from marxist sociology are falsified, historical materialism is falsified too. Hahn ... sociology - which follows from historical materialism - cannot be wrong.
Quality and Quantity 8 (1974) 2 8 3 - 2 9 4 . 9 Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - Printed in The Netherlands
NOTES DOGMATIC TRENDS IN MARXIST SOCIOLOGY* KARL-DIETER OPP
Seminar ffir Sozialwissenschaften, Universitit'tHamburg, 2 Hamburg 13, Sedanstrase 19, West Germany ABSTRACT T h e r e s e a r c h p r o g r a m o f t h e o r e t i c a l pluralism w o u l d i m p l y for sociology, t o c o n f r o n t m a r x i s t w i t h n o n m a r x i s t sociology. This s e e m s useful o n l y if b o t h sociologies are r e f u t a b l e in principle. However, c e r t a i n principles o f m a r x i s t sociology p r e v e n t t h e r e f u t a t i o n of its m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l h y p o t h e s e s . This is s h o w n in analyzing a n o f t e n c i t e d b o o k b y E. Hahn. T h e " b a s i s " o f m a r x i s t sociology is h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m . Thus, if h y p o t h e s e s f r o m m a r x i s t sociology are falsified, h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m is falsified too. H a h n maintains - without presenting any empirical evidence - that historical materialism has f o u n d t h e s o l u t i o n o f all p r o b l e m s a n d t h u s c a n n o t be r e f u t e d . Marxist sociology, h o w e v e r , is - a c c o r d i n g to H a h n -- falsifiable. This s t a t e m e n t a n d t h e thesis m e n t i o n e d b e f o r e are i n c o n s i s t e n t , f o r if h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m is t r u e , m a r x i s t sociology - w h i c h follows f r o m h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m - c a n n o t b e wrong. B u t even if t h e r e w o u l d b e n o i n c o n s i s t e n c y , t h e f o l l o w i n g s i t u a t i o n w o u l d b e possible: Marxist s o c i o l o g y p r o v e s e n t i r e l y wrong, b u t h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m ( t h e " b a s i s " of m a r x i s t sociology) will n o t b e a b a n d o n e d . Furthermore, Hahn maintains that by means of empirical research (observation a n d e x p e r i m e n t ) t h e c e n t r a l h y p o t h e s e s o f m a r x i s t sociology c a n n o t b e tested, n a m e l y t h e " e s s e n c e o f a p p e a r a n c e s . " B u t h e is at a loss for a r g u m e n t s ; so every h y p o t h e s i s c a n b e i m m u n i z e d against falsification b y declaring t h a t it describes t h e "essence" of certain "appearances." O n e f u r t h e r s t r a t e g y o f i m m u n i z a t i o n H a h n i n t r o d u c e s , is t h e rule t h a t in an e x p l a n a t i o n o n l y m a r x i s t laws m a y be used. So it is n o t possible t o c o n f r o n t m a r x i s t a n d n o n m a r x i s t h y p o t h e s e s . This rule e l i m i n a t e s a very effective k i n d of criticism, n a m e l y t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n of i n c o n s i s t e n t theories.
Introduction
An aim of many sociologists is the construction of precise and true theories with high explanatory power. A strategy for reaching this goal * This is a slightly modified version of my paper: "Dogmatische Tendenzen in der marxistischen Soziologie," in: Soziale Welt 1972, vol. 23, pp. 374-82. I thank the editor of this Journal Prof. Dr. Heinz Hartmann - and the publisher - Verlag Otto Schwartz & Co. - for permitting the publication of the English version in "Quality and Quantity."
is to invent continuously new theoretical devices, to confront them with the existing ones and to eliminate the " b a d " theories. 1 The kinds of questions marxist sociologists try to answer are very similar to the questions o f nonmarxist sociologists who try to reach the goal mentioned. The following remarks on the subject o f marxist sociology could as well be found in a nonmarxist introduction to sociology: "Es muss erkl/irt werden, warum zu verschiedenen Zeiten verschledene gesellschaftliche Zustfinde und innerhalb dieser Zusffinde wiederum differenzierte, mehr oder weniger wechselhafte Entwicklungsprozesse zu konstatieren sind. Entwicklungsprozesse und Ablfiufe, die sich in einem ungleich rascheren Tempo vollziehen als Ver/inderungen in der natiirlichen Umgebung dieses Systems. Gleichzeitig muss erkl~rt werden, warum unter ausserordentlich stark voneinander abweichenden Bedingungen der fiusseren Natur bestimmte gesellschaftliche Erscheinungen und Prozesse dem Wesen nach, also abgesehen yon nebensgchlichen Begleiterscheinungen und Existenzformen, hberaus fihnliche Gestalt annehmen. ''2 Although marxists and nonmarxists deal with similar questions, their answers to these questions are very different. Just for the similar questions there would be an opportunity to realize the postulate of a theoretical pluralism, i.e. to confront both (marxist and nonmarxist) ant swers and to eliminate those which prove the worse. Such a research program, which would realize a competition between different theoretical systems, should be organized in cooperation with marxist sociologists; for those who accept a position are less able to see weaknesses of this position than those who do not accept it. Another reason for such a cooperation is that the reproach of misunderstanding the other side's position would be eliminated by "direct communication." The realization o f an eliminative competition between marxist and nonmarxist sociology is only possible if both sociologies can be eliminated at all. That is, if at least one sociology cannot be falsified, a confrontation is not useful, because it has no consequences. If, for example, one of the two sociologies works with the ceteris-paribusclause there are no empirical data which could refute such a science (or theory). Thus, before realizing an eliminative competition between marxist and nonmarxist sociology it seems useful to examine whether both sociologies can be criticized. In this paper marxist sociology will be discussed. First we shall try to demonstrate that certain theses of marxist sociologists have the consequence that a critique of marxist sociology becomes impossible. Secondly we shall try to show some difficulties o f such a dogmatization.
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Our starting point will be the b o o k by Erich Hahn - Historischer Materialismus u n d rnarxistische Soziologie - which we mentioned already. This seems legitimate because Hahn proposes theses which are widely accepted b y German-speaking marxist sociologists. Thus, Hahn's b o o k represents at least one influential branch of marxist sociology. Our discussion implies in no way that there are no strategies to immunize theories against critique in nonmarxist sociology; rather the contrary is correct. We remember the ceteris-paribus clause. Also, some practices described in m y b o o k (op. cit.) are strategies o f immunization. But these are not the subject o f this paper.
1. The Relation b e t w e e n Marxist Sociology and Historical Materialism Historical materialism is a "presupposition" o f marxist sociology. Hegedfis writes, sociology "geh~Srt in den Rahmen des historischen Materialismus und wir k~Snnen deshalb nicht yon einer vom historischen Materialismus losgelrsten Soziologie sprechen. ''3 The exact kind o f relation between marxist sociology and historical materialism, however, remains unclear. There may be a logical relation between marxist sociology and historical materialism, i.e. marxist sociology is a system of sentences which can be deduced from another system o f sentences (historical materialism). The following statement o f Hegedfis could be understood in this way: "Der historische Materialismus erforscht die allgemeinen Gesetze der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung, w~qarend die einzelnen Fachsoziologen sich mit den Eigenti)mlichkeiten konkreter Erscheinungsformen befassen, die in einer gegebenen wirtschaftlich-gesellschaftlichen Situation und Formation ... die Zusammenh//nge zum Ausdruck bringen. ''4 If one wants to formulate marxist sociology as a deduced system of sentences, then this is only possible in a precise manner, if historical materialism is formalized. But for the m o m e n t historical materialism is not yet formalized. Thus, existing marxist sociology has not been deduced and presently is n o t deducible in a strict manner. The relation between historical materialism and marxist sociology could be heuristic, i.e. historical materialism could be the " c o n t e x t o f discovery" for sociological hypotheses. Thus, historical materialism might be a psychological stimulus which leads to the discovery of sociological hypotheses. An example may illustrate this "heuristic relation." A proposition of historical materialism might be: T1 : The material conditions determine the " U b e r b a u . "
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Proceeding from this hypothesis a sociologist m i g h t get the idea that the following proposition (of marxist sociology) could be true:
T2: The stronger the economic concentration in a society is, the more civil suits between employers and employees are decided in favor of employers. T2 is not derivable from T1. However, T1 could have contributed to the formulation o f T2 : T1 might have led the attention of a sociologist to a certain class of variables - material conditions in a society. Thus, historical materialism is used as a class of sociological orientations. Whatever kinds of relations between historical materialism and marxist sociology might exist: If historical materialism is in any sense the basis of marxist sociology, then a falsification or corroboration of marxist sociology has consequences for the falsification or corroboration of historical materialism. This is true if the propositions of marxist sociology are logical deductions from historical materialism. According to the rules of logic a falsification o f marxist sociology would be a falsification of historical materialism (because false theorems cannot be deduced from true axioms). If we suppose a heuristic relation between historical materialism and marxist sociology, then the falsification o f sociological propositions will have consequences for historical materialism too. Suppose, for example, that several hypotheses are tested, postulating the influence of certain variables, representing the economic conditions, on certain others, representing the " U b e r b a u . " In case these hypotheses are falsified and other ones, with different independent variables, are very well confirmed, then T 1 is falsified too and we would abandon T1; this means, that we could no longer apply T! in explanations, predictions and for the solution of practical problems. Hahn, however, rejects a refutation o f historical materialism in principle. According to his opinion historical materialism is an absolutely necessary presupposition for at1 sociological research ("der historische Materialismus (ist) eine unabdingbare Voraussetzung der soziologischen Forschung" (p. 5; the following pages refer to Hahn's book)); historical materialism has found the basic ("grundsfitzliche") solutiol,, of all problems of the theory of knowledge and the basic ("grundlegende") solution o f the general theoretical questions which are subject o f every sociological research (pp. 6; see also pp. 154, 2 5 8 - 5 9 ) . One could say that Hahn builds a stop sign for falsification, s For this he suggests the arguments as follows: "Seit zwei Genera-
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tionen also existiert und entwickelt sich praktisch, empirisch eine Gesellschaft, die in wesentlichen Zfigen als Vollzug theoretischer Prognosen und Antizipationen des historischen Materialismus entstanden i s t und tagt/iglich bewusst gestaltet wird. Seit einem halben Jahrhundert erweist sich tagt/iglich die empirische und vor allem praktische Effektivit/it der marxistischen Gesellschaftsanalyse. Und yon diesem empirischen Fakt erwartet man eine Korrektur der Theorie, ohne die der Sozialismus als Gesellschaft sich nicht entwickelt h/itte" (p. 260). Thus, Hahn maintains that in socialist societies marxist theory has been applied and proved to be true. Whether certain theories are really applied in a society has to be established b y empirical research. First, it is possible that certain theories are verbally accepted, but in fact are n o t applied; m a y b e they serve only as justifications for every measure the " p o w e r elite" thinks to be useful. Furthermore, if a theory is applied to the solution of practical problems, we must k n o w whether the initial conditions are in fact realized (i.e. the conditions which have certain effects according to the theory); for it is possible that people who apply a theory only suppose that the initial conditions are given. Thus, whether the initial conditions for applying a theory are given, has to be established by empirical research. Third, it must be "found o u t b y meens of empirical research, whether the effects the theory maintains did in f a c t occur. It is possible that people only suppose that the effects are realized; they could, for example, " o v e r l o o k " facts, which are contrary to the theory, because they are strongly interested in confirming the theory. Whether the true facts are given or not must be proved b y empirical research. Intuitive reports are not sufficient, because, as is well known, the number o f errors in " c o m m o n sense research" is certainly greater than in enquiries where the methods o f social research are applied. Hahn does not present any piece o f research - a weak basis for the claim that historical materialism has found the solution o f all problems. But let us assume for a m o m e n t that empirical studies o f the kind mentioned are conducted and the hypotheses o f historical materialism have been confirmed very well. F r o m this it follows in no way, that historical materialism will not be falsified in the future. The first reason is that historical materialism consists of statements which refer to an infinite set of objects and infinite objects cannot be examined. 6 But even if historical materialism consists of singular statements (i.e. statements which refer to a certain time and to certain places), they could be wrong, because in testing these statements many mistakes are possible. 7
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Thus, we can say: Because historical materialism is the "presupposition" o f marxist sociology, a falsification of hypotheses from marxist sociology is a falsification of historical materialism. Hahn decides with unacceptable arguments that historical materialism in principle should not be abandoned or modified. Hahn is inclined, however, to abandon or m o d i f y hypotheses from marxist sociology" "Theoretische Leitsfitze werden stfindig durch die Tatsachen der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung fiberprfift, korrigiert, best/itigt oder verworfen" (p. 167). "Die sozialwissenschaftliche Theorie ist.., in einem Masse der st/indigen Konfrontation mit der Praxis und insofern Prfifungen und Bestfitigungen ausgesetzt, wie das in der Geschichte der menschlichen Gesellschaft niemals vorher der Fall war" (p. 155, see also pp. 219 and 244). Thus, b o t h classes o f hypotheses are handled differently: the propositions of historical materialism are "sacred," they must not be changed; the propositions of marxist sociology, which " f o l l o w " from historical materialism, could be falsified and abandoned. Thus, historical materialism is immunized against critique. This immunization leads to difficulties: it remains unclear why the propositions of the first level, i.e. the propositions of marxist sociology, are not already protected against critique. The argument o f Hahn mentioned above could be applied previously to marxist sociology; for if th6 propositions of historical materialism could not be falsified, this should also be the case for the propositions "following" from historical materialism, namely the propositions of marxist sociology. The reason is, that from true sentences no wrong sentences can "follow." This rule is valid, if sentences are logically derivable; but the rule will also be applied, as we mentioned already, if sentences "heuristically follow" from other sentences; for if a proposition is true it will not lead to the formulation o f wrong sefitences. We find no hint in the b o o k o f Hahn that he does not accept this rule. The contrary is the case: in some places he refers to marxist logicians who describe or apply modern logic, for instance sentential calculus or set theory. Thus, if one accepts that the propositions o f historical materialism are true, then this has the consequence that the propositions o f marxist sociology, which "follow" from historical materialism, must also be true. So if Hahn protects the propositions of the "highest theoretical level" against criticism, he must do the same for the "second theoretical level." But as we saw Hahn does not accept this. His decision to accept historical materialism as true and the rule that no wrong propositions follow from true propositions lead to the consequence that the propositions o f marxist sociology are true. Hahn, however, does not accept this consequence. Thus, his argument is inconsistent if we proceed from premisses which H a h n himself accepts. 288
So we see that the argument o f Hahn - irrefutability of historical materialism and refutability of marxist sociology which "follows" from historical materialism - is not acceptable, if we assume that it is consistent. But if we accept this argument, we see that it is inconsistent. According to Hahn the following situation would be possible: the propositions of marxist sociology are tested and falsified and nonmarxist propositions are corroborated very well. In this case the propositions of marxist sociology must be abandoned, according to Hahn, but historical materialism remains untouched. That means that on the one side hypotheses o f nonmarxist sociology are accepted and on the other side hypotheses o f historical materialism are accepted, and b o t h " t y p e s " of hypotheses are contradictory. Even for Hahn such a situation is hardly tolerable. It seems that at least some marxist sociologists do not expect that such a situation will ever occur. This shows in the paper o f Kelle we mentioned above. He writes that historical materialism should not be accepted dogmatically (p. 1050); but it seems also that he is not willing to abandon historical materialism. He writes that historical materialism must be "'worked o u t " or "developed" and must get its " o w n empirical basis"; " t h e working out o f the problems of historical materialism" is "a constructive program, because we must proceed in realizing this program w i t h o u t giving up what we have reached" (p. 1051). Furthermore Kelle suggests in conducting empirical research " t h e application of scientific methods o f data analysis, of rigorous logical and mathematical rules" and "the necessary scientific rigor" (p. 1051 ). It remains at least unclear whether " t h e necessary scientific rigor" should also be applied to historical materialism. If this is not the case one would like to learn arguments for n o t applying "'scientific rigor" to historical materialism. Furthermore, one would have expected to read what would happen if historical materialism proves to be inadequate. It is unnecessary to deal with these consequences of a falsification of historical materialism, if one formulates rules excluding the possibility that marxist sociology or parts of it can be refuted, i.e. if one immunizes marxist sociology against rigorous criticism. Let us see, whether Hahn proposes such rules.
2. The " L i m i t s " of Empirical Research Marxist as well as nonmarxist sociologists practice empirical research. Hahn emphasizes this too, when he writes: "Soziologische Forschung ist wesentlich eine Forschung, die auf dem Einsatz der sogenannten
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empirischen Methoden beruht. A u f die rationelle und effektive Erlangung grundlegender wesentlicher Informationen fiber neue gesellschaftliche Erscheinungen, Prozesse und Tendenzen ist die Forschung angelegt, hierauf sind die theoretischen 0berlegungen, die der eigentlichen Untersuchung vorausgehen, zugeschnitten" (p. 243). 8 If one wants to prevent a falsification of hypotheses of marxist sociology, one could limit the influence of social research somehow because this would be the source o f the "destruction" o f marxist sociology. Exactly this strategy Hahn applies. He writes that the "empirische Stufe der Erkenntnis... nicht in der Lage ist, in das Wesen der betreffenden Erscheinungen einzudringen, den inneren Zusammenhang zu erfassen und zu den wesentlichen Gesetzmfissigkeiten vorzudringen. Darin besteht vielmehr die Aufgabe und der Inhalt der theoretischen Erkenntnis. In der theoretischen Erkenntnis wird das Wesen des betreffenden Objekts widergespiegelt" (p. 169, cf. also p. 87). Furthermore, Hahn distinguishes between knowledge that can be tested directly by means of observation and experiment and knowledge which is not testable in this way. In these remarks Hahn clearly excludes certain propositions from criticism: He maintains that a certain kind of criticism, namely empirical research, is not applicable. The theoretical propositions which according to Hahn - are n o t testable, describe the "essence" (Wesen) of certain "appearances" (Erscheinungen), which uncover the "inner context" (inneren Zusammenhang) between them. Whatever this means: the formulation o f such propositions is the goal o f historical materialism and marxist sociology. Thus, the statements which are central to historical materialism and marxist sociology and which refer to the empirical world must not be criticized b y means of observation and experiment. Thus, empirical research is limited to the test o f propositions which are unimportant in the " s y s t e m " of historical materialism and marxist sociology. Unfortunately Hahn does not show which of the propositions o f historical materialism and marxist sociology cannot be tested and in particular w h y this should n o t be possible. That Hahn does not deal with the question, why these propositions cannot be tested by observation and experiment, is a serious shortcoming o f his argumentation, because these propositions are empirical hypotheses. Thus, we would like to know, whether propositions on the relation between " U b e r b a u " and " U n t e r b a u " are empirically testable. If not, why not? Are these propositions untestable, because they are too vague? If these questions are not answered every proposition can be immunized against criticism: it can always be maintained that a proposition describes the "essence o f appearances" and so is not testable. Thus, ..
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Hahn's thesis o f the limits o f social research can be applied as a strategy to immunize every proposition against criticism.
3. The Marxist Concept of Explanation Explaining a singular fact means a derivation of the sentence describing this fact from (at least) one law and the initial conditions. 9 The logical structure o f an explanation is described also by Hahn (pp. 2 2 7 - 2 2 9 ) . l~ One condition an adequate explanation must fulfill is that the laws used in the explanation must be true. The logic o f an explanation is also used in testing a proposition: if, for example, the initial conditions are given and not the facts to be explained, the law in the explanation is falsified (cf. p. 243). The structure o f an explanation is formal in the sense that there are no rules concerning the content of the laws in an explanation: every law which is true can be part of an explanation. Hahn, however, restricts the content of the laws, that may be used. He postulates that it is only permitted to use laws in an explanation which stem from historical materialism or marxist sociology. He writes: "Wfihrend die Anerkenn u n g d e r logischen Struktur der Erklfirung selbstverst/indlich auch auf der Grundlage eines anderefi philosophischen Standpunktes m6glich ist, erweist sich die materialistische Philosophie als entscheidende und ausschalaggebende Bedingung der Anwendung dieses Verfahrens" (p. 248). Furthermore, he writes, that "alle sozialen Erscheinungen und Prozesse aus ihren materiellen gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen zu erkl/iren (sind)" (p. 248). This methodological rule has the consequence that the possibilities to criticize propositions o f historical materialism and marxist sociology are limited again. For if in an explanation only a certain class o f laws may be used then it is only possible to confront these laws, i.e. to find out which o f these laws are the better ones regarding truth (we remember that the logic o f explanation is the same as the logic o f test). Thus, if in an explanation (test) only laws of historical materialism and marxist sociology may be used, then only these laws may be tested. It would be, for example, not permitted to find out whether the nonmarxist functional theory o f stratification would be corroborated better in an empirical inquiry than the marxist theory of stratification. So Hahn eliminates an especially effective strategy o f criticism, namely an eliminative competition between different theories. If one follows the rule mentioned it is never possible to see whether a nonmarxist theory will be better corroborated than a marxist theory; for a marxist and a nonmarxist theory must not be confronted. 291
Hahn's rule has not only the consequence that nonmarxist theories are eliminated as sources of criticism, i.e. that historical materialism and marxist sociology are protected against criticism - a very effective criticism; the rule mentioned is contradictory to another rule Hahn suggests. If we understand Hahn correctly, his opinion is that marxist propositions should be criticized principally. Because a confrontation of marxist and nonmarxist theories is a certain kind o f criticism, it follows that marxist and nonmarxist theories should be confronted and thus may be parts o f explanations. Hahn, however, postulates the contrary. Thus there is a contradiction in the methodological rules of Hahn.
4. Conclusion I f marxist sociologists accept the rules we discussed, it is not possible to organize an eliminative competition between marxist and nonmarxist sociology in the form of a cooperation between marxist and nonmarxist sociologists. The reason is that one does not bring a cow to a butcher if one wants to prevent the cow from being slaughtered. If one wants in spite of the rules criticized in this paper a confrontation o f marxist and nonmarxist sociology, there is a simple possibility: one does not apply them. It is possible, however, that there are other strategies o f immunization against criticism which are more difficult to eliminate. Whether this is true should be examined in discussing other marxist writings.
Notes 1 On "theoretical pluralism" in sociology see Rolf Kfima, "Theorienpluralismus in der Soziologie," in: Alwin Diemer, ed., Der Methoclen- und Theorienpluralismus in den Wissenschaften, Meisenheim am Glan, 1971, pp. 1 9 8 - 2 1 9 ; Karl-Dieter Opp, Methodologie der Sozialwissenschaften. Einffihrung in Probleme ihrer Theorienbildung, Reinbek, 1970, chapter VIII; Helmut F. Spinner,"Theoretischer Pluralismus. Prolegomena zu einer kxitizistischen Methodologie und Theorie des Erkenntnisfortschritts," in: Hans Albert, ed., Sozialtheorie und soziale Praxis, Meisenheim am Glan, 1971, pp. 17-41. This paper contains further references. 2 Cf. Erich Hahn, Historischer Materialismus und rnarxistische Soziologie. Stuclien zu methodologischen und erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen der soziologischen Forschung, Berlin 1968, p. 58. 3 According to Gabor Kiss, Marxismus als Soziologie. Theorie und Empirie in den Sozialwissenschaflen der DDR, UdSSR, Polens, der CSSR, Ungarns, Bulgariens und Rumiiniens, Reinbek 1971, p. 127. See also Hahn (op. cit.), p. 6 and passim.
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4 Ibid. See also Hahn (op. cit.), pp. 5 - 6 . Thus, according to Hegedtis, marxist sociology consists of empirical laws. But usually one considers also certain descriptive statements and concepts, which axe not parts of laws, as pertaining to marxist sociology. Cf., for example, Hahn (op. cit.), p. 6 and passim. In this paper we deal only with the laws that constitute marxist sociology. 5 To my knowledge there are only few marxists who reject every dogmatizati0n of marxist sociology. Cf., for example: Andrzej Malewski, "Der empirische Gehalt der Theorie des histodschen Matefialismus," in: K61ner Zeitschrift far Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 1959, vol. 11, pp. 281-305; Aleksandra Jasir~ska, "The Need for and Principles of Systematizing the Teachings of Karl Marx," in: Quality and Quantity 1971, vol. 5, pp. 265-279; Leszek Nowak, "The Problem of Explanation in Karl Marx's Capital," in: Quality and Quantity 1971, vol 5, pp. 311-337. Wladislaw Kelle writes, that most marxists in the DDR and UdSSR think that empirical research in sociology cannot have relevant results if it is not based on a solid marxist ground. Cf. "Die Struktur der marxistischen soziologischen Theorie," in: Deutsche Zeitschrift far Philosophie 1967, vol. ! 5, p. 1047. 6 Cf., for example, some laws explicitly formulated by Jfirgen Kuczynski which are cited by Kiss (op. eit.), pp. 114-15. 7 It seems that Hahn accepts a methodology, according to which certain procedures ~ead to true propositions. See, for example, p. 174: "Empirisches und theoretisches Wissen lassen sich nach der Art, in der die Wahrheit des betreffenden Wissens festgestellt wird, unterscheiden." For a criticism of such a methodology see Hans Albert, Traktat fiber kritische Vernunft, Tfibingen 1968, chapter I. 8 Whether empirical research in marxist and nonmarxist sociology is different, will not be discussed in this paper. 9 Cf., for example, Carl G. Hempel, Aspects o f Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy o f Science. New York and London 1965. For an introduction see also my book (op. cit.), Chapter III. 10 Some polemics may be permitted at this point: Hahn seems to hate every nonmarxist author so much that he does not even mention scientists whose ideas he describes. In discussing the logic of explanation he refers to a paper by G. Kr6ber (Deutsche Zeitschrift far Philosophie 1967, pp. 772-84). The first extensive treatment of the logic of explanation has been written by Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim. Cf. "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," in: Philosophy o f Science 1948, vol. 15, pp. 135-175 (reprinted also in Hempel's book, loc. cit.).
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