Double Helix Relationships in Use and Design of ...

Use and Redesign in IS: Double Helix Relationships? A monograph of the Informing Science Journal, Volume 10, 2007

Double Helix Relationships in Use and Design of Informing Systems: Lessons to Learn from Phenomenology and Hermeneutics Hans-Erik Nissen, Department of Information and Computer Science, Lund University, Sweden Peter Bednar, School of Computing, University of Portsmouth, UK & Department of Informatics, Lund University, Sweden Christine Welch, Department of Strategy and Business Systems, University of Portsmouth, UK [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

Abstract The theme of this monograph of Informing Science is a dialectic we perceive to exist between meaningful use and reflection upon use. This dialectic between use and reflection on use (or thinking, and thinking about thinking) may be considered in the following way. Each of these elements is subject to change. As reflection triggers change in use, and such change triggers further reflection, a spiral comes about. Lived human experience, and reflection upon that experience, seems to shape a double helix. The monograph contains contributions exploring particular ways in which studies of use could benefit from a relationship to philosophical frameworks such as hermeneutics and phenomenology. Material published as part of this publication, either on-line or in print, is copyrighted by the Informing Science Institute. Permission to make digital or paper copy of part or all of these works for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that the copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage AND that copies 1) bear this notice in full and 2) give the full citation on the first page. It is permissible to abstract these works so long as credit is given. To copy in all other cases or to republish or to post on a server or to redistribute to lists requires specific permission and payment of a fee. Contact [email protected] to request redistribution permission.

Editors: Nissen, Bednar, and Welch

Double Helix Relationships

Keywords: Double Helix, Design, Use, Informing Systems, Phenomenology, Hermeneutics.

Preface This editorial is organized in the following way: First there is an introduction to the theme of the monograph followed by an overview of its content. The overview describes perspectives chosen by the different authors and connecting patterns within the monograph. In the next section the editors explain what the monograph offers to the reader and also specifically comment on what it does not offer. The monograph concludes with a glossary that explains some of the specific meanings attributed to some terms used in the monograph.

Introduction The original idea for this monograph grew out of a conversation between Peter Bednar and Eli Cohen, the then editor-in-chief of Informing Science: the International Journal of an Emerging Transdiscipline (http://Inform.NU), that took place during the InSITE conference (http://InSITE.NU) at Flagstaff, Arizona in 2005. Peter and Eli discussed approaches to IS research that are based in phenomenology and hermeneutics and Peter outlined his idea of a relationship between use and experience of use in IS, using a double helix metaphor. As a result of this conversation, Eli expressed interest in promoting a monograph, a special series of articles in the journal that focuses on these ideas. The proposal was taken to Professor emeritus Hans-Erik Nissen of Lund University in Sweden, who agreed to become senior guest editor for the suggested monograph. The proposal also included promotion of a ministrand at the following InSITE conference in Manchester in 2006. By that time a number of papers had been received for presentation and panel discussion at the conference. Professor Hans-Erik Nissen introduced the ministrand by elaborating two interpretations of a double helix metaphor based on the double helix of DNA. At the conference, productive sharing of ideas and discussion of phenomenology and hermeneutics took place. These discussions were both enjoyable and useful for the following process of revising the papers. The theme of this monograph of Informing Science is a dialectic we perceive to exist between meaningful use and reflection upon use (using the double helix metaphor). The perspective taken focuses on mutual learning where the key is the "mutual" part - i.e., that workers and in2

Nissen, Bednar, & Welch

formation technology analysts must jointly explore, describe, and understand the nature of the work to be supported. This need for mutual learning entails people in both theory and practice. When we began to think about this theme, it was in part because we felt somewhat isolated in our research perspective and wanted to touch base with other, contemporary, like-minded researchers. We were very pleased therefore, when our call for papers went out, that a number of very different and high quality contributions began to arrive. These contributions came from places as far apart as Bath in the UK, Lund in Sweden, Monash in Australia, Ohio in the USA. They covered widely differing applications of the theme, from organizational problemsolving to multidimensional mapping of conceptual evolution; from field experiences to categorization of knowledge captured in the existing literature. We are privileged that the quality of these papers was matched by very high quality in the reviews provided by academics from around the world, ranging from Japan to Denmark. Our aim is to acquaint readers with some fundamental ideas from phenomenology and hermeneutics and then to offer them some reports illustrating how such ideas have been adapted to improve practice. The aim is to let readers share the ways of reflecting and acting of the authors. These few examples are indicative of some ways in which theories and practice of Informing Science potentially could benefit from insights in how to apply phenomenological and hermeneutic ideas. However, as Whitaker (in this monograph) warns these ideas are not easily applied in practice, as they have to be adapted creatively to particular situations. In trying to do this, systems analysts and developers need to listen to, observe and learn from the clientele they intend to support. Since its inception, the relevance of this monograph has been confirmed for us by the appearance of a number of other events and proposals which give some attention to the interests of users, for example, special issues of journals commemorating the works of the late Claudio Ciborra (Avgerou, Hanseth, & Willcocks, 2006) and the late Enid Mumford (Hirschheim & Porra, 2007). Later works by Ciborra were clearly linked to Heidegger’s perspective of hermeneutic phenomenology (for a discussion of this, please see Depaoli, 2006). More recently, a special issue of the Information Systems Journal has been proposed, entitled ‘User – the Great Unknown of Systems Development: Reasons, forms, challenges, experiences and intellectual contributions of

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user involvement’ (Ivari, Hannakaisa, & Pekkola, 2006). Here again, we hear echoes of our concern with a double helix theme. Not only is this phenomenon visible within areas of Natural and Social Sciences but also within Art and Design we can recognize similar concerns. Nicola Hay, for example, in her work on image as a therapeutic catalyst, gives attention to experience and reflection upon experience (Hay, 2001; 2007). The theme of the 2007 European Conference on Information Systems has been ‘Rigour and Relevance’ (Winter, 2006). We interpret this, again, as a focus on ‘thinking and thinking about thinking’. In the United Kingdom, a series of Leverhulme lectures took place at Salford University, delivered by Heinz K. Klein (2006), on the theme of philosophy as practice. To summarize, the aim of this monograph is to acquaint the readers with some fundamental ideas from phenomenology and hermeneutics. Moreover, it offers its readers some reports illustrating how such ideas have been adapted to improve practice. The authors let the readers share the ways of reflecting and acting. A few examples can only indicate how theories and practice of Informing Science potentially could benefit from insights in how to apply phenomenological and hermeneutic ideas. These ideas are not easily applied in practice as they have to be adapted creatively to particular situations. The perspectives presented and illustrated equip workers, information technology analysts, and researchers with concepts to improve the never ending processes of mutual learning, which use and redesign of information systems entail. In setting up the agenda for this monograph we wished to encourage contributors to explore a metaphor of double helix. The question then arises: how does this inform our practice as analysts, designers, facilitators and researchers in Informing Systems? Exploring metaphors is not just an exercise by academics without practical consequences. Therefore it has been a pleasure to recognize that the contributors to this monograph have risen to the challenge and brought forward their own interpretations, not only of metaphor in the abstract, but of practical application. The indivisibility of theory and practice has been demonstrated like a red thread throughout the papers. We are pleased to introduce the seven papers and glossary which comprise this monograph: •

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‘Using Double Helix Relationships to Understand and Change Informing Systems’ by Hans-Erik Nissen.


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‘Applying Phenomenology and Hermeneutics in IS Design: A Report on Field Experiences’ by Randall Whitaker.

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‘Pedagogy and Process in “Organisational Problem-Solving”‘. by John P. Kawalek

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‘Co-evolution and Contradiction: A Diamond Model of Designer-User Interaction.’ by Anja-Karina Pahl and Linda B. Newnes.

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‘The Culture of Information Systems in Knowledge-Creating Contexts: The Role of User-Centred Design.’ by Natalie Pang and Don Schauder.

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‘On Categorizing the IS Research literature from a User Perspective’. by Bandula. Jayatilaka, Heinz. K. Klein and J. Lee.

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‘A double helix metaphor for use and usefulness in Informing Systems’ by Peter M. Bednar and Christine Welch.

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Glossary of terms used in the monograph on Double Helix. This has been prepared by all the authors in collaboration, under the guidance of Professor Emeritus Hans-Erik Nissen.

All papers are written to stand by themselves. The order in which they are read need not follow their order in the monograph. We hope that the brief presentation of each paper in the overview, together with their abstracts, give some guidance to help readers choose in which order to read them. The whole series of papers is supported by a separate glossary of terms, which forms part of this series.

Overview All researchers and practitioners of informing science study and intervene into ways in which people inform themselves and each other. Today, this comprises people-focused research and many artifacts subsumed under the label of information and communication technologies. The editors and authors of this monograph address some novel and innovative perspectives on use, redesign, and understanding of informing systems. Here, the authors test perspectives useful in understanding, and intervening in, dynamic everyday life situations. In order to handle dynamics of this kind, a perspective has to account for history. Artifacts used to facilitate people informing themselves and each other existed

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long before computers. New artifacts incorporate both redesign of earlier ones and, at best, some affordances of their own. However, for people who wish to, or have to, use them they demand a lot of unlearning and learning. Some time ago, in a book shop, the employees had put up the following poster: “Please excuse the mess! We reconstruct our heads. We have just exchanged our computer system for a much better one but it takes time to relearn, so please show us some patience.” To understand redesigned computer support demands time and effort from those “blessed” by it. Both practitioners and researchers know the difficulties involved in redesign, successful implementation and use of information systems. Researchers and consultants have developed many methods and tools to overcome these difficulties. There is a longstanding tradition to deal with these; one significant example is represented by the work of Enid Mumford (see for example Mumford, 1983; 2006). A reawakened interest in a more contemporary setting may be found in an issue of the Journal of the Association for Information Systems, dedicated to Enid Mumford’s work (Hirschheim & Porra, 2006). A recent issue of IEEE (September 2005) illustrates that designing and implementing software is still a risky business (e.g., Charette, 2005). Neither the authors of this monograph nor anybody else can offer a panacea to these complex difficulties. This is illustrated in the constant updating of the Soft Systems Methodology by Peter Checkland and his co-authors (e.g. Checkland & Poulter, 2006). Here, efforts to combine action with thinking about action are again highlighted, in a systemic context. When a remedy to handle these difficulties does not succeed, its adherents often suggest using more of the same. This monograph tries to support those who, instead, ask themselves: Why not try something different? The authors report attempts they have successfully tried or are testing to improve redesigning and using informing systems. They also discuss how they arrived at their approaches and their rationale for choosing them.

Perspectives Chosen by Different Authors In this section we intend to present the main perspectives chosen by the different authors of this volume. Further we will try to find some patterns connecting them. All contributions focus on practices and theories of evolving processes and on the growth of knowledge. This

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distinguishes them from papers reporting research looking for invariances on which to build technologies. Galtung (1977) discussed the importance for social sciences of distinguishing studies focused on invariance seeking from those focused on invariance breaking. All contributions also share the view that theory and practice stand in a dialectic relationship. What Radnitzky (1970) calls Continental or hermeneuticdialectic (HD) schools of metascience share this position. Whereas, according to Radnitzky (1970), Anglo-Saxon or logical-empirical (LE) schools strictly separate theory from practice. Moreover, HD schools of metascience acknowledge the importance of history, whereas LE schools tend to ignore history. In the following subsections, we will begin by presenting the authors' concerns and on which sources of fundamental ideas they draw. When we write about from where the authors draw their fundamental ideas we sometimes do not give citations here. However, the reader can find citations in the reference lists of the respective papers. In the subsequent section we will highlight patterns in the authors’ papers that appear to us to connect their fundamental ideas. Nissen Nissen calls his paper "Using Double Helix Relationships to Understand and Change Informing Systems". It focuses on concepts and a metaphor intended to improve mutual learning of workers, information technology analysts, and researchers. The paper first introduces a generalized concept of 'informing science'. It then presents some metascientific perspectives and a metaphor that has explanatory power. A double helix metaphor is presented to highlight some important distinctions. The paper also discusses how metascientific perspectives, and the transdiscipline of informing science, can be seen as related. Finally it argues that computerized models never catch up with ever changing situations. However, people always have to handle the full variety of situations, including those not foreseen during requirements engineering. To address this, the paper suggests balancing requirements engineering with model transparency engineering. Nissen has demonstrated in his paper an effort to combine phenomenology with hermeneutics in IS design.

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Whitaker Whitaker’s paper “Applying phenomenology and hermeneutics in IS design: A report on field experience” reports experience from 15 years of applying fundamental philosophical ideas in the design of computerized informing systems. He concerns himself with developing systems to support an improved work milieu which better accommodates and facilitates worker praxis. Because his ‘praxio-focal’ approach emphasizes how the worker engages and interprets data in the context of the work, his analyses and designs are framed with regard to the worker’s first person perspective. The relevance of phenomenology and hermeneutics comes from the insights these fields offer for addressing worker experience, cognitive processes, and data interpretations within this first person perspective. His main theoretical foundations draw on: second order cybernetics including the cybernetics of cybernetics of Heinz von Foerster (1981); the radical constructivism of Ernst von Glasersfeld (1995); and particularly the biology of cognition and enactive cognitive science of Maturana and Varela (Maturana & Varela, 1980; Varela, 1979; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). Whitaker has demonstrated the usefulness of his deep fundamental insights in praxis. This makes his contribution a significant one in that it illustrates both (a) the fact that such fundamental ideas can be practically applied and (b) the issues involved in applying them. The importance of practical involvement in learning to apply these kinds of ideas is discussed in Thomas-Meyers and Whitaker (2007). Kawalek Kawalek calls his paper “Pedagogy and process in ‘Organisational problem-solving’”. He concerns himself with supporting middle managers in a number of companies so that they can act successfully as change agents. In the case he reports the managers were organized into teams (‘learning sets’) to undertake ‘organizational problem solving’. In his pedagogy he introduced system constructs from Churchman (1971), particularly those relevant to Hegelian (dialectic) inquiring systems. These helped to structure aspects of the pedagogy. This intervention took participants from the frustrations of cognizing and interacting in an ongoing “here and now” towards reflecting, describing and theorizing on the meaning of experiences.

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The case reported also illustrates features in consulting/research/client relationships. In order to handle these complex relationships Kawalek and his colleagues conducted what he, according to Gibbons (2000), calls “mode 2 type of research.” This research acknowledges a close connection between theory and practice as hermeneutic-dialectic schools of meta-science do. A double helix metaphor reminds us of the close interconnection between theorizing and lived experience. Besides using systems constructs from Churchman (1971) Kawalek builds on ideas from a number of other sources. These comprise complexity theory, Beer’s Viable Systems Model, Checkland (1981), and Weick (2001) on sense-making. Pahl and Newnes Pahl and Newnes call their paper “Co-evolution and contradiction: A diamond model of designer-user interaction”. In the paper they address the problem of supporting engineers to become more creative in their design tasks. The artifacts designed in their case are not delimited to IT artifacts. Still, where innovation is required in the complex social context of engineering design, the designers, the users, and the researchers also inevitably form a coevolving, mutually emergent informing system. The paper addresses the issue of dialectics which inform designers, users, and researchers in order to improve creativity and innovation. They bring in new ways of talking and reflecting, and provide some structure to previously unstructured dialogs. This they achieve by introducing simple ‘world’ models from Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism as well as Beer’s Viable Systems Model (VSM) and his concept of Team Syntegrity. To establish a reference point for the designer’s conversation with users, they consider the issue of establishing a combined ‘purpose’. This evolves through the researcher’s role in establishing a center for the informing system. Some of Maturana and Varela’s arguments are considered in this light. Pang and Schauder Pang and Schauder call their paper “The culture of information systems in knowledge-creating contexts: The role of User-Centred design”. The authors focus on the usage of computerized informing systems. They seem concerned with “end users” both as individuals and as members of different groups and communities. Their concern focuses on having

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members of various groups to create, access, contribute to resources, including computer support, collaboratively. The authors observe in the late 20th century the advent of autonomous, decentralized computing with globally inter-operative Internet. This step they refer to as the “Personal Computing/Internet threshold.” They argue that this transition strengthens the existing trends to supplement the techno-centric information systems development with user-centered approaches. In their paper they present an adaptive usercentric development approach to meet this challenge. The study has been largely based on a research program fuelled by a PhD study. The study focuses on cultural institutions. The authors see cultural institutions as organizations that promote and support culture, education, and sciences. They do this in a variety of ways: public libraries through the provision of information resources, museums curate and present collections that are representative of communities, or public broadcasting agencies in the provision of rich media-type programs. For the purpose of the authors’ research, case studies from museums and libraries were considered. In the desire to study information systems in communities, case studies of cultural institutions in the context of their interactions with communities turned out well-suited to the goals of the study. The communities considered in cultural institutions are key stakeholder groups, such as community groups gathered around one or more interests, or the staff communities. In their paper the authors report one case fully, an example of a community group whose members share a rural and gender identity. It comprises research on introducing new computerized informing systems in cultural institutions from Australia and Singapore. The case presented comprehensively covered Australia, although there is a good amount of insights borrowed from other case studies in the two countries. As their theoretical basis the authors explicitly mention Giddens’ theory of structuration. This theory they mainly present in a version adapted to information systems research. They are also informed by Orlikowski (1992) and Orlikowski and Robey (1991). For part of their background ideas the authors refer to papers about earlier forms of user-centered design.

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Jayatilaka, Klein, and Lee Jayatilaka, Klein, and Lee call their paper “On categorizing the IS literature – A User oriented perspective.” In their introduction they present an analogy helping systems analysts to understand the burden of learning they impose on their clientele. This happens, for instance, when systems analysts are suddenly forced to switch to an entirely new development method with a new type of CASE (Computer-Aided Software Engineering) tool. The paper proposes a way to categorize the information systems research literature by relating the leading theme of each reference to the structurational effects of IT artifacts. The proposed scheme is illustrated by categorizing six IS papers, but in principle is also applicable to books or book chapters. The categorization should enable people to locate contributions from both sides of the paradigmatic divides in the IS literature. The substantive, cross-paradigmatic classification scheme focuses on the user side of IS development and IS use in organizational and societal contexts. Such a classification can help to identify under-researched areas. It also can be applied to categorize theories underlying information systems research. The authors briefly discuss critical social theories such as those of Habermas (1981/1984, 1981/1987) as an alternative for their categorization. In this paper, like Pang and Schauder, they decide to build their categories on Giddens' (1984) social theory of structuration. Bednar and Welch In this paper, the authors discuss a dialectic they perceive to subsist between use and reflection on use (or thinking, and thinking about thinking). This dialectic is considered in the following way. Each of the elements is subject to change. As reflection triggers change in use, and such change triggers further reflection, a spiral comes about. The authors provide an overview of relevant philosophical approaches. They suggest a need for phenomenological and hermeneutic perspectives on the complexities of informing systems, viewed as human activity systems (critical systemic thinking). They elaborate upon the double helix metaphor, by contrasting the concepts of ‘use’, ‘usability’ and ‘usefulness’ of informing systems.

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Having introduced this discussion, the authors go on to examine a taxonomy of learning and reflection, and Gregory Bateson’s concept of entrapment of mind (Bateson, 1972). An illustration of double bind is provided by reference to the work of Hay (2007) on image as a therapeutic catalyst. Methods of inquiry based in multiple levels of contextual inquiry are suggested as a means to empower individuals to reflect upon their experiences of use. The authors give an example of application in the form of a framework for contextual inquiry, the Strategic Systemic Thinking Framework (Bednar, 2000).

Connecting Patterns On some shared patterns and on terminology We have become aware of the following patterns, which seem to inform all these contributions. They have all concluded that effective change in human contexts demands more than only applying instrumental reason. However, none of them denies the usefulness of instrumental reason in some confined contexts. In both practicing and theorizing which kind of reason to apply becomes a question of an inclusive “or”. All authors seem to listen to the first person perspective of workers affected by computerized parts of informing systems. However, only Whitaker distinguishes this perspective explicitly from the third-person perspective of system analysts. Interestingly enough the authors have arrived at their positions following different analytical paths. On the way they have encountered rather different terminologies in the sources of their fundamental ideas. To go deeply into these terminological differences falls outside the scope of this paper. The reader is referred to the Glossary that forms part of this monograph. This contains explanations of some specialist expressions, term and abbreviations used by the authors. More patterns that connect As mentioned above, the authors of this monograph have walked different paths to arrive at their fundamental ideas. Two of the papers, that by Whitaker and that by Pahl and Newnes, refer to epistemological ideas stressing embodied minds. These they have fetched from Maturana and Varela. Pahl and Newnes, addressing how to improve the creativity of engineers, mainly draw on traditions of awareness and knowledge en12


hancement from Buddhism. They also connect their position on fundamental issues to epistemological ideas of Maturana and Varela. This should come as no a surprise to a reader of Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991). These researchers criticize the analytically inclined Western tradition of logical empiricist philosophers. This is particularly the case when it comes to how humans cognize. They draw parallels to what Buddhist traditions teach about mindfulness/awareness. Pahl and Newnes also build on ideas from Beer (1994) on Team Syntegrity, which aims at reaching a profound degree of shared meaning. Jayatilaka, Klein, and Lee as well as Pang and Schauder borrow fundamental ideas from Giddens (1984). Giddens at the beginning of a chapter called “Consciousness, Self and Social Encounters” writes: ... This will lead directly through an examination of some of the insights which can be drawn from Goffman about interaction between co-present agents. Concern with the body, as the locus of the acting self and as positioned in time-space, is the key linking theme of the material discussed and analysed” (p. 41). Giddens (1984, pp. 58-67) also acknowledges the importance of the body for human everyday life interactions. This provides a link to ideas on embodied cognizing and acting. Moreover, Giddens several times refers to the work of the late Wittgenstein (1963). Giddens social theory of structuration deserves more attention than it has received from information science/technology researchers, especially his discussion of non discursive practice. Jayatilaka, Klein, and Lee also use some ideas from critical social theory as presented by Habermas (1981/1984, 1981/1987). Kawalek uses Flood and Carson (1993) on complexity theory. He also refers to Beer’s Viable Systems Model (VSM) and to Checkland (1981). With respect to complexity, Flood and Carson (p. 11) distinguish between structured and poorly structured situations. To the latter group they count situations, which involve people as in organizations and societies. Their repertoire to handle complex, dynamic situations comprises Beer’s VSM and Checkland’s soft systems methodology. They also refer to ideas about living beings fetched from Maturana and Varela. Moreover, they point to the usefulness of highlighting aspects of complex situations by means of metaphors.

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What Does This Series Offer and What Does It Not Offer? The fundamental ideas which the editors and authors present and use have built on the works of others. In the last three decades some of them have started to appear in papers on informing systems research. However, few reports on cases where they have become applied and ensuing findings exist. This monograph reports findings from a number of practical cases, where the fundamental ideas discussed have been applied. These furnish illustrations of ideas otherwise currently only discussed on theoretical levels. This offers some novel ways of framing processes and events in informing science theory and practice. However, the series does not offer another new one size fits framework. The informing science community has seen enough of such frameworks, especially those that seem to promise analytical and empirical salvation/resolution What this monograph suggests are some new metaphors that may help researchers understand the complexities inherent in using and redesigning informing systems. These contribute to a continuing dialectic that will help us better make sense of the experience others and we construct in our lives. This comprises understanding cultures in other parts of the globe as well as cultures of our predecessors in both the recent and distant past. The series does not intend to discuss and pursue philosophical questions per se. Those interested in some fundamental philosophical questions, however, will find a number of references. Some theories not covered include Activity theory (Engeström, 1987; Leont’ev, 1981; Nardi, 1996) and, by and large, Actor Network theory (Callon, 1991, or Latour, 1992). None of the authors here have referenced the former. Actor Network Theory has briefly been alluded to in the paper of Jayatilaka, Klein, and Lee in this monograph.

Concluding Remark This series takes the position that contextually different situations will call for different ways to resolve them, all of them explicitly theoretically grounded. The authors offer us a contribution by illustrating philosophically well-grounded approaches that are still rather novel in relation to the IS field.

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Acknowledgements All papers have been double blind reviewed several times, by at least three external reviewers in addition to the editors. We would like to acknowledge the contributions of the individuals listed below in this respect. Particular thanks are due to Eli Cohen, whose enthusiastic approach and unflagging support and patience have been greatly appreciated by the editors. Finally, thanks are due to the participants of the two ministrand sessions on Double Helix Relationship of Use and Design at InSITE 2006. The monograph has profited from a number of viewpoints and references, which they contributed.

Reviewers: As editors of this monograph we would especially like to acknowledge the help and support of the following academics who have acted as reviewers for the papers submitted to this monograph: Paolo Depaoli, Department of Science and Technology, Università di Urbino, Italy;

Parissa Hagharian, Faculty of Liberal Arts, Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan;

Roger Eglin, Dept. of Creative Technologies, University of Portsmouth, UK;

Penny Hart, School of Computing, University of Portsmouth, UK;

Umberto Fiaccadori, Dept. of Informatics, Lund University, Sweden;

Andreas Hoecht, Dept. of Strategy and Business Systems, Portsmouth Business School, UK;

Christina Fitch, School of Computing, University of Portsmouth, UK;

Keith Horton, Dept. of Informatics, Napier University, UK;

Sarah Gilmore, Dept. of Human Resource and Marketing Management, Portsmouth Business School, UK; Gillian Green, School of Computing, Northumbria University, UK;

Vasilios Katos, School of Computing, University of Portsmouth, UK; Heinz K. Klein, School of Management, Binghampton University, New York, USA; Jeanette Lemmergaard, Dept. of Marketing and Management, University of Southern Denmark;

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Maria Madlberger, Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, Austria;

Martyn Roberts, Dept. of Strategy and Business Systems, Portsmouth Business School, UK;

Peter Millard, School of Computing, University of Portsmouth, UK;

Michael Wood, Dept. of Strategy and Business Systems, Portsmouth Business School, UK.

Martin Read, Dept. of Strategy and Business Systems, Portsmouth Business School, UK;

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Nissen, Bednar, & Welch Engeström, Y. (1987). Learning by expanding: An activity - Theoretical approach to developmental research. Retrieved November 24 from http://communication.ucsd.edu/MCA/Paper/Engestrom/expanding/to c.htm Flood, R. L., & Carson, E. R. (1993). Dealing with complexity: An introduction to the theory and application of systems science (2nd ed.). New York: Plenum Press. Galtung, J. (1977). Essays in methodology. Volume 1: Methodology and ideology. Copenhagen: Ejlers. Gibbons, M. (2000). Mode 2 society and the emergence of context sensitive science. Science and Public Policy, 27(3), 159-163. Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of communicative action: Reason and the rationalization of society (Vol 1). (T. McCarthy, Trans.) Boston, MA: Beacon Press. (Original work published 1981.) Habermas, J. (1987). The theory of communicative action: The critique of functionalist reason (Vol 2). (T. McCarthy, Trans.) Boston, MA: Beacon Press. (Original work published 1981.) Hay, N. (2001). Problems of individual emergence. Retrieved November, 2006, from http://www.envf.port.ac.uk/illustration/images/vlsh/pieindex.htm Hay, N. (2007). Image as a therapeutic catalyst. The Systemist, 29(1), 7-20. Hirschheim, R., & Porra, J. (Eds.). (2006). Enid Mumford’s contribution to information systems theory and theoretical thinking. Special Issue of the Journal of the Association for Information Systems. Ivari, J., Hannakaisa, I., & Pekkola, S. (Eds.). (2006). User – The great unknown of systems development: Reasons, forms, challenges, experiences and intellectual contributions of user involvement. Special issue of Information Systems Journal. Klein, H. K. (2006). The phenomenological and hermeneutic “Turns”: The significance of Husserl’s, Schutz’s and Gadamer’s ideas for information systems research. Third Leverhulme Lecture, University of Sal-ford, Informatics Research Institute, 15th November, 2006. Latour, B. (1992). Where are the missing masses? The sociology of a few mundane artifacts. In W. E. Bijker & J. Law (Eds.), Shaping technology/building society. Studies in sociotechnical change. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Leont'ev, A. (1981). Problems of the development of mind. [English translation]. Moscow: Progress Press. (Russian original 1947).

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Double Helix Relationships Maturana, H. R., & Varela, F. J. (1980). Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living. Dordrecht: D. Riedel. (First published in Chile 1972 under the title De Machinas y Seres Vivos.) Mumford, E. (1983). Designing human systems for new technology: The ETHICS method. Manchester: Manchester Business School. Mumford, E. (2006). The story of socio-technical design: Reflections on its successes, failures and potential. Information Systems Journal, 16, 317-342. Nardi, B. A. (Ed.) (1996) Context and consciousness: Activity theory and humancomputer interaction. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. Orlikowski, W. J. (1992). The duality of technology: Rethinking the concept of technology in organizations. Organization Science, 3(3), 398-472. Orlikowski, W. J., & Robey, D. (1991). Information technology and the structuring of organizations. Information Systems Research, 2(2), 143-169 Radnitzky, G. (1970). Contemporary schools of metascience (2nd revised ed.). Gothenburg, Sweden: Akademiforlaget. Thomas-Meyers, G., & Whitaker, R. (2007). Apprenticeship in work-centered design: A case study. HSIS 2007: Human Systems Integration Symposium, American Society of Naval Engineers, Annapolis MD, 19 - 21 March. Varela, F. (1979). Principles of biological autonomy. New York: Elsevier. Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. von Foerster, H. (1981). Observing systems, Seaside, CA: Intersystems Publications. von Glasersfeld, E. (1984). Radical constructivism. Washington: Falmer Press. Weick, K. (2001). Making sense of the organisation. Oxford: Blackwell. Winter, R. (2006). Call for Papers: 15th European Conference on Information Systems: Relevant Rigour – Rigorous Relevance, St. Gallen, Switzerland, 7-9 June 2007 Wittgenstein, L. (1963) Philosophical investigations. (G.E.M. Anscombe, Trans.) Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (First edition 1953.)

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Biographies Professor Emeritus Hans-Erik Nissen, since 1991 a senior research fellow at the department of Informatics at Lund University after years of demonstrated research excellence within the information systems field. He graduated in chemistry from the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm. He then for many years worked in various positions in the Swedish Pulp, Paper and Timber industry before reentering academia. The seven last years of these he started and headed the first computer center of the Swedish Cellulose Company (SCA). Peter M Bednar is an Engineer and Senior Lecturer with several years of experience from industry in systems analysis and development. Since 1997, his main occupation is academic. His research covers contextual analysis, organizational change and information systems development, and he has published several book chapters and many articles in these fields. He is currently a member of the IS group at the School of Computing at the University of Portsmouth, UK and is also affiliated to the Department of Informatics at Lund University, Sweden. Christine Welch is a Principal Lecturer in the Department of Strategy and Business Systems, part of the Business School at the University of Portsmouth, UK. Her research interests include critical systemic thinking, contextual analysis and organizational change, and she has published several book chapters and articles in these fields. She is convenor of the Southern Regional Centre of the UK Systems Society.

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Using Double Helix Relationships to Understand and Change Informing Syste ms Hans-Erik Nissen Department of Information and Computer Science University of Lund, Sweden [email protected]

Abstract The paper opens by generalizing the concept of 'informing science'. It then introduces some meta-scientific perspectives and a discussion of a metaphor that has considerable explanatory power. Two main schools of metascience are presented and contrasted. The difference between treating invariances in natural sciences and in social and cultural sciences is discussed. The double helix is introduced as a generic metaphor to highlight important distinctions. Highlighting new distinctions in this way can help to avoid simply assimilating them into already familiar distinctions. The paper also discusses how some metascientific perspectives and the transdisciplinary generalized concept of informing science can be seen as related. Finally, the paper argues that computerized models never keep up with continuously changing situations. However, people always have to handle the full variety of situations, including those not foreseen during requirements engineering. To address this, the paper suggests balancing requirements engineering with model transparency engineering Keywords: cognition versus recognition, double helix metaphor, hermeneutics-dialectics, information systems design, information systems Material published as part of this publication, either on-line or in print, is copyrighted by the Informing Science Institute. Permission to make digital or paper copy of part or all of these works for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that the copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage AND that copies 1) bear this notice in full and 2) give the full citation on the first page. It is permissible to abstract these works so long as credit is given. To copy in all other cases or to republish or to post on a server or to redistribute to lists requires specific permission and payment of a fee. Contact [email protected] to request redistribution permission.


Using Double Helix Relationships

use, informing science, language, languaging, logical-empiricism, metascience, model transparency engineering

Introduction In his 1999 paper Cohen introduces Informing Science as a transdiscipline bridging among "a number of disparate fields that share some common goals". He defines the fields, which form the discipline of Informing Science, in the following way: The fields that comprise the discipline of Informing Science provide their clientele with information in a form, format, and schedule that maximizes its effectiveness (Cohen, 1999). In this paper I shall demarcate the field I call informing science in a slightly different – more general –manner as follows: The fields that comprise the discipline of Informing Science provide their clientele with data and meta-data in a form, format, and schedule that the clientele find ever more valuable. First, I have substituted the word "data" instead of "information". My reason is to safeguard an autonomous right of interpretation to receivers of messages. Second, I have avoided the concept of 'maximization'. This concept lacks precise meaning outside the realm of specified formal (mathematical) models. Third, I have introduced the clientele to evaluate data with which they are furnished in their work or life situations. This reflects the fact that different groups of clientele apply different sets of value criteria. It also acknowledges that a particular group of clientele may change its set of value criteria over time. Fourth, I have accommodated dynamic variability by the phrase "ever more". As clientele values and situations develop over time, so will data and their forms, formats, and schedules. Finally, the reference to meta-data opens the way for including disciplines studying how human expressiveness evolves. My more general demarcation does not invalidate Cohen's original definition. It remains valid provided a set of restrictions are explicitly introduced. Generalizing the discipline of informing science implies a corresponding broadening of the concept of an 'informing system'. Both the original and the generalized characterization of informing science focus on clientele. The latter emphasizes the clientele as interpreters by substituting "data and meta-data" for "information". Today it

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might be argued it is not only people who can interpret. Artificial agents can do so, too. Be this as it may. I will delimit the concept of an 'informing system' in the following way. Its effective use has to include parts of closed cause-effect chains that are not confined to artifacts. In the general demarcation what constitutes effective use remains open for the clientele to decide. (In the subsection on "Generalized informing systems" this point will be discussed somewhat more.) Because it connotes subsumption of multiple ‘sciences’ (i.e., fields), the very idea of a transdiscipline requires an explanatory approach at the level of metascience. Against this background this paper aims to present some metascientific perspectives and a generic metaphor. The metaphor is intended to acknowledge and emphasize a distinction important for practitioners and researchers. This is the distinction between living and acting in a concrete here-and-now versus reflecting upon what has passed or may come. Reflecting is always done using a net of concepts mediated, mainly by language, in a society. The net of concepts used focuses and constrains explicit explanations given and predictions made. Such a net of concepts is generally taken for granted by the members of some subsociety. The distinction helps one to understand that a single such net of concepts cannot be adequate to explain or predict all human living and acting. Giddens (1984, p. 7) discusses a somewhat similar distinction between what he calls "discursive consciousness" and "practical consciousness". A focus on use entails a focus on people, their societies, and cultures and how they change them over time. In their attempts to make sense of their lives, societies, and cultures, people use languages to discuss whether to perpetuate or change their ways of living. To some extent such discussions entail debates about designing new artifacts to improve human life. These debates can be seen as occurring within two partially overlapping arenas. One can be called an arena of craftsmanship and engineering and the other a scientific arena. There currently exists a rather common belief that the scientific arena always leads and paves the way for engineering progress. More fruitfully (and accurately) these two arenas can be seen instead as mutually stimulating each other. Moreover, many products of scientists do not seem to have any impact on human practice. In particular, this seems the case when it comes to findings from fields within the social sciences. This can depend upon the tradition within which any particular study is undertaken.

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In the next section I will discuss the metascience of different scientific schools and some fundamental differences in social science research. I will end with a subsection relating metascientific ideas to studying and meeting demands for changes in informing systems. In the following main section I will discuss a number of views of using a double helix as a generic metaphor. Following that, the next section will go somewhat deeper into how informing science and metascience can be seen as related. The paper will finally present a few conclusions.

Scientific Traditions and Social Science Studies Two Schools of Metascience In the English speaking world the word "science" generally refers only to natural sciences. In this paper, following Radnitzky (1970), I will use words as "science and scientific" in a broader sense encompassing social and cultural sciences as well. Radnitzky (1970, Vol. I, p. 6) uses the term "metascience" somewhat differently from the expression "philosophy of science". He perceives metascience as a scientific discipline that accumulates knowledge about the scientific enterprise, checks this knowledge and organizes it into knowledge systems. (See also "metascience" in the Glossary accompanying this monograph.) In both its broad and in its narrow sense scientific knowledge is necessarily both specialized and fragmentary. People who want to take advantage of scientific knowledge in some practical situation need to synthesize findings from many disciplines. This they will be better equipped to do, if they are aware of the different scientific traditions of various researchers. Informing science researchers and practitioners want to work within a transdiscipline. For them an awareness of different schools of metascience can help them communicate across disciplinary boundaries. Radnitzky (1970) distinguishes between Anglo-Saxon or logical-empirical (LE) and Continental or hermeneutic-dialectic (HD) schools of metascience. . According to Radnitzky these should be perceived as "two highly-stylized ideal types that might be used to polarize the existing types of "philosophical enterprises" (Vol. I, p. 15.) Both these main traditions are comprised of a number of sub-schools. Within the fields of information and computer science the LE school has dominated.

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For at least two decades within information science a number of studies applying HD methods of research have appeared. This monograph addresses how ideas from philosophies behind HD traditions could support informing science research and practice. I shall accordingly focus on perspectives from HD traditions. However, this must not be interpreted to imply that methods from HD traditions should dominate over methods from LE traditions. As Radnitzkty (1970, Vol. II, pp. 6566) argues the two traditions should be seen as complementary. HD traditions, to be self-sufficient, would presuppose that man is fully transparent to himself. This is simply not the case. Taking LE as the only legitimate form of scientific study would reduce all human sciences to behavioral science. Such a reductive ideal of social science must, if consequently adhered to, accept a society divided into manipulators and manipulated. The following differences between Radnitzky's two main schools of metascience are important. LE schools presume: •

to state objectively true facts about an observer independent reality,

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that historical contexts are irrelevant to data collected, (mainly synchronic observations)

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that only values intrinsic to science shall guide research,

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that theory and practice can be strictly separated,

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that language used should be extensional and denotational,

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that they form the bases for technologies and emancipate man from nature.

HD schools presume: •

to state intersubjectively sharable relations between observers and a territory observed,

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that historical contexts are relevant to data collected, (diachronic observations important)

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that both science intrinsic and extrinsic values shall guide research,

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•

that theory and practice are mutually related,

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that language used should be mainly intentional and connotational,

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that they support understanding, mediation of traditions, and emancipation by improved self-understanding.

Researchers of these two meta-scientific schools perceive their work tasks differently. (Here I distinguish them in a similar way to what Radnitzky, 1970, Vol. I, p. 15-16, does with two types of philosophers.) The work of LE researchers must be respectable. They have to adhere to the methods of validating scientific findings according to their tradition. Moreover, as theory and practice are seen as strictly separate they cannot be held accountable for what their findings lead to. They must remain as clarifying on-lookers and sharpeners of (LE) scientific tools. (This reflects the principles of a LE position. Many researchers working within LE traditions are still concerned about where their findings may lead.) In contrast HD researchers are engaged in their work. It is essential for them, both socially and personally, to mediate between their theoretical findings and the practice of life. For them the practice of life constitutes the basic human problem. To increase what we, as humans, know and can build our future societies and lives upon, both these types of researchers are needed. However, they have different strengths with respect to describing and explaining different kinds of subject matter. Working according to LE research traditions is effective for studying inanimate subjects – e.g., in a field such as physics. Working according to HD research traditions shows its strengths when the subject matter includes people - i.e. subjects that involve living human beings forming groups and societies. A critique of the LE methods of verification is foreshadowed in Giambattista Vico's work from the beginning of the 18th century. He contested Descartes' method of verification (through logical deduction from axioms derived from observation) as universally applicable (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007, section 3.). He did not argue that the Cartesian method was irrelevant. His position was that other methods were needed for studies that extended to civil societies. These methods had to account for history and language including rhetoric and use of metaphor. According to Vico, knowledge in human sciences is

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verified not through logic but through creation. This is known as his principle of verum fa ctum.

Galtung's View on Social Science Studies Galtung's ideas about social science studies, stressing potential worlds, are reminiscent of Vico's views on creation and invention. Galtung (1977, p. 57) distinguishes three types of sentences in research: (a) data sentences, (b) theory sentences, and (c) value sentences (external to science). Galtung wrote at a time before it was common to acknowledge the importance of values external to science in information systems studies. Moreover, he thereby exposed the connection between methodology and ideology. He also introduced the important distinction, discussed below, between invariance seeking and invariance breaking. Traditional empirical science, according to Galtung (1977, p. 51-56), only compares data sentences and theory sentences. If they show dissonance, data sentences are perceived as stronger than theory sentences. A dissonant theory sentence (hypothesis) is discarded as false or revised for further testing against data sentences. What Galtung calls traditional science belongs to what above was presented as a science applying LE criteria of validation. For studying civic life and societies such an LE approach functions as a straitjacket preventing the researcher from reaching out to examine values. Data and theory sentences have descriptive power within what may be called two "dimensions" or two "worlds" of reference - i.e., what is empirically observed and what is theoretically foreseen. What is observed or foreseen is not necessarily preferred (p. 56), so issues of preference (criteria, norms, policy, etc.) cannot be addressed within these two dimensions. One way to break out of this straitjacket is to add value sentences. By introducing these, a third dimension, of preferred worlds, is added to the earlier two dimensions. By introducing values one establishes a basis for addressing what is preferred in addition to that which is observed and that which is theoretically foreseen. Moreover, a preferred world situation currently may not exist. To adherents of traditional empirical science possible worlds coincided with the empirically known reality. Applied to the fields of social science this leads to theories of a stable status quo or change following known laws of change. Galtung's trilateral form of science presumes a potential re-

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ality broader than known empirical reality. Moreover, theories have to be open-ended. Further, invariances in social science contexts have to be approached (and accounted for) differently than invariances found in natural sciences (p. 68-71). Galtung (1977) devotes a chapter to what he calls "Science as Invariance-seeking and Invariance-breaking Activity". A proposition is a statement relating a number of variables. It has to be based on a valid data sentence and a valid theory sentence. To become complete the conditions under which it holds have to be specified. If it holds under changes in other variables than those included in the relation, it is said to be invariant under those variables. The inclusion of a value dimension in science provides the basis for distinguishing two attitudes to invariances. The difference between these two attitudes and their scope of application is best illustrated by a quotation: ... For any invariance is here [in the context of social science studies] considered as an ideological statement, however much it is produced under the banner of value-free, "objective" science. ... A sentence, whether based on data sentences or theory sentences, or both, excludes something. A value sentence, whether based on a goal or an interest, includes something, that which is preferred. As long as what is preferred is also observed and/or foreseen by data or theory, there is no problem. However, the moment what is excluded by data and/or theory is preferred, there is a problem. To raise a confirmed theory sentence, the proposition, of that kind to the level of an invariance is tantamount to saying that something preferred is unattainable. This is vastly different from saying that it was never attained in the past. The latter is only a statement about empirical reality, that which is or was; the former a statement about potential reality, that which might be — saying that it coincides with what was. In other words, that potential reality coincides with empirical reality — that only what already is, is possible, now and in the future. This becomes more dramatic as soon as different groups in society hold different values, and "science" excludes what is valued by one, and not what is valued by another. In that case, "science" is obviously on the side of the one and not of the

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other, pronouncing as factual what one group wants and as non-factual ... what is valued by the other group. (Galtung, 1977, pp. 73-74. Emphases in original. Text in square brackets added by the author of this paper.) Galtung (1977, p. 73) perceives a prediction as a specification of an invariance, and an invariance as a generalization involving the future. Invariance seeking research attempts to find general laws on which technologies can be built. Finding invariances within the realm of natural sciences has stimulated considerable technical development. These kinds of research have mainly been performed by researchers adhering to LE schools of metascience. When research in social and cultural sciences finds apparent invariances Galtung considers them as ideological statements (p. 73). As he briefly states, there do not exist any laws in social science (p. 72). Apparent invariances found in social studies could stimulate further investigations in order to envision possible future worlds in which they are broken. Such studies focus on hidden ideologies and question them. Working dialectically within a school of HD metascience supports invariance breaking activities.

Studying and Meeting Demands for Changing Informing Systems New technical artifacts purported to improve informing systems appear on the market at a rapid rate. Their introduction and sales are often boosted by buzzwords. Choosing an appropriate mix of old and new artifacts to inform clientele constitutes a complex task. It has to be built on more solid concepts than current buzzwords. Also the net of concepts with which we, as researchers, describe the use and evolution of informing systems has to remain open to revision. However, we might avoid some cases of reinventing the wheel if we familiarize ourselves with the longstanding debates about fundamental concepts among philosophers of science. Some aspects of these debates have been indicated in the two preceding subsections. In many of the disciplines contributing to informing science, LE traditions have dominated and still do so. In the future the field will need researchers and methods of investigation from both the two main traditions. However, in order to present relatively novel ideas this paper has focused and will focus on HD traditions. These, as mentioned above, perceive theory and practice as mutually related. Phenomenology gen-

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erally focuses on everyday life experience. Hence, it has a lot to offer for understanding the use and demand for change of informing systems. Before becoming able to make effective use of a new artifact introduced in an informing system, people have to know how to do so. In this context I would like to focus on two senses of the verb "to know". These can be characterized simply as schoolbook knowledge and practical knowledge. The former corresponds to what manuals offer and brings the learner to the stage of a novice. The latter is acquired in a number of steps by practical use of an artifact. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986, pp. 16-51) describe a five step way to acquire professional expertise. HD schools and Galtung (1977) stress the importance of values external to science for research. Hence, in projecting an investigation or a program for research, the following question should be asked: Who are those who may potentially act differently based on the findings from this investigation or research? Radnitzky (1970, Vol. II, pp. 4-13) calls answers to this kind of question "research guiding interests". Researchers should employ methods of investigation consistent with their chosen research guiding interest. As long as they do this methods might come from both LE and HD schools. This resolves the often heated debates concerning (e.g.) whether researchers in HD-oriented social sciences could use quantitative methods developed within LE schools. Scientific knowledge, as mentioned before, is necessarily both specialized and fragmentary. Hence, those who attempt to apply it have to form their own syntheses to accommodate the particular situations at hand. Fruitful syntheses could be facilitated by a generic metaphor, which helps to highlight distinctions from newly encountered disciplines or areas of experience. Highlighting them avoids simply reinterpreting them as some already familiar distinction. In the next section I will present a double helix as such a metaphor.

A Double Helix as a Generic Metaphor Presenting Living in Time As human beings we want to make sense of our lives and the world we experience. However, we seldom become aware of how and how much our everyday manner of talking mediates a world view. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) discuss how our everyday language mediates a world view by metaphors. They report that they have found: "... metaphor is 30

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typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. ..." (p. 3). Hence, I will use metaphors when I try to relate how I use, redesign, and understand informing systems. Metaphors highlight some aspects of an event, a process, or a thing. At the same time they hide other aspects. When reflecting on dynamic processes time plays a central role. Some people perceive time to fly like an arrow, progressing linearly. Others perceive it as a circular flow, as when the seasons of the year and birth, life and death endlessly recur. A helix offers a synthesis of these two views. Figure 1 illustrates a helix as a metaphor for related processes perceived as recurring. The lower part of Figure 1 shows three related processes as a circle. To remind the reader of their processual character I have designated them by verbs. Checkland (1981, pp. 170-171) has given a similar advice to use verbs when referring to human activities.

Figure 1. A metaphor presenting related processes as recurring

In lived experience, a person can seldom separate these three processes. Churchman (1971, e.g., pp. 49-56) has discussed difficulties inherent in analyzing and designing systems presupposing separability of their parts. The three processes on which I focus follow research findings by Maturana and Varela (1980). For a number of years, Maturana tried to answer two, what he thought were entirely different, research questions: (a) "What is the organization of the living?" and (b) "What takes place in the phenomenon of perception?" After years of study he arrived at the conclusion that his two questions "...were, in fact, addressed to the same phenomenon: cognition and the opera31


tion of the living system ... were the same thing" (pp. xii-xvii and p. 13). For this reason I write "live – cognize" in Figure 1. People interact physically, with each other and with non-living entities. Much of human interaction takes the form of linguistic interaction. Moreover, "[d]ue to the circular nature of its organization a living system has a self-referring domain of interactions (it is a self-referring system) ..." (p. 10). Maturana and Varela (1980) discuss different kinds of interactions throughout their book (particularly on pages 21-40). Interacting enables us to introduce historical, social, and cultural perspectives. As will be discussed below, each of these three processes entails a number of sub-processes. People interact with one another both face-to-face and indirectly through different media. People interact not only with their contemporaries, but also interact with people in past and future generations. Finally, they also interact with animals and with all kinds of things and events. Some of these things belong to the set of what we call artifacts. All this remains valid in the upper part of Figure 1, where I metaphorically let the three processes evolve into a helix. The process I have called "cognize" is comprised of a number of processes – conscious, subconscious, and unconscious – often given other names. Similarly, the processes to live and interact also entail a number of more specific sub-processes. For example, interacting occurs both physically and linguistically, both in and out of face-to-face situations. Under the word "cognizing" I include such kinds of processes as perceiving, distinguishing, and imagining (cf. Lakoff, 1987, pp. 7-9). More particularly, it subsumes a process generally called "recognize". Often I recognize something as an instance of a category of things or events familiar to me. This presupposes that I have formed a category under which I subsume what I recognize. Those categories which I regard as taken-for-granted, I have formed during my life interacting with others. Many researchers believe that all things or events subsumed under a category share a number of properties and relations. Often, but far from always, this might apply. Lakoff (1987) has developed what he calls a prototype theory of categorizing, in which the traditional view on categories becomes a special case. Here, for example, members of a category share some properties and relations with its prototype. However, they do not necessarily share all of them. An act of cognizing might entail a kind of reframing of something at first recognized as fa-

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miliar. A shift takes place from one frame of reference to another similar to a shift between figure and background. This distinction reminds an observer of the fact that how he reports an observation depends upon the frame of reference he applies. In cognizing people sometimes become aware of a small domain. At another occasion they might cognize large, even cosmic, domains. Still another time they might cognize many domains of intermediate size. In the course of developing ways in which to present interwoven living, cognizing, and interacting I will, in the next section, distinguish them as two parallel helices.

Distinguishing to Live and to Reflect as Two Domains In Figure 2, I present the helix of Figure 1 separated into two helices. As mentioned above, Maturana (Maturana & Varela, 1980, pp. xii-xvii) has by his research found good reasons to approach cognition and the operation of living systems as the same phenomenon. Still, his earlier position and the position of many researchers in current cognitive science indicate some reason to separate these two phenomena, at least analytically. From the perspective of Maturana's theories one could consider the two helices in Figure 2 as performed by an observer operating in two distinct domains of reference. One is the domain of immediate experience and the other the domain of abstracted reflection. This explains why the seemingly dualistic presentation in Figure 2 does not violate the (figurative) unity of Maturana's account of both living systems and cognition mentioned earlier. Another reason for separating the helix of Figure 1 into the two helices of Figure 2 I have found in Schutz (1967). Compared to lived experience conscious reflection, as analyzed by Schutz, always occurs after the event: ... What we, in fact, experience in duration is not a being that is discrete and well-defined but a constant transition from nowthus to a new now-thus. The stream of consciousness by its very nature has not yet been caught up in the net of reflection. Reflection, being a function of the intellect, belongs essentially in the spatiotemporal world of everyday life. The structure of our experience will vary according to whether we surrender

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ourselves to the flow of duration or stop to reflect upon it, trying to classify it into spatiotemporal concepts. (p. 45) The reader should keep this in mind when studying Figure 2.

Figure 2. Metaphorically separating living from reflecting In this form of a double helix metaphor I have chosen to present to "Live, act, interact in the concrete here and now" as one helix. When separating the helix of Figure 1 into two helices cognizing belongs to the domains of both, albeit in different ways. Hence, I do not explicitly use the word "cognize" in Figure 2. The domains of helix 1a entail cognizing on subconscious or unconscious levels. As helix 1b I present "Reflect, distinguishing, etc. in the abstract". Cognizing consciously belongs to the domains referred to by helix 1b. My rationale for this

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particular distinction relates to long-standing issues, as explained in the following sections. Dom ains referred to by the two helices The two helices should help to distinguish two different, although related, sets of domains. "Live, act, interact in the concrete here and now" refers to domains of enacting everyday life as it evolves from situation to situation. This may entail working life situations, but is not limited to such situations. The praxis of everyday life generally entails irreversibly consuming resources. "Reflect, distinguish, etc. in the abstract" refers to domains of conscious, (potentially) creative activities. Short of enacting some of their results they do not irreversibly consume resources, except the time of people involved. Moreover, when people reflect, both collectively and individually, they catch and express their thoughts using some net of concepts. Mostly, the current net of concepts, in some cultures, helps to make sense of issues reflected upon. When it repeatedly fails to do so it might help to reflect on the net of concepts used. This leads to reflecting on a higher logical level, a meta-level. Reflecting also plays an important role in designing artifacts and in coordinating their production among lots of different kinds of professionals. For instance, the design and production of buildings, ships and cars furnish examples. Limitations on available resources make it important to choose which possible ways of life to enact. However, enacting a way of life always has to be done in the face of uncertain and incomplete knowledge. Moreover, different groups of people will have different value preferences. Of all the new ways of life produced by these creative activities only a few will be enacted. If the process to select which ones to enact retains some alternatives, the chances for meeting unforeseen contingencies will increase. So will the chances for supporting the preferred values of different groups of people. What works in praxis, in some historical time period and within a particular society/culture, can be found by observing the kind of domains referred to by helix 1a. However, it must not be taken as a fact that nothing else could work at some future time or in a different society/culture. This is the message above of Galtung. Nor should it be taken for granted that what works in one society/culture can be trans-

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ferred to another one and will work well there. A number of recent failures in technology transfer between different societies/cultures support this conjecture. Reflecting activities referred to by helix 1b need time and can be supported by stimulating milieus. However, they can evolve and be observed among all kinds of people. They can occur, for shorter and longer time intervals, interleaved among everyday life activities. Next I will discuss how some features of the two kinds of domains and their relationships are presented by the two helices of Figure 2. What the two helices present. Both in research and practice involving use and redesign of informing systems a number of models are used. In research and redesign these models are generally explicit and consciously sharable. In use they are generally implicit and sub- or unconscious. Models present maps of parts of informing systems or what else they purport to present. Explicit models show what their creators have chosen as important to focus on. They belong to domains referred to by helix 1b. These domains entail abstract, idealized, or theoretical images of what people may encounter in domains referred to by helix 1a. In other words I have separated reflecting on what has happened or possibly could happen from living concretely here and now. In the Western world people seldom remain aware of this distinction. Our reflections only make us partially aware of what has happened or might happen compared with the full complexity of moments lived here and now. Researchers and systems analysis practitioners use descriptions and models in order to communicate. As reflections of what has happened or might come about, these can only partially or imperfectly portray moments in life experience. This is valid both in the lives of individuals and the lives of groups, communities, and societies. In Figure 2 I have separated "Reflect, distinguish, etc. in the abstract" from "Live, act, interact in the concrete here and now". As fully awake human beings we always find ourselves situated in an ever moving "here and now". Our technical means of talking and observing over long distances do not change this. However, when we reflect, etc. we, in a sense, can freely move around in space and time. One can apply the metaphor of the two helices both to an individual and to aggregates. This I base on Bateson's (1980) concept of mind which I will present below. (See the section on "Some deeper background ...") The aggre36

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gates may be groups, organizations, societies, or cultures. An inquirer, by choice of a unit of investigation, decides whether individuals or some kind of aggregates are to be focused upon. For a proper understanding of a description or model the presenter should make its unit of investigation explicit. For there to be coherence in a process path from initial analysis through design to development, there must be consistent focus on the same unit of investigation. Moreover, understanding or discussing a description or model has to occur at the proper level of abstraction. Thus I argue, based on Bateson's advice, that one should not mix different logical types when trying to arrive at conclusions. When a person reflects, her genetic inheritance (phylogeny) and life experience (ontogeny) have formed the preknowledge with which she meets a situation. To discuss and check what she reflects, etc. with others she has to document it in some form. This she might do in a transient or in a permanent form. The need to check what we, as humans, perceive comes from the fact that it might turn out to be an illusion. What we document becomes accessible to others in their domains of personal experience, etc. What thus becomes accessible to others, and ourselves, then can become an object of reflection, etc. Hence, there exist chains of recurring relations between the domains referred to by the two helices distinguished in Figure 2. Next I will discuss how I perceive the two helices and their corresponding sets of domains as interconnected. Connecting the two helices and their domains. In the lower part of Figure 2 a sector joins the two helices. This illustrates one way a domain of helix 1b may relate to a domain of helix 1a. In a domain referred to by helix 1b a group of persons reflect on a past event. When the event occurred it was encountered by people living and acting in a domain referred to by the helix 1a. Some of those reflecting upon the event may have encountered it earlier. The event might have lasted a short or longer time interval as indicated by the time slice shown. Also reflecting, etc. will demand some time interval. The thin horizontal line indicates that this time interval may be of shorter duration than that of the event. This must not become misconstrued as meaning that reflecting can only result in something like mental snapshots. Instead I intend to highlight that when reflecting ex post people's memories of earlier events may have changed. The field of psychology of witnesses furnishes lots of illustrations of this phenomenon.

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In the upper part of Figure 2 another sector joins the two helices. It illustrates another way a domain of helix 1b can relate to a domain of helix 1a. This illustrates expecting, predicting, imagining, etc. a possible future event. An expectation might include a short or longer time intervals as indicated by the time slice shown. Also expecting will demand some time interval. The thin horizontal line indicates that this time interval generally turns out as short, compared to that of expected events. Moreover, Figure 2 illustrates the fact that time elapses before the time interval of a prediction or plan occurs. In the mean time unforeseen changes most probably will happen. The aging of requirement specifications for computerized parts of informing systems provides a well known example of this. In Figure 2 I use the term "idealizing". This refers to the fact that human models always present an idealization of what they purport to show. This is not to say I present the helix "Reflect, etc." as referring to an ideal domain. The helix "Live, act, etc." refers to a domain in which conflicts and unequal distribution of power exist. In fact, the metamodel proposed here will allow researchers and practitioners to consider the role power and conflict have in the social order. Changes reflected upon in the course of living and acting, e.g. in work tasks, will also demand learning by doing. This, however, has to be enacted by people in the domain "Live, act, etc." These ways of relating the two domains provide a chance to discuss the issue of recurrence mentioned above. Suppose the issue reflected upon is to acquire a package of computer programs purported to improve managerial control of enterprises. Moreover, suppose the reflection ends in a decision to buy and implement the package. The decision entails implementing this package concretely in some part of or the whole enterprise. People in the enterprise in their everyday work will have to learn how to use the package. In essence the process of learning will proceed by trial and error. During the implementation people will start to reflect upon to what extent using the package supports or constrains and complicates their work. These reflections may result in suggestions on how to adapt the package in order to support their work better. To what extent are such suggestions made public? This will depend on how open managers are to suggestions coming from people in lower echelons. Anyhow, suggestions based on lived experience might start off a new round of reflections on feasible and desirable adaptations to the program package. In another paper in this monograph, Kawalek

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reports such a case of problems entailed in transplanting an Enterprise Resource Planning program package from one enterprise culture to a different one. This ends my presentation of one way to apply the generic double helix metaphor. I used it to highlight the difference between (a) domains of explicit descriptions, models, plans, theories, etc. and (b) domains in which events evolve and for which the models purport to portray some important aspects. In other contexts a double helix metaphor could be used to highlight other different but linked processes. One case might be to highlight mutual learning between workers and designers in redesigning computer applications (Cf. Whitaker, 2007). Observers of some system or systemic entity can observe how its components interact. They can also observe how that entity, seen as a whole, interacts with other entities in its environment. Any relation between the two domains of interaction strictly belongs to the cognitive domain of the observer. As Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991, pp. 139-140, cf. above) have argued the nervous systems of living beings work as operationally closed. What happens in the environment of a living system can trigger its nervous system but does not unilaterally control it. The fundamental difference between the two ways of observation can be highlighted by a double helix metaphor. (It falls outside the scope of this paper to show and discuss how this could be done.) However, this paragraph gives a reason why I call the double helix metaphor a generic one. This ends my presentation of a double helix as a potentially useful metaphor. In what follows I will discuss more important differences between interrelated processes. However, I will not explicitly mark them as potential cases for highlighting by a double helix metaphor. In the next section I will go somewhat deeper into the background for distinguishing the two domains mentioned above. Some deeper background for distinguishing two domains The Cartesian method, contested by Vico as the only general method of investigation as mentioned above, presupposes a mind-body split. Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) offer a resolution of the mindbody problem. Briefly they present their resolution thus: In fact an important and pervasive shift is beginning to take place in cognitive science under the very influence of its own research. This shift requires that we move from the idea of the world as independent and extrinsic to the idea of a world as in39


separable from the structure of these processes of selfmodification. This change in stance does not express a mere philosophical preference; it reflects the necessity of understanding cognitive systems not on the basis of their input and output relationships but by their operational closure. A system that has operational closure is one in which the results of its processes are those processes themselves. The notion of operational closure is thus a way of specifying classes of processes that, in their very operation, turn back upon themselves to form autonomous networks. Such networks do not fall into the class of systems defined by external mechanisms of control (heteronomy) but rather into the class of systems defined by internal mechanisms of self-organization (autonomy). The key point is that such systems do not operate by representation. Instead of representing an independent world, they enact a world as a domain of distinctions that is inseparable from the structure embodied by the cognitive system. (pp. 139-140) By thus characterizing cognition as embodied action they attempt to resolve the mind-body problem and offer, on this basis, an additional system model. For the mind-body problem they offer a resolution by characterizing individual minds as being embodied (i.e., embedded in a given biological system) and interacting in an environment. As mentioned earlier, human beings interact both with contemporaries and with past and coming generations and their cultures. Moreover, they interact with many artifacts and natural objects. By acknowledging and addressing the concept of ‘embodiment’ as a basis for cognition, this orientation opens the way for accommodating (e.g.) emotions as important factors in human action. This emphasis on embodiment is also reflected in Lakoff and Johnson (1999), who give a philosophical presentation of the ideas about embodied minds, or rather embodied cognition (pp. 94-117). With regard to system models, Varela, Thompson and Rosch offer a third category augmenting the classic differentiation between open systems on the one hand and closed systems on the other. This is the category of operationally closed systems, which includes (e.g.) the nervous systems of humans and animals and also biological immune systems. Operationally closed systems may exchange material and physically interact with their environment but are not controlled by such exchanges and interactions. This is because the network of their defining proc-

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esses exhibits a mutually integrated closure (in the sense of closure of a directed graph network). Next I shall address some issues relating to supra-individual (i.e., collective or aggregate) contexts for addressing cognition. Some researchers use terms like mind, memory, and learning to designate collective phenomena, whereas others argue these terms only make sense on an individual level. Bateson (1980, pp. 101-143) offered one way to arrive at a synthesis of these two positions. More precisely, he characterizes minds in a way that can be applied to both individuals and aggregates of individuals. Bateson's way of characterizing minds is based in part on his key concept of 'd ifference'. In a section on "Science never proves anything" Bateson first offers a series of seven numbers repeated three times. He then asks the reader to guess the next number. It seems simplest to continue with the first number of the seven number series. He then points out that this guess assumes you can predict the next number based on a rule of simplicity. But as Bateson puts it: "Unfortunately (or perhaps fortunately), it is so that the next fact is never available..." (pp. 35-36). Somewhat later Bateson writes about the impossibility for science to "prove some generalization or even test a single descriptive statement and in that way arrive at final truth" (p. 36). There are other ways of arguing this impossibility. The argument of this book ― which again, surely, can only convince you insofar as what I say fits with what you know and which may be collapsed or totally changed in a few years ― presupposes that science is a way of perceiving and making what we may call 'sense' of our percepts. But perception operates only upon difference. All receipt of information is necessarily a receipt of news of difference, and all perception of difference is limited by threshold. Differences that are too slight or too slowly presented are not perceivable. They are not food for perception. It follows that what we, as scientists, can perceive is always limited by threshold. That is, what is subliminal will not be grist for our mill. Knowledge at any given moment will be a function of the thresholds of our available means of perception. The invention of the microscope or the telescope or of means of measuring time to the fraction of a nanosecond or weighing quantities of matter to millionths of a gram ― all such im-

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proved devices of perception will disclose what was utterly unpredictable from the levels of perception that we could achieve before that discovery. (p. 36-37) In my current way of expression I would have written "data by means of which we inform ourselves" instead of "information". This, however, does not change Bateson's fundamental argument. In any case, Bateson's construct of 'difference' is the foundation for his explanation of his concept of 'mind'. At the beginning of a chapter on "Criteria of Mental Processes" Bateson (1980) briefly lists six criteria for what he would call a mind: 1. A mind is an aggregate of interacting parts or components. 2. The interaction between parts of mind is triggered by difference, and difference is a nonsubstantial phenomenon not located in space or time; ... 3. Mental process requires collateral energy. 4. Mental process requires circular (or more complex) chains of determination. 5. In mental process, the effects of difference are to be regarded as transforms (i.e., coded versions) of events which preceded them. The rules of such transformation must be comparatively stable (i.e., more stable than the content) but are themselves subject to transformation. 6. The description and classification of these processes of transformation disclose a hierarchy of logical types immanent in the phenomena. I shall argue that the phenomena which we call thought, evolution, ecology, life, learning and the like occur only in systems that satisfy these criteria. (p. 101-102) As Bateson (1980) goes on to explain, some aggregates may have parts, which fulfill the criteria above. This could be illustrated by a group of people learning on the group level. The processes of learning at the group level and at the individual level belong to different logical types. Applying Lakoff's (1987) prototype theory of categorizing learning on the two levels will show different characteristics. Bateson (e.g. on pp. 204210) argues for keeping different logical types clearly separated in descriptions and analyses. Conclusions about phenomena on one level of abstraction based upon data within a different level lack validity. (His detailed arguments for this fall outside the scope of this paper.)

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I shall close with a few comments on Bateson's criteria above. First, he writes about differences as "a nonsubstantial phenomenon" not located in space or time. On the surface this might seem to contradict my assertion that I do not believe in unembodied objects. The noun "difference", in criterion 2 above, does not, however, designate such a thing. One clue lies in the expression that "interactions between parts of mind are triggered by a difference". Another clue appears in criterion 5. There Bateson states that the effects of difference should be regarded as transforms of events which preceded them. A bell which rings or an expected letter which does not arrive can trigger activities in a person. Bateson (1980, p. 37) points out that there exist thresholds for various differences. If a difference remains below such a threshold it will not become perceived. By referring to human perception Bateson indicates he does not split body from mind. Bateson mentions "coding" in criterion 5. Coding in his sense is a transform of the effect of a difference. When a person touches a hot surface he almost immediately retracts from it. The heat difference has triggered a train of coded transforms in his nervous system. These result in his retracting his hand from the hot surface. This gives an example of Bateson's sense of coding. Bateson mentions circular or more complex chains of determination in criterion 4. This corresponds to the operational closure of cognitive systems discussed by Varela et al. (1991). Bateson (1980, p. 141) writes that from his set of criteria it follows that minds have the potentiality of autonomy. This resonates with Varela’s (1979) use of the term "autonomy" in relation to operationally and organizationally closed systems – a topic beyond the scope of this discussion. In the next section I will discuss how some meta-scientific perspectives can support research in informing science.

Informing Science and Metascientific Perspectives Looking for Fundamental Issues People have informed themselves and each other for thousands of years. According to some researchers these complexities have increased through the advent of modern communication and data processing technologies. People communicate predominantly by talking and writ-

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ing. When using their mother tongue people seldom become aware of how many social, cultural, and situational clues are involved. Social and cultural features, perceived in a broad sense, can themselves be seen as situational ones. Particularly when people communicate using computers and computer networks of today most situational clues get stripped off as a result of these channels’ relatively impoverished capacities. The paper has pointed out some difficulties in redesigning and using informing systems. Many of these have their roots in human ways of talking and reasoning. Philosophers, linguists, and other researchers have discussed these for many years. The scope and size of this paper forces me to delimit myself to only a few fundamental issues. Forms of rationality: An illustrative exam ple from pedagogy In a world of conflicting interests it seems difficult to agree upon indicators of effectiveness. A comprehensive discussion of this issue falls outside the scope of this paper. However, I will illustrate the most salient points by reference to a relevant discussion comparing rationalities. In the late 1970s, Dunne (1993, p. 1), and his colleagues were "formally introduced to a new model of teaching that promised ... spectacular improvements in the quality of our students' teaching if only they (and we as their mentors) would use it as a blueprint in planning and conducting lessons". The model was called the objectives model and opened the road to efficiency in teaching. Dunne, and good fellow teachers he knew, felt that the objectives model ran up against their experience in classrooms. This triggered him to examine closely representative texts on the objectives model. This examination brought him to study a larger philosophical context and to write his book. Later in his introduction Dunne summarizes his critical views of the objectives model in pedagogy: ... Nor is there any sense that ... something might be at work in the pedagogic situation which cannot simply be made the object of analysis but rather must be lived through ― a kind of subsoil which nourishes the fruits of explicit purposes but which is not itself a fruit. It is as if action can be resolved into analysis ― that the problems of the first-person agent can be solved from the perspective of the third-person analyst. As a form

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of action, then, teaching is no longer seen as embedded in particular contexts or within cultural, linguistic, religious, or political traditions which may be at work in all kinds of tacit and nuanced ways in teachers and pupils as persons. (p. 5) (Emphases added here.) Dunne's illustrative background uses an example from teaching, one form of informing people. However, this quotation to me seems, mutatis mutandis, applicable to other similar relations. For instance, there are parallels here to the relations that exist between system analysts and workers. The analysts remain third-person observers. The workers, as first-person agents, have to make sense, in particular situations, of data from data processing systems. To acknowledge this fundamental difference might improve mutual understanding and communication between the two parties. Advocates of participatory design (PD), as for instance, Ehn (1988) based the notion of PD on this very point. Dunne (1993, p. 5-6) describes the logic behind the objectives model as an instrumentalist one. Its adherents saw means in themselves as value neutral and hence substitutable in principle by any other means. All questions of value became located at the level of (or translated into) ends. Value discussions, however, became attenuated by demanding ends which had become cast into discrete, observable behavior. To evaluate atomistic objectives requires study of their effects aggregated over time. The adherents of the objective model did not include this kind of evaluation on a higher level in the techniques they recommended. Dunne admits that instrumental reason constitutes a logic. But he does not accept it as a universal standard that should determine all rational action: ... the problem confronting me was to show that this standard [of instrumental reason] constituted a logic or a form of rationality ― one which has its own biases, limitations, and (when these limitations were not acknowledged) distortions ― and that it did not, therefore, define exclusively what is meant by 'logical' or coincide with rationality as such. (pp. 7-8) (Emphases in original. Text in square brackets added here.) Dunne confronts his problem by a number of conversations with the philosophers Aristotle, Newman, Collingwood, Hanna Arendt, Gadamer, and Habermas. The supplementary form of rationality he offers I roughly characterize as a historically, linguistically, and cultur-

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ally based rationality exhibited by people in their everyday action. Dunne states that his critical analysis of forms of rationality applies not only to pedagogy but to other fields too. He mentions political activity, organizational and management practices, psychotherapy, and community development (p. 8). All these fields involve people informing themselves and others. The rationality of instrumental reason corresponds to the view on rationality within LE traditions. (The supplementary form of rationality offered by Dunne corresponds to the view on rationality within HD traditions.) Language use and calculi Both in creating and in using informing systems we, as human beings, predominantly use language. There are significant difficulties in analyzing and changing habits of language use. From childhood we have become socialized to communicate by talking and writing. Can there possibly exist any difficulties in this? A metaphor might help to highlight the problems of analyzing, understanding, and changing habits of linguistic communication. As Figure 3 indicates we live and interact in language like fish live and interact in water. Similarly as fish live in water we live in languaging. (The Glossary at the end of this monograph gives an explanation of this term borrowed from Maturana, 1988.)

Figure 3. Man in Languaging like fish in water? In his conversation with Gadamer, Dunne (1993) writes about language and language use in practical situations. Computerized parts of inform-

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ing systems not only transmit linguistic and other symbolic expressions over space and time; they also transform some expressions into new ones. For example, they can be programmed to follow ordinary or matrix algebra. They can also be programmed to draw logical conclusions, generally according to first order predicate logic. This, too, is a form of calculus. However, to perform calculation as computers do, entirely based on syntactic form, puts severe restrictions on the language used. The philosopher Wittgenstein reflected deeply over different language forms. In Wittgenstein (1974, originally published 1921) the author devised a language suitable for deductions by logical calculation. This becomes clear when Wittgenstein (1974) in his statement 3.33 writes: In logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never play a rôle. It must be possible to establish logical syntax without mentioning the meaning of a sign: only the description of expressions may be presupposed. Here the description of an expression refers to the description of its form. By "logical syntax" Wittgenstein refers to rules of transformation of a calculus. In his later writings, for instance, in Wittgenstein (1958, 1963), he stresses that language as used in everyday life does not resemble such a calculus: ... For remember that we in general don't use language according to strict rules ― it hasn't been taught us by means of strict rules, either. We, in our discussions on the other hand, constantly compare language with a calculus proceeding according to strict rules. This is a very one-sided way of looking at language. In practice we very rarely use language as such a calculus. For not only do we not think of the rules of usage ― of definitions, etc. ― while using language, but when we are asked to give such rules, in most cases we aren't able to do so. We are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we use; not because we don't know their real definition, but because there is no real 'definition' to them. To suppose there must be would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they play a game according to strict rules. (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 25)

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This quotation illuminates, mutatis mutandis, why workers encounter difficulties explaining everything they need to know in order to perform a task. This depends on the specific circumstances in particular work situations. Still, system analysts generally ask workers to describe their work precisely as part of requirements engineering. As a metaphor for language use in practical life Wittgenstein (1963) introduces what he calls "language games". By means of these he puts language use into the stream of everyday life situations. Here I will take advantage of the way in which Blair (2006) explains Wittgenstein's metaphor of language games: The language-game is one of the most important components of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. Wittgenstein resists, as we might expect, giving a rigorous definition of it, but that does not mean that it is not a rigorous notion. As usual, we must see its rigor in the examples Wittgenstein gives us. The problem that Wittgenstein faced was how to reconcile the need in language for a predictable structure that determines how words in language go together, with the simultaneous need for flexibility in usage. Further, the structure must be dynamic: it must be able to account for regularities in language that extend over time (such as holding a discussion). Structure in language is necessary so that we can speak in predictable ways and be understood, but flexibility is necessary, too, in order to permit new or creative uses of language ― something important when we face new or different situations, or have to describe something we don't understand well. These situations do not have to be entirely new, but merely new to the speaker. The notion of a language-game provides both the predictable structure in language as well the flexibility that allows us to talk about new or unusual situations. Consider the game of baseball, for example: there are rules, that can be codified and written down, but within these rules there is enormous latitude for innovative play... (p. 80) Blair (2006) then goes on to make a list of the important aspects for language games. He adds that this list is not meant to be regarded as exhaustive or final. Nor is it necessary that all games exhibit all these aspects. A brief presentation of the list follows:

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1. A predictable structure: Usually codified as a set of rules and may be written down in some sports, like baseball or football, or may be proposed informally by casual players of a game, such as two children playing catch. ... 2. A point or a goal: This provides a focus for the intentions of the "players", although not all games, as Wittgenstein rightly points out, have a goal ... 3. Flexibility of performance: There is a wide latitude in terms of what kind of performance is permitted within the boundaries of the game's structure. ... 4. The need for training and practice: In order to "play" the game, one needs to be taught how to play. Some of this teaching may take the form of explanation, but most of it takes the form of being coached ― trying to play the game and have a coach offer suggestions. ... 5. Performance is not necessarily accompanied by conscious mental processes: Many highly skilled athletes claim that they have little conscious thought during their performance. ... 6. The ability to formulate families of games ― to derive new games out of old ones: Many games grow out of existing games and derive their rules and intent from previous games. One needs only to think of American baseball and its antecedent game of English cricket. ... 7. Games can rely on other games for their codification. ... 8. Games are imbedded in, and influenced by the larger context of human activities. This provides a way of instilling extraordinary complexity into a game without having to codify all of the complexity ... 9. Games help individuals build and refine their social and interpersonal skills, such as, the ability to follow rules reliably, the ability to make and interpret rules, the ability to coordinate one's actions with others, etc. 10. Games take place over time, ... (pp. 80-84) I have included this lengthy excerpt from Blair (2006) for two purposes. It sheds light upon Wittgenstein's concept of 'l anguage games'. It also suggests a potentially useful similar concept of 'work-task-games'.

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Workers have difficulties in describing their work tasks precisely to designers of computer support. Moreover, they need to learn and acquire skills in the modified work-task-game to play, once some new computer support has become implemented. It falls outside the scope of this paper to develop this suggestion further. Nevertheless Wittgenstein offers developers some alternative ways to investigate work tasks. Inform ing systems Generalized informing systems. In the introduction I generalized the concepts of 'informing science' and 'informing systems'. In the mean time I have introduced Bateson's generalized concept of mind. As one of his criteria for minds he mentions circular (or more complex) chains of determination. These I call "closed cause-effect chains". Bateson also argued that to understand processes of learning it would help to look for such chains. To learn means to know more, individually or collectively. To inform oneself or others implies an intention to make people more knowledgeable. By her autonomy of interpretation an orientee has to safeguard herself against not well supported messages and misinformation. Informing will be better understood if studied as comprising circular and more complex closed chains of determination. I put this forward as a conjecture of my own. On this conjecture I based my way to delimit informing systems to include parts of closed cause-effect chains that are not confined to artifacts. In some subsystems of informing systems, however, closed cause-effect chains are confined to artifacts, for instance, systems dedicated to support automatic control of machinery. Systems controlling ignition in cars, or industrial robots, or executing programs of washing machines offer examples of the latter kind of systems. (They might be called "automatic control systems" rather than "information systems".) Many more such systems, embedded to control functions of machinery, will be designed over the years to come. For such systems to work reliably the interpretation of data has to follow formal rules based on two-valued logic. The processes in what I have delimited as informing systems operate at a logical level of a different type. Suffice it to indicate that these processes must accommodate Hegelian dialectics. In other words such processes must be able to handle a thesis, its antithesis, and the resolution of their apparent contradiction by an innovative synthesis on a broader level of abstraction.

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In what follows I write about informing systems in the sense explicated. Systems supporting automatic control of machinery should rather be called "automatic control" or "data processing" systems. In the next section I will briefly sketch the history of the term "information system" used so far. Informing systems including computers as parts will form the main subject area for informing science. However, according to my view, informing systems do not need to entail computers. Otherwise, all comparisons with how people informed themselves and each other before the event of digital computers would be excluded. Describing informing systems. Next I will focus on two recurrent sequences of processes which constitute creating and using informing systems. As an area for academic studies information systems appeared with the advent of computers in the middle of the 20th century. How to define the term "information system" still seems open to debate. Historically, when computers were offered to support business tasks, vendors offered them as performing "electronic data processing". After a number of years vendors offered computers as capable of performing "information processing". Lately computers have been offered as performing "knowledge processing". During the last 60 years the amount of data a computer can handle and the speed in handling them has increased dramatically. This has certainly brought a great number of new applications into the realm of (digital) data processing. Has the success of von Neumann computers warranted perceiving them as equivalent to all kinds of human information or knowledge processing? (The majority of computers in use today are built according to a von Neumann architecture. For a brief explanation of a von Neumann computer, see the Glossary at the end of this monograph.) My answer to this question is: No! The reasons for this answer can be briefly summarized. To perform processing a computer needs a program. A computer program directs a computer to operate strictly according to the form of its input data or of some data in its data base. It may also operate according to the form of data internally stored earlier during operation of a program. Finally, as a result of its operation it presents some output data. Here I limit my discussion to cases in which people have to interpret these data, i.e. in agreement with my delimitation above of informing systems. Based on the outcomes or outputs system users decide which action to take, if any. System analysts and programmers have in designing a program assigned standard interpretations to different patterns of data. By these schematic interpretations

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they construct a schematic form of a 'language'. Such a concept of 'l anguage' enables users of an application program to furnish input data and to make sense of output data. This, however, is valid only in relation to some limited domain of application. To keep track of the events in an inventory of spare parts for a number of car models illustrates one such domain of application. To keep inventory records for many thousands of articles manually constitutes a task that demands work by many people. No doubt a computer program can support this kind of task. However, the expressiveness of schematized 'languages', which a computer can process according to their form, is very limited compared to that of natural languages. The reason is that contexts given in standard interpretations of programs are very limited. The ways in which situational contexts offer cues to interpretation in human communication are more complex and dynamic. A deeper analysis of the limits of schematic languages, basic to computer programs, can be found in Whitaker (1992, pp. 42-50). The schematisms used, moreover, exclusively build on set-theoretically based categories. These exclude all types of Lakoff's (1987) prototype categories. This, hopefully, indicates that output from computer processing may better be looked upon as data in need of human interpretation before being acted upon. Such a view helps in assessing information system performance with a critical attitude in light of the live situation of application. Lately the field of information systems has broadened to subsume also journalism and education. Hence it seems appropriate to talk about informing systems rather than information systems. This amplifies the need to distinguish informing systems in the sense explicated above. Such a shift in terminology offers four advantages. First, it characterizes the informing system as something people create to inform themselves and others. Second, people have done so for thousands of years. This opens a way for historical comparisons and a consideration of the role that social and cultural context plays here. Third, it also allows for people interpreting data they gather or receive before reorienting themselves. However, the orientee's reorientation might differ from the one the orienter intended to achieve. Fourth, changing informing systems today will generally entail taking advantage of new affordances offered by communication and computer technologies. The term "information system", coined in parallel with computers, plays down the role of peo52

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ple involved in their use. IS experts, as designers, and company experts consulted during requirements specification become the people who count, relative to those people who will actually use the resultant computer support. The term "informing systems" opens up a possibility for studying people who use them at least as much as those involved in their design. Moreover, in their work and life situations people should be studied as professionals in their own work and life. This brings me to how people become involved in the recurrent processes of use and redesign of informing systems. Recurrent processes of informing systems use and redesign. In Figure 4 I present, in a simplified way, some recurrent processes in informing systems use and redesign. In it I distinguish two different flows of human communication. The outer flows I have called "Face-to-face and other communication not manipulated by computers". The inner flows I have called: "Computer manipulated communication". The words "outer" and "inner" I use only to refer to them in Figure 4. An important difference exists between these two flows of communication. The expressiveness of what can be mediated by the outer flows is an order of magnitude larger than what can be mediated by the inner flows. This is particularly true when it comes to flows that are manipulated by computers to reach conclusions by applying two-valued logic. In the outer flows the often perceived gap between intellectual thoughts and emotions can be bridged. Artists and poets are those people who often best bridge this gap (See Bateson, 1972, pp. 448-465). Figure 4 intends to underline the fundamental non-separability of formal, in the sense of based on explicit rules, and non-formal communication, guided by evolving Wittgensteinian language games. Both in specifying rules for formal communication and in learning how to interpret and act upon messages from formal systems non-formal communication will always be needed. Hence, studies of informing systems cannot entirely ignore non-formal communication. This highlights one reason to approach the field of informing science as a transdisciplinary one. Human communication I interpret in a very broad sense. Following Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson (1967) I take it that people communicate by all kinds of behavior. In a section on "The Impossibility of Not Communicating" they write:

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Figure 4. Recurrent processes of informing systems use and design First of all, there is a property of behavior that could hardly be more basic and is, therefore, often overlooked: behavior has no opposite. In other words, there is no such thing as nonbehavior or, to put it even more simply: one cannot not behave. Now, if it is accepted that all behavior in an interactional situation has message value, i.e., is communication, it follows that no matter how one may try, one cannot not communicate. Activity or inactivity, words or silence all have message value: they influence others, and these others, in turn, cannot not respond

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to these communications and are thus themselves communicating. ... (pp. 48-49) Moreover, according to Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson (1967) there exists both a content and a relationship level of communication: ... in the foregoing it was suggested that any communication implies a commitment and thereby defines the relationship. This is another way of saying that a communication not only conveys information, but that at the same time it imposes behavior. Following Bateson ... these two operations have come to be known as the "report" and the "command" aspects, respectively, of any communication. ... The report aspect of a message conveys information and is, therefore, synonymous in human communication with the content of the message. It may be about anything that is communicable regardless of whether the particular information is true or false, valid, invalid or undecidable. The command aspect on the other hand, refers to what sort of a message it is to be taken as, and, therefore, ultimately to the relationship between the communicants. ... (pp. 51-52) As indicated at the top of Figure 4 there exist many situations in which people interact. This goes for work situations as well as for situations in everyday life. In all of these, people inform themselves or become informed by others by data from a number of informing systems. Data from different sources sometimes suggest choosing (and enacting) different ways of action. In such cases experience of the extent to which a data source has proved reliable earlier comes into play. Some data come from the execution of idealized, formal models on computers. A new source of such data first has to earn trust by showing its reliability. Formal models executed on computers have become more complex. This generally makes it difficult to understand such models and to evaluate the data they furnish. So far requirements engineering has loomed large in research and education with its focus on computerized parts of informing systems. However, idealized, formal models never could or should cover all situations workers meet. Hence, the workers and their managers need to understand the limits of applicability of the computerized models. This goes far beyond the introduction, training, and on line help now given when introducing a new computer application. 55


Computer models only offer sensible advice for a part of the class of situations they have been designed to cover. Moreover, the scope of their successful application diminishes with time. The answer to this generally is that new, more advanced models will be developed. However, first-person actors still have to handle all situations occurring in the mean time. Given a fair amount of autonomy and license to use it, they can effectively handle situations outside the scope of the current computer model. This, however, also presumes that they recognize, within their frame of reference, the strengths and limitations of the model. Recall the discussion above about the limitations of the schematized 'languages' intended to explain models embedded in computer programs. Recall also the rather common, but mistaken, belief that computers handle information and knowledge the way people do. A computer program cannot go outside of the restrictions and values embedded in it. Generally computerized models evaluate situations only along one value scale. Often this is a money scale according to prices estimated as valid in some limited time period. People, however, seem capable of shifting between different mental models depending upon how a situation develops. Admittedly, some mental models might be outdated and some simply wrong. The fact that people make mistakes is often taken as a strong reason to let a computer choose the right decision. Such a conclusion misses an important point. It is not possible to predict the right decision for all possible situations including how to evaluate them and the outcome of a decision. Moreover, the more types of situations a program has to handle the more complex it becomes. A majority of cases a computer may decide automatically based on a set of rules and values specified in advance. These, the workers responsible for handling the cases can devote a small amount of their time and effort to monitor. A minority of cases, selected according to criteria given by the workers, could be brought to the workers' attention and handled by them. These criteria of selection the workers should be enabled to adjust. In a sense these cases could be called exceptional cases. How to handle them is part of the policy of the enterprise. Hence both the workers and their managers can be involved in handling them. Moreover, they are particularly sensitive to the situation in which they occur. Interactive programs have been technically feasible for quite some time. Program designers might now relax the traditional idea of trying to ap-

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proach 100 % automation of cases turning up during requirements engineering. Instead they could focus on a flexible interaction between simple, understandable programs and the workers using them to handle their tasks. The model or set of models a program implements and its variety remains until the program is redesigned. The variety of concrete situations to be handled according to what the computer model suggests increases with time. The additional variety in actions to handle them adequately has to be generated by human actors. They may learn this the hard way by trial and error. If these actors understood the models embedded in programs and their limitations they would be able to decide more confidently when and how to use their full action repertoire. At least that is a conjecture of mine. To achieve this, the models embedded in the programs should be made visible (with respect to presence and coverage) and transparent (with respect to structure and implications). To this end it has to be made clear which action alternatives a model generates and how it evaluates them. Moreover, it has to be stressed that an embedded model cannot generate other types of action alternatives or evaluate them in other ways. In order to bring this home it will help to look upon what computers do as data processing. As mentioned earlier, data processing differs from information or knowledge processing, whatever these terms might refer to. Computer program embedded models have to be made transparent by explaining them in the language of their users. Such explanations offer what I will call model transparency. At least for some computer programs producing and making such explanations assessable should be part of program design. Many programs in which data output guides human action belong to this category. To produce these explanations during program design I will call model transparency engineering. Today use cases, in some form, are collected during requirements engineering. These form a basis upon which models are constructed. They become embedded in programs in the form of models. The majority of those who will be supported by a computer program do not know anything about these use cases. To present them and the fact that the computer will treat all cases as one of these types is part of model transparency engineering. How to do this and what more may be needed lies outside the scope of this paper.

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Some aspects of the model transparency problem I have found discussed in Dinka (2006, chapters 7 and 8). Dinka studied a 3D visualization tool offered in a program intended to support Gamma knife brain surgery. He found that the professionals planning the surgery did not use the 3D visualization. They relied instead on sets of 2D magnetic resonance images. Briefly, it was found that the designers had built a 3D functionality which was not important to the professional users. The functionality did not fit the professional experience of neurosurgeons and physicists involved in the planning. Above, a distinction made by Dunne (1993) between first-person and third-person perspectives was mentioned. Dinka's study illustrates the risks of designing from a designer's perspective and not from that of a professional user. There also might exist lessons to be learned from simulation programs for training pilots, surgeons, and business managers. So far I have only mentioned that people interact with computers as one way of informing themselves or others. However, they also furnish a lot of data that gets processed by computers. If no computer application returns support valuable to these people the situation entails a risk of low data quality. Figure 4 also indicates how societies, cultures and un-computerized parts of informing systems reproduce or change. Within societies and cultures there exist a number of sub-communities. To simplify Figure 4 I have not explicitly indicated this. These processes differ from the large part of interactions in everyday life. Most everyday interactions people perform to achieve some kind of intended goals, or at least something we can interpret as a goal. By the very way in which they do this they mostly reproduce existing societies, cultures, and informing systems. Most people will rarely – if ever - notice effects of their dayto-day interactions in stabilizing or preserving the status quo. In stabilizing societies, cultures, etc. both non-computer manipulated and computer manipulated communication play a role. In the course of changing societies, cultures, etc. face-to-face and other informal forms of communication play the by far dominant role. Among these informal ways of communication I include use of cell phones, bulletin board systems, and blogs. As I see it, these do not represent idealized, formal models executed on a computer. To summarize, Figure 4 illustrates the following points. Many informing systems today involve some computer supported data processing. However, a responsible human actor using such a system always needs 58

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access to other channels of communication too. Two suggestions can emerge. (1) Be selective in choosing which use cases, turning up during requirements engineering, to implement in a particular application program. Resist the professional temptation to cover all. Unforeseen cases may always be expected to turn up soon. (2) Two computerized models implementing different value criteria might inform a human actor better than one. This means studies of use could profit from focusing on more than computerized parts of informing systems alone. Studies of what workers or other people using computer applications actually do will reveal such additional aspects of the use context. Researchers from disciplines other than information and computer science will probably help us understand this more easily. The figure also indicated the need to focus on a new area to support effective use: model transparency engineering.

Conclusions Informing science studies need to draw on traditions of inquiry from several meta-scientific schools. In reporting studies and findings authors should always make explicit whose interests have guided the inquiry. Moreover, they also should make known to what extent the interests of other stakeholders involved have been used as restrictions. Methods of investigation should be used in ways which support the research guiding interest. If used according to a specifiable research guiding interest, it does not matter within which tradition they were first developed. Researchers and practitioners in informing science have very different backgrounds, training, and experience. This creates a problem of communication in collaboration with colleagues from other disciplines. Familiarity with metascience could help in this communication by furnishing all participants a kind of meta-language in which to discuss across disciplinary borders. The generic metaphor of a double helix can be used to highlight important distinctions. In this paper it has illustrated the distinction between describing and reflecting and living in a complex here and now. A few more distinctions, which could be highlighted by a double helix metaphor, have been indicated. Both informal and formal channels of communication are needed for people to inform themselves and others. These should be perceived as

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supplementing each other. By most everyday communication people reproduce the societies and cultures in which they live, generally without being aware of this. In stabilizing societies, cultures, etc. both noncomputer manipulated and computer manipulated communication play a role, whereas face-to-face and other informal forms of communication play the dominant role in changing societies, cultures, etc. Finally, discussions of how to improve computerized parts of informing systems have to date focused on how to improve requirements engineering. The use of these parts of informing systems in the future could more effectively support clientele by developing and implementing methods for model transparency engineering.

Acknowledgements The author is grateful for the insightful comments of the reviewers. Moreover, I like to thank Professor James Nyce and Dr. Randall Whitaker for their extensive study and valuable comments to earlier drafts of this paper. Finally, I want also to thank my co-editor, Christine Welch, for a careful reading of the paper and a number of suggestions to improve its clarity and English. However, it is I alone who should take full responsibility for the content.

References Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an ecology of mind: A revolutionary approach to man's understanding of himself. New York: Ballentine Books. Bateson, G. (1980). Mind and nature. A necessary unit y. London: Fontana Paperbacks. (First published by Wildw ood House in 1979.) Blair, D. (2006). Wittgenstein, language and information: Back to the rough ground. Dordrecht: Springer. Checkland, P. (1981). Systems thinking, systems practice. Chichester: John Wiley. Churchman, C. W. (1971). The design of inquiring systems. New York: Basic Books. Cohen, E. (1999). Reconceptualizing information systems as a field of the transdiscipline informing science: From ugly duckling to sw an. Journal of Computin g and Information Technology, 7(3), 213-219. Dinka, D. (2006). Role, identity and work: Extending the design and development agenda. (Doctoral dissertation, Linkoping University, Sw eden. Linkoping

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Studies in Science and Technology No. 1008.). Retrieved November 25 from http://www.dinka.se/Dinka/Research_files/PhD.pdf Dreyfus, H.L. & Dreyfus, S.E. (1986). Mind over machine: The power of human in tuitio n and expersise in the era of the computer. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackw ell. Dunne, J. (1993). Back to the rough ground: 'phronesis' and 'techne' in modern philosophy and in Aristotle. Notre Dame, IN: Indiana University of Notre Dame Press. Ehn, P. (1988). Work-oriented design of computer artifacts. Stockholm: Arbetslivscentrum. Diss. Galtung, J. (1977). Essays in methodology. Vol. 1. Methodology and ideology. Copenhagen: Ejlers. Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Kaw alek, J. (2007). Pedagogy and process in “organisational problem-solving”. Informing Science, 10. [In this monograph.] Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire, and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied min d and its challenge to western thought. New York: Basic Books Maturana, H. R. (1988). Ontology of observing: The biological foundations of self consciousness and the physical domain of existence. In R. Donaldson (Ed.), Conference w orkbook Texts in cybernetic theory: An in-depth exploration of the thought of Humberto Maturana, William T. Powers, and Ernst von Glasersfeld". American Association for Cybernet ics, 1988. Retrieved November 4, 2006, from http://www .inteco.cl/biology/ontology/ Maturana, H. R. & Varela, F. J. (1980). Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living. Dordrecht: D. Riedel. (First published in Chile 1972 under the title De Machin as y Seres Vivos.) Radnitzky, G. (1970). Contemporary schools of metascience (Second revised edition). New York: Humanities Press and Gothenburg, Sw eden: Akademiforlaget. Schutz, A. (1967). The phenomenology of the social world. (G. Walsh & F. Lehnert, Trans.). Evanston, IL.: Northw estern University Press. (First published in German 1932.) Stanford encycloped ia of philosophy. (2007). Giambattista Vico. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2007/entries/vico/ Varela, F. (1979). Principles of biolo gical autonomy. New York: Elsevier.

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Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.. Watzlaw ick, P., Beavin, J., & Jackson, D. D. (1967). Pragmatics of human communication. New York: Norton. Whitaker, R. (1992). Venues for contexture: A crit ical analysis and enactive reformulation of group decision support systems. Umeå (Sw eden): Umeå Universitet, ADB (Dept. of Administrative Data Processing / Informatics) dissertation / report UMADP-RRIPCS 15.92. Whitaker, R. (2007). Applying phenomenology and hermeneutics in IS design: A report on field experiences. Informing Science, 10. [In this monograph.] Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The blue and brown books. Oxford: Basil Blackw ell. Wittgenstein, L. (1963). Philosophical investigations. (G.E.M. Anscombe, Trans.). Oxford: Basil Blackw ell. (First edition 1953.) Wittgenstein, L. (1974). Tractatus logico-philosophicus. German-English text. (D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness, Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (First German edition in Annalen der Naturphilosophie, 1921.)

Biography Professor Emeritus Hans-Erik Nissen has served since 1991 as a senior research fellow at the department of Informatics at Lund University after years of demonstrated research excellence within the information systems field. He graduated in chemistry from the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm. He then for many years worked in various positions in the Swedish Pulp, Paper and Timber industry before reentering academia. The seven last years of these he started and headed the first computer center of the Swedish Cellulose Company (SCA).

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Applying Phenomenology and Hermeneutics in IS Design: A Report on Field Experiences Randall Whitaker EnolaGaia.com, Dayton, Ohio, USA [email protected]

Abstract Phenomenology and hermeneutics have long been promoted as sources of inspiration for better information system (IS) design. Practical approaches to applying these philosophical ideas have been awaited for just as long. This paper offers a review of one practitioner’s experience in devising a theoretical and methodological ‘toolkit’ via which these disciplines’ principles have been applied in actual IS design practice. Keywords: design, phenomenology, hermeneutics, information systems, praxio-focal approach.

Introduction One December night circa 1990, on a night train from Stockholm to Uppsala, I struck up a conversation with a German scholar returning from that evening's Nobel Prize ceremony. By way of introduction, I told him I was a researcher whose interests focused on phenomenological approaches to epistemology and their application to the design and use of information systems. He was quite familiar with such thinkers as Husserl and Heidegger, and he expressed surprise that computer scientists would know of them - much less seek to apply their ideas. Material published as part of this publication, either on-line or in print, is copyrighted by the Informing Science Institute. Permission to make digital or paper copy of part or all of these works for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that the copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage AND that copies 1) bear this notice in full and 2) give the full citation on the first page. It is permissible to abstract these works so long as credit is given. To copy in all other cases or to republish or to post on a server or to redistribute to lists requires specific permission and payment of a fee. Contact [email protected] to request redistribution permission.


Phenomenology and Hermeneutics in ISD

When I inquired about his academic specialty, he said it was a very obscure field probably unknown to me - hermeneutics. He described it as an esoteric discipline he enjoyed, even though it rendered him something of an isolated party even within academe. He was stunned to hear I had been reading Gadamer and that other information technology researchers were promoting hermeneutics as a source of inspiration and guidance in addressing how IT artifacts are interpreted via design and in practice. By the time we had parted company, he was visibly energized by the idea his little-known discipline might enjoy a renaissance through application to IT. Since that evening, two things have happened. First, I have gone on to a career as a senior human factors / cognitive engineering researcher with a major American defense contractor. Over the last several years I have been involved in a progressive series of projects which have afforded me the opportunity to freely employ my theoretical inclinations (phenomenology, and to a lesser extent hermeneutics) in actual IS development practice. In the course of these projects I have had to confront obstacles and exigencies in both (a) applying these theoretical orientations to 'real-world' situations and (b) demonstrating their unique contributions to the projects' consistently successful outcomes. Second, there has been ongoing promotion of phenomenology and hermeneutics in the literature of such relevant fields as humancomputer interaction (HCI), design science, and participatory design (PD). Though voluminous, this literature can be characterized as 'scholarly' - i.e., abstract or theoretical in content. Fine points of philosophy have been examined in relative isolation from consideration of how they might pertain to the workaday world. Regardless of its illumination of 'meaning' or 'reflection', such theoretical work rarely addresses either the 'meaningful use' or 'reflection upon use' at the center of both my professional design work and this monograph's theme. As a result, such scholarly work - meritorious though it may be - has provided little aid in applying phenomenology and hermeneutics to IS design and in justifying their relevance to the orthodox IS development community. This monograph's call for contributions cited the "dialectic between meaningful use and reflection upon use." My purpose in this paper is to address that dialectic with regard to my years of attempting to apply phenomenology and hermeneutics in IS design. In this case, 'meaningful use' refers to application of those approaches in IS design and de-

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velopment, and 'reflection upon use' refers to what I've derived from those experiences - both in terms of methodological development and feedback on demonstrable applicability of phenomenological and hermeneutic principles. I shall attempt to illustrate these dual sides of the 'double helix' with some selected topics from my practical experience. The objective is not to 'prove' the utility of phenomenology and hermeneutics per se, but rather to report on what I've learned about these orientations' demonstrable 'utility'.

Graduating from Theory to Praxis The most basic problems I've encountered in applying phenomenological and hermeneutic concepts to IS development relate to the distinction between ‘theory’ and ‘praxis’. Both these fields emphasize subjectivity - a topic adequately addressable and typically addressed in the abstract, with little regard to everyday action. In other words, the literature offers much in the way of elaborating ‘theory’ but little in the way of informing ‘praxis’. This emphasis on ‘theory’ over ‘praxis’ is understandable, because work on these ideas originated and largely remains within the scholarly realm. If I were still in academe, this state of affairs would cause me no concern. However, I am a scholarly practitioner rather than a practicing scholar, and this obligates me to confront questions of whether, and to what extent, these ideas can inform or even improve my working praxis.

The Problem of ‘Grounding’ Philosophical Theory to Support Praxis Both phenomenology and hermeneutics focus on the subjectivity of a given person or actor. Phrased another way, these orientations frame their inquiry with regard to someone's 'first person perspective' (1PP, to borrow a term from game programmers). There are a variety of thinkers and theories connoted by the term 'phenomenology', and there is a corresponding diversity in their approaches to addressing this 1PP. The works of both Husserl and Heidegger illustrate the extreme of abstraction in their treatments of what can be present to experience (Husserl) and the actor's essential mode of being (Heidegger). Insightful though they are in educating IS professionals on human cognition and activity, neither offers much that can be directly incorporated into practice. Similarly, hermeneutics elucidates interpretation and inter-

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pretability without providing specific tools or methods for leveraging the understanding one can obtain from its study. In large part, this apparent deficiency derives from these fields' foci. Both phenomenology and hermeneutics emphasize processes and elements intrinsic to the given actor - e.g., what she perceives, the manner in which she thinks, or her capacity for interpretation. This imposes a methodological problem, because an analyst cannot directly inspect the target user's mind or thoughts. The analyst must address the target actor from a third-person perspective (3PP) from which any characterization of that actor's 1PP or 'phenomenology' is at best an allusion and at worst an illusion. This does not mean philosophy cannot offer practitioners inspiration or guidance. One notably illustrative counterexample is Heidegger's concept of 'breakdown', in which the flow of a subject's phenomenal activity is perturbed out of a relatively automatic mode into a more consciously deliberative mode. Figuratively, such breakdown events have been recommended as observable symptoms of phenomenological perturbation and clues to problematical situations in IT usage (e.g., Ehn, 1988; Winograd & Flores, 1986). Such breakdown events can be observed as (e.g.) interruptions or digressions in the course of a given activity, and marking their occurrence is an excellent heuristic for identifying issues to be addressed and resolved. The scope of philosophical concepts that can be brought to bear must therefore be qualified with respect to what can be evident to observation or reasonable inference. The example of breakdowns illustrates one type of such evidence - an impact on observable behavior in the course of an activity. This 'anchors' or 'grounds' the theoretical construct by correlating it with something empirically discernible. Once such 'grounding' can be achieved, IS professionals can pursue development of methods and tools geared to the type of evidence thus nominated for collection. Unfortunately, there are few examples of constructs or concepts from philosophical treatments of phenomenology and hermeneutics that are capable of such 'grounding'. The main problem is that the majority of such constructs are difficult to correlate with observable evidence. The secondary problem is that many elements of phenomenological or hermeneutic philosophy are offered as tenets whose acceptability is based on logical coherence or expository force, not testability against real world situations. As such, guidance for

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interrelating explanatory abstractions to actual circumstances is rarely provided.

Achieving 'Grounding' via Wider Theoretical Foundations The first problem in applying phenomenology and / or hermeneutics in IS design is therefore the identification of theories both (a) consistent with the tenets of phenomenology and hermeneutics and (b) offering insights or models that can be applied to guide praxis. My own approach has been to seek such theories regardless of whether they are popularly categorized as specimens of phenomenological or hermeneutic philosophy. The ones that have come to comprise my theoretical toolkit have recommended themselves on the basis of both (a) accommodating a focus on the subject actor's 1PP while immersed in the target activity and (b) providing a basis for correlating phenomenological elements with some basis for empirical observation. With respect to theoretical foundations, my own preferred sources are drawn primarily from second-order cybernetics. They include the cybernetics of cybernetics of Heinz von Foerster (1981), the radical constructivism of Ernst von Glasersfeld (1995), and most particularly the biology of cognition and enactive cognitive science of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (Maturana & Varela, 1980; Varela, 1979; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). All address the 'phenomenology' and epistemological processes associated with a given system with respect to that system's 1PP. In particular, the work conducted by Maturana and Varela (both jointly and individually) offers a rich set of coherent constructs for characterizing the 'phenomenology of the living' - i.e., experience as contextualized with regard to an observing organism's biological constitution. Another source of theoretical inspiration is the work of Charles Sanders Peirce (e.g., 1935), the first scholar to label philosophical examination of essential mental elements 'phenomenology'. Peirce's work was integrated with his semiotic theories, and this connection affords his 'phenomenology' a stronger linkage to issues of signs and signification than one derives from other philosophical works. This linkage affords the basis for applying Peirce's theory of signs where the form and interrelationship of symbolic elements is critical - as is the case with any IS project.

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Additional theoretical support is drawn from work on design and development practices rather than phenomenology and hermeneutics per se. These influences have proven useful owing to their accommodation of - and even direct allowance for - the subjective aspects of a worker's experience. Over the years, the two I've found most useful are participatory design (PD) (Docherty, Fuchs-Kittowski, Kolm, & Mathiassen, 1987; Ehn, 1988; Greenbaum & Kyng, 1991) and soft systems methodology (SSM) (Checkland, 1981). Participatory design recommends itself for its emphasis on grounded work praxis and the worker's experience as a key object of study. Soft systems methodology recommends itself as a structured protocol actively seeking to portray the subject matter in the same terms as it is perceived and interpreted by workers. These examples are sufficient to illustrate how anyone seeking to apply phenomenology and / or hermeneutics in IS design will need to consider relevant ideas from multiple disciplines. Some of the fields I’ve cited are at best peripheral to current IS design and development curricula, while others are so distant as to represent knowledge no student is likely to encounter at all. As a result, my own experience indicates it requires considerable effort and creativity to equip oneself with a theoretical toolkit for phenomenologically or hermeneutically informed design.

A Comparison of Perspectives and Methods Adopting a more phenomenologically- or hermeneutically-oriented orientation entails changes or re-orientations with respect to methodology as well as theory. In this section I shall summarize some key points upon which I’ve learned a phenomenologically or hermeneutically informed orientation distinguishes itself from the prevailing approach to IS design and development. This will be done by way of a comparative review. For the sake of illustration this review will be framed with regard to the prevailing model for IS design and development projects. Though documented in myriad specific formats, this model has a certain features that for all practical purposes may be considered universal. It consists of an essentially linear process path leading from initial study of the target use environment (knowledge acquisition - KA) through some form of pro forma analysis to the creation of a design concept and generation of design specifications. These specifications serve to guide software development and provide a baseline for testing and evaluating the eventual product (e.g., a prototype).

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Methodological Tactics Reflective of Current Conventional Orientations The linearity of the conventional process path insinuates its constituent activities must be conducted in a stepwise fashion and interconnected via a unidirectional feed-forward of results from one phase to the next. The overall process is therefore structured similarly to an assembly line - a pertinent metaphor, given that IS methodologies have been created and rendered orthodox by a population of professionals (e.g., engineers) self-defined as creators of concrete products. This production metaphor is reflected in a focus on the product (an artifact). Knowledge acquisition and analysis are framed with regard to illuminating factors recommending the prospective artifact's features or configuration. Design is taken to be the process of prescribing such features or configurations, and development is taken to be their realization in the form of a new artifact. Regardless of the terms in which project motives were originally described, improvements to a work environment are in the end re-interpreted in terms of the product’s novelty. This emphasis on novelty underlies the prevailing belief that an IS design and development project’s prime objective is innovation. The workers to whom these new artifacts are to be issued, if considered at all, are addressed as 'users' - i.e., in terms of their role as actors interacting with the artifact. To the very limited extent phenomenology or hermeneutics are ever invoked, it is in passing reference to the 'user experience' with, or 'usability' of, the artifact. The reduction of overall worker experience to only that portion involving the artifact both (a) eliminates concern for how the worker engages the data it provides and the work it supports while (b) simplifying evaluation by attending only to observable behaviors ascribed to human components of a subsuming work system. It is therefore fair to claim conventional IS methodological models are predicated on the metascientific orientation Radnitzky (1970) labels 'logical empiricism' - an objectivist orientation inimical to addressing concerns such as individual phenomenology or subjective interpretation (Whitaker, 1992). This orientation influences the entire IS development process path. Of particular concern is the manner in which it affects the front-end knowledge acquisition activities. Subject matter experts (SME's) are treated as sources of objective data on the target work activity and the related functions to be supported with the new IS artifact(s). Freed of

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concern for subjective aspects of work, analysts presume they can simplify the laborious KA phase through either or both of two tactics. The first is to rely on information sources other than the person(s) actually performing the target work activities. These sources may be (e.g.) other personnel more available for interviews or documentation of the 'official' version of the work and its conduct. The former may have little knowledge of current practices and may even provide views colored by their own (off-topic) experiences or speculation about actual praxis. Documentation is all too often out of date or uninformative about what individual workers have to engage and have to do to accomplish the target tasks. The second simplification tactic is to conduct KA through interviews and other procedures that do not involve on-site observation of the target work being performed. Such approaches are usually justified on the basis of relative economy; direct observation, apprenticeship, and other immersive KA techniques are extremely time-consuming and laborious. Though these approaches can certainly capture valuable data in general, they stand little or no chance of uncovering context-specific aspects of the target work when conducted in isolation from the active work milieu. The logical-empiricist orientation also fosters a reliance on formal models presumed capable of representing and / or illuminating the subject matter. The general notion of modeling the subject matter is not itself the problem. The problem lies in the fact that the most popular modeling approaches treat workers as 'black box' components within a work system or environment which is taken to be an appropriate and sufficient focus for a constructive model. A particularly relevant example is that of the means-ends hierarchy (or abstraction hierarchy) created by Jens Rasmussen (1986) and widely employed in cognitive systems engineering circles. This model lays out the interrelationships between a system's objectives and the elements involved in those objectives' accomplishment. The end result is a representation of a work system architecture from which individual actors have been eliminated as objects of reference. The abstraction hierarchy is a fine tool for what it is. However, it definitely is not a good tool for uncovering and analyzing the cognitive, experiential, or context-dependent aspects of work as engaged by the individual actor. The net effect of these and other aspects of a logical-empirical approach is to progressively, if not comprehensively, emphasize the form

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and function of a new artifact over the process and procedures of the work activities this artifact was commissioned to support. By the time a software prototype is produced it has become the fixed point of reference around which all issues revolve. This culminating position is well-illustrated by current evaluation practices centered on testing a product’s ‘usability’ – i.e., the degree to which a ‘user’ can efficiently and effectively operate the IS product. For such ‘usability’ to be construable as definitive evidence of success, any concerns for the interrelationship between a person (in her work-demarcated role as a ‘worker’) and her task must have been supplanted by attention to the interrelationship between the person (in a distinct artifact-demarcated role of ‘user’) and the artifact itself. The risk inherent in this re-orientation is, of course, the deployment of artifacts certified as ‘usable’ yet demonstrably less than ‘useful’ in workaday practice.

Methodological Tactics Reflective of a Phenomenological Orientation It is easy to characterize conventional IS practices as being geared to production of an artifact. It is more difficult to so concisely describe objectives from a phenomenological or hermeneutic orientation. One thing is certain - proceeding with this orientation requires demoting the eventual artifact from the status of a focal objective to that of an emergent outcome. Indeed, the very necessity for a new artifact must remain an open issue to be decided in light of what one learns of the worker’s needs as seen from the worker’s perspective. Phrased another way, the fact and the form of the artifact must be treated as a ‘variable’ whose instantiation is subordinate to the subjective experience of the worker in the course of her work. It is this flow of interwoven cognition and action which must be addressed as the fixed point of reference if IS designers are to have any chance of understanding current praxis and identifying clues to constructive change. Knowledge acquisition and analysis must be framed with regard to illuminating how the work subject matter is apprehended, how the course of the work process unfolds, and how the process path is navigated from the vantage of the worker herself. Attention must be given not only to objectively observable work performance factors but also to subjective features of the worker’s experience and actions. Such features can include (e.g.) idiosyncratic practices, tacit knowledge, rules of

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thumb, private language, localized jargons, personal categorizations of subject matter, and the like. Why are such subjective factors important? Information-intensive work is typically supported with automation, but it is rarely automatic. Whether the task be case processing or command and control, the presence of a human ‘in the loop’ means specific outcomes will be predicated on the particular actor’s perceptual capabilities, cognitive capabilities, and praxial (“of or relating to praxis”) capabilities. Actions evidence decisions, which in turn are based upon apprehension and interpretation of the subject matter at hand. The most common question posed in challenging a deliberate (i.e., decided) action is: “What were you thinking?” Accordingly, the focus for analyzing deficiencies in, and improving capacity for, deliberate action must be the subjective context within which the decision maker operates. This means the analyst’s task is to learn enough about actual praxis so as to be able to comprehend, emulate, or even simulate worker experiences and orientations as they occur in the flow of the target work. Phrased another way, the goal of KA is to educate the analyst to be a surrogate subject matter expert. This is the wisdom in PD's emphasis on mutual learning in the design process. Armed with this understanding, the analyst is finally ready to undertake design. However, ‘design’ takes on a different character when performed from a phenomenological orientation. Under this orientation, design becomes a matter of specifying what needs to be present to the worker (from her 1PP) during her performance of the target work activity. This will typically include specification of what must be perceived, what interpretations must be made to foster understanding, what representation or expression of this understanding best informs the actor, what must be decided based on this understanding, and what one must do to effectuate decisions. Unless the IS team is privileged to have worker participation throughout the project (the PD ideal), it will fall to the analyst / designer to derive these key elements by simulating the worker's praxis. The flow of work experience becomes the foundation for prescribing what might be done. The target task’s process path serves as the template for a figurative track along which an actor must proceed. This track is punctuated by points at which something shifts, begins, or ends. Each such discernible juncture recommends what must be perceived, interpreted, decided, and enacted before proceeding. The es-

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sence of design is accreting that which recommends itself to a set of prescriptions for the new work environment’s features and then creating a coherent model embodying these features. Regardless of the terms in which project motives were originally described, in this approach improvements are framed as re-definitions of the ‘milieu’ within which the worker operates and with which she engages. This emphasis on re-engineering the milieu underlies my inclination to characterize the intended outcomes of a phenomenologically or hermeneutically sensitive process as interventions. At the point the designer undertakes to specify prescriptions for intervention, there is no presumption these prescriptions will include a novel IS artifact. Only after these prospective interventions are made apparent can they (and should they) be considered with respect to the need for, and the form and functionality of, a new IS artifact. Deferring commitment to a technological ‘fix’ minimizes the risk of unnecessary or misdirected software development. Avoiding premature technical development minimizes the biases induced by fixating on prototypes as unavoidable exemplars of the eventual product. Most importantly, patience allows generation of requirements specifications to proceed with respect to what the target worker needs to be made facile in the future rather than what functionality technological precedents have provided to date. In other words, software prototyping is undertaken with respect to realizing the envisioned new milieu, and its features are circumscribed by the features that new milieu has been taken to incorporate. The primary criteria for evaluating the prototype are therefore framed with respect to ‘utility’ (how useful it is in facilitating worker actions) rather than how ‘usable’ it is in and of itself. This is not to say that usability is disregarded. It only means the issue of whether the worker can better engage this task takes priority over the issue of how well the worker can operate this IS artifact. Figuratively speaking, this orientation emphasizes how well a person in the role of a worker can drive a nail over how well a person in the role of a user can swing the hammer. Because mutual learning is critical to pursuing this style of design and development work, allowance should be made for recurrently interacting with the target workers. This is done to both (a) learn more about the issues which will inevitably surface as the analyst simulates what it's like to do the target work and (b) obtain feedback and validation from the workers themselves. This requirement for a deep working knowl-

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edge of the worker's first-person perspective effectively mandates organizing the IS agenda as a series of 'loops' rather than a stepwise linear progression. In my experience, additional time invested in this learning and consultation with the real experts on the target work will consistently be rewarded with efficiency in both (a) identifying the most constructive interventions to be pursued and (b) generating interventions satisfying the most needs on the first pass.

Summary Comparison of the Two Orientations Table 1 summarizes some key points distinguishing the conventional IS design and development mindset from an orientation more accommodating of phenomenological and hermeneutic considerations. Table 1: Summary Comparison of the Two Orientations POINT OR ISSUE:

CONVENTIONAL ORIENTATION

PHENOMENOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

Focal Product of IS Development Intended Outcome of an IS Project

IS artifact(s) to be employed by workers

A revised work milieu better accommodating and facilitating worker praxis Intervention with respect to the worker’s milieu of praxis

Innovation with respect to the form or function of the new artifact(s) Ascribed Role • Functional compoof Humans nents of the composite work system • ‘Users’ of the IS artifact(s) Perspective Third-person (exterTaken on the nal; objective) vantage Joint Human- on both the work sysMachine Work tem and the human System component(s) within Referential The artifact is in the ‘Anchor’ for foreground as the Analysis and fixed point of referDesign ence ‘Variables’ Pre- • User experience sumed Mutable • User interpretation as Necessary of data provided by the artifact

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Actors from whose perspective the work activity and subject matter are to be portrayed First-person (subjective) vantage of the worker with regard to her work activities and milieu The worker’s experience is in the foreground as the fixed point of reference • Artifact form • Artifact function

Whitaker POINT OR ISSUE:

CONVENTIONAL ORIENTATION

PHENOMENOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

Focal Evidence to be Collected

• Quantitative performance data • Formal descriptions of work organization, process, and tools • Emphasis on ‘universals’ applicable to all workers • Analyst diagnostically examines the subject workers(s) • Analyst accumulates sufficient data to formally model operations and constituent functions • Analyst prescribes an innovation based on the formal model ‘Usability’ – How well the human user operates the IS artifact in and of itself – often without regard to the work itself

• Qualitative accounts of praxis • Informal accounts of actual socio-technical interactivity • Attention to ‘personal’ or ‘subjective’ work issues

Presumptive Analyst / Worker Relationship

Criterion for Evaluating Outcomes / Product(s)

• Analyst learns from the subject worker(s) • Analyst achieves sufficient understanding to simulate worker states in the flow of the work • Analyst describes an intervention based on discerned worker needs ‘Utility’ – The degree to which the worker can engage work subject matter and execute tasks with minimal attention to the artifact itself

Lessons Learned in the Field The preceding section discussed the general ways in which a phenomenologically or hermeneutically sensitive orientation results in practices distinct from prevailing conventions. This section will offer more specific illustrations of some lessons I've learned in pursuing phenomenologically oriented IS design. In the wake of the 1990 train conversation cited at the beginning, I found myself working to identify how – and how far – one could proceed in applying phenomenology and hermeneutics in practical IS design. In the years since I have reached some conclusions about both (a) the prospects for applying these ideas in theory and (b) some techniques for applying them in practice. The following sections will present what I believe to be the most important

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things I’ve learned in attempting to move phenomenological and hermeneutic themes from academe to the workaday world.

The Context for Applying these Ideas The first step in this exposition is to explain the IS design and development context within which I’ve been applying ideas drawn from phenomenology and hermeneutics. Since 1999 I have been involved in a series of projects aimed at developing decision aids for a command and control environment. These projects’ research emphasis has been on creating visualizations and other interface components affording decision makers better focus on relevant subject matter and a resultant capacity for more efficient and effective decisions. Figure 1 illustrates the manner in which I’ve come to view the subject matter of such projects.

Figure 1: Overview of the IS Design Context As illustrated in Figure 1, there is an important distinction to be drawn between the externally observable elements of the work milieu and those that are ‘personal’ to the target user / worker. This distinction is

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analogous to Kant’s division between noumena and phenomena. The directly observable components of the work milieu (artifacts, data ‘content’, user activity patterns, etc.) are the objects for which data is gathered in knowledge acquisition and explored during analysis. However, effort is invested in attempting to identify and describe those ‘personal’ means by which the worker engages her subject matter – e.g., interpretations or translations of observable data as those items are engaged in her personal cognitive context. The process of ‘interpreting’ observable data for meaningful effect on the target work process is the point at which hermeneutics is most applicable. The nature and utility of the resultant interpretations (as discrete items of reference in the worker’s cognitive domain) - along with any permutations, transformations and other operations performed on or with reference to those interpretations - provides the area in which phenomenology is most applicable. The point in doing this is to identify the elements most pertinent to the worker’s first-person perspective on the subject work. Such elements do not necessarily reflect the categories, definitions, etc., laid out in those ‘external’ data sources (e.g., training materials, handbooks, etc.) upon which conventional analysts typically rely. Most important are those descriptive or interpretive elements that have arisen in praxis – i.e., referential items whose criticality has been identified by virtue of their recurrent importance in work performance. Examples of such personally generated and / or personally enacted elements include: •

Clusters or sets of subject matter elements routinely treated as wholes

•

Routine sequencing of subtasks and evaluations of completion criteria

•

Factors identified as indicators of problems or opportunities for task completion

•

Cues indicating tangential requirements (e.g., for additional data)

•

Key features used to judge states of the subject matter or situation at issue

•

Relationships routinely checked among subject matter elements

•

Qualifications or glosses applied to conventional work domain elements

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As connoted in Figure 1, such personal ‘constructs’ may be ‘first-order’ transformations on observable data sources, while others may be ‘higher-order’ transformations building upon such first-order interpretations. Prioritization of such constructs for representation in the design concept is to some extent proportional to their role in the generation of such higher-order constructs. In other words, if lower-order personal construct X serves as the basis for higher-order constructs Y and Z, it is usually most critical to ensure X is reflected in the eventual design concept. The goal is to establish as comprehensive a mapping of the worker’s ‘phenomenal’ or ‘cognitive’ operational domain as possible. Once this has been satisfactorily accomplished, the next step is to craft design requirements with primary regard to such ‘phenomenal’ factors. This closes a procedural loop starting with the observable work milieu, leading through examination of the ‘phenomenal’ projection of the work milieu, and ending with specification of novel observable / external work milieu components (e.g., IS applications). The intended result is an IS design that reflects the worker’s 1PP as much as possible – i.e., an IS design that emulates the worker’s usual ‘vantage’ on the work and the work subject matter. I have applied this general approach to create a series of IS designs which have been accepted and moved forward to development and deployment. These projects’ outcomes have been sufficiently successful to motivate description and promotion of their origins in terms of both a new type of IS product (work-centered support systems) and a novel form of IS design practice (work-centered design) (e.g., Eggleston, 2003; Eggleston & Whitaker, 2002; Eggleston, Young & Whitaker, 2000; Scott et al., 2005). Grateful as I am for these developments, I cannot claim they reflect more than isolated tidbits about my actual design praxis and tactics in the course of the referenced projects. More importantly, none of them reflect the phenomenological or hermeneutic influences that to my mind underpin both my IS design praxis and its successes. As a result, I use the term praxio-focal to connote the praxiscentered nature of my methods and to prevent confusion with those aspects of the formally documented ‘work-centered’ approach appended to (rather than reflective of) the facts of my IS design experience. The remainder of this paper will provide an illustrative overview of my praxio-focal IS design approach with specific emphasis on the key roles

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phenomenology and hermeneutics have played in its formulation and application. In the following sections I shall more deeply discuss selected aspects of this approach and their relation to ideas drawn from phenomenology and / or hermeneutics.

The Scope of Applicability for these Philosophical Ideas In some cases, phenomenology and hermeneutics have been touted as panaceas for reforming or improving IS development methodologies. Though these fields can certainly enhance IS design quality, some of the recommendations made for them are naively overblown. My experience indicates it is vital to understand these ideas’ scope of practical applicability and to circumscribe their usage accordingly. This issue of scope has to be addressed in two distinguishable contexts: (a) the scope of IS project subject matter to which these approaches offer useful insights, and (b) the scope of IS project activities to which they can be expected to usefully contribute. First is the issue of circumscription with respect to subject matter. My project experiences consistently support a point not often made in the literature promoting them - phenomenology and / or hermeneutics do not and cannot represent a comprehensive alternative to conventional IS project methodology. Owing to the fact these approaches concentrate on the individual human’s cognitive processes, they are informative only when addressing the human worker or user – either in isolation or in relation to current and prospective IS artifacts. When considering other aspects or dimensions of the target work milieu, individual capacities and processes may decrease or recede in relative importance or relevance. The two most common such situations occur when attention is given to (a) social / organizational (i.e., supra-individual) aspects of the work activity and (b) purely technical aspects of the work environment. Second is the issue of circumscription with respect to IS project itinerary. The foregoing discussion touched on only certain portions of the conventional IS project progression – knowledge acquisition, analysis, design, and culminating evaluation. The portion of the project stretching from design specification delivery to production of a prototype was not mentioned. The reason for this is that the software development phase is the phase least amenable to influence or improvement through application of phenomenological ideas. Any recourse to issues of (e.g.) apprehension or interpretation during this phase are likely to occur only

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where the upstream project phases have omitted, overlooked, or misconstrued some aspect of the target worker’s task experience. In other words, there is little likelihood of such issues being relevant unless the developers need something elaborated or clarified. In my experience, this most commonly occurs when developers question some aspect of the design concept and the underlying design rationale must be explained. The later evaluation phase (if undertaken at all) typically involves reference back to the design rationale developed in the early phases of the project. This means evaluation is usually concerned with phenomenological / hermeneutic factors identified and analyzed much earlier in the project. As a result, my experience indicates the primary opportunities for leveraging phenomenological and / or hermeneutic ideas lie in the early phases of the IS project’s process path.

Circumscribing the Designers’ Interpretive Problem The prevailing (logical-empiricist) mindset fails to address, much less illuminate, subjective aspects of the worker’s experience. Obtaining a good ‘fit’ between IS designs and workers’ praxis requires that both data and the portrayal of such data be framed in such a way as to facilitate worker apprehension, comprehension, and decision processes. This would imply a need to analyze and reflect the each worker’s phenomenal states during the course of the target praxis. Unfortunately, the analyst has no direct access to the worker's perceptions or thoughts. As such, elements ascribed to the worker’s phenomenal domain are always objects of hermeneutic analysis on the part of the observer / analyst. The observer / analyst’s predicament can be readily illustrated with regard to the concept of cognitive point of view as described by Varela (1979, p. 85) – “… a particular set of presuppositions and attitudes, a perspective, or a frame in the sense of Bateson ... or Goffman ...; in particular, it is associated with some notion of value, or interest. It is also linked up with the cognitive capacities (sensory capabilities, knowledge background) of the distinctor.” The observer’s (analyst’s; designer’s) cognitive point of view circumscribes the particular 'layout' or 'topology' of her observing situation. This circumscription specifies the focus of observational engagement (i.e., where the observer's 'referential cross hairs' are targeted), and this in turn specifies the topology of the observer's immediately-accessible domain of referentiality. In other

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words, the observer / analyst’s capacity for addressing the subject worker is constrained by the observer’s own phenomenology.

Figure 2: Adapted from Whitaker (1998) Varela distinguished two basic cognitive points of view that can be taken on a given system. The recursive view is framed with regard to the operative components of the system, and the behavioral view is framed with regard to the interrelationship of the overall system and the milieu in which the observer observes it to operate. Adopting the behavioral view renders the subject system ‘opaque’ to inspection of its internal operations. From this perspective the system is an undifferentiated whole – a simple unity in Maturana’s terminology (e.g., Maturana, 1978). Conversely, adopting the recursive view obscures one’s ability to contextualize overall system actions in the subsuming milieu. This is because the context of reference is the set of elements comprising the

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system seen as a composite unity (Maturana, 1978). This dichotomy is illustrated in Figure 2. Conventional IS design methodologies address the user from a thirdperson perspective (3PP). From the 3PP vantage the user is a simple unity, and analysis is a matter of reducing her operations to an inventory of inputs and outputs (relative to the work activity; relative to the IS artifact). If one wishes to invoke the user’s phenomenological or hermeneutical processes, it becomes necessary to attempt to emulate the user’s 1PP, and this requires more of a recursive view. In the absence of any ability to observe the ephemeral elements comprising a worker’s cognitive realm, this would seem an impossible task. As the next section describes, however, there is a means for focusing the scope of the observer’s examination so as to obtain interpretive leverage on such otherwise intangible subject matter.

Action as Evidence of Phenomenal Processes The major challenge in phenomenologically informed IS design is how the analyst / designer may reasonably ground the target worker's firstperson perspective and experiences with respect to some form of observable or discernible evidence. To use the terminology introduced in the preceding section, the problem is what may be exploited from a behavioral view of the worker / user that affords approximation of a recursive view onto her phenomenal and interpretive processes. The first step in attacking this problem was to accept the fact that there are distinct domains within which the subject person operates. This was the basis for delineating a set of venues (Whitaker, 1992) analogous to Maturana’s phenomenological domain construct. First, the IS user operates in the role of a worker within a ‘task venue’ – the domain of observable work functions and operations. Second, this person operates in the role of a ‘user’ engaging the IS artifact via a ‘depictive venue’ in which elements of the work subject matter are presented for inspection and manipulation – the domain of (e.g.) on-screen data and representations. Finally, the person operates in the role of a ‘phenomenal / hermeneutic operator’ within her ‘cognitive venue’ – the domain of perceptual and cognitive processes. The first two of these venues can be reasonably addressed from a 3PP; the third requires attention to the subject person’s own 1PP. The remaining issues lay in (a) obtaining tractable means for describing the cognitive venue and (b) interrelating the worker’s tri-fold experiential context in a coherent way.

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The depictive venue – as the object of an eventual design - is not available for exploitation in analyzing praxis or cognition. The cognitive venue is inaccessible by definition. This leaves the task venue as the basis for grounding analysis. Once again I turned to the work of Humberto Maturana, whose biologically-grounded phenomenological theory claims, "All doing is knowing and all knowing is doing" (e.g., Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 27). Maturana's point is that what we colloquially term 'knowledge' is an allusive projection or fiction evidenced by effective action. This entails a conversion from treating “this modeled knowledge as impetus for action” to “action as evidence for what may be construed as ‘knowledge’ “. Having adopted this converted view, I found that modeling the course of praxis is an effective representational foundation upon which I could plot my attributions (i.e., my interpretations) for the perceptions, interpretations, and decisions requisite to the series of actions demarcating the trajectory of that praxis. Only after contextualizing these ascribed ‘elements of information’ with respect to actual praxis could I begin to uncover situation-specific nuances providing better clues to both (a) what the work praxis really entails with respect to the worker’s phenomenal processes and (b) the dimensions of the phenomenal and hermeneutic domains within which the worker actually operates.

Correlating Praxis and Phenomenal Processes in a Coherent Model It has proven difficult to identify a modeling schema configured to portray a combination of actions or activities in terms of elements that could be correlated with 'cognitive' or 'mental' (i.e., phenomenological) events. A usable example for what I sought was not to be found in the literature on work analysis, cognitive psychology, or other relevant fields. In most cases, the available models addressed the worker from a 3PP – treating her as a ‘black box’ and affording no features for addressing the worker’s ‘internal’ processes or experiences. Eventually I found what I was seeking in, of all places, military science. This was the OODA Loop of Col. John R. Boyd (1987). The acronym stands for Observe - Orient - Decide - Act, and a 'loop' is a cycle comprised of these four phases. For all its apparent simplicity, Boyd's OODA Loop exhibits features, which recommend it as a schema for cognitive modeling. First, it explicitly addresses a decision / action cy-

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cle in terms of continuous process from perception (Observe) through cognition (Orient / Decide) to instrumental response (Act). Second, the OODA Loop explicitly ties a system's perceptual / cognitive process to that same system's action toward its operational environment, and vice versa. Third, the OODA Loop can be used as a recursive construct in which any of the four phases can be decomposed into one or more subsidiary loop depictions. Plotting available data onto an OODA schema provides both a framework for organizing what I've learned and a basis for identifying what must be added to flesh out a useful model correlating what the worker sees, interprets, and decides with what she does. Combined with my earlier theoretical explorations (e.g., Whitaker, 1992), this culminated in an integrated model for deliberative task cycles, as illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Process Schema Model for Deliberative Task Cycles For any discernible cycle (whether an entire task or some constituent sub-task) the OODA progression can be punctuated into two primary sections or categories relative to referential focus and vantage. At the beginning and the end of the cycle the activities associated with the Observe and Act phases involve the ‘external’ work environment (which may include the data presentations afforded the IS user). In other words, these phases involve elements amenable to inspection from a 3PP. In the middle of the cycle the Orient and the Decide phases are primarily conducted with respect to the worker’s ‘internal’ cognitive domain. These intermediate phases involve elements directly

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available only to the worker’s 1PP – elements which the analyst / designer must infer and interpret. The critical transitions between these ‘3PP-accessible’ and ‘IPPinferable’ states occur during the initiation of the Orient phase and the Act phase. In terms of both (a) required effort and (b) potential for error, these transitions serve as ‘bottlenecks’ in the process flow. The ‘depiction bottleneck’ is the critical juncture from data apprehension (observation) to conceptualization and comprehension. The ‘enactment bottleneck’ is the critical juncture at which a decided course of action is put into effect. It is not surprising that these junctures entail risk, because it is at these junctures where the worker has to correlate her phenomenal / hermeneutic processes with states of the work environment (including tools and functions). The IS designer seeks to constructively intervene into the subject worker’s capacity for effective observation and initial orientation to the data observed by reconfiguring elements of the task venue. Intervention in support of the deeper aspects of the Orientation phase and the Decide phase is pursued through implementation of a depictive venue well-suited to portraying work subject matter in a manner consistent with the worker’s discerned perspective, terminology, logic, etc. Intervention in support of the Act phase is pursued with respect to the task venue again. The designer is obligated to both (a) recognize the risks immanent at the depiction and enactment bottlenecks and (b) attempt to mitigate these risks by minimizing the cognitive burden attending transition at each juncture. To employ the model above, the analyst / designer must work ‘inward from the ends’ in collecting and examining data on the work milieu and praxis. The data available for utilization in the Observe phase can be projected via a sort of forward-chaining inference process to delineate what it can support through the subsequent phases. Phrased another way, one works forward (through the process path representation) to circumscribe what can be supported later with what is available earlier. Conversely, the set of actions noted or inferred for the Act phase can be projected via a sort of backward-chaining inference process to delineate what their accomplishment entails as far as observed data, comprehension, situation awareness, etc. Phrased another way, one works backward to enumerate what may be required to decide and effectuate a given action. Both strands of inference and analysis are pursued in a process of recursive ‘circulations’ back and forth through the model.

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As this process unfolds, the analyst / designer progressively weaves together a description for the informational and praxial elements comprising a workable environment for performing the target work activity. This description is the basis for designing an IS artifact whose form and function is geared to the worker’s 1PP as she conducts the target work activity. Obviously, such procedures mandate considerable effort and discipline on the part of the analyst(s) and designer(s). Owing to the focus on subjective factors, it is difficult to establish or exploit objective standards or ‘universals’ in framing analytical results or demonstrating value added. If anything, the phenomenologically-oriented analyst / designer must accomplish more than her methodologically conventional analogue, because she must both (a) generate analytical and design results plus (b) establish a comprehensible rationale for why these results should guide subsequent IS development. As such, the burden of effort and responsibility for adequately accomplishing analysis and design activities is at least as great, if not greater, when adopting a phenomenologically or hermeneutically informed protocol.

Illustrative Examples of Tactics for Fleshing Out the Model Fleshing out the basic schema above is a laborious but creative task. Interweaving the descriptive data on the early and late phases of the process cycle(s) may be pursued in a number of ways. In this section I shall offer illustrative examples for three of the more useful tactics I’ve identified over the years. All these tactics prioritize clues obtained from the workers themselves or discerned in observations of worker praxis, because there is no substitute for engagement with the people who actually perform the target work. The best clues for constructive interventions are derived not from what 'works', but from what doesn't. These shortcomings and pitfalls are typically evident only to the people who must confront them on a daily basis. Heideggerian 'breakdowns' are perhaps the most valuable clues, as evidenced by interruptions, problems, and digressions in conducting the target work. One quick observation of a worker 'stumbling' or performing a laborious workaround can be more valuable than hours of observation data on smoothly uneventful operations.

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Because my modeling and analysis approach emphasizes the work process path, discerning the actual course of work activity is critical to success. A particularly rich source of clues lies in any personally- or locally-created work aids (checklists, 'cheat sheets', and the like) the workers have generated to support their own praxis. Where such aids have been developed, one can usually assume the work activity entails complexities that must be addressed or accommodated in the eventual IS design. Such homegrown aids can provide direct evidence of gaps or deficiencies in current work support, and in some cases I've found them to be directly convertible into well-accepted IT features and artifacts. In any case, a robust description of actual praxis gives the designer an inventory of steps, terms, and / or actions that should be reflected in the eventual design. The analytical objective in this IS design approach is to identify what a worker knows (or needs to know) and when she knows (or needs to know) it in the course of her praxis. To correlate these key phenomenal or hermeneutic events with the process path I sometimes conduct what I call a 'horizon exercise'. Given a progression or stepwise activity being studied, I will generate a set of key information elements relevant to performing the activity - e.g., data to be obtained, analytical results to be generated, decision factors to be considered, and so forth. The subject matter expert is then presented with an outline of the activity's phases or stages (e.g., a series of open blocks on a whiteboard). I then go through the list of information elements and ask the SME to indicate at what point in the sequence she will or should know or need to know that particular item. Figuratively speaking, I am probing for the 'horizons' of information and knowledge traversed along the process path. This permits me to obtain evidence of correlations among information elements with respect to one or another situated state along the process path. This sets the stage for identifying (a) information requirements for each of the process path's stages, (b) dependencies of information elements on prior information and actions, and (c) clusters of interrelated information elements suggestive of interface contents. As illustrated in this and the preceding section, I’ve compiled a set of frameworks and tactics capable of usefully supporting the most problematical aspects of phenomenologically-informed IS design. I make no claim that my own methodological repertoire is the only – or even the optimal – set of ‘tools’ for phenomenologically-informed IS design. My only intent is to make a more fundamental point – i.e., it is possible to

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assemble a theoretical and methodological ‘toolkit’ consistent with emphases on phenomenology and / or hermeneutics. At this early stage of development, phenomenologically- / hermeneutically-oriented IS designers have not closed – and in many cases have yet to substantively address - the issue of whether their theoretical preferences can be transformed into practical methods. Only after such methods are more widely created, refined and tested will we have any basis for considering the feasibility and optimality of any ‘toolkit’ prescription.

User ‘Phenomenology’ as the Object of Design Having now touched on selected themes I’ve applied from phenomenologically-oriented sources, I shall now revisit the earlier overview of my IS design work context and restate some points with more specific regard to these sources. From the worker's first-person perspective (1PP), work can be addressed as an unfolding series of problem solving incidents. Effective IS interfaces should aid a user in recognizing, analyzing and reacting to problems encountered in her praxis. The quality criterion for an interface design therefore becomes the degree to which it facilitates such problem solving. This requires the interface to provide everything a worker needs to perform the work at hand with no other extraneous or distracting features. In effect, the design process becomes oriented to inducing an improved ‘phenomenological domain’ (to use Maturana’s term very loosely) for the work activity. This in turn requires the designer to tailor the interface to reflect the way(s) in which the worker may optimally (most ‘transparently’; most directly) address problem situations. My approach to generating such interface designs begins with conceptualizing what is needed to address a given problem situation or scenario. The set of such situations to be addressed will have been derived as results of the process path analysis and cognitive processes analysis work cited above. These analyses should also have produced an understanding of the praxis associated with, and the information elements required for, comprehending and managing each such situation. Using these analytical results as a foundation, the designer must then generate one or more interface concepts tailored to accommodate or support each phase of the associated OODA cycle. For complex decision support tasks, the most important step in this process is identifying the problem's essential features or factors and then identifying the referential background or context most amenable

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to coherently portraying them. In other words, this is a matter of specifying the optimal point of view for addressing the problem - a vantage from which all salient aspects of the problem are discernible. The vantage is typically designed as a central display, around which are arrayed tools through which the user can (a) manipulate the vantage display's contents and (b) perform functions necessary to addressing and resolving the problem. These peripheral tools comprise a frame for the vantage display. Because this design strategy progresses from problem to vantage to frame, it has been labeled the Problem-Vantage-Frame approach (Eggleston & Whitaker, 2002). In effect, this strategy approaches design conceptualization with respect to the target worker’s first-person perspective. I use the term ‘worker’ rather than ‘user’, because the perspective sought is not the one a ‘user’ has on the IT artifact in front of her, but rather the one a ‘worker’ must have on the subject matter of the work she is attempting to perform through the IT artifact. Ideally, such an interface design enables the user to effectuate the entirety of the associated 'problem solving' OODA cycle through one display. To accomplish this, the visualization components must be configured to support all the worker perceptions and interpretations necessary to understand the problem, to evaluate alternatives, and in some cases to project the effects associated with a candidate course of action.

Evaluating Success As noted earlier, principles of phenomenology and / or hermeneutics are most applicable to the earlier stages of an IS design and development project. As the project proceeds, there arise two very interesting issues framed with respect these ideas’ demonstrable value: •

Design Concept Acceptance: What – if any – effect does adoption of these principles have on acceptance of the resultant design concepts during the course of the project?

•

Formal Product Evaluation: What – if any – effect does adoption of these principles have on the evaluation of the project’s product(s)?

Earlier I noted that a smooth flow of events without breakdowns is relatively uninformative. As such, the good news from my experience (i.e., a track record of concepts consistently accepted and products consistently evaluated as ‘good’) is - perhaps ironically - bad news for any89


one demanding definitive proof of such an approach’s value. This is especially true with regard to the latter question (regarding formal product evaluation). By the time a phenomenologically or hermeneutically informed design concept has been translated into a tangible IS artifact, many of the product’s particular features are directly attributable to choices made during the development phase, and this can impede assessments of the degree and extent to which such upstream orientations uniquely affected downstream outcomes. On the other hand, the benefits of a phenomenologically-informed design are to some extent subject to the same contextualization and testability as the benefits conventionally claimed and documented in IS development practices. If the design meets its objectives for providing a worker with a maximally ‘transparent’ window onto the subject matter of her praxis, that worker should be facilitated in performing her task more efficiently and more effectively. This means performancecentered metrics for measuring such improvements (e.g., reduced error rates; faster processing time per case) are therefore as applicable to this new approach as to traditional methodologies. In my experience, when formal quantitative evaluations of such design concepts have been performed the data has recommended their efficacy on the basis of such metrics. For what it’s worth, I suspect the points upon which one could claim more uniquely attributable benefits lie around the periphery of the specific task activity being addressed. By this I mean such points probably relate more to the worker’s personal (phenomenal; hermeneutic) engagement with her overall praxial flow than to any specific task within that flow. Such benefits are best illuminated if the evaluation context is framed with respect to a ‘recursive’ (internal) perspective on the worker’s performance rather than a ‘behavioral’ perspective from which her performance is framed with regard to inputs and outputs. In the case of decision-intensive tasks, such points include (e.g.):

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The scope of possible alternatives made available for the decision maker’s consideration

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The depth to which the decision maker can explore and evaluate the features of a given candidate course of action

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The extent to which the decision maker can project and assess the outcomes and follow-on ramifications of a candidate course of action

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The facility with which the decision maker can interrupt her flow of praxis and resume again without losing situation awareness

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The facility with which the worker can maintain situation awareness over the current work stream (as contrasted with activity on one or another ‘case’ within that stream)

All these issues are conceivably addressable in quantitative terms. However, the scope and the fidelity of a simulation environment capable of supporting illustration and measurement of such factors typically exceed conventional projects’ aspirations or capacities. In any case, the ascribed value of such an approach with respect to both concept acceptance and formal evaluation will be directly proportional to the degree to which actual workers / users are involved as evaluators. Because such concepts are tailored to fit and facilitate workers’ personal work experience, such merits as they may offer will be most apparent to the workers themselves. Just as project engagement is critical at the project’s outset (e.g., in knowledge acquisition), it becomes similarly critical at the close. In between those two junctures it is the responsibility of the analyst / designer to serve as a ‘user advocate’ to ensure the earlier insights are preserved in the form of the eventual products. The most extreme case of worker engagement in my own experience also serves as my nominee for the most clear-cut illustration of what ‘success’ really means. The project was a research study intended to analyze an entire population (less than 10 in number) of certain planners and to devise concepts for better IS support tools. Weeks of preparation led to days of on-site observation and discussion with the workers in their daily workplace. I was able to collect worker-generated work aids (checklists, etc.) and to observe deficiencies causing breakdowns in their praxial flow. In the end I made a single summary presentation to the entire worker population accompanied by an even larger ‘secondary’ audience of operational managers, IS managers, and IT contractors. After presenting my analytical conclusions and design concepts, I asked for feedback and comments. The increasingly awk-

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ward silence was broken when one after another of the workers spoke up to state I’d (a) understood their work, (b) identified issues even they hadn’t recognized, and (c) offered design concepts whose merits they grasped at first glance. I left the meeting feeling extremely gratified and ‘validated’, and the research project was deemed a success. Some 3 years later I was at the same worksite working on another project. I ran into one of the original subject matter experts from three years before, who had become a manager for the planners I’d studied. He told me he wanted to show me something and led me to his office. He logged onto his computer workstation and invoked the software application used by the planners. What I saw was my PowerPoint design illustration instantiated in functional software. My host advised me that he and other the planners had been so firmly convinced of my analysis and design’s merits that they’d proactively lobbied their organization until the concept was built and deployed. Given the organizational setting, this was an extraordinary occurrence. Just as I’d argued years before, the interface allowed them to perform their complicated planning activities with maximum situation awareness and minimal errors – even under the duress of the largest workload surge the organization had ever experienced. I have created praxio-focal concepts whose viability has been quantitatively demonstrated with statistical significance. I have created visualization concepts whose viability has been practically demonstrated by their perseverance across multiple generations of software applications. Nonetheless, my tears at learning that one concept’s fate remain the validation I consider most incontrovertible. To my mind, the fact that my results motivated the workers themselves to champion the concept makes that one project the very definition of a successful intervention wrought by focusing on the subjective aspects of work praxis. This admittedly anecdotal example is not the only one. Since 1999 there have been a total of five substantial decision support artifacts designed via this approach – all of which have been accepted by the target user community and moved forward to development and deployment. Though one may argue such acceptance doesn’t constitute ‘objectively demonstrable proof’ that phenomenology and hermeneutics can constructively inform IS design, neither can one refute the fact these outcomes constitute empirical evidence for the claim that applying these ideas can aid the IS designer in ‘doing IS design right’. As a practitioner, this latter fact is more than sufficient for my purposes.

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Conclusion The issues surrounding application of phenomenology and hermeneutics in IS design extend well beyond the selected sample presented in this paper. Still, this presentation should be sufficient to illustrate that phenomenological topics need not remain confined to philosophical debates. Both phenomenology and hermeneutics offer insights that can inform better IS design and development practices. The difficulty lies in developing practices based on these theories. I would claim I have achieved "meaningful use" of these theories in the sense that I've evolved tactics for accommodating their tenets in real-world projects and seen those projects' IS products be consistently accepted and deployed. As stated at the outset, this has been a report of field experience in the course of my own quest to improve IS design through application of principles derived from phenomenology and hermeneutics. This paper represents "reflection on use" of these theories, thus hopefully completing an iteration of a hermeneutic cycle. To summarize, the results of this reflection include the following points: •

Phenomenology and / or hermeneutics do not and cannot represent a comprehensive alternative to the entirety of conventional IS project methodology. These ideas are of primary utility when addressing individual workers in the course of their work. They are not necessarily so illuminating with respect to (e.g.) purely social / organizational or purely technological aspects of the work milieu.

•

The primary opportunities for leveraging phenomenological and / or hermeneutic ideas lie in the opening phases of the IS project path. These ideas pertain to the worker’s subjective experience, and this experience is more relevant to initially understanding the problem rather than subsequently constructing a solution.

•

The burden of effort and responsibility for adequately accomplishing these earlier phases is at least as great, if not greater, when adopting a phenomenologically or hermeneutically informed protocol. Simply waving one’s hands and invoking academic terminology neither gets the job done nor convinces anyone in the workaday world that these ideas have practical merit. In

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any case, analyzing a target worker’s phenomenological / hermeneutic processes is at least as involved as analyzing her observable task procedures. •

It is possible to assemble a theoretical and methodological ‘toolkit’ consistent with emphases on phenomenology and / or hermeneutics. As illustrated above, I’ve compiled a set of frameworks and models capable of usefully supporting problematical aspects of phenomenologically-informed IS design.

•

It requires considerable effort and creativity to equip oneself with both theoretical and methodological toolkits for phenomenologically or hermeneutically informed design. As illustrated by my own theoretical explorations, I found it necessary to range across multiple disciplines to locate useful concepts, theories, and models. These still had to be augmented with novel tactics developed over the years.

•

At least to some extent, the merit in applying these ideas can be demonstrated. As indicated in the section on evaluation issues, adopting these philosophical inspirations need not mean abandoning rational evaluation of outcomes. However, it does entail confronting ambiguities concerning whether specific outcomes are uniquely attributable to the influence of these philosophical ideas.

In closing, let me return to the story of the 1990 train encounter. I never met that German hermeneutics scholar again, and I have no idea whether our conversation had any influence on him or his work. For my own part, I came away from that night believing the theoretical applicability of phenomenology and hermeneutics to IS design was ‘good news’, and that the next step was to explore the possibilities for transforming this theoretical prospect into practical benefits. As described throughout this article, I’ve invested over 15 years in such exploration. I attribute the bulk of my subsequent success as an IS analyst and designer to the insights phenomenology and hermeneutics afforded me.

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References Boyd, J. (1987). A discourse on winning and losing. Montgomery AL: Air University Library, Maxwell AFB. Report no. MU 43947. Checkland, P. (1981). Systems thinking, systems practice. New York: Wiley. Docherty, P., Fuchs-Kittowski, K., Kolm, P., & Mathiassen, L. (Eds.). (1987). Systems design for human development and productivity: Participation and beyond. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Eggleston, R. (2003). Work-centered design: A cognitive engineering approach to system design. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. 47th Annual Meeting, Santa Monica CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 263–267. Eggleston, R., & Whitaker, R. (2002). Work centered support system design: Using organizing frames to reduce work complexity. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 46th Annual Meeting, Santa Monica CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 265 - 269. Eggleston, R., Young, M., & Whitaker, R. (2000). Work-centered support system technology: A new interface client technology for the battlespace infosphere. Proceedings of NAECON 2000, Dayton OH, 10-12 October, 499-506. Ehn, P. (1988). Work-oriented design of computer artifacts. Stockholm: Arbetslivcentrum. Greenbaum, J., & Kyng, M. (Eds.). (1991). Design at work: Cooperative design of computer systems. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Maturana, H. (1978). Biology of language: The epistemology of reality. In G. Miller & E. Lenneberg (Eds.), Psychology and biology of language and thought (pp. 27-64). New York: Academic Press. Maturana, H., & Varela, F. (1980). Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Maturana, H., &Varela, F. (1992). The tree of knowledge: The biological roots of human understanding. Boston: Shambhala. Peirce, C. S. (1935). Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volumes 1 – 6. Hartshorne, C., and Weiss, P. (eds.). Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Radnitzky, G. (1970). Contemporary schools of metascience, Göteborg: Akademiförlaget.

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Phenomenology and Hermeneutics in ISD Rasmussen, J. (1986). Information processing, and human-machine interaction: An approach to cognitive engineering. New York: Elsevier Science. Scott, R., Roth, E., Deutsch, S., Malchiodi, E., Kazmierczak, T., Eggleston, R., Kuper, S., &Whitaker, R. (2005). Work-centered support systems: A human-centered approach to intelligent system design. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 20(2), 73-81. Varela, F. (1979). Principles of biological autonomy. New York: Elsevier. Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. von Foerster, H. (1981). Observing systems, Seaside, CA: Intersystems Publications. von Glasersfeld, E. (1984). Radical constructivism. Washington: Falmer Press. Whitaker, R. (1992). Venues for contexture: A critical analysis and enactive reformulation of group decision support systems. Umeå (Sweden): Umeå Universitet, ADB (Dept. of Administrative Data Processing / Informatics) dissertation / report UMADP-RRIPCS 15.92. Whitaker, R. (1998). Encyclopaedia autopoietica. Online reference guide to autopoietic theory concepts. Available at http://www.enolagaia.com/EA.html Winograd, T., & Flores, F. (1986). Understanding computers and cognition: A new foundation for design. Norwood NJ: Ablex.

Biography Dr. Randall Whitaker is a senior human factors analyst with Northrop Grumman Information Technology, Vice-President for Electronic Publications - American Society for Cybernetics, and creator / manager of the Observer Web (the largest online resource on the work of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela).

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Pedagogy and Process in 'Organisational Problem-Solving' John Paul Kawalek Sheffield University, UK [email protected]

Abstract This paper outlines a case study in which a management development learning process was tightly coupled to organisational change and development objectives. The case discusses how a research and consulting team came together to develop highly reflexive pedagogy to support the work of internal managers who were organized into teams (learning sets) to undertake 'organisational problem solving'. These learning sets had as their objective, to become catalysts of organisational change and 'performance improvement' within a large organisation. In order to structure the discourse amongst learning set members, a range of principles and constructs were used. Central to these was a form of process modelling, (termed 'models of teleological human process'), derived from Systems Theory. These were carefully introduced to learning set members, and were used to provide a 'basis for a discourse' amongst set members about 'problematic' organisational processes and how to change them. Each learning set was considered a social process in which the principles and constructs had an intrinsic power role, in a process which was purposely designed to integrate the subjective understandings of complex organisational situations of the set members. The learning sets were operationalised in a 2-day workshop followed by a three month period which was supported by an e-learning technology infrastructure. During each phase, the learning sets were facilitated by Material published as part of this publication, either on-line or in print, is copyrighted by the Informing Science Institute. Permission to make digital or paper copy of part or all of these works for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that the copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage AND that copies 1) bear this notice in full and 2) give the full citation on the first page. It is permissible to abstract these works so long as credit is given. To copy in all other cases or to republish or to post on a server or to redistribute to lists requires specific permission and payment of a fee. Contact [email protected] to request redistribution permission.


Organisational Problem-Solving

learning set advisers. The pedagogy, methods and learning outcomes are outlined in this paper. Keywords: Pedagogy, Teleology, Processes, Organisational Change, ERP, e-Learning.

Introduction The research work that is articulated in this paper concerns the challenges, problems and vagaries of developing unstructured problembased learning processes for organisation development. The project was called the ‘OPS project’ (i.e. the ‘Organisational Problem Solving’ project). This project was an addendum to the research activities undertaken in a European research project called MEDFORIST (see MEDFORIST, 2006). The MEDFORIST project involved developing problem-based learning processes in which members of the MEDFORIST community could share experience, resources, techniques, learning etc., in a way that would help them to undertake their roles, and improve their practice, within their own specific situations. The MEDFORIST community were geographically dispersed across the Mediterranean region, and thus there were considerable challenges in integrating the problem-based learning given the diversity in members' social, economic and political contexts: a central tenet of the research was to evaluate the use of e-learning technologies in mediating the problem-based pedagogy. The OPS project was an implementation of the same principles. However, unlike the MEDFORIST project, this follow-on project was undertaken in a commercial context, in which the research was to be applied with the intention that it provided commercial benefits, by providing organisational performance improvements. Internal managers of a large utility company in the US were to undergo management development in ‘organisational problem-solving’ and simultaneously, they were expected to apply their learning in order to undertake ‘change actions’ aimed at controlled organisational development via on-gong reflective practice. Since organisational development occurs over time, the managers (or 'agents of change') were expected to be working in geographically dispersed locations; they were also expected to integrate their ‘change actions’ within their everyday working situations. It was therefore considered essential to support their work with an e-learning environment, and to integrate suitable longitudinal problem based pedagogic processes.

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A new research team was formed. One of the core members of MEDFORIST was joined by another who had been interested (but not centrally involved) in that initiative. These two were joined by two new members from a US based University, to form a new research team. The common interest of the research team in the OPS project stemmed from the pedagogic challenges at the practical, everyday level, which was demanded by the commercial partner. As in MEDFORIST, the learning and action was to be 'driven' by organising managers into learning sets, which were to be given an 'internal consultant' role. In the OPS project, the sets were to be given the challenge of instigating rapid but controlled change. As will be seen, by using a set of principles and constructs, and integrating their latent knowledge of organisation, the learning sets made some dramatic changes to the organisation, including change to an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) computer application. There were innumerable learning points that arose from this, both for learning set members, and the research and consulting team who were involved in the organisational change initiative. The project was based in a large private sector organisation called GW Power Utilities (for the purposes of confidentiality, a nom de plume is used). Although the core purpose was stated as ‘… to provide a range of training and development programmes to meet the strategic objectives of GW Power Utilities’ (GW Power Utilities, 2003, p.2), the implicit objective was simply to instigate organisational 'improvement' through management development. In considering the design of the project, the tendering phase became focused on how to build management teams so that they became “…organisational problem solvers rather than fire-fighters…” (p.3). During the initial discussions, the research team argued that the problem-based learning approach of MEDFORIST had high potential for helping to satisfy the perceived strategic need for organisation improvement. The subsequent design discussions were largely centred upon a number of inter-related questions: •

what was the constitution of skills in ‘organisational problemsolving’;

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how to go about designing a learning process for managers to develop such skills;

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how to organise various activities in order to achieve 'effective' application of the learning process;

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how to evaluate the effectiveness of the learning process.

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The research questions centred upon developing the underpinning methodological principles, and in turn, to answer some of these through the application of the principles into practice, and the evaluation of them, from the experience of practice. These tended to focus on the pragmatics of the project, but the researchers also had some other, and rather more fundamental, interests. For instance, since the researchers were charged with the responsibility of becoming actively involved in the operationalisation of various aspects of the project, it had the essential hallmarks of a typical 'mode 2' study. This is the thesis that has appeared regularly in the Management journals in response to anxieties that have been expressed by senior academics about the lack of relevancy in much academic research activity (see for example, Abrahamson & Eisenman, 2001; Benbasat & Zmud, 1999; Bolton & Stolcis, 2003; Davenport & Markus, 1999; Gopinath & Hoffman, 1995; Hambrick, 1994; Hodgkinson, 2001; Hodgkinson, Herriot, & Anderson, 2001; Huff, 2000; Huff & Huff, 2001; Lyytinen, 1999; Mclean & MacIntosh, 2002; Watson, Taylor, Higgins, Kadlec, & Meeks, 1999). Broadly speaking, the mode 2 thesis argues that researchers can simultaneously increase the relevance of their research, and provide much needed rigour in practical domains if they were to become integrated to form a 'collaborative partnership' (see Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000; Fujigaki & Leydesdorff, 2000; Gibbons, 2000; Gibbons et al., 1994; Grant, 2002; Harvey, Pettigrew, & Ferlie, 2002; MacLean, MacIntosh, & Van Aken, 2001; Starkey & Madan, 2001; Tranfield & Starkey, 1998; Wasser 1990). This is not without some significant challenges from a research perspective. For example, such research sits uncomfortably with the rigours of commonly perceived assumptions about the ‘scientific process’: on the one hand, generally speaking, university researchers wish to benefit from collaborative partnerships, but rightly tend to be very wary of relinquishing their grip on the perceived ‘science’ of their research. Collaborative partnership often implies solving client problems (e.g. as in consultancy), which are dynamic and ephemeral. Thus, it is commonly perceived that it is difficult to maintain the dual role of solving problems and at the same time, applying the rigours of certain types of academic research. For the research team it was considered an opportunity to engage with the ‘mode 2’ debate, and to explore some of the methodological issues that arise from the operationalisation of 'mode 2' type of research. It was perceived to be an opportunity to question how the 'science' of Management is perceived by researchers.

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In addition, the involvement in the case gave an opportunity for the research team to explore the pedagogy and to contrast it with the knowledge generated with 'dominant pedagogy' in the Management field. For example, generally speaking, pedagogy in Management (e.g. in universities) commonly introduces 'theory' but often does little more than engage with rather passive case studies in order to relate that theory to practice. Such cases are often highly 'sanitised' in the sense that the ambiguities, complexities, contradictions, unexpected outcomes, ambivalences, etc., are ignored. In a way, this might be considered to be a highly passive pedagogy, in the sense that it does not actively encourage the engagement in the everyday ambiguities, contradictions, anxieties, frustrations etc. inherent in practice, and might be considered to be problematic in highly applied fields (e.g. Management). This can result in pedagogy which maintains a separation between 'theory' and 'practice'. However, there are scientific schools, which do not strictly separate theory and practice (for an example of such schools, see Radnitzky, 1970, Vol. II, pp. 1-3). These schools go towards increasing emancipation and transparency: the self awareness of human agents that helps them to emancipate themselves from the hypostatised forces of society and history. Recent concerns have been skirting around the consequences, issues and challenges of such a separation in ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ (see for example Geisler, 1995; Guport & Sporn, 1999; Serow, 2000; Ylijoki 2003a, 2003b,). In particular, some of the recent concerns have expressed concern about management development programmes: it is often said that MBA programmes are ‘good in theory’, but remain ‘…irrelevant to practice’! This of course is worrying in a pedagogic sense; it is also financially worrying to universities and business schools in declining MBA markets.

Pedagogy Design: Underpinning Principles Early in the project there were two core objectives considered and ‘agreed’, which were (i) ‘…to help identify and facilitate middle and senior ranking managers to become 'change agents'…’ (a management development objective), and (ii) ‘…to instigate controlled change in the organisation…’, (an organisation development objective). These two were integrated by certain underpinning principles. Firstly, it was considered reasonable to assume that (i) any organisational situation is rather messy, muddled and complex (see Ackoff, 1962, 1978; Ashby, 1973; Flood & Carson, 1993), and (ii) human accounts of the 'situation', its 'problems' and 'solutions' can be subjected to critical analysis, in a process of learning. For 101


example, managerial work often involves dealing with situations that are characterised by a multiplicity of perspectives and interwoven issues and interpretations associated with people, tasks, processes, technologies, power groupings, global market changes, which cross functional boundaries ('marketing' 'finance', 'human resources' etc). If organisations were not messy, complex or muddled, then it is probable that organisational change work could be automated, with fairly rigid or algorithmic activities, ('if x condition, then do y' etc). Therefore, 'making sense of’ such situations is as problematic as the situation itself (see Bateson's 1948/1972 formidable articulation about 'making sense of muddles'). 'Making sense of' a given organisational situation is complex because it involves at least a number of inter-related tasks. For example, it typically involves: •

analysis of the interconnectivity of issues in a given problematic organisational situation (e.g. human behaviour, tasks, processes, attitudes, power dimensions, social structure, communications, control, assumed goals etc);

•

observation and interpretation of humans' viewpoints, behaviours etc;

•

abstracting and clarifying during the process of analysis, observation and interpretation of a given situation, and thus seeking suitable recognisable 'patterns' in a situation, which are sufficient to help gain insights, without oversimplification;

•

evaluating how other cases, experiences, methods, methodologies, concepts, techniques, frameworks etc. might help in developing insight into either a 'current' or 'desired' situation, without losing sight of the unique characteristics of a specific situation;

•

consideration of what is or what is not possible in terms of intervention of one kind or another to bring about changes in one or more areas whilst acknowledging the particular contextual complexities.

Therefore, it is the process of 'making sense of' that is required to be subjected to critique, because it is this that defines the perceptions of the 'problem situation'. In other words, anyone describing a given 'problematic situation' in an organisation, is at the same time expressing

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their process of 'making sense of' it, regardless of the irrationalities in the process (see also Weick, 2001). Further, if it was assumed that the process of 'making sense of' is teleological (i.e. it is purposeful), then it is incumbent on managers, consultants, researchers etc, to be willing to subject to critique their purposefulness inherent in its undertaking. This is very challenging in practice, because in the process of 'making sense of' there is diversity in purpose, related to wider social dimensions, e.g. power, ego, vested interests, experience, role relationships etc., (see also Argyris, 1990). Furthermore, and following from this, it was taken 'as given' that change in an organisational situation will only be possible if there is change in the way managers and stakeholders 'make sense of' them. This simple idea can help to integrate the process of change and learning conceptually because, in undertaking a particular type of learning, it is possible to challenge the accounts on given organisational situations, and how to change those situations. This acknowledges the subjectivity and interpretive process that is involved in analysing a human situation, e.g. in an organisation (see Gadamer, 1988). It was therefore recognised that there was great potential in a process of the subjective exploration and accounts of the human action in (i) analysing organisational situations, (ii) the interpretation of the organisational situations themselves, and (iii) changing those organisational situations. The problems and challenges in doing this, concerns the subjective accounts of people in organisations (e.g. managers), 'making sense of’ their own lived experience (see Schutz, 1972, p. 45-96). On embarking on this, the research team considered that dealing with these aspects was to be an essential component of a pedagogy for 'organisational problem-solving' within GW Power Utilities. On the one hand there had to be room for exploring the subjective accounts of both the issues of concern, and on the other, to consider how certain organisational changes might ‘help’ in some way to ‘resolve’ some of these issues. But the accounts would be required to be subjected to critique in terms of the teleology inherent in those accounts, and the basis and assumptions inherent in those subjective accounts. Thus ‘organisational problem-solving’ was considered a learning process; it was a considered to be the provision of a social process by which groups of managers could explore their own and each others’ subjective accounts. Therefore the research team considered ‘problem-solving’ not to be an assumed outcome, but was considered a goal, albeit an unachievable

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goal, but one which gave purpose and focus to a social process. In order to control a social process, the key managers of GW Power Utilities were organized into small teams (‘learning sets’). The learning set was considered a way to aid communication, underpinned by the hermeneutic concern for inquiry into levels of co-understanding and/or negotiated agreement of members (see Radnitzky, 1970, Vol. II, p. 20). In doing this, it was also considered that it was essential to provide a language of sorts, to help communicate and critique learning set members' accounts (i.e. each of their 'making sense of'). This is consistent with the hermeneutic notion that a development in knowledge cannot exist without ‘foreknowledge’: that there must be a set of assumptions, embodied in language (see Radnitzky, 1970, Vol. II, p. 24). In order to establish a language of sorts that could mediate between set member, the research team had to invent a particular view of managerial work; in practice this involved considering that ‘organisational problem-solvers’ were ‘designers’ of some sort (see also Van Aken, 2005). For example, it was considered that the role of a manager involves (in part) ‘planning’, ‘optimising’ and ‘organising’, and that these types of managerial activities are designed to meet some desired outcome. Thus a manager can be considered to be involved in designing the construction of organised action (or ‘processes’) in order to undertake a current or future task; or designing intervention in order to try to change (and 'improve') one or more humanly organised processes. Ideally perhaps, the nature of the design of organisation or of intervention will be derived from a stream of thinking about the effectiveness (and possibilities) of the design (or more accurately, 'that being designed') in meeting a desired outcome. In that sense the undertaking of managerial work was considered to exhibit characteristics which might be considered to be teleological, i.e. they are 'goal seeking'. Their ‘designs’ (to meet a variety of goals) are, in practice, often hidden from the view of others, but can be made more explicit by being communicated to others in some way, via language and discourse. The language and discourse however, is reliant on a level of shared meaning, and as such can be facilitated by conceptual constructs that can help in both co-understanding, and expressing issues concerning organisational processes, their designs and outcomes. The language was to help facilitate the explicit articulation of ‘problems’ and potential ‘actions’. This explicit articulation was a ‘simplified representation’ of an individual member’s implicit curiosity about the nature of organisational ‘problems’ and ‘actions’, and the result of the social process of the learning set. As such, the language, and the social proc-

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ess, could be seen as simultaneously hiding issues and concerns, as well as enabling the articulation of them. It was considered the role of the learning set, assisted by a learning set adviser, to provide a legitimate forum for the exploration of the ‘problems’ and ‘actions’. It was recognised however that there are some significant differences in the design work involved in the design of physical things and the design work involved in organisations. Unlike designers of physical things (cars, bridges, buildings, robots, computers), managerial work was considered to involve the design of 'organisation' which is only ever a concept. That is to say, an organisation has both physical and non-physical elements, i.e. it involves physical things like people, technologies, machines and also non-physical elements such as activities, tasks, attitudes, data, motives, knowledge, power, control. In engineering physical things, (cars, bridges, buildings, robots, computers), the physical artefact that is designed is an outcome of the conceptualisation of it. However, in the equivalent task in organisations, the outcome is not a physical artefact. It is only ever a concept. Thus in the OPS project, ‘design’ was considered to involve the design of concepts(!) and this has some very important implications for the way that the communication between learning set members was to be enabled. For example, it was perceived that communication could only be achieved using ‘models’ of sorts which could be conceptualised in the mind, and drawn on paper. It was assumed that their purpose would be to convey ideas about organisational processes. Thus, it was perceived that the learning set members would be required to communicate with each other using models of human organisation, which were sufficient to simplify and/or summarise in some way, the features of their perceived ‘design type’ ideas. The challenge for the research team was to find appropriate models of organisational process, in order to facilitate communication between learning set members, without constraining the exploration of their subjective accounts. During the OPS project, the researchers introduced 'process models', or more formally, 'teleological process models' as conceptual constructs. These were taken from classical systems theory, and their function was to help with the communication between learning set members. In design disciplines based on 'physical sciences' (e.g. Construction, Engineering) there are very clear principles, methods and techniques which can guide the designer, which is a situation that is significantly different to that in Management, where there are relatively poor

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‘design guidelines’. Humans have built physical things and are proven to be very effective at it. Management is immature in that the 'design principles' applied to human organisations is much less developed, and often naively applied. Further, in physical design disciplines, it is possible to be much clearer about how to evaluate the designed artefact (e.g. if a house is built badly it will fall down); a conceptual model of an organisational process which includes both physical and non-physical elements requires extremely precise thinking and communication. It was considered an idealistic goal, but a goal nonetheless, that appropriate modelling could simultaneously ‘improve’ the precision in thinking and the clarity and of communication of that thinking. The models were to be applied to current and future organisational processes, and were considered part of a process of 'making sense of' rather than a design in an absolute sense. The research team assumed that the process of explicitly expressing a given organisational model, and iteratively considering alternative models, might enable ‘continuous refinement’ in the learning sets. Further, by selecting from a set of alternative organisational models, it was considered that it may be possible for the members of the learning sets, to consider the desirability of a given model, in order to meet a set of perceptions about ‘desired outcomes’, in a given situation. However, it was also considered that a given ‘explicit expression’, can only partially reflect what is in the mind of the human (i.e. the process of ‘explicitly expressing’ using a model, will involve attenuation); further, the process of organisational model construction, refinement and selection is a human thought process which is itself teleological in nature (i.e. it is purposeful). The ideas about the models were located in a particular genre of management literature (e.g. Beer, 1985; Checkland, 1981; Checkland & Scholes, 1990; Churchman, 1971, 1982; Singer, 1959; Wilson, 1990, 2001). The modelling was to be used was to provide a ‘basis for discourse’, and as such the models, and the ‘systems’ constructs upon which they were based, was essentially an inquiring process. Thus the (systems) models of organisational process are an explicit expression which: •

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in some way describes the characteristics of an organisational activity, or set of activities, and describes the elements (people, tasks, technologies etc.) which when they are organised in a particular manner, are considered to produce outcomes;

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attempts to distinguish (at a conceptual level) the difference between various alternative models;

•

assesses the various potential outcomes of each alternative model for a specific situation, in order to achieve a specific purposeful objective;

•

will have sufficient clarity in order that communication is sufficient so that others can understand it;

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includes an evaluative analysis of how the modelling has informed the action of a manager in a given situation;

•

will attempt to develop general rules, abstractions or methodology, so to avoid the necessity of repeating the same thought processes when faced with similar goal seeking activities (see also Churchman 1971).

It was Churchman (1968, 1971, 1979, 1982), whose work in this area, brought teleology and modelling into management, and which established Systems Theory as a mainstream contributor to management ideas in theory and in practice. Broadly, and paraphrasing some key principles of his 1971 work, any human or organisational process: •

is purposeful, although its purpose can be 'hidden', and more or less substantiated by observations about behaviour and action;

•

has criteria upon which it is judged, although these criteria can be explicitly stated or hidden from view;

•

will serve sets of clients although the 'real clients' are sometimes hidden from view;

•

will have decision makers whose everyday actions and decisions serve to help the process evolve, underpinned by a set of social values, which may or may not be shared with others (e.g. ‘designers’, ‘clients’ etc);

•

contains integrated elements and components which can be considered teleological sub-processes, or elements which serve in some way to operationalise the whole, (e.g. tasks, activities, power groupings, communications and control mechanisms etc).

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It was these principles that informed the design of a pedagogy for the OPS project. The modelling was considered to be primarily concerned to help communicate perceptions about certain organisational processes to other learning set members, and to help managers to express their implicit knowledge of areas of operations. The function of the modelling was to be as rhetorical construct, in a process of considering the members' accounts of current and future operational organisational processes and the intervention actions, to change organisation. In order to develop a dynamic questioning and learning process, managers were to work in small teams ('learning sets'), to generate critiques of each others, and their own inquiring activities. These sets were designed to be mutually supportive 'safe havens' of sorts, to experiment with particular ideas and models, couched in the language of 'teleological process models'. The sets were to critique each others' use of the constructs, accounts and conclusions drawn. These small teams were to be facilitated using a university based learning set adviser. The use of learning set advisers was an acknowledgement that the use of concepts in practice will reflect the social processes in which they are used (i.e. within the social process of the sets, reflecting the power dimensions, frustrations and anxieties of the wider organisation). It was recognised that the constructs have intrinsic or potential power, and that they can be used purposely in various ways, in a given social process. That is to say, such constructs are not 'objective' nor value free, when used in social process in practice. The role of the learning set adviser was therefore, in part, to help the group unpick the social dimensions in which the constructs were to be used. Further, any depiction of a given organisational process, proposal for altering an organisational process, or the design of a new organisational process was (i) to be communicated via a set of models, (ii) acknowledged as being a product of the process of thinking and acting which constructed it (i.e. it was never to be considered 'objective' or 'correct' in an absolute sense). The learning programme therefore was to include:

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•

the nature of teleological models as they apply to organisational processes: this was to include aspects such as the nature of organisational processes as 'transformational entities', and some teleological issues in such processes;

•

the application of the teleological models: this was to include models of processes for control, measurement and moni-

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toring and models of organised processes (or sets of actions) for intervention and change. These two aspects of the pedagogy were built into separate components of the designed activities, see Figure 1.

1. Management Development in ‘Organisational Problem-solving’

3. Reflection and consolidation on action phase

2. Organisational Problem-solving In action

5. Evaluation

4. Monitoring

Figure 1: A sketch of the project as a set of inter-related processes

Operationalisation The first stage of the operationalisation (Process 1 in Figure 1), was realised as a two-day workshop in order to outline and establish certain foundational inquiring principles, and ‘foreknowledge’, upon which future inquiry could be based. It involved the application of some simple concepts, which were to assist small groups of managers, organised into learning sets, for the purpose of inquiring into current and future organisational processes. As detailed in the previous section, these were derived from systems ideas, and were presented as a set of constructs in an attempt to make them easy to access and to use, (e.g. ‘transformation’, ‘input-output’, ‘purpose’, ‘measures of performance’, ‘clients’, ‘designers’, ‘efficiency’, ‘effectiveness’, ‘control’ etc). During this phase, the managers were also encouraged to consider certain more generic inquiring activities and principles, (e.g. examining the relationship between their perceptions of ‘problems’ and ‘symptoms’, the application

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of critical reflections on assertions being made, inquiring into the basis of observations made…etc). Simultaneously, the learning sets were encouraged to analyse their own group process, the strengths and weaknesses of individuals in the group, actions, roles etc. Each learning set represented a social process of sorts, in which the explicit objective was to consider and justify their perceptions of: (i) 'problematic issues' and processes within the organisation, (ii) the designs of processes which might ‘help’ in some way, (iii) their own thinking and justifiying it to other members of a given learning set, (iv) other members' thinking with a view that it might be critiqued in a 'constructive manner'. The learning was intended to inspire new ideas, by providing a ‘new’ language of sorts, to encourage dialogue and communication about an individual manager’s own ‘lived experience’ of organisational processes. This centred on learning set members’ personal perceptions of organisational processes, their frustrations, anxieties, stories, ‘problems’ etc of operational issues. As such, one of the most important goals was perceived to be to ‘tap into’ the latent knowledge of the managers about the functionality and dis-functionality of organisational processes. The learning sets were to be the generators of an inquiring activity. As the learning sets matured, it was considered possible to introduce new concepts in order to deepen the inquiring activities. However, the constructs had to be carefully introduced so that they were used in order to clarify emergent issues and ideas within the sets; it was a consciously designed goal that the learning sets ‘pulled’ the application of a variety of constructs. The constructs themselves, were not considered the central goal of the discussions. Rather it was the organisational issues and processes that were of central concern, and the constructs were used as an enabler of sorts. The constructs only helped in the inquiring activities by providing a language and a legitimacy to discuss issues that were previously hidden or suppressed. In order to achieve this, the learning sets were given ‘advisers’ whose role it was to assist the set to access various constructs. Three of the four research team members were given learning set adviser roles. The fourth member was given responsibility for evaluation, and thus purposely not given a set adviser role. The learning set advisers were concerned with the how the constructs were being used and the related social process in which they were used (i.e. they can be used as a power weapon in a social process, or to purposely obscure the issues in hand etc). Learning set advisers were to 'monitor' the learning, stimulate discussions, help to identify flawed arguments and assertions, help groups

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to evaluate each others contributions, to help overcome some of the power or ego issues which were perceived to have the potential to inhibit a genuine discourse…etc. The learning set advisers had subject specialisms, but were specifically given responsibility to ensure that the human process of the set was fulfilling its objectives, which was centred on (i) 'organisational problem-solving' and (ii) learning about 'organisational problem-solving'. It was not about imparting subject knowledge to the learning sets. Towards the end of a two-day workshop, the teams were organised into 'on-line learning sets' with the view that Process 2 (in Figure 1) would be undertaken (partially) on-line. This was because participants were geographically dispersed. A technology platform was set up which could guarantee confidentiality amongst small teams, and could store documents and had synchronous and asynchronous discussion areas, and could integrate video's and sketches (e.g. set members drawings of models of organisational processes etc). The research team considered that confidentiality was essential because it was assumed that there could be some sensitive issues that could arise from the critical reflections and the explorations of ‘lived experience’. The technology platform also proved to be a very useful research tool, because it stored the learning set discussions. In the operation of the different sets, many themes, issues and actions emerged and, to provide an example of how they were operationalised, the activities of one learning set is outlined. It was serendipitous and co-incidental that the organisation had been undergoing substantial change as a result of investing heavily into a well known Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software platform (SAP r/3). It had not been planned that the OPS project, and the ERP project, would 'come together'. By the time the OPS project was starting, the ERP implementation was considered to be coming to an end. Indeed, the focus in the OPS project, on organisational processes might tend to suggest that it could have been done much earlier in order to maximise the changes that were already taking place as a result of the ERP project! This was because the OPS project re-opened many of the assumptions of the ERP implementation team. During the 2-day workshop, the research team had become aware of many anxieties expressed by the managers about the ERP implementation, and specifically recorded some of the expressions. For example, these are direct quotations, “…its very sophisticated, but I'm keeping well away…”, “…its pie in the sky stuff…”, “…bloody great white elephant if you ask me…”, “…it's a sledge-

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hammer and nut situation…”, and “…we spent millions on it, but as for business benefit, who knows?...”. These are not 'representative' in a formal sense, but the managers who were involved in the two-day workshop were consistently skeptical if not critical of the ERP, and this was a common theme in the discussions about problematic issues within the organisation. It came up so often, that one learning set took it upon themselves to consider the nature of processes, as teleological process models, and how the ERP was being used within each of these processes. This learning set gives a good example of some of the issues that emerged from the operationalisation of the learning sets in general, and indeed the operationalisation of the pedagogic principles. In the iterative modelling episodes that characterised the two day workshop, one of the objectives had been to model a process which had transformational characteristics articulated as “inputs” and “outputs”. One learning set had discussed how to model a process that transformed “bad information” to “good information”. This of course necessitated the learning set to explore a definition of both of these, and fortunately the learning set had such knowledge within its ranks! ... ‘Good information’ must be “timely”, “relevant”, “accurate”, “complete”, “cost effective” etc. One of the most enlightening moments occurred in discussion where the learning set adviser questioned the assumptions of the learning set. How easy would it be to transform ‘bad information’ to ‘good information’? The group recognised the flaw in their assumptions: these characteristics of 'good information' were indeed reasonable, but the learning set discussion was attempting to model the transformation in information, not the transformations involved in a grouping of work activities (i.e. an organisational process). The learning set recognised that its discussions were at the wrong starting point! It was not the information that needed to be transformed. It was the organisational process in which the information is used which is the correct starting point. It was a moment of real enlightenment for the learning set, because they had discovered it themselves, and resulted in significant inspiration. This set went much further, e.g. exploring the purposefulness of the ERP in terms of serving processes: (i) to coordinate or control actions in fulfilling the purpose of a given model of an organisational process, or (ii) to monitor a given process, in order to 'know' whether a given process is working or not.

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The learning set had recognised that the clarity of the models of organisational processes and the monitoring processes determined the function of the ERP. Aspects such as the dynamics, changeability, the degree of repetition or the level of mechanisation of a given process, determined, how the ERP was to be used. The original assumptions of the ERP implementation team were being challenged, within a constructive learning process in this learning set. Models of organisational processes, were drawn, and redrawn, and models of how it was to be monitored and controlled were also drawn and redrawn. In this way, the on-going discussions both in the two day workshop, and on-line, provided results that were startling. This was because the learning process had enabled a discourse by which internal managers could (i) evaluate the way the ERP was being applied currently, (ii) how it could be ‘optimised’, ‘improved’ or ‘changed’ in some way, or indeed ditched... as it related to the operation of given organisational processes, expressed as a given set of teleological process models. The OPS project had, without realising it, provided a forum for an engaged discourse, about organisational processes and the role that the ERP was playing in them. The learning set concluded that the methods applied by the ERP consultants had also '...started in the wrong place...'; i.e. it had started with technology and with information, but not on the vagaries of the organisational processes. The conclusions were that the ERP could not be applied effectively except in the most obvious or simple areas of work (i.e. where there was little ambiguity in the organisational process, its purpose, how it achieved its objectives etc). It certainly could not achieve an adequate organisational change process, i.e. in the OPS project, the learning sets had the responsibility for change, and thus the managers themselves were in some ways in control of the ERP application, rather than feeling that they were victims of it. The problem with the methods used for implementation was that they lacked an adequate learning process, and a focus on 'organisational problem-solving'. There were continued discussions during the operationalisation of the on-line learning set activities, all of which were recorded by the elearning platform. This gave an excellent data source for further analysis by the research team who could simultaneously consider the pedagogic and social processes of a given learning set, as well as developing their own insights into the current and future operational processes in the host organisation. Many proposals and actual changes to processes emerged, including the way the ERP was to be used within given organisational processes. For example, it had appeared that there had been

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serious delays in certain field operations, due to a combination of problematic issues concerning materials purchases, maintenance contracts and the hiring of temporary local labour. Some of the decision-making had been centralised in order to maintain financial control. One of the process changes that were recommended by a learning set was to decentralise such decisions. Control over financial expenditure was proposed in a different way, i.e. to be maintained by additional data to be added to the ERP databases, in order that information about maintenance contracts would be monitored centrally, but decisions taken locally. The learning set were charged with estimating efficiency and effectiveness gains, demonstrating that the changes were workable in practice, and outlining the processes and activities to make the change happen, including a half day workshop for those staff charged with increased decision making responsibilities. Central to this was the change to the ERP application: the ERP became an enabler, not the 'white elephant' as it was perceived of as being at the outset. Another emergent outcome of this was that the set realised that the effectiveness of the ERP can only be judged using models of organisational processes. An ERP cannot be evaluated without having clarity of the process models, and the inquiry into the ambiguities and complexities inherent in the processes in practice. Furthermore, the learning set discussed the limitations of the ERP implementation team, i.e. they had been too focused on a simplistic view of the organisational processes (and the 'rationality' in them), and had assumed that their key purpose was to attempt to optimise a given (rather ill-defined) process, by attempting to 'mechanise' it, which was only sometimes appropriate. The e-learning platform, recorded some of these discussions, “…they took their experience of another organisation, and imposed it on us…”, “…we don't work as machines in this company…”, “…they never really tried to understand how we do things ‘round here….”, “…lots of things changed… but nothing changed…”. During the period of the learning set, the research team concluded that (i) the implementation of the ERP had not been done in a manner which integrated a substantial learning process into it; (ii) there had been little critical reflexivity or learning actions in the discussion that had taken place with 'users', and that (iii) the underlying assumption of the ERP implementation was to 'make things more systematic' – i.e. more mechanical, and more rationalised, but there remained lots of questions about how effective some of these changes had been. It was

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concluded by the research team, that in considering processes, the ERP team had not harnessed the latent knowledge of managers in a way that the OPS project was doing, and thus had a relatively naïve view of the realities of operating processes in practice, and had made a number of assumptions: •

they had started in the wrong place, as the learning set had done, and were primarily focused on issues concerning ‘improving’ information, not on articulating how information serves a given organisational process or the monitoring of a given process;

•

they had assumed that a given process had clear purposeful objectives, rather than the contradictory and ambivalent human objectives that characterise human organisations in practice; and

•

they had assumed that their role was to make a process 'more rational' or 'more mechanistic'.

Whilst these may be familiar to specialists in the field, these were conclusions drawn directly from the learning set's activities, and were considered to be very significant by the research team because it provided a way in which future ERP applications could be applied into other organisations… i.e. by using similar pedagogy in learning sets, which attempted to critically appraise and change organisational processes. This was seen as significant by the research team because pedagogy of the OPS project had provided a structure of sorts for attempting the ‘optimisation’ of ERP applications.

Findings and Learning Outcomes The operationalisation of the project gave innumerable learning outcomes. Firstly, it demonstrated the use of teleological models of process in a number of areas. For instance, it enabled a way of developing discourse in order to gain new insights by members of the learning sets. Indeed, the use of teleological process modelling in the design and operationalisation of projects, itself became an area which was considered to have high potential for future change initiatives (e.g. in ERP implementations). One of the most important aspects of the project was in the way systems ideas were integrated into the pedagogy. The research team found

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that these conceptually demanding constructs could be used and applied by the managers involved. Initially, it had been a cause of some anxiety amongst the research team, that these ideas, largely derived from Churchman (1971), might not easily be usable for practice based inquiring activities. Prior to the commencement of the project, there was substantial discussion about the usability of the ideas, and how they could be conveyed in an integrated and cohesive manner. It was feared that the managers might find these ideas to be not sufficiently pragmatic, or might not be able to apply them to help them to think about organisational processes in their own contexts (i.e. there were fear that the managers may not consider these ideas to be 'in the real world'!). Amongst those who formed the research team, there was an ex-teacher, who had been concerned to insert 'learning markers' and 'checks' of sorts, into the two-day workshop which helped with the clarity, retention and application of the systems concepts. During the evaluation work (Process 5 in Figure 1), this was considered an enormous help in enabling the managers to apply some of the principles effectively, and quickly, and thus enabling a very rapid discussion on both problems of current processes, and how they could or should be changed. Towards the end of Process 1, teams were so immersed and engrossed in the application of such models, that they continued to work beyond the allotted time given, and were eager to continue discussions. This is not to say that there was no ‘dissent’. Indeed, some of the managers had brought with them particular political agenda's, or gripes and various motives. This was seen as inevitable prior to the commencement of the workshop. At first, this was unnerving, as it appeared at one stage that the workshops could degenerate into a 'whinging session'. However, the managers generally appeared responsive to the intellectual constructs being used, and were intrigued by the critical reflexive component, which encouraged them to reflect in small learning set groups on their own individual motives, informal roles etc. This proved to be a key aspect because the groups themselves were explicitly encouraged to 'untangle' such issues during the process. Indeed, the evaluation study suggested that the initial dissention proved to be “… a positive, because it brought into the open issues that could have otherwise have been hidden…” (GW Power Utilities, 2005, p.5). Another aspect of the pedagogy was that the individuals had been encouraged to avoid jumping to 'solution mode' without analysing the nature of the problems. This again was an important aspect because, many managers tended to bring with them ideas about what needed to change within GW Power Utilities, with what

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appeared to be varied levels of justification. It was in the process of justification that these could be scrutinised by a given learning-set, and be subjected to critical appraisal, in a negotiated social process, facilitated by the constructs, pedagogy etc. The research team perceived that a second significant outcome concerned the pedagogy during the e-learning phase. The research team had been most interested in this, partly because of the on-going research into knowledge management and e-learning. This project provided some very useful insights into the use of the e-learning approach. For instance, in this case, the pedagogy was characterised as being a 'problem-solving' process, in which groups were allocated specific goals (defined at the end of the face-to-face workshop). The learning was to be undertaken in small learning groups, with high levels of critical reflexivity, but with highly targeted outcomes. Each learning set was able to make proposals for changes to organisational operations, or to identify issues, concerns or constraints to any suggested changes. The teleological process models were to provide a language of sorts, in this process. The justification implied that the learning set members were involved in inquiry of sorts, into the specifics of current or future organisational situations, and integrating a range of different perspectives etc. This was a very target driven approach in inquiry and in 'problem solving', and had pedagogical implications. It was considered that this approach, within the context of e-learning, was one that gave focus and purpose to the learning sets. It was in fact, the clarity of the purpose that enabled the approach to be useful. Without such clarity of purpose, it was assumed that there would be no possibility for groups to work together effectively. This point came out clearly in the monitoring processes, and in the reflections of the learning set advisers (Process 5 in Figure1). It was considered that each learning set could be considered to be a teleological social process: modelling the process of a learning set in this way, provided insights into the behaviours and decisions of the individuals in each set. In practice, the learning set members each had different goals for participating. It was the alignment of such goals, with the highly targeted ‘problem-solving’ goals of the whole set, which largely defined the evolving role of the learning set adviser. In practice, it meant keeping a learning set focused on the problem-solving goals, structuring and clarifying a learning set’s discussions, activities and actions, clarifying the agenda's of the set, targets, timescales, responsibilities etc., and ensuring that each member was both given the opportu-

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nity for expressing their perspectives, as well as evaluating each others’ perspectives and actions. A further area that the research team considered important concerned 'mode 2' research. This was a project in which the researchers had been integrated into project teams. This itself was a social process and each member brought their own goals, experience, knowledge, motives, cultural traditions, expectations etc. As in the learning sets, the social processes were mediated through language and ultimately, it was the social processes which were to determine outcomes and how those outcomes would be judged. Thus research findings and knowledge generated, was ultimately mediated by the social traditions of a diverse and heterogeneous group (researchers, consultants, managers, executives etc). In doing this, there were obvious contradictions and ambiguities. For example, the researchers had to fulfil roles that were seemingly in conflict: (i) to play a role in the design, operations, monitoring and evaluation of the project, and (ii) to undertake a set of research objectives. They were themselves the subject of study as they themselves brought with them their own experiences, knowledge, assumptions, goals etc. At the outset, this was considered an inevitable characteristic of 'mode 2' research; on reflection it became obvious to the research team that this was an essential characteristic of ‘mode 2’ research. Negotiating the interpretations of the ambiguities, contradictions of such a social process is essential in ‘mode 2’ research. Since the researchers were concerned with teleology and 'models of process', it seemed incumbent on the researchers to reflect on their own purpose and process within the social process. As such, the objectives of research, and the objectives of the project would need to be compatible in some way. Hence, in any research effort there is a desire to: (A) discover new knowledge about existing phenomena; (B) verify, validate or falsify known knowledge (via, for instance, the process of repeatability, refutation and validation); and/or (C) discover new knowledge, unknown phenomena and new concepts, models, theory, methods, techniques and methodology, by explorative studies. These are the general aims of academic research (often explicit and stated) and thus they can provide a certain insight and guidance for the

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development of any inquiring process, whether it involves explicit 'intervention' (e.g. action research, product development, prototype experiments), or attempts to avoid 'intervention' (e.g. surveys, interviews, observation) or simply discourses (critical debate, theoretical analysis). That is not to say that these are the purposeful goals of researchers in practice because there may be other, hidden purposeful goals within the process of research. Rather, these are the explicit and stated goals of a teleological process of research. However, the purpose in organisational problem-solving (or 'mode 2' research in Management) is very different. The primary goal might be considered to be to: (D) develop an inquiring process, in order to justify action to 'improve' an organisational situation. The inquiry in (D) is not the same as the inquiry that would be generated in meeting the objectives of (A), (B) and (C). Rather, (A), (B) and (C) are concerned to evaluate the nature, operationalisation, effectiveness and outcomes of the inquiry undertaken in (D). If research was considered only the inquiry as in (D) then it would probably be accused of being nothing but consultancy. However, in the case of GW Power Utilities, the ideas and knowledge utilised some very high level generalisable constructs, adapted them for purpose, applied them, and derived findings, based on their application. The findings were focused on the use of teleological models in organisational problem-solving, pedagogy and e-learning. This is not pertinent only to a single case. These are generalisable abstractions. In the case of GW Power Utilities they were used to support managers to emancipate themselves from earlier ideas about how to handle problematic situations and to bring about organisational change. The same and similar constructs, however, could be used in other cases where the main research interest is to emancipate groups of people from taken for granted ideas. Furthermore, it is a research approach which has its own rigour, which explores the ‘lived experience’ involved in undertaking inquiry and research, in social groups, who bring social diversity with them. It is the ability of the researcher in negotiating the resultant ambiguities and complexities, and seeking to explain the research outcomes as they relate to this social process, which will provide richness, rigour and relevance to future research in ‘mode 2’. As such, in operationalising 'mode 2' research, there is a need for clarity about the nature of the purpose to which inquiry is applied, and processes can be designed to meet the purpose. The research team concluded that the 'mode 2' debate could benefit from a deeper

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understanding of the contributions of scientific schools based on hermeneutic and phenomenological traditions.

Conclusions Researchers were integrated into this project to provide rigour and independence. Twelve of the original twenty managers who participated in the original workshop and the five on-line learning sets, completed the project. Three left the organisation, and four left the project for a variety of reasons, (e.g. change in role, lack of time, lack of buy-in). One left the project because of personal reasons. Whilst this appeared on the surface to be a little disappointing, it seemed on reflection that it was inevitable that there would be a certain level of drop out. Nonetheless, the remaining twelve have remained in the project, and continue to be enthusiastic ‘organisational problem solvers’. These individuals have already made significant changes to the organisation’s processes. They are now involved in the next stage. It involves the introduction of new additional constructs and learning activities, particularly involving implementing organisational processes in response to perceived strategic imperatives. Significantly, changes in GW Power Utilities have come about in a number of areas. There have been changes in certain operations, in the sales teams, repair of machines, the integration of routine repairs with key suppliers, including the application of IT to coordinate such activities, in some Human Resource policies, in the ERP. There have been changes to employee reward processes, and a range of proposals that are currently being considered, which involve greater levels of investment. Most importantly, the case enabled the simultaneous development of 'problem-solving' teams acting as a catalyst for future change initiatives. With the benefits of hindsight, the following now seems obvious to the research team. Change in an organisation will only occur if it is brought about by genuine purposeful action, co-ordinated by cross-functional teams. These have to be given constructs which can provide a language of sorts, in order to explore the intellectual basis for change. Isolated attempts at changing aspects of organisation can easily be purposely undertaken for the wrong reasons. They also might respond to perceived ‘problems’ which have a weak intellectual grounding, or be based on negligible diagnostic inquiry. Similarly, strategies and projects which attempt to operationalise themselves, without a complimentary management development process, are equally vulnerable. This case has

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outlined a very practical method of implementing change based on a relatively simple management development process, but one which was careful in its underpinning, philosophy, the social processes that were involved and its own purpose (i.e. its own teleology).

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Organisational Problem-Solving Van Aken, J. E. (2001). Mode 2 knowledge production in the field of management. Eindhoven University of Technology, ECIS working papers, no. 01.13. Retrieved 18/11/04 from http://fp.tm.tue.nl/ecis/working%20papers/eciswp46.pdf Van Aken, J. E. (2005). Management research as a design science: Articulating the research products of mode 2 knowledge production in management. British Journal of Management, 16(1), 19-36. Wasser, H. (1990). Changes in the European university: From traditional to entrepreneurial. Higher Education Quarterly, 44, 111-122. Watson, H. J., Taylor, K. P., Higgins, G., Kadlec, C., & Meeks, M. (1999). Leaders assess the current state of the IS academic discipline. Communications of the Association for Information Systems, 2, Article 2. University of Georgia, Terry College of Business. Weick, K. (2001). Making sense of the organisation. Oxford: Blackwell. Wilson, B. (1990). Systems concepts, theory, methodologies and applications. UK: Wiley. Wilson, B. (2001). Soft systems methodology, conceptual model building and its contributions. UK: Wiley. Ylijoki, O-H. (2003a). Contested identities and moral orders in academia. Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Knowledge & Discourse, Hong Kong. Retrieved from http://ec.hku.hk/kd2/pdf/Theme1/Ylijoki108.pdf Ylijoki, O-H., (2003b). Entangled in academic capitalism? A case-study on changing ideals and practices of university research. Higher Education, 45(3), 307-335.

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Biography Dr Kawalek's professional background is in IT and Management Consulting. He started his career in the manufacturing sector as a Programmer/Analyst, Systems Analyst, and then as a Senior Systems Analyst. He then worked as an IT Consultant, and on realising that 'many IT decisions are organisational change decisions…', decided to study Management at doctoral level. He lectures in Systems Theory, Change Management and Management Consultancy at the University of Sheffield, UK., and is also an associate Professor of the Grenoble Graduate School of Business, France. He has co-founded the Global ThinkTank Institute based in the US (www.globaltti.com), to bring 'research into practice, and practice into research'! One of Institute's key products is to use certain knowledge management principles to produce significant and rapid leaps in organisational performance…. '...managers move from 'fire-fighting mode' to 'organisational problem-solving'; once they do that, then they can start driving change…'. Dr Kawalek holds three degrees in different disciplinary areas. His undergraduate degree is in History & Economics, his master's degree is in Computer Science and his PhD is in Management. He is a member of the British Computer Society, and is Chartered as an Information Technology Professional.

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Co-evolution and Contradiction: A Diamond Model of Designer-User Interaction Anja-Karina Pahl and Linda B. Newnes IMRC, Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Bath, Claverton Down, UK [email protected] [email protected]

Abstract This paper explores how the Engineering Design process might balance conflicting constraints of technical product design and the social demands of users. Building on a generic 2D map for innovation in design from the author’s previous work, a prototype 3D Diamond Model is presented to help structure conversations between Designers and Users – or indeed any other group with apparently opposing aims. In theory, the model draws on the structure of Buddhism (in particular the Mandala of the Five Buddha Families) and managerial cybernetics (in particular Beer’s Viable System Model and his Team Syntegrity protocol), to establish how one’s worldview might evolve and how a common worldview for two teams can be determined. In practise, a Facilitator or Researcher helps Designers and Users achieve their respective aims, and develop a common one. When a common worldview is achieved, conversations and activities can become mutually informing, coevolving and emotionally satisfactory at both the individual and team levels.

Material published as part of this publication, either on-line or in print, is copyrighted by the Informing Science Institute. Permission to make digital or paper copy of part or all of these works for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that the copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage AND that copies 1) bear this notice in full and 2) give the full citation on the first page. It is permissible to abstract these works so long as credit is given. To copy in all other cases or to republish or to post on a server or to redistribute to lists requires specific permission and payment of a fee. Contact [email protected] to request redistribution permission.


Co-evolution and Contradiction

Keywords: Innovation, co-evolution, Buddhism, phenomenology, cybernetics, VSM, Team Syntegrity

Background and Aims of this Paper Our Starting Position This paper presents part of a programme of work, which has been ongoing in the Department of Mechanical Engineering at the University of Bath since 2001, and prior to that, also in Australia. This research aims to investigate existing methods and synthesize new methods, which can systematically enhance creativity and innovation in individuals and teams in early phases of engineering design and product development. In particular, it is concerned with (i) the streamlining of unstructured information or knowledge, (ii) the rapid integration and subsequent transformation of multi-disciplinary information with existing patterns of thinking, (iii) the liberation of engineering designers from a worldview of ‘problem-solving’, to one of ‘solution-finding’ (these terms are in general use by engineers) – especially one where the solution has been inherent in the system resources all along. Following investigation of tens of thousands of examples of the processes of ‘creating’ and ‘innovating’ in the literature and practise of many disciplines (the difference between the two terms will be clarified in the sections on ‘Contradiction’, and ‘The Generic Process of Creating’), we abstracted and synthesized their common steps. This allowed us to develop a 2D map and a generic model for innovation in design (A-K. Pahl, Newnes, & McMahon, in press), to be briefly discussed below, which is arguably the most comprehensive model for innovation currently available. In its current form, it is bearing fruit in a test in Aerospace design. We need now to admit however, that while the efficacy of the model is dependent on using the language of Western scientific reporting (in particular from the domains of study we loosely call ‘Engineering Design’ and the ‘Psychology of Creativity’), the strength of the model is based on its foundation in Eastern scientific reporting (in particular from the view of ‘Mahayana’ and ‘Vajrayana’ Buddhism). We did not originally intend to make this foundation explicate in a peer-reviewed paper, but early comments by reviewers of Informing Science Journal rightly forced our hand, and eased our reservations. We

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cannot, of course, introduce this material in a way that befits a serious researcher in Buddhist Studies. Nevertheless we hope that explaining some core elements of Buddhist Meditation will help make the application of our Diamond Model easier for designers who wish to consider their own point of view as part of a larger, informing system.

On the Difficulties Entailed in Reporting At the outset, we would like to point out that both our language and ‘representation’ (this term will be further discussed below) of the conceptual domains, which are considered in this paper are incomplete. This is not just because we cannot simultaneously be experts in all of the domains we draw upon, and must rely on our language and understanding of the accepted axioms and propositions of the three domains of Engineering Design, Psychology and Buddhism to co-evolve. It is also because our evolution of thought is currently largely independent of the input of other researchers. We expect this will evolve as others join our discussion. To that extent, the problems we face in multidisciplinary reporting are obvious. However there are additional factors to consider. Needless to say, prior to our study and field tests of our proposed generic model for innovation, a coincidence of the domains of Engineering Design, the Psychology of Creativity and Buddhist Meditation (as defined above) has not previously been considered useful. Not only that, the possibility that it might be useful is emotionally loaded. There are many who would prefer that creativity and innovation remain intuitive or mysterious, lest a systematic approach take the fun or birthright or spontaneous experience from the act of creation. And there are many who would prefer to keep religion and science separate, lest the presumed belief of one impinge on the supposed non-belief of the other. We asked ourselves many times: do we have a right to trespass that space? Do we have a right to systemically unpack creativity or scientifically examine the tools of what many perceive to be a religion? In the past, these hindrances have kept us from exploring the useful connections as much as we might. We here propose, however, that Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism are actually more science than religion, in the sense that they proceed in the same manner as Western science. To be exact, both Western science and Buddhism: (1) aim at a goal for the benefit of humanity, (2) define their starting axioms, (3) encourage practitioners to make hy-

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potheses about reality, and (4) give repeatable methods for testing whether the hypotheses and experience of reality match. What is more, when the latter do not match, Buddhists change their assumptions about reality just as Western scientists do, rather than dogmatically insist that things must be a certain way. The historical Buddha Shakyamuni himself encouraged his followers and colleagues to do this many times during the course of his life, pointing out that, ‘Just as a learned one tests gold by burning it and rubbing … so should my statements be accepted after examination and not (merely) out of respect for the guru’ (Dighanikaya, ii ; Tattvasamgraha, 3588; Visuddhimagga Vii). We also point out that the methods for testing ‘how things really are’ (here we use this concept loosely – it is defined more rigorously in ‘Backgrounds to Meditation’) differ in all domains in any case. Thus Buddhism cannot be excluded from being a science, by having methods that differ from physics, for instance. In fact, it is not the existence but the nature of the starting axioms and nature of the goal of the Eastern and Western sciences that differ. Buddhism has as its starting axiom an assumption that the nature of both space and mind are quintessentially creative, integrative and non-dualistic. Western science on the other hand, is mostly based on Aristotle’s premise that the universe is composed of separate, non-integrable parts and cannot be experienced as ‘mind’ (please note also that how psychologists speak of mind is not how Buddhists think of mind). The only other slight difference between the Eastern and Western approach to investigation of reality is that the goal of Buddhism is also linked to its starting axiom. Thus, on reaching the goal one no longer assumes, but actually completely knows or experiences the starting axiom to be true. Such conviction is not possible in Western science, due in part to a disparity between the starting point and an unknown finish. In any case, it is in the context of Buddhism as science – not Buddhism as an adjunct to, or foreign discipline to science, that we have been given permission from Buddhist Lineage holders to deal with this topic here. In that respect, we say nothing about the core experience of living Buddhism, which must be transmitted first by the oral teaching of a qualified Lama, and second realised by one’s own meditation. In that respect also, we limit ourselves to merely exploring the structure of the formal meditations, which are widely available without undertaking initiations, and which can be regarded impartially as ‘Creativity tools’ and

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‘Innovation tools’ (this distinction comes from A-K. Pahl, 2006b) for both individuals and teams. In addition, we need to consider a word limit for this paper as well as the predisposition of a modern Western public to receiving information in rather smaller intellectual chunks than might have been the case 100 years ago. Thus we did not wish to reproduce any written Buddhist explanations in the complexity in which they were originally given, or translated from the Indian or Tibetan into English. Rather than deal with the patterns of Buddhist meaning layered in such texts, we instead prefer to deal directly with the geometric pattern of the formal meditation practises. After all, the latter were designed to cut through the psychological baggage that accompanies the use of over-familiar terms. They were designed to liberate one from any kind of ‘fixation’ (this term is from Eckert & Stacey, 2001, 2003) on concepts and enable a continuously fresh view and experience of one’s ‘world’ (this term from Gero & Kannengiesser, 2004, inclusive of both a physical space and Boden’s, 1992, 1994a, 1994b, ‘conceptual space’). And this is exactly why we believe that examining the mechanics of meditation is of benefit for the social and psychological space of design. Of course, we cannot avoid language in reporting, nor in placing ancient knowledge in a new context. Thus we must partially invent a language, which integrates the three domains we wish to connect and whereby we can talk about things, which should not be named at all, if they are to be understood as originally intended. We are likely the first to attempt this and trust that the reader will bear the inadequacy of our language in mind, as he proceeds. Having said we will focus on the geometry of the formal meditation practise, rather than on the concepts accompanying them, one issue does, however, stand out as needing special introduction for our model in general and this paper in particular. That is the issue of ‘representation’, which we alluded to, in the beginning of this section. It has been pointed out that often this term is understood as implying the existence of a ‘pre-given’, objective, observer independent, physical reality, which can be consensually talked about (see e.g. Maturana & Varela, 1992, pp. 129-134). Of course many modern philosophers and scientists are aware that a physical ‘reality’ is not necessarily as it seems, but instead much influenced by our perceptions and communicative abilities and the construction of Boden’s (1992, 1994a, 1994b) conceptual spaces, and we do not wish to imply otherwise. However, for the sake of sim-

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plicity and pedagogy in this paper, we will assume that this insight is not yet a complete understanding shared by all who call themselves scientists, researchers or designers. Thus we take the approach of explanation in our paper, which is also taken in Buddhist teachings, whereby even advanced students always successfully start from the simplest possible starting point. Incidentally, we will use the term ‘pre-given’ to refer to the kind of world most non-meditators would consider themselves familiar with, for the same reason. In Buddhist terms, this is a basic starting point. The thorough examination of a pre-given world may or may not lead to acquiring true knowledge (of reality). Acquiring knowledge, as Maturana and Varela (1992) also pointed out, is not an action ‘of acquiring features of a pre-given world’. However it is self-evident that any act of human experiencing, which leads to knowledge of what is truly real does still take place in a social world. In such a world, all individuals are influenced by the building blocks and methods of others (we return to this concept in ‘Preparing for Meditation’, below). These building blocks include knowledge both presumed (received secondhand from others) and experienced for oneself, which is accrued in both physical and conceptual spaces of all scales and perspectives. For differing reasons, building blocks become accepted as facts and passed on as common knowledge to peers or those coming afterward. But at each stage of passing knowledge on, we feel we must, as researchers, assume that any pre-given world (and any linguistic term used to describe it) acts as a reference frame and is therefore quasi-concrete. In other words, the issue of acknowledging one or more (albeit incompletely specifiable) kinds of pre-given world cannot be avoided in the issue of any representation of a world. To be exact however, in this paper, we employ the term ‘representation’ not only for the pre-given world of Westerners and non-meditators but also for the world of the Buddhas. In short, it is employed in the same way as in the practise of meditation. In that sense, the reality (the ‘existence’ or ‘non-existence’) of the object or event represented as a concept is not questioned – nor indeed relevant to the representation. Having this attitude toward using maps of invisible conceptual spaces is useful, because it allows for at least two extreme scenarios of experiencing reality. These are, albeit, not mutually exclusive. These are that the object or event represented is: (i) an internally experienced and nonshareable reality i.e. not a pre-given reality, and (ii) an externally inde-

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pendent and/or consensually experienced (thus pre-given) one. The practical advantage of having the attitude that a map may represent either or both of these realities (and one does not really mind which is true), is that in early stages of use, the map is not confused with the reality. In other words, if no questions are asked about the truth or validity of the conceptual object or event behind the map, one is released from doubt as to the truth or validity of the map, which is intended to lead to finding and seeing the reality it represents. In Buddhist meditation that means one simply goes ahead and acts as if an independently existing ‘divine’ (this term is from Beyer, 1973) reality were pre-given by the map. At the same time, one does not lose touch of the pre-given reality, which also has its own implicit map. That said, the point of meditation practise is not, of course, to introduce multiple new worlds and see them as separate from each other, but to superpose the map and experience of the divine world with the map and experience of the pre-given one, so that a transformation of both occurs. This will be discussed further in ‘Mandalas for Engineering Design’. On top of this, we are very much aware, as Vajrayana practitioners generally are, that the creation of maps and the naming of worlds to designate fields of perception or concepts is entirely fabricated. Such worlds do not exist in or of themselves. In other words, we are improperly naming things, which do not exist to be independently named in any case! However, it is crucial to our argument and hopefully evident to readers that researchers need a reference framework or measuring stick. There is no other means with which to discuss and test what elements in a given world are real, consensual or pre-given, as opposed to merely theoretical. Now, it is not our intention to delve more deeply than this, into what can sound like very weighty intellectual philosophy. Our intention is rather to delve as deeply as we can into the simple geometry upon which such weighty statements are arguably based. For it is precisely because Western science lacks any kind of map for the conceptual space of design and innovation, and a reference model for the experience of it, that we feel we cannot do other than borrow the Buddhist representations of such spaces, and see whether they help us too.

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Aims of this Paper As mentioned in ‘Our starting position’, we did not make any background reasons for establishing a generic process of creating, explicate at the time of first publishing that model, because it was beyond the scope of that particular paper. Nor did we explain why we proposed a 2D Diamond Model of innovation. However, for those interested in, and familiar with, multidisciplinary research and the above fields, as is likely the case in this special issue, we here aim to extend our model for co-evolution and contradiction in the context of discriminating three main behaviours. We consider these behaviours in the form of archetypal people we call the ‘Designer’, the ‘User’ and the ‘Researcher’ (capitalized for the remainder of this paper). By these terms we hope to include not just engineering designers, but designers in all other fields also. Along the way, we introduce reference to other authors and concepts loosely grouped under the headings of Buddhism, phenomenology and cybernetics – fields in which we are not expert and can only hope to scratch the surface to provoke discussion. First we provide a background of meditation and Engineering Design, including a summary of our previous work on the process of creating and innovating in Engineering Design. In this paper, we focus primarily on extending a small part of the 7-step process we identified there and previously in A-K. Pahl (2005a, 2005b). In particular, we deal with the fifth step, in which a complete system is described. Detailed knowledge of the whole map is not necessary to understand this. To facilitate conversations between the Designer and User, who each partially understand the system, and can only together build a complete system description, we propose using the structure of a Buddhist ‘Mandala’ (defined in the section ‘The Mandala of the Five Buddha Families’ below). We link our exploration of this structure with Stafford Beer’s (1984, 1985) Viable System as well as drawing on the protocol of Beer’s (1994) icosahedral ‘Team Syntegrity’ model. We suggest why a threedimensional version of a two-dimensional map might be useful for discussion of complex topics in teams who apparently oppose each other. This is what we call the ‘Diamond Model’ of Designer-User interaction. Last, we consider how to establish a combined purpose for stakeholders using our model.

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Backgrounds of Meditation Preliminary Thoughts Preparing for meditation – Establishing the view Engineering Design has traditionally focused on immediate action and product generation, with little regard for longer-term reflection or feedback on the consequences of that action. However psychologists since Osborn (1953) proposed that ‘reflection’, in the sense of ‘contemplation’ or ‘rumination’, is intrinsic to the process of creating. Rumination of course also requires time for mental incubation of problems (though the scale of this can range significantly). To be more pedantic, the process of rumination and feedback on any theme must also have an aim, if it is ever to have an outcome. To that end, we can add the biologists Maturana and Varela’s (1992, p. 24) definition that ‘reflection is the process of knowing how we know’. There exist very few methods, which can facilitate the process of achieving perfect, early stage feedback in Engineering Design. The soft science of ‘Action Research’ (Heron & Reason, 1995; McTaggert, 1996; Reason, 2002; Schön, 1983, 1987; Wadsworth, 1998) is perhaps the only validated method currently available to Western researchers, to facilitate cycles of action and reflection in teams. Since its relatively recent inception, however, said method has not been widely accepted in the hard science, and it has not evolved much detail. In respect to engineering needs, it is certainly too general and unsystematic. It has no structure to help identify or incorporate common and necessary elements of conversations of teams of Designers and Users when there are conflicting viewpoints. The formal structure of Buddhist meditation, on the other hand, can fill this gap. The 2500 year old methods are designed to make reflection on complex sets of actions with one or multiple stakeholders systematic. We must now digress for a moment to point out we use the term ‘meditation’ in this paper in two senses. One is the sense that there is a formal structure, which provides a ‘mirror’ (this term is from Vajrayana Buddhism) and therefore also reflection on one’s action and purpose. The other is that it is a complete ritual and a complete experience, which encompasses both the action of being and its reflection as well as the awareness (which we will later in this paper call ‘knowledge’) of the co-existence of the two. The insider Buddhist definition of meditation 135


as an ‘effortless resting in the way things are’ (Seegers, 2007) refers to the experience of aware co-existence of the two worlds (but see also Prebish & Keown, 2004). However, since the latter is considered an advanced realisation, it is the first sense of the term that is most generally used. In order to distinguish the two senses, we capitalize the formal Meditation practise, which is structured as a map or method, for the remainder of this paper. Intrinsic to reflecting on one’s actions, is knowing one’s reason, purpose or motivation for even wanting said reflection. This is especially important, when one is using a ritual, map or method for reflection. It is less beneficial to follow someone else’s footsteps blindly. The preparation for Meditation therefore, requires one first to contemplate the situation where one actually is right now, and why one might want to be somewhere else. Buddha’s first teachings, known as The Four Noble Truths, generally provide an impetus for refining one’s wish to move towards another more ideal state of existence. The wish to move includes a wish to employ methods that lead to an understanding and experience of a world where action and reflection are unified in a continuous feedback. The Four Noble Truths are ordered in a way, which Westerners and Theravada practitioners would generally recognize as coming from a problem-space or problem-oriented view. In short, they acknowledge (i) we experience problems in our existing world, because we do not understand the natural order of things (ii) there is a cause for our problems in that we want things to be a certain way, which is not in their nature (iii) there is a solution to our problems, in allowing things to be as they naturally are (iv) there are methods to reach the solution and we should use them. We can also consider a similar set of pithy truths starting from the viewpoint of the solution-space. This is the Vajrayana practitioner’s view. In this case, we establish our motivation via the basic thoughts that (i) we have a great opportunity facing us in our existing world (ii) problems do not last, just as joy in material things does not last (iii) we are responsible for changing our view and handling of problems to seeing only solutions (iv) knowing that we do not yet see only solutions in our existing world, we want to learn from those who can do so. The basic thoughts of The Four Noble Truths and other Buddhist Meditation are incidentally identical with considerations reported by

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engineers and young people (A-K. Pahl, 2006b) in early stages of determining their problem-space and goal of innovation. They also make up the first four steps of the complete ‘Diamond Map of Design’ (as we have called it), a brief summary of which is included in the sections on ‘Contradiction’ and ‘The Basic Generic Model of Creating’ (a thorough elucidation is beyond the focus of this paper). These simple thoughts cover the lengthy Buddhist teachings on impermanence, karma, interdependent origination and emptiness. A thorough exploration of those topics is traditionally carried out in monastic teaching situations lasting twenty or more years, and can be interesting for those disposed to analysis. A deep understanding of those topics is said to lead to liberation from the perception and sensation of being trapped in a problem-oriented view of the world. However, to enable Designers to streamline their thought processes without lengthy study on these topics, we summarized the mechanics of these teachings in a map for innovation in design (A-K. Pahl, 2005b), just as we now summarize the mechanism of using that map, and in particular, of discussing its fifth step with two teams. The need for maps and methods As mentioned in the section ‘On the difficulties entailed in reporting’ and in ‘Preparing for Meditation’ above, the authors of this paper believe that modern design cannot progress without some generic reference frame. This must first describe its existing world and thenceforth help make decisions on new input and directions for innovation. In other words, we propose that a Designer needs a map and method(s) to express his inner experiences and external material considerations in conversations with others involved in product innovation. To some extent, this is already done. There are of course, accepted sequences in which engineering design is taught and talked about. G. Pahl and Beitz’ (1984) system is perhaps the most widely taught and accepted standard in the UK. Furthermore, designers have always made ad hoc individual maps, trying to capture their thinking, intuition and design decisions. So why do we suddenly propose to make more maps, when the existing ones seem to have worked perfectly well to date? To answer this question, we need to consider that there is not just one direction or level of action between an individual and his world. Yet to date, engineers have maps going in only one direction if in any at all (see ‘Contradiction’, 137


below). The problem with such a map is not that it is too simple (for we also consider our map and model to be simple), but that it is inadequate. The existing maps and any discussion, which refers to these conceptual spaces, make no systematic link between the different worlds that co-exist and co-evolve (for example between a Designer, and a User). Suffice to say that this view of a system is incomplete and thus ultimately confusing. When a situation is confusing, it helps to have a map. This should not, of course, materialize from thin air. It should be relevant both to the individual and to the collective pre-given world. And for this kind of coincidence to happen between the individual and the collective, there must be a coincidence of external elements of the world, which are shareable and can be agreed upon, with the internal elements of the intellectual world, which is arguably non-shareable. There must, in other words, be a relationship between the inner and outer organization of the space one perceives This is, in any case, what Buddhism considers to happen. Buddhism equates the organization of the thinker’s awareness and the organization of his senses and his perceived and pre-given world. This is not dissimilar to the realisation of the Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana, as popularised in ‘The Tree of Knowledge’ (Maturana and Varela, 1992, pp. 24-27). There, the authors discuss the shortcoming of Western culture not to acknowledge the fundamental circularity of living, acting and knowing. This, as they state (p. 27), entails both the individual and the social level. A classic way in which the issues of individual perception and social organization are related in Buddhism is given in Table 1, summarized from two approaches of the Indian philosophers Vasubandhu and Sthiramati (Beyer, 1973, p. 97-98). ‘Reality itself’ is about the kind of awareness that perceives directly, without labels or interpretation of any kind. It is the equivalent of the ‘divine’ (explained below). In a pregiven world, this is given two labels, depending on the extent to which one is aware of oneself and one’s surroundings, and makes a distinction between the two. The ‘underlying awareness’ of reality includes awareness of the physical ground one stands on and all physical objects in it. It includes an ability to make mental connections and inferences of relationships between objects, based on reason and experience. An ‘evolved awareness’ includes awareness of one’s own thoughts and their

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effect on one’s perception of other objects and beings. In other words, it includes awareness of the interrelationship between one’s inner senses and their projections on the pre-given world. A hierarchy of awareness could be construed (obvious from top to bottom in the right-most column), moving from physical concerns to concerns of (self-) esteem and self-actualization. Though Buddhism does not identify or condone this hierarchy, the divisions implied are not dissimilar to the well-known ‘Hierarchy of Needs’ identified by Abraham Maslow (1943), and similar observations made by many other modern thinkers. Certainly in Buddhism it is not enough to make philosophical correspondences (or hierarchical diagrams) between one’s perception and the organization of the inner senses or outer realities one perceives. Buddhism also requires that a coincidence of one’s perception and reality be known from experience. Buddhist maps, methods and rituals were created in order to provide a starting point for this experiment in one’s life. To be completely clear, Buddhist maps are not provided as a kind of theory of alternate worlds. They are provided in part due to the observation that human beings are predisposed toward understanding their world by grasping external objects. Indeed even the evolved awareness makes objects of intellectual concepts if none are physically available (this is a different angle on the researcher’s need for a reference frame we previously discussed above). On top of that, however, a paradox exists. The maps provided in Meditation are supposed to be structuring for the mind, but at the same time also liberating from fixation on objects. How is this possible – to provide a structure and yet be simultaneously be free of structure? This is the very question Designers face for, ideally, innovation will produce a result which is close enough to a standard set of rules to be recognisable, and yet far enough away from them, to be exciting or profitable.

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Implementation, initial direction

Viable System Model of Stafford Beer

Coordination or information

Perceptual stimulus, feeling, sensation

Equality in Diversity

Identification

Form, structure, body, sense objects

South -

2

1

East -

Sub-system

Sub-system

Internal control

Cognition, recognition mental processing of sensory stimuli

Discrimination

West -

Sub-system 3

Integrated & externalized intelligence

Mental habits, thoughts, ideas, relationships, associations, volitions

accomplishment

Overall

North -

4

Sub-system

Intention, Policy, overall command

Conscious awareness of self, others and cosmos

Ultimate reality

Centre -

5

Sub-system

Predominant function of Sub-systems of an ideal whole

The Five Skandhas of Buddhist philosophy

Mandala of The Five Buddha Families

Organizational System describing perception and experience


Table 1: Summary of classic Buddhist teaching connecting the focus of awareness and organization of a pre-given reality.

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To achieve this end of freedom inclusive of structure, formal Meditations, and Mandalas in particular (defined in ‘the Mandala of the Five Buddha Families’ below) focus the mind on a world, which is stripped of any but the most fundamental pre-given conceptions or rules. This world is liberated from the confusion that results from not having any kind of template at all, to establish the way things naturally are. But it is precisely because any given Mandala is only a template that it allows room for change. It provides no predictable events that need to meet one’s expectations. Formal Meditation thus offers something similar to what Schutz would have called ‘the life world’ –a world, which is pre-structured for the individual, who is actually trying to construct his own world, but cannot do so in isolation from the building blocks and methods offered to him by others (Schutz, 1972, as cited in Wagner, 1974). Schutz’s concept was, of course based on observation of human society, whereas Meditation is based on the observation of Buddha nature (defined in ‘Geometric Structure’ and particularly in ‘The Mandala of the Five Buddha Families’ below). However the concept of offering a pre-given world to help those who come after us is the same in both cases. Some particularly well-constructed Meditations have additional functions, other than offering a map and view of a particular world, in which confusion does not exist. They also present (i) a microcosm of the entire ritual structure of Buddhist initiation (ii) a microcosm of the physical, social and conceptual world, which human beings generally accept as real. We used such a Meditation (Nydahl, 2000a) in evaluating the other processes of creating for our 2D Diamond Map of Design and the model of the Generic Process of Creating (A-K. Pahl et al., in press). The reader will need to refer to our original paper, since the table in which this is summarized is too large to reprint here. However, we summarize the process of using Meditation, to change one’s present situation of perceiving problems, into a situation of perceiving solutions, drawing on Beyer’s explanations (1973, see p. 67 and 103). In Figure 1, we show the two directions of action, which are both required and automatic in Meditation. These are: (i) action in the pregiven e.g. external, physical or problem-space world, and (ii) reflection on, or from, the ideal world which appears as a ‘solution-space’ (ideal ‘divine’ world). Starting from a pre-given reality, it is considered that one realizes one’s limitations and constructs (or is given) a formal map or model of a liberated reality, to help oneself transcend them. The

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other direction of action starts from the ideal world, which reflects only the best qualities of the former. In this sequence, it is important to note that reflection is nevertheless not a passive consequence of mental action. Indeed, reflection must also be actively sought out. In other words, it is also action of the mind. This double-ended action preempts the concept of ‘co-evolution’, which will be discussed in ‘Backgrounds of Engineering Design’ below.

Figure 1. The ritual and experience of meditation. There are two directions of action, which constitute the ritual and experience of meditation. One is from the pre-given world and the other is from an ideal ‘divine’ world. When Buddhist Meditation is applied as magic or religion instead of science, the reflective action of the practitioner is said to be instead carried out by a being called from the divine world. This being changes from something absolute and indescribable (discussed further below) into something, which can be identified as knowledge as he comes closer to the practitioner (Beyer, 1973). The act of reflection upon a divine object or being (as itself, as being within oneself, as a projection of one’s own mind, or seen in others), is considered empowering. Reflection on the divine thus works in the same way that receiving answers to questions asked of one’s peers and friends are empowering. It enables one to gain positive feedback in the world of one’s experience, and improve one’s understanding of the way things really are.

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Geometric Structure The Three Jewels Buddhism identifies three irreducible elements, which define the first most important structure of mind, on the human side of an ‘indescribable absolute’ (we invent this term to capture the reported experience of achieving the goal in Buddhism, which approximates experiencing Beyer’s 1973 absolute ‘divine’ world, and the godhead as described in all world religions). Grouped together under the term The Three Jewels, they are called Buddha (interpreted as ‘awakened one’, and often standing for the historical Buddha Shakyamuni), Dharma (interpreted by Nydahl, 1996, in the Vajrayana sense as ‘how things are’ but generally standing for the ‘law’ or teachings of the historical Buddha) and Sangha (interpreted as ‘community of practitioners’). Vajrayana Buddhism adds a fourth element – the Lama (interpreted as ‘highest principle’ and standing for one’s own teacher), who unites The Three Jewels, and thereby presents the indescribable absolute nature of mind. From our broad research during these last five years, we have seen that these irreducible elements recognized in Buddhism are also elements, which are common to every society and organization (ancient and modern) on earth. We did not formally document evidence to back up this proposal, however trust it will ring true with the reader if we explain our observations for this paper now. We can, for instance, recognize the elements of Buddha in the founder of a village or inventor of a product. He may no longer be alive, but he was the one who started it all off. He’s the one of whom people make posters, venerate and strive to imitate, like a movie star. He gave the rules or Dharma, to help people work or advised on the operating instructions for an object’s proper functioning. These may be written or unwritten, verbal or implicit. Either way, they are always common patterns and shareable knowledge. Rules can be further co-created by his community, as the latter get used to the way things flow. The third element – the Sangha, villagers or Users of inventions are also indispensable. In small societies and large production companies, individuals would achieve little without colleagues to share the load and help overcome difficulties on the way. They iron out the quirks in each other’s understanding and practise of the operating instructions for their product or life, and strengthen each other’s resolve to continue using the rules to achieve their agreed ultimate goal. A community will continue

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to exist as long as all members strive for the same ideal or goal. Similarly, those who strive for the variations of the same goal, quite naturally create communities to rely upon, while working for the same guy. The fourth element, the Lama, is obvious in the fact that founders die or reach retirement, yet a need for leadership remains. Consequently, a new Mayor or CEO is elected. He’s the one who knows the newest trade routes and market conditions, and who has experience in all aspects of the business. Usually, he has worked his way to the top of the ladder from the bottom. He knows what it takes to play by the rules or break them, while he also consistently builds towards the original founder’s vision for the villagers or stakeholders in the business. In Buddhism, these three elements, which can be seen as people and objects in the pre-given Western world, also stand for inner qualities or functions which one (i.e. one’s mind) can develop. All three are inherent and coincident in the absolute ideal state of being and in the ‘nature of mind’ (this term is distinguished from mere ‘mind’ in Buddhism and can be defined only by experience, not by words). For this paper, we suggest these elements are ‘meta-qualities’ of mind (to be discussed further in ‘Mandalas for Engineering Design’, below). We note however that, while talking or writing about qualities and functions sounds quite abstract, The Three Jewels start to make real sense imagined as people and objects in actual Meditation. They are then placed in a very specific geometry. In the case of a modern Vajrayana Meditation on The Three Jewels, for instance: (i) the Buddha is called to mind as the historical Shakyamuni, sitting in front and a little to the left of oneself (ii) the Dharma is visualized as books or a library directly in front but a little away from oneself, (iii) the Sangha is visualized as a compassionate being, in front and a little to the right. In addition, (iv) the Lama is added as a teacher in golden, kingly robes, as close as comfortable and directly in front of oneself (Nydahl, 2000b). If all these elements are visualized as sitting in the plane of the practitioner’s point of view, the Lama might obscure the library behind him. Figure 2 illustrates the Geometry of a Mahayana Meditation on The Three Jewels of Buddhism, seen from the point, and in the plane of view, of the practitioner. The central element is a Vajra-yana addition. The formal Meditation follows after the correct preparation (outlined above), by acknowledging these figures from left to right in turn, and confirming their prime relevance to one’s life. In Vajrayana practise, one starts with the Lama and completes the cycle with the Sangha. In Mahayana prac-

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tise, one starts with the Buddha and does not include the Lama. Either way, one does as many repetitions as one likes.

Figure 2. The Geometry of a Mahayana meditation on The Three Jewels of Buddhism, seen from the point, and in the plane of view, of the practitioner. What this geometry of movement of attention actually does is create a crude Mandala with four objects in it. The Three Jewels occupy the entire visual field of the practitioner. Figure 2 shows the geometry of a Mahayana meditation on ‘the three jewels’ of Buddhism, seen from the point, and in the plane of view of the practitioner. The central element is a Vajrayana addition. The straight black arrows and lines signify the limits of the practitioner’s field of vision, looking at the elements as if they were physical objects situated at an imagined horizon at each side, and towards a vanishing point, in the distant foreground. In the Mahayana version, a square is created by joining The Three Jewels with the practitioner as if they really were sitting together in physical space. The blue circular arrows represent the cycle of attention around all the elements in the field of view. The same square and circular geometry are also created in the case of Vajrayana practise, which extends The Three Jewels by introducing the

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Lama. We have included him as the fourth, unnamed, element in the centre of Figure 2. The only difference between the two versions of the practice lies in whether the practitioner or the Lama unifies the activity and function of the other three meta-qualities of mind in themselves. If the Lama unifies the other elements, the geometry of the practice is preserved by completing the square with him, and seating the practitioner invisibly outside the square. We will discuss this geometry further in Figure 4 below. Suffice to say here that, like all other Meditations in the Buddhist toolkit, the Meditation on The Three Jewels forms a basic and implicit nonverbal or symbolic language. This language can be understood by all who practise seeing the same conceptual space. It can even be understood by those who do not practise Meditation but intuit that such an idealised pattern (of the pre-given world) makes common sense. We ask readers to note that this method in particular (and Buddhism in general) is designed so as to promote links between the manifestation of the three different meta-qualities in external society as well as inside one’s own mind. In other words, Buddhist practise is intrinsically inclusive of a group, both in the internal structure of the formal Meditations, whereby one imagines a community to exist, and in an external physical team which accretes around their common goal or teacher. Each team member vows to support others to develop to their highest potential, as if they were interchangeable with oneself, and this naturally leads individuals to heightened awareness of emergent patterns in teams. The Three Pillars In a previous literature review of multiple discplines, we summarized the work and terminology of Csikzentmihalyi (1990, 1997), Koestler (1964) and Boden (1994a, 2005) among others, to define ‘Three Contexts of Creating’ (A-K. Pahl et al., in press). These contexts are generic to the complete cycle of creation from idea conception to public recognition, regardless of the product type. The Contexts of Creating are (i) ‘The Person’ who activates creation, (ii) ‘The Field’ of stakeholders in which the creation is accepted and widely applied and (iii) ‘The Domain’ of knowledge which holds a map of all creations for the benefit of The Field, that they might reproduce, use, or further develop existing results. Note that all three are coincident with each other and with the product co-evolving with them.

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It is hopefully obvious to readers that these three contexts distilled from Western scientific research are virtually identical with The Three Jewels of Buddhism, as described above. This coincidence is helpful both for Engineering Design and for explaining Buddhism. In both cases, we can say that The Three Jewels represent the perfected outcomes of certain styles of behaviour, where by conceptual liberation and/or innovation takes place. Naturally, a style of behaviour is enhanced and easier for others to see, it if takes place in an appropriate environment. The styles of behaviour do therefore have appropriate environments, which allow The Three Jewels to evolve to perfection. They are called The Three Pillars. The first of the Pillars presumes that some people like to deal with structure, methods or formal tools. The second Pillar identifies that others like to use these tools in an informal way to make a difference in their community (and do not necessarily desire a full understanding of their structure). The third Pillar focuses on acquiring the kind of knowledge, which applies to understanding both the underlying structure and its application or reflection. All three styles of behaviour support each other and Buddhism suggests that an individual is capable (and indeed required) to carry out all of them, to achieve the ideal final result. The more one does so, the more likely one is to reach a comprehensive understanding of the reality one co-evolves with others, and the way things really are (Nydahl, 1996). To repeat what we have already said in regard to the Meditation and The Three Jewels, this description of The Three Pillars is also not supposed to remain a mere pretty concept. It is also supposed to become a practical ‘view’ or ‘worldview’ (these terms are loosely used, to cover both the Buddhist meaning, and also the general English sense) and phenomenological starting point for one’s experiments and experience of reality. In Table 2 we contrast the Three Contexts of Creating, The Three Pillars and The Three Jewels with the terms we earlier introduced as Designer, User and Researcher (and which are discussed further in ‘Mandalas for Engineering Design’). Each column states the main behavioural style and environment in which Meditators and Engineering Designers act.

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Table 2: Comparison of terms used to describe The Three Jewels and The Three Pillars of Buddhism with the Three Contexts of Creating and the Diamond Model for Design. The Three Contexts of Creating Previous paper (Pahl et al., 2007 )

The Diamond Model of Design

The Three Pillars of Buddhism

This paper

Modern interpretation

(Pahl & Newnes, 2007 )

(Nydahl, 1996 )

Modern Interpretation

The Three Jewels

Classic translation

(Seegers, 2007b )

Field

User

Holding the View (while applying the methods in real life)

Action or Behaviour

Sangha

Domain

Designer

Meditation (methods)

Contemplation or Meditation

Dharma

Person

Researcher

Knowledge

Hearing or Learning

Buddha

The Mandala of the five Buddha families Buddhist Mandalas are Meditation practises, which originated over 1500 years ago in India and were brought to Tibet in the mid-7th century. The Sanskrit term ‘Mandala’, which predates Buddhism, is best translated as ‘circle’. This is also the best-known visual or geometric feature (in Figure 2, called ‘the cycle of attention’). The Tibetan word ‘kyil khor’, which means ‘centre circle’, also captures the point at the centre of the Mandala circle, from whence the divine being is said to emanate from the absolute indescribable reality (in Figure 1, this is the extreme right hand side of the diagram). There are many different kinds of emanation – in Vajrayana Buddhism each kind is considered a different ‘Buddha Aspect’. Aspects with similar functions, activities and qualities are considered to belong to one ‘Family’. A Mandala is, of course, not merely the home of a Buddha Aspect. It is also considered a map or reflection of both the practitioner’s individual conceptual world (or indeed of the true nature of his mind) and of the pre-given world (this will be discussed further in the section on ‘Mandalas for Engineering Design’). The instructions for the representation of these Buddha Aspects, in the creation of all (the hundreds of different) Mandala forms are therefore very specific. There is not much room for spontaneous individual expression (see for instance, Leidy & Thurmann, 1998; McArthur, 2002, p. 175). Indeed, the Mandala itself was never intended to be freely created but to provide the rules whereby the practitioner could more freely create his own life. Use of

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the Mandala is intended to transform both the individually perceived and socially pre-given conceptual worlds in which the practitioner feels he exists, from being an experience of confusion, problems and suffering into one of wisdom and bliss (among other things). Of the many available teachings on Mandalas we will abstract only those elements, which are relevant to the simple purpose of being helpful to Engineering Design. Thus, of the many available Mandalas, we will concentrate for this paper only on the Mandala of the Five Buddha Families. For more extensive information, the reader should please look at texts such as those by R. Beer (2003, pp. 234-236) and Snellgrove (2004, pp. 191-213).

Figure 3. The Mandala of the Five Buddha Families stylized for this paper. Figure 3 presents a template of this Mandala, stylized for this paper. For the more beautiful original version, we ask the reader to please look at traditional Buddhist thangkas (scroll paintings), in Art Galleries, Museums or a Buddhist centre in his country. Each compass direction of the square is assigned (or considered to inherently possess) some aspect of a ‘completely functioning mind’ (this term is from Vajrayana Buddhism and used comparably with Stafford Beer’s Viable System description, to be explained below). Please note that the compass directions given in the diagram are those of traditional Buddhism, and included for that sake only. They are not relevant to our argument for Engineering Design. However it is important that the complete, inte-

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grated function of mind is assigned the central position.For the same reason that The Three Jewels are represented as objects rather than behaviours, each function of mind in the Mandala of the Five Buddha Families also is depicted not in abstract words, but as the physical form of a Buddha (or Buddha Aspect). But this should not be construed as concretising the concepts! The Mandala of the Five Buddha Families is nevertheless intended to represent how the pre-given world looks when it is liberated from a fixation on concrete objects into displaying qualities of energy and light. Notably, such a transformation from material to energy is also the ideal final result of the evolution trends of entire classes of engineered products (Altshuller, 1984). In Buddhist teaching, one constructs the Mandala from the starting point of a pre-given world based on the five senses and the five emotions. That means the Buddhas are called into being ‘from space’ (which may be conceptual or physical). They are intended to help the practitioner transform all fixed, pre-given mental conceptions of the world into knowledge of the absolute reality. Thereby (or as a prior step) they help transform the emotional tendencies associated with perceptual or mental fixation. Traditionally, the emotions associated with different kinds of mental fixation are: anger, pride, desire, jealousy and ignorance. To be specific; Akshobya (in the East) functions in a way that overcomes the anger of separation from a divine world. He himself is said to have reached this realisation and now bestows and represents a mirror-like quality of awareness of one’s own ‘Buddha nature’ on the practitioner (the term Buddha nature is traditional to Buddhism, and used to represent a composite of the concretely recognisable Buddha as well as the more abstract nature of mind). Moving clockwise round the circle we find Ratnasambhava, who is said to have overcome pride in his own accomplishments. He thus bestows and represents a many-faceted, jewel-like or equalizing awareness that all beings have Buddha nature. Opposite Akshobya sits Amitabha, the transformer of general passion or desire into a discriminating awareness focussed only on the highest bliss. Then there is Amoghasiddhi (in the north), who has overcome the jealousy accompanying unrequited passion and now represents the awareness of all-encompassing and thus all-accomplishing bliss. And finally, in the centre, sits Vairocana, who is considered to have overcome the ignorance of separation from Buddha nature in self, other beings, and in all elements of internal and external space and thus

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represents the wisdom and ‘awareness of the absolute, indescribable reality itself’ (Scherer, 2005, 171-173 & 204-205; Vessantara, 1993). Although, as we suggested in ‘Preparing for Meditation’, reflection can be considered a function of mind (one’s inner conceptual space), it is interesting to note that reflection is also inherent in the qualities of a pre-given or ‘physical’ space. In this respect, we point out that the geometry of the Mandala is highly symmetric. There would be four major planes of (mirror) reflection and lines of (8-fold) rotation, were different functions of mind not assigned to the cardinal directions. The fact that there are, however, directional differences, means that the only plane of geometric reflection which truly exists, lies between an external 2D Mandala and the practitioner’s inner world of percepts and constructs. Mathematically, the practitioner adds a third dimension to the whole, by his very existence and contemplation of the object, so that it fills his entire field of view (whether he knows it or not). Although Mandalas can be placed (or created) horizontally on tables as well as hung vertically on walls, for ease of explanation, we have shown the relationship of practitioner and Mandala in

Figure 4. View of the Meditation of Figure 2 as if it were a framed Artwork hung vertically on a wall.

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Figure 4, as if the former were sitting, looking at a framed painting of the latter on a wall. To show that this is a general principle inherent in the geometry of all Meditation and not limited to the Mandala of the Five Buddha Families, we use the elements of the Meditation of Figure 2, to furnish the illustration. Keeping in mind this view, a Mandala can be considered as a 3D space including the practitioner, even when it is drawn in 2D. We suggest that all formal Meditation elements are automatically projected into (or perceived as existing) in a virtual external space, whether the practitioner is conscious of it, or not. The second point will be discussed a little further in the section on ‘Contradiction’, below.

Backgrounds of Engineering Design Co-evolution Modern engineering design and coincident innovation is notoriously ‘wicked’ or ‘under-defined’ (in the sense originally coined by Rittel & Weber, 1984). This means there are often no rigorous specifications of the starting point, just as there is no scientifically measurable finishing point. Both situations depend on a complex combination of the desires and limitations of the stakeholders, be they ethics, values, social or technical requirements. In order to progress from concept to marketable realisation, all of these factors and actors must ‘co-evolve’. The term co-evolution was originally developed in respect to engineering design by Gero (1990), Qian and Gero (1993, 1996), Suwa, Gero, and Purcell (2000), Dorst and Cross (2001) and Gero and Kannengiesser (2004), and is emerging as a useful concept in that community. It describes the phenomenon whereby, as product design (a solutionspace) evolves, Designers understand their restrictions and requirements (problem-space) better. Work in the solution-space informs the problem-space and vice versa. Knowing that this is the case, it becomes possible to consciously work in both directions. That means one continually reframes or reformulates one’s perception of, and relationship to, the problem while at the same time allowing a solution to emerge from the space between both. This kind of shared interaction of people with their environment and each other has been known to philosophers interested in phenomenologically acquired knowledge for some time. We presume, for instance, that Alfred Schutz in the 1930’s would have equated co152

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evolution with a ‘communicative common environment (which) … is filled with objects and events apperceived … and experienced simultaneously (by both parties), although … the situation has two subjective foci: Each of the persons … lives through his own experience, of which the other is (only) a part. Yet he not only experiences himself in (a) situation, he experiences the experiencing of the situation by the other’ (Schutz, 1992, as cited in Wagner, 1974). Maturana and Varela (1992) also note that in the acquisition of knowledge, there must be dual, mutually informing processes taking place. In Vajrayana Buddhism, their point would be spelt out a little more explicitly, such that ‘the knower, the known and the act of knowing are mutually specified’ (Nydahl, 2004, 14 & 18). In the terms of interest to this paper, this means the Designer, the designed (object), and the act of designing are linked, at the same time as the User, the object used and the act of using it are specified. That, at least, is what we are looking for. In this paper, we consider the concept of co-evolution from the point of view of Designers and Users (or other stakeholders) who come to a discussion with apparently opposing concepts of what should be achieved. Our model therefore deals not only with technical requirements, but at the very least, with a combination of technical and social requirements, which can often seem to form a real conflict or a contradiction in terms. Thus as we shall see, Users can fulfil some of the functions which Designers must otherwise inadequately carry out themselves, and vice versa.

Contradiction Calling something a ‘contradiction’ is not normal engineering terminology. It was the Russian Genrich Altshuller who renamed what others perceived to be problems as ‘contradictions’ (see Altshuller, 1984), to take the intellectual sting out of the situation. A similar approach is taken in modern English-speaking countries, where it is now also politically correct to talk of ‘challenges’ rather than problems. Altshuller’s ‘theory of inventive problem-solving’ (known in the West by its Russian acronym, TRIZ), which was originally developed in the 1950’s, uses contradiction as the basis of its primary and the best-known tool – the ‘Contradiction Matrix’. Due to the strength of this tool, TRIZ has been used by many American Fortune 500 companies. It is touted as the quickest methodology for generating patentable ideas both on its own

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and combined with other well-known systems such as Quality Function Deployment (a method of ‘total quality control’ developed in Japan in the 1960’s) and ‘6 Sigma’ (a process improvement and failure reduction method which originated at Motorola Company in the early 1980s). The Contradiction Matrix provides a shortcut to problem-solving, as long as the problem is formulated in a simple way. It has to be simple enough for Designers to see it in a ‘play-off’ between only two targets or variables that must be attained simultaneously, and which can be stated as two single words. This means, for instance, one would say ‘I want to improve strength’ and ‘I don’t want to increase weight’, in which case one has ‘a strength-weight contradiction’. Please note that the concept of contradiction, in the way we use it (and no one knows whether Altshuller intended it to be used this way) differs from the concept of ‘dialectic’ known to Marxists and philosophers. The latter proceeds by arguing each salient point in turn, in a zigzag fashion, while we see contradiction as arguing two points at the same time. In that sense, we define contradiction as ‘a line between two end-points, which represent dual targets to be reached, and whose length does not include the resolution’ (A-K. Pahl & Bogatyreva, 2003). The resolution of the contradiction is achieved by thinking in another dimension. This is mapped as two arrows of thought converging on a

Figure 5. A way to present contradiction. Contradiction can be represented as a line relating two targets, which does not include a point resolving the contradiction. (From A-K Pahl & Bogatyreva, 2003; A-K Pahl et al., in press)

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single point, whereupon the resulting triangle forms the solution-space, in Figure 5. The figure describes how contradiction can be represented as a line relating two targets, which does not include a point resolving the contradiction. (from A-K. Pahl & Bogatyreva, 2003 and A-K. Pahl et al., in press). Our map of an internal conceptual space obeys the same rules as a mapping of external physical space. This is because we suspect people think of their conceptual resolution as if were a physical object, situated in the distant future, or unreachable, like an object on a distant horizon. Thus we also map it in the same way that parallel railway tracks mapped in a pre-given world triangulate on the horizon. However we need to point out that there are many directions in which one can look, and many places at which one can start mapping one’s conceptual space. Certainly, looking at a point the physical horizon first in front and then behind oneself would produce a diamond-shaped map. Conceptually, the same is true. Thus a Designer can stand in the middle of a 2D ‘Diamond Map of Design’, looking both forwards to the expected solution, and backwards to the unknown problem origin. This situation, the ’Diamond Map of Design’, evolves by establishing a line of contradiction, and defining points at which the resolution and problem-source exist. This is illustrated in Figure 6 (from A-K. Pahl, 2006a).

Figure 6. The 'Diamond Map of Design'. The 'Diamond Map of Design' evolves by establishing a line of contradiction and defining points at which the resolution and the problem-source exist. 155


We also wish to point out to the reader that a diamond-shaped map of conceptual spaces is not only a construct of our making. The diamond geometry of conceptual space more or less coincides with the research of others. In particular, most empirical research studies in creativity now confirm what psychologists have intuited since the time of Wallas (1926) – any process of creating something new is defined by a sequence of roughly the same kinds of (between three and seven) discrete acts, periods or steps. These steps can be summarized in even fewer stages. The two most important are a period of ‘divergent’ thinking (term from Guildford, 1950) or apparently uncensored idea generation and multiplication, followed by a period of ‘convergent’ thinking (term again from Guildford, 1950), which we also identify as editing, criticism and evaluation. These stages have also been well-known to engineers for some time, even though they were largely disregarded in practise (due to the simplicity of the original literature) and rarely drawn on paper. As Figure 6 intimates and Figure 7 confirms, mapping the thought process of divergent and convergent thinking in its simplest combination on paper produces a diamond. Figure 7 gives an overview of the ‘Diamond of Creating’ and ‘Diamond of Problem-solving’ (which are the same). Note that the arrows of thought on the left hand side of the

Figure 7. The 'Diamond of Creating' and ' Diamond of Problem-Solving'. Note that the arrows of thought on the left hand side of the diagram (in the problem space) move in the opposite direction to those in the ‘Diamond Map of Design.’

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diagram (in the problem-space) move in the opposite direction to those in the ‘Diamond Map of Design’. The fact that a diverging and converging conceptual space is already familiar to Designers indicates that the diamond is not only an obvious choice, but a useful one. In spite of this, we ask the reader to please note that depending on where one stands (perceives and starts creating one’s object or world), the arrows of conceptual thought move in different directions. In previous literature and practice (and as is illustrated in Figure 7), people spoke of both creating and problem-solving, as if Designers moved only in one direction, from left to right in the manner of reading text in the West. This is presumably because creation of an object with a known template proceeds neatly from a starting point to a finishing point. Likewise, Designers may think they know exactly what their problem is, and believe they move from the source of this problem to a solution, in the same way that they would create their product, if no problem existed. In that case we point out (and engineers also know this from their daily work) that the first resolution can immediately become the second problem, and so on. In fact, there need be no end to the cycle of problem-solving, just as there is no end to the cycle of creating potential solutions (even for potentially non-existent problems). In short, what we call the ‘Diamond of Creating’ is identical with the ‘Diamond of Problem-solving’ and both are a problem-resolution string. This kind of thinking is not very innovative. It does not liberate Designers’ previous concepts from their old constraints; it merely replaces them with the same ones in different guises or contexts. In Buddhist terms, this kind of thinking typifies samsara (Sanskrit. approximately meaning ‘cycle or process of illusion’ and ‘bondage of ordinary life’). Innovation, on the other hand, is distinguished from pure problemsolving and also from the simple single act of creation by the ability to look in both directions simultaneously. This kind of thinking allows the Designer to start constructing his world from either the problem-space or the solution-space, or preferably, both together. This paradox is crucial to innovation, to introduce new ideas not just for the sake of having ideas, but for the sake of being

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in the appropriate context (A-K. Pahl, 2006a, A-K. Pahl et al., in press). It is obvious that one cannot solve a problem using the same kind of thinking that created it in the first place. That means, by definition, new ideas are sourced outside the original problem-space. Comparing and matching the elements in a problem-space and those in solution-space is easiest if the elements are temporarily highly abstracted. Altshuller’s (1984) formulation of technical contradiction in two terms is the simplest way to do this. Having formulated his contradiction, the Designer then stands at the centre of our Diamond Map of Design. Just as importantly however, in innovation (as opposed to creation or problem-solving) the Designer need not find his own solution. As every TRIZ practitioners and Google users know, it is possible to create more quickly and arguably better by ‘stealing’ (this term from Vincent, 2002, meaning ‘adapting’) someone else’s existing solution, or a close match. This match can be carried out on the level of the individual working with intellectual knowledge databases. Or it can be carried out by the Designer discussing possible solution scenarios with others. In any case, the two directions of evolution co-exist, such that the worlds, views and maps of conceptual spaces for other stakeholders can be superposed and interactive with those of the Designer. We will discuss this in more detail later. Lastly, we propose that the process of innovative design (via resolving contradiction) is not a single act of looping forward and backwards, but an iterative or recursive process. This is intimated by its etymology – the term ‘innovation’ comes from the Latin novare, meaning ‘to make new’ and Latin inne, meaning ‘within itself’. In the same way, it is also intimated in the ritual of Meditation (discussed with Figure 1). It is intimated in the process of establishing analogy between two previously unconnected objects, events or worlds, in ever-finer precision of measured similarities and differences via a repetition of three simple mathematical steps (A-K. Pahl, 2001; A-K. Pahl et al., in press). It is mentioned by S. Beer (1984, p. 25) in terms of his Viable System Model, as will be further discussed below.

Action, Reflection and Research Engineers would generally say that their practise consists almost purely of action. Design, on the other hand, includes some cognitive reflection

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on previous actions (A-K. Pahl et al., in press). Where and when reflection occurs is the key to success. Engineering Designers, especially in very large companies, often carry out both kinds of behaviours, from the early stages to the end stages of product design. They not only act but also reflect on their actions, and thirdly even also often attempt to observe, record and interpret their activities and reflections (traditionally in diagrams and more recently through computerized ‘creativitysupport tools’) both during and post design. Such behaviour is ad hoc – implicit in community practise and not consciously acknowledged or executed as a meta-design or research activity. This situation exists, because they rarely have a chance to interact directly with stakeholders outside their team, who might fulfil some of the functions of reflection and research. Thus they are subject to the ‘character of practical knowledge … (for) the knowledge of the man who acts and thinks within the world of his daily life is not homogeneous: it is (i) incoherent (ii) only partially clear (iii) not at all free from contradictions’ (Schutz, 1972, as cited in Wagner, 1974). Of course, reflection on product design is best supplied by those who are or will be the users of the product, and no longer by its creators. The User can, and usually does, present the Designer with a different view of requirements based on social considerations that may appear initially to contradict current technical capabilities. Yet this contradiction from the market of Users always drives engineers to find another resolution and add more dimensions to the final system (or product or process). Despite the fact that human beings can and ideally should carry out multiple functions, in this paper, we still assume an important distinction exists between the technical functions of Designers and social activities of Users. This is because we know from real life Engineering Design that both parties are not really in a position to speak for each other. A facilitator or Researcher must behave in yet a third way, that of trying to generate ‘knowledge’. He is in a difficult position, where he cannot speak purely for either Designers or Users, he cannot align himself completely with one party or the other. Instead, he must try to generate a better understanding of the important relationships between action and reflection, on behalf of others who are fully engaged in either process, while perhaps semi-detached from both. Of course this does not mean that the Researcher is separate from the process and experience,

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for one can nevertheless also not be a mere ‘objective observer’ as Western scientists would traditionally have liked. As is well known in phenomenology (Psathas, 1973, pp. 129-156) and popularly cited from quantum physics, one cannot be separate from the world one observes. In the Researcher’s situation, one alternates and ultimately integrates his judgement between the conflicting parties and avoids promulgating a view of ‘us and them’. One negotiates between a solution-space and problem-space, and considers internal emotional considerations together with external system requirements, for the product or issue being discussed. We hope the reader has noticed the authors are Researchers who speak not only for ourselves, but also hope to speak for, ‘copresent’, contemporary academic researchers (to use the terminology of Wagner, 1974), whom we know. We speak for all those people, who have multidisciplinary backgrounds that cause them to cognitively stand between two groups of people (such as Designers and Users) or two or more scientific domains, trying to find coincidences and differences that will inform both sides. To be exact, we believe a Researcher can and should take the position both of the Designer (who creates a physical product and an associated conceptual system of rules) and of the User (who buys a product and intuitively enters the associated conceptual system). By making it linguistically clear that there are distinctions in function between them, we can better understand how each of the participants in a system composed of opposing viewpoints can best function. Furthermore, due to this unique vantage point, the responsibility of building a model or structure of the dynamic process where action and reflection inform each other (and are potentially unified) falls to the Researcher, rather than either of the other types of individuals or functions. It must be said that there will, in an ideal, fully functioning system, be additional roles to play – the Manager, for one. However although we can (and will later) show that his role has a central position in the Mandala for Design, considering his full impact and relationship to our three primary roles is beyond the scope of this paper.

The ‘Generic Process of Creating’ The authors of this paper recently carried out a comparative study of the stages of creativity and innovation which are well-accepted and arguably dominating in hundreds of processes in many fields, including

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psychological literature, engineering design, knitting fashion, sociological action research, Organizational development (of commercial enterprises rather than biological systems), theories of colour and perspective in renaissance art and architecture, baroque and early classical music, the classic dramatic structures of literature and modern screenwriting, commercial creativity tools and innovation tools, and the practise of Buddhist Meditation (please see Pahl et al., in press, for a literature list).

The ‘Generic Process of Creating’ in a Table Laying all processes whereby various things are created side by side, and carefully translating the keyword terms for behaviours from different domains, a set of common, standard or underlying stages and principles of behaviour becomes obvious, as outlined in Table 3 (and further discussed in the section ‘Mandalas for Engineering Design’). A single ‘generic process of creating’ is presented in the extreme left column, which includes all the steps of the processes in all domains, but at the same time abstracts their essence and simplifies their language. The column entitled ‘Commonalities in humanities literature’ abstracts another table from A-K. Pahl et al. (in press), which summarizes the steps of creating that were identified by psychologists since 1926. The terminology we chose for the generic process is linked with the geometry we developed for the evolution and representation of the conceptual spaces of design. That means we attribute the complexity of the problem-source to lie nested inside a (non-dimensional) point at some ‘infinite horizon’. Likewise, a complete solution (the specifics of which have not yet been defined) is nested inside a point at the other horizon. In between these endpoints lie two fields of expanded awareness or conceptual space. The first field encompasses the ideas evolving around the problem, and the second field entails the ideas, which are worked into a solution. The fact that such a generic pattern does exist cannot be merely a vague coincidence, or a device of wishful thinking. While it is true that minute difference in process and potentially major differences in the problemand solution-spaces of domains do exist and are fundamentally important for including personal experience and context (and can be explored under the auspices of a formal hermeneutics), the express aim of identifying an underlying framework is that it should provide a structure upon which all succeeding differences can exist and make sense.

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We therefore return to a question we alluded to earlier: Why, when inventions are obviously invented without requiring conscious awareness of the process by which they happen, do we need to make explicate a structure for innovation in design? We can answer this question with a brief diversion into the Theory of Music. Music had no formal notation system in the Western world, prior to the Middle Ages. It was taught and remembered and passed on orally, aurally and through practise. There had apparently been some knowledge of fundamental principles, which linked sounds irrespective of the instrument used to produce them – in other words, there was an intimation of a previous theory of music, in the time of the Roman Empire. But this was lost at its fall. The (re-)development of symbolic musical notation towards the very end of the Dark Ages occurred to facilitate and preserve Gregorian chanting in English monasteries. The point relevant to our argument about a system for innovation is that the development of musical notation did not affect any implicit understanding or cultural feeling for the ideal spatial relationship of tones. Music continued to be sung and played and passed on around the world, as it had been for millennia. Having notation did also not change the frequency of tones or their factual relationship to each other. Nor did it change the fact that each composer could vary the temporal relationship of constituent tones, in order to make sonatas distinct from symphonies for instance or to allow jazz music to develop from classical. The development of a common notation did, however, have an enormous impact on how music was shared and taught. Understanding – and developing a notation for- the principles, which connected the sounds (as a Theory of Music) made it possible to pass music on to people who had never heard a particular kind of music. Then, given the right environment for practise and the provision of appropriate tools, musical notation enabled practitioners to recreate the original composition, through an imagined aural transmission, rather than the oral transmission. It is for this reason that we propose the pattern of creating, which we have identified and call generic, is necessary for Design. We hope that the existence and passing on of this pattern should not be subject to debate for emotive reasons we discussed as hindrances to this research in the past (in ‘On the difficulties entailed in reporting’).

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The Generic Model of Creating – A Diamond Map of Co-evolution The generic pattern of creating is, happily, not merely a matrix or taxonomy, but as we have already seen can be geometrically represented as a diamond of cognitive or conceptual divergence and convergence (in Figures 5, 6 and 7, above). In our previous paper (A-K. Pahl et al., in press), we gave a rather complex explanation of how the Designer can simultaneously view his conceptual space from different starting points and fulfil all functions of action, reflection and understanding of his system. Thus we started to define the mechanism of co-evolution. We will not repeat that explanation nor reproduce that map here. For this paper, we can explain the mechanism of co-evolution more exactly by considering how Designers interact with Users. Suffice to say that we assume Designers have a tacit or explicit Diamond Map of Creating for their conceptual space of Engineering Design and Users also have a separate Diamond Map of Creating for their conceptual space of product use. In order to find a coincidence of their expectations and experiences, they – or a Researcher acting on their behalf – need to superpose their respective maps of the world. The simplest way to do this is to assume that the divergent thinking of the Designers is met by the convergent thinking of the Users. Figure 8 shows a simple ‘Diamond Map of Co-evolution’. The divergent thinking of one team is met by the divergent thinking of the other in a pregiven space of knowledge transfer. In other words, the Users act to provide reflection to the Designers and the latter need not do it themselves. This is the situation akin to that described to considering Buddhism as magic (Figure 1). It is also the ideal situation of innovation for, if one has understood the problem-space systematically, correctly and completely, the pattern of the problem-space and the solutionspace are easier to match and knowledge can be transferred. When this process is unconscious, it can seem as if the solution comes to meet the seeker by divine inspiration (A-K. Pahl, 2006b). Note that the arrows signifying thought in this diagram are different to those in Figure 6 and Figure 7. We will explore this form further in ‘Mandalas for Engineering Design’.

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Figure 8. A simple 'Diamond Map of Co-evolution'. The divergent thinking of one team is met by the divergent thinking of the other in a pre-given space of knowledge transfer. The last important point to extract for this paper from our previous one, is that the seven steps of the Generic Process of Creating (see Table 3) are divided into the three stages of (i) divergent thinking, (ii) convergent thinking and (iii) pattern matching, knowledge transfer and/or transformation, as illustrated in Figure 9. This figure describes the ‘Diamond Map of Co-evolution’, with divergent thinking at one end of the diamond, convergent thinking at the other and knowledge transfer in the middle. Please note in this diagram the thought arrows defining the map are given for Designers only. The fifth step of innovation, which takes place immediately right of the plane of pattern matching and knowledge transfer (also the plane of reflection), requires Designers (and Users) to specify a complete system description. It is this step, on which we concentrate for the remainder of this paper.

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Table 3: The ‘Generic process of creating’ on the left, juxtaposed against other processes of creating in the remainder of the table (from Pahl et al., in press) GENERIC PROCESS OF CREATING Pahl (2005 a, b) Problem as point

Problem as field

Idea generation

Idea evaluation

1

Commona lities in humanitie s literature Problem or situation definition

2

3

4

Engineering DESIGN PROCESS

Narrative/ Literature

Pahl & Beitz (1984 )

Buzan and Kurz and Buzan (1993 ) Snowden (2002 )

McKee (1997 )

Nydahl (2000a )

Identify essential problem, need or task

Identify goal (implicit)

Define known domain - cause and effect of situation are repeatable and predictable

Inciting incident

Define current situation –which inherently creates the motivation and reason for moving toward another goal

Establish function structures

First burst of associative ideas around the goal (brainstormin g)

Establish parameters of Knowable domain – cause and effect may mismatch in time and space

Establish context

Establish specifications for the ideal final goal

Solution as field

Explore complex domain - cause and effect are coherent only in hindsight

Define conflicts

Set up conceptual template of a potential solution

Create specifications for solution

Idea generation

Search for working principles

First reconstructio n and revision

Combine principles into concept variants

Incubation

Concept preliminary layouts

Second reconstructio n and revision (analysis and decision – making)

Establish detailed structure of solution Critical template in iterations choices addressing material, which are Explore chaotic information and domain – cause & most likely communication effect relations are to lead the systems hero to completely success incomprehensible

The final stage of matching solution with goal

Return to complex domain

Idea evaluation

Solution as point (Ideal final result)

Incubation 5

6

7

Meditation

Incubation

Test embodiment with respect to solution principles Insight, integration and pattern matching

CREATIVITY METHODS, MODELS, TOOLS and TECHNIQUES Mindmapping CYNEFIN MODEL for COMPLEX ITY

Solution generation including problem situation recapitulat ion

Form variants of assemblies

Search for resolution

Climax

Overlay (melt ) solution template on (or into ) current situation

Definitive layout

Reversal

Evaluate best fit of solution in context of current situation for activation

Finalize production documents

Resolution

Establish second known situation

Optimize design

Dedicate a general application or template for all other systems and societies

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Figure 9. The full 'Diamond Map of Co-evolution'. Divergent thinking is at one end of the diamond, convergent thinking at the other, and knowledge transfer in the middle.

Insights from Managerial Cybernetics The Viable System Model In this section, we will introduce some parallels of our research with that of Stafford Beer, who was acknowledged as ‘the father of managerial cybernetics’ by Norbert Wiener (‘the father of cybernetics’) (1948) himself. Over the course of 30 years, Beer developed a rigorous model for Organizational behaviour based on an assumption that the biological structure of the human and his social behaviour were intrinsically linked. Starting with observations as a psychologist in the army, and then during several decades in management of the steel industry he dedicated his time to diagnosing Organizational behaviour and understanding long-term growth. To pass on his insights, he started with a mathematical (set-theoretical) model of the brain as the template for organizational growth, but quickly realized that peers preferred to understand his concepts with more concrete information. Thus he combined the maths with what he considered everyone knew about their

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bodies, in particular, about the central nervous system and general brain structure. In other words, he considered that the organization of the living and the mechanisms of perception were linked (cf. issue discussed in ‘The need for Maps and Methods’). What is more, he believed that ‘the organization of the living’ referred not only to the individual, but also to society. He assumed that whatever patterns existed in the nervous system of the human would determine their behaviour and patterns of working in the physical and/or pre-given world. The most important point for this paper is that Beer (1984, 1985) realized that a well-functioning and independent or ‘viable’ social system invariably included five distinct (necessary and sufficient) types of behaviours and sub-systems. In a trilogy of three books developing this idea, he proposed their integration in a ‘Viable System Model’ or VSM. In these books, Beer describes how functional decentralization and inherent cohesion of any system is possible once it is built on solid foundations. His model offers a way of providing autonomy in the design of adaptable and flexible organizations. Organizations built on his principles are apparently better able to balance both external and internal perspectives, and long- and short-term thinking, than others who do not use them (Leonard, 1997). Beer never actually provided an explicit list of the five behaviours in any of his case studies or in any theoretical chapters of ‘The Brain of the Firm’ (1972) or ‘The Heart of Enterprise’ (1979). As he explained many years later, in response to others trying to create such a list, his rationale for leaving it out was that, ‘the five sub-systems work recursively and cannot be isolated from each other, so attempts in the literature to identify them separately with managerial names are illconceived’ (Beer, 2000). However we propose that he was being over-cautious. The fact that a system includes interdependently arising and recursive behaviours should not stop us from identifying what these behaviours actually are. Thus we now provide an interpretation of the stages, qualities and functions, which the VSM sub-systems exhibit. This list is distilled from many different parts of his work, and of course, as Beer (2000) also said, does not imply a definitive order of manifestation: (1) structural physical elements which provide the elements to be controlled and the initial direction in which movement takes place (e.g. the body or environment);

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(2) the information systems, which coordinate relationships between elements in (1); (3) the autonomic command centre, for operation and distribution of the internal functions of (1) and (2); (4) the centre for planning and foresight and integration of (1) and (2) and (3) with the outside world; (5) the overall command or control centre, which balances all other functions and demands (and is the so-called ‘heart’ or brain of the firm). A more succinct summary of the VSM, whose stages are nevertheless comparable to ours, has been proposed by Leonard (1997), who worked with Beer for 25 years: •

Implementation (System1)

•

Coordination (System2)

•

Control (System3)

•

Intelligence (System4)

•

Policy (System5)

The sub-systems in the VSM are also comparable to the Mandala of the Five Buddha Families and the grouping of the Buddhist ‘skandhas’ (meaning ‘heaps’ of aggregated sense consciousness), as shown in Table 4 (using Leonard’s, 1997, terms for the sub-systems). In other words, these three systems make similar conclusions about the way in which human perception and behaviour is organized. This is not completely surprising, given that Beer used models of the physiological functions of the brain and nervous system to underpin his VSM. We propose it stands to reason that if humans are built the same general way, then they must also have an inbuilt tendency to build structures and relationships in a particular order – or at least to include many of the same steps in creating, no matter what or in which field they create. Thus it is also not an unexpected coincidence that the five sub-systems of the VSM are evident in the first five steps of the generic process for creating, which was partly shown in Table 3 (A-K. Pahl et al., in press).

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Table 4 Comparison of Mandala of the Five Buddha Families and Buddhist skandhas with the Viable System Model of Stafford Beer (2000). Organizational System describing perception and experience

Predominant function of Sub-systems of an ideal whole Sub-system

Sub-system

1

2

Sub-system 3

Sub-system

Sub-system

4

5 Centre -

Mandala of The Five Buddha Families

East -

South -

West -

North -

Identification

Equality in Diversity

Discriminatio n

Overall accomplishment

Ultimate reality

The Five Skandhas of Buddhist philosophy

Form, structure, body, sense objects

Perceptual stimulus, feeling, sensation

Cognition, recognition mental processing of sensory stimuli

Mental habits, thoughts, ideas, relationships, associations, volitions

Conscious awareness of self, others and cosmos

Viable System Model of Stafford Beer

Implementation, initial direction

Coordination or information

Internal control

Integrated & externalized intelligence

Intention, Policy, overall command

Interestingly, Beer once laid out his four subsystems in a square 2D geometry, which can be compared to a Mandala (Beer, 1972, p. 143) – this is recreated in Figure 10. This diagram illustrates the coupling, which he suggests takes place in human organization and Organizations, both between the elements of the individual nervous system, and between the elements of societies or companies. In particular, a coupling exists between sub-systems one and three, which represent his ‘external sensory’ and the ‘internal motor’ worlds respectively. We paraphrase his ‘external sensory’ as the material world, which can be perceived with the five senses – this is a subset of our pre-given one. The ‘internal motor’ world is the set of neural and muscular connections which enable action and communication to take place. Another coupling exists between sub-systems two and four, which represent his ‘internal sensory’ and ‘external motor’ worlds, respectively. In our terms, the ‘internal sensory’ includes the five senses which facilitate perception (e.g. sight) as well as the nervous connections and mechanisms by which that sense is activated (e.g. the lens, pupil and iris). The ‘external motor’ world is the one in which action and communication takes place – again as a subset of our pre-given one. Each of the systems needs to ‘switch’ their mode of behaviour in order to integrate incoming information from their coupled system. He also points out that system four is ‘the biggest switch’, since it brings in information from outside the system altogether, as well as dealing with that from

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the other three interior sub-systems. Sub-system 5, at the centre, refers to the overall control or command centre of the central nervous system.

Figure 10. The Sub-systems of Stafford Beer’s Viable System model (after Beer, 1972). We note that Beer says nothing, which is categorically about perception itself, only about its environment. However, in both cases, Beer (1972, p. 182) implies that the pre-given world mirrors the perceived world. He implies that perception depends on the way in which movement and experiences are wired into the brain, and vice versa. In effect, Beer thus assumed as given from the outset of his work what other researchers have always generally questioned at the outset of their own. But of course, this was possible because Beer was interested in behaviours of groups in a pre-given world, and could only start his observation by proposing a generalized hypothesis of individual function. Maturana on the other hand, was not influenced by this consideration, and was interested purely in observing the specifics of individuals. Beer and Maturana were, in any case, also not the only ones to make observations like these. The phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty (1964a, 1964b, 1965) was convinced the experience of the outer world and the organization of the inner world are linked – his work is continued in the current philosophy movement focussed on ‘Interactive Mind’. While we do not expand on the connections in this paper, we hope the reader will bear in mind that the perception and organization of the living may indeed be linked, as we describe ‘Mandalas for Engineering Design’ in the next section.

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In Beer’s VSM, just as in the Buddhist Mandala, each of the subsystems one to four supports the function of the others in a recursive, co-evolving relationship, and is subservient only to sub-system five and the whole. This means that while sub-systems one to four are ‘open’ (in the mathematical sense), the fifth sub-system of a complete system enables the whole to ‘close in on itself’ (Beer, 1984). This is mathematically relatively easy to say. In practise however, Beer reported that Organizations find closure and hence viability difficult to achieve. He noted that teams were often flustered when asked to define the components of the crucial fifth subsystem in their Organization, even though they had easily decided upon the components of sub-systems one to four. In his experience, everyone gave a different answer, when nominating what sub-system five was or should be made of (Beer, 1984). In other words they could not agree on what ought to have been the central question, or ‘heart’ of their Organization. Reflecting on why this should be difficult, Beer realized (particularly during his work with President Allende in Chile) that people projected their expectations regarding their own particular sub-system (and pregiven world) onto the whole. Since the Organization grew from different directions, there was no coincidence in the view of how growth of the whole was expected to take place (this is, of course, the exact situation a product Designer and User face when trying to integrate their worldviews). At that point of insight, many years after first establishing his model, he realized that it was the duty of the fifth sub-system to set, and affirm if necessary, some original intention as to what particular kind of Organizational growth all sub-systems should undergo (Beer, ibid). This point will be further discussed in ‘Mandalas for Engineering Design’ and the discussion on ‘Purpose’, where we integrate Beer’s insights with our Diamond Model.

Mandalas for Engineering Design A Five Element System Iterated meditation on a Mandala, as Leidy and Thurmann (1999, in appendices) explain, should lead the practitioner to ever more refinement. In particular, one is expected to transform the five gross modes of sense-related behaviour prevalent in the pre-given world to three

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more subtle modes of perception and behaviour (which we called ‘meta-qualities’ in the section on The Three Jewels). Now we will explore the exact steps how this transformation from ‘real to ideal’ happens and why it is relevant for Engineering Design. As a complement to the ideal world represented by the five Buddha families, we introduce another Buddhist Mandala, which traditionally represents the pre-given world. In this, five figures are represented as worldly ‘Kings’ who are not completely liberated from fixation. They do, however, still hold the key to mystical knowledge and outwardly seem to act in a manner similar to the Buddhas (see for e.g. McArthur, 2002, p. 71). Buddhists suggest the reason for this similarity is that someone who strives to reach the pinnacle of achievement and also contribute to the best of all his fellows, will reduce chaos in his actions, and streamline, refine and evolve his preferred style of behaviour to achieve his goal. Ultimately he will exemplify a behavioural pattern which psychologists call ‘archetypal’ and Buddhists call ‘achieving highest worldly dharma’. Without Meditation, this is the closest a person can get to true dharma. The so-called Mandala of the Five Kings is said to mirror the Mandala of the Five Buddha Families. In Vajrayana Buddhism, the two kinds of world (that of the Kings and that of the Buddhas) relate to each other not just by reflection, but by being integrated in the perception of someone sitting in the middle of both worlds. The one who sees both worlds and integrates them, thereby overcoming all duality and discrepancies, is the historical (and primordial) Buddha. How can this be possible? This is possible because, as we pointed out in ‘On the difficulties entailed in reporting’; and ‘The need for Maps and Methods’, both worlds (the pre-given world of the Kings and the ideal world of the Buddhas) are actually based on a concept or mental construct. We can exist in a mentally constructed world only with a mental body and not with a physical one. Thus, as Long & Burnama (2005) point out from ancient Mahayana texts, ‘… the mental body of the (Buddha-to-be) … proceeded to the (divine world), even as his (physical) body remained seated on the bank of the … River’. The practical use of this statement will become more evident in Figure 11a, where we show how a Buddha might separate his view, while seated in the centre of the two Mandalas. This figure is based on the

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view of the practitioner we introduced in Figure 4. We, the external observer (outside the plane of the page on which the diagram of the event is drawn) looking at a theoretical Buddha, would see him seated in the centre of one non-conceptual and two conceptual worlds. The only non-conceptual world is the one in which he is seated, meditating. Of the conceptual worlds, one is a pre-given divine world, to which he travels to with his mental body, and whereupon he becomes its central figure (the world of the Five Buddha Families). The other is a pre-given human world, in which he ordinarily acts with his physical body (when he is not sitting on the bank of a River) and where he has also reached the highest attainment and become the central figure (the world of the Five Kings).

Figure 11a. A theoretical Buddha at the centre of two conceptual worlds. Importantly however, we can show the very same situation integrated into a single geometry. As is described in Figure 11b, the theoretical Buddha of this paper may also make both his worlds coincident and coevolving. This integrates (and inverts) the geometry of the preceding figure. This diagram is technically speaking an octagon, but we loosely call it a diamond. It illustrates how the action and reflection of Figures 6 and 8 (and the practice and ritual of meditation described in Figure 1), would look in 3D. At this point, the theoretical Buddha of this paper can appear to us (the external observer), to be coincidentally King, practitioner and Buddha. The three positions of true centre and

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the two central end points are completely equivalent although they are expressed in different contexts. The Buddha acts in (and indeed creates or co-evolves) all these worlds simultaneously. What is more, as the theoretical Buddha makes all his worlds coincident, to our external eye, this not only integrates but inverts the geometry of the preceding part of this figure.

Figure 11b. The theoretical Buddha of this paper. In Figure 12a and 12b, we show our first attempt to make the situation of the Buddha in the previous diagrams useful for Engineers and immediately find we cannot. The reason why we cannot do so is as follows: An ordinary person in a pre-given world based on Aristotelian logic constructing his or her worldview in isolation from other possible worlds. Let us say he projects or perceives the important elements of his world around him in the geometry introduced in Figure 4, i.e. a halfdiamond. Now let us say there are two such people, each with their own geometric projection, and we, the external observers wish to join the two half-diamonds up in a single diamond, as shown in Figure 12a. We cannot do it because there is a mismatch in the position of the elements of the respective worldviews. It is possible, if we do not look too closely, that we might propose the worlds mirror each other. But they do not. The Mandalas on either side of the central plane are simply opposites. Figure 12a shows how the worldview of the Designer and User may be considered by two teams to oppose each other. Even though both have independently evolved similar Mandalas of thought and behavior, they do not naturally match over the central mirror plane.

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Figure 12a. The worldviews of the Designer and User considered as opposing. Of course, that is precisely what occurs when we look in a mirror in the Western world. The image that greets us on the other side does not actually part its hair on the same side as we do. This mismatch is unavoidable because, as Plato pointed out in his book Timaeus (quoted and extended in Plitcha, 1998, p. 108), two mirrors must be placed at right angles to each other, giving four-fold quadrant symmetry (assuming the mirror extends behind the intersection we see), with infinite space in each direction, in order to get the correct image reflected back from the central join. Actually, as Plitcha (1998) tested it, such a four-fold mirror ‘…shows me as if I were standing in front of myself and thus in reverse. In addition there are two normal reflections, one on the left and one on the right’. He goes on to ask ‘… do the four people – (myself) and the three reflections - also exist when I take away the mirror? …. (because if that is true then this) mirror makes it possible to see a hidden phenomenon, such as a mental picture, an idea.’ Plitcha thus proposes that a ‘space of concepts’ can be said to have or require a quadruple structure because it can only be seen completely by arranging two plane mirrors in this way. His argument links with Giordano Bruno’s mathematics that ‘ … infinite space with (the mirrored planes measuring D² x D² giving a resultant) 4D geometry differs from finite space, which is measured in 3 simple axial dimensions’ (Plitcha, 1998, p. 105).

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It will be obvious to the reader that Plitcha’s exercise establishes a Mandala of five elements, which includes the perceiver of a world within the central space of its mirrored geometry, as well as outside it. We thus confirm from a mathematical point of view that a five-element system is appropriate to model a complete conceptual space in the plane of the perceiver, just as is proposed in the Buddhist point of view. Furthermore, the existence of the perceiver both inside and outside that five-element system confirms the extension of that basic plane Mandala to create at least a sixth element and half the Diamond Model, which is the object of this paper. We must also note in passing that having said two ordinary people cannot fail to mismatch the meeting point of their two worlds, our theoretical Buddha cannot geometrically fail to match his. This is in the first instance because the Buddha is just one being and not two separate individuals or teams with opposing concepts, motivations and views. Thus, when he starts moving into any world from his own central point (which is also the central space of Beer’s fifth subsystem), he comes and goes from each of his perceived worlds in the same way. To that end, he focuses not so much on the diamond structure itself – nor even on the individual elements which define that structure in a pre-given world. Rather, he focuses on the dynamic cycling of mind which links the elements and thus activate the diamond structure (as already alluded to in Figure 2) or indeed produce a Mandala coincident with the diamond in the first place. In 2D, the cycling of mind is approximated by a wheel. In 3D however, this same motion is actually double helical and vortexial spin along a time axis. Thus the theoretical Buddha’s mind cycles out from a single point in the centre where he sits between the worlds and comes back into a point at the centre. Next of course, it is important to note that the centre can exist in more than one place – at the very least in a Mandala at each end of Figure 11a and 11b. This movement produces ever more elaborate shapes. Further elaboration of the geometry and its implications for Research and Design is beyond the scope of this paper, but will be treated in a forthcoming project. To be fair, we could actually disregard the situation of mismatched worlds for the sake of simplicity and force the elements of the Designer’s world and the elements of the User’s world to coincide like those of a theoretical Buddha, on either side of a central mirror plane.

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We do this in Figure 12b, here we make a prototype of the Diamond Model, which is the penultimate step before building the model that is the focus of this paper. We force a coincidence of the worldview of the Designer and User upon each other. If we had no other option, we would thereby achieve a relative simplicity in the protocol of discussion between the two opposing teams (see ‘Structuring Designer-User conversations with the 3D Diamond model’) and a kind of prototype model. Thus we have loosely called this option a Mandala for Engineering Design. But it is not quite our Diamond Model yet.

Figure 12b. A prototype of the Diamond Model. Luckily, forcing the world to fit is not necessary. There is a way to resolve all discrepancies and dualism as if by magic, so that everything fits perfectly. This is possible because there is a second way for the Buddha to create a perfectly integrated world, utilizing the structure we can reognize as external observers. This involves the Mandala of the Five Buddha Families morphing into (or from) The Three Pillars of Buddhism, at another level of creation, as we will elaborate in the next section.

A Five Element System has Three Meta-qualities In Buddhist terms, formal Meditation is a first step toward moving from a problem-space towards a solution. However, considering the elements of a formal Meditation to exist outside oneself involves only uni-directional movement of thought. As we have mentioned in Figure 1, and as explained by Leidy and Thurmann (1999, see the section above), the true experience of meditation is bi-directional. Not only does a practitioner move from his pre-given world, but the reflection of his action or the ideal reality should come in to meet him.

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What we wish to consider now therefore, is the other side of the equation, especially in regards to innovation. In other words, how does one move from a solution-space to meet a problem-space? To help answer this question, we looked at the elaboration of steps a Buddha takes to manifest in the pre-given world. Buddhist teachings explain that the last task an aspiring Buddha must undertake to prove his accomplishment is not merely to complete his own understanding of the absolute indescribable world, but to return from his realization of how things are, into the physical world, to teach others. In our terms, he must emanate from what we can consider the solution-space of Engineering Design. The process of emanating a perfect form and perfect knowledge from space is described as unfolding yet hierarchical (in early Pali sources such as Mahavagga of the Vinaya, Mv 1, 5 and Majjhima-Nikaya 26 and also by Mkhas-grub-rje quoted in Long & Burnama, 2005) as follows: Having completely realized himself as existing in the absolute indescribable reality, the new Buddha-to-be emanates two additional variations of himself. This corresponds exactly to the view of oneself as three people, which is created in the four-fold mirror of Plato and Plitcha (explained in ‘A Five Element System’). On his right, we paraphrase that one emanation is responsible for giving (or enabling) methods or tools to achieve perfect reflection. The other emanation, on his left, is responsible for the power (or intensity of application) of the methods. Altogether, the trio is said to represent The Three Jewels – respectively, Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha. Early Pali sources then say that, in order to penetrate and become inseparable from the physical world, the two emanated forms of the Buddha-to-be each split themselves into two more forms. The emanation of Dharma emanates two variations of himself – these being Akshobya (the Buddha of mirror-like awareness) and Ratnasambhava (the Buddha of equalizing awareness), whom we introduced in the section on ‘The Mandala of the Five Buddha Families’. The emanation of Sangha also emanates two further variations of himself – these appearing as Amitabha (the Buddha of discriminating awareness) and Amoghasiddhi (the Buddha of all-accomplishing awareness). In other words, the three preferred modes of behaviour (and associated meta-qualities) we discussed in ‘The Three Jewels’ always become five modes of behaviour at a more detailed level. The converse is also true:

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the three meta-qualities and behavioural styles should arise from fully integrating perceptions from the five senses, emotions and physical experiences in one’s pre-given reality. This division of conceptual space into three and five categories can be shown as a neat hierarchy in Figure 13a, as the unfolding of space (The Three Jewels, The Three Pillars and The Mandala of the Five Buddha Families integrated and rephrased for this paper) from an absolute indescribable reality (which we first indicated without details on the right hand side of Figure 1).

Figure 13a. Unfolding of space – Three Jewels, Three Pillars and Five Buddha Families. The Buddhist division of conceptual space can also be rephrased for use in Engineering Design, as shown in Figure 13b. This renders the above explanation useful for this paper. We thus propose to consider the primordial Buddha of the Pali explanation as existing somewhat impersonally at the highest level, as ‘The Complete Informing System’. At the next level down, his function can be carried out by a person who facilitates exchange of conversation and integration of information between the two opposing teams. In a static Organization, this role could be filled by a top-level Manager. In this paper and in the Mandala of Engineering Design and the Diamond Model as we use it now, the role of the Facilitator is carried out by the Researcher. As everyone knows, the Researcher does not have absolute knowledge at the outset of a

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project. His knowledge evolves as the details and the conversations between parties evolve. He is, however, in the position of making questions simple for the participants in a discussion.

Figure 13b. The Complete Informing System - Buddhist division of conceptual space for use in Engineering Design. In Buddhist teachings, the function of knowledge is present at every level of unfolding of space, as the central element or mirror plane. Both in Buddhism and in the Diamond Model for Engineering Designfor , if all functions perfectly, the system informs itself and the central role becomes invisible. Thus the holder of the knowledge both acts and does not act in two conceptual and one non-conceptual world. His only role in facilitation is to appear to others as if he understands both sides of the story of Design and Use. The function of providing structures, methods or tools is exemplified in the spokesperson for Designers, who acts on the level of the metaqualities. The spokesperson for Users also acts on the level of the metaqualities, where he provides reflection and feedback on the use of said structures, methods or tools in real life. The functions of mirroring- , equalizing -, discriminating - and accomplishing total awareness of one’s reality are achieved by different teams acting as different sub-systems of the Complete Informing System. In

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order to achieve the best result, it is easiest if we (and the Buddha-tobe) do not think of the sub-systems as being four completely different behaviours. It is possible, quite succinctly, to apply just two different modes of thinking about action and its reflection in the pre-given world, albeit in two different ways. In Figure 13b we describe the Complete Informing System’ – The Buddhist division of conceptual space as rephrased for use in Engineering Design. The two ways are: in respect to one (the individual), and in respect to others (many interdependent ‘universa’). In other words, the ideal Researcher should not necessarily look in a plain mirror to reflect on his own actions, but left and right at his spokespersons (or in a multi-dimensional mirror), to see the actions and reflections of others. In these two ways, he covers all possible problem- and solution-spaces. This finally brings us to the Diamond Model for Designer-User interaction, which is the point of this paper as, we return to a point we promised to clarify at the end of the section on ‘A Five Element System’. There is, in fact, a magical resolution of the mismatches of the two fiveelement Mandalas, which are experienced and projected by Designers and Users respectively. The key is in the hierarchy just presented and in Beer’s insight on the purpose of a Viable System. Assuming of course that Designers and Users wish to see themselves as part of a single informing and co-evolving system, then the answer to achieving it is to (tautologously) propose a template for its existence first. This does not need to be completely visible or spelt out, but it must certainly take at least a rudimentary form. This should be followed by assigning two spokespeople, who are integral to achieving the central purpose. The one provides the methods in the first place; the other provides feedback on the application of the methods. Both can be called into being simultaneously. These two spokespeople are then responsible for a delegating their work in a further two people in a third step. We tried visualizing how the functions of the Designer, User and Researcher relate during emanation and found the easiest option is to place them in a straight line, with the Researcher in the centre. Then the Designer and User form end-points of a line. From the end-points, we then visualize the placement of the two sub-systems for each primary function back into the central plane. The spokesperson for application of the methods is responsible for only two functions in a com-

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plete Mandala system which has five second-level functions. Likewise, the provider of methods is responsible for delegating only two functions in the complete Mandala system. Each delegation forms half of a full, stable Mandala square around the Researcher. The important point in unification of the opposing teams is precisely that – the Mandala of each side is not complete on its own. They complete each other. The ideal and expected natural order of set-up of functions in a Complete Informing System is shown in Figure 14a, with arrows indicating direction of emanation and set-up. Together, the spokespeople and their sub-functions (teams) form the rough outline of a diamond. This figure shows the ideal order of set-up for achieving a Complete Informing System. The higher level purpose and view of the Designer and User form end-points. The two sub-functions of each end-point add together, to create an integrated and stable whole. Lastly, we integrate and paraphrase the terminology of The Three Jewels, The Three Pillars, and the Mandala of the Five Buddha Families, as already shown in Figure 13 with the VSM of S. Beer (1984, 1985), and arrows of Figure 14a, to produce the Diamond Model for DesignerUser interaction in Figure 14b. This figure describes the final Diamond Model for the Complete Informing System of Designer-User Interaction.

Figure 14a. The ideal order of set-up for achieving a complete Informing System.

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Figure 14b. The final Diamond Model for the complete informing system of Designer-User interaction.

Structuring Designer-User Conversations with the 3D Diamond Model Why? The ideal representation of the process of discussion and resolution of contradictory requirements in design is probably a spinning, doublehelical vortexial model. This would show that the process is fluid, flexible and integrated and might help Designers understand how the ‘flow’ of the creative process should feel (to use the terminology of Csikzentmihalyi, 1997). Such a model would not, however, provide any structure whereby teams of Designers and Users could interact and consider all angles or directions of their potentially conflicting technical and social issues. And since we know from S. Beer’s (1984, 1985) VSM that having a clear structure is basic and integral not only to building a world in the first place, but also to establishing viability of an organism or Organiza-

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tion, we propose to take Beer’s lead, using a solid geometry – the diamond described in the previous section, for modelling conversation. Beer (1994) used an icosahedron to marshal and enhance the dynamics of (Organizational, personal or product) design and thought processes in a process he called ‘Team Syntegrity’ (from a playful combination of ‘synergy’, meaning the condition in which the properties of the whole are greater than those of the sum of its individual parts; and ‘tensegrity’, which was a word coined by Buckminster Fuller around 1975, to mean ‘tensile integrity’ – the structural strength provided by tension). Beer (1994) chose this topology both by trial and error while running workshops on the technique, and was also influenced by theoretical considerations. As we saw earlier in this paper, Beer was predisposed to seeing five-fold geometry as being the most useful for representation of the way in which individuals formed teams in their pre-given world. In his model, groups of five triangular faces form twenty pentagonal clusters. Thirty people are needed to represent the edges of the structure, as well as the innovative design solutions at the vertices or nodes. The latter represent combinations of two or more ways of perceiving a given problem (Itsy, 2006; Leonard, 1999; and Schwaninger, 1997). For an extract from Schwaninger's summary of the protocol, see Appendix A. For an interpretation of Leonard's work as applied to our Diamond Model, please see Appendix B. Suffice here to say that, having defined what is important via less structured processes (including a ‘Problem Jostle’ leading to ‘Statements of Importance’), five people discuss one topic, and thereafter thirty discuss twelve topics. Each participant is a member of two conversations, which are different to those of all other participants, to provide ‘compressive strength’ to the structure (Leonard, 1997) and there are at least three iterations of the procedure, which ensure that there is over 90% of information shared throughout the whole group. What is notable about the Team Syntegrity model, in comparison with our Diamond Model, is that the topics to be discussed are not preempted. Strangely, Beer never applied his insights from his VSM to the protocol for discussion in Team Syntegrity, although he did suggest that the latter could be used as a periodic activity in the former. In that case, he expected it to balance attention between the inside and outside of the system, and thus between the functions of sub-systems three and four (Leonard, 1997). In short, while he saw the need for combining the views of opposing teams, he did not attempt to ensure that any par-

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ticular types of issues would be covered. He left all decisions regarding the kinds of issues that were to be raised around a central theme, to emerge from the team. By all accounts, Beer’s model works well and is not so difficult for a Facilitator or Researcher to learn and apply in an Organization, with a little practise (it is licensed to business consultants and widely used in Europe today). However, it also requires companies to set thirty key decision-makers free from their everyday duties (one for each icosahedral edge or strut), for five full days – which is the time it usually takes to come to a final conclusion using this model, and this is a significant investment, which not everyone can make (Leonard, 1997). As a result, Beer and some of his colleagues (Cullen & Leonard, 2000; Leonard 1996) experimented with extracting ‘short-forms’ of polyhedra from the icosahedral model, which could achieve the same structure with fewer people, retaining the same twelve-fold depth and complexity of topic discussion. He felt the 12-fold nature of icosahedral vertices needed to be retained for the process of dialogue, in order to reduce the risk that topics and points of view would collapse onto each other too early, before there had been enough divergence of ideas. Although they subsequently decided against implementing any of them, it is of note for our paper, that the first of the short forms, which allows the Team Syntegrity protocol to be run with only twenty-four people, is a distorted cube-octahedron (Truss, Cullen, & Leonard, 2000). Successive compactions of the icosahedral geometry lead yet closer to our own favoured geometry, making use of the dual quality of a cube-octahedron that allows it to flex in peculiar directions and fold in on itself (called the ‘vector-flexor’ property by Buckminster-Fuller). The ultimate compaction produces a topic space, which approximates a flattened cube-octahedron approximating the 3D Diamond Model, where twelve people can fulfil all the previous roles and depth of discussion, which were expected in the larger form (Truss et al., 2000). It would seem there is merit in considering our Diamond Model as an addition to Beer’s original geometry for the following reasons: The first is that, over and above the need to have shortened versions of Team Syntegrity on the basis of saving time, we can fill a gap for a model of conversation and activity between not just one team but two distinct teams, who must come to a common ground.

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The second is that we can definitively state that the ideal system can be described in merely five sub-systems from a science of mind, which has some 2500 years of experiment to its credit. Applying the structure of the Mandala of the Five Buddha Families to team discussions enables the different starting points of participants to be honoured and does not force anyone to view their ‘Organizational Mandala’ from the same direction as other participants, from the outset of discussion (or indeed at any other time). At the same time, providing a coincident and coevolving structure for conversation from two end-points contributes to the faster emergence of a common purpose.

How? Beer’s model was worked out over many years and it is, as Allen Leonard (1997) writes, ‘beyond its experimental stages in some sense but not in others’. The existing protocol and ‘key questions to be asked’ during the process (also appended to this paper) are known to produce results, but there are many avenues for further research. Our model seems to fit with (and is potentially integrable with) what has been done by Beer and associates referred to previously in this section, although we have not yet confirmed a formal protocol for its use. Our Diamond Model is still very much in experimental stages. However, based on what already works, we have drawn on Beer’s (1994) Team Syntegrity protocol to help structure our questions and movements in the physical space of the conference room where discussion takes place. Our suggested protocol keeps the crucial 3-fold and 5-fold geometry (which Beer also thought important for reasons of his own), which has been discussed at length in the previous section. In this respect, we have proposed the following protocol to start experimenting with using the Diamond Model of Designer-User interaction:

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1.

The process can be carried out with as few as 10 people – two teams of five, plus a facilitator or Researcher.

2.

The process is launched by proposing a core issue for the discussion (this can be done according to Beer’s ‘Problem Jostle’). This proposition will naturally be incomplete – its form can only evolve during discussion and its final iteration will be agreed upon at the conclusion of the exercise. Thus, since this statement is only a starting point, little

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time should be given to agreement between participants at this stage. The purpose should be written succinctly enough to fit on a post-it note (or similar) and kept by the Researcher for reference, in the central position in the room. 3.

The time limit for discussions should also be set at the beginning. It can vary with each cycle of discussion – and coincidently with each new core issue addressed. It should however, be kept strictly by the Researcher. Based on our experience with facilitating similar conversations with other creativity tools, we believe it is possible to spend as little as five minutes on one topic. Thus the total for one cycle of the entire discussion process can be as little as twenty minutes and produce a meaningful result. Of course, this depends on the complexity of the initial issue of the meeting.

4.

Then one participant from each team should volunteer to function as spokesperson or coordinator for his team. He will initially sit at the apex of the Diamond for his team. The Designer (the creator of structure, tools and methods) forms one apex of the Diamond Model, while the User (who applied the structure, tools and methods), forms a complementary one. These should be physically as far apart as possible in the room.

5.

The remaining participants should place themselves on the edges of a Mandala square (just as in Beer’s protocol), where the four outer Buddhas of the Mandala of the Five Buddha Families sit. They may choose the position of their natural inclination, or go against it. If the former option is chosen, time needs to be set aside for participants to determine which mode of behaviour suits them best. One person from each team then pairs with one person from the opposing team, so there should be four pairs (or groups) of participants. Two notebooks should be given to each group –one for Designers and one for the Users. When participants move discussion, their original notebook should be left on the table, for the next participant (or team) to continue adding their discussion results on that topic in the same book.

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6.

The topics of discussion for teams are determined by Figure 14a and 14b. They are as follows: generation of Structure and Methods in respect to one (implementation of initial direction); generation of Structure and Methods in respect to many (function coordination and information between sub-systems); Application of Structure and Methods internally or in respect to one (information processing, sub-system control and feedback); Application of Structure and Methods externally or in respect to many (applications and external relations). These discussions should be about all the practical issues concerning the topic. They should cover all possible technical and social contradictions. All stories and ideas about the issue should be recorded but not evaluated (that happens later). We trust the roles are simple to understand and any topic can be comprehensively covered, assuming that a team can allow enough time for discussion.

7.

After the allotted time, participants are moved round to the next discussion. Two cycles of movement need to take place. In the first instance, the Design team should stay put, and the Users should move clockwise round the Mandala, taking part in a discussion at each new edge, till they return to their starting positions. This means there will be four iterations of the conversations at each point. In the second cycle of conversation, Designers should move anticlockwise round the Mandala, also taking part in a discussion at each edge, till they return to their starting positions. The sum total of conversations in both cycles is eight. It is inevitable and desirable that there will be cross-fertilization of concerns and issues to be discussed.

8.

The spokespeople at the apices of the Diamond can choose to take part in whichever discussion they like. In each case, their function is to ‘keep the overview’ and remind each discussion group of their primary vision, when they seem to get bogged down in practical details (i.e. they should either create methods and tools, or apply them).

9.

The Researcher likewise, need not stay with either Designers or Users, nor move in any order. He can move to any discussion he likes. His role during the discussion time is

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to ask probing questions and keep time. He may not give his opinion on any topic at this time. 10.

When the agreed time is up, each team should collect all notebooks belonging to them and convene at the apex of their Mandala, to produce a short series of statements that covers but summarizes all their current concerns.

11.

Each team presents their summary in turn to the Researcher. The Researcher should consider the information presented from both teams, integrate it and propose a new, improved core issue. Teams should take part in establishing the common elements of the issue.

12.

The new core issue is written on a new post-it note and sets the starting point for the next cycle of the discussion process. This begins at step 2, above, and remains identical to the previous iteration of the process.

13.

When three cycles of the discussion have been completed, the evolution of the core issue should be quite robust, and lead to establishing a ‘common purpose’ for both teams.

Although it is obvious that three iterations of the process will cover a substantial amount of ground with the Diamond Model, we do not know if that is enough, nor what is ideal. We have not yet carried out a formal test.

What We Expect The Role of the Researcher There are three issues we currently face in our research in Aerospace design. The first is, as cosmologists and mathematicians have also discovered, it is not possible to solve existing problems by using the same methodology that created them in the first place (Penrose, 1990). The second is that the reasons for needing to change a given protocol that appears to be working are also not obvious, till viewed retrospectively from the new one. Lastly, there is great difficulty in capturing the outcomes of inadequately or inappropriately structured discussions. The presence of a central focal point, such as a Researcher, in a discussion between teams of Designers and Users can help integrate new information in a more seamless way than would otherwise be possible. 189


The Researcher can help facilitate implementation of good ground rules for individuals and for the whole system. Even better, our field tests confirm that the role of a Researcher is vital to maintaining the question protocol only at early stages of application. At later stages of application, when the questions are known, teams can facilitate themselves and the role of the Researcher can be left open with no ill effects. Readers will surely have noticed that in making the model three dimensional, we also move beyond a five-element system, to a seven-element system. The extra levels hidden in the original Mandala are only noticeable when the Designer and User are asked to give their own view of the whole and the Researcher brings the two extreme views together. In some sense, the ultimate function of the Researcher is typified in the seventh, solution-finding step of the generic process of creating (Table 3). However, in actual practise, this is not an end-point of the process of discussion or design. Instead, is a place of self-reference and reflection or recursion. Relating to self – Purpose The central point is to some extent a hidden or quasi-secret level in the system, in that this particular model of an informing system can evolve and even achieve closure (and viability) without itself understanding its purpose. However, the system is much more robust, if the purpose is known. To make this innermost level explicate requires all participants to move beyond concerns about their sub-systems or indeed the material structures and functions of the system as a whole, to identifying its fundamental character. This character may be considered ‘the mind’ of the evolving system (to play on Beer’s concept of a ‘Heart of Enterprise’, although the term is also related to Buddhist goals). Its ‘essential character’ (Latin. natura) or point (Greek. kharakter or kharax for ‘engraved mark’ or ‘pointed stake’) gives a system both a reason for moving, and a direction in which to move. When the seventh function is carried out, after considering all actions and reflection, a Researcher must make a choice about whether or how data is put together. Any act of making a choice forces awareness on the system, since one must return from the outer reaches of one’s quest for new information, to compare it with the original purpose. Naturally, the centre links all points and participants in the system – not least, according to Giodarno Bruno, because the point represents infinity, and 190

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thus its centre is everywhere. Beer likewise points out that ‘ … incidentally, if we put (the Self) as a viable system in the centre of the (sphere) generated by the set of recursive chains, then we have a model of selfhood that both expands to embrace the universe and also shrinks to a vanishing grain of sand – a model familiar in oriental philosophy’ (Beer, 1984, p. 25). Thus we consider that when the Researcher acts on behalf of all and none, he is simultaneously ‘self-referent’ (we consider this geometrically as standing at the centre and acting on behalf of the central point of the system) and ‘other-referent’ (‘referring to the central point of all other sub-systems at any stage of evolution’). As we are describing the system, there is no pure observer. In our case, he is built into the system as a function rather than a person, as a meta-quality of mind. If the Researcher is doing his job correctly, he exchanges a simple meaning of existence of him ‘self’ (to use the term from Beer), for a greater meaning. In other words, the purpose of the self is inseparable from the purpose of all co-evolving sub-systems or meta-qualities. As we suggest in the section ‘How?’, the conscious intention of the Designer, User and Researcher evolves as information is gathered and structure manifests, to resemble a ‘core intention’ which is itself perhaps unknown at the start of proceedings. Yet a transformative and self-referent behaviour of conceptual space is the key to success in creativity and innovation (Boden, 1994a, 2005; Csikzentmihalyi, 1997). When there is a functional coincidence of the world in which Designers act, the world which provides reflection and world in which both are joined, the separate activities become ‘ultimately creative’, as Boden (2005) suggested should be the case. This is especially true when the process whereby coincidence is achieved is iterative (and implicitly recursive) behaviour that ‘constructs the situation within which the (situation) itself is constructed’ (Boden, 2005). As already mentioned, Beer’s VSM model requires the fifth sub-system to be the place where the core value and purpose for Organizational growth is set and retained. It does so, by making choices that align the design and use of any organization of sub-systems with the central intention or purpose. We add that the meta-activity of knowledge, which is implicit in the heart of Beer’s model and also in the heart of Buddhism, is in our model a seventh function of ‘knowing the purpose of (our) existence’. At this point, it is not possible that an entity other than the informing system itself can be falsely attributed with the power of divining its purpose. It is not duly affected by incoming information

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from outside itself. Thus it is accurate to say that when information from two worlds of Design and Use are integrated at the (seventh) central point, then the system also knows itself. Relating to others and the world Self-reference and other-reference are made possible by both reflection and recursion. As we have mentioned earlier, reflection requires plane geometries (or maps of static situations in which symmetries exist that look like plane geometries) to act as mirrors. And similarly, when people use the phrase, ‘I’ll reflect on that (mental) point’, we can imagine they mean, ‘I’ll make a mental picture to consider the relationship of aspects in that situation as if it were geometric and symmetric’. We have also said that the centre of the informing system is the place of self-reference. Yet the central point cannot really be reflected upon in a way that makes spatial, mathematical sense, since it does not exist in the normal space of a pre-given world. Indeed, for self-reference to be possible recursion is the only option. Recursion is a special kind of non-linear (fluid) process of repetition, which occurs often and (or) over longer time periods, and allows or causes elements to be repeated at different scales. It does not refer to the repetition of elements themselves but to the process, which makes it happen. In the 3D Diamond Model discussed in this paper, recursion is implicit in the central point, which forms the reference for the entire map. Recursion takes place at this point (or, more accurately, through it), as long as the Researcher keeps asking questions. For each recursion (of the mapping) a smaller diamond now exists within the core of the larger one. Moreover, the point can holographically reproduce the characteristics of the larger one, like any small mirror can reflect a large amount of the world, if it is held close to the eye. The holographic nature of this particular model is characteristic of resolving contradiction, and the hallmark of creative processes, where the nascent solution is periodically injected into the process of idea generation (A-K. Pahl et al., in press). In other words, if our model is structured correctly, it will be a template for innovation. Thus the system can produce nothing but itself and yet appear, to outside observers, to produce variations of itself. And that kind of dissemination is what we are all aiming for.

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Conclusion As the Dalai Lama has affirmed many times, ‘… if elements of Buddhist doctrine … are compellingly refuted by new empirical (scientific) evidence or cogent reasoning, then those Buddhist tenets must be abandoned … (or) revised accordingly’ (Wallace, 1999, p. 158). In this paper however, we have proposed the opposite – that some elements of Western scientific doctrine would be well served by incorporating scientific principles from Buddhism. The ancient methods provide important means of structuring the psychological and social elements known to contribute to ideal human functioning. Coincidentally, the structure provides a reference map for viewing personal behaviours, Organizational behaviour and innovative design. In particular, the conceptual structures of the Four Basic Thoughts, The Three Jewels, The Three Pillars and the Mandala of the Five Buddha Families correlate well with general Western Research about the above topics. But in addition, the Buddhist methods propose a way of structuring this information, which has been lacking in the West. Our trial integration of these Buddhist maps and methods with Western ones seems particularly compatible with the elements of Beer’s (1984, 1985) Viable System Model, and with a protocol similar to his Team Syntegrity (1994) model. Combining these insights has allowed an extension of our recent ‘Generic Model of Creating’ (A-K. Pahl et al., in press), in such a way that teams of Designers and Users can complement each other in discussions about innovative engineering, especially at the stage of considering the complete system description. The most comprehensive representation of the process of innovation approximates a diamond. In 2D, this is a ‘Diamond map’ and in 3D it is a ‘Diamond Model of Designer-User interaction’. In practise, the Diamond Model of Designer-User interaction forms a Complete Informing System with as few as 10 participants, who co-evolve their purpose in three cycles of discussion. We believe that this kind of co-evolving discussion which integrates both the Designer-based problem-space and User-based solution-space leads to faster product development. In order for maximum benefit to be gained from discussion, a common purpose for the system is best defined at the outset of design and modified as conversations evolve. Conceptually, the common central purpose can be represented in many ways. Certainly, it is situated at the very centre of the Diamond, a space of self-reference, reflection and

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indeed recursion. In terms of conversations between Designers and Users, it signifies the integration of all contradictory thoughts and actions between the end-members of the different teams. It is the mechanism of recursion, which occurs during questioning of the common purpose and answering this question that allows flux to exist in the system. The important thing is that movement happens even while the principles that relate the elements (participants and topics) to each other stay the same. Originally, a Researcher takes on the function of guiding the two teams to the integration of their opposing views and realisation of their purpose. He must be someone who can draw together the threads of (1) making structures, rules, methods and tools, and (2) applying the structures and tools in different ways. Later, this role becomes somewhat redundant and can be left open, since the system eventually informs itself. At this time, the participants in the system would be expected to self-liberate themselves from fixations. In other words, they would see the solution immediately on encountering any situation, without the necessity of ever experiencing it as a problem-space. Thus, at the instant in time when the system of Designers and Users informs itself, we can say that the system not only integrates all information and knowledge. It also transforms what it knows of the problem-space into the solution-space, in all situations and levels.

Acknowledgements This paper was produced with internal funding from IMRC, University of Bath. We thank anonymous reviewers and also Professor Hans-Erik Nissen for their thoughtful comments, which greatly improved the original submission to its current form. We thank the Lamas of the Karma Kagyu school of Tibetan Buddhism for their inspiration and encouragement in developing this model investigating Buddhism as science, in spite of our poor understanding of their teachings. We dedicate all insights we have gained from this process of enquiry to the liberation of all beings.

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Appendix A: A Comparison of the Syntegration Process of Beer with the Generic Model for Creating Syntegration Process GENERIC MODEL

Fractal

Syntegration process (simplified after Schwaninger, 1997)

Subsets of action

Problem definition as a field

1. Opening: Syntegration encompasses a general topic that focuses all mutual efforts. The opening question is also general eg: Which form should x take in future?

Divergent thinking

2. Generation of the agenda (Problem Jostle) : Each participant makes contributing ‘Statements of Importance’ that seem important to him. These are discussed and successively synthesised into ‘Aggregated Statements of Importance’. Then they are prioritised and the agenda for the actual work on the general topic or problem is generated (by Hexadic Reduction). This is finally worded into exactly 12 topics or ‘Consolidated Statements of Importance’

Evaluation

Convergent Thinking

Problem definition as a point

3. Assignment to groups (Topic Auction) : Each participant decides on the (2? ) topics to which he or she would prefer to contribute. Based on these preferences, they are assigned to teams which ideally consist of 5 players and 5 critics each, with the help of an optimization algorithm (or randomly )

Solution definition

3 or more Reiterations of:

4. Working on the topic (Outcome Resolve): The individual teams discuss their respective topic. Teams meet several times, while players move between groups so that the problem setting is continually, subtly reformulated and processed in alternating compositions and the different but interconnected aspects can be more clearly seen. This leads to a highly integrated selforganizing process

as a field

Problem as field Divergent thinking Evaluation Convergent Thinking

Solution definition as a point

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5. Conclusion: final coordination if necessary in Triplets (corresponding to the triangular faces of the icosahedron), and presentation of the results in plenary.

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Appendix B: Questions from the Team Syntegration Process Questions from the Team Syntegration Process described by Leonard (1999) were modified so as to be now used with the Diamond Model proposed in this paper. Two main questions can start it all off: •

What pattern of events could we expect to see, if x were implemented in our department/team?

•

What pattern of events could we expect to see, if x were implemented elsewhere or not at all?

For discussion during cycles through the Diamond Model, teams might consider more specific questions, such as: •

What do you think you need right now

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What do you need it for

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How much do you know about it

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What tool/system/way of doing things would it replace

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If it would not replace anything, then how would it affect the current system

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Who else would use it/be involved in future

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Would they need it for the same reasons/use it the same way

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What other services etc. could/would merge with the programme

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What do you think would be the impact on the team it.

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Biographies Anja-Karina Pahl is currently a Research Officer in the IMRC of the Department of Mechanical Engineering at the University of Bath. Following an early career in Structural Geology, she trained in TRIZ methods in 2000 and moved in the direction of consulting in Innovation and Entrepreneurship in Melbourne before moving to the University of Bath. Here she collaborated on setting up the MSc programme in Biomimetic and Technical Creativity. Her primary interest is in pattern recognition and streamlining processes for improved multi-disciplinary knowledge transfer, individual creativity and team-driven innovation. In particular, she concentrates on the development of syntheses between western and non-western methods for insight. Her current fields of application for methods based on these syntheses are UK schools and Aerospace Engineering. Dr. Linda Newnes is currently Senior Lecturer in the Innovative Manufacturing Research Centre (IMRC ) of the Department of Mechanical Engineering at the University of Bath. From a background in Engineering Design, her current research interests include: Printed Circuits, Engineering Management Information Systems, Industrial Systems Engineering, Production Engineering, Automation, Engineering Design, Manufacturing Engineering, Computer-Aided Engineering, Quality/Product Control, Production/Operations Management, Expert Systems, Computer Simulation/Modelling, Optimization, Technology Planning/Policy.

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The Culture of Information Systems in Knowledge-Creating Contexts: The Role of User-Centred Design Natalie Pang and Don Schauder Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Australia [email protected] [email protected]

Abstract Examining communities in all their meanings, the paper locates UserCentred Design (UCD) in the amplified scope of approaches to Information Systems Design (ISD). Culture in communities is explained in structurational terms, in which human action and social structure (including ICT) interact to produce and reproduce the social patterning that both supports and constrains action. The widening of the spectrum of ISD approaches has paralleled the supplementing or superseding of Fordist methods of production by knowledge-based production. The transition to an ICT world characterised by personal computing and the Internet is identified as key threshold (referred to as the PC/I or Personal Computing/Internet threshold) necessitating the development of user-centric concepts alongside more established technocentric approaches. Noting the diversity of understandings in UCD, the paper proposes an approach to consider the wider relationship of tasks and community cultures. The aim is to explore the feasibility of a participative and reflexive design, resulting in design practices that are an emergent property of community culture. The research is based on case studies in the cultural institutions’ sector, and one of the cases is outlined. Material published as part of this publication, either on-line or in print, is copyrighted by the Informing Science Institute. Permission to make digital or paper copy of part or all of these works for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that the copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage AND that copies 1) bear this notice in full and 2) give the full citation on the first page. It is permissible to abstract these works so long as credit is given. To copy in all other cases or to republish or to post on a server or to redistribute to lists requires specific permission and payment of a fee. Contact [email protected] to request redistribution permission.


User Centred Design

Keywords: user-centred design, structuration theory, community informatics, knowledge creation, reflexive design, participatory design, cultural institutions

Introduction This paper arises from a project whose aim is to explore whether and how cultural institutions, particularly museums and libraries, can engage with their users in a continuous, co-creative design process that addresses both opportunities and problems in the age of digitisation. The project will be based on a series of case studies, one of which will be briefly described. However the purpose of this paper is to explore some of the general system design issues seen to be relevant to the specific project at hand, and perhaps to other similar projects. Community’ is used in this paper in its widest sense, including communities of practice, communities of interest, local and virtual communities (Wellman & Haythornthwaite, 2000; Wenger & Snyder, 2000). It covers not only corporate-based communities, but also the vast variety of communities that make up civil society as defined by the World Summit on the Information Society (Schauder, Johanson, & Taylor, 2006). The essential property of communities, as the term is used in this paper, is that they are sites of discourse where meaning is recursively made and re-made. This paper aims to explore design principles through a focus on communities – a community-based approach where the interpretive dynamics of communities are considered. The term ‘User-Centred Design (UCD)’ is much used, but still there appears to be only a basic consensus as to its meanings and implications: the consensus that ‘user’ needs should inform processes of information systems design. This paper argues for a concept of UCD that draws its procedures, and its explanatory and prescriptive power, from the interpretive study of communities in which people live and work. In this it owes much to the task-based approach to Knowledge Management developed by Burstein and Linger (2003), concepts of Community Informatics as pioneered by Gurstein (2000) and, at a fundamental level, structuration theory as developed by Giddens and others (Giddens, 1984; Orlikowski, 1992; Orlikowski & Robey, 1991), and elaborated in the Information Continuum Model developed by Upward, Schauder and others (Schauder, Johanson, & Stillman, 2005).

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The cumulative effect of people’s living and working within social frameworks (through a dynamic that Giddens calls structuration) is the production and re-production of culture. The cultural context is generated and re-generated through the interplay of action and structure the ‘duality of structure’). Social structure both supports and constrains the endeavours of individuals, communities and, societies. The implications for design arising out of structuration theory is an important one and will be elaborated in a later section. An interpretive approach to UCD implies a fine-grained study of the relationships and interactions among people in their creation and recreation of community culture manifested in the knowledge and practice of community members. For the purpose of studying this, case studies of cultural institutions are undertaken through procedures of grounded, reflexive analysis. Cultural institutions are defined in this study as organizations whose charter is to promote and support education, arts, and sciences through creating, preserving, sharing and transmitting knowledge – a definition consistent with UNESCO’s Virtual Exhibition on the knowledge society (UNESCO, 2003). For the purpose of this research, case studies from museums and libraries in Australia and Singapore are considered. Within the broad aim of the project as stated in the first paragraph of this paper, the study has two goals: a) To assess how far collaboration between cultural institutions and communities can be characterised and explained as ongoing processes of adaptive UCD. In this context cultural institutions are considered as systems for the creation, preservation, sharing and transmission of public knowledge in communities. b) To apply insights from this assessment to the future development of museums and libraries as components of ‘the knowledge commons’. The commons is a concept with deep historical roots that has been brought into current prominence by the capacity of digital technologies to facilitate endeavours in the public co-creation and use of knowledge resources. The following sections of this paper seek to elaborate some of these key ideas and objectives, with particular reference to the question of whether and how UCD is applicable to the continuous, adaptive codesign of ‘knowledge commons’ systems such as cultural institutions.

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User-Centred Design Poor relationships between the ‘users’ and computer scientists often arose out of techno-centric approaches to design; commonly referred to as the IT/User gap (Mann, 2002). Towards this several contributing factors have been cited: a lack of understanding about user needs and the broader implications of these needs; a lack of understanding about IT by users; and an absence of empowerment because of these misunderstandings (Mann, 2002; Stowell, 1991). The fundamental concepts of UCD originate from critical research and pioneering management projects as far back as the 1970s. Although the term, user-centred design, was first formally expounded by Norman (1986), the underlying principles of UCD reflected broad based concerns in social science and management about the limitations of prescriptive design. Researchers and managers embarked on a critique of the ‘scientific management tradition’ founded by J.P. Taylor and turned to Scandinavia and Japan for examples of how the engagement of workers in the design of production processes could improve productivity and competitiveness. Scandinavian efforts to conceptualise ‘worker-centred design’, pioneered by Volvo, were based on essentially the same principles as UCD. So were a range of endeavours associated with the action research movement. In the words of Whyte, writing in 1986: It is striking that researchers are reaching the same general conclusions in fields so divergent as industry in highly industrialized countries and agriculture in developing nations. In conventional organizations in both fields we find the same tendency of those in power to grossly underestimate the intellectual contribution that could be made by the powerless if the social systems were restructured so as to facilitate and utilize that contribution. (p. 561) The study, of which this paper is a preliminary stage, attempts to extend the notion of UCD into the area of participative, adaptive design on the part of communities, drawing of key ideas from structuration theory. While not attempting to define or even re-define UCD, the paper now discusses the very message inherent in the term. The term UCD signals that this approach locates itself on a different part of the spectrum from other approaches to information systems design (ISD), although

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it need not be completely distinct from them. The basis of this differentiation is the claim that, more than other approaches, it focuses on human needs ahead of perceived technological imperatives as the prime consideration in ISD. What is the value proposition underlying such an approach? Is it just a sentimental fad, pandering to a view that corporate life – and indeed the whole demanding business of everyday living - can be something other than goal directed, tough and earnest? As can be observed through everyday experience, and as attested in the literature (Walsham, 2001), information and communication technologies (ICT) has become essential and almost ubiquitous in contemporary society. From initial applications in the military and ‘big science’ sectors, the utility of ICT has been recognised and applied in all manner of organisations, in the business, government and civil society sectors. The ascendancy of ICT owes much to ISD approaches that are driven more by the potentialities of technologies to perform certain tasks than by an understanding of human needs, and the social ramifications of technological interventions (Culnan, 1984; Faulkner, 1998). At this point, it is important to note that there is an ever increasing engagement in developing social theories of ICT (Katsikides, 1998; Pinch & Bijker, 1989). Sceptics of UCD could argue that to date the success of ICT has owed little to notions such as UCD. With such a proven track-record of success by other ISD approaches, why does the ICT world need UCD? An approach such as UCD is more consonant with humanity’s best aspirations as expressed in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, especially Articles 19 and Article 27 which assert the right of every individual to freedom of communication in any medium. That vision has been supplemented more recently by Article III.20 of the UN’s Millennium Declaration which states ‘that the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communication technologies … [should be] available to all’. In these declarations of rights of which the prime concern is to widen the scope of action for the individual: ICT is foremost a means of making humans more autonomous and empowered, not just human components of a production system. Other ‘user-centric’ charters relevant to ICT include those of the International Association of Media and Communications Researchers (IAMCR), the Budapest Open Access Initiative, the Berlin Declaration, the Creative Commons, and the Open Courseware Initiative (Schauder et al, 2006).

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However the argument for an adaptive, community oriented appoach to UCD in this paper only partially rests on such visions of individual empowerment in the age of digitisation. Current society is characterised by the almost ubiquitous availability of digital networks that can facilitate human communication, learning and other action. For the purpose of this paper we refer to such a societal state as the knowledge society. The paper also argues from the premise that current technological condition of society is in fact making the more ‘techno-centric’ approaches to ISD relatively less potent in a range of contexts than ‘user-centric’ approaches. Kaufer and Carley (1993, p. 99) define the technological condition of a society as: ‘…a set of available technologies and their distribution across individuals in the society’. Ubiquitous digitisation is a fundamental change in the technological condition of society globally, affecting everyone whether directly or indirectly. In the language of complex systems science (Price, 2004) the processes of emergence accompanying such fundamental and widespread change can be described as a threshold change. In this paper we have coined the term PC/I (Personal Computing/Internet) threshold to characterise the change. The revised approach to UCD which this paper seeks to explore in a preliminary way is seen as just one way, among many possible processes of adaptation and adjustment, to address both opportunities and problems arising from the post PC/I technological condition of society.

Design of Informing Systems: A Historical Perspective It could not have been anticipated, but is clear in hindsight, that ultimately techno-centric approaches to ISD would need to be supplemented by some form of UCD. The impulse towards this development originated within the techno-political development trajectory of ICT, especially since the late 1940s. The paper begins this section with lessons from history; but the purpose of this is to help provide background and rationale for the UCD approach being proposed. Shift from Fordism to the knowledge society: ISD consequences The professional discipline of IS was initially strongly influenced by the age of mass production – beginning with the Industrial Revolution of the 18th century, and refined by Taylorism and Fordism in the early

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20th century. The technologies of industrialised warfare brought techno-centric views of information systems into high focus by the end of WWII, and this trend was reinforced by the needs of the militaryindustrial complexes that dominated the Cold War era. Under the threat of mutual nuclear annihilation, the possibility of powerful, independently-operating microcomputing technologies was conceived. This possibility resulted in the explosion of personal computing in the late 20th century. In tandem, the potentially decentralised, selforganising technology of the Internet was developed. As explained, in this paper the transition from large centralised computing with noninteroperable networking arrangements to autonomous decentralised computing with a globally interoperative Internet is referred to as the ‘PC/I (Personal Computing/Internet) threshold’. Out of these technological developments grew the possibility of a wide range of individuals and communities reclaiming their power over information technologies – a power which had waxed and waned through the millennia as orality, writing, and graphic and print communication, contended and co-evolved as information technologies – certainly the transition to print technology was a threshold as profound as the PC/I. The potentials for a more holistic information environment created after passing through the PC/I threshold unleashed the energy behind the ‘knowledge society’ declarations and charters cited above, and behind such agendas as the World Summit on the Information Society. As observed, the ideals of open communication basic to the knowledge society were clear in the pre-digital Universal Declaration of Human Rights (and were evident as far back as the framing of the Constitution of the United States of America). However it was the PC/I threshold transition that prompted the Millennium Declaration and the movement in which the two parts of the UN/ITU World Summit on the Information Society in Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005 were focal events. The same energy that, through the Millennium Declaration and WSIS, updated concepts of open communication for the digital age is, we argue, a key part of the UCD story. The techno-centric approach to production, including its IS dimensions, stems in part from the circumstances of a much leaner information environment, where only the experts – the designers – could have continuous and up-to-date access to essential information sources. Since the majority of stakeholders affected by a design regime (the

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workers, the users) could not access a substantial part of the knowledge base, they must take the design on trust or at least as a given. The resulting technological condition of society was that human beings must adapt to technology, rather than vice versa. Success was achieved when tasks are broken down into the simplest possible components – ‘bite sized’ -, and organised such that minimal information, knowledge and skill were needed for their performance. In exploitative situations, such production systems could operate with little regard to negative impacts on the physical, psychological, and social wellbeing of their human components. Over the decades it became clear that production organised along Fordist lines, in the pursuit of profit maximisation and commoditisation, had led to several implications. Sites of production were moved from place to place in pursuit of tangible and intangible gains and stability. Such an industrial society, as Bell (1996, p. 147) stated, is ‘a game against fabricated nature’. At its worst industrial society - technical, rationalised and centred on the production of commodities - treats humans as things because things are more easily managed within repetitive, modularised work designs than human beings. The post-industrial (information or knowledge) society (Bell, 1996), on the other hand, is centred on services. People not only know one another, they have to ‘love one another or die’ (Bell, 1996, p. 149). Reality in the post-industrial society is not an externality – a given that has been designed by others and must be accepted - but something to be constructed and reconstructed, to be made and remade. Thanks to collaborative digital technologies knowledgeability, and therefore the potentiality for participation in continuous design, can be much more inclusive and broadly based. Perhaps as importantly, categories of knowledge not held by experts – ‘grass roots’ knowledge, in Giddens’ terms tacit rather than discursive (Giddens, 1984, p .22) – can be brought strongly into play. The challenge in design is to have an encompassing approach where both techno-centric and user-centric approaches are included; and where all contexts or realities are considered - in Bell’s (1996) formulation the realities of the social world, the natural world, and the technical world. Heightened consciousness and sensibility of all three inter-connected realities are necessary for sustainability of communities and society.

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This leads to the use of structuration theory as a foundation to discern the unintended consequences and non-explicit conditions of design. Bell (1996) proposes that this changing experience – from all things as objects to all things as ‘a web of consciousness’ (p.149) will create a change in consciousness and sensibility. The relationship between structuration theory and the approach of UCD argued in this paper will be further discussed in a later section. The co-evolution of techno-centric and user-centric ISD The emergence of UCD as a systems design approach has therefore been part of a movement in which ISD has developed a range of approaches across the spectrum of techno-centric to user-centric. Concepts and practices which were shaped by Taylorism and Fordism, together with user-centric approaches such as UCD, are all part of a wide range of options in ISD, the relevance of which depends on context. As proposed by Taylor, ‘scientific management’ was based on the view that for most profitable results human activities could be measured, analysed, and controlled by techniques usually applied to physical objects (Doray, 1988). Ford went further, applying Taylorism in the automotive industry to achieve unprecedented levels of productivity and profitability. Even before Taylor the capacity of machines to divide complex work into ‘bite-sized’ tasks had been demonstrated in the textile factories of the British industrial revolution. The human consequences of regarding people as interchangeable components of technocentric production systems contributed to Marx’s concept of ‘alienation’. In the developed world, human considerations in industrial production have over time increased through regulative action often spurred by trade union action (Gambino, 1996). On top of this, the transitions that have taken place, from pre-industrial, industrial, to the postindustrial society (Bell, 1996) reflect a requirement for a widened range of approaches to ISD – a range that includes adaptive UCD that moulds itself primarily to the human actor, and secondarily the technologies. In the past 20 years the IS complex of disciplines has evolved significantly. It is not claimed that the adaptive, user-centric UCD approach, supported by structuration theory, argued for in this paper is radically new. The point has been well made that:

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The unequal power between managers of IS designers hired by them to Taylorise production and use of data systems has been criticised by researchers at least from the 1970s. Let me just mention Enid Mumford in the UK and Kristen Nygaard in Norway … However all that has been and currently is undertaken to strengthen the position of ICT ‘users’does not necessarily wave a flag with ‘UCD’ on it. (H. Nissen, personal communication, August 8, 2006). The conceptual journey towards UCD gained pace in the 1980s. Penniman (1985) stressed the importance of user experience and satisfaction being included in the performance measurement of information systems. However after two decades Karat and Karat (2003) still characterise UCD as a relatively young discipline undergoing evolution. They observe that the term is still often used loosely, reflecting the changing scope and nature of UCD. There has yet to be a consistent agreement in the field with respect to the focus areas practised by the industry and academia, though all are agreed that UCD is fundamentally about understanding the needs of users, and harnessing such understandings in the design process. Part of the change toward more user-centric orientations is marked by terms such as usability, user-centred design, human computer interaction, and user computing, being used almost interchangeably. Organisations express their own user-centric design philosophies differently. However all would claim a focus on the functional needs of users. Bernard (1998) acknowledges the diversity of interpretations of UCD, but notes that they are all agreed in distancing themselves from Taylorist principles. Beyond these clear points of agreement there is a broad consensus in the UCD world that reality is ‘mutable’, there are ‘no certain truths’, and ‘knowledge is constructed through communally created knowledge and action’. A principle advocated if not yet realised is that UCD involves the collective participation of many or all stakeholders, and it is this principle that the current research seeks further explore and relate to practical cases.

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UCD – Practice or Aspiration? As already acknowledged, recognition of the merits of addressing the abilities of users in system design, is not new. Baroudi, Olson, and Ives (1986) found that user involvement in system design could lead to increased system usage and information satisfaction. Though the study does not point out the need to take into account user abilities beyond the provision of an information system (that is, in continuous and adaptive design) it does suggest the need to reconsider the measurement of user involvement and its related constructs. Another conceptual frontier in UCD is whether the individual or the collective should be the primary focus of UCD. The Nielsen school of usability, for example, focuses extensively on the individual in front of the computer screen (Abelse, White, & Hahn, 1998) Merholz (c.f. Evans, 2002) refer to UCD as ‘not a process, but a philosophy’. Simply put, it refers to the involvement of end-users throughout the design process. In contrast to the other methods of ISD, UCD is intended to be user-driven, concerned with the user’s perspective of the system, involving end users in early stages of systems development (Alexander, 2003). Smith (1997) made the point that although general ideas of UCD are well established in the academic and practicing communities, there is a lack of common meaning about the practice of UCD. Karat and Karat (2003) agree that there is a consensus in principle about the nature and intentions of UCD. However they find that there is no general agreement in terms of focus within the field of UCD – different organizations engage themselves in very different activities in their practice of UCD. Vredenburg, Isensee, and Righi (2002) provide the insight that when organisations claim a commitment to UCD all that can be generalised from this is that they try to focus on understanding what users need to know in a task situation as a way to inform design. If, according to Merholz (c.f. Evans, 2002), UCD is a philosophy, then the literature on UCD has successfully conveyed one message: it is the core requirement of UCD to evolve all processes around users. That may sound simple enough – yet it is not an easily achievable feat given the increasing complexities of user communities. And more than ever, the process of computerisation has become inseparable from the social dynamics of the organisations and communities within which information systems are embedded (Agre, 1995).

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Current approaches in UCD Practices and activities perceived as part of the UCD process of systems’ development include participatory design (Abelse et al., 1998; Karat & Karat, 2003), needs analysis (Allen, 1996), task analysis (Allen, 1996; Vredenburg, et al., 2002; Wei & Salvendy, 2004), resource analysis (Allen, 1996; Vredenburg et al., 2002), user modelling (Allen, 1996; Vredenburg et al., 2002), and usability testing (Allen, 1996; Fraser, 2002; Twidale & Nichols, 1998; Vredenburg et al, 2002). The essential contributions of some of these approaches can be summarised as follows.

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Needs analysis is concerned with understanding and analysing the information needs of users. Studies in this area have typically investigated the needs and uses of information situated within an information system. It is important to note that the background of this focus goes back to many cognate disciplines including psychology, sociology, political, and organisational theory (Allen, 1996). This reflects the complex and diverse nature of assessing information needs, which are deeply seated in the interplays of individual, social, organisational, and group influences with information behaviour.

Task analysis is concerned with making explicit the specific, essential tasks of users as they interact with information systems. It analyses in detail how these tasks are being performed by users, through consideration of subtasks (Allen, 1996). There is a similarity between task analysis and the functional needs of users as discussed by Smith (1997). Smith identifies Caroll’s taskartefact cycle as a key development in task analysis. The taskartefact cycle has mostly been used in the study of humancomputer interaction, notably for establishing the settings for usability studies (Allen, 1996; Smith, 1997). The task artefact cycle aims to help define the requirements of artefacts in a system and is based on the concept of iterative product lifecycle. Once initial tasks are defined for an artefact, it is put into operational use. Through such use, new possibilities for the same artefact will be generated. The cycle then starts again, providing requirements which gives rise to new or refined artefacts.

Individual versus groups as units of analysis. There is a debate in UCD about the relative importance of focussing on individuals

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or groups. So far the study of tasks has mostly evolved around individuals. However, there is a growing concern for tasks that are not only individualistic, but social or collective as well. Kukla, Clemens, Morse, and Cash (1992) argue that understanding the dynamics of the organization in which users are situated must complement the analysis of tasks addressed and for which an information system is designed. This is especially important in settings where tasks are performed collaboratively by users in groups, whether formal or informal. The mapping of individual against group tasks and the impact of collective task performance on individual performance have only recently begun to feature in UCD studies (Berger & Hines, 1992). These current approaches in UCD practices form the baseline of our work which endeavours to rethink UCD in terms of community culture. As mentioned earlier, community in this study refers to any collectivity in which meaning (‘knowledge’) is made, including communities of practice, local communities, ethnic or religious communities. Community culture comprises the ongoing interplay of action and social structure through which meaning is constructed in the minds of individual participants.

Designing for Control and Flexibility in Knowledge Production To government and business organisations, traditionally characterised by a relatively high degree of control, passing through the PC/I threshold has offered almost limitless potential for personnel to act with flexibility, both individually and collaboratively. However these opportunities have been embraced only partially and with caution because of the perceived risks of decreased control. For civil society collectives such as associations and social movements the barriers to strongly effective ICT take-up have been more complex – largely due to the vast diversity in scope and scale of civil society collectives, and the relatively limited resources both in money and skills that can be brought to bear. Visions of the full potentialities of ICT beyond the PC/I threshold have given rise to notions such as the learning organisation, the knowledge economy and the knowledge society. They have found expression in emergent professional disciplines in the IS cluster such as Knowl-

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edge Management and Community Informatics. Within IS, understandings of the post PC/I threshold state have given rise to approaches such as soft systems methodology, and brought prominence to Applied Structuration Theory and Actor-Network theory. Each of these approaches provides insights regarding the contention between control and flexibility, whether through lenses of technocentric versus user-centric design, or of standardised versus customised ICT regimes for information management and ICT governance.

Purpose, Emergence and Knowledge-based Models of Production Information systems and technologies have often been viewed as external forces with predictable impacts. Much research has evolved around this assumption – attempting to anticipate and assess these impacts. Recently attention has shifted to the ‘social reality’ of technologies – recognising that the use and development of technologies can occur in organisations for a range of very different reasons arising from the changing properties of a complex social setting. It is because of this recognition that the phenomenon of emergence and the social construction of technologies have become critical issues in UCD (Liker, Hadad, & Karlin, 1999). The concepts and practices of information systems design are being inexorably influenced by this changing frame of reference. The traditional ‘waterfall’ approach to systems design focuses on the use of technologies to manage functional tasks to be undertaken by targeted groups of users. Known goals, purposes, and processes are at the centre of the frame (Pinch & Bijker, 1989). Even a relatively recent definition of information systems lays strong emphasis on the attainment of known goals. Preece, Sharp, & Rogers (2002) suggests that information systems are systems designed with an intended purpose for a targeted community of people (recognised as ‘users’ by designers and developers), with underlying policies governing its use, with required hardware and software supporting the requirements of these information systems. In contrast an earlier definition is more fluid in its conceptualisation of the same phenomenon. Allen (1996) defines an information system as a linked and related system of entities (including one or more information devices) that provides ac-

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cess to one or more bodies of knowledge and acts as a mechanism through which individuals can inform or become informed. Despite the divergence exemplified in these two formulations, the position of ‘traditional’ ISD could be expressed as follows. Information systems are purposeful, and set out to achieve one or more sets of goals. These purposes and goals are determined by targeted groups of people. With underlying policies governing their use, they usually consist of a systematic integration of hardware and software. Information, as well as the communication of it, is a key element of information systems. This kind of conceptualisation has been the subject of a mounting critique from within the IS discipline. The traditional systems development life cycle is a structured approach to systems development that separates the functions and duties of IT specialists and knowledge workers (Haag, Cummings, & Dawkins, 1998, p. 345). The six steps typical of this approach are: planning, scoping, analysis, design, implementation, and support. The approach was widely used by organisations in the 1970s and early 1980s but has met a range of criticisms – mainly because of its perceived incapacity to consider the needs of users comprehensively. Some critics (Pinch & Bijker, 1989) characterise this shortcoming in terms of its excessive focus on artefacts. It is assumed that an information system’s ‘product’ developed in one context will necessarily translate to another without much effort devoted to fundamental assessment and explanation. This is reminiscent of the saying that if your only tool is a hammer, all problems will be treated as nails. Returning to our earlier proposition that personal computing and the Internet marked the emergence of a fundamentally new techno-social condition, it can be argued that a concern with ‘usability’ as conceived by Nielsen and his followers, while very helpful in day-to-day interface evaluation, is only one aspect of UCD. The distinction between techno-centric and user-centric ISD is this. Techno-centric ISD assumes the classic conditions of the ‘waterfall’ and ‘lifecycle’ approach, where systems design is seen as a major creative intervention followed by a lengthy period of routine operation within the framework established. The user-centred approach, on the other hand, assumes continuous and simultaneous processes of observation, analysis, action and adjustment. Often these processes unfold in

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conditions where entire cycles cannot be completed before the next adjustment is required. Most importantly every adjustment affects the whole – in structurational terms the emergent ‘culture’ both shapes and takes shape. Breaking through the PC/I threshold has embedded information systems so deeply in our everyday lives that our dealings with information systems in a design sense have become partly deliberate, partly intuitive, like the footballer responding to and initiating change in the flow of the game. Information systems are forgotten as often as they are remembered in the conduct of everyday life, and have long since overflowed their original ambit of the workplace to include almost all other aspects of living. So extensive are the potentials of information systems in the post PC/I threshold world that the term ‘information systems’ has become too diverse a concept to be captured in any short definition. Information systems – when considered as an object of study – require constantly renewed effort at definition depending on context. It is now a reality of the techno-social condition that people need to grapple continuously with the multiple personae of ‘information’ and ‘information systems’ while interacting with them to fulfil their everyday activities. Away from a supply-oriented view of UCD, which envisions users as groups of people waiting for deliveries, this paper proposes an approach which includes a reflexive process of participative, community and action based interpretations.

Systems Informed by Structuration Theory With this in mind, a vision of technologies informed by structuration theory is discussed; one that is integrated in its form and can be applied to both the technological and human dimensions of collaborative endeavours. In the study of ICT, there are broadly two traditions of assumptions: social reality as subjective or objective (Orlikowoski & Robey, 1991). Research assuming the subjectivity of social systems focuses on individual, internalised human experiences, interpretation of them, and their expressions through human behaviour modifying the world. The contrasting view of objectivism focuses on the externalised properties of institutions shaping social systems, providing explanations for their influences on human actions and relationships. Structuration theory as developed by Giddens views the subjectivity and objectivity

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of social realities as equally important. According to structuration theory, cultural context is generated and regenerated through the interplay of action and structure. It recognises that ‘man actively shapes the world he lives in at the same time as it shapes him’ (Giddens, 1982, p. 21). The user-centred methodology of design draws on similar principles. The design of information systems, however exhaustive, imposes certain forms of structure on its users. Yet this process of design must also call on the human actions shaping the eventual structure of information systems. More information systems researchers are now arguing the case for iterative design (Carroll, 2000; Preece et al., 2002) as a way to factor in the effects of human actions – but more critical for cultural institutions is the importance of factoring in the cumulative actions of communities as a whole, and incorporating this in the design methodologies of information systems, services, and workspaces. It is not only about the delivery of services by cultural institutions, but includes dialogue and innovation for communities – a key objective of the knowledge commons. As Rose and Scheepers (2001) pointed out, while the use of structuration theory to theorise the field of information systems and its empirical scenarios is not new, there has been little effort made in using the theory to influence practice. Structuration theory is complex and must be carefully adapted to specific contexts in order to operationalise it to an applied methodology. Orlikowski and Robey have done much in theorising information systems using structuration theory. According to them, ‘in its constituted nature – information technology is the social product of subjective human action within specific structural and cultural contexts – and [in] its constitutive role – information technology is simultaneously an objective set of rules and resources involved in mediating (facilitating and constraining) human action and hence contributing to the creation, recreation and transformation of these contexts’ (Orlikowski & Robey, 1991, p. 151). As already suggested, so extensive are their potentials that information systems have become too conceptually diverse to be captured in any short definition. Information systems, when considered as an object of study, require a constant renewal of definition depending on context. It is a reality that people need to grapple continuously with the multiple personae of ‘information’ and ‘information systems’, as expounded in Buckland’s (1991) discussion of ‘information as thing’. Clearly this

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Institutional properties d Technology c b

a

a b c d

technology as a product of human agency technology as a medium of human action institutional conditions of interaction with technology institutional consequences of interaction with technology

Human agents

Figure 1. Structurational model of technology (Orlikowski, 1992, p. 410)

highly dynamic interaction with information systems needs to be accounted for. Orlikowoski (1992, p. 410) depicts a recursive model of information technologies using structurational theory (Figure 1). The recursive nature of technologies based on structuration theory is manifested in the properties of technologies as being created and changed by human action; but also both supporting and constraining such actions. In the case of cultural institutions the trajectory becoming discernable (albeit still faintly, like the changing quality of light preceding the dawn) is a trend towards design as a much more inclusive phenomenon. This trend moves from a ‘subject-object’ (expert to user) vision of service delivery, towards a culture of continuing collaborative design in which expert-to-peer, and peer-to-peer, dialogue and learning continuously shape and re-shape systems, services, and spaces. This is design conceived of as collaborative innovation by communities. The proposition being explored in this research is that such design is a key attribute of the knowledge commons. It is readily observable in the open source software movement. Its emergence within the realm of cultural institutions is less obvious to discern, but observable particularly where ‘new media’ and community memory are being brought into creative conjunction. Referring to collective memories of communities that are shared and understood both implicitly and explicitly (Pang, Denison, Johanson, Schauder, & Williamson, 2006), researchers have noted incipient paradigm shifts in the ways cultural institutions are positioning themselves in communities. Dale, for example, argued the case for mu-

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seums as agents of change in communities. As mainstream cultural institutions, museums have a significant role in ‘creating public understanding and knowledge of the world’ (Dale, 2003). In her paper, Dale gave examples of how museums around the world are repositioning themselves as agents of cultural change, by collecting, preserving and facilitating alternative discourses and knowledge.

Structuration Theory and Its Application to User-Centred Design The dynamic interplay of user needs and feedback (action) and translating these needs into some practical specification of requirements for any information system (structure) cannot be satisfied in a linear, nonrecursive methodology of design. As Bonner (2002) pointed out, users have found it difficult to communicate ideas or concepts beyond their own experiences. Many practitioners have also found problems with the classic process of attempting to capture user needs; that they are poorly timed, time-consuming and costly. The iterative view of usercentred design implies that there can never be a finalised information system for the community to use (Cockton, 2004; Fraser, 2002; Head, 1999). Perhaps it is not a difficulty to be resolved – but a condition or state of open-ended opportunity to be continuously negotiated between cultural institutions and communities. It is this interpretation of the relationship between people and information systems that leads to characterising UCD as a process of emergence rather than known purpose, and to propose as its appropriate ‘design’ methodology a reflexive process of participative, community and action based, interpretations. This approach to UCD draws its procedures, and its explanatory and prescriptive power, from the interpretive study of communities in which people live and work – a basic tenet of structuration theory. It requires the study of people at multiple levels from the individual and small group to large collectivities, distinct from the typical study of people in an artificially reductionist way as users of a system under design or evaluation. In other words, the study of people and their interactions with information technologies is aimed to be holistic – taking accounts of the multiple cultures of communities in which people are embedded.

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A Case-based Program of Research The development of a community-based approach to UCD is much assisted by having a framework for considering the communicative interactions of human collectives. Linger (2002) in consultation with colleagues from the information management and systems disciplines at Monash University arrived at a model extending the task-based approach to Knowledge Management across individual to societal levels of analysis and engagement. This formulation is influenced by the Information Continuum Model (ICM) developed as a research and teaching framework for Information Management at Monash University. The ICM is built on key structurational insights from Giddens and other action-structure theorists as applied to the creation, capture, organisation and pluralisation of information at the levels of individuals, groups, organisations, and societies (Schauder et al., 2005). The Linger model is found in Figure 2.

It is a priority of the study to elucidate UCD issues at both individual and group levels. The concept of community is bound up with various kinds of group affiliation or belonging by individuals; understanding that individuals belong to multiple communities. The project is interested in exploring the achievement of systems-design ‘fit’ for both indi222

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viduals and groups, and the ways in which group participation influences the design expectations, participations, and evaluations of individuals where activities (perhaps a wider category than tasks) are being undertaken collaboratively. Many user studies have focused on the user as a single unit of analysis; assessing their behaviours and needs while studying them as an individual. Our focus for a renewed vision of UCD is on the interaction between the individual and the group, and the community culture generated by the interplay against the backdrop of wider social structuring processes – a structurational approach. In this study, the model is conceptualised as below: •

Communities and information objects

In the context of communities and cultural institutions, information objects are defined as the public resources cultural institutions seek to provide for communities. Depending on the cultural institution, this may include literary works, digital resources, spaces, moving pictures and other multimedia, community information, and so on. These information objects come about through the construction and reconstruction of cultures by communities. They have both structural and agency relationships with communities, and vice versa. •

Layers/levels of interactions

The interactions between communities and information objects are contextualised using four layers of interpretations. It is recognised that these four layers are merely points along a typological continuum. At the individual level, the individuals make sense of their own self-knowledge and engage in private projects. This is a vital component in the construction of knowledge which may later be re-contextualised and/or reshaped by other layers of interpretations. The individual thus contributes to the production of knowledge by the community (as seen as the ‘group’ layer in Linger’s model). This is in turn shaped by organisational influences, referring to cultural institutions in this project. It should also be highlighted that organisations, while they have an influence on the communities and their interactions with information objects, are also significantly influenced by the very dynamics of these interactions at the community level. The fourth and

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overarching layer lies at the societal level of interpretation – shaping the actions of cultural organisations and their constituent communities while at the same time being shaped by them (among many other agencies). These layers of interpretation relate also to two poles of a spectrum of information systems. At one pole is the storage of information objects. The other relates to the usage of information objects, for example in the context of the knowledge commons. The usage end of the spectrum is where this study mostly concentrates. A challenging insight on ‘conservative’ UCD is provided by Spinuzzi’s characterisation of the user as a ‘victim’ to ‘rescued’ (Spinuzzi, 2003). Such an interpretation can be drawn from UCD literature that concentrates on the adeptness of designers, developers, usability specialists and managers to capture the needs of users effectively, but go no further than providing effective interfaces and systems to ‘rescue’ end users. In the notion of harnessing community dynamics in design, where members in the community create, access, contribute to, and own resources collaboratively, the perspectives of users are such that they are not merely users, but co-producers and participants in the things that are meaningful to the communities in which they are participants. At the core of this concept of UCD is a design matrix of technologiesuser adaptation. This is intended to be used as a basis for monitoring various states of technological acceptance by individuals and communities studied in various case studies. The paper draws on the statistical concept of standard deviation to visualise options for technologies in use within a community. In statistics, standard deviation is a measure of the range of variation from an average of a group of measurements. In a normal distribution 68% of all measurements fall within one standard deviation (1S, -1S) of the average , and 95% of all measurements fall within two standard deviations (2S, -2S) of the average. In this case the variable being considered is the degree of satisfaction with the technologies-in-use among community members. If the normal distribution is visualized as a bell-curve, a ‘steep’ bell curve will mean high consensus, while a ‘flat’ bell curve will mean low consensus. Depending on the specific situation it might be possible to calculate standard deviation in the classic statistical way, but more likely a qualitative conclusion analogous in nature would be achieved using ethnographic techniques. Irrespective of the way that an estimate of variation is argued, the point is that degree of acceptance of technologies in use by individual com224

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munity members would be compared or contrasted with the degree of acceptance by all community members. By visualising the community using the concept of standard deviation we can plot the situation of different communities on a Cartesian coordinate diagram as shown in Figure 3. The horizontal and vertical axes indicate degrees of acceptance of the existing information technologies by individuals, and by the communities to which they belong. For illustrative purposes, the paper discusses four representative cases – which eventually lead to monitoring the backgrounds of the selection of cases in this study. These examples are are denoted by A, B, C, and D in the figure.

A C

Rejection by Individuals

Acceptance by Community

Acceptance by Individuals

B D Rejection by Community Figure 3: Cartesian co-ordinate diagram of technology in use by individual community members versus the degree of acceptance by all community members

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A. The technologies-in-use are accepted by the whole community as congruent with their needs. From the viewpoint of UCD, the system-state should be monitored for ongoing user acceptance and technical performance. This is a desirable system state to be in – where acceptance is high for both individual users and communities. New systems to be implemented are initiated with a good understanding of what is desired by the community. B. The technologies are acceptable to some individuals but not to the community as a whole. This is a UCD problem susceptible to adaptation. The technologies should be adapted to satisfy the wider community while not losing utility for those who already find them acceptable, for example by the addition of assistive technologies for a user with disabilities. C. Acceptance of technologies-in-use by some individuals is low, yet acceptable to the community as a whole. This is a UCD problem susceptible to adaptation. Members of the community can engage in adapting themselves to the technologies in use to reach an acceptable degree of congruence between the technologies and the community’s shared meanings, for example through training or peer support. D. The technologies are rejected by the community as a whole as incongruent with their needs: acceptance of technologies-inuse by both individuals and the community as a whole is low. This is a critical UCD problem. The system-state should be analysed both in regard to user needs and technological affordances for radical re-design. This project seeks to advance understanding and definition of UCD both in theory and practice through focusing on how people as individuals and in communities act, and in doing so interact with (adjust to or change) the structures, especially the information systems, that both enable and constrain their scope of action.

The Case of a Digital Collection In the first half of 2005 discussions were held with individuals and groups across the university to identify cases through which the concepts and phenomena discussed above could be observed and explored in the context of cultural institutions. Contact with researchers in Pub-

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lic History resulted in engagement with collaborative project involving historians, museologists and a grass roots movement called The Women on Farms Gathering (WoFG). WoFG is a forum in which women from a rural background, whether themselves farmers or connected in other ways with farming, could build better understandings of their own lives and experiences, and convey these understandings to the wider (mostly urbanised) Australian population. Part of this endeavour envisaged a physical and virtual exhibition, focussing on artefacts and other objects to which meanings were or could be attached. The first step was to negotiate with WoFG members whether such a case study might be feasible, and how the researchers could position themselves to gain in-depth insights concerning the WoFG community. There was initially some concern about engagement with researchers from an IT background. Where community members had previous experience of IT researchers this was not necessarily regarded as an advantage. One participant wrote: I don't mean to caste aspersions on IT researchers as such, but frequently there's a lack of sensitivity about the different needs in rural communities, and ways to get research ‘out there’ in a credible fashion. (Lottkowitz, 2005, p. 1) She also commented: … I have a sense from the early discussions about this project that it needs to be women focussed and driven, and IT is not always friendly for many women in the communities of interest. (Lottkowitz, 2005, p. 2) Yet it is notable that this same participant distributes an e-bulletin to rural communities, in a simple format able to be readily accessed with minimal equipment. She recognised the irony of her commitment to that system alongside her scepticism about the involvement of IT researchers. This ‘us and them’ tension is a manifestation of the kind of problem in information systems design practice that our proposed communitybased, adaptive approach to UCD seeks to address. Discussion with a history academic involved in the WoFG project conjured the analogy of the Procrustean bed. This refers to the ancient Greek account of a person named Procrustes who offered hospitality to travellers, claiming that his bed exactly fitted the length of each guest. He did not reveal

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that this was achieved by stretching the guests or chopping off their legs to obtain the correct fit. Those inside the IT professions may under estimate the extent to which users suspect the Procrustean approach to be the underlying methodology of ISD. Such comments and experience seem to support concerns expressed in the kind of literature referred to in earlier sections that something is out of kilter in the conceptualisation and practice of information systems, even where those involved believe they are doing their utmost to consider user needs. The WoFG public history project became, through mutual agreement, the principal case study for the project. It is briefly described here to illustrate how the community-based approach to design, which the sections above have sought to justify theoretically, was deployed in the ‘real world’ context of the WoFG project. The case summary in Figure 4 provides a summary of the background and analysis that took place. Much of this analysis has been based on the preliminary model development for the proposed community-based centred design approach (see Figure 2). The Community: Emerged from a grassroots endeavour, beginning with with a gathering of farm women in the state of Victoria, Australia in 1990, for sharing of insights and experience on issues of common importance. A collection of significant objects was established in 2001 with the involvement of Museum Victoria. The partnership between the Museum and the community is different from the general model for the development of museum exhibits which primarily express the understanding and vision of the curator. With the WoFG exhibit the curator involved, supported by the public history scholars at Monash Universty, attempted from the outset to keep the community in equal engagement. This approach conceives of the Museum as a central and neutral entity for the purpose of ensuring the sustainability of the collection, and not the sole or even primary interpreter of the meaning of the collection. Information objects: Take the forms of stories, symbolic icons, gathering reports, responses to stories, oral histories, and other memories from members of the community. On their own few of these objects have intrinsic value but their meanings are constructed by the community collectively through

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what Giddens calls the ‘interpretive’ modality - resulting from the interplay of communication (action) and signification (structure) (Giddens, 1984, p. 28-29). Technologies-in-use: Email was the most prevalent technologies used in the community for communication purposes. At the beginning of the project, while some individuals found this quite acceptable to overcome difficulties posed by physical distances, the community as a whole decided in a periodic meeting that they needed to communicate the shared information objects publicly and more dynamically within and beyond the community. The desire for upgraded information systems was also driven by a need to gather memories and stories for the collection in a more effective way. There was a strong, shared motivation to take this next step in information management, because of the rapid changes affecting rural society and the sense that significant understandings could be lost. Tasks and needs in contexts: Once these requirements were realised the tasks and needs of the community were analysed and written down in context. Alongside the members of the community, the museum curator, and the public historians, the IT reseacher were given access to the dynamics of the project as developers of virtual exhibition website, and to help build relevant IT skills among WoFG members. It was understood from the outset that, if the exhibition succeeded, the pilot system and ongoing design would need to interoperate with the Museum’s mainstream information systems. Figure 4: Case summary Engagement with the WoFG case led to the development of a digital collection using the UCD proposed approach argued for in this paper. It may very well be that the same requirements and system outcomes could have been generated by other approaches – but the process that both the community and Museum went through via the adaptive community-oriented UCD approach was seen by the WoFG participants as empowering, rather than disempowering. This was demonstrated by members who were initially apprehensive about the project taking ownership of content management and learning the administrative functionalities of the system. Having the system deeply grounded in the cultural context the WoFG community ensured a sense of continuing

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engagement and control, rather than a ‘hand-over’ or alienation of significant objects and the accompanying heritage to ‘the experts’. The system is now integrated into a mobile exhibition for the community’s annual gatherings, and has become a part of the communicative interactions that help in the constructing and re-constructing of identity by the community. Further case studies concerning cultural institutions in their relation to communities, technologies and the knowledge commons will be added to that of the WoFG/Museum Victoria case to complete the project, and a fuller account of the WoFG and other cases will be given in future publications.

Conclusion The main features of the adaptive UCD approach being explored through the theoretical argument and case study introduced in this paper are that UCD is seen as an integral part of the culture of communities. Community culture is produced and re-produced through structuration – the continuous interplay of human action and social structure. Technologies such as ICT are a crucial element of structure. Adaptive UCD thus becomes more an emergent than a deterministic process, as predicated by complexity theory. The rationale behind the approach is well summarised by Price (2004): As a metaphor of holism it [complexity] has become a powerful counter to mechanistic views of organizations and organizational change. Proponents of a retreat from Newtonian theories of organisation or Taylorist approaches to management find common ground in this form of ‘complexity’. In this view, UCD becomes an increasingly essential part of community culture when members of the community, as an accustomed part of their work or life style, continually ‘read’ the system-state through interpreting needs and meanings in the community, and act to alter it for maximum acceptability. UCD understood in this way both fosters and is made possible by reflexive processes of participative, community and action based, interpretation – which both shapes and is shaped by community culture.

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Acknowledgements We would like to thank the reviewers for their comments and Professor Hans-Erik Nissen for his time and extensive study of our paper. Without them this paper would not have been possible.

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Biographies Natalie Pang is a PhD candidate in Monash University's Faculty of Information Technology. Her research investigates the interplay between design and the knowledge commons in communities and cultural institutions. Her other research and teaching interests include information management, usability evaluations, peer to peer technologies and approaches, and digital libraries. A graduate of Melbourne University in Australia and Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, Natalie has worked in Singapore, Malaysia, and Australia. She has also served as an Honorary Research Associate of Museum Victoria in Australia, and is currently a Visiting Scholar at the School of Communication and Information, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Don Schauder is Professor of Information Management in the Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University. He is Chair of the Information & Telecommunication Needs Research Group (ITNR), and of the Centre for Community Networking Research (CCNR). The foci of his teaching and research are developing information products and services that benefit individuals, organisations and society; and facilitating the transfer of knowledge among people. He was a pioneer of electronic publishing in Australia, and a cofounder of the international Community Informatics Research Network (CIRN).

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On Categorizing the IS Research Literature: User Oriented Perspective Bandula Jayatilaka, Heinz K. Klein, and Jinyoul Lee School of Management, State University of New York, Binghamton, USA [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to propose a new approach for categorizing the body of knowledge captured in the existing literature, past and present in such a way that contributions to the use side of systems development are made explicit. The new twist of this approach is that it seeks to bridge the most prevalent divides currently fragmenting the IS literature by offering an integrative classification framework for “use side” oriented IS research. We call our approach to literature classification “substance oriented”, because it builds on social theory concepts related to user concerns. It follows neither the latest paradigmatic nor earlier inductive citation or key word based literature classification schemes. Instead, it explicitly builds on the core concepts of Giddens’ Structuration Theory (ST), at least at its highest level. The approach has some affinity to Ritzer’s (1991) “metatheorizing”. Keywords: User orientation, IS theories, cross-paradigm research integration, structuration theory, research literature classification, coding and retrieval, IS core properties.

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User Oriented Perspective

Introduction The monograph on the dialectical relationships between use and redesign of IS places an important question before IS researchers, in their roles as both contributors to and readers of the research literature: In which ways could studies of the use side particularly benefit from a relationship to philosophical frameworks such as hermeneutics and phenomenology? The term “use side” is obviously associated with user perspective and both of these terms are in need of interpretation. The end-user literature defined user as any person that directly interacts with a computerbased system, but not a trained IS professional with the principal responsibility for IS development maintenance or administration. For our purposes, this definition is too narrow. It is difficult to find a thorough working definitions of the terms “use side” or user perspective in the IS literature even though such distinctions as direct and indirect user have been made. We found that the terms use side or user perspective are widely used undefined (Belcher & Watson, 1993; Joshi, 1991; LaPointe & Rivard, 2005) and “use side” is not a common phrase at all. The call for papers of this special issue appears to associate the use side with the following at least four characteristics. The first two are “aspects of use” and “learning and unlearning”, It also refers to “lived human experience and reflection upon that experience” as having a potential impact upon the “dialectic” relationship “between meaningful use and reflection upon use” and “unwelcome burdens” All of these conceptual hints are in further need of clarification. For example, “aspects use” in our minds could refer to the extensive literature on the need for ease of use, user-defined requirements and user friendliness. “Learning and unlearning” could be interpreted as related to organizational change, mental shifts and sense making the latter being extensively discussed in the literature on lifeworlds (Husserl, 1970, Schutz & Luckman, 1983) and the philosophy of hermeneutics, especially Gadamer. Drawing attention to ‘unwelcome burdens’ that the new learning associated with systems change might demand from users reminded us of interpretive studies on alienation and user resistance. Last, but not least, the reference to “lived human experience and its reflection” appears to have a distinctive Heideggerian flavor evoking the specters of loss of meaning in the work experience, increased stress and reduced freedom resulting in a deterioration of “being”, i.e. the impoverishment of general conditions of human existence that Heideg-

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ger saw as a critical question arising form the intrusion of technology into all spheres of life (cf. Heidegger, 1978; Introna, 1994). Whereas it is impossible to reflect all of these aspects of “use side” in a working definition, the hints in the call for papers on its possible meanings do make it clear that the classical end-user definition is too narrow. For the following we shall adopt a role oriented working definition by considering as “user” anyone who has to cope within his “normal” dayto-day work roles with externally imposed system changes and whose normal work roles do not include the building or maintaining the types of systems “coming down the pipe” by external fiat. This definition is based on the observation that in organizations a parallelism exists between different classes of users. Consider first the example of a systems programmer/analyst, who is primarily concerned with developing applications for “application end-users”. If the systems analyst is suddenly forced to switch to an entirely new development method with a new type of CASE (Computer-Aided Software Engineering) tool suite for the development of application systems, this may be just as frustrating and “burdensome” to him or her as it is for the end-users who may find that the new application systems implemented by the programmer/analyst are imposing “unwelcome learning burdens”. This type of reasoning extends backwards into the organizational food-chain. As an example, consider the situation of a professional CASA/CASE (computer-aided systems analysis /computer-aided software engineering) tool specialist whose main responsibility is developing and implementing new CASA/CASE tools for applications analysts. He may experience the same frustrations as the programmer/analysts as users, when she is forced into using a new operating system or having to learn a new programming standard. Orlikowski’s (1991) study of ISD case tools as managerial control mechanisms has, indeed, described such a situation. Researching the user side in this broad sense requires us as researchers to take a holistic perspective of the impacts of IS changes. This in turn has implications for research methodology in that interpretive types of research tend to be relatively best suited for analyzing the broader issues of the user side including but also extending beyond the details of user-friendly, ergonomic interfaces. In principal, there appear to be two contrasting research strategies to study the use side or user perspectives of IS. One is to investigate directly users’ lived experience either by a hermeneutic or phenomenological study (Creswell, 1998, 2003) or

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through an autobiography if at least one of the researchers has gained a significant amount of professional user experience herself before joining academia. In this paper, we committed to the second approach. Its basic idea is to look for a theoretical a priori basis that in principle is capable of capturing a broad range of user oriented concerns and issues associated with user needs, values and requirements. Such an apriori theory should explicitly address sense making, which are related to user understanding and learning, ethics, which is related to the legitimization of user values and needs, and power; the last is critical for the user side, because issues of social influence and control are always a major concern at the user side because of the Heideggerian concerns with technology. A theory focusing on these phenomena can be used to formulate a user oriented perspective. An integrative framework based on such a theory can be called user oriented. If such a framework is used to classify the existing research it should provide a focus on the user side of the past IS research showcasing the extent at which the past literature has represented the user side and by implication, identifying the current gaps in our understanding of the user side with obvious implications for future research. Continuing with this approach, the purpose of this paper is to identify a theoretical basis that can link the phenomena defining the use side as consistently and comprehensively as possible in an integrative framework bridging the current paradigmatic divides. Hardly any research paper would deny the importance of user issues, yet only a subset tries to address them substantively with appropriate theory. A social theory based classification should clearly showcase these. In addition, many research papers contain isolated insights on user issues, but if their focus is elsewhere, the user related insights are often lost, because the papers cannot be easily retrieved with user-oriented keyword searches. In line with these considerations, this paper proposes a new approach to the categorization of the body of knowledge captured in the existing literature, past and present in such a way that contributions to the user side of systems development are made explicit. The new twist of this approach is that it seeks to bridge the most prevalent divides currently fragmenting the IS literature providing more integrative perspectives on IS use. By addressing this purpose, we intend to point to a line of progress from the first keyword based classification of IS research (Barki, Rivard, & Talbot, 1988), to multi-paradigmatic classification schemes

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(Hirschheim & Klein, 1989; Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991) to substantive classification schemes that go beyond paradigm categories, at least at the primary level of categorization. We call our proposed new approach to literature classification “substance oriented”, because it follows neither the latest paradigmatic classification nor the early bottom up citation or key word based literature classification schemes, but explicitly builds on “substantive” social theory concepts, at least at its highest level. . Our approach has some affinity to Ritzer’s (1991) “metatheorizing”. The next section identifies the preferred theoretical basis for this paper and reviews some prior approaches to literature classification. The section following the next one explains our arguments for believing that an alternative approach to literature classification is needed that we call “substance-oriented”. This section also more fully explains the rationale for choosing ST as the basis for such a new coding scheme. Then we present an outline of the proposed approach with some examples. The section before the last one discusses some limitations and philosophical issues that our approach raises. The final section presents a conclusion regarding the benefits of our approach for research on user side issues and the current identity and core property debate.

Theoretical Basis and Literature Review The call for papers of this special issue gives some guidance for the characteristics of the social theories that are most suitable for capturing user concerns. Based on prior work (Klein, 2004), we agree that they should be sought from those theorists that have responded to the revolutions in social thinking and epistemology brought about by the hermeneutic and linguistic turns and by the recognition of the multiparadigmatic nature of the social and cultural sciences, in particular of sociology. Clearly these revolutions in the very foundations of the social and cultural sciences have had a profound impact on all their applied branches, which include the field of IS. In particular, a new generation of classification schemes should include the interpretive and critical research streams, while it must not ignore the many insights from the fact-finding and hypothesis generation efforts in the positivist literature. To meet these criteria we looked for theories meeting two conditions: (i) they should have the potential to bridge some of the paradigmatic divides in the IS literature and (ii) through reclassification, they should bring to bear a wide range of the mainstream literature on user related

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concerns. After evaluating four widely recognized social theorists (Bourdieu, 1990, 1979; Foucault, 1970; Habermas, 1984, 1987; Giddens, 1984), we concluded that the three structural dimensions of Giddens’ structuration theory (ST) provide the most promising starting point for two reasons. First, Giddens’ structural dimensions of signification, legitimation, and domination relate to the key user issues of understanding (or inability of making sense of the IS artifact), social acceptance (or resistance) and social control. One or more of these phenomena are typically at the core of user issues. A proper analysis and understanding of these issues is the prerequisite for building a practical approach of dealing with these issues in IS development (ISD) projects. A second reason for preferring ST as an intellectual base is the potential that ST can bridge the philosophical divides between positivist and interpretive research approaches. Giddens (1984) himself has made this claim. In addition, we have reasons to believe that his concepts can also be linked to key concerns of critical social theories such as Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action (TCA), Bourdieu’s theory of social and cultural capital and Foucault’s insights gained from studying the archaeology and genealogy of knowledge. An example for such a critical study can be found in Orlikowski’s (1991) study of ISD methods control mechanisms in a consulting firm. However, for the sake of keeping this paper within reasonable bounds, we shall not try to extend the proposed approach to classifying the critical research streams also even though we believe that in principle this is possible – in a later section (cf. the section titled: On the Assumptions and Completeness of ST: the case of critical management research) we shall briefly expand this claim. To the extent, in which the existing literature body of knowledge can be shown to contribute to the analysis, understanding, and thereby to an approach of handling the three key human-social user issues, it does contribute to the user side of ISD. The most recent and influential stream of past approaches to classifying the IS research literature has derived classification categories from an analysis of paradigmatic assumptions, most notably those identified by Burrell and Morgan (1979). Whereas the first keyword approaches were limited to a single paradigm, the mulit-paradigm classifications lost the connections to the substantive contents of IS research by relying on such categories as “interpretive field study” or “realist ontology”. These types of concepts refer to general characteristics of the underlying research philosophy or methods. In contrast, substantive classification

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categories relate to an article’s language for describing its research situation and thereby to identifiable phenomena (incidents, social entities, objects) in the field, with which the researcher engaged to address the research question and which are then described in the contents of the research report. We emphasize that classification of research along dimensions not directly related to paradigm characteristics (or at least appear to be so), is different from ignoring the existence of multiple paradigms, as has been the case with single paradigm classification of research. To the best of our knowledge there were only three single paradigm classifications. The first of these, Barki et al. (1988), derived their top-level categories from a positivistic-functionalist framework (i.e., Ives, Hamilton, & Davis 1980). The second (Hirschheim, Klein, & Lyytinen, 1996) made a claim to generality for comprehensively classifying the ISD literature. In principle, it might be possible to apply it to other specializations in IS research; because it is based on a general theory of social action, but this has not been worked out and tested in detail. Hirschheim et al. (1996) derived categories from Habermas’ TCA (1984, 1987) and the resulting classification is concerned with substantive issues as opposed to methodological ones. The resulting classification of IS research is based on the social action types of TCA and can be said to result in a paradigmatic bias, because TCA is the successor of Habermas’ (1972) first version of Critical Social Theory (with focus on Knowledge and Human Interest) and widely perceived as one of the principal contributors to the critical research philosophy (along with Foucault, Bourdieu and possibly other theorists). In fact, the TCAbased research categorization is not even representative of the whole spectrum of critical research as is evident from Deetz (2000). Deetz (1994, 1996) proposed a third classification scheme. It is a modification of Burrell and Morgan (1979) by replacing their “subjective – objective” dimension with “origin of concepts and problems” (local/emergent vs. elite/a priori). It appears to be primarily suited for classifying critical research, at least this is the way Alvesson and Deetz (2000) used it for classifying critical management research. However, Schultze and Leidner (2002) used it for analyzing the knowledge management research in general. Hence, we are left with the impression that no classification has been proposed that explicitly attempts to bridge the divisions between functionalist-positivist, interpretitivist and critical research.

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The Need for Complementary IS Research Categorization While the classification of research by methodological orientations (paradigms) remains important for general orientation and training in alternative research methods, it is not sufficient for all purposes.

The Need for Alternative Classification Schemes We see three reasons for the need for a substance-oriented classification of IS research that complement one along methodological lines. (i) Such a classification helps in organizing the rapidly emerging body of IS research in a way so that different approaches to similar areas of concern or research questions can easily be located. (ii) It helps us identify important topics that are under-researched, which helps to discuss and formulate research priorities. Moreover, a good classification of the past archival research record says something about the identity of IS research, what it is, and what it has and has not accomplished so far. Hence, it will contribute to the identity discussion by demonstrating what the core efforts and properties of IS research have been in the published literature. (iii) A good substantive documentation of research results is also invaluable for newcomers and for other academics that want to know what IS researchers do and who are not primarily interested in whether the methods used have been positivist, interpretive or critical. The approach of this paper for creating such a classification is to try to relate representative articles employing radically different research methods to a common conceptual scheme without denying their diverse origins. To achieve our objective, we searched for a theoretical basis that explicitly reaches beyond the most prevalent current distinctions in the epistemological and methodological debate of IS research with the relatively least amount of bias. The only theory that we could find coming close to this ideal is Giddens’ Theory of Structuration or ST for short. Of course, we must be sensitive to the objection that no theory can be completely free of biases. If so, it might not be possible to map all IS research equally convincingly or with equal ease into the framework underlying ST. We feel that such difficulties or “distortions” themselves are noteworthy results. The difficulties will shed light on the characteristics of various research streams and whether ST can live up to its bold claim that it can bridge the major divisions in the social and cultural sciences, on which IS has drawn as reference disciplines. 244


Why ST? The introductory chapter in the “Elements of the Theory of Structuration” explicitly addresses the divisions that Giddens seeks to overcome: “One of my principal ambitions is in the formulation of structuration theory is to put an end to each of these empire-building endeavors”. (Giddens 1984, p. 2) Moreover, he emphasizes that these perspectives or “empires” of social science “have often taken to be epistemological, whereas they are in fact also ontological” (Giddens 1984, p. 2). The perspectives or intellectual “empires” in question (1984, cf. p. 1) are functionalism (including systems theory), structuralism (in the sense of Levi-Strauss), and hermeneutics including other forms of interpretive sociology. For the sake of shorthand, the following will refer to both as “structuralistfunctional” or “positivist-functionalist” research approaches when comparing them with hermeneutics and critical types of research. This is justified because Giddens (1984, p. 1) points to “some notable similarities” between functionalism and structuralism that relate to the broader concept of positivism: “Both tend to express a naturalist standpoint, and both are inclined towards objectivism”. This is not to deny marked differences that exist between functionalism and structuralism. For the sake of clarity it should also be noted that ST does not explicitly consider all forms of positivism, in particular it does not discuss rationalism (typical for the modeling of human action as in economics and the management sciences) and certain inductive empirical research streams such as Perrow’s theory of bureaucratic forms. Giddens presents ST as a way of thinking about social phenomena. It can therefore be compared to other social theories such as Etzioni’s “Active Society” (1968), Parsons’ “Social System” (1971), Luhmann’s “Soziale Systems” (1987) or Habermas’ TCA. All of these theories can be used in two ways. One is to guide research in the field. Typically structuration theory has been used in field research to guide data collection, analysis or interpretation of results. That means structuration theory typically has been applied to analyze and describe phenomena in the research domain understood to consist of collective structures, human agents and behaviors (social processes) connecting agents and structures. The second way is to apply a social theory to the literature of research domain for reinterpretation and organization of research, for example as Lyytinen and Ngwenyama (1992) have applied ST to the definition of the nature of CSCW research. 245


In this paper, we apply ST in the second manner. This is similar to how Ives, Hamilton and Davis’ 1980 framework was applied to classify dissertation research, which is similar to the way in which Hirschheim, Klein and Lyytinen (1996) applied concepts from the TCA to classify the research literature on ISD. That is, the domain to which the concepts of ST will be applied does not consist of the social phenomena in the field, but of the descriptions of these phenomena in the past research literature. This means that ST is applied at a meta-level to classify the IS literature by its topics, where topic categories are derived from ST. The IS literature is, of course, the principal product of IS research consisting primarily of the publications in the fields recognized conferences, journals and research monographs. One may question if such an approach is promising. Are there reasons to believe that ST is sufficiently comprehensive to cover if not all topics, then at least a sufficiently large and well-defined core segment of topics? We believe such reasons can be found in the ways by which ST has influenced IS research directly, which is, of course only a subset of all IS research. Ever since Barley’s (1986) classical study of how IT provides opportunities for social restructuring, ST has been applied to a wide variety of social phenomena. This has been possible, because intrinsic to ST design is the claim that it is a comprehensive theory of human and social phenomena. This means that ST is concerned with all types of structures, processes, modalities, and human agency in society. Moreover, it has been shown in much prior research, that ST can also be applied to the level of organizations, groups and other types of social entities, such as networks. Therefore we formulated the heuristic research hypothesis that it should be possible to use ST for classifying the descriptions found in a wide variety of social and cultural research as long as such research has focused on some important aspects of social structure, process, or human agency. This should be true regardless of whether the research directly relied on Giddens’ ST or some other theoretical basis. If ST’s intrinsic claim to comprehensive coverage of social phenomena is justified, then it should be possible to link most kinds of social research to it – admittedly more or less perfectly. The key requirement is only that some aspects of structure, process, agency, or a combination of these three play a substantial role in the research reported. Prima facie evidence for the fruitfulness of this heuristic hypothesis is that Giddens himself relates ST to many classical and recent social

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theories including Max Weber, Parsons, Bourdieu, Foucault, Gadamer, and Habermas. Using the last author as an example, the correspondence of the major themes discussed is striking even though the language and approach of both authors is very different. Noting such correspondences is not meant to blur over important differences between the TCA and ST, such as those surface when comparing the treatment of social structures. Rather it is merely to illustrate our claim that principal correspondences exist with a sufficient level of detail so that research using other theoretical bases different from ST can be meaningfully linked to the principal concepts of ST. Insofar as such an effort might also reveal differences by leading to some conceptual difficulties, it should deepen our understandings of both ST and the works of competing authors. We shall return to this point in the discussion section. The claim to comprehensiveness also applies to methodological issues because ST explicitly seeks to bridge some of the major epistemological divides in the cultural-social sciences based disciplines (Giddens 1984, cf. p. XX, XXVII, pp. 1, 213, 327.). Specifically mentioned is the linguistic turn in social theory and the emergence of post-empiricist philosophies of science. These have also surfaced in the methodological debate in IS (e.g. cf. Klein 2004) where they reappear under such labels as qualitative vs. quantitative, positivist vs. interpretive vs. critical research methods. Giddens, somewhat disappointing response to this is to give ontological issues the priority, because “concentration upon epistemological issues draws attention away from the more ‘ontological’ concerns of social theory and it is these upon which structuration theory primarily concentrates” (1984, p. XX). Again we defer further discussion of such issues until later (cf. the section titled: The discussion of philosophical issues), however, noting in advance that other social theories take a more balanced approach to methodological issues because the two cannot be totally separated. The above discussion implies existence of at least one important area of IS research that we need to eliminate from consideration in this paper, i.e. research of a purely technical nature. ST’s conceptual apparatus is quite limited in capturing physical aspects whether they are objects of nature or human-designed artifacts. With regards to the identity and core properties discussion, in principle it will be interesting to note, what percentage of total IS research published in our major journals is of a purely technical nature focusing on the “IT artifact” (cf. Benbasat

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& Zmud 2003; Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001). A preliminary count indicated that only a small amount of the literature is purely technical and its omission from the coding will not render the classification of research uninteresting that has social or cultural implications. In summary, the preliminary classification scheme proposed in this paper is not intended for the classification of papers on research methods and information technology without consideration of human or cultural-social aspects. The next section discusses how representative examples from the diverse IS research literature can be related to the principle dimensions of Giddens’ ST by applying the proposed classification scheme. It begins with a brief introduction to the key concepts of ST on which the classification of the research literature will rely.

Mapping the IS Research Literature to Structuration Theory This section introduces the most important concepts needed for our purposes and then illustrates how the IS research literature can be linked in the framework of ST. The introduction to ST is limited to recapitulating only short working definitions of the core concepts applied here (cf. Table 1), because ST has already been widely used (cf. Barley, 1986; Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Orlikowski & Robey, 1991, to name just a few). Table 1 provides working definitions for the three principal dimensions of structures, which are at the heart of ST (cf. Giddens, 1984). They are called signification, domination and legitimation. Reflexive monitoring and formation of structures occurs as a result of interactions between the agents and the structures, and in the reproduction of systems of interactions, the agents or actors draw upon the modalities of structuration. These modalities relate the structural properties to the knowledgeable capacities of the actors. Basically the modalities can be thought of as scripts that serve as procedural resources to guide human actions (Barley, 1986; Barley &Tolbert, 1997).

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Table 1 – Constituents of ST Structures are properties of social systems and social systems produce social practices resulting in structuration. Structures – rules, reasons or sets of transformation relations Duality of structures – Structure is the medium and outcome of the conduct it recursively organizes Core of ST

Social systems – reproduced relations between actors and collectivities organized as social practices Structuration – conditions governing the continuity or transformation of structures and therefore reproduction of social systems

Primary categories of dimensions

Structures, Modalities, Interactions Structures – Signification, Domination, Legitimation

Dimensions

Modalities – Interpretive Scheme, Facility, Norm for the three structures, respectively. “What I call the ‘modalities’ of structuration serve to clarify the main dimensions of the duality of structure in interaction, relating the knowledgeable capacities of agents to structural features. Actors draw upon the modalities of structuration in the reproduction of systems of interaction, by the same token reconstituting their structural properties.” (ST, p. 28) Interactions – Communication, Power, Sanctions, each of which is related to one of the three structures, respectively.

The process of structuration in general refers to the social processes that involve the interactions between human actors and the structural features of organizations. Structures consist of rules, reasons or sets of transformation relations and resources. These structures exist within social systems as a result of the reproduced relations (that occur and reoccur) between actors and collectivities. Structures can also be described as organized social practices, which are stable over time and occur independently of any specific individual. However, a key proposition of Giddens’ work is that structure is both a product of and a constraint on human action. This fundamental proposition of ST is often referred to as the duality of social structures. The principal emphasis of Table 2 in this section is to illustrate how the categories of ST can be applied to classifying IS research articles exhibiting methodological diversity.

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Table 2: Illustration of mapping paradigmatically diverse research to ST

Structures

Signification

Domination

Legitimation

Cooper and Zmud (1990) Task characteristics, Technology characteristics

Elkjaer et al. (1991) ISD purposes and outcomes regulatory and exercising control (existing)

Orlikowski (1993) Radical and incremental change factors

Elkjaer et al. (1991) ISD relations where knowledge is decommodified (proposal)

Markus 1983 Distribution of power Resistance

Meso et al. (2005) Socializing use of mobile ICT vs. Business use of mobile ICT: Usefulness. Ease of use (3) Orlikowski (1993) Radical and incremental change factors

Modalities

Kohli and Kettinger (2004) Establishment of practices for cost and behavior control

Interpretive Scheme

Facility

Norm

Cooper and Zmud (1990) Compatibility and system

Elkjaer et al. (1991) ISD process as a facility (1)

Kohli and Kettinger (2004) Professional peer norms of medical practice responsive to values of quality of care, demonstrated (clinical) effectiveness and economic costbenefit efficiency.

Elkjaer et al. (1991) Critical theory approach (1) Meso et al. (2005) Educational level, age, gender, perceived reliability (3)

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Orlikowski (1991) Organizational policy enabled by Information System (CASE tool)

Kohli and Kettinger (2004) Customized webbased information system (technostructure); professional peer relationships (role structures) and reputation hierarchies conferring legitimacy on changes in managerial control structures. (4)

Orlikowski (1991) Information System as enabler of new types of organizational control Kohli and Kettinger (2004) IS as enabling communication of standards for control


Interactions

Communication

Power

Sanction

Cooper and Zmud (1990) Technology diffusion and infusion

Elkjaer et al. (1991) Power in ISD (1)

Orlikowski (1993) Notifying about changes

Elkjaer et al. (1991) Enabling relations (proposal) Orlikowski (1993) Articulation of needs

Markus (1983) Politics Kohli and Kettinger (2004) Principal with power

Kohli and Kettinger (2004) “Informating the clan” (p. 380); e.g. peer reviews, incorporation of benchmarks in the system and “panoptic visibility” strengthening “processes of self, as well as, direct managerial control.” (p. 369)

Difficulties Encountered when Placing Articles into the Framework of Table 2. 1. Elkjaer et al. (1991) is more descriptive. However, it proposes an ISD approach which is different from the traditional approach where the emphasis is more on control and legitimization. This is one of the few papers trying to capture modality as mediating between interactions and structure change; however little reference can be found to legitimation concerns. 2. Some concepts and factors appear to be falling into both structure and modality e.g., Kohli and Kettinger (2004). IS management wanted to establish structures of control while IS facilitated communication of standards necessary for control. 3. Other grey areas or ‘may be ambiguous ones’ – usefulness and ease of use: these two are treated as mental structures constructed by users while they may have some interpretation schemes associated with it. However, in absence of explicit mentioning of such schemes in the paper, these are placed under structures. 4. The paper’s overall thrust is on legitimizing the messengers – human and technical - and information for improving physicians’ cost control while maintaining quality of care. The authors have used action research with two intervention cycles. If the two intervention cycles are taken as the unit of analysis rather than the paper

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as a whole, the emphasis of the first intervention is more on domination and the second on gaining legitimacy by appealing to the user’s internal group (clan) values and practices. In order to illustrate the use of ST for this purpose, we selected research articles that differ in the underlying paradigmatic assumptions as Table 3 shows. At least one article from each of the three major research paradigms (functionalist, interpretive, and critical) was included resulting into six papers ultimately selected. In order to test how an article with a theoretical foundation other than ST could be categorized in Table 2, only one article was included one that uses ST as its theoretical foundation. Table 3: Characterization of the articles selected for classification Phenomenon Studied

Research question or conceptual issue (purpose)

Theoretical basis and Methodological Approach

Prominent characteristics and/or Other comments

Cooper and Zmud (1990): A diffusion theory approach to IT implementation in an MRP system

Applying the Kwon and Zmud (1987) implementation model to an empirical study of IT application.

Innovationa and diffusion literature on factor analysis of implementation success

Uses a random sample of manufacturing firms. Typical positivist research model emphasizing hypothesis testing

Elkjaer et al. (1991): latent effects of participatory ISD

The commodification of expertise in ISD consulting and its discontents for “smooth” IS development

Secondary literature on applying Habermas’ discourse theory and Braverman 1974

Explicitly critical

Markus (1983): Explanation of resistance to IS implementation

Comparison and evaluation of four alternative theories of resistance

Uses a political variant of interaction theory as a preferred theoretical base

The case study has interpretive leanings but no clear indication of its philosophical basis; evaluates multiple theories of resistance with the case study data identifying the political variant as the preferred theory (p. 438)

Meso et al. (2005): Studying the mobile ICT usage behavior in LDC’s

“What are the technology acceptance factors that explain the use mobile ICT’s by individual end-users in sub-Saharan Africa” (p. 121)

TAM and uses structural equation modeling

Positivist. While perceptions of end-users regarding the usability of ICT’s are listed there is no observations on the cognitive difficulties and processes which users cope with the hermeneutic task of making sense of the new technology and incorporating it into their life worlds.

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Jayatilaka, Klein, and Lee Orlikowski (1993): Experiences of a consulting (SCC) and a petrochemical firm (PCC) with adoption of CASE tools over time.

Orlikowski (1991): Effect of introducing IT on the nature and role of organizational control mechanisms

To identify the critical elements that shape organizational changes as a result of CASE tool introduction with paying attention to issues of stake-holders intentions, actions and the processes and the context surrounding IT deployment.

Grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss) and uses interviewing, case documentation, and participant observation for data collection.

Examine the possible consequences of internal and external control mechanisms and other organizational impacts of deploying IT in work processes

Structuration theory using the same case study as in the previous one (Orlikowski 1993)

Distinguishes between the incremental and radical types of innovations to propose a process framework of organizational change related to CASE tools.

GT approach with interpretive stance While the design of the case study did not indicate any critical intentions of the researcher, its conclusions contribute to critical research by stating that IT reinforced rather than transformed the status quo and did not stimulate new organizational forms. Interpretive and critical aspects.

Kohli and Kettinger (2004): Organizational control through IS

Examine the effect of IS when the principal does not possess legitimacy to impose conformance.

Agency theory’s use of information systems for control. Action research

Uses agency theory as an a priori research framework and attempts to replicate previous research. (1) Through action research the authors produce possible explanations for the inability to replicate. Positivistic bias

(1) “…this study began as a replication of previous research in the context of physicians (i.e., IS induced behavioral and outcome transparency of an agent’s work will result in higher control for the principal, as per agency theory and Zuboff’s informating).” (Kohli & Kettinger., 2004, p. 386)

In order to place the articles in the appropriate cells of Table 2, they had to be interpreted from the perspective of ST regardless of whether their research used ST as theoretical foundation or not. This interpretation made the assumption underlying Barley’s (1986) research, namely IT applications in organizations and society provide opportunities for structuration. This should be true irrespective of the researcher’s epistemological and ontological assumptions. Therefore, it should be possible to identify the features of structuration in the main concepts and findings of the research reported in all the articles selected. With this in mind, we analyzed the concepts and findings of the papers in the light of these meaning ST’s central propositions. Then we placed the article in the appropriate cells of the structuration framework as shown in Ta-

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ble 2. Because a single article can address more than one aspect of ST, it is possible that the article can be placed in more than one cell of table 2. This is based on the heuristic assumption that most papers can only address a limited number of the aspects covered in ST. The placement of articles into Table 2 amounts to using the core concepts of ST as “codes” in the general sense of Ryan and Bernard (2000, p. 769), i.e. specific articles are assigned to selected concepts from ST. The process followed was not that of GT where codes are highly emergent, but it does have similarities with stage (1) of the constant comparison method of coding as introduced in the Glaser and Strauss (1999) version of Grounded Theory (GT). Of course, we are coding articles and not original field data. In the following quote, a collection of articles (as in Table 3) is looked upon as the data and a single research article is an “incident”: “The analyst starts by coding each incident in his data into as many category of analysis as possible as categories emerge or as data emerge as data emerge that fit an existing category.” (Glaser & Strauss, 1999, p. 105) In our case, neither data nor categories are emergent. We treat representative segments of the article as data, a single article as an incident and the meanings of the prefixed categories are those of ST. At a later stage, we plan to find subcategories for the core concepts of ST, for example by associating scripts with the signification modality. In future research, the results of a comprehensive coding of the IS research literature could yield insights into the strengths and limits of ST as a general underpinning for IS research. Because the core concepts of ST are of a global nature referring to fundamental (macro) characteristics of social systems the coding of articles requires that we apply them to the concrete circumstances of specific research papers, which are often at a more detailed level analysis than ST. This cannot be done mechanically, but depends on the coder’s ability to bridge the typical gaps of meanings between abstract concept and their instantiations. Because of the abstract nature and inherent ambiguities of ST’s principal constructs, using them to classify a specific research contribution is fraught with difficulties, which need to be bridged with guided interpretations. We followed the steps given below to classify the articles.

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The first step is to abstract from each article the summaries as shown in Table 3. Step 2 is to use the summary of each article for mapping its contents to Table 2. Of course, the summaries are used only as a memory aid to the coding; they should be interpreted along with any other available information from the article, i.e. its findings, methods, results, to determine whether its main focus is on one of the three dimensions of IS or on one of the structurational aspects (structure, modality, interaction). It is best to start with one of the following considerations, whichever is the easiest to recognize in the particular article to be coded: ¾ Concrete research tends to focus on one of the two “ends” of ST’ duality. It will either give priority to structural aspects or the interaction aspect. To determine an article’s structurational aspect, it should be helpful to examine the strength and weaknesses (bias) of its methodological and theoretical foundation. What ST calls “modality” is closely associated with the structure concept – this is one of the obvious ambiguities in ST. Research focusing on modalities would have to investigate the agent’s cognitive resources (“scripts”, skills) or their use of specific resources. While this is possible in principle, it will be rare for two reasons. First it is intrinsically difficult to observe and hence to collect data on it; second because the notion of modality is very unique to ST, it is unlikely that other researchers will focus on modality unless they seek to apply ST directly. Barley and Tolbert (1997) recognize the first difficulty when they write: “…. Historical and archival material will rarely contain the detailed data necessary for documenting the link between every acts and the creation of an institution. Thus it is likely that most investigations seeking to link actions and institutions will focus on the process by which the existing institutions are maintained and modified.(p. 100)” ¾ It is unlikely that an article will pay equal attention to all three dimensions of ST (signification, domination and legitimation). These three dimensions indicate fundamental social orientations, i.e. sense-making, giving or receiving orders and feelings of right or wrong (or social acceptance and disapproval). At the agents’ interaction level, these would be apparent by prevalent motivationalintentional directions, which a research article ascribes to the social actors in the field. For example, does a particular study focus on

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the cognitive capacities of actors in problem solving (signification and interpretive schemes in decision making) or the motivation of complying with accepted policies (legitimation) or the formation of policies and resistance to them (domination)? One would expect that the basic research question along with the researcher’s theoretical basis and the kind of data collected would help to determine on which of three orientations in the field the researchers have focused primarily. Again, it is possible that some researchers have paid attention to more than one of these three dimensions, but the heuristic expectation is that one or at most two would be primary. Looking at the first entry of Table 1, Markus’ (1983) research question immediately points us to ST’s domination dimension. Looking for potential counterevidence to this, in the main text we find only minor comments on signification and legitimation. Therefore, we can proceed to scan the article contents from the perspective whether its main emphasis is on structure, modality or interaction. Again referring to the summary in Table 3, it is striking that this particular article is one of the rare examples for research evaluating alternative theoretical basis. From this evaluation, “interaction” theory emerges as the author’s preferred theoretical foundation for the case study. This theory is close to ST, because it focuses the analyst on both characteristics of human agency and structural attributes such as power distribution or features of technology. Therefore, we find evidence in the article that it covers both power uses (e.g. the observations “hidden inducements to participation”, “data fudging” cf. p. 435) and structural aspects like power distribution, centralized control of corporate accountants vs. autonomy of divisional accountants with the structural aspects receiving the most attention. Only minor comments are made on modality, e.g. that the FIS was intended to serve as a tool for financial accounting and “the analysis of managerial-oriented profit data” (p. 440). Therefore, the outcome of this classification is that this article primarily contributes to understanding how IS affects structures of domination and power interactions. A contrasting example is Meso, Musa, and Mbarika (2005). While the phenomenon studied points to “behavior” could be taken as an indication of modality and interaction, a closer look at the research question reveals immediately that most of the success factors are structural in nature. In addition, the research methods used (closed end question-

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naire with Likert types scale for quantitative analysis) are more suitable to identify structural features than interaction patterns. While “cultural influences” are one of the models external variables (p. 122), their definition treats them as “beliefs, norms and values among other cultural influences”, which are fixed and as such “impact how the individual uses mobile ICT”. (p. 126). How the impacts operate as legitimating forces are not considered, neither are phenomena of power distribution or use nor the structurational feedback from using ICT on changing cultural patterns and influences. Therefore, we classified the article as primarily contributing to structures of signification, i.e. what kind of structural characteristics such as education, age, gender, cultural influences, accessibility and reliability of technology affect (“constrain or enable” in the sense of ST) mobile IT uses for business and social purposes. There appear to be no considerations of mobile technology as a modality in this particular research model.

Discussion of Selected Philosophical Issues Philosophical issues and objections to using ST as a general frame of reference for categorizing the IS literature may arise from two lines of arguments. First, it is widely accepted that all comprehensive social theories make epistemological and ontological assumptions. This raises the question which fundamental (paradigmatic) assumptions underlie ST and how ST can escape the dilemma of doing justice to classifying research literature with epistemological and ontological assumptions that possibly are in contradiction to those of ST. Related to this issue is the observation that when ST is compared to other social theories (such as Bourdieu 1979, Etzioni 1968 or Habermas 1984, 1987), in some part it lacks detail and in other parts it appears incomplete altogether. It is incomplete, because it has hardly any constructs relating to the physical world beyond the human agents subjective and social worlds. The principal exception occurs in the treatment of the modalities of power (cf. Gidden, 1984, allocative vs. authoritative resources, p. 256).This observation raises the issue whether ST is better suited to classifying all types of IS (or management) research than other social theories. As already noted, ST is not the only attempt to bridge the major divisions in the social and cultural sciences. The problem was clearly recognized as early as 1967 (Habermas, 1967/1988). A second line of attack may come from those who, based on Burrell and Morgan (1979), have argued that trying to synthesize across differ-

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ent paradigms is like “mixing apples and oranges” resulting in a conceptual muddle that no longer does justice to any of the basic positions that were the starting for the synthesis. These thorny issues cannot be treated comprehensively here. However, we can signal our awareness of them and communicate the principle position taken in this paper.

On the Assumptions and Completeness of ST: The Case of Critical Management Research Giddens himself takes up the question of having discussed differing “threads” or a “variety of forms of social research” that “is not possible to draw together under single heading” (1984, p. 327). Unfortunately, he unnecessarily limits his stimulating comments to the “traditional debate between ‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’ methods in social research, when in fact his treatment is of a broader nature (pp. 328-354). In order to indicate how ST could be adapted to the issues pertinent to the approach taken here, not by abandoning but by extending Giddens’ own conceptual foundations, the following takes up just one question: how can ST accommodate research that is building on the tenets of a critical research philosophy (paradigm) as outlined in Deetz (2000) and McGrawth (2005, with comments by Avgerou, 2005, and Walsham, 2005). Critical research is a good example to make the point that ST, with modifications and further synthesis of other theoretical constructs such as Actor Network Theory (Atkinson & Brooks, 2003) could, indeed, provide a conceptual roof to bring together if not all, so still a significant core not only of IS research, but also of management research in other disciplines, which is an important point to be taken up in the conclusions. It is not necessary to make the same argument explicit for the hermeneutic-phenomenological lines of research, because Giddens himself has already done this: “All social research presumes a hermeneutic moment, but the presumption may remain latent, … because researcher and research inhabit a common cultural milieu” (p. 328). Because ST has already sketched the connections to hermeneutics, it should easily be possible to add more detail to them when needed depending on the requirements of specific research programs (e.g. along the lines proposed in Monod & Klein, 2005). In short, “the most important feature that distinguishes critical research is that it engages with questions of an overtly political or moral nature. … The way power is implicated in the development of claims to truth has held a central position in critical theory” Avgerou (2005, p. 106).

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This, of course, has implications for research focus that critical researchers tend to prefer, e.g. power, ideology and other communicative distortions, socially disadvantaged groups. Beside “research focus”, Walsham (2005) offers three more criteria to characterize critical research: motivation, choice of theory, and influencing others. One of the preferred critical theories along with Foucault and Bourdieu has been Habermas’ TCA. So how do the two, ST and TCA, relate to each other? TCA offers noticeably more detail on human agency than ST, but it is weaker than ST in clarifying how individual (or collective) social agency and the institutional framework relate to each other. TCA attempts to capture this with the system – lifeworld distinction (for introduction cf. Klein & Minh, 2004). Apart from that, ST’s three core categories find their equivalent in TCA. They can therefore serve as principal gateways to link research publications guided by these two theoretical lenses (cf. Exhibit 1 given below) Exhibit 1: Illustration of links between ST and TCA For the purpose of illustration, we select TCA’s principal category: communicative action. Habermas extensive treatment of “communicative action” (CA) including discursive turns when conversations run into difficulties with misunderstandings or controversial claims corresponds very closely to ST’s characterization of the nature of human agency with the concepts of “reflexive monitoring of action”, “rationalization of action”, which in turn make use of “practical and discursive consciousness”. In fact, it would be possible to demonstrate with detailed quotes that “practical consciousness” takes up the same issues as TCA treats under normal (undisturbed) communicative action and discursive consciousness deals with the issue of maintaining mutual understanding and agreement when regular interaction takes runs into difficulties. The similarities are particularly apparent whenever Giddens (1984) analyses transcripts of communicative interactions (cf. the sentencing exchange between a public defender, a district attorney and a judge, p. 330, for a particularly informative and short example). Similar arguments can be made with respect to the treatment of normatively regulated action and legitimation at the center of which are the roles of norms in human agency and the exercise of power (strategic action in the TCA). One important difference is that there is no direct equivalent of the 3-world ontology, which TCA associates with CA plus the lifeworld construct. Another difference is that TCA treats other actions types as modification of CA, thereby capturing their mutual dependence, where ST treats S-D-L as analytical categories on the same level. These different conceptual strategies do not stand in the way of classifying research.

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In a similar way, TCA’s concepts of communicative and normatively regulated interactions would relate to Giddens use of knowledge and norms in the modalities of human agency in communication and sanction. Habermas’ claims to power in strategic action find their equivalent in Giddens’ treatment of domination. However, there appears to be no direct equivalent of human agency directed towards inanimate objects (instrumental action). The consequence of this is that ST cannot directly talk about the IT artifact, which has become an important influence in every one’s lifeworld. One can also make a good argument that fundamental or radical critique and change of social order finds a less prominent position in ST than in Bourdieu or the TCA (cf. Giddens, 1984, pp. 228, 244, 256). Others have noted this as well (cf. Atkinson & Brooks, 2003). This does not mean that ST could not be extended to recognize the critical research perspective more explicitly, for example especially by building on Giddens’ weak analysis of the intellectual influence of Foucault and the second generation of the Frankfurt school (cf. Giddens, 1984, p. 256). Another philosophical aspect to be considered when using ST across multiple paradigms is the issue of incommensurability.

The Commensurability Issue Even though ST does not explicitly spell out its epistemological and ontological assumptions, it is easy to see that it is closest to hermeneutics. This is clear from the references to which it gives prominence, but also from explicit comments (e.g. cf. Giddens, 1984, p. 330). In contrast, its relationship to the “real world” is primarily functionalist (p. 330) and for the most part limited to dealing with the reification of social structures in terms of Blau (cf. Giddens, 1984, p. 213). It lacks the phenomenological connections to a broader treatment of the importance of lifeworld in meaning creation and sensemaking. However, because of the later Wittgenstein (cf. his Philosophical Investigations, not the “Tractatus”), Winch and Gadamer, it would not be inconsistent with the overall frame of reference to add phenomenological insights to the ST frame of reference. With that in mind, no incommensurability with the critical paradigm would seem to exist. If incommensurability issues are a concern, they were seeded into ST from the start with integrating functionalist-positivist views of social reality and hermeneutic-constructivist epistemology. This is most apparent in Giddens’ confusing definition of multiple social structure

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concepts. At the core of ST, there appears to be a virtual structure concept: “Structure, as recursively organized set of rules and resources is out of space and time, saved in its instantiations and coordination as memory traces, and is marked by an absence of the ‘subject’.” (Giddens, 1984, p. 25) This definition is confusing, because Giddens also insists to: “distinguish ‘structure’ as a generic term from ‘structures’ in the plural and both from the ‘structural properties of social systems’.” (p. 23). This conceptual muddling is necessary to accommodate both the social construction of structure in people’s minds, but independently of any specific individual and the (functionalist) conception of ‘structure’ as: “… the more enduring aspects of social systems” … “giving ‘solidity’ across time and space. (p. 23-24) In light of these contradictory definitions, it cannot surprise that many readers have difficulties interpreting what Giddens exactly has in mind with the concept of structure and associated modalities as is obvious from the observation that separate articles have devoted to clarifying this issue (cf. Barley, 1986; Barley & Tolbert, 1997; in comparison, ST exposition of human agency is fraught with far fewer difficulties). Nevertheless, philosophically we can defend Giddens’ multiple structure definitions by explaining in which way the incommensurability issue has been misinterpreted if not overstated in the past. The key point that Burrell and Morgan (1979) – and Kuhn (1970) - failed to take into account is that ontological incommensurability does not necessarily prevent “discursive commensurability”, i.e. the ability to talk about related notions, their commonalities and differences. This idea is illustrated with the example of “time” in the following paragraph: Whereas the (ontological) notion of time may have incommensurable (radically different) meanings in the works of Newton, Einstein and Heidegger (in Being and Time, 1962), they still do point to the same phenomenon with which all humans have experiences of various forms in their lifeworlds, i.e. from being short of time to the long-term process of aging and death. Therefore it is possible to have a meaningful discourse about these meanings drawing an all three frames of reference. This

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kind of discourse is productive to enrich our understanding of the possible meanings of time in ways reaching beyond the limited life experiences of any single person. In the sense of discursive commensurability, it is certainly possible to talk about structure and do research about it in ways that transcends the frames of reference of the functionalist-positivist, structuralist (in the sense of Levi-Strauss), hermeneutic-phenomenological and critical research approaches and philosophies even though ontological structure may mean very different kind of things in the differing theoretical lenses. As long as one keeps these differences in mind, these different uses of the structure concept should be coded under a common category, maybe with a distinguishing qualifier, because the different research approaches complement each other. They all can contribute to enriching the meaning of the structure concept. If some of these meanings turn out to be incompatible, the coding will help to surface conflicts about which meanings should take priority. Hopefully such conflicts will provoke a discussion about the relative fruitfulness of alternative views on structure and this may help to refine definitions bringing about better understandings of the limited scope, to which conflicting definitions apply. Similar considerations would also apply to the definition of the IT artifact. The current situation is characterized by a trichotomy of defining IS as a technical system, as a formalized language system replacing ordinary language communications and as an emergent interaction system between the behavioral and technological subsystems (Hirschheim, Klein, & Lyytinen, 1995; Lee, 1999, 2001). The implications of these definitions for what constitutes “good” IS research are very different. Yet if the extensive literature employing these definitions were coded together, this might lead to very fruitful insights and clarifying discussions. It might turn out that more than one IS meaning could be accommodated within the ST framework. For example, IS might be a modality of signification and power; it might also be a structural concept with relatively enduring, time invariant properties that could empirically be captured using some of the constructs of Orlikowski and Iacono (2001). In Orlikowski and Iacono (2001), the major ways of conceptualizing IT are summarized from the literature into five major categories: tool views, proxy views, ensemble views, computational views and nominal views. In Hirschheim and Klein (1996) we have summarized the fundamental weakness of most of these views. One of

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the important benefits of a good coding system is to surface such differences for wider consideration.

Conclusions The foregoing discussion provides some reasons to believe that a categorization scheme whose core is derived from ST, could succeed in categorizing a substantial cross-section of the IS research literature in a new and interesting way. The new classification is based on concepts with specific social theory semantics that apply to a wide range of human issues, but especially those relating to the use and social effects of IT artifacts in an organizational or societal context. Therefore, it is suitable to represent the use side of IS development and use. A major benefit of the proposed substantive, cross-paradigm classification of key journal articles is that it would reveal under-researched areas of the use side of IS change by the sheer frequencies of how the total number of articles is distributed among the classification cells. For example, it could turn out that studies dealing with legitimation, social control and alienation issues are under-researched. Revealing such imbalances could then help to formulate research priorities leading to a more effective allocation of existing research resources for studying the user side. It could also help to obtain additional resources by showing the need for investigating definable user issues and by attracting new graduate students interested in these issues. Complementary to the classification of single publications, the proposed scheme can also be applied to the categorization of underlying theories (e.g. TAM, HCI theories etc.). Ranking these theories on a scale of being more or less suited for investigating use issues, could also be a future valuable contribution. Theory ranking is an important, because theory often determines the research goal and strongly influences to what extent the use side is considered as part of the research design or ignored as an important research goal. In addition, under the assumption that methodology and theory can be independent from each other, the relationship of different methodologies with various theories with more or less use orientation should be investigated. This could lead to insights on whether certain research methods are dominant with a given theory and which research methods are more or less suited or at least “popular” with use side oriented research.

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Besides helping to refocus existing research results on the user side of ISD, the proposed substance-oriented classification scheme also has wider implications for improving communication between diverse research communities. This could be a major benefit internal to the IS discipline, because the research literature on one specific substantive social issues (such as user alienation or resistance) would be grouped together by the proposed integrative classification scheme whereas it is now separated by the paradigmatic divides. This is an essential tool for overcoming some of the fragmentation in the field, whose dysfunctional consequences were identified in Hirschheim and Klein (2003). It would also indirectly demonstrate the feasibility and desirability of multi-method research, the paucity of which has been deplored by others (Mingers 2001a, 2001b). This in turn could give new inspirations to research using alternative methods (e.g. Creswell, 2003; Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997; Walsham, 2005). Assuming that these ideas find reasonable support, we propose to undertake a major coding effort classifying the IS literature in several major journals beginning with their foundation dates in the 90’s (Information Systems Research 1991; Information & Organization 1991) and papers from all the ICIS proceedings because they have the longest unbroken historical record. Note that, MISQ has a longer history than 1980, the starting year for ICIS. However, it has gone through several major reorganizations since its original foundation at the U. of Minnesota in the seventies and thereby changed its identity. We have not decided on the exact year from which MISQ should be included. Such an effort could strengthen the integration and cohesion of IS research and facilitate more interaction among different schools of thought in the IS research community. We anticipate that applying the basic ideas of the proposed classification strategy to a wider base of literature will require further clarification of how to relate specific IS research contributions to ST. This in turn is likely to prompt some modification and amendments of its frame reference. Atkinson and Brooks (2003) have already opened up a research approach to this by combining ST with Actor Network Theory, which can be taken further. This internal benefit might also extend to stakeholders external to IS, but within academia, who have some familiarity with Giddens from their own work, e.g. the organization sciences and marketing. Using a trans-disciplinary research categorization holds the promise to build better bridges between IS research and some of its sister disciplines in

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Business Administration. This is not to say that ST is unique in this regard, but it has less of a bias than other theories, which either lean towards positivist-functionalist (e.g. Williamson, 1981, 1985, TAM, information richness theory) or critical positions (Bourdieu, 1979, and Habermas’ TCA); therefore, ST might be more readily adopted. Of course this is a two-way street: if other disciplines start to use the same or similar categories, IS research could more readily find and absorb their research approaches and results in making the whole academic enterprise in the applied social sciences stronger (cf. Galliers, 2003). We also believe that coding a representative portion of the historical research archives in terms of substantive social theory concepts is likely to provide a good factual base for the so-called identity and core properties discussion by visibly demonstrating to the research community how its IS research directions have changed since the foundation of the first IS publication outlets. King and Lyytinen (2006) have undertaken to document this debate in a forth-coming monograph. They grouped the past literature into two major categories: Part I: The nature and specificity of IS research domain; Part II The identity, legitimacy and the future of the discipline. The book also will include reactions of all the authors to the prior debate. Most of the articles in question are referenced in Lyytinen and King (2004). Rather than beginning with speculations what should be our identity in the future, we could look at our collective work from a long-term perspective and discuss where we have come from and what our “center” (cf. King and Lyytinen 2006) has been in the last three decades. Based on this, we can then reflect on how we should proceed forward depending on our perceptions of the current challenges and opportunities that we need to address in order to continue to thrive in the future as a growing academic discipline. As an important by-product, a social theory based coding of a representative portion of the historical research archives could also reveal if the user side of ISD ever was a core concern (as it might have been during the so-called user participation debate). In this context, we should then ask which priority should be given to user side issues in the future.

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Jayatilaka, Klein, and Lee Markus, L. (1983). Power, politics, and MIS implementation. Communications of the ACM, 26(6), 430-444. McGrath, K. (2005). Doing critical research in information systems: A case of theory and practice not informing each other. Information Systems Journal, 15, 85-101. Meso, P., Musa, P., & Mbarika, V. (2005). Towards a model of consumer use of mobile information and communication technology in LDCs: The case of sub-Saharan Africa. Information Systems Journal, 15, 119-149. Mingers, J. C. (2001a). Combining IS research methods: Towards a pluralist methodology. Information Systems Research, 12(3), 240–259. Mingers, J. C. (2001b). The paucity of multimethod research. Information Systems Journal, 13(3), 233–249. Monod, E., & Klein, H. K. (2005a). From e-heritage to interpretive archaeology systems (ias): A research framework for requirements specifications of ICT in cultural heritage. European Conference of Information Systems, Regensburg, May 26-28, 2005. Monod, E., & Klein, H. K. (2005b). A phenomenological evaluation framework for cultural heritage interpretation: from e-HS to Heidegger’s historicity. Americas Conference on Information Systems, 11 Aug. 2005 Omaha. Ngwenyama, O., & Lee, A. (1997). Communication richness in electronic mail: Critical social theory and the contextuality of meaning. MIS Quarterly, 21(2), 145-168. Orlikowski, W. (1991). Integrated information environment or matrix of control? The contradictory implications of information technology. Accounting, Management, & Information (renamed Information and Organization), 1(1), 9-42. Orlikowski, W. (1993). CASE tools as organizational change: Investigating incremental and radical changes in systems development. MIS Quarterly, 17(3), 309-340. Orlikowski, W., & Baroudi, J. (1991). Studying information technology in organizations: Research approaches and assumptions. Information Systems Research, 2(1), 1-28. Orlikowski, W., & Iacono, S. (2001). Desperately seeking the ‘IT’ in IT research- A call to theorizing the IT artifact. Information Systems Research, June, 121-134 Orlikowski, W., & Robey, D. (1991). Information technology and the structuring of organizations. Information Systems Research, 2(1), 1-28.

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User Oriented Perspective Parsons, T. (1971). The system of modern societies. Englewood, CA: Prentice-Hall. Ritzer, G. (1991). Metatheorizing in sociology. Lexington Books. Ryan, G. W., & Bernard, H. R. (2000). Data management and analysis methods In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 769-802). Sage Publications. Schutz, A., & Luckman, T. (1983). The structures of the life-world, Volumes I & II. Evanston, IL; Northwestern University Press. Schultze, U., & Leidner, D. (2002). Studying knowledge management in information systems research: Discourses and Theoretical Assumptions. MIS Quarterly, 26(3), 213-242. Walsham, G. (2005). Learning about being critical. Information Systems Journal, 15, 111-117. Williamson, O. E. (1981). The modern corporation: Origin, evolution, attributes. Journal of Economic Literature, 19(December), 1537-1568. Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York, NY: Free Press.

Biographies Bandula Jayatilaka is an Assistant Professor in MIS at the School of Management in Binghamton University, SUNY. His current research interests are: organizational change and IS, knowledge management and IS development. Before joining the academic community, he worked for General Electric Company at Johnson Space Center NASA in Houston where he developed real-time data systems for the Science Monitoring Area of the space center. He earned his PhD in MIS from the University of Houston. Heinz K. Klein is an Associate Professor in MIS at the School of Management at Binghamton University, SUNY. He has published many excellent and valuable articles and has published in journals such as MISQ. He is a well recognized MIS scholar and a researcher around the world.

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Jinyoul Lee received his Ph.D. from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and has been an Assistant Professor of Management Information Systems at State University of New York at Binghamton. His research interests include knowledge management and enterprise integration. His most recent research is focusing on the Internet environment on social structuration process.

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A Double Helix Metaphor for Use and Usefulness in Informing Systems Peter Bednar, School of Computing, University of Portsmouth, UK; Department of Informatics, Lund University, Sweden Christine Welch, Department of Strategy and Business Systems, University of Portsmouth, UK [email protected] [email protected]

Abstract Following the theme of this monograph, this paper discusses a dialectic we perceive to subsist between meaningful use and reflection upon use. This dialectic between experiencing use and reflecting upon experiencing use (or thinking, and thinking about thinking) may be considered in the following way. Each of these elements is subject to change. As reflection triggers change in use, and such change triggers further reflection, a spiral comes about. Lived human experience, and reflection upon that experience, seems to shape a double helix. In this paper, the authors suggest a need for a hermeneutically-informed, phenomenological approach when considering the complexities of informing systems, viewed as human activity systems. It is suggested that human actors, as users of informing systems, must own and control any inquiry into use in relation to design for themselves, and that individual sensemaking processes are the key to successful interaction within the double helix metaphor. Keywords: Use, Usefulness, Informing Systems, Phenomenology, HermeneuticsDouble Helix. Material published as part of this publication, either on-line or in print, is copyrighted by the Informing Science Institute. Permission to make digital or paper copy of part or all of these works for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that the copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage AND that copies 1) bear this notice in full and 2) give the full citation on the first page. It is permissible to abstract these works so long as credit is given. To copy in all other cases or to republish or to post on a server or to redistribute to lists requires specific permission and payment of a fee. Contact [email protected] to request redistribution permission.


Double Helix: Use and Usefulness

Introduction “...human history is a two stranded rope; the history of events and the history of ideas develop in intimate relation with each other yet each according to its own logic and its own time scale; and each conditions both its own future and the future of the other.” (Vickers, 1965, p.15) The theme of this monograph is a dialectic we perceive to subsist between meaningful use and reflection upon use in informing systems (using a metaphor of double helix, as shown in Figure 1). We are by no means the first to reflect upon such relationships in a wider context (see, for example, Vickers, 1965, quoted above). In this paper, we explore the nature of the symbiosis between experiences people have in using systems to inform themselves (or others) and the evolution of these informing systems. If we choose a metaphor of a two stranded rope, we can see that the coil of one strand influences the coil of the other in an ongoing helix – neither can remain straight without challenging the integrity of the rope. Vickers refers to ‘history’. In this paper, we use this term to denote on-going and continuous change of experience, and development of experience (i.e. process of ‘experiencing’), by both individuals and collective groups. The rope metaphor reflects our thinking that human behavior unfolds in a continuous pattern of response to reflection upon experience. As conscious beings, we have no choice but to reflect and thus our consciousness changes from one moment to the next. Börje Langefors highlights the on-going nature of human sense-making processes in his Infological Equation (Langefors, 1966). Our interpretations of perceptions are related to assumptions arising from previous reflections upon our lived experiences. It is, of course, possible for individuals to become entrapped in taken-for-granted assumptions. We will discuss these isFigure 1: Double Helix sues further in a later section of the paper.

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Few people would dispute that a dialectic subsists between users’ experiences of ICT artifacts and the processes of design and redesign. For example, we may consider the recent launch of the iPhone by the Apple Corporation. Undoubtedly, this has been preceded by discussions between designers, and users of cell phones and MP3 music players, to discover which features of these devices might be popular if incorporated into a new artifact. Further testing of devices by prospective users will also have taken place in order to refine design and enhance product development. A great deal of academic debate has taken place in the past around this dialectic relationship. See, for example, discussions by Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch (1987) and Mackay (1995) in which they debate evidence for technological determinism of social use, as against social shaping of technologies. However, the authors believe that processes involved in development of what are usually termed ‘information systems’ must be distinct from those concerned with artifact design. Information (informing) systems may be considered to have a twofold purpose: to support people in informing themselves, and/or to support people in helping others to inform themselves. Research into processes for developing informing systems may be seen as a quest for approaches which combine rigor with appropriate recognition of complexity, and which address meaningfulness of systems from the perspectives of individual participants. We consider that a key to achieving this balance of rigor with relevance lies in creation of an effective learning spiral in which stakeholders (i.e. actors who participate in using informing systems) can engage in reflection within the context of their use. How could this be done? The authors point to two approaches which support application of hermeneutically-informed, phenomenological inquiry into human activity systems in practice. The next section of the paper gives the philosophical background and ideas underpinning the discussion. Following this, the authors consider concepts of use, usability and usefulness in relation to the double helix metaphor. A further section then gives two examples of practical application. Finally, we attempt to draw some conclusions.

Philosophical Perspectives A key aspect of meaningful research in this area, for the authors, is consideration of individual and collective sense-making processes (Dervin, 1983; Weick, 1995). The authors reject a realist approach,

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which assumes that there is one world ‘out there’ awaiting individual discovery. Alfred Schutz, writing of the work of Edmund Husserl (1954/1970), puts forward an argument for phenomenological approaches as follows: ‘All empirical sciences refer to the world as pre-given; but they and their instruments are themselves elements of this world. Only a philosophical doubt cast upon the implicit presuppositions of all our habitual thinking – scientific or not – can guarantee the “exactitude” not only of such a philosophical attempt itself but of all the sciences dealing directly or indirectly with our experiences of the world …’ (Wagner, 1970, p.54). It is this ‘philosophical doubt’ that we pursue when we adopt a hermeneutic approach. Thus, for the authors, a kind of critical idealism may be preferred over realism. We recognize that individuals create their own perspectives of ‘realities’, through sense-making (see Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Radnitzky, 1970). For the authors, a kind of critical idealism may be preferred over realism, and thus sharing of ‘realities’ is problematic. The way forward is a communicative effort, applying critically-informed systemic thinking, drawing on Gregory Bateson’s holistic, hermeneutic approach (Bateson, 1972). The focus is on selfemancipation through systemic meta-reflection from unique individual perspectives of autonomous and self-reflecting systems. Bateson proposes a perspective of human self-awareness and understanding. The authors believe that theory and practice are indivisible, neither can progress without the other and they stand in a dialectic relationship. What Radnitzky (1970) calls Continental or hermeneutic-dialectic (HD) schools of metascience share this position. Whereas, according to Radnitzky, Anglo-Saxon or logical-empirical (LE) schools strictly separate theory from practice. Moreover, HD schools of metascience acknowledge the importance of history, which LE schools tend to ignore. In this context, we are not referring to history as a recorded sequence of past events, but as an on-going, continuous process of change in predefined variables (Langefors, 1966). The authors acknowledge that approaches based in Hermeneutic Dialectics recognize, not only individual uniqueness, but a need to avoid a Cartesian split in analysis. Any observation must be made by a particular observer, under particular circumstances, in a particular context (Maturana & Varela, 1992). It is not possible to separate observers from what is observed, in order to objectify/simplify analysis. Inquiries based in an LE tradition are likely to give great attention to precision and clarity in expressing a problem

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situation. Radnitzky (1970) points to a danger within such inquiries that an artificial separation may arise between observations made and the unique perspectives of observer and observed. Adopting such a focus of attention could consequently lead to a loss of critical awareness and entrapment in confusion between specific and generalizable descriptions of experiences. Researchers whose inquiries are based in philosophical practice from an HD tradition, on the other hand, are likely to make explicit recognition of uncertainty/ambiguity as features of socially-constructed perspectives on human activity. Their focus is likely to be on transparency, rather than clarity, emphasizing individual selfawareness. Individual learning may be described as taking place through sensemaking processes as a response to messy and uncertain contexts in which resolutions are sought. Different orders of learning may be identified, based on a cycle of experience and reflection on experience (Argyris & Schon, 1974; Bateson, 1972). Higher orders of learning may involve reflection on sense-making processes themselves, i.e. a learning cycle may become transformed into a spiral. It is possible to describe reflection on sense-making as an exercise in practical philosophy, or exercise of the kind of ‘philosophical doubt’ described by Schutz (Wagner, 1970). The authors believe that certain points follow from this. First, if individual learning is a creative process based in sense-making, then context is clearly important. Any unique individual’s view is based in reflection on experience (Bateson, 1972), and experience is context specific. It is suggested in this work, therefore, that an examination of contextual dependencies, as part of analysis, will be important. The Infological Equation (Langefors, 1966) suggests that individuals develop unique understandings (meanings) by examining data in the light of pre-knowledge gained from reflecting on experiencing during a previous time interval. Furthermore, processes of reconstructing new understandings (meaning-shaping), by examining data in light of experience, may be what constitute organizations, their goals and cultures. Many researchers interested in informing systems ‘design’ have attempted to explore philosophical frameworks based in phenomenology (e.g. Klein, 2006; Mumford, 2003). These researchers recognized that they were dealing with autonomous human beings, who also attempted to make sense of their worlds. However, in order to take into account unique individual sense-making processes within an organizational problem arena, we suggest a need for analysts to explore multiple levels of

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contextual dependencies. Since it is not possible to explore a problem space from someone else’s point of view, it follows that an external analyst/designer can only play a supportive role in enabling individuals within a given context to explore their own sense-making. In the authors’ view, exploration of multiple levels of contextual dependency may help to avoid entrapment in various types of reductionism: sociological, psychological or technological. It may also help to eliminate tendencies towards generalization, or substitution of an external analyst’s own views for those of the participating stakeholders. Furthermore, we advocate attempts to go beyond grounding of research in phenomenological paradigms, recognizing a need for critically-informed understandings of problem-spaces. The authors suggest that, in order to avoid various types of reductionism and introduce ‘philosophical doubt’, analysts might attempt to incorporate philosophy as an integral part of their research practice (Bateson, 1972; Hirschheim, Klein, & Lyytinen, 1995). A reductionist approach, emphasizing artifact design, ignores the possibility of emergent properties, which appear when individual behavior is considered in the context of systems. It is important to note that recognition of emergent properties of a system as a whole is insufficient. An individual actor acting within the context of a human activity system (of which an informing system may be viewed as one special case) may represent emergence of a different order. It is possible that the emergent properties associated with that individual may amount to more than those of the system as a whole, when considering the influence of other systems of which s/he is a component. For example, consider a fashion house as a human activity system. We might view a couturier as one contributing component, if we choose to draw a boundary around a ‘system for supplying ladies clothing’. However, considered as a ‘system for making profits by attracting customers to buy designer fashion wear’, the emergent properties change, as the identity and reputation of the designer becomes an attracting influence (Bednar, 2001). As pointed out by Werner Ulrich in his discussion of boundary critique, perception of a system varies with the stance of the observer (Ulrich, 2001). In some theories of sense-making attempts are made to differentiate between an observer’s and another actor’s pictures of ‘reality’. See, for example, work by Dervin (1983). These views are not assumed to be complete or static. Instead, they are characterized by discontinuities.

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Individuals make efforts to bridge these gaps in a continual process of meaning-shaping. ‘Information’ might here be described as a sensemaking/meaning-shaping continuity (re)constructed by a particular individual at a particular moment in time and space, through continual adjustments of perspective. Any observer must attempt to shape meaning in a particular situation by comparing different actors’ apparent perspectives within given criteria, i.e. by carrying out a ‘circling of realities’. Thus, anyone wishing to inquire into informing system use must continually align themselves with an actor’s perspective. For example, the meaning shaping in a particular situation can be described through a comparison of different actors’ perspectives within given structural criteria. When we speak of ‘circling of realities’, we refer to a necessity to acquire a number of different perspectives (in time-space) needed to get a better and more stable picture of a particular actor’s view of ‘reality’. This actor’s view of ‘reality’ is influenced by reflecting on interactions with other actors (Bateson, 1972). It is most important that those considering systems design recognize that they are setting up personal boundaries for a situation by defining it from their own experiences and preferences. We all have a pre-understanding of something, which is influenced by our own values, wishful thinking, and how we as individuals have been socialized into a particular society. Awareness of this process, and attempts to focus upon the understandings and perspectives of the actors/stakeholders, are needed in shaping the requirements for design. The claim to take an actor perspective might seem to be unreasonable, but with the help of what is known as the ‘hermeneutic circle’, the preunderstanding is being reviewed gradually, with the support of ones experience. In other words there is a continual exchange/interchange between an individual’s pre-understanding and experience, and it is within this process that inquiry may progress (Thurén, 1991). Furthermore, a dialectic emerges in such interactions, because each individual is concurrently interacting with others (Hermeneutic Dialectics). HansErik Nissen draws attention to human perception of time (Nissen, in this monograph). He points out that on some occasions individuals see time as a linear progression from past to future. In other circumstances, however, individuals perceive time as a cyclical flow. For example we might consider the lifecycle of a frog. Frogs spawn in the spring; tadpoles hatch and grow into new frogs during the summer. These frogs either perish or grow strong during the year. In the winter, they shelter at the bottom of a pond, waiting for a chance to mate next spring, pro-

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ducing spawn. But we know that this is not the same spawn as before; it is the beginning of a new generation. Thus, it is not a life cycle but a spiral. We perceive a helix to form as a metaphor which combines both views of time. The term ‘sense-making’ is intended to suggest the idea that people constantly meet gaps in meaning which need to be overcome. People move through life moment-by-moment, step-by-step, by experiencing. A step can be a re-occurrence of previous behaviors but, philosophically speaking, it is always a new step since it takes place in a new moment in time and space. Sense-making relates to that moment when a step in movement is halted and hindered because of all the discontinuities that surround us. We can reflect, like Heraclitus, "No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it is not the same river and he is not the same man." This aspect of human experiencing creates a need to construct new meanings and understandings. In the context of our double-helix metaphor, users and designers must unravel how an individual interprets and overcomes this moment. Why was a gap experienced? How did the individual move strategically or tactically to overcome the gap? How did the individual continue her/his journey after the bridge building (Dervin, 1989)?

Thinking about Use Different researchers have conceptualized the term ‘information system’ in a variety of ways. Nissen (1984), for example, points out that information systems have two distinct dimensions, i.e. they usually include information technology and they are associated with people capable of acting as self-steering systems. Checkland and Holwell (1998) make a similar point, suggesting that not one, but two systems are involved – a system to be served (i.e. people engaged in activities), and a serving system containing elements which generate data useful to those people. Sauer also points out that an information system is not just an artifact, but that: ‘Economic task, organizational, human relations / labor process and technical perspectives are all involved’ (Sauer, 1993, p 10). Claudio Ciborra (2002), points to a tendency within the field of information systems research to adopt perspectives suggested to be associated with outdated perspectives of natural sciences, which researchers proclaim to be ‘objective.’ Thus, systems professionals may be observing social phenomena and yet insist upon recording their observations using abstractions such as entity-relationship diagrams in order to preserve ‘ob-

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jectivity’. As Ciborra puts it: “Thus, one tends to forget … the role of human choice behind the technical artefacts, and study the user side of IS by adopting the methods of natural sciences.” The authors of this paper wish to highlight the confusion inherent in treating technical and social domains as if they are either alike or susceptible to ‘objective’ investigation. Furthermore, we believe use of the term ‘information system’ itself to be problematic, since it suggests that there is a commodity ‘information’ which can be readily transmitted from one person to another. Since human beings are required to take part in such a system in order to interpret data and transform it into something meaningful to them, we consider it preferable to refer to a system by which a person seeks to inform herself / himself as a selfinforming system. Similarly, a system through which a person seeks to support others in informing themselves might be called an informing system. Drawing on work such as Mumford, Hirshheim, Fitzgerald, and WoodHarper (1984) and Checkland and Holwell (1998), it appears to the authors that the question ‘What is the purpose of an informing system?’ is a relevant one to ask. Design of (i.e. human efforts to purposefully influence change or transformation of) an informing system, which is to be assessed as meaningful from someone’s perspective, requires understanding (a process of meaning-shaping) as to what would make it meaningful for that person. However, if people are regarded as essential elements within an informing system, as the definitions above must imply, then a further dimension of complexity is added. People cannot be the subject of design by external professional developers. It may be possible only to contemplate design of use of an informing system (process), but not of the system itself. Borje Langefors (1966) pointed out in his Infological Equation that each individual creates meaningful information for himself. The equation “I=i(D,S,t)” shows how meaningful information (I) may be constructed from the data (D) in the light of participants’ pre-knowledge (S) by an interpretive process (i) during the time interval (t). The necessary pre-knowledge (s) is generated through the entire previous life experience of the individual. This can be viewed as a single helix of experiencing, interpreting and reflecting, because understanding is continually changing as time goes by. We might consider that this reflects Heidegger’s words, that objectivity has meaning only for a subject who judges. It follows then that understanding of use is a matter of interpreting by the individual user concerned,

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through her sense-making processes. We would argue, therefore, that those individuals must own and control the process of development for themselves and cannot delegate such tasks entirely to an external professional ‘designer’. A key purpose for design of systems appears to be to change something for the better, as defined by some participant in, or observer of, that system. Such change may be seen as an emergent consequence from combined individual and organizational learning and sense-making processes (Bednar & Welch, 2005). In order for beneficial change to be brought about, both explicit and tacit organizational norms must be challenged. This requires users of ICT’s and actors in organizational processes, both individually and collectively, to contemplate embracing the (as yet) unknown (Bednar & Mallalieu, 2001). Design efforts are contemplating a future problem space without any guarantee of success. Such challenges are often found to be uncomfortable by some participants in organizational life (see, e.g. Argyris, 1990; Mumford, 2003; Walsham, 1993) and thus a political dimension adds further complexity. We do not intend, in this paper, to define human beings by their use of a technology or process. ‘User’ should not be perceived as referring to people as important mainly in their role in using ICT artifacts. We prefer to write about ‘workers’ or to use examples of names of people in their proper professions, when talking about people who use IT artifacts. This helps to break an unfortunate linguistic trend. On those occasions when we refer to ‘users’ we do not intend to imply assumptions of common characteristics between collections of individual people who are ‘users’ of particular technologies. People, as users, interact with ingenious creations of designers in the course of daily life. Each user’s experience of use is unique and contextual. Descriptions of people’s experiences as users may be made either by themselves or by other observers of use, e.g. analysts (formally or informally). As use is experienced, so descriptions of use will be interpreted by users and other analysts. Such interpretations will, in turn, lead to change in the experiences themselves in an unfolding process over time, e.g. the experience of driving a car for the first time cannot be repeated. The second drive is a different experience, influenced by interpretation of experiencing the first. Thus, experiencing use can be seen as a spiral, driven on by the interaction of experiencing and interpreting of experience (see Figures 2 and 3).

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Living, experiencing and reflecting, individually and in various groups we perceive as on-going processes. This we have tried to indicate by the directed arcs suggesting a helix. The diagram shows two interacting helices, which may be described in the following way: 1. Helix one: Living and experiencing. This helix relates technological system use and design. End users meet, use and experience systems and their designers. Systems analysts / developers design and redesign systems and infrastructures and meet end users. 2. Helix two: Reflecting about system use and design individually, as well as communicating and reflecting both in peer groups and in mixed groups. We perceive each helix to influence the other. Thinking about use triggers interpretation of the descriptions of experiences made by users and

Figure 2: Experiencing and Reflecting other observers. Such interpretations trigger changes in experience of use and may lead to novel approaches to use, triggering ideas for further ingenuity in design.

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Use Usefulness

Change processes may focus on technology itself and fail to analyse user requirements, or fail to analyse them in sufficient depth. Where use is considered, context of use may nevertheless be neglected or ignored.

Usability When analysts consider use, and the context of use, then they may interact with endusers in order to explore how the proposed system performs in a trial. However, trials may be performed in situations other than those in which everyday use will occur. It is unlikely that analysts and users together will think of every variable aspect of ‘usability’ which might affect the experience of everyday use.

Concepts of usability do not necessarily take account of ‘meaningful use’ - the experience of end users in putting systems to everyday use for practical purposes in particular contexts. A more rigorous process of analysis may be required into ‘usefulness’ by enabling users to shape their requirements in collaboration with analysts, prior to, during and after processes of design and testing.

In consequence there is likely to be dissatisfaction with use of final products.

Figure 3: Experiencing use. Ingenious designers create new technologies aiming to satisfy the requirements of particular use. Such creative thinking begins a spiral in which reflections on use (by users and analysts interacting with them) can lead to modifications in design by focusing on usability (can an artifact satisfy the requirements of use?). Further reflections on usefulness (could the requirements of users be better satisfied than they are?) drive the spiral on by triggering further ingenuity in design. See Figure 3 for an overview of the relation between use, usability and usefulness. In the context of informing systems, ‘Use’ reflects a purpose for the system (what someone wanted to achieve with it). Designers and developers will have a view of this purpose when they begin an intentional process of creative development. Reflecting upon this purpose as development progresses may lead developers (and/or other participants in the creative process) to consider ‘usability’ (how can the users be supported to pursue that purpose effectively / easily / pleasantly?)

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Here, we can consider Gregory Bateson’s (1972) concept of multiple orders of learning. At lower orders, an individual attempts to make sense of phenomena in order to bridge an epistemic gap. Higher orders of learning occur when the individual reflects upon his own sensemaking processes in this context, and upon these reflections themselves. We might see a focus on purpose (what) as an instance of what Bateson refers to as zero order learning, whilst reflection upon usability (how) may suggest a move to first order, i.e. involving reflection upon the process by which the what is achieved. However, this does not appear to go far enough. Bateson refers to informing as creation of a ‘difference that makes a difference.’ Our purpose in highlighting these three terms is to focus upon cognition. In order to cognize, we must be able to recognize a phenomenon, i.e. to perceive a difference. Each individual who seeks to make use of an informing system has reasons of her own for doing so, which are both unique and contextual. It is this that we refer to when we use the term ‘usefulness’ – not what, or how, but why does the individual engage as a participant in the informing system? This is the difference that makes a difference for her. Unless designers reflect upon ‘usefulness’ (why and from whose perspective?), it is likely that their creative process may focus upon a different problem space than that which is of genuine concern to problem owners (intended ‘users’). Consider, for example, a number of well-publicized cases of organizational ICT developments that have failed to deliver the benefits expected from them. In some cases, participants within organizations have reflected that problems arose through conception of the development process as occupying a technological or socio-technical problem space, ignoring cultural dimensions. A shift of perspective on the nature of the problem space has sometimes enabled ‘success’ to become achievable. As Heidegger (1962) points out, experience of living can lead in many different, unexpected directions that cannot be planned or managed in advance. It follows that any process of design that focuses only on specific purposes (what and how) is unlikely to be experienced as satisfying by intended ‘users’ of the system. In work related to application of formal methods, Claudio Ciborra points out two alternative strategies which developers of an informing system could choose to adopt.

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When faced with a novel problem space, a person might first try to make sense of it in a context of her previous experiences in seeking for resolutions. Beginning within familiar competences, and gradually ‘tinkering’ and moving outwards from this base, she might only turn to wider or more formal sources of unfamiliar ‘knowledge’ if her existing competences prove insufficient to the task (see Ciborra, 1992). This first type of strategy, Ciborra refers to as bricolage, or improvisation. Similar observations can be recognized in the work of Ehn (1993) related to efforts of going beyond Participatory Design. Ciborra relates the concept of improvisation to the complex world of open source, and how the phenomena of open source as a community has been able to deal with increasingly complex and dynamic software development, through ‘hacking’. This may be contrasted with commonly specified purposes behind more formal information systems methodologies, which assume orchestrated efforts in ‘information systems’ analysis and development. We can reflect that hermeneutically-informed, phenomenological approaches to analysis are a necessary part of the double helix described earlier. In a method for contextual inquiry, such as the Strategic Systemic Thinking framework (Bednar, 2000), we can see a multitude of different roles for users (and other actors) as analysts. They may make descriptions of their own sense-making and experiencing, and reflect upon them. The external analyst (e.g. consultant), on the other hand, both observes her/his own experiencing and assists users (or other actors) in making their descriptions and interpretations. Figures 2 and 3 draw attention to the thinking / reflecting about use side and presents different dilemmas of system analysis/design as against system use.

Double Helix As we have seen, Gregory Bateson (1972) put forward a concept of multiple orders of learning. At lower orders, an individual attempts to make sense of phenomena in order to bridge an epistemic gap. Higher orders of learning occur when the individual reflects upon his own sense-making processes in this context, and upon these reflections themselves. We might again consider this to involve the creation of a double helix. Zero and first order of learning we relate to the ‘first’ helix. The second order of learning we see related to the second helix. When Bateson remarks on his description of order he suggest that ‘the talking and thinking about’ the second order, in its own right, would be

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outside of the taxonomy. In a sense it would be ‘parallel’ to it or possibly something which could be described as order 2.5. When referring to the metaphor of double helix, we could imagine that when we, as observers, discuss the double helix (as a metaphorical phenomenon) we might do it from a perspective within a ‘third’ external helix. We might reflect with Gregory Bateson that there is a double bind in our thinking which relates to the double helix theme. As conscious human beings, we have no choice but to reflect (see Figure 4). Bateson suggests that efforts to adopt a third party perspective (an imaginary outsider parallel) may help to break out of double bind, i.e. in our view an observer perspective brings out creation of a triple helix. Werner Ulrich (2001, 2006) discusses research as a means to promote reflective societal practice He points to three indispensable qualities for reflective competence (in relation to one’s own claims and those of others). It must be:

Figure 4: Example of Double Bind (Hay, 2001)

1. self-critical: the effort of systematically examining one’s own premises through self-reflection and dialogue, with a view to carefully qualifying the meaning and validity of one’s claims; 2. emancipatory: working actively to help others in emancipating themselves from one’s claims, as well as from theirs; and 3. ethically alert: making transparent to oneself and to others the value implications of one’s claims, and limiting these claims accordingly (Ulrich, 2006, p16). To us, Ulrich’s three qualities described above reflect the same characteristics of critical systemic thinking that we recognize in the work of Gregory Bateson, i.e. a focus on self-emancipation through systemic meta-reflection from unique individual perspectives of autonomous and self-reflecting systems. The question for us all to address is how we should conduct hermeneutically-informed, phenomenological inquiry into human activity systems in a practical setting. We discuss some examples of approaches

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which attempt to do this, below. The first of these relates to the specific context of professional practice in systems analysis. Here the focus is on inquiry into complex problem spaces in an organizational setting (e.g. ICT development as an instance of organizational change). The second example focuses on image as a therapeutic catalyst in the context of dysfunctional relationships within human activity systems. The Strategic Systemic Framework (see Figure 5) is an example of an approach to contextual inquiry that may be helpful in empowering individuals to break out from prejudices and explore their own perspectives in order to escape from a double bind (e.g. Bednar, 2000). “perception”

Creation and sense-making of narratives

resolution narrative

Intra-analysis Inter-analysis

“belief”

Value-analysis

“perception” resolution narrative

“belief”

Intra-analysis Inter-analysis Value-analysis

messages

“meaning”

“meaning”

dialogue creation of narratives

messages: not meaning

clarification and recreation of narratives

Figure 5: Sense-making in the SST framework

The process of the SST framework includes three, interrelated aspects (intra-analysis; inter-analysis and value analysis). All aspects incorporate tools and techniques that support actors, both in the process of elaboration and in the process of categorization of messages. The intra-analysis aspect is intended to support creation of a learning spiral, as actors are supported to reflect and think about a problem space with this collection of tools and techniques. In inter-analysis, actors are supported in creating a learning spiral that focuses on communication of their individually-created narratives, and sense-making of others’ individually-created narratives. In value analysis, actors are supported, both individually and in group interaction, to create a learning spiral that focuses on reflecting and thinking about the scale of ‘measurement’. What is worthwhile as a scale of comparison for evaluation of narratives, and assessing how they will be evaluated? 288

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All three aspects together are intended to support people in creating a frame of reference for reflection over their process of inquiry. Each aspect may be described using the metaphor of a helix; and together they ‘form’ an intertwined, double helix upon which participants may reflect. Another approach supporting individuals to break out from entrapment of mind can be found in the work of Hay (2001, 2007), relating to image as a therapeutic catalyst. Here, she uses visualization of an outside perspective to support individuals caught in a double bind in e.g. dysfunctional family relationships through games using computer animation. It reflects Gregory Bateson’s idea of an “Infinite dance of changing coalitions” (Bateson, 1972, pp. 240-242), which is itself a translation of Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s game theory. Human sense-making is the essence of the creative dialectic in the helices to which we refer. We reflect that the concept of senses can be used in different ways. We might understand our senses to involve the input of perceptions of lived experience to our human consciousness, i.e. the ‘now’. However, it is also possible for us to conceive of senses as those of the imagination and human emotions (e.g. as conceived by in contexts of art, emotional intelligence, etc.). Here, the senses are released from ‘now’ and can ‘experience’ the past or the future as well. Why is it difficult to connect reflection with use (or reflection on analysis with design practice)? This may be due to cultural and social aspects of our environments. Figure 6 is an illustrator’s view on the double bind in society (Hay, 2001). It shows marshmallows (representing individual

Figure 6: Society and Double Bind. (Hay, 2001)

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people) caught in a double bind. Each ‘soft’ marshmallow experiences ‘pain’ in its encounters with ‘spiked’ fellows. As a response, it grows spikes of its own. When marshmallows with spikes get together they are more prone to get stuck, reflecting entrapment. We can draw a parallel with entrapment of mind which can occur when human individuals espouse a paradigm equating to Bateson’s first order learning and are not able to move beyond to embrace second order learning (e.g. reflection on thinking). ‘Individual emergence could mean unraveling entrapment through the identification of double binds and 'mixed messages', in short the re-learning of leveling patterns of communication and there is an irony that this can be done through therapy using double-binds’ (Hay, 2001). Hence, efforts at reflection on ones own behavior from an observer’s stance might break into this cycle of harmful responses and encourage a beneficial dialogue. This can be viewed as breaking away from a single helix of experience, interpretation and reflection. In both the examples discussed above, we can see how individual understandings, and reflection over these understandings, are continually changing in interaction with other people as time goes by. It is for this reason that we highlight a need to consider multiple levels of contextual dependencies. We might also consider, paraphrasing Heidegger’s words, that inquiry into usability and usefulness has meaning only for the particular subject who judges (e.g. Heidegger, 1962).

Conclusions In this paper, we explore the proposition that separation of (and confusion between) reflecting over use and usability, on one hand, and usefulness on the other, are open to question. We see support for this view in discussions such as that referred to in the 6th annual National Colloquium for Computer Security Education 2002: ‘Most representatives and speakers talked of information assurance programs at the bits and bytes level, with research agendas heavy on technology, including loss leaders like public-key infrastructure. And while speakers touted forensics programs, intrusion-detection and prevention programs, security standards development and other technical programs, there was little talk about business value and critical thinking’ (Radcliff, 2002).

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It appears that there were a few individual speakers, such as Professor Nimal Jayaratna, who deviated from the main stream and suggested that ‘We need a fundamental re-think about security education issues’. Some educators, like Alexander Korzyk ‘questioned whether information security should remain in the computer science discipline at all or be moved to areas of study more reflective of business risk issues’ (Radcliff, 2002) This is to us another example of the great importance we ascribe to reflecting on overall usefulness from end users’ points of view. However, it is not obvious how reflecting would be encouraged in practice. We believe that the metaphor of the double helix described in this paper, may provide a vehicle for discussion - a step in the right direction. In this paper, the authors have attempted to draw a distinction between the dialectic relationship of experiencing and designing of artifacts/processes, such as communication and information technology devices, and the more complex relationship which must be surmised to subsist between use and design in informing systems. We have done this by highlighting differences between the terms use, usability and usefulness in this context. The inherent complexity of such processes is a function of the nature of informing systems as a special case of a human activity system, in which people form an essential part of the system itself. The double helix metaphor is considered by the authors to be helpful as a means to examine complexities in such a relationship. The contribution of this paper is to support systems analysts in their efforts to cognize, and to recognize, continuities of experience and reflections upon experience in their practical inquiries. From a philosophical perspective, the authors have highlighted the importance of a hermeneutically-informed, phenomenological approach as a means to challenge presuppositions which might be taken for granted. Such an approach also helps us to avoid a fallacious emphasis on objectivity, which is inappropriate when examining individual reflections on experiences (use of the plural ‘experiences’ here is intended to emphasize the uniqueness of individual perspectives). Dangers involved in an artificial separation between observations made and the unique perspectives of observers, leading to a loss of critical awareness are also highlighted. Methods of inquiry based in multiple levels of contextual inquiry are suggested as a means to empower individuals to reflect upon their experiences of use. In developing informing systems, they need to consider not just what and how and on whose behalf, but also the

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why, and from whose point of view – as this reflects the difference that makes a difference. We have introduced two examples of approaches to inquiry into human activity systems which draw upon hermeneutically-informed, phenomenological perspectives. These are the Strategic Systemic Thinking Framework (Bednar, 2000) and image as a therapeutic catalyst (Hay, 2007). Both of these exemplify efforts to put critical systemic thinking into practice, influenced by work by Gregory Bateson. Individual and collective sense-making processes are discussed in relation to learning about experiencing use in relation to designing. The authors discuss a need to go beyond the concept of the ‘hermeneutic circle’. We discuss how an individual gradually reviews her own preunderstandings, with the support of experience, in a continual exchange/interchange between those pre-understandings and experience. Additionally, it is necessary to include interactions between individuals as a part of the analytical process. A recognition that people are reflecting and experiencing in interaction with other people (who are also reflecting and experiencing) supports awareness of a double hermeneutic through which a dialectic emerges. It is only through this recognition that critically-informed, systemic inquiry is enabled to progress. We perceive the phenomenon of a continuing flow of human experiencing and reflecting, not as a circle, but as a multifaceted spiral of learning about, and experience of, use, usability and usefulness over time.

References Argyris, C. (1990). Overcoming organizational defenses: Facilitating organizational learning. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Argyris, C., & Schon, D. (1979). Organizational learning. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. Bateson G. (1972). Steps to an ecology of mind. New York: Ballantine. Bednar P. M. (2000). A contextual integration of individual and organizational learning perspectives as part of IS analysis. Informing Science Journal, 3(3), 145-156. Retrieved from http://inform.nu/Articles/Vol3/v3n3p145156.pdf Bednar, P.M. (2001). Individual emergence in contextual analysis. Problems of Individual Emergence: 12th biannual ‘Problems of…’ Systems Conference, Amsterdam, April 16-20.

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Bednar and Welch Bednar, P. M., & Mallalieu, G. M. (2001). Romancing the stone: Play between romance and affection. EGOS 17th Colloquium, The Odyssey of Organising, Lyon, France, 5-7 July. Bednar, P. M., & Welch, C. (2005). IS, process, organisational change and their relationship with contextual dependencies. Proceedings of ECIS 2005, Regensburg, Germany, 26-28 May. Berger, P. L., & Luckman, T. (1967). The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge. Anchor Books. Bijker, N. E., Hughes, T. P., & Pinch, T. J. (Eds). (1987). The social construction of technological systems. MIT Press. Checkland, P., & Holwell, S. (1998). Information, systems and information systems: making sense of the field. Chichester: Wiley. Ciborra, C.U. (1992). From thinking to tinkering: The grassroots of strategic information systems. Information Society, 8, 297-309. Ciborra, C. (2002). The Labyrinths of information. Oxford University Press Dervin, B. (1983) An overview of sense-making research: concepts, methods, and results to date. Paper presented at International Communication Association annual meeting, Dallas, May 1983. Dervin, B. (1989). Audience as listener and learner, teacher and confidante: The sense-making approach. In R. Rice & C. Atkin (Eds.), Public Communication Campaigns (2nd ed.). The United States of America: Sage Publications. Ehn, P (1993). Skandinavian design: On participation and skill. In D. N. Schuler, & N. Aki (Eds.), Participatory design: Principles and practice (Chapter 4, pp. 41-77). Lawrence Erlbaum. Hay, N. (2001). Problems of individual emergence. Retrieved November 2006 from http://www.envf.port.ac.uk/illustration/images/vlsh/pieindex.htm Hay, N. (2007 May). Image as a therapeutic catalyst. The Systemist, 29(1). Heidegger, M. (1962). Gelassenheit. Stuttgart: Neske Hirschheim, R., Klein, H. K., & Lyytinen, K. (1995). Information systems development and data modelling: Conceptual and philosophical foundations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Husserl, E. (1970). The crisis of European sciences and transcendental philosophy: An introduction to phenomenological philosophy (D. Carr, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Originally published 1954 in German, Walter Biernel (editor).

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Double Helix: Use and Usefulness Klein, H. K. (2006). The phenomenological and hermeneutic “Turns”: The significance of Husserl’s, Schutz’ and Gadamer’s ideas for information systems research. Third Leverhulme Lecture, University of Salford, Informatics Research Institute, 15th November. Langefors, B. (1966). Theoretical analysis of information systems. Lund, Sweden: Studentlitteratur. Mackay, H. (1995). Theorising the IT/society relationship. In N. Heap, R. Thomas, G. Einon, & H. Mackay (Eds.), Information technology and society (pp 41-53). Open University Press/Sage. Maturana, H., &Varela, F. (1992). The tree of knowledge: The biological roots of human understanding. Boston: Shambhala. Mumford, E. (2003). Redesigning human systems. London: IRM Press. Mumford, E., Hirshheim, R., Fitzgerald, G., & Wood-Harper, A. T. (Eds.). (1984). Research methods in information systems. Proceedings of the IFIP WG 8.2 Colloquium, Manchester Business School, North Holland, Amsterdam. Nissen, H-E. (1984). Acquiring knowledge of information systems – Research in a methodological quagmire. In E. Mumford, R. Hirshheim, G. Fitzgerald, & A. T. Wood-Harper (Eds.), Research methods in information systems. Proceedings of the IFIP WG 8.2 Colloquium, Manchester Business School (pp 39-52). North Holland, Amsterdam. Nissen, H-E. (in this monograph). Double helix relationships of use, redesign and understanding of information systems. Informing Science Journal, Special Series. Radcliff, D. (2002 June 05). Clarke warns educators about need for better security. Computerworld: Security. Retrieved from http://computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,71714, 00.html Radnitzky, G. (1970). Contemporary schools of metascience (2nd ed.). Gothenburg: Akademiforlaget. Sauer, C. (1993). Why information systems fail: A case study approach. Oxfordshire: Alfred Waller. Thurén, T. (1991). Vetenskapsteori för nybörjare. [Theory of science for beginners]. Stockholm: Runa Förlag (in Swedish). Ulrich, W. (2001). Critically systemic discourse: A discursive approach to reflective practice in ISD, Parts 1 & 2. The Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application (JITTA), 3(3), 55-106.

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Bednar and Welch Ulrich, W. (2006). Rethinking critically reflective research practice: Beyond Popper’s critical rationalism. Journal of Research Practice, 2(2), Article P1. Retrieved 26 June 2007, from http://jrp.icaap.org/index.php/jrp/article/view/64/63 Vickers, G. (1965). The art of judgment. London: Methuen Wagner, H. R. (Ed.). (1970). Alfred Schutz on phenomenology and social relations: Selected readings. University of Chicago Press Walsham, G (1993). Interpreting information systems in organisations. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Weick, K. (1995). Sense making in organizations. Sage.

Biographies Peter M Bednar is an Engineer and Senior Lecturer. Since 1997, he has been working as an academic. His research covers contextual analysis, organizational change and information systems development, and he has published several book chapters and many articles in these fields. He is currently a member of the Information Systems group in the School of Computing at the University of Portsmouth, UK and is also affiliated to the Department of Informatics at Lund University, Sweden. Christine Welch is a Principal Lecturer in the Department of Strategy and Business Systems, part of the Business School at the University of Portsmouth, UK. Her research interests include critical systemic thinking, contextual analysis and organizational change, and she has published several book chapters and articles in these fields. She is convener of the Southern Regional Centre of the UK Systems Society.

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Glossary Monograph: Double Helix This glossary was prepared under the guidance of Hans-Erik Nissen in collaboration with the authors of the papers in the monograph. It is a glossary of terms used in monograph Double Helix relationships in use and design of Informing Systems: Lessons to learn from phenomenology and hermeneutics Guest editors: Hans-Erik Nissen, Department of Information and Computer Science, Lund University, Sweden. Peter Bednar, School of Computing, University of Portsmouth, UK; Department of Informatics, Lund University, Sweden. Christine Welch, Department of Strategy and Business Systems, University of Portsmouth, UK [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] The papers below, together with the editorial, are supported by this glossary: •

Double Helix relationships in use and design of Informing Systems: Lessons to learn from phenomenology and hermeneutics. (Editorial paper) by Hans-Erik Nissen, Peter M. Bednar and Christine Welch.

•

‘Using Double Helix Relationships to Understand and Change Informing Systems’ by Hans-Erik Nissen.

•

‘Applying Phenomenology and Hermeneutics in IS Design: A Report on Field Experiences’. by Randall Whitaker.

•

‘Pedagogy and Process in “Organisational ProblemSolving”‘. by John P. Kawalek

•

‘Co-evolution and Contradiction: A Diamond Model of Designer-User Interaction.’ by Anja-Karina Pahl and Linda B. Newnes.


Glossary for Monograph on Double Helix

•

‘The Culture of Information Systems in KnowledgeCreating Contexts: The Role of User-Centred Design.’ by Natalie Pang and Don Schauder.

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‘On Categorizing the IS Research literature from a User Perspective’. by Bandula. Jayatilaka, Heinz. K. Klein and J. Lee.

•

‘A double helix metaphor for use and usefulness in Informing Systems’. by Peter M. Bednar and Christine Welch.

Glossary Boldface terms in an explanation or note are terms explained elsewhere in the glossary.

Term

Explanation

Note

1PP

Acronym for first person perspective .

Originated in the software gaming community.

3PP

Acronym for third person perspective .

Originated in the software gaming community.

actor

The term ‘actor’ is used to denote any individual human being who takes part in a human activity system. In the text the term is generally used to refer to an individual human being in the real world. This is a somewhat broader use than the one in the first sentence connecting the term with a human activity system according to Checkland (1981).

Cf. or cf.

Abbreviation of the Latin word "confer". The imperative of conferre: to compare. Meaning: Compare!

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Nissen

Term

Explanation

Note

commons, historical

Historically land used in common by people of a community esp. for pasture.

Cf. knowledge commons.

connotational

Indicates that a word or phrase suggests or implies a meaning along with or apart from the thing named. Also used to describe one function of natural languages.

Cf. denotational.

constructivism

An epistemological orientation emphasizing the subjectivity of knowledge and the observer's active role in generating knowledge from experience.

Cf. radical constructivism.

cybernetics

The study of communication and control. It typically involves regulatory feedback in living organisms, machines and organizations, as well as their combinations.

Ashby (1956), Wiener (1948).

data

The term "data" is often used in everyday language as a synonym of "information". In the context of information systems research (ISR) the term "data" should be delimited to denote "means for presenting information" or "digital or alphabetic symbols presenting part of a message". In order to inform data need to be interpreted by an observer, who relates them to his pre-knowledge. Sometimes the term "data" is used to refer to what in a court trial would be called "not contested evidence". The fact that data are not given but somehow selected has been stressed by Checkland and Holwell (1998, pp. 86 – 92). To indicate this they suggest using the term "capta".

Data is the plural form of the Latin word "datum". Langefors (1993, pp. 147150) gives an argument why it is important to distinguish "data" from "information" in ISR. Strictly speaking computers only process data. Cf. information .

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Term

Explanation

Note

denotational

Indicates the direct specific reference of a word as distinct from any additional suggestions. Also used to describe one function of natural languages.

Cf. connotational.

diachronic

Considering phenomena as they occur, or develop over time.

Cf. synchronic.

DNA

An abbreviation of Deoxyribonucleic acid a nucleic acid containing genetic instructions for the development and functioning of living organisms.

duality of structure

Structure as the medium and outcome of the conduct it recursively organizes; the structural properties of social systems do not exist outside of action but are chronically implicated in its production and reproduction.

According to Giddens (1984, p. 374).

enact

In simplest terms, used for "act" to stress the involvement of the actor's body.

Varela, et al. (1991, pp. 172 – 179).

epistemology

The philosophical field concerned with knowledge – its nature, the mechanisms underlying its accretion and manipulation, its limits, its validity, etc.

The term is sometimes used to connote the specific knowledge of a given person.

ERP

Acronym for: Enterprise Resource Planning. ERP systems attempt to integrate all data and processes of an organization into a unified system. An ERP system uses many components of computer software to achieve the integration.

et al or et al.

and others

Latin et alia.

ex ante

Based on assumption and prediction; being essentially subjective and estimative.

post.

300

Latin cf. ex

Nissen

Term

Explanation

experience(s)

Experience refers to a high level of abstraction. Human experience develops as part of living. Experiences refer to a lower level of abstraction. Experiences, or rather descriptions of experienced episodes, are episodes reflected ex post.

ex post

Based on knowledge and retrospection; essentially experience based.

extensional

The truth value of a sentence, in an extensional language, only depends on if the subject belongs to the set explicitly defined by the predicate.

Note

Latin. cf. ex

ante .

Cf. intentional. Nissen (in this monograph).

first person perspective

The point of view or vantage of a given observer himself or herself.

Whitaker (in this monograph).

first order predicate logic

(Also called "first order predicate calculus.) A logic strong enough to deal with sentence forms and not only with propositions. A sentence form has no definite truth value because of the appearance of individual variables. A sentence form qualified by a quantifier, such as some, all, or there exists, takes on a truth value. In first order logic variables only range over sets of individuals. Predicates, describing properties and relations on sets, are treated as constants.

See, e.g. Korfhage (1966, chapter 6).

Abbreviation for a set of hermeneuticdialectic schools of metascience mainly developed in Central Europe. Also called Continental schools of metascience.

See Radnitzky (1970).

HD

Nissen (in this monograph).

301


Term

Explanation

Note

hermeneutics

Hermeneutics may be described as the development and study of theories of the interpretation and understanding of texts. The concept of "text" is here also extended beyond written documents to any objects subject to interpretation. Somewhat simplified hermeneutics addresses issues of interpretation and interpretable phenomena.

Earlier hermeneutics only referred to study of the interpretation of Biblical texts. There exist a number of schools of hermeneutics.

human activity system

A notional purposive system which expresses some purposeful human activity, activity which could in principle be found in the real world.

Checkland (1981, p. 314).

ibid. or ibid

In the same place.

An abbreviation of the Latin word "ibidem".

icosahedron

A convex polyhedron having 20 faces, 12 vertices, and 30 edges. All the faces are equilateral triangles.

Mentioned in Pahl and Newnes (in this monograph).

i.e.

that is.

An abbreviation of Latin: id est.

implementation

In the context of computerized parts of informing systems it sometimes refers to introducing a new or changed such system in a work situation of an enterprise. Some authors delimit it to refer to coding the specifications for a computer program.

302

Beer (1994, p. 14).

Nissen

Term

Explanation

Note

information

A frequently used, but easily misleading, noun. It makes the hearer/reader look for some (non existent) thing or substance. The word can hardly be avoided in expressions like "information system". It could help to stress that such an expression as "information system" is a non-separable unit.

Try to use verbs like "inform" or "orient". These help looking for the processes and relations involved in informing oneself or others.

information society

A model of society, which focuses on producing symbolic goods more than on producing material goods or even services. By focusing on production the concept gets a technical bias. Human societies are developed by people based on what they historically received from their ancestors to be handed over to new generations.

Cf. the explication of WSIS.

informing system

A socio-technical organization (M&V) intended to inform or orient oneself or other clientele.

innovation

An orientation to improvements focusing on novel features (e.g., form, functionality) of an artifact.

As used by Whitaker (in this monograph).

intentional

To decide the truth value of a sentence in intentional language, used in natural language and in social sciences, one must understand it.

Cf. extensional.

Nissen (in this monograph).

An orientation to improvements focusing on modifications to any aspect(s) of a joint human-machine system.

As used by Whitaker (in this monograph).

intervention

303


Term

Explanation

Note

ITU

International Telecommunication Unity. Today a United Nations agency.

Mentioned in Pang and Schauder (in this monograph) as UN/ITU.

knowledge

A frequently used, but often misleading, noun. It easily makes the hearer/reader look for some (non existent) thing or substance. Preferably verbs should be used to indicate what persons know or show they can do practically.

knowledge commons

Historically "commons" was used about land used in common by people of a community. Lately, the term "knowledge commons" has become applied to cultural institutions and the creation of intellectual property. Libraries may now refer to themselves as sites of shared and available resources and places where collaborative work happens.

In Pang and Schauder (in this monograph), who also have contributed to this explanation. Cf. commons, historical .

languaging

Therefore to operate in language is not From Maturana an abstract activity, as we usually think. (1988, pp. 31Language takes place in the domain of 32). relations in the recursion of consensual coordinations ..., but at the same time language takes place through structural interactions in the domain of the bodyhoods of the languaging organisms.

LE

Abbreviation for a set of logicalempirical schools of metascience mainly developed in The U.K. and the U.S.A. Also called Anglo-Saxon schools of metascience.

304

See Radnitzky (1970).

Nissen

Term

Explanation

Note

logic

Often simply understood as twovalued logic formalized in propositional and in first order predicate logic . However, there exist a number of other logics, e.g. many valued ones. Moreover, the logic of a description is the same as the logic of the describing system. Not all describing systems apply the same logic.

On logics see Haack (1978).

Mahayana (Sanskrt). Maha great, Yana way or vehicle. This style of Buddhism is based on the second cycle of teachings given by the historical Buddha Shakyamuni. It goes beyond the first cycle teachings (on the recognition and release of one’s own suffering), to identify the nature of being in the world with others. While enlightenment is the future goal, the means of becoming a Buddha and transcending self is by helping others. Thus the path focuses on compassion as an activity of merit and wisdom as being the other hand of enlightened activity. This path is often followed by lay people.


Mahayana Buddhism

Maturana and Varela (1980, p. 52).

Explanation given by Pahl in a personnel communication.

305


Term

Explanation

Note

metascience

Metascience studies scientific enterprises. These studies include: (a) studies of researchers their motivation, abilities, ideas, etc. both individually and of members of a group or a school of some discipline; (b) studies of production (research) (How is research planned? How is research steered by research strategy? How are hypotheses framed? How are claims to knowledge supported?); (c) studies of products (How is knowledge systematized? How are knowledge systems improved?); (d) studies of reporting knowledge, i.e. the manner in which the results are made known to the scientific community and to society at large.

Radnitzky (1970, Vol. I, pp. 2-6). Referred to in Nissen (in this monograph).

M&V

Abbreviation sometimes used in this Glossary to refer to Maturana and Varela (1980).

mutatis mutandis

With necessary changes having been made.

Latin.

noumena

An objective aspect of elements of the external world (as contrasted with an observer's subjective perception or apprehension of it).


observer

Living human beings interact with each others and with things in their environment. In a sense this makes human beings both observers and interactors. Observation entails interaction. In the texts in the series interactors are generally simply called actors.

Cf. also Maturana and Varela (1980, pp. 32-33 and 98-99).

306

Nissen

Term

Explanation

Note

octahedron

A convex polyhedron having 8 faces, 6 vertices, and 12 edges. All the faces are equilateral triangles.


ontogeny

The (biological) development or course of development of an individual.

Cf. phylogeny.

ontological

Relating to existence; especially based upon analysis of the nature of being.

OODA

'Observe – Orient – Decide – Act'. A 4-step activity cycle model originated by Colonel John Boyd.

Referred to by Whitaker (in this monograph).

organization

The relations that define a system as a unity , and determine the dynamics of interaction and transformation which it may undergo as such a unity, constitute the organization of the system.

According to Maturana and Varela (1980, p. 137), cf. structure (different structures can realize the same organization).

orientee

A person receiving messages, who, unlike what is generally assumed of a receiver according to information theory, can interpret these independently of what their sender intends them to mean.

See Maturana and Varela (1980, pp. 2833). Nissen (in this monograph).

orienter

A person sending messages, who intends to orient receivers by them, but does not control the interpretations of the receivers.

See Maturana and Varela (1980, pp. 2733). Nissen (in this monograph).

Beer (1994, p. 14).

307


Term

Explanation

Note

PC/I threshold

Abbreviation for Personal Computing/Internet threshold, necessitating the development of user-centric concepts alongside more established techno-centric approaches.

According to Pang and Schauder (in this monograph).

per se

by, of, or in itself.

Latin.

phenomenological

Of, pertaining to, or qualified with respect to an observer's subjective experience or cognitive processes.

phenomenology

Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first person perspective. It generally focuses on everyday life experience. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something. Somewhat simplified phenomenology focuses attention on perceived everyday life experience

There exist a number of schools of phenomenology.

phenomenon

An observable fact or event as it is observed or apprehended by an observer: an item of experience or perceived reality.

Epistemologists reserve this term for "an object of sense perception as distinguished from an ultimate reality".

phylogeny

The evolution of a genetically related group of organisms.

Cf. ontogeny.

praxial

Of or pertaining to praxis.

Adjectival form coined by Whitaker.

praxio-focal

An orientation or approach framed with regard to a particular person's or role's praxis in a work or action context.

Adjectival form coined by Whitaker.

308

Nissen

Term

Explanation

Note

praxis

Action, which can be efficient or inefficient. In the writings of Marx "praxis" particularly denotes action, which transforms economic circumstances to free man from his alienation (in a capitalist society).

Aristotle, in his conception of three basic activities of man: theoria, poiesis and praxis made a distinction between good (eupraxia) and bad (dyspraxia) praxis.

protocol

A "way of working" [in a meeting or some other group process] can be called a protocol. At the same time "a protocol" also can refer to the text which contains the subject-matter of a meeting. Both these explanations are helpful, as long as they include human behavior.

Beer (1994, pp. 19 - 20). Pahl and Newnes (in this monograph) present a

radical constructivism

second-order cybernetics

A way of knowing and learning based on the principles: •

knowledge is not passively received but built up by the cognizing subject;

•

the function of cognition is adaptive and serves the organization of the experiential world, not the discovery of ontological reality. (p. 18, boldface added here.)

An extension of cybernetics theory largely focused on cybernetics with an awareness that the observers/investigators are part of the system, and of the importance of selfreferentiality, self-organizing, etc.

team syntegrity protocol for

10-12 people.

von Glasersfeld (1995).

Whitaker (in this monograph) and Heinz von Foerster (1981).

309


Term

Explanation

Note

semiotic

To interpret signs as in semiotics, a philosophical theory of signs and symbols that deals especially with their function in both artificially constructed and natural languages.


SHK

Sang Hyang Kamahyanikan: ancient Mahayana Buddhist texts.

In Pahl and Newnes (in this monograph).

social system

The pattering of social relations across time-space, understood as reproduced practices. Social systems should be regarded as widely variable in terms of the degree of 'systemness' they display and rarely have the sort of internal unity which may be found in physical and biological systems.


status quo

The existing state of affairs as in political or social relationships.

Latin.

structuration

The cumulative effect of people's living and working within social frameworks (through a dynamics that Giddens calls struturation) is the production and re-production of culture. The cultural context is continuously generated and re-generated through the interplay of action and structure (the 'duality of structure'). Social structure both supports and constrains the endeavors of individuals, communities, and societies. (Giddens, 1984, pp. 140.) In essence, structuration theory holds that "man actively shapes the world he lives in at the same time as it shapes him" (Giddens, 1982, p. 21)."The structuring of social relations across time and space, in virtue of the duality of structure ". (Giddens, 1984, p. 377. boldface added here.)

The explicatory text before the excerpt from Giddens' (1984, p. 377) glossary has been contributed by Pang and Schauder.

310

Giddens' theory of structuration plays an important role both in the papers of Jayatilaka, Klein, Lee and of Pang and Schauder.

Nissen

Term

Explanation

Note

structure

Rules and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems. Structure exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, and as instantiated in action. (Boldface added here.)


structure

The actual relations which hold between the components which integrate a concrete machine in a given space.

According to Maturana and Varela (1980, p. 138) cf. organiztion.

structures

Rule-resource sets, implicated in the institutional articulation of social systems. To study structures, including structural principles, is to study major aspects of the transformation/mediation relations which influence social and system integration. (Boldface added here.)


synchronic

Concerned with events existing in a limited time period (as the present) and ignoring history.

Cf. diachronic.

syntegrity

A word drawn together from the Beer (1994, pp. words "synergistic tensegrity". A term 12 - 14). coined to refer to group processes in a group exhibiting logical closure. Such a group looks for the compression of its shared idea into a cohesive statement. It is also aware of tension. Tension generates discussion not to say argument. It is an exemplar of a Fullerian tensegrity balance.

311


Term

Explanation

Note

system

A system is not something given in nature but something defined by intelligence. ... We select from an infinite number of relations between things, a set which, because of coherence and pattern and purpose, permits an interpretation of what might otherwise be a meaningless cavalcade of arbitrary events. It follows that the detection of system in the world outside ourselves is a subjective matter. Two people will not necessarily agree on the existence, or nature, or boundaries of any system so detected. A model of a whole entity; when applied to human activity, the model is characterized fundamentally in terms of hierarchical structure, emergent properties, communication and control. ... When applied to natural or man-made entities, the crucial characteristic is the emergent properties of the whole.

Beer (1966, pp. 242-243).

Some authors use the term "system" both for models describing the organization of whole entities and for a structure (Maturana and Varela, 1980) implementing a particular organization . The reader has to be attentive to distinguish which they refer to from the context.

Cf. social system.

system

312

Checkland (1981, pp. 317318).

Nissen

Term

Explanation

Note

team syntegrity

Team syntegrity is a group process which facilitates team building, innovation and planning. The process is designed to be non-hierarchical so that communication can be open and synergy can be captured. Team syntegrity Beer (1994) used for a protocol he developed to provide a structure for a group of thirty persons to join together in a non-hierarchical but interconnected exercise in creativity and the building of group consciousness.

Presented in Beer (1994) and in Leonard (1997). Used in Pahl and Newnes (in this monograph).

tensegrity

A crucial aspect of the concept of syntegrity, means tensile integrity (where "tensile" refers to both tension and compression), and refers to arrangements (called a protocol ) for conducting proceedings within [a] group to maintain its productivity and creativity. (A term coined by W. Buckminster Fuller from "tensile integrity" characteristic of domes he built for tensile strength of their structure as a whole.)

Beer (1994. pp. 13, 21).

Theravada Buddhism

Theravada (Sanskrt). Thera Elder or monk, Yana way or vehicle. Also called Hinayana, where Hina is translated as ‘basic’. This style of Buddhism is based on the first cycle of teachings given by the historical Buddha Shakyamuni. It identifies the basis of suffering and the existence of methods to liberate oneself from suffering and reach an ‘unbound’ state. The means of reaching liberation is formal meditation and analytic concentration, which usually take place in a monastic setting.

Mentioned in Pahl and Newnes (in this monograph). Explanation given by Pahl in a personnel communication.

313


Term

Explanation

Note

third person perspective

The point of view or vantage of an observer when observing another person.

Whitaker (in this monograph) and Dunne (1993, p. 5).

TRIZ

A Russian acronym for Altshuller’s ‘theory of inventive problem-solving’.

In Pahl's and Newnes' paper (in this monograph).

UCD

Abbreviation for User Centered Design. Although several definitions exist, they all agree on the same differentiation from prescriptive design.

In Pang and Schauder (in this monograph) their UCD focuses on human needs ahead of perceived technological imperatives.

unity

That which is distinguishable from a background, the sole condition necessary for existence in a certain domain. The nature of a unity and the domain in which a unity exists are specified by the process of its distinction and determination; this is so regardless of whether this process is conceptual or physical.

According to Maturana and Varela (1980, p. 138).

314

Nissen

Term

Explanation

Note

Vajrayana Buddhism

Vajrayana (Sanskrt). Vajra diamond or thunderbolt, Yana way or vehicle. This style of Buddhism is based on the third cycle of teachings given by the historical Buddha Shakyamuni. Originally given only to a select group of disciples, it goes beyond second cycle teachings to define all beings as having Buddha Nature and the ability to reach enlightenment. The means of becoming a Buddha is by helping others, but in addition to the utilizing the qualities and activities of Mahayana Buddhism, special techniques are added. These significantly reduce the time needed to achieve results, as they weave and mirror Enlightenment into the present day. The path is generally followed by yogis or those who do not belong to any one social group.


von Neumann architecture

An architecture for universal computers comprising a control unit, an arithmetic/logic unit, a memory, an input/output unit, and a bus connecting all units.

Mentioned in Nissen (in this monograph).

von Neumann computer

A digital computer implementing a Mentioned in von Neumann architecture . In order Nissen (in this to work a program has to be loaded monograph). into the computer.

WSIS

Abbreviation for World Summit on the Information Society. Initiated by the United Nations General Assembly on 21 December 2001, the organization of this conference is led by the International Telecommunication Union. It brings together representatives from the highest levels of government, businesses from the private sector, civil society, and nongovernmental organizations.

Explanation given by Pahl in a personnel communication.

Mentioned in Pang and Schauder (in this monograph).

315


References Ashby, W. R. (1956). An introduction to cybernetics. London: Methuen. Beer, S. (1994). Beyond dispute: The in vention of team syntegrity. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Beer, S. (1966). Decision & control: The meanin g of operatio nal research & management cybernetics. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Checkland, P. (1981). Systems thinking, systems practice. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Checkland, P. & Holwell, S. (1998). Informatio n, systems and in formation systems – making sense of the field. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Giddens, A. (1982). Profiles and critiques in social theory. Berkeley: University of California Press. Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Haack, S. (1978). Philosophy of logics. Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Korfhage, R. R. (1966). Logic and algorithms: With applications to the computer and information sciences. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Langefors, B. (1993). Essays on infolo gy: Summing up and planning fo r the fu ture. B. Dahlbom (Ed.). Gothenburg, Sweden: Department of Information Systems, University of Gothenburg. Report 5 (August 1993). Leonard, A. L. (1997). Team syntegrity background. Retrieved February 18, 2007 from http://www.phrontis.com/facilts.htm Maturana, H. R. (1988). Ontology of observing: The biological foundations of self consciousness and the physical domain of existence. In R. Donaldson (Ed.), Conference workbook Texts in cybernetic theory: An in-depth exploration

of the thought of Humberto Maturana, William T. Powers, and Ernst von Glasersfeld". American Association for Cybernetics, 1988. Retrieved November 4,

2006, from http://www.inteco.cl/biology/ontology/index.html

Maturana, H., R. & Varela, F. J. (1980). Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living. Dordrecht: D. Riedel. (First published in Chile 1972 under the title De Machin as y Seres Vivos.) Radnitzky, G. (1970). Contemporary schools of metascience (Second revised edition). New York: Humanities Press and Gothenburg, Sweden: Akademiforlaget. von Foerster, H. (1981). Observing systems. Seaside, CA: Intersystems Publications. von Glasersfeld, E. (1995). Radical constructivism. Washington: Falmer Press. 316

Nissen

Varela, F. J., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wagner, H. R. (Ed.). (1970). Alfred Schutz on phenomenology and social relations: Selected readin gs. University of Chicago Press Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics or control and communication in the animal and the machine. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

317


Index A abstracted reflection, 33 Ackoff, 101 aggregate, 36, 42 Allende, 171 Altshuller, 153 Alvesson, 243 apparent invariance, 29 Argyris, 103 automatic control system, 50 autonomous network, 40 autonomy, 40, 43 autonomy of interpretation, 50 awareness, 12, 13

B Bateson, 12, 36, 41, 80, 102, 276, 285, 289, 292 Beer, 9, 13, 127, 134, 158, 166, 181, 186, 193, 200 behavioral view, 81 biology of cognition, 8, 67 Boden, 131, 146, 191 body, 13 Bourdieu, 242, 243, 257 bricolage. See improvisation Buddhism, 9, 13, 127, 129, 138, 172, 193, 199 Buddhist Meditation, 129, 133, 135, 136, 142, 161 Burrell and Morgan, 242, 257 buzzwords, 29

C calculus, 47 categorization, 11 of IS Research, 244 categorizing prototype theory, 32, 42 category, 32 set-theoretically based, 52 chains

closed cause-effect, 50 chains of determination, 43, 50 circular and more complex, 42, 50 change agent, 8, 101 Checkland, 6, 31, 106, 280 Churchman, 8, 106, 107, 116 Ciborra, 3, 280, 285 circular chains of determination, 50 classification of research, 243 single paradigm, 243 classification schemes of IS research, 241 alternative, 244 clientele, 3, 11 closed cause-effect chains, 50 coding, 43 co-evolution, 9, 127, 134, 142, 152, 163 cognitive point of view, 80 cognitive process, 8 cognize, 32 Cohen, 22 communication, 53 human, 53 Community, 204, 215, 228, 230 Community Informatics, 204, 216 complexity, 13, 275, 281, 282, 291 complexity theory, 13 composite unity, 82 computer model, 56 computer program, 56 connotational, 26 consciousness, 23 contextual complexities, 102 contextual dependencies, 277, 278, 290, 293 contradiction, 127, 153, 154 Contradiction Matrix, 154 creativity, 9, 12 critical social theories, 11 cultural institution, 10 culture, 14 culture in communities, 203


Index

D data, 8, 22, 25, 42, 45, 51, 55 data interpretation, 8 data processing, 51, 58 data processing system, 45, 51 data quality, 58 data source, 55 Davenport, 100 Deetz, 243, 258 denotational, 25 depiction bottleneck, 85 description, 36, 39 design, 99, 104, 118 of a pedagogy, 108 of organisational process, 108 of projects, 115 diachronic observations, 25 dialectic, 2, 11, 14, 154 dialectic relationship, 7 dialectics, 9 Diamond of Creating, 156 of Problem-solving, 156 Diamond Map of Co-evolution, 163 Diamond Map of Design, 137, 141, 155, 158 Diamond Model, 134, 148, 176, 177, 183, 192, 201 Diamond Model for Engineering Design, 180 Diamond Model of Designer-User Interaction, 127, 181, 186 difference, 41, 43 discursive commensurability, 261 discursive consciousness, 23 DNA, 2 double bind, 287, 288, 289 double helix, 2, 4, 30, 33, 286 double helix metaphor, 2, 4, 7, 39, 59, 273, 280, 287, 291 double helix relationships, 21 dynamic, 5

E electronic data processing, 51 embodied mind, 12

320

embodiment, 40 emergence, 216, 278, 290, 292 enact, 35, 40 enactive cognitive science, 8, 67 enactment bottleneck, 85 end users, 9 Engineering Design, 9, 127, 135, 152, 159, 163, 172, 197 Enterprise Resource Planning, 99, 111 epistemological ideas, 13 Etzioni, 245, 257 everyday life interaction, 13 everyday life situation, 5 exceptional case, 56 expressiveness, 53 expressiveness of schematized languages, 52 extensional, 25

F first order predicate logic, 47 first person perspective, 8, 12, 65 first-order transformations, 78 first-person agent, 44 Fordism, 203, 208, 210 formal model, 55, 58 Foucault, 242, 243, 259 Four Noble Truths, 136 framework, 14

G Gadamer, 103 Galtung, 7, 27 generic metaphor, 30 Generic Process of Creating, 160 Giddens, 11, 13, 23, 204, 210, 218, 242, 248, 258 Giddens’ theory of structuration, 10 growth of knowledge, 6

H Habermas, 242, 243, 245, 252, 257 HD. See hermeneutic dialectics HD traditions, 25

Index Heidegger, 281, 285, 290 hermeneutic dialectics, 276, 279 hermeneutic-dialectic schools of metascience, 7, 24, 276 hermeneutics, 63, 67, 89, 104, 120, 276, 279 heteronomy, 40 hidden ideologies, 29 higher-order transformations, 78 historical contexts, 25 history, 5, 7, 26 horizon exercise, 87 human activity system, 278, 291 human communication, 53 human everyday life interaction, 13 human expressiveness, 22

I idealize, 38 identity gender, 10 rural, 10 ideology, 27 immediate experience, 33 implement, 38, 50, 59 improvisation, 286 indivisibility of theory and practice, 4 Infological Equation, 274, 277, 281 information, 22 Information Continuum Model, 204, 222 information processing, 51 information system definition, 280 information systems development techno-centric, 10 user-centric, 10 information technology analyst, 3, 4, 7 informing science, 5, 22, 43 informing system, 23, 29, 36, 50 description, 51 purpose, 281 use and redesign, 53 informing systems research, 14 innovation, 9

input data, 51 instrumental reason, 12, 45 intentional, 26 interactive program, 56 interpretation, 22 interpretation of data, 50 interventions, 73 invariance, 7, 28 apparent, 29 breaking, 7 seeking, 7 invariance breaking, 27, 29 invariance seeking, 27 invariant, 28 IS research literature, 11, 237, 240 classification, 241, 246, 264

K know the verb, 30 knowledge schoolbook and practical, 30 Knowledge Management, 204, 216, 222 knowledge processing, 51

L Langefors, 274, 276, 277, 281 language game, 48, 49, 53 languaging, 46 LE. See logical-empirical LE traditions, 25 learning, 6, 11 learning set, 97, 99, 104, 109, 117 on-line, 111, 113 learning spiral, 275, 288 Leonard, 168, 186, 201 level of abstraction, 37, 42, 50 Levi-Strauss, 245, 262 library, 10 logical empiricism, 69 logical level, 35, 50 logical syntax, 47 logical type, 37, 42 logical-empirical, 276

321

Index logical-empirical schools of metascience, 7, 24 Luhmann, 245 Lyytinen, 100, 245, 262

M Mandala, 127, 134, 141, 145, 160, 196 geometry, 151 of the five Buddha families, 148, 169, 179, 186 Mandala for Engineering Design, 171, 177 manipulated, 25 manipulators, 25 Maslow, 139 Maturana, 8, 31, 67, 132, 135, 153, 276 maximization, 22 meaning shaping, 279 measures of performance, 109 meditation, 135 meta-data, 22 meta-model, 38 metaphor, 7, 13, 31, 289, 291, See also double helix metaphor double helix, 274, 287 generic, 30 metascience schools of, 24 methodology, 27 middle manager, 8, 101 mind, 41, 42 mind-body problem, 39, 40 split, 39 mindfulness, 13 mode 2 type of research, 9 model, 36, 38, 39, 97, 105 computer, 56 explicit, 36 formal, 22, 55, 58 of organisational processes, 113, 114 of process, 118 organizational, 106 teleological, 108, 115, 119

322

teleological process, 105, 112, 117 model transparency, 57 model transparency engineering, 7, 57, 59 model transparency problem, 58 Mumford, 3, 6, 277, 281, 282 museum, 10 mutual learning, 2, 4, 39, 72

N needs analysis, 214 net of concepts, 23, 29, 35 network autonomous, 40 non discursive practice, 13

O ontogeny, 37 OODA Loop, 83 operational closure, 40, 43 operationalisation, 100, 109, 115, 119 operationally closed, 39 operationally closed system, 40 orders of learning, 277, 285, 286, See also Bateson organisational problem-solving, 98, See also problem solving orientee, 50, 52 orienter, 52 Orlikowski, 204, 219, 239, 241, 242, 248 output data, 51

P paradigm, 242, 258, 263 paradigmatic divide, 11 participatory design, 45, 68 pattern, 12 pedagogic, 98, 112, 113 pedagogy, 8, 44, 97, 98, 101, 109, 115, 116, 119 design, 101

Index for organisational problemsolving, 103 Peirce, Charles S., 67 Personal Computing/Internet threshold, 10, 203, 208 perspective first-person, 58 hermeneutic, 11 phenomenological, 11 third-person, 58 phenomenological, 120 phenomenology, 63, 67, 89, 273 philosophical doubt, 276 philosophical questions, 14 phylogeny, 37 practical consciousness, 23 practice, 7 practitioner, 5 praxio-focal, 8, 78 praxis, 8, 35, 65 everyday life, 35 predecessor, 14 preferred worlds, 27 problem-solving, 98, 103, 111, 117, 120 Problem-Vantage-Frame, 89 program computer, 56 interactive, 56

R radical constructivism, 8, 67 Radnitzky, 24, 30, 101, 104, 276 rationality, 44, 45 recognize, 32 recurrence, 38 recursion, 192 recursive view, 81 reflecting, 23 requirements engineering, 7, 48, 55, 59, 60 research guiding interest, 30, 59 researcher, 4, 5, 7, 9 resource, 35 rhetoric, 26

S schools of metascience, 7, 24, 25 hermeneutic-dialectic, 24 logical-empirical, 24 Schutz, 103, 141, 152, 159 Schwaninger, 184 second-order cybernetics, 8, 67 self-organization, 40 sense-making, 9, 273, 274, 275, 277, 280, 282, 285, 286, 289, 292 simple unity, 81 situation poorly structured, 13 structured, 13 social process, 97, 103, 108, 110, 117, 118 social theories for capturing user concerns, 241 soft systems methodology, 6, 13, 68 ST, 248, See also structuration Strategic Systemic Thinking Framework, 12 structuration, 10, 205, 211, 218, 221, 230, 237, 245, 248 and TCA, 259 constituents of, 249 structuration theory, 11, 242 subjectivity, 65 synchronic observations, 25 Syntegrity, 127, 134, 184, 186, 193 system closed, 40 open, 40 operationally closed, 40 system analyst, 12 Systems Theory, 97, 107

T task analysis, 214 Taylorism, 211 TCA, 242, 243, 245 and structuration, 259 Team Syntegrity, 9, 13, See also Syntegrity teleological models, 108 teleology, 103, 107, 118, 121

323

Index theory, 7 Theory of Communicative Action, 242, See also TCA Theory of Music, 162 theory of structuration, 13 thinking about thinking, 4, 11 third-person analyst, 44 third-person perspective, 12, 82 Three Jewels, 143, 179 Three Pillars, 146, 179 threshold, 41, 43 traditions, 24 hermeneutic-dialectic (HD), 25, 46 logical-emperical (LE), 25, 46 scientific, 24 transdiscipline, 22 TRIZ, 153 two-valued logic, 50, 53

U UCD, 205, 211, 213, 214, 221, 230, See also User-Centred Design Ulrich, 278, 287 under-researched areas, 11 unit of investigation, 37 unlearning, 6 usability, 11 use, 11 use case, 57, 59 use side, 238 usefulness, 11, 275, 284, 285, 290 user perspective, 238 User-Centred Design, 10, 204, 206, See also UCD

V value criteria, 22, 59 value sentences, 27 values, 25, 27 vantage, 89 Varela, 8, 31, 39, 67, 132, 135, 153, 276 venues, 82 verb, 30, 31 verum factum, 27 Viable System description, 149 Viable System Model, 9, 13, 127, 158, 166, 169, 193 Vico, 26 von Neumann computers, 51 VSM. See Viable System Model

W Watzlawick, 53 Weick, 9, 103 Wittgenstein, 47 WoFG, 227, See Women on Farms Gathering Women on Farms Gathering, 227 work milieu, 8 work-centered design, 78 work-centered support systems, 78 worker, 2, 4, 7, 8, 12 worker experience, 8 worker praxis, 8 work-task-game, 49

Z Zmud, 100, 248, 250

324

Double Helix Relationships in Use and Design of ...

Double Helix Relationships in Use and Design of ...

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