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Downward Counterfactual Thinking 1

Running Head: DOWNWARD COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING

Looking on the Bright Side: Downward Counterfactual Thinking in Response to Stressful Life Events

Katherine White and Darrin R. Lehman University of British Columbia

Keywords: counterfactual think ing, self-enhancement, self-motives, coping

Corresponding author: Katherine White Department of Psychology Simon Fraser University 8888 University Drive Burnaby, BC, Canada, V5A 1S6 Phone: 604-291-3123 Fax: (604) 291-3427

Submitted to: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: ASC

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 2 Abstract Although the literature has identified both a self-enhancement and a self-improvement function of counterfactual thinking, most evidence points to situations in which the self-improvement function predominates. The current research spotlights a set of factors that increase the role of self-enhancement in counterfactual thinking. Threatening experiences such as chronic illness (Study 1) and the terrorist attacks of 9-11 (Study 2) were a ssociated with more downward than upward counterfactuals. In Study 3, among those more motivated to self-enhance, a manipulation of event severity led to the generation of more downward than upward counterfactuals. Cultural background (Studies 3, 4, & 5), manipulated motives (Study 4), and the opportunity for self-affirmation (Study 5) also were related to the self-enhancing function of counterfactual thoughts.

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 3 We have, without any doubt, the best Police Department, the best Fire Department, the best police officers, the best fire officers, the best emergency workers of any place in the whole world. And, although today's tragedy is going to be enormous, and there's no way to minimize it, if it weren't for them, this tragedy would be far worse…without our Police Department, our Fire Department, our EMS, and the kinds of people we have, many of whom lost their lives, there would be double or triple the number of casualties. - Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, Wednesday, Sept. 12, 2001 (The Washington Post Company, 2001[italics added] ) People often respond to events in their lives by considering alternative scenarios of “what might have been,” and Mayor Giuliani’s statement illustrates this type of thinking with respect to a particularly traumatic event. The process of generating such thoughts is called counterfactual thinking (e.g., Kahneman & Miller, 1986) because it involves the mental simulation of events that are counter to what actually transpired. The generation of alternative scenarios that are better than what actually happened is labeled “upward counterfactual thinking,” whereas the generation of alternative scenarios that are worse than what actually occurred is labeled “downward counterfactual thinking” (Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993; see Roese & Olson, 1995a for a review). Giuliani was understandably using downward counterfactuals in an attempt to alleviate the feelings of threat and despair that had been thrust upon his fellow New Yorkers. Although little research has examined the conditions under which counterfactuals are used to make the self feel better, poignant examples such as this suggest that simulating possible worse worlds may be one way in which people cope. The Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking One widely supported view of counterfactual thinking is that counterfactuals can serve both affective and preparative functions (e.g., Roese, 1994). According to this functional theory of counterfactual thinking, upward counterfactuals serve a preparative (sometimes referred to as selfimprovement) function, allowing individuals to prepare for the future by providing information about how

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 4 to improve. Downward counterfactuals provide an affective (sometimes referred to as self-enhancement) function, allowing individuals to feel better by comparison to worse-off simulations of what might have occurred (for evidence of these functions of counterfactuals, see Markman et al., 1993; Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Roese, 1994; Roese & Olson, 1995b, 1995c). Although both functions of counterfactuals have been noted in the literature, a review reveals that upward rather than downward counterfactuals are more commonly generated in response to negatively valenced events. Although there are factors that moderate this finding, people have been found to generate a majority of upward counterfactuals in response to manipulated failure on laboratory tasks (Markman et al., 1993; Roese & Hur, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1997), recalled academic setbacks (Mandel, 2003) and other negative life events (Roese & Olson, 1997; Sanna, Turley-Ames, & Meier, 1999; Schimel, Arndt, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2001), poor performance on academic tests (Nasco & Marsh, 1999), vignettes of negative life occurrences (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000, Roese & Hur, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995c, 1997; Sanna, Meier, Turley-Ames, 1998; Sanna et al., 1999), losses in athletic settings (Grieve, Houston, Dupuis, & Eddy, 1999), and negative affective states (Roese, 1997; Roese & Hur, 1997; Sanna et al., 1998, 1999). Thus, more evidence has amassed for the preparative and self-improving nature of counterfactuals than for the affective and self-enhancing nature of counterfactuals. The current research sets out to examine the conditions under which self-enhancement1, rather than self-improvement motives dominate in counterfactual thinking, thereby leading to the generation of more downward than upward counterfactuals. The most typical pattern between antecedent event valence and counterfactual direction, therefore, is one of mood congruency (for reviews of mood congruency in memory and social judgment see Bower, 1981, 1991; Forgas, 1995, 2000; Schwarz & Clore, 1996), whereby positive moods (and positive events) are associated with downward counterfactual thoughts, and negative moods (and negative events) a re associated with upward counterfactual thoughts. This pattern mirrors what the research on the relation between moods and cognitions typically finds (e.g., Bower, 1991). The current studies build upon past

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 5 research by examining whether people can demonstrate mood incongruency effects by generating more downward than upward counterfactuals in response to negative life events. In support of this proposition, an emerging line of research suggests that cognitions are not always congruent with moods. For instance, those in negative moods sometimes demonstrate mood incongruency effects by recruiting positive memories (McFarland & Buehler, 1997, 1998; Parrott & Sabini, 1990), which may represent attempts at mood repair. The current question is: Under what conditions will people similarly generate more downward counterfactuals than upward counterfactuals? More precisely, the current research sets out to examine the conditions under which self-enhancement, rather than self-improvement motives dominate in counterfactual thinking, thereby leading to the generation of a majority of downward counterfactuals. Counterfactual Thinking in Response to Stressful Life Events In line with the notion of an affective and a preparative function of counterfactual thoughts, researchers in the field of stress and coping similarly distinguish between two general types of coping efforts (e.g., Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). Problem-focused coping involves efforts to do something constructive about the situation, whereas emotion-focused coping involves regulating the emotional consequences of a stressful event. Upward counterfactual thinking has been theorized to represent a problem-focused coping strategy, in which one attempts to plan for the future and attain a sense of control and mastery over negative events (Kasimatis & Wells, 1995; Taylor & Schneider, 1989). Downward counterfactual thinking, on the other hand, has been posited to represent emotion-focused coping, whereby negative mood states are alleviated by comparison to a simulated alternative that makes one’s true state of affairs seem less negative (Kasimatis & Wells, 1995; Roese, 1994; see also Taylor, Wood, & Lichtman, 1983). As mentioned above, however, to date there is little evidence that people engage in downward counterfactual thinking as a coping strategy or as a means of attenuating threats to the self. Past research on stressful life events and counterfactual thinking has largely focused on the role of upward counterfactuals (Davis & Lehman, 1995; Davis, Lehman, Silver, Wortman, & Ellard, 1996; Davis, Lehman, Wortman, Silver, & Thompson, 1995). In one telling example, Davis and colleagues (Davis &

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 6 Lehman, 1995; Davis et al., 1995) examined responses to highly stressful events such as the loss of a loved one in a motor vehicle accident and the loss of a child to Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. Respondents commonly reported undoing these events, that is imagining how things could have turned out better (i.e., upward counterfactual thinking). Furthermore, this undoing of past traumatic events was associated with greater psychological distress. Another study (Davis et al., 1996) examined upward counterfactual thoughts (i.e., thinking about how events could have been avoided) among spinal cord-injured patients. These researchers found that respondents’ self-implicating upward counterfactual thoughts were related to judgments of self-blame, even when other factors such as general causal attributions for the event and foreseeability were statistically controlled. In sum, the literature largely finds a predominance of upward counterfactuals in people’s responses to stressful life events. Even so, the notion that downward counterfactuals may be recruited after stressful life events is supported by research that finds that victims of rape sometimes mention that they could have been killed or experienced even greater violence than was actually the case (Burgess & Holmstrom, 1979). Such research is suggestive that people sometimes naturally generate downward counterfactuals in order to alleviate feelings of threat in response to stressful life events. Downward Social Comparisons and Downward Counterfactual Thinking as Coping Strategies Although the counterfactual literature does not offer much empirical evidence for the use of downward counterfactuals as a coping strategy or as a means of self-enhancement, the social comparison literature is suggestive in this regard. It has been found that when people are threatened, experience failure, or are motivated to self-enhance they often engage in downward social comparison (e.g., Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & LaPrelle, 1985; Wills, 1981) and lower their preferred comparison level (Gibbons et al., 2002). According to selective evaluation theory, those who experience stressful events often employ strategies to make themselves feel comparatively fortunate, thereby mitigating feelings of loss of meaning, perceptions of lack of control, and threats to self-esteem (Taylor, 1983; Taylor et al., 1983). In this way downward social comparisons serve as

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 7 a coping strategy, providing a buffer against stressful life events (e.g., Gibbons & Gerrard, 1991; Taylor, Wayment, & Carrillo, 1996; Wills 1987). For example, although cancer patients make upward social comparisons for informational, affiliative, and inspirational reasons (Taylor & Lobel, 1989), they often evaluate themselves against worse-off others in ways that ameliorate threats to self-esteem (Wood & VanderZee, 1997). Similar evidence for downward comparisons has been found among other threatened individuals such as those with rheumatoid arthritis (Affleck, Tennen, Pfeiffer, Fifield, & Rowe, 1987; Blalock, DeVellis, & DeVellis, 1989; DeVellis et al., 1990), those with spinal cord injuries (Schulz & Decker, 1985), those with AIDS (Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, & Aspinwall, 1991), and the mentally retarded (Gibbons, 1985). There are many parallels to be drawn between social comparison and counterfactual thinking (e.g., Markman et al., 1993, see Olson, Buhrmann & Roese, 2000 for a discussion). It has been noted (e.g., Wood, 1996) that the social comparisons people make are often more appropriately construed as comparisons to counterfactual situations. In fact, social comparisons often are a subset of counterfactual thoughts– by considering how it might be different (i.e., better or worse) to be in another person’s shoes one is implicitly engaging in counterfactual thinking. Thus, factors that increase the desire for selfenhancement may increase downward counterfactual thinking in much the same way as self-enhancement motives increase interest in downward social comparison. Self-Motives and Downward Counterfactual Thinking The puzzle is this: Why is the counterfactual thinking literature short on evidence for the generation of more downward than upward counterfactuals in response to negative life events when other research, such as that on rape, suggests that people often do consider possible worse worlds when dealing with stressful events, and research on social comparison reveals that people often engage in downward social comparison when dealing with negative life events? Although both a self-enhancement and a selfimprovement function have been identified in the counterfactual thinking literature, evidence has more commonly demonstrated upward counterfactual thinking in response to negative life events, and is thus

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 8 suggestive that self-improvement motives predominate. An important theoretical question, then, is what determines which function plays a more prominent role in determining counterfactual generation? The goal of the current research is to examine the conditions under which self-enhancement, rather than selfimprovement motives, dominate in counterfactual thinking. Instead of finding a preponderance of upward counterfactual thoughts, we anticipate that, under conditions that encourage self-enhancement motives, participants will generate more downward than upward counterfactuals. Recent evidence supports the notion that those who are more motivated to buttress the self are more likely to engage in downward counterfactual thinking (Schimel et al., 2001). These researchers found that those who believed they were liked intrinsically by others (and who presumably were less motivated to self-enhance) generated more upward counterfactuals (and fewer downward counterfactuals) than those who did not believe they were liked intrinsically by others. Neither group, however, demonstrated a preference for generating more downward than upward counterfactuals. Other researchers have also found that self-motives are related to the generation of upward and downward counterfactual thoughts (e.g., Sanna, Chang, & Meier, 2001; Sanna et al., 1998, 1999). One noteworthy line of evidence is the finding that optimists (Sanna, 1996, 1998) and those high in self-esteem (Sanna et al., 1998, 1999) are more likely than their counterparts to generate downward counterfactuals in response to negative moods and events. Presumably this is because optimists and those high in self-esteem are motivated to see themselves in a positive light. In another example, Sanna et al. (2001; Study 1) had participants engage in a word association (Remote Associates) task in the laboratory and then view either positive or negative mood-inducing movie clips. Participants then were asked to rate various upward and downward counterfactual statements in a computer task, while keeping particular self-motives (i.e., moodrepair, self-protection, mood-maintenance, or self-improvement) in mind. The results revealed that those with mood-repair motives agreed more with downward counterfactual statements when in bad moods than when in good moods, and more than people with self-improvement, mood-maintenance, or selfprotection motives. These studies involved laboratory tasks to which participants responded to upward

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 9 and downward counterfactual statements. The current studies build upon this research by (a) examining whether people can actively generate more downward than upward counterfactuals in response negative events, (b) determining whether self-enhancement motives can lead to the generation of more downward than upward counterfactuals in response to real-life stressful events as well as in the laboratory, and (c) investigating factors that increase the prominence of self-enhancement motives, thereby leading to an increase in the likelihood of downward counterfactuals. Specifically, we examined the role of event severity (Studies 1, 2, 3), cultural background (Studies 3, 4, & 5), manipulated motives (Study 3), and selfaffirmation (Study 5). Study 1: Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and Counterfactual Thinking Past research suggests that those who are threatened in some way often are motivated to enhance the self. For example, people have been observed to self-enhance in response to self-relevant threats by recruiting downward social comparisons (Wills, 1981; Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985), avoiding upward social comparisons (Pyszczynski et al., 1985), constructing favorable temporal comparisons (McFarland & Alvaro, 2001), derogating outgroups (Crocker et al., 1987), resorting to negative stereotypes (Fein & Spencer, 1997), inflating one’s own self-image (Brown & Smart, 1991; Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985), ascribing traits to others in ways that are self-enhancing (Alicke, 1985; Beauregard & Dunning, 1998), and making self-serving attributions (see Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). In order to begin exploring the conditions under which the self-enhancing function of counterfactuals will be apparent, we conducted a preliminary study with a group of people dealing with an ongoing health threat: Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS). CFS is a condition characterized by severe, disabling fatigue and other symptoms such as musculoskeletal pain, sleep disturbance, impaired concentration, and headaches (Reid, Chalder, Cleare, Hotopf, & Wessely, 2000). While we anticipated that participants would report generating both upward and downward counterfactuals regarding their CFS, we predicted that the latter would be more prevalent. Because CFS is chronic, somewhat uncontrollable, and threatening to the self, it seemed likely that an adaptive response would be one of self-enhancement rather than self-improvement.

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 10 Method Participants. One hundred five respondents with CFS living in the Greater Vancouver area were recruited with the help of an infectious disease specialist and a non-profit organization supporting those with CFS (overall response rate = 73%). The sample was predominantly Caucasian (96%) and female (88%). The mean age in this sample was 47 years. Procedure. Respondents were interviewed in person. An interview was developed to assess key constructs such as counterfactual thinking, psychological adjustment, social support, and causal attributions. The items of interest here are the two questions regarding counterfactual thinking: People with CFS sometimes think about how things might have turned out differently. In some instances, they may think about how things may have turned out better [worse]. For example, they might think, “If only something had been different, I might not have become ill, or things might not have been so bad” [“At least such and such didn’t happen to me” or “Even though I have ME, it would have been worse if such and such had been different”]. Since getting CFS, have you ever had thoughts about how things might have turned out better [worse]?” After each description, participants were asked to report their counterfactual thoughts. The interviews were tape-recorded, and the responses were transcribed. Results and Discussion Participants’ open-ended responses were coded independently by two blind raters for upward and downward counterfactual thoughts. Disagreements between raters were resolved through discussion. Excellent inter-rater reliability was observed for the number of upward, r = .92, p .04, η2 = .04. As predicted, planned contrasts revealed that European-Canadians generated more downward (M = 3.30; SD = 1.37) than upward (M = 2.34; SD = 1.74) prompted counterfactuals, t(117) = 3.10, p < .01. Asian-Canadians generated similar numbers of downward (M = 2.50; SD = 1.43) and upward (M = 2.47; SD = 1.69) prompted counterfactuals. There were no significant cultural differences in the number of spontaneous upward and downward counterfactuals generated, F(1, 117) = 2.24, p < .14, η2 = .02. and there were no significant 3way interactions (culture x motive condition x counterfactual direction) for prompted (p < .3) or spontaneous counterfactuals (p < .7). Study 4 revealed that those given a self-enhancement motive generated more downward than upward counterfactuals, and more downward counterfactuals than those given a self-improvement motive. European-Canadians, who are presumably more motivated to self-enhance, generated more downward than upward counterfactuals, whereas Asian-Canadians did not demonstrate this tendency. Taken together, the results of Study 4 provide support for the notion that both the desire to enhance the self and cultural background are related to the self-enhancement function of counterfactuals. Study 5: Self-Affirmation and Counterfactual Thinking Taken together, the results of the foregoing studies suggest that the affective function of counterfactuals is more appreciable when factors such as (a) event severity, (b) cultural background, and (c) situational factors (e.g., motive instructions) increase the desire to self-enhance. Although Study 4 had

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 26 the advantage of creating a controlled manipulation, a drawback was that goals were explicitly given to participants. It is conceivable that rather than actually adopting the motives they were prescribed, participants may have simply acted on their implicit theories about what they may have done if they had adopted the different motives (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson & Ross, 2000). Thus, although Study 4 is consistent with our thesis that situational factors that augment a desire for self-enhancement will lead to the generation of more downward than upward counterfactuals, we felt it was important to conduct an additional study to examine what people do when they actually possess the motive to enhance the self. In Study 5 a self-affirmation task was used to further explore the links between self-enhancement and the generation of downward counterfactuals. Past research suggests that when individuals are given the opportunity to affirm the self via the acknowledgment of important values, the tendency to selfenhance through other means is attenuated (e.g., Steele, 1988). For example, the tendencies to hinder a close other’s performance after a threatening upward social comparison (Tesser & Cornell, 1991), to engage in downward social comparison (and avoid upward social comparison; Spencer, Fein, & Lomore, 2001), to derogate others when threatened (Fein & Spencer, 1997), to exhibit dissonance reduction (Steele & Liu, 1983), to be resistant to messages that counter one’s views (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000), and to be defensive in light of threatening health information (Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000) all are reduced when people are given the opportunity to self-affirm. Thus, we anticipated that, compared to those who were not given the opportunity to self-affirm, those given the opportunity to self-affirm would be less motivated by self-enhancement and less likely to generate downward counterfactuals after recalling a negative event. Presumably, when given the opportunity to feel better about the self through selfaffirmation, people won’t be as much in need of generating downward counterfactuals to self-enhance. In this way, the self-affirmation paradigm is another vehicle to examine the self-enhancement function of counterfactuals. In addition, we once again examined relations between cultural background and counterfactual thinking. We predicted that European-Canadians would generate more downward than upward

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 27 counterfactuals, whereas Asian-Canadians would show the opposite tendency. The self-affirmation procedure we used not only allows for individual self-enhancement (e.g., traits such as “being independent,” “physical attractiveness,” etc.), but also for relationship enhancement (e.g., values such as “relations with friends and family,” “honesty,” etc.). Past research suggests that although those from more interdependent cultural backgrounds are less likely to exhibit self-enhancement biases, they do appear to exhibit relationship-enhancement (Endo, Heine, & Lehman, 2000). Thus, we remained agnostic on whether cultural background, self-affirmation condition, and counterfactual direction would interact. Method Participants. Seventy participants (60 females and 10 males, mean age = 19.9) completed this study for class credit. We pre-selected European-Canadians (n = 37) and Asian-Canadians (n = 33). In this sample the majority of European-Canadians were of British decent (or British mixed with another European background [61.7%]). The majority of Asian-Canadians was once again mostly of Chinese decent (70.5%). Materials and procedure. Participants completed a study ostensibly regarding personality and reactions to life events in groups of 2-4. Using the same procedure as in the severe event condition in Study 3, participants were asked to recall a traumatic life event and describe the event in writing. After this task (which presumably was somewhat threatening to the self), participants were told by the experimenter that she had forgotten to administer one of the personality measures and that they would now be asked to complete a measure of how people evaluate different values. The self-affirmation manipulation used was a modified version of that used successfully in past research (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000; Fein & Spencer, 1997; Lui & Steele, 1996; Steele, 1988). Specifically, all participants were asked to rank order 11 traits and values (e.g., artistic skills/aesthetic appreciation, sense of humor, relations with friends/family). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the self-affirmation condition participants were asked to write about why their 1st ranked value was important to them, and to describe a time in their lives when that particular value was meaningful to them. In the no self-affirmation condition, participants were asked

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 28 to write about why their 9th ranked value might be important to a typical UBC student, and to describe a time (true or fictitious) when that value was meaningful to someone else. After completing the self-affirmation task, participants completed a questionnaire package. Participants were asked to think back to the stressful life event they had recalled at the beginning of the study, and then were asked about any upward and downward counterfactuals (in counterbalanced order). The wording was similar to that of Study 3, with the exception that participants were asked to report current counterfactual thoughts about the recalled event. Results and Discussion Coding for counterfactuals. Once again, two trained coders coded for upward and downward counterfactuals. All disagreements were resolved through discussion. Good inter-rater reliability was observed for upward, r = .93, p < .0001, and downward, r = .96, p < .0001, counterfactuals. In addition, the type of event recalled was coded for (κ = .93). The most commonly reported events involved death of a loved one (29.7%), a relationship problem such as a break-up or argument (25.7%), injury or illness to self (16.2%), or injury or illness to a loved one (10.8 %). Self-affirmation and counterfactual thinking. We anticipated that participants who were not given the opportunity to self-affirm would generate more downward counterfactuals than those who were given the opportunity to affirm the self. In order to examine this hypothesis, we conducted a 2 (self-affirmation condition: self-affirmation vs. no self-affirmation) x 2(culture: Asian-Canadian vs. European-Canadian) x 2(counterbalancing: upward first vs. downward first) x 2 (counterfactual direction: upward vs. downward) mixed model ANOVA with counterfactual direction as the within-subjects measure. The key interaction between counterfactual direction and self-affirmation condition was statistically reliable, F(1, 62) = 5.78, p < .02, η2 =.09. As anticipated, those who were not given the opportunity to selfaffirm generated significantly more downward counterfactuals (M = 2.82) than those who were given the opportunity to self-affirm (M = 1.74), t(62) = 2.00, p < .05. Participants also generated marginally more downward (M = 2.82) than upward (M = 1.93) counterfactuals in the no-affirmation condition (see Table

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 29 4). There were no significant main effects for counterfactual direction, F(1, 62) = .03, ns, or selfaffirmation condition, F(1, 62) = .57, p > .45, η2 =.009. There was no main effect for counterbalancing, and no significant interactions between counterbalancing and any other variables. Culture and counterfactual thinking. We also examined the prediction that European-Canadians would once again generate more downward than upward counterfactuals, whereas Asian-Canadians would exhibit the reverse pattern. The predicted interaction between culture and counterfactual direction emerged, F(1, 62) = 9.48, p < .01, η2 =.13. European-Canadians generated significantly more downward (M = 2.92) than upward (M = 1.80), t(62) = 2.33, p < .03, counterfactuals, whereas Asian-Canadians generated more upward (M = 2.64) than downward counterfactuals (M = 1.64), t(62) = 2.17, p < .04. There was no significant main effect for culture, F(1, 62) = .47, p > .45, no significant interaction between culture and affirmation condition, F(1, 62) = .20, ns, and no 3-way interaction between culture, self-affirmation condition, and counterfactual direction, F(1, 62) = .39, p >.50. The results of Study 5 indicate that the need to view the self in a positive light, as manipulated through a self-affirmation task, predicted the ratio of upward to downward counterfactuals generated. Specifically, those not given the opportunity to affirm important values generated more downward counterfactuals than those who were given the opportunity to affirm the self. Furthermore, EuropeanCanadians once again generated more downward than upward counterfactuals, whereas Asian-Canadians generated more upward than downward counterfactuals. Thus, Study 5 provides further evidence that cultural background and the desire to self-enhance are factors that lead to the generation of more downward than upward counterfactuals. General Discussion These 5 studies provide converging evidence that event severity, cultural background, manipulated motives, and self-affirmation all act to make the self-enhancing function of counterfactuals more apparent. That is, those experiencing more severe events, those from Western cultural backgrounds, those given a self-enhancement motive, and those unable to affirm the self are more likely to generate downward than

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 30 upward counterfactuals in the face of negative life events. Why do the current results run counter to previous studies that have failed to find much evidence for the generation of downward counterfactuals following negative events (e.g., Roese, 1997)? A key difference between the current set of studies (e.g., Studies 1 and 2) and past research is that whereas many past studies that found a preponderance of upward counterfactuals examined counterfactual thinking in response to mildly negative events, laboratory tasks, or performance-related events (e.g., Markman, et al., 1993; Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Roese & Hur, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995, 1997; Sanna & Turley, 1996; Sanna et al., 1998), we examined responses to more stressful events. The latter set of events are more likely to invoke self-enhancement goals whereas the events studied in previous research are more likely to invoke self-improvement goals. In addition, the current data suggest that only under conditions that invoke self-enhancement motives will people be more likely to engage in downward counterfactual in response to negative life events. It is also noteworthy that some past studies specifically focused on upward counterfactual thinking, asking questions about upward counterfactuals and coding for upward (but not downward) counterfactuals (e.g., Davis et al., 1995, 1996). The Temporal Course of Counterfactual Thinking The divergent results between the current studies and past research may also have to do with the temporal course of counterfactual thinking (see Roese & Olson, 2000). Upward counterfactuals may represent an automatic, default response to stressful life events (see Goldinger, Kleider, Azuma, & Beike, 2003 for evidence that the generation of upward counterfactuals is an automatic process), whereas downward counterfactuals may represent a more controlled, effortful, and deliberate response. In the face of an immediate threat, upward counterfactuals may be generated spontaneously in order to avoid more problems, however when the immediate threat has subsided, downward counterfactuals may be consciously recruited in order to regulate affect. For example, Sanna (2000; see also Roese, Sanna, & Galinsky, in press) has proposed that although the automatic default response to a negative mood may be to generate upward counterfactuals, people (such as those with high self-esteem) can effortfully override their initial upward mental simulations with downward mental simulations. Indeed, recent research on

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 31 mood and social cognition has found that initial mood-congruent responses are reversed and replaced, over time, by mood-incongruent reactions (Forgas & Ciarrochi, 2002). Thus, upward counterfactuals may be more detectable immediately following a negative event, whereas downward counterfactuals may be more detectable some time after the onset of the negative event. Because most lab studies prompt for counterfactuals immediately after the induction of a negative mood or the experience of a negative event, this is another possible explanation for the preponderance of upward counterfactuals in such studies. Stressful Life Events and Counterfactual Thinking We are not suggesting that people will always generate more downward than upward counterfactuals in response to stressful life events. Some life events are so traumatic that it is not conceivable to imagine how things could have been worse (e.g., as may have been the case in the Davis et al. studies [1995, 1996; Davis & Lehman, 1995]). People in such circumstances, or those with certain dispositions (e.g., depressed individuals), may lack the desire to lift their spirits and hence may not engage in downward counterfactual thinking. Although no research has tested this assertion, it seems plausible that there is a curvilinear relation between degree of threat and generation of downward counterfactuals. That is, under low threat very few downward counterfactuals are generated as they are not needed to boost self-esteem. As degree of threat increases, so does the generation of downward counterfactuals. However, if the degree of threat becomes too extreme, it may be that worse alternatives are rarely generated. Direction of Counterfactual Thinking and Affective Outcomes Although intuitively it seems that downward counterfactual thinking will lead to positive affect and upward counterfactual thinking to negative affect, the link between counterfactual direction and affective outcomes may not always be so clear. For example, social comparison research informs us that both upward and downward social comparisons can have positive or negative implications for the self (e.g., Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, & Dakof, 1990). Although contrast effects (i.e., more positive moods and self-ratings in response to a downward comparison target than in response to an upward comparison target) are often exhibited, at times people engaging in social comparison demonstrate assimilation effects.

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 32 That is, they experience favorable responses to upward comparison targets and unfavorable responses to downward comparison targets (Major, Testa, & Blysma, 1991; McFarland, Buehler, & McKay, 2001; Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995). Both assimilation and contrast mechanisms may play an important role in influencing affective reactions to counterfactual thoughts as well (McMullen & Markman, 2000; McMullen, Markman, & Gavanski, 1995; see Markman & McMullen, in press for a review of assimilation and contrast effects in comparative evaluation). Thus, an interesting direction for future research would be to further explore the conditions which lead to assimilation and contrast effects in counterfactual thinking. Future Research Possibilities Would instructing individuals to recruit downward (vs. upward) counterfactuals after experiencing stressful life events help to alleviate negative affect? How do people respond to counterfactuals told to them by others? Individuals may have a tendency to tell others about how things could have been worse in an attempt to lift their spirits. However, such a strategy can backfire as minimizing the severity of the event may not be well received (see Lehman & Hemphill, 1990). In the opening quote, Mayor Giuliani certainly was aware that he should not minimize the events while employing downward counterfactuals to try to alleviate the negative emotions of others. Future research could profitably examine the interpersonal implications of counterfactual thinking, and under what conditions offering downward counterfactuals to others is helpful versus unhelpful. The current research suggests that there are indeed ways of thinking about counterfactual alternatives that can be used to feel better about the self, and future research could examine whether offering these thoughts to others can, under certain conditions, have similar effects.

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Downward Counterfactual Thinking 43 Author Notes Katherine White and Darrin R. Lehman, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia. This research was supported by a SSHRC doctoral fellowship awarded to White and SSHRC operating grants awarded to Lehman. This research was conducted as White’s doctoral dissertation. We thank Steve Heine, Cathy McFarland, Del Paulhus, and Leaf Van Boven for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. We are also grateful to Bree Archibald, Meagan Bibby, Dominique Bigras, Teresa Chan, Collette Hoption, Irene Hui, and Tim Ylagan for their assistance during various phases of this research. Address correspondence to Katherine White, who is now at Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, Canada V5A 1S6. Electronic mail may be sent to White at [email protected].

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 44 Footnotes 1

We use the term self-enhancement to describe people’s desire “…to enhance the positivity of their self-

conceptions and to protect the self from negative information” (Sedikides, 1993, p. 18). We acknowledge, however, that attempts to increase the positivity and decrease the negativity of the self may have distinct antecedents and consequences (e.g., Paulhus & Reid, 1991; Rhodewalt, Morf, Hazlett, & Fairfield, 1991). 2

Gender did not predict number of upward or downward counterfactuals in this, or any of the studies.

Furthermore, gender did not interact with any other independent variables in Studies 2, 3, or 4 to predict any significant variance in counterfactual thinking. Thus gender is not discussed further. 3

There was no main effect for counterbalancing and no interaction between counterbalancing and any

other variable, with one exception: There was a significant interaction between counterbalancing and counterfactual direction, F(1, 67) = 17.57, p < .0001. Participants recalled more upward counterfactuals when upward counterfactuals were elicited first (M = 2.64) than when they were elicited second (M = 1.84). Participants recalled more downward counterfactuals when downward counterfactuals were elicited first (M = 2.76) than when they were elicited second (M = .97). 4

There was a marginal main effect for counterbalancing, F(1, 132) = 2.56, p < .12. Specifically, participants

generated somewhat more prompted counterfactuals when they were asked to generate upward counterfactuals first (M = 2.65) than when they were asked to generate downward counterfactuals first (M = 2.34). However, there were no significant interactions between counterbalancing and any other variables.

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 45 Table 1 Mean Number of Upward and Downward Counterfactuals as a Function of Cultural Background and Event Type (Study 2).

Event Type

Counterfactual Direction

Mild Event Severe Event __________________________________________________ Upward Downward Upward Downward ___________________________________________________________________________ European-Canadian

Asian-Canadian

M = 1.91a

M = 1.54a

M = 1.86a

M = 3.29b

SD = 1.40

SD = 2.22

SD = 2.00

SD = 2.66

M = 2.18ac

M = 1.63ad

M = 3.00c

M = 1.00d

SD = 2.20

SD = 1.77

SD = 2.24

SD = 1.51

___________________________________________________________________________ Note: Numbers indicate the number of counterfactuals reported. Within columns and rows, numbers with differing subscripts differ at least at the p < .05 level, two-tailed. Planned contrasts throughout this paper were calculated as outlined by Howell, 1997.

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 46 Table 2 Ratings of Moods and Motives as a Function of Counterfactual Direction (Study 2).

Upward Counterfactuals

Downward Counterfactuals

___________________________________________________________________________ Positive Mood

M = 2.93a

M =3.72b

Negative Mood

M = 3.81a

M = 2.60 b

Affective Motives

M = 4.17a

M = 5.35 b

Self-Improvement Motives

M = 5.02a

M = 4.29 b

___________________________________________________________________________ Note: Within rows, numbers with differing subscripts differ at least at the p < .05 level, two-tailed.

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 47 Table 3 Generation of Spontaneous and Prompted Counterfactuals as a Function of Motives (Study 3).

Spontaneous Counterfactuals

Motive Condition

Upward Counterfactuals Downward Counterfactuals ______________________________________________

Self-Enhancement (N = 45)

M = 0.17a SD = 0.38

M = 2.78b SD = 2.29

No Motive (N = 47)

M = 0.40c SD = 0.64

M = 0.94d SD = 1.25

Self-Improvement (N = 46)

M = 0.50c SD = 0.78

M =0.45c SD = 0.82

Prompted Counterfactuals Upward Counterfactuals Downward Counterfactuals _______________________________________________ Motive Condition ___________________________________________________________________________________ Self-Enhancement (N = 45)

M = 1.83a SD = 1.27

M = 2.97c SD = 1.74

No Motive (N = 47)

M = 2.73b SD = 1.84

M = 2.56bc SD = 1.57

Self-Improvement (N = 46)

M = 2.59b SD = 1.64

M = 2.36b SD = 1.33

__________________________________________________________________________________ Note: Numbers indicate the number of counterfactuals reported. Within columns and rows, numbers with differing subscripts differ at least at the p < .05 level, two-tailed.

Downward Counterfactual Thinking 48

Table 4 Number of Upward and Downward Counterfactuals Generated in the Self-Affirmation and No Self-Affirmation Conditions (Study 4).

Upward Counterfactuals

Downward Counterfactuals

Affirmation Condition ___________________________________________________________________________

Self-Affirmation N = 34

M = 2.51a SD = 1.84

M = 1.74a SD = 1.59

No Self-Affirmation N = 36

M = 1.93ab SD = 1.59

M = 2.82b SD = 2.75

____________________________________________________________________ Note: Within columns and rows, numbers with differing subscripts differ at least at the p < .05 level, two-tailed. The differences between the numbers of upward and downward counterfactuals generated in the no self-affirmation condition and in the self-affirmation condition are marginally significant at at least the p < .10 level, two-tailed.