Distributive Justice

TOM R TYLER AND E. ALLAN LIND

Westview Press. vier, T. R.. Huo, Y.J.. and Lind, E. A. (1999). TheTwo Psychologies of Conflict Resolution: Differing Antecedenu of Prc-expe"ence Choices and Post-exprience Evaluations. Group Processes and hrergmup Relariom. 2-99-118. Waeatsuma,. H... and Rosen. A. (1986). The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States. Law and Sociery Review, 20, 461-498. Walker. L.. LaTour. S.. Lind, E. A., and Thibaut, J. (1974). Reactions of W c i p a n u and Observers to Modes of Adjudication. Joumal of Applied Social Psychology. 4, 295-310. Zucker. L. G. (1986). Production of Trust: Institutional S o ~ r c e of s Economic Structure. 1840-1920. In Research in Orgmizarional Behavior (Vol. 8. pp. 53-111). Gree~~wich, CT:JAI Press.

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Vier. T. R.. Boeckmann. R. J.. Smth. H. I.. and Huo, Y. J. (1997). Socrnl Justice in a Diversr Socrery. Boulder. CO:

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Recent Theoretical Developments and Applications Karen A. Hegtvedt and Karen S. Cook

A. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: AN OVERVIEW Theories of justice have developed within the social sciences based on the earlier work of social philosophers and political theorists who for decades have debated issues of inequality and justice within the polity and the meaning of citizenship. One of the most influential works in the twentieth century is the book by John Rawls (1971) entitledA Theory ofJustice, in which he attempts to specify the appropriate principles of justice in various circumstances. His primary assumption is that the fairest principles of allocative justice are those we would choose if we were not to know our own station in life (i.e., from behind a "veil of igno&nce"). In such a case the principles we would select would focus on improving the overall welfare of all in the society, subject to ensuring equal rights to liberties and opportunities and fostering support for distribution principles that arrange inequalities to the greatest benefit of those who. are disadvantaged in the society. A related approach to distributive justice has been developed by Brian Barry (1989,1995) in his recent volumes on justice in which he proposes the concept of "justice as impartiality." According to Barry (1995:7), "a theory of justice which makes it turn on the terms of reasonable agreement" is a theory of justice as impartiality. In game theoretic terms this conception of justice approximates an "assurance game." Barry (199551) argues that individuals motivated to behave fairly will follow the rules based on justice as impartiality if they see that enough other people are also following such rules. Barry's conception ofjustice as impartiality with his emphasis on neutrality provides a framework that is compatible with some of the current work in social psychology on procedural justice. Lind and Tyler (1988), for example, argue that citizens are concerned about being "treated fairly" as much as they are with the outcomes they receive. While much of the current research in social psychology deals with procedural justice and

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Karen A. Hegtvedt Depamnent of Sociology. Emory University. Atlanta, Georgia 30322. Department of Sociology. Sonford University, Stanford, Caliiornia 94305.

Karen S. Cook

Handbook of furice Research in Lnw. edited by Sanders and Hamilton. Kluwer Academic /Plenum Publishers. New York. 2000.

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KAREN A. HEGTVEDT AND KAREN S. COOK

the relationship between this form of justice and distributive justice, most of the work prior to the mid-1980s focused on various principles of distributive justice and the conditions under which they applied. The general theoretical perspectives on problems of distributive justice within the fields of sociology and psychology derived from cognitive theories of dissonance (e.g., Adams's early work on equity theory in the 1960s) or from exchange notions (e.g., Homans's work on social behavior as exchange and distributive justice as a principle of dyadic exchange). Walster's work (e.g., Walster. Walster, and Berscheid, 1978) combines exchange and dissonance arguments to propose a set of principles that specify when situations are perceived as equitable (e.g., an equality of exchange ratios). It also predicts that in situations defined as inequitable. individuals will act in ways to reduce the dissonance associated with inequity. Cognitive or behavioral responses may range from altering one's perceptions of entitlement to changing the object of social comparison or leaving the situation or the relationship altogether. Subsequent theoretical work (e.g., Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, and Cohen, 1972;Jasso, 1980,1983,1990) critiques the exchange approach to distributive justice as too focused on contributions and the consummatory value of rewards, ignoring the status significance of rewards. These authors offer alternative formulations that take into account more fully the role of status distinctions and the nature of more complex social comparisons that result in sentiments of inequity as well as collective reactions to injustice. This work also poses more general "laws" concerning the distribution of justice sentiments in a population and the determinants of reactions to injustice. Recently. Jabso and Wegener (1997) have offered an argument that attempts to integrate under one theoretical umbrella issues of what is just, how people make justice assessments, and how they respond to injustice. While the Jasso and Wegener perspective awaits empirical scrutiny and the earlier perspectives remain the subject of continued debate, critique, and refinement, the work of Hornans, Walster and others still form the basis for predictions concerning the conditions under which allocations will be defined as just or equitable. It is now widely accepted that there are multiple justice principles, not one.' They include allocation on the basis of need (see Lemer, 1975), equality, and the standard contributions rule, derived from exchange theory. Moreover, different allocative principles are defined as just under different circumstances (Leventhal, 1976). This insight has mitigated some of the earlier debate over the "one just way" of making allocations or of distributing,valued goods. The research on allocation principles is reviewed in more detail in the first major section of this chapter, followed by a review of the research on reactions to situations defined as unjust and recent work on justice in personal relationships. Much of this research uses experimental methods, especially the early work on inequity. Experimental methods have been critiqued in a variecy of texts (e.g., Wmer, 1971; Meeker and Leik. 1995). and -iournals (e.g., Orne, 1962; Bonacich and Light, 1978), including the best known discussion of experimental and quasi-experimental methods by Campbell and Stanley (1963). Experimentation in any field is used primarily as a technique for testing causal claims by creating specific conditions of theoretical interest, controlling factors that might make inference difficult and by creating comparisons that inform the key theoretical hypotheses. In well-designed studies this control allows investigators to rule out spurious causation. As Meeker and Leik (1995:646) note in their comprehensive review chapter: "issues of internal validity concern eliminating spurious effects in an experiment," while "issues of external validity concern the generalizability of results to other settings." Both sets of issues hinge importantly on the careful design of studies to maximize internal validity (and the quality of inferences that can be drawn from the data obtained) and to allow for theoretical generalizability of the results to other settings of interest (maximizing external validity, see

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

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Zelditch, 1969). As they argue, the latter is enhanced when experimental studies are conducted as part of a larger program of research, where replication and extension of the theories being tested can be best accomplished by systematic experimental work, rather than one-shot laboratory or field studies. The trend over time in social psychology has been away from the latter in order to maximize the utility of the information obtained from experiments conducted both inside and outside the laboratorv. Generally, experimental research on allocation, as well as on reactions to injustice, has primarily focused on testing "basic" principles of justice theory. Such research is often referred to as "basic" research, a term that is meant to be contrasted with "applied" research, in which the focus of the inquiry is with the application of the theory. As discussed further below, many experimental studies examine individual preferences for equal or equitable distributions as a way to examine basic theoretical ideas. But in addition, research on actual distributions, for example of health care resources in a society, is viewed as applied research. While this terminology has been used in the social sciences for some time, it is clear that the boundary between these two general classes of research is often blurred. Applied research often allows for tests of the underlying theories of justice and so-called basic research (theorytesting) is often conducted in the context of "real-world" instances of the phenomenon of theoretical interest (e.g., as in the allocation of scarce resources like gasoline during an energy crisis, or of livers and kidneys for organ transplantation). It is our general view that this distinction is less useful in swidl pay~holugjnow than it ]night have been several decades ago. We will, however, use the term "applied" to call attention to work that directly applies insights from justice theories to phenomena of interest to social scientists in various fields, such as social stratification, social movements, organizations, and criminology, and to social policy analysts. In the next section, we review both basic and applied research relevant to the fairness of allocation decisions.

B. ALLOCATION DECISIONS: EQUITY, EQUALITY, AND NEED Allocation research typically focuses on the distribution of rewards (or costs) to a circle of recipients by a corecipient (first-party allocation) or an outsider (third-party allocation). Researchers classify the resulting distributions in terms of the extent to which they approximate equal, equitable (contributions-based), or needs-based distributions. Most of the early allocation studies concentrated on the choice between equity and equality in productivity situations. The intent of such studies was to determine how individual characteristics, relationship factors, and situational conditions influenced the choice (see Cook and Hegtvedt, 1983). This traditional approach remains evident in more recent studies, although current trends reflect greater emphasis on cognitive dimensions and group-level factors. In addition, a "resource sharing" paradigm has been developed in which allocations of unearned, public goods are distributed to a pool of recipients (e.g., Messick and Allison, 1987; Samuelson and Allison, 1994). Despite the large number of allocation studies, this work is still characterized by the lack of a cogent theoretical paradigm. One integrative attempt, Leventhal's expectancy value theory of allocation (Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry, 1980). seems to have had little impact on allocation research (see Skitka and Tetlock, 1992, as a possible exception). Some of the themes inherent in his theory, however, emerge in the cumnt work on goals and the motivations underlying allocation decisions. First we examine the various factors that affect allocation decisions. How individuals "want" to distribute rewards (or costs) may not constitute the fairest distribution (in the eyes

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KAREN A. REGTVEDT AND KAREN S. COOK

of others), but it does provide a starting point for investigating how those individuals will evaluate distributions. We begin with a discussion of the gods and motivations that shape allocation decisions. Then we examine individual-level characteristics and copitive factors that shape how individuals assess whether a particular distribution rule will fulfill their goals. A discussion of relationship and situational factors, many of which interact with individuallevel factors, follows. We note briefly the importance of cross-cultural factors (see also Leung and Moms, this volume) and close with a brief summary of the issues raised by basic allocation research and how these same issues arise in applied settings.

1. Goals and Motivations: In Pursuit of Distributive Justice Leventhal et ul. (1980) assume that individuals hold expectancies concerning how particular distribution rules will fulfill specific goals and that people hold multiple goals of varying importance. In addition to fairness, these goals include self-interest, efficiency, obedience to authority, and others. They argue that preferences for the way in which rewards are to be allocated are determined by the combination of expectancies and the value of each goal. Although allocation preference theory has not spurred much empirical work, a number of studies have examined how the pursuit of various goals, each constituting a form of motivation, results in different types of distributions. When instructed to pursue fairness, individuals specify different allocation rules depending on the situation (see Leventhal, 1976; Leung and Park, 1986; Prentice and Crosby, 1987). Generally, people specify equitable or contributions-based rules in work situations where productivity is a central concern, an equal division where group harmony is paramount, and a needs-based distribution rule in contexts focusing on social welfare. 1"ne sometimes conflicting motives of competition and cooperation in work situations parallel dual emphasis on productivity and group harmony. When task structures are competitive, workers are likely to prefer equity, whereas cooperative task structures enhance the preference for equal distributions (Griffith and Sell, 1988). Also, it appears that people favor need-based rules for allocating costs as well as rewards among family members (Wagstaff, Huggins, and Perfect, 1993).Other results, however, demonstrate a more complex pattern. Messick and Sentis (1979) show that individuals in a work situation specify as fair a larger amount to self than to other, even with equivalent contributions. Individuals tend to evaluate their own inputs more favorably than those of others in order to justify receipt of a greater share and still maintain perceived equity. Thus, self-interest may combine with fairness goals in allocation situations. Despite the general emphasis on equity as the basis for fair division in productivity situations, three issues arise. F i t , while fairness and self-interest may dominate in allocations in the workplace under normal circumstances, when the situation demands expediency, individuals may opt for other distribution rules. Multiple motives may combine to produce complex allocation choices. Second, individual motives alone are insufficient to understand some types of distribution. Social identity and intergroup relations also influence choices. Finally, the potential conflict between individual-level and group-level interests (i.e., selfinterest versus group welfare) raises new concerns about fundamental assumptions in distributive justice research (Tyler and Dawes, 1993; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, and Huo, 1997). Messick (1993) suggests that in situations in which allocations have to be made, equality may be a useful heuristic. Use of an equality rule when the goods or bads being distributed are divisible requires little additional knowledge about recipients other than the number in the


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pool.2 An equal distribution may not irhbit conflict over an allocation, but it at least provides a ready anchor from which to adjust the distribution, depending on other factors. Although equality may be a more expedient approach under certain conditions, it is not always the most efficient. Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers, and Ord6fiez (1993) examine the trade-offs between equality (as fairness) and efficiency (as the goods and services that result from a given input) in allocation decisions. Using a hypothetical society paradigm in which subjects were unaware of their material interests, those who were more concerned with equality tended to allocate in a manner that maximized the incomes of the poorest citizens (maximin) whereas those who focused more on efficiency opted for a compromise between ensuring a floor (to satisfy basic needs) and distributing rewards based on merit. Researchers noted that subjects generally avoided distributions that increase the number below the poverty line. In a follow-up study also involving hypothetical societies. Ord6iiez and Mellers (1993) demonstrate that although people make trade-offs between equality and efficiency, trade-offs tend to occur more frequently between emphasis on a minimum salary and the work-salary correlation (i.e., a contributions-based rule). Furthermore, they note that the latter two goals predict fairness and preference judgments better than a basic equality-equity rule. Interestingly, concern for a minimum standard was a stronger predictor of preference rankings than fairness rankings. In addition to instrumental goals, socioemotional and group maintenance goals may motivate managers in work organizations. Rusbult and her colleagues (Rusbult, Lowery, Hubbard, Maravankin, and Neises, 1988) argue that allocation decisions stemming from the combination of these goals depend also on the mobility of the employees and availability of both labor and rewards. Results show that subjects generally prefer to allocate s a l q based on workers' competence and dedication. Deviations from equity per se, in the service of maintaining group membership, occur when managers are willing to pay more to highly competent employees with high mobility than those similarly skilled workers with low mobility. The authors' term for this strategy is rational selective exploitation. The consequences of this strategy for the morale of the low-mobility, competent employees remain unknown. In addition, some evidence suggests this strategy is parricularly pronounced under conditions of low reward availability and low labor availability. Thus, structural conditions often affect how individuals fulfill their multiple goals in an allocation situation. Embeddedness in groups Likewise constitutes a structural factor that may influence goals. A series of studies examines the dual pressures of fairness and intergroup bias when the goal is enhancing group rewards. In some situations individuals may be motivated by both their concern for fairness, manifested in the use of an equity rule to distribute rewards in a work situation, and their concerns for how well their own group members fare in the distribution, possibly requiring deviation from the use of an equity rule. Ng (1984) demonstrates that when in-group members perform well, subjects accentuate the importance of an equitable distribution. Takenishi (1988) notes that even when subjects were told to use an equity rule, they gave a greater than proportional amount to an in-group member who performed well and leveled the reward when an in-group member performed poorly. Other studies suggest that the salience of status differences (Ng, 1986) and emphasis on competition between groups (Towson, Lerner, and DeCarufel, 1981) enhance this effect. Wtule situational conditions account for some of the propensity to pursue in-group enhancement at the expense of fairness, another study indicates that social value orientations may be equally important. Platow, McClintock, and Liebrand (1990) find that although subjects typically evaluate in-group members more favorably, their allocations do not always


implications of these assumptions for allocation decisions. They note, however, that despite the effect of philosophical differences, justice judgments remain sensitive to contextual factors and even the methods of study. How individuals value themselves may also influence their allocation decisions. Brockner, O'Malley, Hite, and Davies (9187) examine the extent to which self-esteem moderates the effects of performance level and partner's allocation pattern (i.e., selfish, equitable, egalitarian, or generous). Results indicate that subjects with low self-esteem are more likely to imitate their partners' reward allocations than are subjects with high self-esteem. For those with h g h self-esteem, relative performance exerts a strong influence on their allocation decisions.

c. Cognitive Elements in Allocation Decisions Cohen (1982) argues that to understand distribution preferences, it is necessary to examine allocator's perceptions of the situation. In particular, he highlights the importance of attributions. Whether or not allocators perceive recipients as causally responsible for their contributions affects resulting distribution decisions. Cohen thoroughly explores the possible implications not only of different types of attributions (e.g.. internal versus external, stable versus unstable, controllable versus uncontrollable), but also the implications of various attribution biases. Some relatively recent empirical work has addressed the former, but little has been done to examine the latter directly. Generally, in order for individuals to consider invoking an equitable distribution. they must perceive that compensable inputs are under the control of the recipients and are internally caused. Wittig, Marks, and Jones (1981) illustrate the importance of internal causality in a study in which they manipulated possible attributions. When subjects attributed their performance to their own effort (internal, unstable, controllable cause), they made greater allocations to themselves than when their performance seemed related to luck (external, unstable, uncontrollable cause). Elliot and Meeker (1984) likewise confirm the importance of attributions. Subjects allocated more to target recipients who had greater ability, effort, and faced a more difficult task. Some research indicates the greater importance of effort in allocations than ability (an internal, stable cause over which individuals may have little immediate control). Thud-party allocators distributed greater rewards to more diligent group members than to the more talented ones (Lamm, Kayser, and Schanz, 1983), even if doing so created inequality between friends (Kayser and Lamrn, 1981). Although these studies are limited to comparisons between a few simple attributions, they confirm Cohen's general argument. Other work examines a greater variety of attributions but does so indirectly by asking subjects what they believe accounts for the differences in performance levels. Presumably such accounts indicate the underlying reasoning that people use to determine whether to allocate equally or equitably. For example, researchers have suggested that women may attribute their inputs to external factors and then take less for themselves, whereas males accentuate their inputs by attributing them to internal factors. Major and A d m s (1983). however, fail to find evidence for this reasoning in a study of first-person allocations. In contrast, Stake (1985) does obtain gender differences in third party allocations and attributions. She speculates on how such reasoning affects distribution preferences. In her study, females were more likely to attribute lower productivity rates to internal constraints emphasizing quality workmanstup and thus allocated equally while males attributed low performance to lower motivation (i.e., lack of effort) and invoked equitable allocations. Given these mixed results, it is unclear whether attributions mediate between this particular individual-level characteristic and allocation.

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Inferred attributions may account for the results in two resource sharing studies. Me and Allison (1987) examined how knowledge of the size of the resource pool to be s would affect contributions to the pool by individuals. Given that the resources could on shared if all six group members' requests for resources were equal or less than the total po was incumbent on the sixth person to request an m o u n t less than the remainder to e resources for all of the group members. Although most subjects accepted the unfair amo those who did not were more likely to refuse when they believed the others knew the amount. Such results suggest that the sixth group member believed that rhe orhers intentio shortchanged himher. Such an internal attribution of maliciousness inhibited willingne ensure other group members their resources. In the absence of knowledge about the size o resource pool, no such attribution was likely and the subject could justify requestin amount that would not exceed the size of the pool. Similarly, implicit attributions seem to mediate contributions in a public goods dile investigated by Van Dijk and Wilke (1993). Some subjects were to receive a high proportio the public good (high-interest subjects), while others were to receive a small proportion ( interest subjects). These differences either were justified by an asymmetry of inputs or w not justified by the experimenter. Subjects, particularly high-interest ones, tended to minim differences in final outcomes in the absence ofjustification. In effect, the justification serve locate the cause of the difference between the subjects internally, thus entitling some higher final outcome. The findings from both of these resource sharing studies suggest possibility that when differences between subjects are internally caused, deviations f equality are likely, and when differences between subjects are externally caused, deviat from equity are likely. The biases inherent in attribution pwesses, however, may complicate this picture. T is some evidence that individuals differentially assess their own inputs. People judge m favorably their own or their group's inputs (MessC, Hymes, and MacCoun, 1986) and m weigh more heavily inputs that they rate more highly (Cook and Yarnagishi, 1983). S patterns suggest the operation of an egoistic bias. Whether other biases discussed by Co (1982), such as divergent perspectives or the fundamental attribution error, affect alloca decisions remains to be investigated. In addition, whether characteristics of the relationship situation interact with or are mediated by attributions are questions for future research.

3. Decisions Beyond the Individual: Effects of Relational and Situational Factors on Allocation

a. Relational Factors

Relational influences on allocation preferences include individuals' relative standings reward-relevant factors as well as the nature of the relationship between the individu involved. Because it is necessary to differentiate individuals in ~ o r ksituations in order establish whether rewards are distributed equitably, relative performance is the most f quently examined relational factor. The second major relational factor to receive attention relative need. Investigators have examined how affective links between the allocator and recipients (or among recipients in third-party allocation situations) affect the impact differences in performance and need. In impersonal situations, high performers are more likely to prefer equitable distributio and low performers are more Wtely to prefer equal ones (see Cook and Hegtvedt, 1983). Such

KAREN A. HEGTYEDT AND KAREN S . COOK

pattern of preferences maximizes material gains for each p a y . In contrwt, between f r h d s , or simply with the anticipation of future interaction between the allocator and recipients, individuals express a greater preference for equality regardless of performance level (Austin. 1980; Sagan, Pondel. and Wittig, 1981). Major, Bylsma, and Cozzarelli (1989) demonsullte that in intimate relationships, individuals often prefer benevolent distributions that benefit one's partner. Such preferences may reflect a politeness ritual (Schwinger, 1980) or concerns for social rewards that may be threatened by self-interested allocation preferences (Reis, 1981). Alternatively, as Tyler and Dawes (1993) speculate, the stronger social bond between friends enhances group identity which in turn suppresses egoistic distributions. Kayser and Larnrn (1981). however, show that third-party allocators fail to provide equal amounts to friends whose performance differences stem from lack of effort by one person. Likewise, Marin (1985) finds no effect of acquaintance; third-party allocators consistently preferred equitable distributions. The preference for equity among nonrecipient allocators may reflect the normative emphasis on equity in workplace situations, especially when one's own interests are not at stake. Moreover, it may be the case that when the allocator is not part of the recipient group, no feelings of group identity emerge to counteract impersonal, nonnative guidelines. Most studies on the role of needs in allocation preferences only involve third parties. Given workers with equal contributions to a task, allocators deviate from equality to provide greater rewards to the more needy worker, especially if the worken are friends (Lamm and Schwinger, 1980; Schwinger and L m , 1981). Thus, friendship bonds seem to differentially affect third-party allocators, depending on whether social welfare concerns or simply productivity are at issue. When instructed to make just allocations, allocators emphasize need, regardless of the attraction level between recipients (Lamm and Schwinger. 1983). Situational factors, however, affect the extent to which individuals enlphasize need in their allocations. Skitka and Tetlock (1992) suggest that in the distribution of public resources (e.g., health care or welfare), allocators appraise the adequacy of the resource pooi and the causes of claimants' needs. When resources are inadequate, individuals presumably engage in attributional analysis to assess the source of need (internal versus external, controllable versus uncontrollable) and the effectiveness of the resources in assuaging the need. Results of a thirdparty allocation study show that with low scarcity, allocators are more likely to deny claims for those who were responsible for their predicament. Claimants whose needs are internally caused and controllable were likely to receive resources only if their need was high and the use of the resources would be efficient. With high scarcity, subjects provided aid to claimants not responsible for their problems and greatly in need but with a high chance of success. h addition, individual attitudes affected responses. Subjects scoring high in conservatism were more likely than those scoring high on liberalism to devalue the deservingness of people with internal-controllable causes of need. In fact, when no scarcity was present, conservative subjects withheld aid from some claimants. This complex study thus indicates the importance of cognitive, affective, and personal-ideological variables in predicting allocation preferences. It also extends beyond other'work by attempting to explain how people process the implications of situational factors in making allocation decisions.

b. Situational Factors Most work on the effects of situational factors on allocation decisions gives little explicit consideration to motivational and cognitive processes that theoretically link the situation to the distribution. As noted already, situational factors often interact with individual characteristics

DISTRIBUTWE JUSTICE

(e.g., gender), thus complicating the underlying links. The situational factors review pertain mostly to the nature of what is being distributed: rewards (goods) versus cog and the amount of each at stake. In 1980. Harris and Joyce noted that individuals tended to allocate outcomes of effort equitably whereas they were likely to distribute expenses equally. Similarly, studies show that individuals preferred equal allocations of losses (Kayser and L m Lomm er al., 1983; Tdmblom and Jonsson, 1985). But contrasting results have al obtained. Meeker and Elliott (1987) demonstrate a preference for the equitable distrib negative outcomes. Tomblorn (1988) and Griffith (1989) review additional studies, con that mixed results are endemic. The inconsistencies may stem from cultural diffe methodological variations, and the confounding effects of information presented to allo In comparing allocations ofpositive and negative outcomes, Griffith (1989:128) conclud most of the evidence poinrs to the idea that "what's fair for rewarding individuals or gr also fair for punishing them." Thus, allocation of expenses or losses is likely to be sub the influence of similar factors ;ISthose reviewed for the distribution of rewards. For ex when motivated by competition, individuals are less likely to prefer an equal distribu negative outcomes (see Griffith, 1989). Explanations for the effect of resource scarcity on allocations in three-person prou focus on underlying motivations. Hegtvedt (1987) found that allocators tend to make rially self-interested distributions when resources were abundant enough to exceed the pay expectations for all group members. But when resources were insufficient to mee pay expectations, individuals allocated more generously to other group members. He suggests that this pattern of results stems from concerns for other group members a responsibility stemming from the allocator's role in the larger group when faced with re scarcity. Whether situational factors actually alter underlying motivations from one o interest encompassing social rewards as well as material ones or from the developm group identity remains to be investigated. Some cross-cultural studies also rely on assum about different motivations for culturally distinct groups.

c. Cross-Cultural Factors

Generally, there is agreement that allocation preferences are culturally relative, bou socialization practices and societal norms. Identifying these practices and the norms th count for different motivational bases for allocations may prove to be elusive. Three int ing studies, however, make explicit attempts. Emphasizing cultural variation jn collectivistic orientation, h u n g and Bond ( compare American and Chinese allocation preferences. Results demonstrate the greater d for maintaining group solidarity in collectivistic China. Chinese subjects preferred an table allocation when dealing with an out-group member or when the individuals had inputs, whereas they opted for equality with in-group members or when their own inputs high. Such preference patterns. typically not found among Americans, enhance the well-b of other group members. Drawing on Hofstede's (1984) categorization of countries, Kim, Park, and Suzuki (1 reason that people in more individualistic and "masculine" countries such as the United S and Japan are more likely to prefer equitable divisions. Their findings for the United States Japan, in comparison to South Korea, which is not considered as individualistic and m culine, confirm this reasoning. Similarly, Walker (1989) dissects the political and social attitudes that distinguish Am


cans and Australians. His study reveals value differences that may influence allocations. Indeed, he reports that American subjects were more liberal and radical than Australians who were more conservative and stronger endorsers of the Protestant ethic. As a consequence of these value orientations, Americans favored equality more strongly while Australians had a greater preference for equity. Other research challenges these findings indicating that Australians prefer equality and have fairly complex views of individual deservingness (e.g., Feather, 1994).

4. General Allocation Issues and Applications Researchers have investigated the influence of a wide variety of factors on allocation preferences. Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of this body of research is that many factors-individual, relational, and situational-interact to create variation in the pattern of distribution preferences. Unfortunately, in the absence of an integrated theoretical framework from which to derive predictions concerning allocation preferences and, by implication, fairness assessments, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions. We have accumulated many findings but our current knowledge about fairness in allocation is not necessarily cumulative. Leventhal and colleagues' (1980) underused theoretical perspective draws attention to goals and expectancies as critical variables predicting allocation decisions. While some studies specifically address the influence of goals on allocations, most investigators do not manipulate or explicitly measure goals and motivations. Based on the research reviewed above, however, it seems likely that individual, relational, and situational factors jointly influence the goals that actors attempt to achieve by their allocation preferences as Leventhal's perspective generally implies but does not spell out. Given that existing research gives clear evidence of the effects of value orientations on allocation decisions, one avenue for future research is to determine specifically how situational and relational factors modify the motivations associated with these value orientations. For example, a given value orientation may suggest that individuals will largely be self-interested in their distribution preferences. Yet, contextual factors such as moderate reward scarcity, public pronouncement of preferences, or emphasis on ties among group memben may inhibit the extent to which maximizing selfinterested gains determines the allocation decision. Rather, such situational factors may enhance the pursuit of collective interests. How various factors combine to create or to modify individual goals and motivations is a central theoretical and empirical issue for future research. How cognitive processing affects interpretation of the situation, or, in other words, how individuals attempt to achieve their gods through particular distribution principles, also requires further investigation. Do attributions moderate or mediate situational influences on allocation preferences? Do contextual factors that affect motivations likewise affect processing of other information available in the situation? For example, to the extent that group ties are emphasized. are distribution decisions the result of the motivation to enhance group welfare or cognitive biases concerning the cause of relevant inputs? Such questions draw attention to the complicated interplay between motivations and cognitions. Drawing out the theoretical links between the various elements involved in the allocation profess constitutes the next frontier of research. With greater theoretical understanding of these links, it will be possible to tackle questions that have yet to be addressed. For example, we can begin to address the problem of determining the consequences of competing claims given different allocation preferences among individuals. While the bargaining literature (see Lawler and Ford, 1995) examines the resolution of opposing interests, little of it deals with


issues of competing conceptions of fairness (see Hegtvedt and Cook. 1987). On the other ha the research on allocation preferences stops short of analyzing how people work out t disagreements over what is fair. Yet. such disagreements are endemic in many situation which allocations occur. While it is difficult to discern empirically when disagreements are merely conflict personal interests (as often assumed in bargaining studies) or are fundamental difference fairness beliefs (beyond simple personal interests), people frequently debate ways of alloc ing many different classes of resources (e.g., educational programs, water rights, wetlands, burdens). A prime example of variation in justice claims is the distribution of health c r e s ~ u r c e sIssues .~ of equity have long been discussed in the health care arena (see Anders 1972). Given spiraling health care costs and increasing numbers of uninsured individu greater attention has recently focused on fairness in the provision of health care service Several researchers have analyzed the consequences of the application of various distr utive justice principles on the allocation of health care resources (e.g., Haayry and Haay 1990; Perein, 1993). Jecker and Berg (1992) specifically contrast the approach to just expressed by a sample of rural physicians with the justice conception that dominates Weste philosophy. Given the difficulties of providing health care in rum1 areas, these physicia device accounts for their decisions that may seem at odds with typical approaches to justic In general, scarcity forces debates about what is fair. Aaron and Schwartz (1984) label t decisions regarding the rationing of health care in the British National Health Service, whi often results in denying certain types of care (e.g., renal dialysis) to elderly patients or t creation of long queues for other treatments (e.g., hip replacements) as "painful prescri tions." Likewise. Mechanic (1989) notes how U.S. health care faces such painful choices. F example, debates over expenditures of health care resources for the elderly versus those f neonates raise concerns about the relevance of what might be termed compensable factor Often arguments tout the remaining years of life as an important factor in deciding how heal care dollars should be spent (Kuhse and Singer, 1988). What people claim as a just distribution of health care resources often reflects their ow value orientations, much like the experimental research indicates. Gill, Ingman, and Campbe (1991) compare the provision of geriatric care in the United States and Great Britain. The mo dominant individualist orientation in the U.S. health care system results in a greater provisio of geriatric care in the United States whereas such care is provided at lower levels in Gre Britain. The British collectivist orientation (and concomitant centralized, government-funde National Health Service) leads to concern for ensuring resources to a broader segment of th population given budget constraints. Space limitations do not allow a more extensive review of the allocation of health car resources as a justice issue. It is clear, however, that issues raised in the experimental work o allocation decisions do pertain to applied concerns. Moreover, by examining actual allocatio decisions and debates in the health care arena, basic researchers may gain insights into a wide m a y of contextual factors and interpersonal dynamics that may affect allocation preference more broadly.

C. REACTIONS TO INJUSTICE

Adams's (1965) initial statement on equity in interpersonal relations stimulated a decade of research on reactions to inequity. This early formulation assumed that individuals would assess their outcomes/inputs ratios in comparison to that of some other individual. This

106


"local" comparison provided the basis for determining whether one was inequitably underrewarded, equitably rewarded, or inequitably ovemwarded. Adams argued that distress from inequity motivated individuals to respond by: (1) changing their inputs, (2) changing their outcomes, (3) altering their perceptions of their own inputs or outcomes or those of their partner, (4) changing the object of their comparison, or (5) withdrawing from the situation. The first two options coincide with what Walster et al. (19784 label restoring acrual equiry whereas the remaining options fit their category of restoring psychological equiry. Presumably, individuals would select the least costly form of response. A flurry of research in the decade after 1965 focused on responses to underpay, equitable pay, and overpay (see Cook and Hegtvedt, 1983, for a review). Studies of this genre were of two types: (1) alterations in input levels on subsequent tasks after receipt of inequitable pay or (2) alterations in outcome levels by the reallocation of a bonus or additional pay. Findings typically confirmed that overrewarded subjects increased their productivity, though the explanations for this effect were inconsistent. In contrast. the pattern of results is less systematic for underrewarded subjects. Ln experiments of the second type, findings typically show that underrewarded subjects take more bonus pay for themselves and overrewarded subjects take less. Several Limitations characterized these early studies. First, most researcher; assumed that inequity would produce an observable reaction. This assumption ignored the possibility, though outlined by Adams, of a cognitive response or no response. Second, the structure of the experimental framework most often disallowed investigation of the choice among possible reactions since only one form of response was studied. And third, despite the early observations by Homans (1961) in an organizational setting, researchers have typically investigated reactions to inequity in laboratory settings. More recent work on reactions to injustice addresses these limitations. A large body of work examines factors mediating responses to inequity-some of which account for the possibility of nonresponse. Here the focus is on emotional and cognitive mediators, and the role of self-evaluation. Other work notes how individual and contextual factors. as well as procedural justice evaluations, moderate the perceived inequity-reactions relationship. In addition, several investigations move beyond a singular focus on one type of behaviord reaction to include multiple behaviors as well as co,gitive responses. Finally, an increasing number of researchers are analyzing responses to injustice in applied settings.

1. Factors that Mediate Reactions to Inequity The earlier theoretical formulations of Adams (1965) and Walster et al. (1978a) have two interrelated shortcomings: they ignore the complexities of justice assessments and they fail to address the complex mechanisms that link perceived inequity to specific reactions to it. Theoretically, such mediating factors may affect not only the occurrence of a response, but also the type of response: behavioral or cognitive, individual or collective.

a. Emotional Mediators Approaches based on equity theory anticipate the role of distress as one factor mediating responses to injustice, but provide little explication of its nature (see Cook and Hegtvedt, 1983). Studies of distress in inequitable relationships typically involve physiological indicators and self-reports of feelings.


107

Focusing on physiological measures, there is some evidence supporting the inequitydistress relationship. Galvanic skin response measures indicate that underrewarded subjects (Austin and Walster, 1974; Markovsky, 1988) and overrewarded subjects (Markovsky, 1988) experience more distress compared to equitably paid subjects. The second approach to studying distress relies on self-reports of feelings measured by adjective checklists or scales of the intensity of different types of emotions. A clear pattern of findings emerges from such studies: Equitably rewarded individuals feel more content and less distressed than do those who are inequitably rewarded, regardless of whether the relationship is intimate (Sprecher, 1986) or impersonal (Austin and Walster, 1974; Vecchio, 1984; Hegtvedt, 1990). Self-repon studies focusing more specifically on Homans's (1961, 1974) theoretical predictions that individuals who are underrewarded are likely to feel angry and those who are overrewarded are likely to feel guilty provide more mixed results. While studies repeatedly confirm that underrewarded individuals are likely to feel anger (Gray-Little and Teddlie, 1978; Hassebrauck, 1986; Hegtvedt, 1990). the extent to which overrewarded individuals feel guilty is unclear. There is some evidence that individuals who benefit from inequity experience positive affect (Davidson, 1984; Hegtvedt, 1990). Although overrewarded individuals may feel more guilty than others as Hassebrauck (1986) demonstrates, the actual levels of guilt may actually be quite low (Hegtvedt, 1990). And, sometimes there are no differences in levels of guilt across reward conditions (Gray-Little and Teddlie, 1978). Thus, with the exception of feelings of guilt, the work on inequity and distress is consistent with theoretical expectations. But does distress mediate between inequity and behavioral or psychological responses? There is no research that specifically addresses this question. Sprecher's (1992) study of individuals' responses to vignettes asking them to imagine themselves in an imbalanced relationship, first involving underbenefit and then later involving overbenefit, comes closest. Subjects expressed how they "expected" to feel in each situation and the behaviors they anticipated in response to the inequity. Sprecher compared the types of emotion and behavior expected for each type of inequity. Results suggest that underbenefited respondents expect to become distressed and anticipate actions to restore equity. Overbenefited respondents indicate no general distress; they admit possible feelings of guilt, however, and also anticipate enacting equity-restoring behaviors. Other work investigates the moderating effect of various factors on affective responses. Sprecher (1992) qualifies her inequity-distress reactions results in terms of gender and exchange orientation. Women and individuals with a strong exchange orientation are more likely to report feelings of distress and to try to restore justice. Feldman, Barbaresi, and Caiola (1983) show that if an exchange partner is physically handicapped, inequitably rewarded subjects express less distress than when their partner is not handicapped. It seems that interactants' characteristics may moderate the inequity-distress relationship. Schafer, (1988) investigates the role of self-esteem in the inequity-distress relationship. He assumes that the experience of inequity in a relationship threatens an individual's selfesteem. Data from a sample of students indicate about 40% of the total effect of inequity on distress is indirect, mediated through levels of self-esteem. He argues that this mediating effect of self-esteem supports the reinterpretation of equity-restoring behavior as self-enhancing behavior designed to maintain or to boost self-esteem. In summary, a great deal of research confirms the theoretical relationship between inequity and feelings of distress. Unfortunately, whether distress or more specific emotions actually mediate reactions to inequity remains unknown. Future investigations that more explicitly examine how affective responses mediate behavioral and psychological reactions

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