (16%), and “Roma/Other special cultural groups” (10%).
Concluding this brief review it is suggested that the relationship between crime and the financial crisis may be non-linear, irregular and complex, as the Greek experience bears witness. Also it is important to note that the process of ‘identification’ of a period of ‘crisis’ or of an ‘impact’ on crime is highly subjective. In addition, the suggestion of the existence of a period of economic downturn and an impact on crime by use of econometric tools alone is unable to identify whether economic changes are causal of crime changes or to take account of changes in other factors that may also impact upon crime levels. Research is still needed in order to validate such remarks.
Regarding the socio-demographic characteristics of the two groups one major difference between them is that 72.7% of members of Vulnerable Social Groups have Greek citizenship as opposed to 98.4% of general population. VSGs also report lower levels of educational and professional skills (such as “computer efficacy”, “fluency in English”, “fluency in Greek” and “level of education”). Also, members of VSGs are unemployed for a longer period of time than members of control group.
The Identity of Excluded in Times of Fiscal Austerity in Greece: Perceptions and Experiences of Discrimination in Employment
First we focus on how individuals perceive discrimination in contemporary Greek labor market. Discrimination is considered either: a) as social threat or b) as personal threat of exclusion from employment. Social threat refers to a general perception of discrimination felt by members of social groups and it constitutes a rather abstract threat. In this case we study individuals’ estimates about the extent of discrimination in general (in Greek labor market nowadays). Personal threat refers to a self-directed threat that arises from personal experience of discrimination and it constitutes a rather realistic threat. In this case we study individuals’ estimates of discrimination based on relevant personal experience in various conditions of employment.
By Katerina Iliou1 (
[email protected]) The present economic crisis in Eurozone sets Greece in the center of international interest as far as economic breakdown and social unrest is concerned. Trends in unemployment in South European countries outline a pessimist ground for present and future workforce. At time when the present study was conducted 23.1% of Greek people were officially recorded as unemployed, while in May 2013 unemployment reached 27.6%. The implementation of fiscal austerity policies and the enforcement of overwhelming taxation measures contribute to a greater risk of poverty for 21.4% of the Greek population. Under these circumstances old and new social groups have to cope with exaggerated inequalities in employment.
Analysis shows that social threat is considerably perceived since Means of answers of total sample reveal that discrimination problems in Greek labor market exist “to a great extent”. Discriminations are indicated mostly in “Hiring”, “Dismissals”, and “Terms of conditions of employment”, but also in “Taking full advantage of staff and promotions” and “Wages”. What is more, the majority (55%) have experienced discrimination at least once in the process of hiring for a vacancy (depicting aspects of Personal threat). Most persons attribute discrimination to their “age” (26%), their “gender” (14%), their “nationality” (13%) and their “place of origin” (12%) (see Figure 1). As source of discrimination they recognize their “employers” (16.8%), their “managers” (10.5%) and to a lesser extent their “colleagues” (8%) (see Figure 2). The greatest share of respondents (17.2%) did not react at all to the discrimination. The rest coped with discrimination by “verbal reactions” (16.9%), while very few appear to follow official legal processes (such as “filing
This paper includes results from a survey conducted by the National Centre for Social Research in collaboration with the “Manpower Employment Organization”2 during 2012. Research was part of PROGRESS (20072013) - The European Union Programme For Employment and Social Solidarity. Quantitative data were collected with a questionnaire. Sample design focused on two main groups: a) Members of Vulnerable Social Groups, who were selected proportionally in Local Employment Promotion Centers of “Manpower Employment Organization” throughout Greece (N=1280) and 1 Greek
National Centre for Social Research - EKKE a) promotion of employment, b) employment insurance and c) vocational education and training. 2 The public national institution for:
5
economic conditions”4 , “Occupation processes”5 ) contribute to prediction of Social threat (i.e. perception of discrimination) in general. In Models 3 and 4 we test if the same factors contribute to prediction of Personal threat (i.e. experience of discrimination). In a few words, analyses show that “group membership” is the main factor that contributes to prediction of Social and Personal threat of exclusion from employment. However, various “Socio-economic conditions” and “Occupation processes” also contribute to perception and experience of discrimination6 . Figure 1: Attributions of discrimination
Drawing from above, we attempt to identify the excluded from labor market by focusing on perceptions of Social and Personal threat of exclusion. Two different groups are tested: Members of Vulnerable Social Groups and members of general population as control group. In agreement with our hypothesis, members of VSGs appear to be in disadvantage, since they report higher levels of Personal threat of employment exclusion (stating personal experience of discrimination). Nevertheless, in contrast to our hypothesis, non members of VSGs tend to express higher levels of Social threat (reporting high levels of discrimination in general). Such findings, highlighting that although members of VSGs appear to be the victims of discrimination, non members tend to report discrimination to a higher extent, can be explained in different ways. First, it may be an outcome of economic crisis in Greece that inflates social dissatisfaction and emphasizes social inequalities. However, we should also consider that in times of fiscal austerity new social groups are at risk of deterioration of their social status or even poverty. Second, it could be explained as an outcome of the meaning of “discrimination”. In this case members of general population may view discrimination in labor market in a more general way (when the interviewer sets the question) including nepotism, corruption and in-group favoritism. In this case we should
Figure 2: Source of discrimination
a complaint to the Labor Inspectorate” or “filing a lawsuit”). Further analysis focuses on the research hypothesis that membership in a devalued social group may increase perceptions and experiences of discrimination. In contrast to this hypothesis, analysis (running Independent samples t-tests) shows that non members of VSGs express higher perception of Social threat compared to members of VSGs. However, our hypothesis is verified as far as Personal threat is concerned. Comparison of answers between members and non members of VSGs (applying Chi-square statistical criterion) highlight that members of VSGs report personal experience of discrimination in “hiring” and “previous jobs” more than expected. They also appear to be victims of discriminatory behavior more than expected by their employers and their colleagues.
4 Concerning “Age”, “Marital status”, “Citizenship”, “Education”, “Employment”, “Sector of economy in employment” and “Salary”. 5 Concerning “Change of many employers”, “Total time of employment”, “Job satisfaction” and “Total time of unemployment”. 6 In detail: a) Model 1 shows that “non members of VSGs”, “Greek citizens”, persons with “low salary”, “low job satisfaction” and “long-time unemployed” tend to express higher levels of discrimination in general in labor market. b) Model 2 shows that “non members of VSGs”, “Greek citizens”, persons with “low salary”, “low job satisfaction”, “working in public sector”, and “long-time unemployed” tend to express higher levels of frequency of discrimination in general. c) Model 3 shows that “members of VSGs”, “married” persons, with “low salary”, “low job satisfaction” and “change of many employers” tend to report higher levels of personal experience of discrimination in hiring. d) Model 4 shows that “members of VSGs”, persons with “low job satisfaction”, and “change of many employers” tend to report higher levels of personal experience of discrimination in previous jobs.
In order to find out which factors contribute to prediction of Social and Personal threat of exclusion from labor market we test four separate Models (running Multiple Regression Analysis with Stepwise method for loading of independent variables). In Models 1 and 2 we test which factors (“Group membership”3 , “Socio3 Concerning
being vs. not being member of Vulnerable Social
Groups.
6
consider formulating an open question for the definition of “discrimination” in future questionnaires. Third, this could be an outcome of sample design. Findings may reflect views of VSGs located in public institutions such as the Manpower Employment Organization that cannot be generalized. For example, immigrants who represent 35% of present sample, are only such immigrants that hold official papers of stay. At the same time, social scientists often face up problems of access to populations such as paperless immigrants. However, specific public institutions should be used with caution and proper methodological questioning.
COMPLAINTS FOR
2009
2010
2011
2012
Ethnic origin
3.7%
3.8%
3.5%
4.5%
Racial origin
53.7%
67.9%
47.3%
58%
Disability-reasonable
25.9%
26.4%
24.5%
17%
Age
13%
1.9%
22.8%
15.2%
Sexual orientation
3.7%
-
1.8 %
3.5%
Religious beliefs
-
-
-
-
100%
100%
100%
100%
DISCRIMINATION (by discrimination ground)
adjustments
Total
Last, but not least, the present paper highlights that group membership is not a sufficient factor for predicting Social and/or Personal threat of exclusion from labor market. Perception of discrimination in general as well as personal experience of discrimination are multi-factorial phenomena involving not only affiliations with groups, but also socio-economical conditions and processes.
Table 1: Citizens’ Complaints for Discriminations covered by Law 3304/2005 (2009-2012). Source: Greek Ombudsman’s Annual Reports 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 crimination while the other surveys stamp the population perception of discrimination. Following Law 3304/2005, the Greek Ombudsman is the specialized body, to which citizens may appeal in cases of experiencing discriminatory treatment on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, religious or other beliefs, disability, age or sexual orientation. Drawing from the GO’s annual reports, it is observed that during the last four years there is a steady number of complaints filed by citizens who have experienced discriminations and ask the GO to intervene and apply the principle of equal treatment. More specifically, 54 cases were examined by the GO in 2009, 53 in 2010, 57 in 2011, and 112 in 2012. In Table 1 the respective percentages concerning all discrimination grounds covered by Law 3304/2005 are presented. The main reason citizens appeal to the GO over time is discriminations on the grounds of ethnic or racial origin at a rate steadily over 47%.
The Institutional Framework on Combating Discrimination in the Greek Labour Market under the Impact of the Economic Crisis By Nikos Sarris1 (
[email protected]) This article examines the implementation of the antidiscrimination legislative framework in Greece, particularly after the incorporation of Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC2 through Law 3304/20053 . It further aims to document the efficacy of implementing the legislative provisions concerning discrimination both in general and especially on the labour market, particularly within a period of economic crisis. This short analysis is based on data from Greek Ombudsman’s (GO) annual reports, Eurobarometer surveys and the 5th Round of the European Social Survey. The GO’s data present citizen complaints, in other words reported experience of dis-
The Greek Ombudsman’s interventions regarding gender discrimination is of equal importance, particularly after the passing of Law 3896/2010, which widens GO’s competencies on gender discrimination in the workplace in both public and private sectors. With Law 3896/2010 the legislature institutionally enhanced the role of GO as a body for monitoring and promoting the principle of equal treatment between men and women in employment and extended the Authority’s duties regarding equal opportunities for men and women. Table 2 presents cases by form of unequal treatment on the grounds of gender or marital status for years 2009-2012.4 The majority of complaints related to terms and conditions of employment, which rose to 72.89% in 2010, while during last
1 Researcher,
Greek National Centre for Social Research - EKKE Directives on racial and ethnic equality (2000/43/EC) and employment equality (2000/78/EC) serve a dual purpose: a) the formation of a framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of racial and ethnic origin, disability, religion or belief, age or sexual orientation in the EU member-states and b) the establishment of bodies and mechanisms in the EU states in order to monitor the implementation of the legislation discussed and to promote and encourage equal treatment. 3 Law 3304/2005 incorporates Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC and provides for the protection against discriminatory treatment due to racial or ethnic origin (employment and training, education, social protection, including social security and healthcare social benefits, membership and participation in employees’ and employers’ organizations, access to goods and services, including housing), religious or other convictions, disability, age and sexual orientation (for the sectors of employment and training). The aim is to form a general framework for combating discrimination. 2 The
4 The numbers in the table are referred as such in each one of the annual reports of the Greek Ombudsman and are obviously based on citizen cases that were examined in each specific year. The total number of each year is 250-300 cases. See http://www.synigoros.gr/
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Distribution of cases
2009
2010
2011
2012
39.13%
72.89%
47.83%
40.81%
Access to employment
20.29%
18.64%
4.35%
0.82%
Termination of
23.19%
5.08%
41.74%
30.20%
Wages
11.59%
3.39%
0.87%
4.08%
Professional/Staff
4.35%
-
3.48%
2.04%
1.45%
-
1.74%
0.41%
Employment terms and conditions
employment relationship
development Professional/Vocational
Figure 1: Very and fairly widespread types of discrimination in Greece. Source: Eurobarometer 77.4. Discrimination in the EU in 2012 – Results for Greece
training
Table 2: Cases of unequal treatment on the ground of gender for 2009-2012. Source: Greek Ombudsman’s Annual Reports 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 two years there was a rapid increase of complaints regarding terminations of employment relationships. This could be mainly due to the increase of flexible forms of employment and the change of scenery within the labour market, brought about by a series of legislative interventions imposed by the memoranda5 and applicable laws. According to the Eurobarometer survey, in 2012 citizens in Greece believed that most forms of discrimination they were asked about are (very and fairly) widespread in their country. Findings are presented in Figure 1. The most commonly reported form of discrimination is ethnic origin by 70%, followed by sexual orientation (being bisexual, gay or lesbian) by 65%, gender identity (being transgender or transsexual) by 64%, disability by 53%, age (being over 55 years old) by 43%, religion or beliefs by 37%, gender by 23% and age (being under 30 years old) by 15%.
Figure 2: Types of discrimination in Greece and the EU. Source: Eurobarometer 77.4 Discrimination in the EU in 2012 55 years old and persons under 30 years old) and religion or beliefs. On the other hand, by collating Eurobarometer 2012 findings for Greece with the findings of 2009, as they are presented in Figure 3, it is observed that citizens’ perceptions about discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin (71% in 2009 and 70% in 2012) and sexual orientation (64% in 2009 and 65% in 2012) remain steady. However, there is a decrease in other types of discrimination, rather impressive especially when it comes to gender discrimination (from 49% in 2009 to 23% in 2012).
Comparing discrimination rates in Greece with the EU27 mean (Figure 2), it is noticed that rates are higher in Greece on the grounds of ethnic origin (70% versus 56% in EU-27), disability (53% versus 46% in EU-27), sexual orientation (65% versus 46% in EU-27), and gender identity (64% versus 45% in EU-27). On the other hand, lower rates of discrimination are observed on the grounds of gender (23% versus 31% in EU-27), whereas they are more or less equally high when it comes to discrimination on the grounds of age (for both persons over 5 Since
May 2010, the euro area Member States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been providing financial support to Greece through an Economic Adjustment Programme in the context of a sharp deterioration in its financing conditions. The aim is to support the Greek government’s efforts to restore fiscal sustainability and to implement structural reforms in order to improve the competitiveness of the economy, thereby laying the foundations for sustainable economic growth. Memoranda are the international conventions between the Greek government and the board of creditors.
Figure 3: Comparative longitudinal data of discrimination in Greece. Source: Eurobarometer 2012 and 2009, Discrimination in the EU 8
Figure 5: Grounds of discrimination in Greece. Source: ESS Data, Results of 5th Round, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/
Figure 4: Factors that are perceived to put job applicants at a disadvantage in Greece and the EU. Source: Eurobarometer 77.4, Discrimination in the EU in 2012
with Laws 4074/2012 and 4097/2012; these laws incorporate into the Greek legislation directives and international conventions, thus increasing the level of protection. Looking closely into the application of legislation, it could be argued that complaints regarding discriminations on the grounds of religion or beliefs and sexual orientation are still quite limited. A greater effort needs to be made in this area by the state, in order to raise public awareness and in order for citizens to learn their rights. According to the Eurobarometer survey, in Greece there is a relatively stable view regarding discriminations due to ethnic origin and sexual orientation, whereas a decrease is documented on other grounds, especially regarding gender discrimination. Discrimination on the ground of nationality remains the basic ground of discrimination in Greece, as the ESS findings also suggest. Out of the ten proposed grounds of discrimination, there is a decrease in six, nationality rates remain stable, and rates are higher for the remainder three.
Discrimination however is also prominent in workplaces. Job candidates’ certain characteristics may in most cases act as determinants for their selection or not by prospective employers. Asked “when a company wants to hire someone and has the choice between two candidates with equal skills and qualifications, which of the following criteria may, in your opinion, put one candidate at a disadvantage”, respondents in Greece consider the candidate’s age, specifically being over 55 years old, as the primary criterion of discrimination in the labour market (54%). This is followed by disability (48%) and the candidate’s look (manner of dress or presentation, 47%). The candidate’s skin colour or ethnic origin (43%) and his/her psychical appearance (size, weight, face, etc, 42%) are also believed to be significant grounds of discrimination. Age over 55 years old is at the top (54%) when EU-27 is concerned, followed by the candidate’s look (45%) and disability (40%). Figure 4 presents in detail the criteria which could put a candidate at a disadvantage in the labour market, as well as response rates for Greece and the EU.
Discriminations seem to be more intensified in the labour market, where all rates are higher. Age discrimination (being over 55 years old) appears as the most prominent ground of unequal treatment. Discrimination outside working life is seen as occurring less often. The economic crisis has also increased discriminations, particularly in the labour market and mainly due to flexible forms of employment and the change of scenery, brought about by a series of legislative interventions.
According to the European Social Survey’s (ESS) 2011 data, the proportion of respondents who identify themselves as members of groups that are subject to discrimination amounts to 7.5% in Greece, whereas the respective average across the 27 participating countries is 6.5%. The most commonly reported grounds of discrimination in Greece are nationality by 35.5%, colour or race by 29.1% and age by 11.3%. On the other end we find discrimination due to sexual orientation and disability, both amounting to 2.5% (see figure 4). These data are in accordance with the outcomes of the Eurobarometer’s survey, as well as data from the Greek Ombudsman based on citizens’ complaints filed with the Authority.
The primary duty of the Greek state is to raise citizens’ awareness and to disseminate information regarding anti-discrimination legislation. Raising public awareness on discrimination issues is an important tool, which will ultimately be used to combat them. Developing social dialogue among government, the civil society and social partners could constitute a significant step of progress.
Regarding Greece despite any gaps of Law 3304/2005, there is today a comprehensive anti-discrimination legislative framework, which has been recently enhanced 9
European mean. F igure 1. A t risk of poverty rate, selected countries 2005-2011 22
The Demographics of Poverty in Selected Mediterranean Countries
20.5 19.7 19.6 19.4 18.9
20 19
By Dionyssis
Balourdos1
(
[email protected])
18 17
19.9 19.6 18.5
16.4 16.1
16
14
20.3 19.8 19.7
20.1 19.6 18.7 18.5
18.1
16.5
16.5
15.6
15.5 14.8
15
Aim
21.8 21.4
A t risk of poverty rate
21
16.4 15.9 15.0
19.7 19.5 18.4 17.9 16.3 15.8 15.3
20.7 20.1
19.6
18.2
18.0
17.9
16.9
16.3 15.1 15.0
15.4 14.5
14.0
13.9
13
The use of demographic variables is an essential part of any analysis of poverty. However, we cannot yet be fully satisfied with the analysis and understandings of the role of demographic factors that influence poverty. This paper focuses on three factors related to demography, which have been shown to have an impact on poverty: fertility, age and household size and composition.
Year
12 2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
1: that Atbyrisk rate, selected countries FFigure igure 2 shows 2011, of somepoverty of the biggest declines in TFR occurred in the countries hardest hit by the euro crisis. Spain's fertility rate fell from 1.46 in 2008 to 2005-2011. Source: Eurostat around 1.36 in 2011. *UHHFH¶VIHOOIURPWREHORZ,WVHHPVWKDWDWHQ-year fertility rise stopped around 2008 as the economic crisis hit, and started to slide in 2011. In Cyprus and Portugal in 2011, the TFR was 1.5, just above 1.3, considered by VRPHVFKRODUVDV PDUNLQJDOHYHO RIµORZHVW-ORZ¶IHUWLOLW\ To see such a change in Selected empirical findings trend so soon after the start of recession is remarkable. It seems that, changes in fertility partially follow changes in the economy, with an average lag of less than two years. Macro level studies generally conclude that increase in
Theoretical considerations
Frelative igure 2. E conomic recession and to fertility: Mediter raneanof countries 2002-2011 poverty is due higher levels fertility. Mi1.64
E U 27 to have 1.60 cro level studies find that poor households tend Total fertility rate 1.60 1.59 1.59 1.56 1.57 1.54 larger families and that their children are raised in ‘lower 1.54 1.51 1.52 1.51 4 1.51 1.51 1.50 quality’. 1.50 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.48
In social science literatures there are partial theoretical pieces, each one contributing to the understanding of the poverty and demography connection. I shortly consider three suitable perspectives.
Series brake
1.47 1.46 1.45
1.47
1.45
1.46
M alta
Italy 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.43 As Figure 1 1.44 shows, strict to have 1.42 income policy 1.42 seems1.41 1.42 1.41 1.41 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.38 1.38 1.39 Spain 1.37 poverty 1.37 1.37 had a strong impact on relative in Greece, Spain 1.36 1.36 1.34 1.36 1.33 1.34 1.35 1.35 1.33 1.33 Portugal! 1.31 1.32example, in Greece relative 1.32 and Portugal. For poverty 1.32 1.30 1.29 1.29 1.27 1.28 increased from 20.1% in 2008 to 21.4% in 2011 while Year in 1.26 1.24 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Spain during the same period it increased from 19.6% to 21.8%. In Malta and Cyprus the risk of poverty rate is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! lower than the European mean. !$OOGDWDLVGHULYHGIURP(XURVWDW¶VRQOLQHGDWDEDVH!
The individualization perspective: Ulrich Beck2 assumes that poverty is not a fixed condition, a personal or group feature, but rather it is an experience or a stage in the lifecourse. It is not necessarily associated with a marginal position in society, but reaches well into the middle class (erosion of middle class).
"
!
The family stress perspective was developed with the aim to verify the effect of financial loss during the Great Depression.3 The perspective assumes that poor families face significant economic pressure as they struggle to pay bills and are forced to cut back on the costs of daily living. This economic pressure, coupled with other stressful life events, creates stress which is manifested in depression and hostility in poor parents. These behaviors are reflective on marital and parenting relationships which may be detrimental to their children and other household dependents. The Second Demographic Transition perspective refers to changes in family structure, delayed marriage, postponed and more rare childbearing, cohabitation, higher rates of abortion and divorce, lower fertility-below replacement and more non-marital childbearing. Overall, the recent recession is likely to have some depressing effects on childbearing and push period fertility rates that are often considered too low, to a slightly lower level in many countries.
Figure 2 shows that by 2011, some of the biggest de-2 clines in total fertility rate (TFR)5 occurred in the countries hardest hit by the euro crisis. Spain’s fertility rate fell from 1.46 in 2008 to around 1.36 in 2011. Greece’s fell from 1.51 to below 1.42. It seems that a ten-year fertility rise stopped around 2008 as the economic crisis hit, and started to slide in 2011. In Cyprus and Portugal in 2011, the TFR was 1.5, just above 1.3, considered by some scholars as marking a level of ‘lowest-low’ fertility. To see such a change in trend so soon after the start of recession is remarkable. It seems that changes in fertility partially follow changes in the economy, with an average lag of less than two years. Concerning the relationship between poverty and fertility we find that low fertility is associated with high poverty rates and this is actually the trend in all Mediterranean countries except Malta and Cyprus which have 4 The
cost for raising children includes the direct financial costs e.g. housing, health care, education, child care, but also the indirect or opportunity cost, of the mother’s time spent in child care (often measured using estimates of the woman’s earning power, or potential wage rate, in the labor market). 5 The term Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is used to describe the total number of children the average women in a population is likely to have, based on current birth rates throughout her life. The TFR required for replacement is currently considered to be around 2.1 children per woman.
1 Research
Director, Greek National Centre for Social Research EKKE 2 Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage (German original 1986). 3 Elder, G. H., Jr. (1974). Children of the Great Depression: Social change in life experience. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
10
trend so soon after the start of recession is remarkable. It seems that, changes in fertility partially follow changes in the economy, with an average lag of less than two years. !
!
F igure 2. E conomic recession and fertility: Mediter ranean countries 2002-2011 1.64
As data extracted from Eurostat show, in 2011 two types of households face higher risks of poverty:
E U 27
1.60
Total fertility rate 1.59 that low1.60 Concerning the relationship between poverty and fertility we find fertility is 1.59 1.56 1.57 associated with high poverty rates and this 1.54 is actually the trend in all Mediterranean 1.54 countries except Malta and Cyprus and poverty levels 1.51which have low fertility 1.52 1.51 rates Series brake 1.51 1.51 1.50 1.50 below 3). 1.49 the 1.49 1.49EU mean ( F igure1.49 1.48 1.47
1.47 1.46 1.45
M alta 1.46 1.45 Italy 1.44 1.44 1.43 1.42 1.42 1.42 1.41 1.41the two sexes1.41 1.40 We1.39also find that the differences in1.40 poverty between are not so high. In 1.40 1.40 1.39 1.39 1.38 1.38 1.39 Spain 1.37 1.37 1.37 general females show higher rates than men. 1.36 Concerning the risk of poverty with 1.36 1.34 1.36 1.33 1.34 1.33 Portugal! respect to age we1.31 observe 1.32 that in 1.33 Spain,1.35 Italy, Portugal and Malta risk1.35of 1.32the child 1.32 1.30 1.29 1.29 1.27 poverty rate is significantly higher than the risk of poverty rate of the aged, while in 1.28 1.44
• Single-adult households (that is, single parents with dependent children, or without children); and
1.44
• Households with a greater number of children.
Yearamong 1.26 Cyprus the opposite is observed. Generally, the elderly and children feature 1.24 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 of the core 2002 groups 2003 with a2004 higher 2005 than average poverty risk, compared to people working age or to total population.3
Poverty among single-person households can be higher than in two-adult households, where income pooling can facilitate responses to income shocks if they affect one of the two individuals.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Figure 2: Economic recession and fertility: Mediter2002-2011. Source: Eurostat Franean igure 3. Acountries t risk of poverty rate and fertility in E U countries, 2011 2
"
!$OOGDWDLVGHULYHGIURP(XURVWDW¶VRQOLQHGDWDEDVH!
! 24
A t risk of poverty rate
22 20
Romania
Poland 16 Cyprus Hungary
12
Lithuania
Italy Estonia
Portugal
Germany Malta Luxembourg
Ireland
Belgium Slovenia
Austria
United Kingdom
EU 27
Slovakia
Finland
Denmark Netherlands
Sweden
10
France
y = 8.3651x2 - 31.77x + 44.84 5ð
Czech Republic 8 1.20
Also, single-adult households are often composed of young, unemployed persons or elderly pensioners, both of who face higher risks of poverty. Women are especially at risk since they are over-represented both among single-parent households (in several European states, more than 80 percent of all single-parent households are headed by women) and among single-adult households, since elderly female pensioners are more likely to live alone than elderly men.
Bulgaria Greece
Latvia
18
14
Spain
Total fertility rate 1.30
1.40
1.50
1.60
1.70
1.80
1.90
2.00
2.10
Household structure and of sizepoverty rate and fertility in EU counFigure 3: At risk We assume that better educated women are motivated to increase their labor market tries, 2011. Source: Eurostat attachment and postpone childbearing due to fear of putting their career progress at risk. According to mainstream theory they face higher opportunity costs than those with low income potential. In contrast, among the women with lower education, FKLOGEHDULQJFRXOGEHFRPHDµVWUDWHJ\¶LIWKHUHLVHQRXJKILQDQFLDOVXSSRUWIURPWKH low fertility ratesduring and the poverty below the EU mean welfare system. However, recession,levels as the welfare systems¶ generosity has been exhausted and the unemployment rates are high, the possible ORVV RI D PDQ¶V (Figure 3). LQFRPH LV D FHQWUDO IDFWRU LQ FRXSOHV¶ childbearing decision. It is WKH µtempo HIIHFW¶ that matters and the average age of first births is expected to increase further.
Risk of poverty among lone parents is lower in Cyprus (12.3%) and is over 30 percent in Portugal, Italy, Greece and Malta. Child poverty has been associated with lone parent households, which are often headed by women, and therefore already at a disadvantage in terms of earnings, partly since the income available to support the child is limited. We also find that poverty risks for single-adult households are significantly higher across the selected countries and the EU average, whether the household includes children or not, compared to twoadult households with or without children. This cannot be attributed to a decrease in family size, as all the examined countries have a high average family size. On the contrary, it may be stated that as the share of people living in single households has grown in these countries, growing poverty risks for larger parts of the population is observed.
We also find that the differences in poverty between the
As data extracted from Eurostat show, in 2011 two types of households face higher two sexes are not so high. In general females show risks of poverty:
higher poverty rates than men. Concerning the risk of Ibid. poverty with respect to age we observe that in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Malta children’s risk of poverty rate3 ! is significantly higher than the risk of poverty rate of the elderly, while in Cyprus the opposite is observed. Generally, the elderly and children feature among the core groups with a higher than average poverty risk, compared to people of working age or to total population. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 3
Household structure and size
Besides, according to recent statistical data, the risk of poverty is high for immigrants from a non EU country (Third Country Nationals): the risk of poverty follows an increasing trend during the period 2008-2011, in all countries and the EU average. In 2011, the rate is higher in Greece (46.3%), Spain (43.2%), Cyprus (36.3%) and Portugal (35.3%).
My paper assumes that better educated women are motivated to increase their labor market attachment and postpone childbearing due to fear of putting their career progress at risk. According to mainstream thinking, they face higher opportunity costs than those with low income potential. In contrast, among the women with lower education, childbearing could become a ‘strategy’ if there is enough financial support from the welfare system. However, during the recession, as the welfare systems’ generosity has been exhausted and the unemployment rates are high, the possible loss of a man’s income is a central factor in couples’ childbearing decision. It is the ‘tempo effect’ that matters and the average age of first births is expected to increase further.
Material deprivation rate provides an estimate of the proportion of people whose living conditions are severely affected by a lack of resources and varies significantly among Member States. In Greece, Italy and Cyprus the indicator of severe material deprivation rate is high, especially for women. Besides, in 2011, the share of persons declaring that they were having great difficulty in ‘making ends meet’, is higher in Greece (25.6%), Cyprus 11
also the population size matters. F igure 4. T he size of the poor population and the poverty rate across E uropean countries, 2011*
(25.1%), and Portugal (19.2%). It seems that for Spain and Malta monetary poverty is the dominant indicator while in Greece, Italy, Cyprus and Portugal the non monetary aspects of poverty6 are of great significance.
30
A t r isk of pove r ty r ate
Romania
25 B ulga ria
C roatia
Spain
G reece
Italy
L ithuania
20
Estonia M alta C yprus
15
L uxembourg
U. K .
Portugal
L atvia
Poland I reland
G ermany
Sweden
Denma r k F inland Slovenia Slova kia A ustria
B elgium
H unga ry F rance
10
Conclusions
C zech Republic
Netherlands
5
• Population trends are more sensitive to the economic cycle than might be expected, although showing some time lag.
0 0
5
10
15
20
25
30
* Bubbles showing the size of the poor population
Figure 4: The size of the poor population and the poverty rate across European countries, 2011. Source: Eurostat
• People are postponing starting families (tempo effect), as the average age of first births rises and first births are decreasing more than later births in some countries, suggesting also that people are postponing starting families.
The Social Acceptability of Surveillance Technologies in Pre-emptive Security: Towards a Democratization of Risk Management Strategies 5 By Elvira Santiago1 (
[email protected]), ! 2 Sara Degli Esposti (
[email protected]) & Vincenzo Pavone3 (
[email protected])
• The central point for the countries hit hardest by the recession is the sustainability of male income and the uncertainty of this factor postpones the childbearing decision.
Over the past ten years, in the face of global terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and transnational organized crime, new approaches to safeguard national and personal security have emerged. As a result of the spatial and temporal unpredictability of criminal actions and of their global repercussions, a safer society is often pursued through the implementation of security policies that increasingly rely on the deployment of surveillance-oriented security technologies (SOSTs). A surveillance-oriented security technology is a technology which collects information about the general population to monitor their activities in order to tackle a security problem. These technologies rely on ubiquitous surveillance and interconnected data exchange systems to identify malicious behaviours and stop - or even prevent – criminal activity from occurring. However, while any real improvement of public security has to be demonstrated on a case by case basis, SOST systems are based on a mass blanket surveillance approach. The high level of monitoring and control to which ordinary citizens are subject, as a result of the implementation of SOST systems, is interpreted by some sociology scholars as evidence of the transformation of our Western societies into surveillance societies (Lyon 1994; SSN 2006; Lyon 2007).
• Low fertility is a feature for countries with low GDP and high poverty rates. • Gender has a limited effect on poverty while age has an enlarged effect. • The household types most at risk of poverty were single parents with dependent children, single elderly people and single females, while children are among the new risk groups. • The examined Mediterranean countries are neither equally affected by the crisis nor do they face similar population characteristics and household structure. The situation is dramatic for those who are monetary poor, feel poor and are materially deprived (basically Greece and Portugal but also Spain and Italy).
The following figure is very important, showing that not only the composition but also the population size matters.
Although the role played by the shifting nature of security risks and the national reactions to security threats have been studied (Kroener and Neyland 2012), little
6 Non-monetary poverty can be described by a host of indicators, related to the enforced lack of a combination of items that depict material living conditions: durable goods, housing facilities and deterioration etc.
1 IPP-CSIC,
Spain Open University, UK 3 IPP-CSIC, Spain 2 The
12
make invisible to those who design, produce and manage the technology more complex issues underlying privacy concerns and public scepticism towards the adoption of new security measures.
work has been done on how the public perceive the massive and often indiscriminate development and deployment of SOSTs (Pavone and Degli Esposti 2010). The specific characteristics of these new technologies and the controversy around their acceptability increase the debate about the validity of the distinction between subjective and objective risks and highlight the need for new risk management frameworks and theories.
In response to these developments, the SurPRISE Project, funded under the EU 7th Framework Programme, organises large scale participatory events, called citizen summits, with the aim of re-examining the relationship between security, privacy and surveillance from a lay public’s perspective. SurPrise, which is an acronym, stands for “Surveillance, Privacy and Security: A large-scale participatory assessment of criteria and factors determining acceptability and acceptance of security technologies in Europe”. One of the aims of the project is to identify factors affecting SOSTs’ acceptability and investigate if citizens see a trade-off between security and privacy and how this affects their acceptability perceptions. By ‘acceptability’ we mean that a technology is capable of being endured, because it is tolerable, adequate and conforms to approved standards from public’s point of view, nor necessarily from a technical or legal perspective.
To tackle security problems surveillance measures are often implemented throughout Europe without acknowledging cultural and social differences. Diverging national understandings, political traditions and institutional settings may affect the way these technologies are perceived, implemented and managed. So far decisions on matters concerning security and privacy have left essential questions regarding public opinion unanswered: What are acceptable security technologies in Europe, what are not and why? How do citizens interpret the relationship between privacy and security? How do Europeans diverge in their privacy and security perceptions and why? Where security measures and technologies involve the collection of information about citizens, questions arise about whether and to what extent their privacy has been infringed. This infringement of individual privacy is sometimes seen as an acceptable cost of enhanced security. Similarly, it is assumed that citizens are willing to trade off their privacy for enhanced personal security in different settings. This common understanding of the security-privacy relationship, both at state and citizen level, has informed policymakers, legislative developments and best practice guidelines concerning security developments across the EU.
In order to study SOSTs’ acceptability and identify its antecedents we relied on three types of academic literatures: science and technology studies (STS), risk analysis studies, and privacy and security studies. The following list presents the factors selected as considered most likely to influence SOSTs’ acceptability: 1. ‘Familiarity with SOSTs’ (Slovic et al. 1986) and ‘General attitude towards SOSTs: Technology Detractors vs. Supporters’, (Gaskel et al. 2005) coming from STS literature;
The security-liberty trade-off is problematic for at least three reasons. First, liberty and security are presented as abstract categories, instead of enacted social practices emerging from the interaction between people and their social and institutional context. Second, the debate on security and liberty is framed as a zero-sum game, in which the trade-off acts as a rhetorical device to reduce public opposition to a mere problem of making the necessary sacrifice for the sake of national security. Third, studies adopting the trade-off approach are empirically narrow, because they require citizens to assess the introduction of new security technologies using a predetermined conceptual approach, which frames security and privacy as interchangeable goods right from the start.
2. Perceived Intrusiveness and Perceived Effectiveness’, (Sanquist et al. 2008); ‘Temporal, Spatial and Social Proximity’ (Bickerstaff et al 2006; Irwin et al 1999; Moffat et al 2004); ‘Perceived Level of Security Threat’ (Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Huddy et al. 2002), and the variable ‘Trade-off Model’ (Sanquist, 2008), from Risk studies; 3. ‘Institutional Trustworthiness’ (Tensey and O’Riordan, 1999; Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000), from both STS contextual approach and the socio-cultural perspective in Risk studies; 4. ‘Substantive Privacy Concerns’ (Clarke, 1997; Pavone, Degli Esposti and Santiago 2013) inferred from privacy studies.
However, an emergent body of work questions the validity of the security-privacy trade-off (Pavone and Degli Esposti 2010). This work suggests that the trade-off model over-simplifies the reactions of citizens to security measures, especially when they embed surveillance functionalities. The reliance on the trade-off model may
This theoretical framework represents the base for the development of the survey design and of the corresponding questionnaire that will be used during the citizen 13
Moffatt, S.; Boeldke, B.; and Pless-Mulloli, T. (2004). Local environmental concerns among communities in North-East England and South Hessen Germany: the influence of proximity to industry. Journal of Risk Research, vol. 6:125-144
summits to collect people’s responses. Questions will be displayed on a large screen and people will be able to answer by means of clickers. Before the event, summit participants will receive a booklet containing information about three specific SOSTs: Smart Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV); Cyber surveillance using Deep Packet Inspection (DPI); and Smartphone Location Tracking. During the event citizens will also watch short documentaries films presenting these same technologies and will have the chance of discussing with fellow participants. Citizen summits with about 200 participants will be held in Italy, Spain, Norway, Germany, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Austria, and Denmark between January and March 2014.
Pavone, V. and S. Degli Esposti (2010). Public assessment of new surveillance-oriented security technologies: beyond the trade-off between privacy and security. Public Understanding of Science, DOI: 10.1177/0963662510376886. Pavone, V., Degli Esposti, S. and Santiago, E. (2013). Deliverable 2.2: Draft Report on Key Factors, 28/02/2013. URL: http://surprise-project.eu/ Sanquist, T. F., Mahy, H. et al. (2008). An Exploratory Risk Perception Study of Attitudes Toward Homeland Security Systems. Risk Analysis: An International Journal, vol. 28(4): 1125-1133.
References Bickerstaff, K.; Simmons, P. Pidgeon, N. (2006). Public perceptions of risk, science and governance: main findings of a qualitative study of six risk cases. Understanding risk working paper.
Siegrist, M and Cvetkovich, G. (2000) Perception of Hazards: The Role of Social Trust and Knowledge. Risk Analysis, 20: 713-720. Slovic, P.; Fischhoff, B.; and Liechtenstein, S. (1986). The psychometric study of risk perceptions. Risk Evaluation and Management. New York, London, Plenum Press, pp. 3-24.
Clarke, R. (1997). Introduction to Dataveillance and Information Privacy, and Definitions of Terms, last version 7th August 2006. URL: http://www.rogerclarke.com/ DV/Intro.html
SSN (2006). A Report on the Surveillance Society. A report for the Information Commissioner’s Office. London UK, Surveillance Studies Network.
Gasckell, G.; Eyck, T. et al. (2005). Imagining nanotechnology: cultural support for technological innovation in Europe and the United States. Public Understanding of Science, vol. 14: 81-90.
Tansey, J. and O’Riordan, T. (1999). Cultural theory and risk: a review. Health, Risk and Society 1(1): 71-90.
Huddy, L.; Feldman, S.; Capelos, T. and Provost, C. (2002). The consequences of Terrorism: Disentangling the effects of personal and national threat. Political Psychology, vol. 23(3):485-509.
Negotiating the Future of International Peace (or War) Under Conditions of Natural Resource Scarcity and Global Climate Change
Irwin, A.; Simmons, P. and Walker, G. (1999). Faulty environments and risk reasoning: the local understanding of industrial hazards. Environment and Planning, vol. 31:1311-1326.
By Tracey Skillington1 (
[email protected]) The following presents a brief assessment of a number of recent policy statements on the security implications of climate change before offering a critical appraisal of how inclinations towards democratic peace might be maintained in the face of intensifying competition between states for diminishing stocks of natural resources. From a Rawlsian perspective, the motives necessary to recognize and act upon obligations of justice are becoming increasingly strained by the depletion of global reserves of resources like gas, oil, fish, water and minerals.2 Princi-
Johnson, E. J.; and Tversky, A. (1983). Affect, generalization and the perception of risk. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 45:20–31. Kroener, I. and D. Neyland (2012). New technologies, security and surveillance. Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies. K. Ball, K. Haggerty and D. Lyon. London, Routledge International Handbooks.
1 Dr.,
University College Cork, Ireland John Rawls (1971:11), ‘justice as fairness’ is best understood as the product of a hypothetical agreement among the free members of a self-guiding ‘society of peoples’ like a nation state whose future flourishing depends upon the continued availability of sufficient supplies of essential natural resources, amongst other elements.
Lyon, D. (1994). The electronic eye: The rise of surveillance society. Minneapolis, University Of Minnesota Press.
2 For
Lyon, D. (2007). Surveillance, Security and Social Sorting. International Criminal Justice Review, 17(3): 161. 14
weakening states, and widening economic inequalities’ conditions that in severe cases are likely to ‘breed extremism and terrorism’ (p.3).
ples of justice are widely assumed to operate more effectively within bounded political communities (e.g., nation states) where interpersonal ties and historically grounded models of justice and solidarity predominate. What is taken for granted in this instance is the notion that issues of justice can continue in some way to be ‘contained’ within the borders of distinct sovereign political communities and extended only minimally to include certain ‘duties of assistance’ to the peoples of other states.
International Alert has identified forty-six states with a combined population of 2.7 billion people, where climate change and water-related crises produce a high risk of violent conflict. In a further fifty-six states, 1.2 billion people, they estimate, are likely to experience various forms of climate-induced political instability in the decades ahead. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2012) notes how at least eighteen of the most violent conflicts in the last two decades have been fuelled by natural resource distribution, not only those centred on ‘high value’ resources like diamonds, gold, or oil but also more regular and increasingly scarce resources like fresh water. Figures produced by The Robert S. Strauss Center (Social Conflict in Africa Database 2011) support the concerns of the UN and point to a sharp rise in the incidence of hostilities in areas vulnerable to climate-related hazards, including Chad, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique where a high prevalence of drought and over-intensive resource exploitation all contribute to social unrest in regions predicted to lose upwards of 75% of their arable lands in the decades ahead. Implicit in this policy discourse on the security implications of climate change is the notion that war, in certain circumstances, is a legitimate response to perceived threats to a community’s resource reserves and given the inevitability of shortages amongst many climate vulnerable states in the future, highly likely. An ‘uncomfortable paradox’ (Beck 2008:131) emerges alongside the institutionalization of a liberal democratic regime that in principle supports global peace and solidarity under conditions of resource scarcity and growing climate adversity but in practice, also offers legitimation occasionally to its opposite – war - as a ‘just’ response to acts of resource aggression.3
What require greater sociological investigation are those mechanisms that currently restrict prospects for a greater resource sharing and simultaneously encourage anticosmopolitan tendencies towards inter-state rivalry and occasionally, conflict over diminishing stocks of resources worldwide. Arguably, the core element missing is a more practically oriented principle of ‘coresponsibility’ (Apel 1993: 9) for the deepening humanitarian effects of global climate change – crop failure, drought, flooding, leading to a greater incidence of disease, hunger, and mass displacement. Notions of ‘our common future’ (e.g., Bruntland Report 1987) have circulated in international political debate on climate change for more than three decades. Yet until recently, this discourse has not provoked any serious effort to cosmopolitanize the law of peoples or extend spheres of resource justice across sovereign borders in a manner that maximizes opportunities to secure a minimum of resources for all the peoples of this world. If anything, we have seen an intensification of state communitarian reasoning. With the long-term resource supplies of bounded political communities seen as under increasing threat, a military defense of diminishing reserves is presented by many of the larger political powers as a legitimate ‘climate change security measure’. In a Report to the European Council on Climate Change and International Security (March 2008), the European Commission urges the Council to establish a ‘preventative security policy’ capable of responding effectively to the threats greater natural resource conflict will pose to the EU in the future. ‘Entire regions’, it argues, may be destabilized by a ‘politics of resentment between those most responsible for climate change and those most affected by it’. Threats to international security are most likely to emerge where governance capacity at the state level is overstretched and unable to manage the physical impacts of climate change. Where this occurs, civil unrest, inter-communal violence, mass migration, and political instability become increasingly probable. In its 2010 Climate Change Adaptation Report, the US Department of Homeland Security echoes many of the concerns of the European Commission when it explains how as a ‘threat multiplier’, climate change may trigger ‘organized insurrections due to increased resource scarcity,
It is crucial that current models of democratic peace begin to take on board the reasonableness of the larger political powers’ justificatory claims for war in a resource challenged world. In particular, strategic denials of the fact that states are interdependent in their reliance upon certain resources subject to redistribution (e.g., a fishing commons or more fundamentally, the earth’s atmo3 Ulrich Beck (2003:454) explains how the institutionalization of an ‘actually existing cosmopolitanism’ must maintain a critical purpose particularly in relation to current expressions of a burgeoning war mentality on issues like the future resource security of the communities of this world. The ‘ambivalent transitional co-existence’ of a lingering ‘national gaze’ on climate adversities, for instance, with more cosmopolitan visions of our common future is more the product of a persisting lack of reflexivity in the self-understandings of the national perspective of states, the latter of which gives rise to blatant moral asymmetries and radical inequalities of opportunity in the context of globally sustained climate risks.
15
Beck, U., 2003. ‘Toward a New Critical Theory With a Cosmopolitan Intent’. Constellations. 10, 4. 453-468.
sphere, see Vanderheiden (2008) and perhaps in time, water). The relevant community to deliberate on such issues is international, not national or regional in isolation, especially when we take into consideration the various ‘spillover effects’ of the escalating ‘race for resources’. As communitarians have argued (e.g., Walzer 1994), norms that grant persons control over matters of common concern should coincide with the communities of which they are a part. Applying this reasoning to the issue of resource scarcity, the latter is a matter of ‘common concern’, one that is international in scope and, therefore, transcends the exclusive jurisdiction of individual nation states. If basic resources are to be preserved both now and into the future, then all within this globally extended community must abide by the principles of a peaceful and cooperative cosmopolitan scheme of distributive justice to ensure humanity’s common survival (see UN General Assembly Resolution 65/159, December 20, 2010 ‘Protection of a Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Humankind’). As Vanderheiden (2008) warns, a self-interested ‘race to the bottom’ in climate policy, even by one nation, can undermine overall commitments to an inter-generational justice. The question then is how can we improve prospects for a principled cooperation on resource distribution amongst the ‘global commons’?
Beck U., 2008: Cosmopolitan Vision. Polity.
Cambridge:
Bohman J., 2012. ‘Jus Post Bellum as a Deliberative Process: Transnationalizing Peacebuilding’. Irish Journal of Sociology, 20, 1, 10-27. Delanty, G., 2013. ‘The Prospects of Cosmopolitanism and the Possibility of Global Justice’, Journal of Sociology, Special Issue on Globalization and Cosmopolitanism (forthcoming) 49, 4. European Commission, 2008. Climate Change and International Security. See: http://www.consilium. europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/ 99387.pdf European Commission, 2012. Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps, http://eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/ docs/join_2012_19.pdf Rawls, J., 1971. A Theory of Justice. Harvard: Harvard University Press. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2009: From Conflict to Peace-building: The role of natural resources and the environment. http://postconflict.unep. ch/publications/pcdmb_policy_01.pdf
According to Delanty (2013), what are required are substantial socio-cognitive shifts in self-understanding and ways of thinking about our common membership of ‘world risk society’ (Beck & Levy, 2013). It is about activating cosmopolitan learning potentials in the search for solutions to problems that eventually will threaten all of humanity. The sheer scale and speed of resource depletions today require the full range of our principlereflexive capacities to adjust to new global realities and open up the space of the political to new possibilities for global peace under changing ecological conditions. Arguably, the best way to ensure perpetual peace is to trans-nationalize procedures for peace building (Bohman 2012). The latter may take the form of multiple deliberative procedures (legal, political and public procedures coordinated by one, globally elected steering committee) that debate the conduct of resource wars from multiple angles and perspectives and establish, on the basis of ongoing discussion, a new set of requirements for a ‘just global peace’ and ongoing democratic compromise.
UN General Assembly Resolution 65/159, December 20, 2010 ‘Protection of a Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Humankind’ UN Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development. Our Common Future (Bruntland Report), 1987. See: http://conspect.nl/pdf/Our_Common_ Future-Brundtland_Report_1987.pdf Vanderheiden, S. 2008. Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Walzer M., 1977. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New York: Basic Books. White House, 2009: US National Security. Arctic Policy Report (National Security Presidential Directive-66 (NSPD). https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66. htm
References Apel, K. O. 1993. ‘How to Ground Universalistic Ethics of Co-Responsibility For the Effects of Collective Actions and Activities?’, Philosophica. 52 (2): 9-29. 16
“Social Attractors”: A Tool for Reading Shifts in Gender Relations in Disaster Contexts
feedbacks. For example, he explains, “as the commitment to nature increases, the use of and support for power boats decreases. . . [and] conservation increases”.
By Christopher Lyon1 (
[email protected]) Socially marginalised groups may suffer undue harm due their exclusion in society, suggesting that at least part of the solution rests in finding ways of recognising their voices. Drawing on recent work in social-ecological systems resilience by the late Ken Hatt on concept of social attractors, this extended abstract shows how the attractor concept may also be used to make visible marginalised groups in disaster scenarios. Following an explanation of the concept, two examples from gender and disaster literature are used to illustrate how this might work. Edward Said’s contrapuntal approach to unequal relationships provides an additional conceptual anchor.
Recognising the discourses and practices of marginalised groups as activities that feedback into the larger social system makes these groups visible as actors in the analysis of disaster. The links between discourses around the attractor and the consequent social practices are important. These connections reveal the feedback effects of the practices into the particularities of the functioning of a given social (-ecological) system and show how the actions of each group influence the whole. Considered with Edward Said’s contrapuntal approach to postcolonial relationships, such an approach helps us understand the role of marginalised groups in disaster settings.
Theory of resilience and social attractors
Link to contrapuntal approach Edward Said3 borrowed the contrapuntal concept from music theory to describe a way of reconceptualising the relationship between colonised and coloniser society as one of hybridisation and relationship, like the way a music is made of the sounds of different instruments. Said writes,
Ken Hatt’s 2012 paper2 describes a useful way of doing this. Hatt integrates insights from the study of ecological systems to provide a better understanding of social systems dynamics in social-ecological systems (SES) resilience. SES resilience thinking sees the natural and human worlds as dynamic systems where human and non-human elements interact in complex processes of growth, change, and renewal at different scales of time and space. Social attractors are the things around which people’s perspectives (discourses) and actions (social practices) are formed. People’s discourses and related social practices enable or constrain certain types of action around a given issue, to positive or negative feedback into the social system (society). Formulating a society as a system of discourses and practices creates a dynamic map of the groups, key issues, and viewpoints that drive people’s actions. Importantly, it helps to show how different social practices interact with others in a system of feedbacks that act to maintain or transform the society.
No one today is purely one thing. Labels like Indian, or woman, or Muslim, or American are not more than starting points, which if followed into actual experience for only a moment are quickly left behind. . . survival in fact is about the connections between things. Applying Said’s approach to disaster accounts for the role of marginalised groups as part of the system of disaster that also includes privileged groups. In turn, this allows disaster to be understood holistically and beyond the valuable but narrow focus on the most marginalised. Just as people are more than just vulnerable, the discourses around which people mobilise are also not singular. Therefore, whichever group is considered marginalised or vulnerable in a scenario may mobilise around similar or unrelated attractors to those considered to have privilege and in addition to those centred on notions of difference or “contestation”. It is not enough to say that this group or that is vulnerable or privileged without also looking for the places where they are more equitable. By reading disaster contrapuntally and seeking out the social attractors, the complex ways in which marginalised people are both impacted by and also contribute to shaping the outcomes for their communities may be revealed.
To illustrate the social attractor approach, Hatt describes the scenario of development around an austere lakeside cottage community in rural Québec, Canada. Here, the system of ecological attractor of the lake and social attractors (nature, conservation, property) define certain discourses around social practices (boating, septic/toilets, farming, electricity). Through a simple equation, he shows how the interaction between groups, discourses, and practices results in positive or negative 1 School
of the Environment, University of Dundee, Dundee, Scotland 2 Hatt, Ken. 2012. ‘Social Attractors: A Proposal to Enhance “Resilience Thinking” About the Social’. Society & Natural Resources 26(1):30–43.
3 Said,
Edward. 1994. Culture and Imperialism. 1st Vintage Books ed. New York: Vintage Books.
17
Figure 2: Haiti Earthquake (drawing on Horton 2012)
Figure 1: Hurricane Katrina (drawing on Luft 2008) Reading social attractors in gender and disaster
ganisations after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The Haitian social context and recent history has resulted in the marginalisation and poor treatment of women on a number of levels, including state sanctioned rape used to threaten women activists and leaders, and the exclusion of women from male dominated roles in civil society as well as the foreign-dominated the aid and development sectors. Here, women’s discourse in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake centred on “survival and basic needs” and, positioning themselves as “mothers and caretakers” around the social attractor of children and other women. Children may have lost parents, and women tended to be worse off and prostitution or violence were risks. Haitian women formed a committee to ensure dangers such as the bodies of victims were removed from the area so it could be made safe for children. In the longer-term, these women’s organisations shifted their focus to more strategic issues of education, police, and justice reform aimed addressing women’s structural inequalities in Haitian society and politics. Thus, as Figure 2 shows, the social attractors of women and children led to a positive feedback where local women collectively acted to provide aid after the earthquake and empowered local women as a force for change within the legal, political, and social attractors in Haiti.
Rachel Luft4 examines the intersections of class, race, and gender in her account of a series sexual assaults within a large relief organisation operating in the Hurricane Katrina impacted New Orleans area. The organisation, Common Ground (CG), although emerging from a call from local members, drew on mostly white and sometimes middle-class volunteers who travelled from locations throughout the United States. A popular draw was an initiative that positioned volunteering as an alternative spring break for university students. During the course of relief efforts a number of mostly white men assaulted a number of white women within CG. However, the gendered and racialised discourse that subsequently emerged within the organisation around the sexual assault attractor saw it both advise against the practice venturing alone into the nearby mostly Black neighbourhood and fail to mention the internal rapes to newly arrived volunteers. Figure 1 shows how a negative feedback was created that ultimately served to reinforce the intersectional racialised, sexualised, and colonial social relations extant in the American South as they were reflected in the relationship between largely white relief volunteers and local recipients of relief and rebuilding efforts. However, despite these problems, the organisation did much productive work and the women and men within the organisation still worked together. Recognising but moving beyond intersectionality in accounting for the experience of the marginalised is therefore necessary, especially if the goal of progressive social transformation is to be achieved.
These accounts each reveal examples of how social attractors contribute to negative and positive feedbacks into the overall system of a community facing disaster. Horton’s example in particular shows how marginalised groups, in her case women, might contribute positively not only in helping with disaster recovery, but in moving toward progressive social change. However, these kinds of account are incomplete if they are understood without reference to the other groups in relationship to them including those understood to have a normative privilege, as a contrapuntal approach would have. Relational, or contrapuntal, analysis of the experiences of nonmarginalised and marginalised is inclusive, and when combined with a social attractor approach, presents a
In contrast, an example of a positive disaster feedback resulting in social transformation is provided by Lynn Horton’s5 study of Haitian women and women’s or4 Luft,
Rachel E. 2008. ‘Looking for Common Ground: Relief Work in Post-Katrina New Orleans as an American Parable of Race and Gender Violence’. NWSA Journal 20(3):5. 5 Horton, Lynn. 2012. ‘After the Earthquake: Gender Inequality and Transformation in Post-disaster Haiti’. Gender & Development 20(2):295–308.
18
F igure 1: Model of information blockage
more nuanced systemic picture of the social aspects of disaster than approaches that focus on single issues.
1. Internal decision-making subsystem: slow decisionmaking, approval of operative decisions on top level
Conclusion
1.1. Information processing: lack of reliable external resources, slow flow of internal information, groupthink !!!
The social attractor concept as a systems-based approach for understanding the contribution of marginalised communities toward disaster recovery shows the relationship between the discourses around which groups coalesce, and how these translate into social practices that feedback into the overall social system. In Luft’s study, the gendered feedbacks from the discursive practice of sexual assault were racialised and had negative consquences for both CG’s members and its relationship with the surrounding community, yet did not ultimately negate the benefits CG brought the locality. Used here, the social attractor approach reveals the complex and sometimes ambiguous nature of intersectional disaster settings. In Horton’s study, a positive shift in gendered relationships occurred as the hurricane instigated collective action among women that was at first focussed on protecting women and children, which sustained and developed into political change. More broadly, demonstrating the value of marginalised groups as capable actors in disaster recovery and how disaster can be mobilised to promote longer-term social progress, the social attractor approach may help reduce marginalisation.
2.1. Information dissemination: denial, lack of risk communication, information vacuum
2.2. C itizen involvement: formal control of participation, civil self-organization is suppressed
Figure 1: Model of information blockage of internal decision-making applies mechanisms of information processing and coordination between different units of a crisis management team. The subsystem of external crisis communications includes not only exchange of information but also crowdsourcing and citizen involvement in crisis management. By models I understand different functioning procedures of the governmental crisis communications and information management system which depend on three major factors: 1) goal setting, 2) crisis type, and 3) level of citizen involvement. Goal setting The government often chooses misguided crisis communications strategies and tactics not by ignorance but in order to reach divergent goals, not (only) crisis management. Conflicting goals can damage the whole system, not only crisis communications but decision-making as well. The hypothesis is proved by developing models of information blockage and information manipulation that can be easily illustrated by real-life cases.
Models of Governmental Crisis Communications and Information Management By Elena Gryzunova1 (
[email protected]) The term crisis designates an unexpected perceived disruption of a social unit which threatens its basic structures, integrity, reputation or survival, shatters the lifeworlds of people by challenging the public sense of safety, legitimacy or fundamental values and norms, and requires critical decisions under time pressure, uncertainty, complexity and increased attention.
The information blockage strategy is aimed not only at crisis management but also at hiding evidence and avoiding open discussion which leads to misuse of the system’s mechanisms (Figure 1). The classical example of this model is Chernobyl disaster (USSR, 1986) crisis management. In 1990 the Soviet government admitted that mistakes in information management had destructive social and political effects which threatened legitimacy of local and central government (Postanovleniye. . . , 1990). We may even suppose that the Chernobyl crisis was among the many factors that contributed to the Soviet Union breakdown.
The aim of this study is to analyze the role of information and communications in governmental crisis management, and to explore major factors that make crisis communications and information management functional or dysfunctional. The research presents new perspectives on the status of citizens as productive actors of crisis management.
The information manipulation strategy (Figure 2) is chosen to gain political advantage or make a profit out of a crisis which leads to opportunistic decision-making and crisis-escalating “victimization” (Altheide, 2009, p. 4546) tactics. For example, to draw on critical scholarship, the US discourse of the war on terror after 9/11 could of-
Governmental crisis communications and information management can be represented for clarity as a system which consists of two subsystems. Here, the subsystem 1 PhD
1.2. Coordination: hierarchy, command and control, top level overload !!!
2. E xternal crisis communication subsystem: dysfunctional strategy of information blockage
in sociology, MGIMO-University, Moscow, Russia
19
F igure 3: Model of conventional information management for conflict crises!
F igure 2: Model of information manipulation 1. Internal decision-making subsystem: opportunistic decisions
1.1. Information processing: preconceived analysis, ignoring some risks & crisis factors, exaggerating others !!!
1.2. Coordination: lack of coordination between agencies, latent rivalry, postcrisis hierarchization
2. E xternal crisis communication subsystem: dysfunctional (crisisescalating) strategy of fear management
2.1. Information dissemination: victimization, discourse of fear, new propaganda
1. Internal decision-making subsystem: strategic decisions centralized, operative ones made on lower levels
2.2. C itizen involvement: symbolic supportive DFWLYLW\³EORFN watch", some forms are suppressed
1.1. Information processing: issues evaluation, conflict analysis, monitoring of psychological threats, infosuperiority assessment, sense-making
Figure 2: Model of information manipulation
1.2. Coordination: combination of network and hierarchy, situational hierarchical structure
2. E xternal crisis communication subsystem: speaking with one voice, getting feedback
2.1. Information dissemination: risk & threat communications, quick response, winning media loyalty, newsfield domination, opposing manipulation
2.2. C itizen involvement: public dialogue on issues (not on acute stage)
!"
! F igure Model of of integrated crowdsourced andmanageFigure 3: 4:Model conventional information conventional information management for consensus ment for conflict crises
fer one case study. Sociologist D. Altheide (2011), who applies symbolic interactionism to consider how the terrorist threat was presented in the mass media, argues that “the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 were strategically used by officials to justify various domestic and international actions” (p. 270).
crises
1. Internal decision-making subsystem: crowdsourced information & citizen knowledge enhance decisionmaking 1.1. Information processing: integration of traditional & crowdsourced information, crisis mapping, citizen science & community-based risk assessment
Crisis type and the level of citizen involvement The second hypothesis of my study was as follows: employment of crowdsourcing and citizen participation makes the crisis communications and information management system more effective because the crisis is successfully managed by using more resources with less input. However, at the same time, this statement is only partly accurate. Citizen participation can be dysfunctional as well, and the possibility to crowdsource depends on a social response to crisis.
1.2. Coordination: situational flexible coordination with other organizations & volunteers; webresources for crowdsourcing & network-building !!
2. E xternal crisis communication subsystem: openness, voice of citizens as both transmitters & receivers 2.1. Information dissemination: not only officials but also citizens as communicators (community leaders, bloggers); discourse of consolidation
2.2. C itizen involvement: creating attractors (culture, webresources, open scientific projects) for constructive self-organization & participation of "! citizens
Figure 4: Model of integrated crowdsourced and conventional information management for consensus crises formation management which suits this crisis type is represented in Figure 3. The case study of Russian information policy in 2000-2004 during terrorist threat crisis and military campaign in the North Caucasus shows that the tactics applied by the government consisted of: framing the counterterrorist operation and distinguishing it from war; soft power media relations to win media loyalty; monitoring of psychological threats, opposing disinformation, manipulation and trauma; and a discourse of renewal (Gryzunova, 2012).
In the basic classification of a crisis by the disaster sociologist E. Quarantelli (1993) there are two crisis types. Conflict crises (confrontation and malevolent acts) divide the society because there is a group which tries to aggravate the crisis situation. Consensus crises like natural, biological and technological disasters, on the contrary, unite the society in the attempt to overcome the crisis situation. However, not all crisis types fit this classification. We can also add polemic crises (Freund, 1976) which provoke discussion and correspond to complex structural crises in systems (political, social, cultural, economic, and ecological) and institutions. Different crisis types require specific communication and information management strategies.
For consensus crises, on the contrary, consolidation and constructive self-organization are natural. In this case citizen participation and crowdsourcing are not only cost-effective practices to overcome a crisis, but they can also increase solidarity and represent new chance for development. Integrated crowdsourced and conventional information management model (Figure 4) means that citizens participate in crisis management as equal actors. They are involved in the information processing in forms of crisis mapping and “citizen science” (McCormick, 2012). Technological and legal tools are required to integrate official and crowdsourced information. Disaster site volunteering demands citizen-institutional coordination of activities including special web-resources and
During conflict crises use of crowdsourcing can lead to crisis escalation in forms of aggression or psychological trauma. There is also a problem of using crowdsourced information because social media contain rumors and malevolent propaganda. Traditional mass media may oppose the government and take the other side of the conflict as well. The prescriptive model of conventional in20
F igure 5: Model of public dialogue facilitation and knowledge management for polemic crises
mobile applications. Citizens also participate in external communication not only as receivers of information but also as crisis communicators themselves (community leaders or socially responsible online bloggers called citizen journalists). In this model the government supports citizen participation by creating attractors for constructive self-organization.
1. Internal decision-making subsystem: decisions through ³FRPPXQLFDWLYHDFWLRQ´ negotiations, balance of interests & citizen knowledge networks
1.1. Information processing: detection of problems & opinion (interest) groups; creation of multiple think tanks; knowledge management; sense-making
We can look at Hurricane Sandy disaster management as an example close to the model. Before the crisis there was the call of President Barack Obama to promote volunteering culture and self-organization practices, followed by creation of University for volunteers (HandsOn University) and of governmental Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS) in 2009. At the acute crisis stage the authorities showed good coordination (regardless of political parties during Presidential race), cooperated with volunteer organizations and networks through CNCS and ad hoc, used geospatial platforms, including FEMA GeoPlatform, online resource for informing, network-building and crowdsourcing which was launched in August, 2012. At the postcrisis stage FEMA used crowdsourcing for creating a map of fuel scarcity (together with a mobile application called "Waze") and damage assessment. The authorities also cooperated with volunteers in relief operations.
1.2. Coordination: through public dialogue (discussion, negotiations, citizen jury or council) & participatory problem-solving
2. E xternal crisis communication subsystem: based on new communication culture of open public dialogue space
2.1. Information dissemination: negotiations between groups & networks; supracommunicative practices of facilitation & mediation
2.2. C itizen involvement: development of participatory democracy & civil society institutions that further constructive selforganization
Figure 5: Model of public dialogue facilitation and knowledge management for polemic crises tures, participatory decision-making, and creation of Minatom’s (now Rosatom’s) citizen council. The initiative of the dialogue was actually put forward by Russian ecological activists (Mironova, 2003). However, the governmental agencies and enterprises used the dialogue and crowdsourcing space to manage a crisis in nuclear industry when CEO of a governmental nuclear plant “Mayak” was accused for severe ecological damage to Techa River and contiguous area during the years 2001-2004 (the prosecution was stopped in May 2006 due to the amnesty granted by the Parliament on its 100-year anniversary). Knowledge management ecological program “Techa-2006” (formally connected to Kyshtym disaster of 1957) financed by Rosatom and “Mayak” was aimed at crowdsourcing of citizen project ideas for ecological, social and information policy in the region. From the crisis management perspective it not only helped to collect and realize useful ideas but also switched the attention of ecological and civil rights organizations to cooperative project management instead of protest activity.
In polemic crises there are different opinions how to solve a crisis based on specific knowledge and different interests. All of them should be represented and integrated in participative decisions. The model of public dialogue facilitation and knowledge management is proposed to solve this kind of crises. A new communication culture of open public dialogue should be created. Thus decision-making becomes the result of negotiations (Van Santen, Jonker, Wijngaards, 2009) and knowledge sharing. First of all, the government should detect social problems and corresponding opinion or interest groups. As long as crisis communications resemble negotiations between them, there should be a structure within the government that is responsible for their facilitation and mediation. Coordination of crisis management activities can be done through public dialogue where all opinions are represented or through participatory crowdsourced problem-solving. If the dialogue is facilitated, networks of interests are transformed into networks of knowledge sharing(see Figure 5).
References Altheide, D. (2011). Creating fear: transforming terrorist attacks into control and consumption. In: K. Doveling (Ed.). The Routledge Handbook of Emotions and Mass Media (pp. 259-272). New York: Routledge. Altheide, D. (2009). Terror Post 9/11 and the Media. New York: Peter Lang Publishing.
The model can be illustrated by nuclear policy dialogue and crowdsourcing in Russia (1999-2006). Nuclear industry provokes issues and crises which are transsystem by consequences (affecting ecological, economical, political, health systems, etc.) and polemic by the social response. The society-government nuclear policy dialogue included: meetings between Russian ecological network, experts, governmental and municipal struc-
Freund, J. (1976). Observations sur deux catégories de la dynamique polémogène; de la crise au conflit (Observations of two categories of polemic dynamics: from a crisis to a conflict). Communications, No. 25. Gryzunova, E. (2012). Crisis communication under terrorist threat: a case study of Counterterrorist operation 21
in Chechnya. Proceedings of the ECREA 2012 Conference. Istanbul.
upon the exchange of information, and where both artificial and human agents, and their relations and interactions, play a central role (cf. e.g. Suchman, 2002). In such systems, the fact that interaction calls for further interaction could have fatal consequences. This is because, besides the interacting subjects, other relevant elements, such as specific inter- and infra-organizational ends and goals, are in place. The present contribution – result of an interdisciplinary effort (sociology, philosophy, AI) – is mainly theoretical, yet some empirical cases, stemming both from fieldwork and documentary analysis, are taken into consideration. They mainly serve as examples of application of our approach. The paper reflects on interpersonal interaction and its force of attraction, introduces the notion of Recognized Epistemic Field (REF), and considers the role they all play in sociotechnical systems’ crisis management.
McCormick, S. (2012). After the cap: risk assessment, citizen science and disaster recovery. Ecology and society, Vol. 17 (4). Mironova, N. (2003). Obshestvo-Pravitelstvo: strategiya peregovorov (Society-Government: strategy of negotiations). In: Ekologiya i prava cheloveka (Ecology and human rights). Chelyabinsk: ChelGU-CEPR (pp. 160176). Postanovleniye Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ot 25 aprelya 1990 g. [Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 25 April, 1990] (1990). Moscow. Quarantelli, E. L. (1993). Community crises: an exploratory comparison of the characteristics and consequences of disasters and riots. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 1 (2).
Interpersonal interaction is a process involving subjects. Conceiving subjects entails, for us, considering them as having an Epistemic Field (EF), i.e., an ensemble of attitudes: intending to go to the movies, believing that it is raining, etc. When subjects are interacting, they regard the other participants (as well as themselves) as having an EF too. This is what, in a sense, allows interaction itself: on such a basis, in fact, participants are oriented towards the construction and mutual recognition of a common ground of/for the interaction, i.e., an epistemic field which is recognized as shared. What we call Recognized Epistemic Field is, simultaneously, a by-product and a requirement of interpersonal interaction. In our account, situated and co-constructed sense making, has, among its basic elements, reference points (RP). Dan’s putting an item on the counter and Alex picking it up and scanning creates an RP in their interaction. With this RP in force, it would be awkward, for instance, if Alex, right after, ran away instead of doing the checking out. When people create an RP by mutually recognizing it through interactional moves and reply moves, they mark that point in the REF. That is, they have reached an “interpersonally valid definition of the situation” (Garfinkel 2008). By an ongoing confirmation through recognition, REF emerges as an interactional co-construction and achievement. A REF, basically, is a regarded-as-shared map of the ongoing interaction that allows coordination (objectivity is more a requirement than a feature of interaction).
Van Santen W., Jonker C., Wijngaards N. (2009). Crisis decision making through a negotiation mental model. Proceedings of the 6th International ISCRAM Conference. Gothenburg.
The Dark Side of Interaction in Socio-technical Systems1 By Chiara Bassetti2 (
[email protected]. cnr.it), Emanuele Bottazzi3 (emanuele.bottazzi @loa.istc.cnr.it) & Roberta Ferrario4 (roberta.
[email protected]) Interaction seems to be responsible in manifold ways for accidents and disasters (e.g., Perrow 2008; Vaughan 1999; Mattewman 2012). Interpersonal interaction may help in mitigating crises, but it can also pave the way to catastrophes. We delineate some peculiar ways in which this can be true and propose that interaction is a fatal attraction. That is to say, people prefer to maintain and sustain interpersonal interaction, and are attracted to it, as an end per se. This is crucial in socio-technical systems, intended as complex and technologically dense environments, whose functioning is strongly dependent 1 A previous version of the paper, “Fatal attraction. Interaction and crisis management in socio-technical systems”, has been presented at the 29th EGOS Colloquium, July 4-6, 2013, Montreal, Canada. 2 Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Trento & Department of Sociology, University of Trento 3 Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Trento 4 Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Trento
The REF as an ongoing interactional accomplishment situated in a local environment is fundamental for coordination and triangulation5 , that are in turn crucial in complex socio-technical contexts. REF’s boundaries 5 The
notion of triangulation is partially inspired by Davidson (2001). Here is to be intended as taking place between two (or more) interactants and the environment (with its artefacts, tools, etc.). In other terms, intersubjective coordination is achieved leveraging on the features of the surrounding environment and –at the same time–
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are the boundaries of coordinated action-in-interaction. What is not marked in the REF does not exist, so to speak, with respect to the —positive and negative— ends of the socio-technical system: what has not been agreed upon and “marked” in the REF is not available as a means for reaching such ends through situated interaction, and this may led to catastrophe. Furthermore, in socio-technical systems, coordination has to be maintained also with the relevant elements of the environment; the system’s ends go beyond the per se end of interacting, and the latter can therefore cause problems. Some examples in this sense are given by the detailed analysis of two empirical cases: the crash of an AirFrance Airbus in 2009 (Table 1), and the incursion that occurred in 2001 on Milan Linate Airport’s runaways.
Excerpt #1 02:08:03
R:
You can possibly pull it a little to the left.
02:08:05
B:
Sorry, what?
02:08:07
R:
You can possibly pull it a little to the left.
02:08:19
B:
We’re agreed that we’re in manual, yeah? What I call in manual er, no we’re in computed. Excerpt #2 02:10:10 02:10:11
The stall warning sounds. R:
Excerpt #3 02:10:51
What’s this? The stall alarm begins to sound: “Stall, stall” + cricket continuously.
On such a basis, finally, we propose some indications for improving crisis management in socio-technical system. Such guidelines refer both to human agents’ possible education, and to artificial agents’ design. On the one hand, we single out which extra-ordinary modality, or “style”, of action-in-interaction is more suited for dealing with critical situations in complex organizational contexts. First, even if at the detriment of interpersonal interaction per se, though not to the point of misfiring interaction, REF needs to be periodically doublechecked by participants, like in the sequence of the Air France case that had lead indeed to a temporary realignment of the copilots’ REF (Table 1, Excerpt #1). Participants should thus resist the attraction of interaction, increase “dis-preferred” moves and, in some sense, search for impasses – that is, they should neither take agreement for granted, nor get caught too deeply in the entrainment that characterizes most of interpersonal interaction. Monitoring the REF is crucial, at least with respect to those aspects that are most relevant both in systemic terms, such as organizational (positive) goals and (negative) ends, and at the situated level of the material environment and its artefacts. Such an extra-ordinary control over reciprocal perspectives requires an equally extra-ordinary interaction: more “frail” than the ordinary one; less oriented towards agreement, as well as interactional continuity and stability; prone to dis-preferred moves and local impasses for the sake of the goals of the socio-technical system.
02:10:55
R:
Damn it!
02:10:56
B:
TOGA.
02:11:00
R:
Above all try to touch the lateral controls as
02:11:03
B:
I’m in TOGA, eh?
02:11:06
R:
(3.00) Damn it, is he coming or not?
little as possible eh.
02:11:07
Plane reaches maximum altitude. With engines at full power, the nose pitched upward,it moves horizontally for an instant and then begins to sink back toward the ocean.
Table 1: Air France Airbus Crash. Elaborated from Otelli (2011) and BEA (2012).
The Cessna was instructed to taxi along taxiway R5, and then to the main taxiway; instead, the pilot taxied along taxiway R6, crossing the main runway where the Scandinavian airbus was passing. This error was primarily due to the bad communication by the air traffic controller on the ground, and to the copresence of an old and a new signalling systems. On the one hand, the controller was not aware of the permanence of old signs, while, on the other hand, the pilot did not know about their dismissal and used them as a reference. When communicating his position after taxing, the pilot made reference to S4 (old sign), but the controller did not take into account this mismatch, assuming the pilot was where instructed (R5). In the accident, 118 people were killed. Even in this case, both pilot and controller behaved as more concerned with the interaction per se rather than on the content of such interaction. Furthermore, the ambiguity due to the double signalling system undermined the triangulation with the environment, and thus prevented the construction of a mutually recognized, “valid” definition of the situation.
Secondarily, not only mutual coordination, but also the triangulation with the environmental elements that are relevant to the socio-technical system’s ends is fundamental. To illustrate this we introduce the Linate Airport case: on 8 October 2001, a Cessna collided with a Scandinavian Airlines Flight, which was preparing to take off.
Sometimes, and we reach the third and last issue, considering artefacts as subjects, thus capable to contribute to the REF, may be helpful. It is not by chance that, in the Air France case, the interactional sequence of re-
the relevant (for the purpose at hand) features are singled out and recognized by means of interaction itself (cf. also Liberman 2013: ch. 1).
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Keywords: Interaction, Socio-technical systems, Recognized Epistemic Field, Crisis
triangulation and realignment which got closest to solve the crisis and prevent the tragedy contained the following turn: “It says we’re going up, so descend”. Unfortunately, however, it seems that a cultural tendency towards technology and technological artefacts is emerging that goes in the opposite direction: indifference and/or overruling. This, moreover, appears to pertain not only to common sense culture, but also professional, expert and organizational ones, as the empirical cases show.
Acknowledgements C. Bassetti and R. Ferrario are supported by the VisCoSo project grant, financed by the Autonomous Province of Trento through the “Team 2011” funding programme. Emanuele Bottazzi is supported by the STACCO project grant, financed by the Autonomous Province of Trento through the “Post-doc 2011” funding programme.
On the other hand, we should also acknowledge that humans interact in technologically dense environments, in which artificial devices surely play a role in interaction, but are not regarded as genuinely active participants. Take for instance the case of the Air France flight: Why did the co-pilots ignore the warning that was being proposed again and again? Because, whereas the onboard computer was signalling the stall, they could not recognize the situation they were in as a stall and, not being able to really interact with the computer (asking explanations or confirmations, providing the reasons of their sayings or doings), they just ignored it. They had understood that the computer was giving a warning alarm, they had understood that the computer was warning them because it “believed” they were in stall, but they could not understand why the computer “believed” it, and the computer could not explain why, nor acknowledge the problem.
References BEA (2012). Final report: On the accident on 1st June 2009. Davidson, D. (2001) Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. OUP. Durkheim (1912/1995). Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. (1912). The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Translated by Karen Fields. Free Press (1995). Liberman (2013). More Studies in Ethnomethodology. SUNY Press. Garfinkel, H. (2008). Toward a sociological theory of information. Paradigm.
Therefore, it is necessary to develop artificial agents able to play an active role in interaction, that is, able to represent, reason and communicate about: the socio-technical system as a whole and in its components, the environment in which the system is immersed, and most of all – and this is the point we would like to make here – the interaction itself. The latter includes many aspects, such as the rules of the particular kind of interaction, the roles that various agents play in the interaction, the dynamics of the interaction, the attitudes of the interactants (as they can be inferred by their ongoing sequential conduct), and the REF that is reached at various stages of the interaction. To capture these aspects is for sure not an easy task, but a last claim we would like to make is that applied ontology (cf. Guarino 2009), intended as a technique in Knowledge Representation in AI, could have a key role. The ontological approach is grounded on a foundational analysis of the context at hand, aimed at making explicit the meaning of the terms used to express the concepts. The result of the analytical work is the construction of axiomatic models, expressed in a formal language, which are implementable in artificial agents. The conceptual primitives of such models are anchored in common sense and therefore understandable by human agents. The copresence of these two elements may foster the achievement of a system-level communication.
Guarino, N., Oberle, D., Staab, S. (2009). What is an ontology? In Staab, S., Studer, R. (eds.), Handbook on Ontologies, Second Edition:1–17. Springer Verlag. Matthewman, S. (2012). Accidentology. International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 1(2):193–215. Otelli, J. (2011). Erreurs de pilotage: Tome 5. Altipresse. Perrow, C. (2008). Normal Accidents. PUP. Suchman, L. (2002). Practice-based design of information systems: Notes from the hyperdeveloped world. The Information Society, 8(2), 139–144. Vaughan, D. (1999). The dark side of organizations. Annual Review of Sociology, 25:271–305.
ESA’13 Photographs On the following pages, you will find photographs taken at the DCSCRN sessions in ESA’13 at the University of Turin, Italy. All together, we have received more than 50 pictures from our friends and colleagues and we thank everyone very much for their efforts and help. This 24
newsletter can of course only present a small selection of the pictures. The photos here were taken by Dr. Nicholas Petropoulos (except for Figure 1, which was taken by Antti Silvast). Please follow our web site dcscrn.org for more publications of the photographs in the future.
New publications Jelle Groenendaal who is a doctoral student in Nijmegen in the Netherlands and Joe Scanlon have published two more articles about the role of ordinary people in emergencies. They teamed up when Joe was invited to lecture on that subject by the Amsterdam-Amstelland fire department which has been studying ways to integrate the real first responders (ordinary people) into the subsequent response by personnel from emergency agencies.
Figure 1: From left to right: Nikos Petropoulos, Murat Balamir, Nina Blom Andersen, Barbara Lucini, and Elena Gryzunova.
• Scanlon, Joseph and Jelle Groenendaal (2013) “P HASE O NE : B YSTANDERS. Focusing on ‘ordinary people’ – the ‘first’ first responders” Natural Hazards Observer, November pp: 9-11 • Scanlon, Joseph and Jelle Groenendaal (2013) “W HEN D ISASTER S TRIKES , O RDINARY C ITI ZENS R ESPOND : I T ’ S T IME TO M AKE THEM PART OF THE P LAN” Royal Canadian Mounted Police Gazette, Vol. 75 No. 1 pp: 30-31 Joe also has a chapter in a book on medical ethics which is now in press and is scheduled to come out early next year. The chapter flows from an invited lecture he gave at a conference on medical ethics in Geneva two years ago. Figure 2: Erna Danielsson and Jörgen Sparf • Scanlon, Joseph (2014) “Ethical Issues in Health Communications: Strategies for the (Inevitable) Next Pandemic” in Dónal P. O’Mathúna, Bert Gordijn and Mike Clark, Eds. Disaster Bioethics: Normative Issues When Nothing is Normal. Public Health Ethics Analysis, Vol. 2 pp: 77-93 The thrust of Joe’s article (which won’t surprise anyone in the disaster field) is that transparency is the best policy but there are ethical questions including questions about privacy and the behaviour of medical professionals. He has noted that in 1918 during the second and deadly wave of pandemic influenza there was a continual attempt to downplay the extent of the threat. This was sometimes almost amusing as the same issue of a newspaper stating the flu was not serious would carry five to seven obituaries of persons who died from the flu. For example an article in the Kingston Daily Standard on November 7, 1918 was headlined "I NFLUENZA IS NOT A LARMING ” while assuring readers there was no
Figure 3: Ivano Scotti
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Figure 4: Karin Erdberg
Figure 7: Arho Toikka
Figure 5: Vincent Ialenti
Figure 8: Christopher Lyon
Figure 6: Elvira Santiago
Figure 9: Audience in the sessions
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A NNOUNCEMENTS
cause for alarm but went on to mention there were several hundred cases in the city and that the hospitals were beginning to experience a strain. Joe Scanlon (
[email protected])
Call for Papers: International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters – Special Issue on Nordic Research on Disasters, Crises and other Related Topics
Conference report: Transformation in a Changing Climate, University of Oslo, Norway, June 2013
Guest editors • David M. Neal, Oklahoma State University
The highly unique and excellent Transformation in a Changing Climate conference, held at the University of Olso in June was organised by Professor Karen O’Brien and Linda Sygna, and aimed at understanding and enabling social transformation in the face of climate change. As such, it would be of great interest to those persons and organisations engaged with social change and disaster. Unlike a standard academic conference, this one used an ‘open space’ facilitation format and included both academics and practitioners from various circles. This meant for example, that paper sessions were organised around ‘speed talks’ of not more than five minutes, after which the audience and speakers could congregate around each other freely to engage in deeper discussion. People were also free to leave sessions and conversations to join others. Participants were thus able to engage with topics much more deeply that would be possible in a standard question and answer format. In turn, this helped to build new networks and insights, making the conference itself a transformative experience, pointing toward an active means of mobilising science and practice for climate adaptation. The next conferences in this series are scheduled for the Stockholm Resilience Centre in Sweden in 2015, and the University of Dundee, Scotland in 2017.
• Erna Danielsson, Mid Sweden University • Roine Johansson, Mid Sweden University Brief background The International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters is the longest publishing journal related to topics related to disasters. Henry Quarantelli established the journal and became its first editor. The first issue, published in March 1983, was based upon a 1980 conference on Family and Disaster held at Rosersberg Slott, Sweden. Jan Trost and Örjan Hultåker of Uppsala University served as guest editors. Since that time, IJMED has published a number of papers related to Nordic disaster issues by Nordic researchers. This special issue provides an opportunity to put current Nordic themes, perspectives and ideas into one volume. Manuscript parameters We are soliciting manuscripts related to Nordic Research with a focus on disasters, crises and other related topics.
More information may be found at the following URLs: • About 7,000 words. • http://www.sv.uio.no/iss/english/research/newsand-events/events/conferences-andseminars/transformations/about/index.html
• Research carried out by Nordic researchers with a priority on crises within the Nordic countries. • Empirical papers preferred manuscripts considered.
• http://www.stockholmresilience.org/21/research/res earch-news/6-27-2013-transformation-in-achanging- climate.html
but
theoretical
• Empirical papers can be qualitative, quantitative, or mixed method.
Christopher Lyon (
[email protected]) • Manuscripts should have a social science focus. • May be interdisciplinary among social sciences. • May be interdisciplinary using social and natural sciences. • Manuscripts must be submitted by May 1, 2014, and written in English. 27
• Initial reviews should be completed by October 1, 2014. Final revisions will be completed by December 31, 2014.
Relevant contributions from the field of disaster, conflict and crisis research, as well as from applied disaster, conflict and crisis management practice, are most welcome!
• Publication is scheduled for the March 2015 Issue (Volume 33, #1)
All “signed” texts express the opinions of the authors and not necessarily those of the coordinators, the editor or of the DCSCRN.
• Submit manuscripts to
[email protected].
Nina Blom Andersen, DCSCRN Coordinator
this
address:
Antti Silvast, DCSCRN Vice Coordinator and ENewsletter Editor
• Please attach only one copy of the manuscript. • Please identify that this submission is for the Nordic Research issue. • All manuscripts will use the double blind review process. • Please follow formatting and citation requirements found at this web address: http://www.ijmed.org/ article-submission/. • If you have any questions, please contact Dave Neal at
[email protected]. Roine Johansson (
[email protected])
T HE DCSCRN E LECTRONIC N EWSLETTER This is the periodic electronic newsletter of the Disaster, Conflict and Social Crisis Research Network (DCSCRN). The purpose of the DCSCRN is to promote the study, research and analysis of “natural”, “technological” and “social” disasters with a view to contributing to the development of disaster resilient European communities, and preventing or mitigating the human, economic, social, cultural and psychological effects of crises and disasters. The DCSCRN Electronic Newsletter is published three times a year (April, August, December). The previously published newsletters are downloadable at the network’s webpage: http://www.dcscrn.org. Announcements of conferences, book, film, and CDROM reviews, reportage on conferences, disaster diaries, brief articles on best or worst practices in disaster prevention and recovery, commentaries on disasters and crises, human interest stories relevant to disasters, etc. should be sent electronically to the editor, Antti Silvast (
[email protected]) no later than the first of the month of publication. Contributions to the newsletter should preferably be written in a concise format (½-1 page long maximum) in order to make reading comprehensive albeit focused. Ideas should be referenced (Author, year), but there is no need for a complete reference list. 28
