Drugs and bullets in Myanmar

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Drugs and bullets in Myanmar As more people in Kachin fall victim to drug abuse, Christian group Pat Jasan is taking matters into its own hands. 08 Feb 2017 11:31 GMT |

David Shaw

Myitkyina, Kachin State, Myanmar Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin state and Myanmar's northernmost region, is a bustling market town and a central trading point between Myanmar, China and India. The state is also renowned for its many illicit and undercover industries, such as jade and gold mining, timber and opium. A large government military presence is heavily felt in the state in reaction to the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) rebellion and local natural resources. The conflict, which escalated again on June 9, 2011, after a 17 year ceasefire, has created thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) across Kachin state. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2015 South East Asia Opium Survey (PDF), heroin production has stayed at stable high levels since 2012, and across Kachin state a drug epidemic has developed. Though the Burmese government has not conducted an official drugs survey, the Transnational Institute has stated that "Myanmar is the world's secondlargest producer of opium after Afghanistan". Just yesterday, on February 7, a Buddhist monk was discovered to be in the possession of massive amounts of methamphetamine tablets. He was arrested when 400,000 pills were discovered in his car as he drove from Shwe Baho village in Rakhine state. A search of his monastery yielded a further four million pills, according to AFP. But the matter is multifaceted and politicised, according to organisations monitoring the problem.

According to Ahgu Khin, steering committee secretary of the churchbased antidrugs organisation Pat Jasan, "The drug issue is made worse because the military uses it as a weapon." He says: "They are fighting the Kachin people with drugs as well as bullets, keeping people addicted. "The Kachin people have been trying to get recognition or independence from the rest of Burma, and that is why many are fighting the government army." On April 25, 2014, in reaction to the growing drug problem, "DDay" was declared by the newly formed anti drugs coalition of church and communitybased activists of Pat Jasan, whose goal is to "completely eradicate 1/5

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drugs from the Kachin people", says Ahgu Khin. The organisation runs awareness and education campaigns, rehabilitation centres and has a vigilante element that arrests and prosecutes drug users and dealers. "The KIA has been trying to destroy the [opium] fields and reduce the drug problem for many years," Ahgu Khin explains (PDF). "They cannot win because the government military allows militias and the Burmese border force to grow and distribute the drugs freely. So the Kachin community and church leaders decided to create Pat Jasan to fight these drugs at a community level." The United States state department's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2016 states that despite Myanmar's government domestic corruption law in 2013, "many in Burma assume senior government officials benefit from narcotics trafficking". However, no highlevel officials have been arrested to date, and this practice, according to the report, is not an official policy of the Burmese government, despite "credible reports" alleging that "midlevel military officers and government officials are engaged in drugrelated corruption". Al Jazeera was unable to reach Myanmar government representatives for comment on this situation. READ MORE: A brief history of war and drugs From Vikings to Nazis

Battling addiction At the Catholic Pat Jasan Rebirth Rehabilitation Centre, recovering drug users play football, study the Bible and sing together as they fight their addictions. The patients are not allowed to leave, and the compound is surrounded by a large metal wall. It is operated by John Zau Aung, a local Catholic relief worker with a long career in helping IDPs, drug users and other people affected by the nearby war. He believes that "there is a political deception because the government and military purposely spread the heroin. The militia groups target poor and young people and the farmers who grow the drugs are paid in heroin, which they either use or sell." Tom Kramer is a political scientist and researcher at the Transnational Institute who has worked for more than 15 years in Myanmar and its border regions. He has found that the military's main concern is security and conflict management rather than drug production. However, the army "has many allied nongovernment militias that they either support or create which are not part of the peace process, and these militias are involved with the production and trafficking of drugs. "It is a very difficult thing to prove, but it is safe to assume that all armed groups, including the Myanmar military, are involved in the drugs trade one way or another," Kramer continues. "For instance, some groups will tax opium farmers in the same way they would tax rice farmers. You can also tax drugs transportation in your area, or drugs production in your area, or even organise drugs production in your area. There can be a whole range of different levels of involvement at a low level. It is much more difficult to get evidence at a high level, even if we know it is there," Kramer notes. "It is such a difficult conflict and to fund this means you would expect that there had to be some involvement from higher levels." This mistrust of outside and governmental programmes is strong throughout the Kachin people. There are rumours of tabletmaking machines on government military bases, as well as the sale of drugs in the governmentrun rehabilitation centres. READ MORE: Poppylands Understanding Myanmar's addiction to heroin

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Bawn Hkaw, 23, is one of the centre's patients. He came voluntarily when he relapsed after previous stays in two other Pat Jasan rehab camps, of which there are currently 29. Bawn Hkaw has been addicted to heroin for four years. He started using drugs in high school, where he had been a "troubled student". Soon after, the drug dealers approached him to sell drugs in the educational establishments he could access with his student card. Ahgu Khin claims that drug usage is very common in the local schools and the Kachin state universities. Pat Jasan's patients often include children as young as 13. Tang Gun, a youth director in several local church organisations and Pat Jasan member, believes that the local environment and natural resources alongside a lack of rule of law play a massive role in the drug epidemic. "In this region, we have a lot of natural resources, so there are lots of immigrants from other states in Myanmar, such as Shan state and even Burma, coming to work in the mines alongside the locals. These people are often paid in heroin, and the conditions are very bad," say Tang Gun. "We have been under the military government for decades, and [in these times], there was a restriction on people coming together or becoming an organisation. No more than five people together in a space, unless it was a religious or family setting. It meant that even though we can see the drugs, we couldn't organise together to change these things or educate the people. Most drug users in Kachin are poor, uneducated and jobless and do not understand what they are getting into, and this was made worse due to years of neglect,"

Tang Gun says.

Tang Nau, 37, is currently a client at the New Life in Christ Centre, a Kachin Baptist Church rehabilitation compound that is small and crowded. Before being admitted for rehabilitation, he was addicted to heroin for 10 years, which he claims to have picked up while working in a jade mine. "Before [rehabilitation], I was doing bad things; lots of drugs," says Tang Nau. "I used to have my own business in the jade mines. We would wait at the bottom, and the bosses would throw the smaller unwanted bits down the mountain, and everyone would run and start fighting to get just a little bit to sell. It gave me lots of stress. Most people at the mines were on drugs. I started there," Tang Nau tells. At another Pat Jasan rehab centre in Myitkyina, local operational volunteers drink tea and discuss their current investigations. Wearing militarystyle vests and soldier's helmets, they look like a small paramilitary force. Pat Jasan's volunteers do not use weapons other than bamboo canes, and many drug users or dealers will fight back during the arrest. John Phung Gan, 45, is one the volunteers responsible for investigating, arrests and guarding some of the centres, but does not worry about his safety. Outside his Pat Jasan duties, he works as a vegetable farmer and occasionally at the jade mines. He sees many people using drugs, including his own friends and relatives, and this is what brought him to volunteering with the organisation. Other volunteers agree. Their personal experiences with family members and friends convinced them to put their own safety on the line by helping the local community. "I feel that it is hard to do it ourselves," says John Phung Gan. "We need cooperation from the government to actually get rid of drugs. The government is always covering up the problems in Kachin state." READ MORE: Crackdowns and cutbacks Indonesia's drug policy

Changing the mindset Many Pat Jasan members have been arrested owing to their activities with the group which have been perceived as harsh and lawless.

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The group, which as of autumn 2016, have no official authority, forcibly detain people. All Pat Jasan clients are required to spend two weeks in the "detox room" a small cage they cannot leave while going through the initial withdrawal process. They are often restrained in this time and defecate in the cage. They are not given any withdrawal relief or medicine. Dr Tun Tun Brang works for Substance Abuse Research Association (SARA), a local drugrelated NGO that offers counselling, education and medical treatment, as well as operate harm reduction programmes. "We have a different strategy for Pat Jasan," Tun Tun Brang says. "SARA has created a harm reduction programme through education, medical advice and a needle exchange as 4050 percent of drug users in Kachin state have HIV. We also try to help reintegrate people back into society by offering vocational training," Tun Tun Brang tells Al Jazeera. "No single treatment will work in regard to addiction. Drug users need an environmental and social change in their lives. There is a huge and inspiring community involvement in this social movement, but the problem is that most of the staff in the camps are not trained in treating addiction neither are many medical doctors," Tun Tun Brangs says. "Physically, yes. Two weeks in the detox room will remove the drugs from their bodies. But in the long term, patients need a drastic environmental change [so as to not relapse]." "Internationally, there has always been a resistance to voluntary harm reduction techniques," says Kramer. "However, there is always a positive outcome." Kramer believes that wider issues in Kachin state and Myanmar need to be addressed before the issue of drugs will be solved. "Opium farmers suffer issues such as poverty and conflict, so will continue to grow the drugs. It is very hard to solve these problems without solving the conflict in Myanmar first," he says.

Spiritual ways Reverend Gyung Hkawng, the chairman of the Pat Jasan steering committee, explains how Pat Jasan's policy is not to use medicine, but to use Christian spiritual ways to treat their clients. "We don't emphasise treatment as we don't believe these programmes will work on the Kachin people. They will not change their mindset through spiritual bondage and using the word of God and prayer." Kramer relates to these feelings. "Heroin is cheap and widely available and this affects the poor, young and students the worst," he says. "There is very little being done to keep drugs off the market in Kachin state, and few services available to people who are using drugs. There is a very strong sentiment in Kachin state that the army is using the drugs as a weapon of war against them," Kramer explains. "This may or may not be the case, but the sentiment is there and this why you have the Pat Jasan movement trying to take matters into their own hands. However, by targeting the opium farmers and drug users, you really are targeting the lower end of the drugs trade. I understand where the Pat Jasan movement is coming from, but I believe their methods to be harsh. Everybody, even drug users, has human rights."

Ahgu Khin disagrees. "Since the start of the war in 2011, more than 500 KIA soldiers have died. However, many more have died from drugs," he says. "It is part of their [the military's] war on the Kachin people. It is clear to see why this firm reaction to drugs has come about in Kachin state, but after decades of isolation and repression, Pat Jasan seem convinced in doing it their own way." Photogallery

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Source: Al Jazeera Drugs Myanmar Asia Health War & Conflict

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The shady players in Myanmar's drugs trade Drug exports from Myanmar continue to escalate, as distinctions between the illicit trade and the 'legal' economy blur. 26 Sep 2012 09:12 GMT |

Francis Wade @Francis_Wade

Francis Wade is a Thailandbased freelance journalist and analyst covering Myanmar and Southeast Asia. Warnings of Myanmar's expanding drugs trade tumble out of the offices of the UN annually, but these days rarely draw a frown. The reports have become a hackneyed reminder that for all the bravado of the government's antidrugs programme, the problem is as intractable as ever: cultivation of poppies has increased yearonyear since 2007, despite promises from Naypyidaw that it'll eliminate the practice by 2014, while militias operating in the mountainous east continue to pump out millions of methamphetamine pills each year, leading some experts to warn that Myanmar could be the world's largest narcotics state. To date the government has largely rejected accusations that it is lax in its approach to the situation. Last month however a police officer in the drugs control department described Warnings of Myanmar's expanding drugs trade tumble out of the offices of the UN annually, but these days rarely draw a frown. The reports have become a hackneyed reminder that for all the bravado of the government's antidrugs programme, the problem is as intractable as ever: cultivation of poppies has increased yearonyear since 2007, despite promises from Naypyidaw that it'll eliminate the practice by 2014, while militias operating in the mountainous east continue to pump out millions of methamphetamine pills each year, leading some experts to warn that Myanmar could be the world's largest narcotics state. To date the government has largely rejected accusations that it is lax in its approach to the situation. Last month however a police officer in the drugs control department described the problem as "very dangerous now" and getting worse, a candid and unusual admission from an official that Myanmar's muchtouted "war on drugs" is a spectacular failure. 1/4

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This is something observers have known for a long time. Last year, around 610 tonnes of opium were produced, with only Afghanistan recording a higher output. The amount of acreage used for growing poppies is also on a continual rise 14 per cent between 2010 and 2011, according to the UN suggesting that a reinvigorated campaign to rid the country of opium farming has not found its target. But opium is no longer the main problem: production of methamphetamine is so vast that Myanmar is most likely a world leader in a market that neighbouring countries have identified as fuelling one of the great regional crises. The police officer's statement has additional uses, however. Smothered by the international chorus of praise over Myanmar's reform process is the government's role in abetting and profiting from the industry. Despite its claims to the contrary, Naypyidaw has done little to tackle the scourge, and the mutually beneficial relationship the former junta enjoyed with production and trafficking rackets continues into the quasidemocratic era. In November last year, the Thailandbased Shan Drug Watch released a report that named seven MPs in President Thein Sein's administration known to be involved in the drugs industry. One of them, T Hkun Mya, was elected to chair the House Bill Committee in the lower house, but is said in the report to have close dealings with a racket that protects drug shipments passing through Namtu in Shan state. Legislator Kyaw Myint meanwhile had been "notorious among local people as a drug dealer in the Shan State North's Namkham township". Khunsai Jaiyen, an expert on Myanmar's drugs trade, told the Democratic Voice of Burma last year that the MPs had "persuaded locals in their constituencies to vote for them by promising to allow poppy growing". Another one not included in the report is Wilson Moe, also a member of the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), who occupies a seat in the upper house. He is thought to be a key member of a Shan group called the Nampong People's Militia Force, led by Colonel Yishay, who is on Thailand's most wanted list. These militia groups, who were set up by the Myanmar army to assist in their operations against rebel groups, "have become key players in the drug trade, both heroin and ATS [amphetaminetype stimulants]", said Shan Drug Watch in June. "Yet government complicity in the tangled drug problem is being conveniently ignored by the international community as it embraces Burma's new administration." Flourishing drug trade The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has historically been reluctant to draw a link between rising narcotics' production and the role of the government, given that asserting a link would jeopardise its ability to work in the country. There has, however, long been an acknowledgement among experts on the trade that at the very least it could not flourish without government complicity, while others contend that the military junta relied on it as a key economic crutch. Some even believe it was an active participant in the production process. It's a view shared by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS), which said in a 2008 paper [PDF] that trafficking of contraband, including narcotics, "remains a lowrisk enterprise, as corruption among officials in Burma's [former] ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), appears to facilitate trafficking and effectively provide the criminal underground immunity from law enforcement and judicial action". Warnings such as these would issue frequently from the halls of Washington prior to the US beginning a programme of engagement with the government following the 2010 elections. Now, however, despite Myanmar remaining on the US "watch list" of narcostates, the criticism is muted. Yet with Aung San Suu Kyi successfully lobbying for the removal of sanctions on Myanmar, the US finds itself in a tricky position: while ending the blockade would allow US businesses to enter Myanmar, it would also free up a number of names on Washington's blacklist who are there because of their role in the drugs trade. 2/4

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This includes the likes of Stephen Law, son of Lo Hsing Han, who respectively manage and chair Asia World, the largest conglomerate in Myanmar, which built Naypyidaw's new airport. Lo Hsing Han is widely believed to have set up Asia World as a front for laundering the millions he earned as one of the region's most notorious heroin kingpins. Former prime minister Khin Nyunt had allowed Lo Hsing Han to continue in the drugs trade, even ensuring he would win lucrative business contracts that would help disguise his earnings, in return for negotiating ceasefires with powerful ethnic groups. Among these was the United Wa State Army (UWSA), one of Southeast Asia's largest drugproducing entities which continues to manufacture methamphetamine and heroin free of pressure from the Myanmar government, helped along by a ruling in the 2008 constitution that allows it complete control over two "selfadministered districts" in northeastern Shan state. As well as drug production, the UWSA has more legitimate business interests: Aik Hauk, the son of UWSA founder Bo Yiouxang, owns Yangon Airways, one of only a handful of domestic airlines in Myanmar. The relationship exemplifies how tight the nexus between the black market operators and the "legal" economy is. Kickbacks What then appears to have been forgotten amid the hype surrounding this new era in Myanmar is that many figures in the narcotics industry who once received tacit support from the military regime are alive and well, some enjoying life as MPs while others have become key players in a blossoming business arena. With the prospect of sanctions ending, they could be at the forefront of Myanmar's drive to court western businesses. The government has publicised a reinvigorated antiopium drive, even inviting journalists along to poppy eradication exercises deep in the hills of Shan state. It also holds annual drug burning ceremonies at which diplomats and UN officials are presented with supposedly hard evidence of Naypyidaw's good intentions. Seizures are also on the increase, with July alone seeing raids that netted 1.4 million methamphetamine pills. But these are a fraction of the total amount produced, and certainly do not all make it to the yearly bonfire where they go to from the police station is anybody's guess. The reasons behind the government's reluctance to really tackle the trade become clear when one understands the profits it has historically reaped. The CRS estimated in 2008 that "illicit narcotics reportedly generate between $1 billion and $2 billion annually in exports [from Myanmar]". Bertil Lintner, a prominent authority on the regional trade, writes in his book, Merchants of Madness, that "black money is laundered white, playing an important role in the local economies of countries that produce or consume narcotics". Precisely how much of that money goes to entities associated with the Myanmar government is impossible to say, but a diverse cross section of state officials will have benefitted, right from the regional army commanders who levy a tax on opium growers to more senior governmental figures who receive kickbacks from druglords in order that they can operate with impunity. Despite the government's drive to legitimate itself in the eyes of the international community, little seems to have changed. Indeed areas of its reform programme, namely the ceasefires signed between Naypyidaw and various armed groups known to be kneedeep in the industry, could in fact bolster the drug trade. As observers like Joshua Kurlantzick have noted, the peace deals could provide ulterior dividends to these groups, including "longer periods of time in which they can run their [drugs] operations without much government interference". Moreover, the government's antiopium campaigns in the mid1990s were perhaps the key driver of the rise of methamphetamine production, given the woeful lack of cropsubstitution programmes that are integral to any drug eradication schemes.

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The police officer's statement last month could be a veiled appeal for more international funding for eradication and substitution, but it should also provide a warning to the UN that it is endemic corruption and complicity, not lack of money, that has ensured Myanmar's continued status as world leader in the drugs industry. Eradication campaigns may be a means to divert attention from the ongoing role of the state, which requires greater urgency now as western countries apparently so aghast at the global scourge from narcotics draw closer to Myanmar. Francis Wade is a freelance journalist and analyst covering Myanmar and Southeast Asia. Follow him on Twitter: @Francis_Wade

Source: Al Jazeera Politics US & Canada Afghanistan China Myanmar Tell us what you think CONTINUE READING

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Neighborhood Watch: Kachin Youths Team up to Tackle Drugs in Eastern Myanmar

Features

Neighborhood Watch

https://www.irrawaddy.com/features/neighborhoodwatch.html

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A determined group of Kachin youth face an uphill battle to eradicate drugs from their community.

By BRENNAN O’CONNOR

19 May 2015

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  A heroin addict injects the drug in a field in Lashio. (Photo: Brennan O’Connor)

LASHIO, Shan State — Fed up with the daily sight of drug users in their local neighborhood, Ah Zeng and other Kachin youth leaders decided to take matters into their own hands. “At the time we didn’t have a good plan. We just didn’t like these drugs in our area,” said Ah Zeng, a resident of Block 5, a small neighborhood set on a mountain just north of Lashio in northern Shan State. Ten Kachin youth leaders formed a small association last year called the White Group supported by the Kachin Baptist Church. They began educating other young people in their community on the dangers of using drugs. They also began night patrols aimed at warning drug dealers and users—who often came to the mountain from other areas of Lashio to use drugs—to move on. Support for White Group has grown, attracting many young people in the community. They planned to open a drug rehabilitation center for users in the neighborhood very soon. However, their work has not been without its setbacks. https://www.irrawaddy.com/features/neighborhoodwatch.html

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One night last September, several youth and village leaders confronted a known local drug dealer after he was observed meeting an addict near his home. According to Ah Zeng, two village leaders struck him on the head and he ran away. He returned shortly afterwards with his father. When the suspected dealer attacked one of the village leaders with a stick, the youth group retaliated. One member broke the man’s jaw. Two weeks later, 10 members of the group found themselves in court, where they were ordered to pay 4 million kyat (about US$3,900) to the suspected dealer’s father in order to avoid prosecution. They were forced to borrow money from people in their local community to cover the fine and so far have only been able to pay back half the loan. Meanwhile, the alleged dealer’s wife was recently incarcerated for using heroin, Ah Zeng said. An Uphill Battle The Block 5 neighborhood has long been a favorite meeting spot for drug users. “Our village is a good place to sell and use [drugs] because there is a forest behind the Chinese temple where they can hide from police raids,” Ah Zeng said. “When the children went to school they would see needles on the street and people using drugs.” Myanmar remains the second-largest producer of opium in the world after Afghanistan, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s annual Southeast Asia Opium Survey for 2014. The overwhelming majority of poppy cultivation takes place in Shan State. The report found that a total of 57,600 hectares in northern Myanmar was under opium poppy cultivation in 2014, compared to a low of 21,600 hectares in 2006. It also documented spiraling rates of drug use in the region, warning that the use of opium more than doubled and the use of heroin and amphetamine-type stimulants tripled in poppy-growing areas of northern Myanmar from 2012 to 2014. Block 5 was already infamous in Lashio as a place to buy and use drugs when U Sein Linn, a traditional ethnic Palaung doctor, moved to the area around 20 years ago. U Sein Linn said that after the Myanmar Army built an infantry base not far from Block 5, the road to Mong Yaw—a town about two hours’ drive away with many poppy farms— was greatly improved, making it easier to transport drugs to the local community. However, since the youth group formed last year, U Sein Linn said he had seen a visible reduction in the number of drug addicts in the area. Zau Bawk, a pastor at the Eden Kachin Baptist Church near Block 5, is a former heroin addict. He managed to kick a 12-year addiction with the support of his family and friends and his religious faith. https://www.irrawaddy.com/features/neighborhoodwatch.html

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With two friends, one of whom lost a brother to drugs, and the support of the Kachin Baptist Church, Zau Bawk helped establish a drug rehabilitation center for male youth about seven miles outside of Lashio. They used group therapy, prayer sessions and agricultural activities to help youths overcome their addiction. Zau Bawk estimated that he helped around 3,700 addicts kick the habit during the five years he served as the center’s director. Since resigning in order to better support his family, Zau Bawk said these days the center isn’t as effective as it once was because none of the current staff have personal experience with drugs. During his time there, when patients would seem hopeless and say they still hungered for the drug, Zau Bawk would draw on a simple, yet effective, inspiration. “I told them that I used to be a drug user, yet I stopped,” he said. This article originally appeared in the May 2015 issue of The Irrawaddy magazine. Topics: A_Factiva, Features, Magazine

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Brennan O’Connor The Irrawaddy

Asia

Roads Before Welfare: India’s Modi Faces Dissent Over Spending Shakeup

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Yangon's desolate monument to the war on drugs | Frontier Myanmar

Yangon's desolate monument to the war on drugs Yangon's desolate monument to the war on drugs Wednesday, December 21, 2016 Share 52

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Open to the public but almost forgotten, Yangon’s towering and lavish National Drug Elimination Museum is a living relic of military propaganda. By JARED DOWNING | FRONTIER Photos NYEIN SU WAI KYAW SOE

AS USUAL, Police Major Nyi Nyi Lynn’s antidrug museum is almost empty. His footsteps echo through the dim hallways lined with portraits of retired generals, dioramas of British and Burmese soldiers bayonetting one another, and a replica poppy plant, two metres tall. One display features a towering map of the country and promises a drugfree Myanmar by 2015. “The plan has been extended five years,” Nyi Nyi Lynn said matteroffactly, as if eradicating the poppy and methamphetamine trade were no different than a new highway project.

http://frontiermyanmar.net/en/yangonsdesolatemonumenttothewarondrugs

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Nyein Su Wai Kyaw Soe / Frontier But the major has been fighting drugs in Myanmar for 35 years, and he is patient. He formerly served as a tax officer in the Drug Enforcement Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs, and claimed he took on so many extra duties that the stress eventually gave him cancer. “My stomach, my spleen, my pancreas, I gave these for my country,” he said. After recovering, he was made chief of the ministry’s new National Drug Elimination Museum, which – as skirmishes raged in border areas and Senior General Than Shwe’s Myanmar found itself on international drug trafficking watch lists – would be a tangible symbol of the government’s devotion to peace and development.

The ribbon was cut on June 26, 2001, the International Day Against Drug Abuse, as police officers ceremonially incinerated the year’s drug seizures.


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Nyein Su Wai Kyaw Soe / Frontier Now the windows of the towering white building in Yangon’s Kamaryut Township are dark. The great fountain in the sprawling compound is dry and rusting, and the beautiful Japanese grass is overgrown with weeds. Inside the vast atrium, a mannequin farmer leads his buffalo through a field of

blooming poppy. He has been carefully dusted, but the lights are off, and the artificial stream that runs through his field hasn’t been filled for years. “All displays are electronic, but they were turned off day by day,” Nyi Nyi Lynn said, arriving at an interactive display that invites visitors to help police incinerate a pile of drugs. Embarrassed, Nyi Nyi Lynn spends several minutes flipping switches on wall panels until it activates.


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Nyi Nyi Lynn, the manager of Yangon's National Drug Elimination Museum. (Nyein Su Wai Kyaw Soe / Frontier) Nyi Nyi Lynn and his team do their best to maintain the place, but other than the wages for a skeleton staff, the ministry has left the museum to fend for itself.

Most visitors are students on field trips, who don’t pay an entry fee, and the occasional tourist after reading about the “insight into the strangeness and paranoia that has pervaded Burmese society for decades,” as

Vice described it, or simply a “brutalist eyesore,” according to the Atlantic.


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Nyein Su Wai Kyaw Soe / Frontier The museum isn’t technically “brutalist” (the architecture more resembles the stately, white, government complexes in Nay Pyi Taw), but the term

captures the sentiment of the visitors who poke fun at the bizarre testament of military propaganda and ask themselves, in the era of the National League for Democracy, why the museum is still open? Nyi Nyi Lynn has an answer. “This government, they don’t even know the drug museum is still in Yangon,” he said, adding, “But everybody local is interested in our museum.” “Everybody local” includes bigname developers who Nyi Nyi Lynn says still covet the prime museum site, which borders the Junction Square shopping mall. Nyi Nyi Lynn reckons the site is worth K700,000 (about US$530) a square foot.


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Nyein Su Wai Kyaw Soe / Frontier He said the museum spent the last decade only a handshake away from being sold to one of the country’s prominent business families, as was the site for Junction Square. Both plots were once Yangon’s largest cemetery.

In a way, Nay Pyi Taw was the drug museum’s saving grace: After it became the capital in November 2005 there were only two big museums left in Yangon (the other being the National Museum) and officials needed something to show foreign dignitaries visiting the city. Among them was United Nations SecretaryGeneral Mr Kofi Annan.

Now the museum is safer than ever. The NLD government is unlikely to risk accusations of favouritism by selling the land to a private developer, and the Ministry of Home Affairs has little reason to bother with its obscure passion project from 2001.

Nyein Su Wai Kyaw Soe / Frontier


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The Drug Elimination Museum more or less holds its fate in its own hands, and Nyi Nyi Lynn isn’t changing anything. He believes in his museum. “The main ambition is that people and students visit our museum and gain knowledge that drugs are dangerous,” he said in the same sincere, matteroffact tone.

That Myanmar hasn’t succeeded in ending its drug trade makes his museum all the more relevant, and he has kept everything exactly as it has been since the ribbon was cut (except for photos featuring former Military Intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt, which were removed after he was arrested during a power struggle in 2004).

Nyein Su Wai Kyaw Soe / Frontier The exhibits (originally designed by Daw Nu Myat San of the Ministry of Culture, who also designed the National Museum) depict the history of Myanmar from the time of Portuguese colonists and the British opium wars. They cast drugs as a great, foreign antagonist that has plagued the country, from individual addicts to the unruly rebels ensnared in its trade.


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On the top floor, educational displays about heroin and methamphetamine are juxtaposed with murals of thriving crops, models of bridges and photos of generals shaking hands with ethnic leaders overjoyed to be returning to the “legal fold”.

It is a narrative free of human rights abuses, corruption and greed, and it has been almost perfectly preserved in a bureaucratic buddle at the corner of Hanthawaddy and Kyun Taw roads. You can see it for K4,000.

Nyi Nyi Lynn will retire next year. He doesn’t know who will replace him after he leaves, but he is confident they will carry on the good work. 0

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Jared Downing Jared Downing is an American journalist from Colorado and Alabama. He likes podcasts, radio theatre and hitchhiking and collects cans of sardines from around the world. 0 Comments

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The peace process: Stalled but not dead 23 Oct 2015


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Central Committee for Drug Abuse control

Evidence for enhancing resilience to opium poppy cultivation in Shan State, Myanmar Implications for alternative development, peace, and stability March 2017

Research

In Southeast Asia, UNODC supports Member States to develop and implement evidence based rule of law, drug control and related criminal justice responses through the Regional Programme 2014-2018 and aligned country programmes including the Myanmar Country Programme 2014-2018. This study is connected to the Mekong MOU on Drug Control which UNODC actively supports through the Regional Programme, including the commitment to develop data and evidence as the basis for countries of the Mekong region to respond to challenges of drug production, trafficking and use. UNODC’s Research and Trend Analysis Branch promotes and supports the development and implementation of surveys globally. The development and dissemination of this report has been made possible with financial contributions from the Governments of China, Japan and the United States of America.

UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific Telephone: +6622882100 Fax: +6622812129 Email: [email protected] Website: www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific Twitter: @UNODC_SEAP

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNODC concerning the legal status of any country, territory or city, or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................. iii 1. Introduction: implications for alternative development, peace, and stability ........................ 1 2. Analysis of the survey evidence............................................................................................. 5 2.1 Prevalence of opium poppy cultivation in Shan State ............................................................. 5 2.2 Economic indicators of opium poppy cultivation .................................................................... 8 2.3 Major causes of opium poppy cultivation: Remoteness and limitations in infrastructure and services ..................................................................................................................................... 14 2.4. Causes and consequences of opium poppy cultivation: the dual roles of income inequality, food insecurity and weak governance ........................................................................................ 26 2.5. Village headmen’s perceived reasons for why farmers decide to grow opium poppy in Shan State ......................................................................................................................................... 30 2.6 Village headmen’s perceived reasons for why farmers have never grown opium poppy or why they stop cultivation ................................................................................................................. 31 2.7 Alternatives to opium poppy income after stopping cultivation ............................................ 32 2.8 Dependency and conservation status of forest resources and implications of climate change in opium poppy and non‐poppy villages ........................................................................................ 37

3. Government‐reported opium poppy eradication and seizures ............................................. 41 4. Recommendations and conclusions .................................................................................... 47 Appendix 1: Description of SDG indicators included in the “spider” graphs of the Executive Summary and Recommendations ........................................................................................... 51 Appendix 2: Survey methodology ........................................................................................... 52 Appendix 3: Socio‐economic questionnaire 2016 .................................................................... 59

Evidence for enhancing resilience to opium poppy cultivation in Shan State, Myanmar

Abbreviations CCDAC

Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control

GOUM

Government of the Republic of the Union on Myanmar

ICMP

UNODC Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme

RAB

Research and Analysis Branch

PDMU

Programme Management and Development Programme

SR

Special Region

UNODC

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Acknowledgements This report was prepared by the Research and Trend Analysis Branch (RAB), Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs (DPA), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, under the supervision of Jean-Luc Lemahieu, Director of DPA, and Angela Me, Chief of RAB. In the field, supervision was undertaken by Jeremy Douglas, Regional Representative, Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control Pol. Maj. Gen. Zaw Win

Chief of Myanmar Police Force, Secretary of CCDAC

Pol. Brig. Gen. Kyaw Win

Commander of Drug Enforcement Division, Joint Secretary of CCDAC

Pol. Col. Zaw Lin Tun

Head of Project Management Department, CCDAC

The implementation of the survey would not have been possible without the support of the local administrations and the dedicated work of 129 surveyors. UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific Jeremy Douglas

Regional Representative, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

Tun Nay Soe

Regional Coordinator, Global SMART Programme

Akara Umapornsakula

Graphic and Web Designer

UNODC Myanmar Troels Vester

Country Manager

San Lwin Htwe

Remote Sensing/GIS Specialist and Survey Coordinator

Zaw Win

GIS Analyst

Naing Lin Aung

Data Analyst

UNODC Research and Trend Analysis Branch (RAB) Angela Me

Chief, RAB

Anja Korenblik

Chief, PDMU

Coen Bussink

Programme Officer (Research)

Jaqueline Garcia-Yi

Research Officer

Lorenzo Vita

Programme Officer (Remote Sensing and GIS)

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ii


Executive Summary In 2016, the annual village survey was conducted in 591 villages in Shan state, the main opium poppy cultivating area in Myanmar. An independent area estimation was not part of the survey this year; however, UNODC expanded largely on the socio‐economic analysis of opium cultivation in the context of the UN Guiding Principles on Alternative Development and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Opium poppy continues to be an important part of the Shan State economy About 1 in 10 households in the villages surveyed in Shan State are directly involved in opium poppy cultivation. The share of villages that cultivate opium poppy and the share of households within these villages that participate have both decreased over the past year. However, opium poppy is still integral to the state’s economy, and there are many households who depend on poppy cultivation for their livelihood. Figure 1: Change in the share of surveyed villages in Shan State that cultivate opium poppy, and the share of households in opium cultivating villages that are involved in cultivation, 2015‐2016 80%

69%

60% 40%

49% 31% 22%

20%

Share of villages that cultivate opium poppy Share of households involved (in poppy villages)

0% 2015

2016

Fewer villages and farmers are growing opium poppy There has been a reduction in the number of villages and households involved in opium poppy cultivation; however, accompanied by an increase in the average area under cultivation per household. The average area under opium poppy cultivation increased from 0.4 hectares per household in 2015 to 0.6 hectares in 2016. This concentration of cultivation confirms earlier observations. The average income in opium poppy villages is higher, but the positive impact on household finances is largely offset by higher costs of living The average annual household income is higher in villages where opium poppy is cultivated (US$2,261) than in non‐opium poppy villages (US$1,839). Farmers in opium poppy villages, however, were primarily buying food with the income from poppy cultivation. Moreover, there are several indications that people living in villages where opium poppy is grown face higher living costs than their peers in non‐opium poppy villages. Many opium poppy villages in East and North Shan are located in remote or highly inaccessible areas with low infrastructure coverage. For example, very few opium poppy villages have asphalt roads, and somewhat fewer of these villages have clinics than non‐growing villages (although village clinics are rare throughout East and North Shan, with such facilities operating in less than one in five villages). The nearest outside clinic also took twice as long to reach from opium poppy villages. The lack of clinics and roads means that health and transportation costs are higher for farmers in opium poppy villages in East and North Shan.

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Figure 2: Shares of villages in East and North Shan with clinics and asphalt roads, by opium poppy cultivation status 35%

30%

30% 25%

22% 19%

20% 15%

14% 15%

12%

10% 5%

Villages with clinics Villages with asphalt roads

6% 0%

0% East Shan

North Shan

Opium poppy villages

East Shan

North Shan

Non‐opium poppy villages

Farmers in opium poppy villages face challenges in relying only on licit sources of income Across Shan State, cash crops – licit or illicit – are the main source of income for farmers. In non‐ opium poppy villages, cash crops, primarily rice, were cited as the primary source of income by nearly half of all surveyed village headmen. Before deciding to substitute opium poppy with licit crops, farmers would need to consider some challenges. Access to local markets for agricultural products is critical. None of the opium poppy cultivating villages had local markets, whereas 8 per cent of the non‐opium poppy villages had them. Moreover, the nearest market took more than two hours to reach on foot from opium poppy villages, compared to just under an hour from non‐ opium poppy villages. Daily wages were also markedly lower in poppy‐cultivating villages; the difference was greatest for male workers. These challenges make it more difficult to earn a living from licit activities in opium poppy villages than in villages where opium poppy is not grown. Distinct motivations for growing opium poppy in South Shan Several sustainable development indicators show a different situation in South Shan in comparison to East and North Shan. Villages which cultivate opium poppy in South Shan still have low levels of development but their characteristics are different from those in East and North Shan. In South Shan, the average income is higher and the infrastructure better than in East and North Shan, and more people are able to access salaried jobs, which are usually better remunerated and more stable. Moreover, according to the village headmen, the majority of households in South Shan, regardless of their opium poppy cultivation status, do not need to resort to drastic strategies to cope with food insecurity, such as reducing the number of meals per day, in contrast to East and North Shan. The higher incomes, better infrastructure and food security status in South Shan may indicate that opium poppy cultivation is primarily driven by capital accumulation, while in East and North Shan, cultivation seems to be more closely linked with subsistence needs. However, the relatively high income inequality among farmers in opium poppy villages in South Shan may suggest that there are a number of farmers who are not able to make ends meet also there. People in opium poppy villages are more dependent on forest resources, and more prone to experiencing environmental and climate‐related challenges Many households across Shan State depend on wood from local forests for cooking, particularly in villages where opium poppy is cultivated. More village headmen from opium poppy villages reported declining local forest quality in the last two years than their peers from non‐opium poppy villages. The quality of the drinking water is another concern, and again, the problem is more pronounced in opium poppy villages. There are also indications that opium poppy villages seem to

iv


be somewhat more affected by climate related shocks, like frost or drought, which could decrease crop yields and increase the price of food. Figure 3: Shares of villages in Shan State that rely on forest wood for cooking and report having poor quality drinking water, by opium poppy cultivation status 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

85% 75% 65% 53% Opium poppy villages Non‐opium poppy villages

Reliance on forest wood

Poor quality drinking water

Governance and security conditions seem to affect opium poppy cultivation levels While many factors affect farmers’ decisions regarding whether or not to cultivate opium poppy, governance and security considerations have a considerable impact. The UNODC survey results show that good security conditions and stable governance are associated with less opium poppy cultivation. This link has been observed in many areas where illicit crops are cultivated (for example, in Afghanistan or Colombia) which are isolated and plagued by ethnic and other conflicts or political instability. In this respect, the ongoing peace process in conflict areas may bring further improvements to governance and security which can have a tangible impact and reduce opium poppy cultivation. At the same time, law enforcement played a significant role in farmers’ decisions regarding opium poppy cultivation. When asked about the main reasons why farmers in their village stopped growing opium poppy, headmen in 29 per cent of the surveyed opium poppy villages cited fear of eradication by the Government. Moreover, headmen in nearly half of opium poppy villages reported that a government ban on opium poppy was one of the top three reasons why some farmers chose to revert from opium poppy to licit crops. Scope for development There are also some remarkable differences in the development stage of opium growing and non‐ growing villages. As shown in the graph below, there is a development gap – measured as the distance between the attainment of the sustainable development goal indicators in the communities affected by opium cultivation compared to attainment in communities without poppy cultivation ‐ particularly in areas related to security, environment, inequality, job opportunities and infrastructure.

v


Shan State SDG 1: No poverty (normalized income) SDG 2: No hunger (coping without SDG 16: Peace and institutions 1 reducing # meals) (perception of safety) 0.8 SDG15: Life on land (non‐ SDG 3: Health (availability of clinic) 0.6 deteriorated quality forest) SDG 13: Climate (no crop shocks related to climate change) SDG 12: Responsible consumption (no collecting forest wood for cooking)

0.4 0.2

SDG 4: Education (availability of school)

0

SDG 10: Reduced inequalities (income allowing savings)

SDG 5: Gender equality (no different wage men and women) SDG 6: Water and sanitation (availability of good quality water)

SDG 7: Energy (availability of public SDG 9: Infrastructure (availability of electricity) asphalt roads) SDG 8: Work (availability of internal market to sell crops) Non‐opium‐poppy village

Opium‐poppy village

Implications for policy The data collected through the village survey in Shan State confirms that, with some exceptions, villages where opium poppy is cultivated have lower levels of development and perceived safety levels than villages without cultivation. The survey has highlighted the diverse socioeconomic situations found within Shan State and the differences between and within regions. The diversity of conditions and factors associated with poverty and opium poppy cultivation need to be acknowledged and taken into account when designing and implementing alternative development interventions. For example, infrastructure‐related needs seem to be most urgent in East and North Shan, whereas income inequality is of more concern in South Shan. In order to better understand the most pressing development needs, carrying out a targeted situation analysis, with a particular focus on the poorest in Shan State, would be helpful. This report is building an evidence base and sharing lessons learned to better understand the needs of opium poppy and non‐opium poppy villages across Shan State. Further monitoring and evaluation must not only continue, but also delve deeper into these complex interactions to better understand what is happening and why, and how progress towards the achievement of a sustainable development outside the illegal economy. The extensive historical databases from the annual village surveys conducted by UNODC can be used as guidance for these analyses. The existence of direct and indirect linkages between conflict and illicit drug cultivation means that any intervention must also deal with conflict mitigation or resolution. Depending on the local context, this may mean that strategies and programmes that help households and communities cope with the causes and consequences of conflict should be developed. This is particularly relevant for the ongoing peace process and cease‐fire commitment to stop drug production and trafficking in the conflict areas of Shan state where large parts of the opium cultivation takes place. The survey results show that law enforcement and the fear for eradication by the Government is an important reason for farmers to abstain from opium cultivation, which suggest that law enforcement measures could enhance the resilience to opium poppy cultivation. However, evidence from other illicit crop cultivation areas shows that interventions focused on suppression only can have adverse consequences on stability and security, as well as on poverty alleviation. Based on more than 40 years of experience and lessons learned, the UN Guiding Principles on

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Alternative Development recommend to “target illicit cultivation […], and address related factors, by alleviating poverty, by strengthening the rule of law and institutional frameworks, as appropriate, and by promoting sustainable development aimed at enhancing the welfare of the population” and to implement alternative development in concert with broader drug control policies, including demand reduction, law enforcement, illicit crop elimination and awareness‐ raising. UNODC is assisting the Government of Myanmar in implementing an alternative development strategy, and has been requested to increase support in this area. UNODC has therefore developed several projects to improve short‐ and medium‐term access to food and income. The scale of these programmes requires significant large funds to become effective at a regional level, however. Successful implementation of a national drug control strategy is also dependent on international efforts to control drug trafficking and organized crime in the region. A comprehensive approach is needed to tackle the challenges that may be posed by the possible links between drug trafficking, corruption and different forms of organized crime. Owing to the transnational nature of drug‐ related crimes, coordinated cross‐border collaboration and alternative development activities are important, where appropriate and feasible, which requires support of the international community.

vii


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1. Introduction: implications for alternative development, peace, and stability The majority of opium production in Southeast Asia is confined to parts of Myanmar, especially Shan State, which hosts a number of ethnic armed groups. While the opium producers and small traffickers are often coming from these groups and are usually poor, the main profits are made further along the trafficking routes by buyers and traders in Southeast Asia who are involved with the opium/heroin market and other illegal activities. Heroin and opium continue to be important sources of financing for organized crime groups and the success of the peace process in Myanmar will largely be dependent on successfully tackling the complex drugs and conflict situation. The UN Guiding Principles on Alternative Development, adopted in 2013, reaffirm that the drug problem remains a common and shared responsibility that requires international cooperation, and an integrated and balanced approach to supply and demand reduction strategies. At the supply level, they recognize and position alternative development as an integral component of drug control policies. Under the Guiding Principles, alternative development comprises the policies specifically focused on tackling poverty and providing livelihood opportunities outside the illicit crop economy to local communities. The Guiding Principles also encourage Member States to apply a broad range of socio‐economic and environmental indicators to monitor and ensure that current and future alternative development interventions are in line with national and international development objectives, including the Sustainable Development Goals. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted by Member States in September 2015. The SDGs cover different topics related to development, including income poverty, health, education and forest quality. More specifically, the SDGs have 169 targets to be achieved by 2030, with an associated 230 global indicators1. Among the targets associated with Sustainable Development Goal 16, those related to the rule of law and access to justice and reducing violence, economic crime (corruption and bribery), organized crime and illicit financial flows all have significant links with the drug problem and with the response to it. The SDGs recognize the need to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies that provide equal access to justice and that are based on respect for human rights (including the right to development), effective rule of law and good governance at all levels, and transparent, effective and accountable institutions. In 2016, the outcome document from the UN General Assembly on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS) recognizes that the efforts to achieve the SDGs and effectively address the world drug problem, through alternative development, are complementary and mutually reinforcing.2 To support the implementation of alternative development initiatives and the SDG agenda, a better understanding of the links between poverty, illicit drug cultivation, production and trafficking is required3. Since 1999, UNODC has been monitoring illicit crop cultivation areas and socio‐ economic conditions in rural villages in different supply countries. In most countries, the results indicate that illicit crop cultivation and poverty are closely interlinked, coupled with other development issues, for example security and governance4. Examples from countries supplying illicit crops have shown that comprehensive alternative development programmes along with

1

UN Statistical Commission. Global Indicator Framework. Accessed in December 12, 2016: http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/03/un‐statistical‐commission‐endorses‐global‐indicator‐framework/ 2 UNGASS. 2016. Resolution A/ RES/S‐30/1 containing outcome document entitled "Our joint commitment to effectively addressing and countering the world drug problem". 3 UN Economic and Social Council. 2016. Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals. 4 UNODC. 2016. World Drug Report.

1


programmed law enforcement interventions can have positive sustainable development outcomes in affected villages and assist in restoring the rule of law.5 In Myanmar, some 55,500 hectares of opium poppy were cultivated in 2015, almost all (90 per cent) in Shan State6. In 2016, UNODC conducted a survey in a representative sample of 591 villages in the opium poppy cultivation risk area in Shan State7 and gathered socio‐economic and other relevant data to compare the situation between these two types of villages. The aims were to identify possible socio‐economic differences between villages that may be generating incentives for opium‐poppy cultivation; and to evaluate the current status of opium poppy villages in relation to alternative development needs, and their challenges ahead for achieving the SDGs. This report analyses this information, but it does not include estimates of opium poppy cultivation area and opium production. It also does not include socio‐economic analyses from areas outside Shan State. Since 2011, Myanmar has been undergoing a period of political transition and Myanmar’s economy has been increasingly opened8. In a few years, almost every aspect of life has been affected by fundamental economic and political reforms aimed at improving the living conditions of the population9. This report aims to contribute to this process by providing evidence to assist in building resilience of rural communities to opium poppy cultivation, and to improve the understanding of the different challenges that the villages in Shan State are currently facing to achieve sustainable development within a legal economy. A mix of alternative development10 and law enforcement interventions conceived and embedded as fully integrated components of comprehensive regional rural development policies can help to reduce opium poppy cultivation. Although this report provides an overview of the root causes of opium poppy cultivation and main considerations for designing alternative development strategies, their final outline requires careful adaptation to the evolving local contexts, including the identification and promotion of optimal rural household dynamics and livelihood strategies, which also strengthen the ecosystem and environmental conditions and social institutions of the villages.

5

UNODC. 2015. World Drug Report. UNODC. 2015. Southeast Asia Opium Survey. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar. 7 The sampling frame excludes the Western parts of South and North Shan (see methodology). 8 World Bank. 2014. Myanmar. Ending Poverty and Boosting shared Prosperity in a Time of Transition. 9 World Food Programme. 2016. Special report from the crop and food security assessment mission to Myanmar. 10 The specific purpose of alternative development in its present, broader meaning is to contribute to economic development (especially in rural areas) in order to target the underlying factors and root causes of illicit drug economies (UNODC. 2015. World Drug Report) 6

2


Map 1: Location of surveyed villages by opium poppy cultivation status, Shan State 2016

3


4


2. Analysis of the survey evidence 2.1 Prevalence of opium poppy cultivation in Shan State11 Opium poppy is cultivated in almost one quarter of the villages (22 per cent) in Shan State12 Most of the opium poppy villages in Shan State were in South and East Shan. In those regions, opium poppy cultivation took place in approximately one third of the villages, while in North Shan, in less than one in ten villages. These results of the 2016 village survey were in line with the findings of the 2015 UNODC opium poppy cultivation survey: the regions with the largest shares of opium poppy villages corresponded to the regions with the largest areas under opium poppy cultivation in Shan State. Compared to the results of the 2015 village survey6, the proportion of opium growing villages has decreased in Shan State (from 31 per cent in 2015 to 22 per cent in 2016). However, this reduction seems to be related to a gradual concentration of opium poppy growing in fewer villages which started several years ago, when the total opium poppy cultivation area in Myanmar showed an increase (2008‐2015).13 Figure 4: Type of village by opium cultivation status, by region, 2016 100%

80%

7% 30%

22% 34%

60% 93% 40%

78%

70%

66%

South Shan State

East Shan State

20%

0%

Non‐Poppy villages

North Shan State

Shan Total

Poppy villages

11

The data in this section is reported according to the village headmen statements. Although survey design mechanisms were in place to minimize bias (see the methodology section), village headmen may have had incentives to provide biased answers. For example, they may have indicated that there was no opium poppy cultivation in the village or understated the number of opium poppy farmers if they were afraid of potential future eradication campaigns by the Government of the Union of Myanmar in their villages. Or some village headmen may have overstated the extent of opium poppy cultivation if they expected external assistance targeting opium poppy farmers only. Therefore, the estimates provided in this section should be used with caution as referential numbers, and may be updated as more evidence becomes available (for example, additional data from triangulation sources, such as key informants or remote sensing estimates of opium poppy cultivation areas). 12 About 4 per cent (23) of the village headmen in the sample did not indicate whether there was opium poppy cultivation inside their village, and the data from those villages was not included in the analyses conducted for this report. 13 These results were based on responses from annual socio‐economic surveys and (time‐series) remote sensing analyses.

5


70000

60%

60000

50%

50000

40%

40000 30% 30000 20%

20000

10%

10000 0 2008

2010

2012

2014

0% 2016

Proportion of opium poppy villages from total villages

Total opium poppy area (hectares)

Figure 5: Trends in opium poppy area and proportion of opium poppy villages as percentage of total villages, Myanmar, 2009‐2015

Year

About half of the households in opium‐growing villages are directly involved in cultivation, equivalent to 1 in 10 households in Shan State Not all farmers located in opium poppy villages cultivate opium poppy. The incentives, personal preferences, capabilities and assets could be very dissimilar between farmers within the same village. The responses from the village headmen suggest that, on average, almost half of the households (49 per cent) were involved in opium poppy cultivation in opium poppy villages in 2016, while the same figure last year was 69 per cent. Nevertheless, this may not directly translate into a reduction of the total opium poppy cultivation area, as individual opium poppy areas vary (significantly) year‐on‐year. Considering all the villages surveyed (regardless of opium poppy cultivation status), roughly 1 in 10 households (11 per cent) were directly involved in opium poppy cultivation. Figure 6: Percentage of opium poppy households in opium poppy villages, total and by region, 2016

Opium‐poppy households in opium‐ poppy villages (%)

70%

68%

60% 49%

50% 37%

40%

36%

30% 20% 10% 0% East Shan State

6

North Shan State South Shan State

Shan Total


Most of the households’ direct involvement in opium poppy consists of growing opium poppy on their own land (non‐legal customary property) In contrast to Afghanistan, the other major opium poppy supply country, most of the households’ involvement in opium poppy in Shan State entails growing opium poppy on their own land. A few farmers earn wages as opium poppy labourers (8 per cent). Land rental for growing opium poppy or sharecropping (where the tenant uses the land and returns a share of the crops produced to the landowner as payment) are practically non‐existent in Shan State. Almost all farmers grow opium poppy on their own land (96 per cent), for which they have customary use rights but not legal property rights. No major differences in types of involvement and land tenure modalities were found among the different regions. These results reflect the recent land reform in the country. Until 2012, all land in Myanmar belonged to the state. Under the policy of state ownership, farmers were given the right to cultivate the land but they could not sell, divide or mortgage it. This policy was abandoned when the Farm Land Law was passed in March 2012. Under this law, existing farmers are for the first time allowed to mortgage, rent, and exchange or sell their land9. Administrative procedures are now in place and the changes are gradually put into effect. Future changes in legal land ownership may have an effect on farmers’ decisions to cultivate opium poppy. Increases in the number of farmers with legal land ownership have been associated with less illicit crop cultivation5. Figure 7: Percentage of opium poppy households by type of involvement in opium poppy cultivation, 2016

8%

92%

Earning wages as poppy labor

Only growing own poppy

Figure 8: Percentage of opium poppy households by land tenure modality, 2016 1%

3%

96%

Sharecrop and combined

Rent land

Own land (customary)

7


On average, an opium poppy household cultivates 0.6 hectares of opium poppy in Shan State A household in North Shan cultivates, on average, a smaller area of opium poppy (0.4 ha) than a household in East and South Shan (0.6‐0.7 ha). North Shan is the region with the lowest level of opium poppy cultivation in Shan State, and therefore, a smaller average opium poppy area per household could be expected.14 In comparison to last year’s village survey findings, the average opium poppy area per household has increased by 18 per cent, which may be partially associated with the lower level of eradication by the Government, compared to 2015 (see section 3 for details on eradicated opium poppy areas in 2016). Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that there are currently fewer opium poppy farmers, but they are growing larger fields than in 2015. Figure 9: Average area of cultivation per opium poppy household (hectares), total and by region, 2016 0.7

0.65

Average area per opium poppy household (hectares)

0.62

0.6

0.6 0.5 0.4

0.36

0.3 0.2 0.1 0 East Shan State

North Shan State

South Shan State

Shan Total

2.2 Economic indicators of opium poppy cultivation The average production costs of opium poppy was US$437 per hectare in 2016 The Shan State production cost (US$437 per hectare) is about half of the production costs for Afghanistan in 2015 (US$931). Half of the costs in both Shan State and Afghanistan are related to opium poppy weeding and lancing (opium harvesting) for which labour needs to be hired. However, opium poppy farmers in Shan State do not invest in irrigation, while irrigation in Afghanistan comprises up to 22 per cent of the total costs. At the same time, the average yield in Shan State is typically between 12‐15 kg/ha, 30‐60 per cent lower than the average yield in Afghanistan (18‐29 kg/ha), but farm‐gate prices of fresh opium poppy are usually higher in Myanmar (US$224 per kg in 2016) than in Afghanistan (US$129 per kg in 2015). This makes the net profit per hectare higher in Myanmar (US$2,587) than in Afghanistan (US$2,100). 15 16

14

Nevertheless, some areas in the north of North Shan were in conflict and inaccessible. Those villages were not possible to cover in the survey. Therefore, opium poppy patterns may be different, influenced by conditions imposed by non‐state armed groups. 15 See UNODC’s Afghanistan Opium Survey: Cultivation and Production (from 2012 to 2015), Afghanistan Opium Survey: Socio‐ Economic Survey. Socio‐Economic Analysis (2015), and Southeast Asia Opium Survey (from 2012 to 2015) 16 Estimates for Afghanistan using data from 2015, as 2016 cost figures are yet available. Yields used in the net profit estimation for Myanmar and Afghanistan are based on the average for the period 2012‐2015. Also, this straightforward comparison does not consider differences in cost of living between the two countries.

8


Figure 10: Distribution of opium poppy cultivation expenses (for one hectare, in US$), total and by region, 2016 East Shan State

North Shan State

29

South Shan State

27

20

21

23

19

0

10

20

30

29

2

US$341

27

3

US$533

25

4

US$437

18

21

31

Shan Total

US$242

8

19

16

16

42

40 50 60 70 80 Percentage of total opium-poppy costs (%)

90

100

Poppy cultivation expenses Irrigation Seeds Fertilizer Ploughing Weeding Lancing / harvesting

The average (farm‐gate) price of fresh opium has slightly increased (+5 per cent) The average (farm‐gate) price of fresh opium corrected for inflation in 2015 was 275,439 Kyat per kilogram (or US$224 per kg at the November 2016 – exchange rate). In 2016, it was 5 per cent higher (289,138 Kyat per kg or US$235). The historical trends for opium poppy areas and fresh opium poppy prices suggest that when cultivation areas decrease, prices increase. However, the price increase was marginal from 2015 to 2016. This suggests that there was slight reduction, but not a large change in total opium poppy areas over this period. This needs to be confirmed by other means, such as opium poppy area estimates from remote sensing analysis. Figure 11: Trends in opium poppy prices, Myanmar, 2004‐2016

700,000 600,000

Kyat per kilogram

500,000 400,000 300,000 200,000 100,000 ‐ 2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012* 2013* 2014* 2015* 2016**

Fresh‐opium price (farm‐gate), kyat per kilogram, inflation adjusted Dry opium price, kyat per kilogram, inflation adjusted

*For 2012‐2015, prices reflect data from East, North, and South Shan only, weighted by cultivation (regions with larger opium poppy areas contributed more to the final mean). In 2016, no weights were applied as no data on cultivation is available. The consumer price index for 2016 was based on a projection of the historical consumer price index (2010=100) (World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL).

9


Figure 12: The relation between increases in the total area under opium poppy cultivation and decreases in fresh opium prices, Myanmar, 2006‐2015

Total opium poppy area (hectares)

70000

450000 400000

60000

350000 50000

300000

40000

250000

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100000 10000 0 2004

50000 2006

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(Farm‐gate) prices of fresh opium poppy (in Kyat) corrected by inflation

Year

The household income in opium poppy villages was larger than in non‐opium poppy villages, but on average remained below the poverty line In 2016, the household income in opium poppy villages was higher (US$2,261), on average, than the income among households in non‐opium poppy villages (US$1,839). In opium poppy villages, the largest share of the income was derived from opium poppy (32 per cent), while in non‐opium poppy villages the largest share came from daily wages (50 per cent). Such wages are usually low and temporal, and other research17 has indicated that households which main source of income is daily wages are among the poorest in Myanmar. There were also important differences in how the income was derived at the regional level. For example, in East Shan, the region with the lowest annual income, the second largest share of the income was derived from livestock sales and by‐ products, and not from cash crops (rice and other licit crops) as in the other two regions. As cash crops reached relatively good prices this year, the average income in North and South Shan were also higher than in East Shan. Additionally, in South Shan, the region with the highest annual income in 2016, households derived between 12 and 13 per cent of their total income from salaried jobs, which usually require qualifications and are well remunerated.

17 FAO. 2015. Report of the Workshops to Present the Initial Research Findings from a Nation‐Wide Survey and Analysis on Social Protection and Poverty Dimensions in Support of Rural Development and Poverty Reduction on Myanmar.

10


Annual income per household (US$)

Figure 13: Average annual income per household (US$), total, by region and cultivation status, 2016

Figure 14: Percentage of total income by source, total, by region and cultivation status, 2016 Non‐Poppy villages

East Shan State

34

North Shan State

27

South Shan State

Poppy villages

11

24

20

East Shan State

24

Shan Total

0

10

20

19 30

9

16

13

6

14

7

3

40 50 60 Percentage of total income (%)

70

6

11

8

9

5

80

5 1

1

11

12

10

3

3

7

3

1

2 2 2

6

34

15

7

7

13

8

17

33

9

12

2

19

11

8

3

8

36

18

South Shan State

7

30

14

North Shan State

25

3 22

7 90

4

2 100

Sources of income Other income Rental (property or similar) Petty trade in market Salaried job Daily wage ‐ non agriculture Daily wage ‐ agriculture Sales forest products Sales of livestock and by‐products Sales other cash crops Sales Opium Poppy Sales of paddy

11


Selling a forest product (honey) in North Shan, 2016

On a daily basis, a person in a non‐opium poppy village earned less than a person in an opium poppy village in 2016. However, a direct comparison of poverty in Myanmar to that in other countries, using the global poverty line of US$1.25 per day, calculated as purchasing power parity (PPP), is not possible because currently there are no reliable survey‐based price estimates to calculate the PPP conversion factors8. Figure 15: Income per person per day in US$ (calculated with exchange rate only), total, by region and cultivation status, 2016

12


The daily wages for opium poppy weeding and harvesting decreased by 10 per cent in 2016 There has been a decline of about 10 per cent in the average daily wages paid for opium poppy weeding (for males: US$3.4; females: US$3.2) and harvesting/lancing (males: US$3.6; females: US$3.4) in Shan State in 2016, in comparison to 2015. Opium poppy lancing requires intensive physical effort and experience, and wages are usually higher for lancing than for weeding. The female labour force participation rate in Myanmar is among the highest in South‐East Asia18, but typically, women earn less than their male counterparts. In all the villages in the three regions (East, North and South Shan), female daily labourers (opium poppy and non‐opium poppy related; farm and non‐farm labour) earned less than their male counterparts in 2016. In the case of opium poppy‐related labour and agricultural labour in opium poppy villages, the difference between male and female daily wages was between 3 and 6 per cent; while for farm labour in non‐poppy villages as well as for non‐agricultural labour, the difference in daily wages was higher, between 13 and 16 per cent. Additionally, daily wages for similar labour for males and females (non‐opium poppy‐related agricultural and non‐agricultural activities) were between 10 and 20 per cent higher in non‐opium poppy villages than in opium poppy villages, regardless of region. This may have helped to create better opportunities for households in non‐opium poppy villages for generating sufficient income from licit activities. One of the most acute problems in remote areas is the lack of stable and reasonably well remunerated employment opportunities. Casual labour is still an important source of income in rural areas worldwide, and it is the main source of income for a third of the rural population in Myanmar17. Adequate availability of off‐season employment can help to improve material conditions in Shan State. It can be assumed that poor people would supply more labour to make ends meet if more paid opportunities would be available18. Figure 16: Daily wages for opium poppy labour, in US$, by gender and region, 2016

18

UNDP. 2013. A regional perspective on poverty in Myanmar.

13


Figure 17: Daily wages for non‐poppy related labour, as indicated by village headmen, in US$, by gender, region and cultivation status, Shan State, 2016 Daily wage for farm labour (non-poppy) - Female

Daily wage for farm labour (non-poppy) - Male

Daily wage for non-farm labour - Female

Daily wage for non-farm labour - Male

USD 4.3 USD 4.0

4

USD 3.7

USD 3.5 USD 3.2

USD 3.1

USD 3.6 USD 3.2

3

2

1

0 Non-Poppy villages

Poppy villages

Non-Poppy villages

Poppy villages

Non-Poppy villages

Poppy villages

Non-Poppy villages

Poppy villages

2.3 Major causes of opium poppy cultivation: Remoteness and limitations in infrastructure and services Poverty and opium poppy cultivation are interlinked. In this regard, the UN Guiding Principles on Alternative Development define alternative development as a process to prevent and eliminate illicit crop cultivation through locally designed rural development measures, within a framework of a comprehensive and permanent solution to the drug problem. Therefore, the underlying reasoning is that illicit crop cultivation is less prone to take place in rural communities with high levels of development, as it remains a risky activity. This section seeks to understand the major local challenges for achieving sustainable development outside the illicit crop economy, mainly by comparing the circumstances in opium poppy and non‐opium poppy villages in Shan State. This comparative analysis helps to clarify why some communities grow opium poppy while others not only decide to cease growing but are also able to remain poppy free. In this regard, other things being equal, the differences between opium poppy and non‐opium poppy communities can be viewed as causes or consequences of illicit crop cultivation. The major differences between these two types of villages were related to infrastructure and services, which are essential to the operation of a society. For example, road networks help to keep transportation costs low, and minimize crop losses. The availability and quality of infrastructure and services in opium poppy villages were lower than non‐opium poppy villages, which constitute major obstacles to the integration of opium poppy villages into the mainstream economy while also increasing their cost of living. Future alternative development strategies need to consider reducing such sustainable development gaps, as part of a comprehensive policy that includes, among other factors, the enhancement of the rule of law and carefully planned sequence of law enforcement mechanisms. Availability of roads Road density in Myanmar is the lowest in Asia, with 40 km of roads per 1,000 km2. This is 50 per cent lower than in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, which has the second‐lowest road density in the region. Road conditions are often poor as well. The availability of roads and good

14


transport services are fundamental for economic development in rural areas, as physical isolation is one of the core features of the poverty trap. On average, about half of the non‐opium poppy villages had asphalt roads in their proximity, in contrast to one third of the opium poppy villages. Moreover, a higher percentage (26 per cent) of non‐opium poppy villages had in 2016 access to buses inside the village compared to opium poppy villages (15 per cent). South Shan showed a different pattern than the two other regions. In South Shan, the availability of asphalt roads in opium poppy and non‐opium poppy villages was similar (43‐44 per cent of villages) whereas opium villages in the North and East Shan had significantly less asphalted roads. Figure 18: Percentage of villages by main type of roads, as indicated by village headmen, total, by region and cultivation status, 2016

Dirt road in East Shan, 2016

15


Access to markets As the rural population in Myanmar derives most of its income from agriculture17, good access to markets – a place where to sell and buy agricultural and other products – is imperative for obtaining sufficient household income. Rural populations worldwide have indicated that one of the reasons they cannot improve their standards of living is that they face difficulties in accessing markets. This restricts farmers’ opportunities for income generation, as large distances increase uncertainty and transportation costs, and this means limited sales opportunities, reduced farm‐ gate profits and increased farm costs. It also exacerbates the problem of post‐harvest losses19. In Shan State, opium poppy cultivation is associated with access to markets. All the markets for opium poppy villages were located outside the villages (external markets), and took an average of 2 hours and 8 minutes to reach by walking, while 8 per cent of non‐opium poppy villages had local markets, with external markets taking 58 minutes to reach on foot in 2016.

Time to market (in walking minutes)

Figure 19: Walking time to external market (outside the village), as indicated by the village headmen, total, by region and cultivation status, 2016

Access to markets does not only relate to physical access, but also to the risk of being disempowered because farmers are unable to negotiate fair terms with buyers. Farmer organizations facilitate more direct integration of farmers into value chains and increase their negotiation power. In this regard, the UN Guiding Principles on Alternative Development encourage efforts allowing the promotion and enhancement of farmer associations in illicit crop communities, as the lack of or weak farmer associations has been identified as one of the potential drivers of illicit crop cultivation. Opium poppy villages had fewer formal farmers’ organizations, such as co‐operatives (2 per cent) than non‐opium poppy villages (8 per cent) in 2016.

19

IFAD. 2003. Promoting market access for the rural poor.

16


Figure 20: Percentage of villages with availability of cooperatives inside the villages, as indicated by the village headmen, total, by region and cultivation status, 2016*

* Village headmen did not indicate the availability of co‐operatives in East Shan. Building long‐term relationships and trust between buyers and sellers also minimizes transaction costs (such as negotiation costs) and assists farmers in reaching fairer sale prices. On average, more non‐opium poppy villages sold agricultural products to the same buyer (27 per cent) than opium poppy villages (22 per cent) in 2016, which may denote some degree of trust between buyers and sellers. Figure 21: Percentage of villages by main criteria for choosing buyer in the market, as indicated by village headmen, total, by region and cultivation status, 2016 East Shan State

Poppy villages

60

Non-Poppy villages North Shan State

55

Poppy villages

45

0

10

20

28 15 29

20 30

1

26

21 52

Shan Total

33

19 57

Non-Poppy villages

23

13

51

Poppy villages

13

22

53

Non-Poppy villages South Shan State

27

40 50 60 Percentage of villages (%)

4 26

70

80

90

100

Criteria for choosing buyer (Pre-) contract Other criteria Always same buyer Closest buyer

Best price

17


Cash crop transportation to markets in North Shan, 2016

Access to information and communication technology In Myanmar, the links between farmers and markets are weak. The majority of farmers are not aware of the crop prices at the nearest market before arriving there to sell their products. Similarly, most farmers are not aware of the latest market opportunities concerning consumer preferences and price competitiveness9. The ownership of assets to enable farmers to communicate could facilitate their access to information and potential integration into broader rural economic systems. In Shan State, opium poppy cultivation is associated with low access to technology. More households in non‐opium poppy villages owned assets such as mobile phone (+17 per cent), motorcycle (+5 per cent), radio (+2 per cent) or television (+14 per cent) than in opium poppy villages. However, once again, opium poppy villages in South Shan were better off in relation to access to such assets, where up to 60 per cent of households owned motorcycles, in contrast to 44 per cent of households in non‐opium poppy villages in the same region.

18


Percentage households (%)



Figure 22: Percentage of households owning assets enabling communication and access to information, as indicated by village headmen, by region and cultivation status, 2016

Motorcycles in East Shan, 2016

Television inside a household in East Shan, 2016

Availability of public electricity The availability of continuous electricity, as provided by the public grid, is a prerequisite for development. A lower percentage of opium poppy villages had access to public grid electricity as the main source of energy (5 per cent) compared to the share of non‐opium poppy villages with similar access (22 per cent). The situation was particularly critical in East Shan where none of the opium poppy villages had access to public grid energy in 2016. Significant progress has been made in relation to access to solar panel energy, especially in non‐opium poppy villages. However, on average about one third of opium poppy villages still relied on candles as the main source for household lighting.

19


Figure 23: Percentage of villages by main type of energy for lighting, as indicated by village headmen, total, by region and cultivation status, 2016

Solar panel for lighting in South Shan, 2016

Public grid electricity in South Shan, 2016

Availability of educational services Education is fundamental for development and growth, and also plays a key role in overcoming intergenerational poverty traps20. Less educated parents tend to invest less in children’s education, and may also be more likely to cut education spending or remove children from school as a coping mechanism in response to economic shocks17. In general, access to education in Shan State is limited, and 37 per cent of villages did not have schools within the village in 2016. Generally opium poppy villages without schools are very remote, and it takes more than twice the time (52 minutes) to reach the closest school outside the village on foot in comparison to non‐opium poppy villages without schools (21 minutes).

20

Poverty trap is a self‐reinforcing mechanism that makes it difficult to escape poverty and forces people to remain poor.

20


School in village (% villages)

Figure 24: Walking time to nearest school outside the village, as indicated by village headmen, by region and cultivation status, 2016*

*94 per cent of opium poppy villages in North Shan had access to local schools in 2016, and the remaining 6

per cent without access indicated that the closest schools in other villages were unreachable (these are not shown in the graph).

Inside the classroom of a primary school, South Shan, 2016

21


Availability of clean water and sanitation In relation to the quality of the available drinking water, on average, 75 per cent of headmen in opium poppy villages did not perceive that their villages had access to good or very good quality drinking water, in contrast to 65 per cent of non‐opium poppy village headmen. This situation was worse in North Shan, where 88 per cent of village headmen reported a lack of access to good or very good quality drinking water in 2016.

Communal standpipe in a village in South Shan, 2016

Figure 25: Percentage of villages by quality of drinking water, as perceived by village headmen, total, by region and cultivation status, 2016 East Shan State

Non-Poppy villages

44%

Poppy villages

54%

27%

Non-Poppy North Shan villages State Poppy villages

7%

71%

23%

69%

13%

Non-Poppy South Shan villages State Poppy villages

75%

13%

33%

64%

26%

72%

29%

Shan Total 0%

10%

20%

66% 30%

40% 50% 60% Percentage of villages

70%

80%

90%

100%

Quality of the drinking water Bad quality Regular quality Good quality Very good quality

Illness caused by inadequate sanitation can generate significant health costs. Previous studies conducted in Myanmar have suggested that rural households without access to sanitation lost more days to ill health and spent more money on health than households which had toilets17. About one third of opium poppy villages did not have access to sanitation services and households

22


practiced open defecation, in comparison to less than one in ten non‐opium poppy villages. However, there were important regional differences, and in South Shan, open defecation was uncommon in both opium poppy and non‐opium poppy villages (practiced in only 1‐2 per cent of villages). In East Shan, in contrast, open defecation occurred in 69 per cent of opium poppy villages. Figure 26: Percentage of villages by main type of sewage, as indicated by village headmen, total, by region and cultivation status, 2016

East Shan State

Poppy villages

69

Non-Poppy villages Poppy North Shan villages State Non-Poppy villages Poppy South Shan villages State Non-Poppy villages

18

18 50

4

48

33

2

65 44

13 0%

13

46

2

10%

19

64

38

Shan Total

12

55 37

20%

30%

50 40% 50% 60% Percentage of villages

70%

80%

90%

100%

Type of sewage Flush toilet Latrine Open air

Latrine in East Shan, 2016

23


Availability of health services On average, the shares of non‐opium poppy and opium poppy villages with available local health services (“clinics”) were similar but relatively low (19 per cent). There were large regional differences, with the highest percentage of villages with clinics found among the opium poppy villages in South Shan (26 per cent), and the lowest among the opium poppy villages in East Shan (12 per cent). The average time to reach a clinic when not available within the village was more than double for opium poppy villages (1 hour 40 minutes) than non‐opium villages (47 minutes) in 2016. Figure 27: Percentage of villages with clinics and distance in walking time to closest clinic (if no clinic in village), as indicated by the village headmen, by region and cultivation status, 2016

Village clinic in East Shan, 2016

24


Access to financial services A larger share of opium poppy villages (59 per cent) than non‐opium poppy villages (48 per cent) had household debt in 2016. However, farmers in opium poppy villages seemed to be less likely or able to obtain loans. The main reasons for not obtaining loans in opium poppy villages were diverse and included failure to pay previous loans, lack of collateral, or the high interest rate (40 per cent of villages), while “no need for credit” was indicated as reason in the remaining 60 per cent of villages. In comparison 24 per cent of non‐opium poppy reasons stated similar diverse reasons, and a larger share indicated “no need” as a main reason for not accessing credit (76 per cent).

Villages with households in debt (%)

Figure 28: Percentage of villages with households in debt, total, by region and cultivation status, 2016

Figure 29: Percentage of village headmen who indicated ‘no need’ as the main reason why farmers do not access credit, total, by region and cultivation status, 2016

25


2.4. Causes and consequences of opium poppy cultivation: the dual roles of income inequality, food insecurity and weak governance While the availability of infrastructure and services are mainly determinants of illicit crop cultivation; other factors, such as income inequality, food insecurity and weak governance are both causes and consequences of illicit crop cultivation. Further analyses need to be conducted to clarify their most prominent function, and elaborate alternative development policies that address the underlying causes of opium poppy cultivation in a balanced manner, and minimize the negative effects of illicit crop cultivation in the affected communities in Shan State. Income inequality In Myanmar, the rural poverty rate is around 70 per cent9. However, Myanmar’s inequality is considered low; a characteristic of traditional or agrarian societiesError! Bookmark not defined.. The villages in Shan State where opium poppy is cultivated had higher levels of inequality. A larger share of households in opium poppy villages than in non‐opium poppy villages failed to obtain sufficient income to sustain their household in 2016. On average, about half of the households in non‐opium poppy villages could accumulate some savings, in comparison to approximately one third of the households in opium poppy villages. This could indicate that a higher percentage of the poorest (households who spend all their income on subsistence without any possibility of accumulating savings) lived in opium poppy villages in 2016. Opium poppy villages in South Shan, which were the most affluent in terms of average income, had the largest comparative share of the poorest households (almost one third), denoting higher levels of inequality than in the other regions. However, it remains unclear whether income inequality provides incentives for illicit crop cultivation, or it is a consequence, or both. Detailed evaluations are needed to elucidate income inequality effects. This is particularly important in countries which have been subject to conflict, as inequality exacerbates violence and impedes stability. Figure 30: Percentage of households by income level, as indicated by village headmen, total, by region and cultivation status, 2016

26


Food security and coping strategies One of the top three coping strategies when facing food insecurity in non‐opium poppy villages entailed eating less expensive food, while in opium poppy villages, measures were in general more drastic, including reducing the number of daily meals. This may suggest that on average non‐opium poppy villages enjoy better food security and living conditions than opium poppy villages, even though incomes were lower in non‐opium poppy villages. This is also closely related to the higher levels of income inequality found in opium poppy villages, as indicated before. Figure 31: Strategies indicated by the village headmen as one of the three main strategies for coping with food deficiency, by cultivation status, 2016 Eat cheaper, less preferred food

Borrow food

Reduce number of meals per day

60

60 Percentage of village (%)

Food on credit

52

52 48 41

41

40

20

13 5 0 Non-Poppy villages

Poppy villages

Non-Poppy villages

Poppy villages

Non-Poppy villages

Poppy villages

Non-Poppy villages

Poppy villages

Percentage of villages (%)

Figure 32: Percentage of village headmen who indicated reducing the number of meals as one of the three main strategies for coping with food insecurity, by region and cultivation status, 2016

Buying food was indicated as one of the top three uses of poppy income in 94 per cent of the opium poppy villages. This may imply that opium poppy farmers are not exclusively accumulating capital, but require opium poppy income for basic needs. Detailed analyses are needed to fully understand the role of opium poppy income in how households are coping with food insecurity, including the collection of survey data at farm level. In particular, potential higher farm incomes

27


from opium poppy may increase local food prices within opium poppy communities. This could leave non poppy growers more prone to food insecurity, which would, in turn, create incentives for them to start cultivating opium poppy. As such, food insecurity may be a cause as well as a consequence of opium poppy cultivation.

Main use of opium-poppy for buying food (%villages)

Figure 33: Percentage of village headmen who indicated buying food as one of the three main uses of poppy income, total and by region, 2016

Furthermore, recent floods have significantly affected the rural population in Myanmar17. Rice prices reached record high levels in the country in 2015/2016, reflecting the strong depreciation of the local currency (Kyat). This increased rice exports to China and decreased the availability of the crop in the internal market. Rice is an important staple in Myanmar. Overall, over 90 per cent of the rural population reported consuming rice more than once per day18. The sharp increase in the price of rice affected both opium poppy and non‐opium poppy villages, although a somewhat higher percentage of opium poppy villages (67 per cent) were affected by high prices than non‐ opium poppy villages (63 per cent) (see section 2.8 for a graph detailing the type of shocks faced inside the villages). This could suggest that prices may have peaked in the most remote markets where opium poppy villages are mainly located, making opium poppy villages more vulnerable to food insecurity.

Rice pounding for rice polishing in East Shan, 2016

28


Governance and security Peace, justice and effective, accountable and inclusive institutions are at the core of sustainable development. On average, a smaller share of opium poppy villages were under the control of the government (76 per cent) than non‐opium poppy villages (88 per cent). The perception of feeling “unsafe” or “very unsafe” inside the village was higher among opium poppy villages (11 per cent) than non‐opium poppy villages (2 per cent). Restoring governance and security might help reduce opium poppy cultivation, as it will make it more difficult for drug traffickers to conduct their business with impunity. Nevertheless, as drug traffickers can move their operations with relative ease, this makes villages with weak governance and security structures more prone to be targeted by new or increasing opium poppy cultivation. Figure 34: Percentage of villages controlled by the government, as indicated by village headmen, total, by region and cultivation status, 2016

Figure 35: Percentage of villages by degree of safety inside villages, as perceived by the village headmen, total, by region and cultivation status, 2016

29


2.5. Village headmen’s perceived reasons for why farmers decide to grow opium poppy in Shan State Village headmen were requested to indicate the top three reasons why farmers cultivate opium poppy21. Their perceptions can be considered as expert opinions of the situation at the local level. The responses were consistent regardless of the location: obtaining higher income from opium poppy than other crops was perceived as the major motivation for cultivating opium poppy (55 per cent of the responses), followed by being able to obtain a large amount of cash at once (49 per cent). Having experience with opium poppy cultivation was indicated as a main reason by one third of the headmen, which can denote a degree of risk aversion by the opium poppy farmers in changing to non‐poppy activities. About one quarter of the opium poppy village headmen indicated that lack of legal land ownership ‐ which is, in turn, associated with a lack of interest in long‐term investments in land productivity ‐ was one of the top three reasons why farmers cultivate opium poppy. Formalising individual land rights may lead to increased investment, credit and efficiency22, and as such it is an integral part of the UN Guiding Principles on Alternative Development. This type of alternative development strategy has been implemented in Peru and Colombia, and could be contemplated for Shan State as well. Agronomic and ecological reasons for growing opium poppy were of minor importance, implying that there is no comparative advantage in relation to other crops.

21

In high debt

Advance cash provided for poppy growers

High sale price of opium poppy

High cost inputs other crops

Need money for food supplies

Higher income than other crops

Need large amount of money (at once)

High availability poppy labor

Small land area for other crops

No need transport poppy

Easy to sell poppy

Difficult to reach market

Cannot find non‐poppy job

No land owner

Good climate conditions

Bad yield results alternative crops

High yields

Easier to grow than other crops

No afraid eradication

Forced to grow opium poppy

Self‐consumption

It is common

Have experience

Percentage of responses (%)

Figure 36: Top three reasons for cultivating opium poppy, as stated by the village headmen, Shan State

Only village headmen in opium poppy village were requested to indicate the reasons why farmers cultivate opium poppy, as other village headmen may not be fully aware of potential farmers’ motivations. 22 ODI. 2013.

30


2.6 Village headmen’s perceived reasons for why farmers have never grown opium poppy or why they stop cultivation About half of the headmen in villages where farmers have never grown opium poppy indicated that the major motivations for the absence of opium poppy cultivation were related to the governmental ban. Other important reasons that restrained farmers from cultivating opium poppy was the fear that they or one of their family members could become addicted to opiates (39 per cent of village headmen). In general, for about a quarter of the headmen, the villages where opium poppy cultivation has never taken place provide better conditions for making a living outside the illicit economy, such as access to enough land (26 per cent of village headmen), access to non‐ poppy jobs (24 per cent), and sufficient revenues from non‐opium poppy crops (21 percent).

Availability of external assistance

No advance cash for poppy

Good price of non‐poppy crops

Low price of inputs for non‐poppy crops

Have access to credit

Low or not debt

Good results non‐poppy crops

Low availability of labor for growing poppy

Easy to take crops to market

Farmers can find non‐poppy jobs

Access to enough land to avoid poppy

Bad climate conditions for poppy

Afraid of poppy eradication

Banned (others).

Limited experience as poppy farmer

Poppy cultivation is not common

Afraid becoming addicted

Banned by the government


Figure 37: Top three reasons for having never grown opium poppy, as stated by the village headmen, Shan State

According to the village headmen, one in ten villages that did not cultivate opium poppy in 2016 did so in the past. In these types of villages, the presence of the rule of law and law enforcement were conducive to decreases in opium poppy cultivation. As such, being banned by the government was indicated as one of the top three reasons for stopping opium poppy cultivation in almost half of the villages that did so, while fear of eradication was cited as a key reason in almost one third of the villages. Good economic and yield results with alternative crops were indicated as main reasons for stopping opium poppy cultivation by one third and almost one quarter of the village headmen, respectively. Conversely to reasons for stopping opium poppy cultivation, such as lack of opium poppy labor (stated by one in ten of the village headmen), good results with alternative crops suggest that there might be sustainable motivations for completely ceasing illicit crop growing over time in Shan State.

31


Figure 38: Top three reasons for stopping opium poppy cultivation, as stated by the village headmen, Shan State 50

49

Agronomic and ecological reasons

Social and behavioral reaons

Access to labor, land and market related reasons

Income and economic reasons

45


40 35

33 31 29

30

27 25 22 20 16 15 11

11 9

10

9 7

7 4

5

4

4

2

2

No need of cash advance

Low price opium poppy

Good price of alternative crops

No debt

No large expense

Good result alternative crops

Could take other crops to market

Accessed more land for other crops

Low availability poppy labor

Found non‐poppy jobs

High poppy diseases

Bad climate for opium poppy

Good yield results alternative crops

It is not common

Banned (others)

Afraid eradication

Afraid of adiction

Banned (government)

0

2.7 Alternatives to opium poppy income after stopping cultivation On average, after stopping opium poppy cultivation, the income of the previous opium poppy households remained the same in more than half of the villages. Nevertheless, there were differences among regions, and the village headmen in East Shan indicated a decrease in income after stopping poppy cultivation. This result was related to the reasons for stopping opium poppy cultivation. In North and South Shan, the reasons focused primarily on finding alternative sources of income, denoting a purposive decision to stop this activity. In East Shan, however, the main reason indicated by the respondents was lack of labour to sustain opium poppy cultivation. Figure 39: Percentage of villages by change in household income after stopping opium poppy cultivation, as perceived by village headmen, total and by region, 2016 East Shan State

100%

North Shan State

18%

South Shan State

40%

0%

32

10%

18%

60%

20%

Shan Total

65%

57%

20%

30%

40%

50% 60% Percentage of villages

24%

70%

80%

90%

100%


In general, the three main activities that households performed to replace opium poppy cultivation were cultivating licit crops, earning daily wages, and raising livestock (any combination of the three). Alternative activities such as petty trade, relying on remittances or rental of land or equipment were only indicated as a replacement in North Shan, while a small share of households opened small businesses in South Shan (7 per cent). Previous opium poppy growers in South Shan had the highest percentage of villages indicating an increase in household income after stopping opium poppy cultivation. This is probably due to the opportunities to invest in sufficiently profitable small businesses there. Households in this region have higher average incomes and therefore more purchasing power compared to households in East and North Shan. Nevertheless, it may not be feasible to promote small business as a general substitute for opium poppy as (retail) businesses require a certain volume of clients to become profitable, which might be unrealistic in rural areas. The promotion of new retail businesses in regions without enough purchasing power could reduce the margins of existing businesses, and reinforce poverty.

Livestock breeding in South Shan, 2016

Thriving markets in South Shan, 2016

In 60 per cent of the villages in which farmers stopped opium poppy cultivation, alternative crops were cultivated on larger plots than those used for opium poppy. This may be indicative of a higher pressure on land resources. A clear exception was East Shan, where there was a decrease in cultivated areas after the cessation of opium poppy growing. In the case of East Shan, as indicated before, farmers stopped opium poppy cultivation due to the lack of opium poppy labour. Therefore, these farmers probably also lacked the resources needed for cultivating licit crops.

33


Figure 40: Percentage of villages by change in land area used for licit crops after stopping opium poppy cultivation, as perceived by village headmen, total and by region, 2016

Slash and burn for extending cultivation areas in North Shan, 2016

Livelihood diversity has been strongly linked to higher economic status, lower poverty rates, and higher levels of social capital17. Diversification of livelihoods has long been promoted as a key element of increasing resilience to opium poppy cultivation and reducing vulnerability to poverty in rural households. In addition, increases in rural incomes cannot be substantial if farmers exclusively focus on a couple of mainly subsistence food crops (rice/paddy and corn). On the one

34


hand, additional high value crops need to be identified and promoted, connections with markets need to be established, and beneficial trade conditions for farmers need to be obtained. On the other, production costs of currently commercialized cash crops may need to be lowered, whenever possible. In the particular case of rice (paddy), the major cash crop in Myanmar, there were differences in the contribution of different activities to the total production costs for opium poppy cultivating and non‐cultivating villages in 2016. For example, farmers in opium poppy villages in East Shan spent proportionally more on buying rice seeds than farmers in non‐opium poppy villages, and less on rice harvesting. A further study at farm level would be needed to identify the specific reasons for these differences. Figure 41: Percentage of villages by type of cash crops cultivated, as indicated by village headmen, Shan State, 2016

Corn fields in North Shan, 2016

35


Pre‐processing sugarcane in South Shan, 2016

Figure 42: Contribution to the total rice cultivation expenses by activity, as indicated by village headmen, total, by region and cultivation status, 2016

36


Monsoon paddy cultivation in South Shan, 2016

2.8 Dependency and conservation status of forest resources and implications of climate change in opium poppy and non‐poppy villages Sustainable growth and development require minimizing the use of natural resources throughout the production and consumption processes. Despite clear linkages between poverty reduction and natural resource management, knowledge and skills relating to the latter are still lacking in rural Myanmar17. Opium poppy communities were more dependent on forest resources ‐ for example, wood for cooking ‐ compared to non‐opium poppy communities. On average, 85 per cent of opium‐poppy village headmen indicated that households in their villages “always” collected wood for cooking, whereas 53 per cent of non‐opium poppy villages did so in 2016. Figure 43: Percentage of villages by frequency of collection of wood for cooking, as indicated by village headmen, total, by region and cultivation status, 2016 East Shan State

Poppy villages

89%

Non-Poppy villages

47%

Poppy North Shan villages State

6%

24%

62%

Non-Poppy villages

13%

Poppy South Shan villages State

4%

65%

0%

10%

20%

30%

7% 40%

50% 60% Percentage villages

5%

32%

7%

60%

Shan Total

7%

23%

86%

Non-Poppy villages

4%

23% 15%

50%

6%

8%

9% 70%

18% 20%

80%

90%

4% 100%

Collect wood for cooking Never Seldom Sometimes Often Always

37


Firewood collection for cooking in North Shan, 2016

Forest resources were deteriorating more rapidly in opium poppy villages than in non‐opium poppy villages. On average, 77 per cent of the opium poppy villages indicated that forest resources had deteriorated over the last two years, in comparison to 53 per cent of non‐opium poppy villages in 2016. This may be related to the more intensive use of forest resources in opium poppy villages, and attest to the need for developing forest management plans and working with opium poppy communities in identifying the reasons for the higher level of forest deterioration and to preserve their common resources. Figure 44: Percentage of villages by change in forest quality over the last two years as perceived by the village headmen, total, by region and cultivation status, 2016 East Shan State

Poppy villages Non-Poppy villages

19% 5%

69%

Poppy North Shan villages State Non-Poppy 3% villages

62% 59%

38%

33%

64% 42%

4% 0%

26%

38%

Poppy 3% South Shan villages State Non-Poppy 11% villages Shan Total

81%

47%

51% 10%

20%

30%

45% 40%

50% 60% Percentage villages

70%

80%

90%

100%

Change in forest quality Deteriorated forest quality Same forest quality Improved forest quality

38


Forest surrounding a village in East Shan, 2016

Climate change presents one of the biggest threats to development, and its widespread impacts disproportionately burden the poorest and most vulnerable18. Poverty is typically shallow in Myanmar, meaning that most of the households are conglomerated just above and below the poverty line. Small improvements can thus bring a large number of people out of poverty, but conversely, even small shocks (meaning sudden events with economic consequences) can bring many people into poverty18. The most important shocks were environment‐related, and were mainly associated with increases in the price of food due to the flood in 2015‐2016, and low crop yields attributed to adverse weather conditions in 2016. In addition to forest management plans, broad climate action plans for Shan State could help to alleviate the risk of and mitigate the impact of such shocks in the future. Figure 45: Percentage of villages by type of shocks faced, as indicated by village headmen, total, by region and cultivation status, 2016

39


40


3. Government‐reported opium poppy eradication and seizures The Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (GOUM) provided data on the eradication of opium poppy and seizures of opium. According to this data, 7,561 hectares of opium poppy were eradicated during the 2015/2016 season, which is a decrease of 44 per cent from the 2014/2015 figure. As in previous years, most eradication took place in South Shan (65 per cent). This year, areas in conflict were mostly avoided (compare Maps 2 and 3). UNODC did not monitor or validate the results of the eradication campaign or seizures carried out by GOUM. Table 1: Eradication of opium poppy by the Government of the Union of Myanmar from 2007 to 2016, by state, Myanmar (hectares) Region/ State East Shan

2006‐ 2007 1,101

2007‐ 2008 1,249

2008‐ 2009 702

2009‐ 2010 868

2010‐ 2011 1,230

2011‐ 2012 1,257

2012‐ 2013 537

2013‐ 2014 356

2014‐ 2015 378

2015‐ 2016 482

North Shan

916

932

546

1,309

1,315

977

532

337

532

69

South Shan

1,316

1,748

1,466

3,138

3,579

21,157

10,869

13,696 10,715

4,947

Shan state Total Kachin

3,333

3,929

2,714

5,315

6,124

23,391

11,939

14,389 11,625

5,498

189

790

1,350

2,936

847

83

250

395

1,495

1,504

Kayah

12

12

14

13

38

84

59

67

54

16

Magway

45

1

1

4

7

60

8

9

Chin

10

86

5

2

10

110

32

277

267

534

3

2

39

45 2

1

Mandalay Sagaing

9

Other states National total

64 3,662

1

4,820

4,087

8,267

7,058

23,718

12,288

15,188 13,450

7,561

Source: GOUM/CCDAC.

Table 2: Seizures of drugs (opiates) from 1988 to 2016 (kilograms)

Year 1988‐1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Raw Opium 22,992.26 5,393.63 1,473.03 1,528.39 1,629.07 1,863.28 1,481.70 606.89 772.72 2,320.90 1,273.97 1,463.39 752.04 764.78

Heroin 3,721.51 403.80 245.35 158.92 96.74 333.89 568.08 973.52 811.69 92.33 68.38 88.13 1,076.13 88.54

Brown opium 185.73 95.87 24.10 22.70 6.52 314.40 156.25 58.90 43.77 1,370.84 1,120.97 206.08 325.70 98.20

Liquid opium 117.57 206.07 332.50 16.09 18.68 18.25 51.74 39.12 20.55 28.96 56.36 80.14 27.48 35.47

Low‐grade opium 305.79 312.25 314.35 245.26 141.70 125.95 203.87 395.75 127.74 6,153.56 10,972.20 2,452.79 465.43 147.07

41


2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 (until Aug) Source: GOUM/CCDAC.

42

828.27 1,470.35 2,356.98 1,828.41 888.84 481.84

42.44 335.79 238.93 435.46 186.04 161.88

36.88 45.76 71.55 1,108.76 538.91 197.80

60.04 29.32 115.25 102.11 38.08 43.09

281.65 80.79 65.98 134.10 34.92 18.34


Map 2: Location of reported opium poppy eradication by the Government of the Union of Myanmar, 2016

43


Map 3: Location of reported conflicts, 2016

44


Map 4: Density of opium poppy cultivation in Shan and Kachin states, based on 2015 survey

45


46


4. Recommendations and conclusions By disaggregating a range of socio‐economic village‐level data by opium poppy cultivation status and region, this report has highlighted some major differences between opium and non‐opium poppy villages in Shan State. In 2016, East and North Shan faced larger challenges in terms of income poverty than South Shan. The major reasons were related to the available sources of income, where inhabitants of South Shan had better access to relatively stable and predictable salaried jobs. Also, although households in opium poppy villages in East and North Shan earned, on average, a higher income than households in non‐opium poppy villages, they seemed to face higher costs of living. For example, the percentage of villages with clinics was lower in opium poppy villages, as was the availability of asphalt roads. The situation was different for South Shan, where a larger share of opium poppy villages had clinics than non‐opium poppy villages, and the same percentage of opium poppy and non‐opium poppy villages had access to asphalt roads. Some conditions were unfavourable in opium poppy villages in contrast to non‐opium poppy villages, regardless of region. For example, a smaller share of opium poppy villages had access to public grid electricity and local markets for selling their produce. Daily wages were lower as well. These conditions make it more difficult to make a living from licit activities in opium poppy villages than in non‐opium poppy villages. Conversely, a higher percentage of opium poppy villages had access to schools, but education alone does not seem to be able to generate licit sources of income. In both opium poppy and non‐opium poppy villages in all regions, female daily wages were lower than male daily wages for similar work, denoting gender inequalities in all types of villages. Opium poppy households seem to be primarily buying food from opium poppy income regardless of their location, indicating that some degree of food insecurity could be expected if opium poppy cultivation were eliminated without alternatives in place. The more difficult situation of households in some of the opium poppy villages is reflected by their coping mechanisms to face food insecurity, with households in East and North Shan more likely to reduce their number of meals. Households in the comparatively better off South Shan do not cut meals, but may, for example, eat less preferred food. That said, the higher income inequality among opium poppy villages in South Shan suggests that there is a group of farmers there who may not have access to licit sources of income, which would allow them to improve their living conditions. In East and North Shan, the drivers of opium poppy cultivation seem to be more associated with subsistence needs. Opium poppy villages depend more directly on natural resources (such as collection of forest wood for cooking) than non‐opium poppy villages, regardless of their location. Opium poppy villages also have lower‐quality natural resources such as drinking water, and report faster degradation of forest quality. This suggests that there is a need to implement natural resource awareness and management plans, especially in opium poppy villages. Governance and security were found to be inversely associated with opium poppy growing, as non‐opium poppy villages had better governance and enhanced security levels. However, these low levels seem to be cause and consequence of opium poppy cultivation. Opium poppy starts in villages with relatively low levels of governance and security, and once there opium poppy cultivation decreases furthermore the governance and security of the villages. Sustainable development without opium poppy cultivation requires good governance and security, which are also linked to developments in the ongoing peace process. The picture that emerges from the analysis shows that South Shan has higher levels of development than other regions. In this region, although opium poppy villages have a lower level of development than non‐opium poppy villages, the “sustainable development gap” is smaller. The graphs disaggregated by region included below show the “sustainable development gap” associated with illicit crop cultivation, corresponding to the difference in attainment of many of

47


the SDG indicators between opium poppy villages (red line) and non‐opium poppy villages (blue line). (See appendix 1 for the description of the SDG indicators). East Shan SDG 1: No poverty (normalized income) SDG 2: No hunger (coping without SDG 16: Peace and institutions 1 (perception of safety) reducing # meals) 0.8 SDG15: Life on land (non‐ SDG 3: Health (availability of clinic) 0.6 deteriorated quality forest) SDG 13: Climate (no crop shocks related to climate change) SDG 12: Responsible consumption (no collecting forest wood for cooking)

0.4


0.2 0

SDG 5: Gender equality (no different wage men and women)


SDG 6: Water and sanitation (availability of good quality water)

SDG 9: Infrastructure (availability of SDG 7: Energy (availability of public asphalt roads) electricity) SDG 8: Work (availability of internal market to sell crops) Non‐opium‐poppy village


North Shan SDG 1: No poverty (normalized income) SDG 2: No hunger (coping without SDG 16: Peace and institutions 1 reducing # meals) (perception of safety) 0.8 SDG15: Life on land (non‐ SDG 3: Health (availability of clinic) 0.6 deteriorated quality forest) SDG 13: Climate (no crop shocks related to climate change) SDG 12: Responsible consumption (no collecting forest wood for cooking)

0.4


0.2 0





48



South Shan SDG 1: No poverty (normalized income) SDG 2: No hunger (coping without SDG 16: Peace and institutions 1 reducing # meals) (perception of safety) 0.8 SDG15: Life on land (non‐ SDG 3: Health (availability of clinic) 0.6 deteriorated quality forest) 0.4

SDG 13: Climate (no crop shocks related to climate change)

0.2


0

SDG 12: Responsible consumption (no collecting forest wood for cooking)






The diversity of conditions and factors associated with the different levels of development and opium poppy cultivation need to be acknowledged and taken into account in the elaboration of local alternative development policies, as indicated in the UN Guiding Principles on Alternative Development. The evidence suggests that improvement in infrastructure and services can help to reduce the costs of living in opium poppy villages, and therefore decrease the dependency of those communities on opium poppy income. This holds particularly true in East and North Shan, while in South Shan, further analysis of the reasons driving income inequality would help to explain opium poppy cultivation in this region, where opium poppy villages are not particularly affected by weak infrastructure and service delivery. These improvements need to be accompanied by income diversification opportunities, and only then followed by law enforcement to avoid generating poverty and food insecurity. In addition, the strengthening of institutions and governance can help to reduce opium poppy cultivation, as well as promoting the support to the rule of law. In this regard, the village headmen indicated that the ban on opium poppy cultivation was a major contributing factor for stopping cultivation in 2016. Another factor worth exploring as an alternative development strategy is the provision of land property rights to farmers, while continued support to alternative crops will also help to curb opium poppy cultivation. This report is building an evidence base and sharing lessons learned to further our understanding of the motivations for opium poppy cultivation, based on the needs of opium poppy and non‐ opium poppy villages across Shan State. Further monitoring and evaluations must continue with these efforts and delve deeper into the complex interactions between poverty and opium poppy cultivation, as well as focus on complementing the analysis with disaggregated data at household level, to better understand what is happening and why, and how progress towards a sustainable development outside the illicit crop economy can be fully attained and maintained in Shan State.

49


50


Appendix 1: Description of SDG indicators included in the “spider” graphs of the Executive Summary and Recommendations The indicators used in the graphs are briefly described below:  SDG 1 No Poverty: household income per year (normalized or adjusted to the scale 0‐1 for comparative purposes).  SDG 2 Zero Hunger: percentage of villages where one of the three most important household mechanisms to cope with food insecurity does not involve reducing the number of meals per day.  SDG 3 Good Health and Well‐Being: percentage of villages with a clinic inside the village.  SDG 4 Quality of Education: percentage of villages with a school inside the village.  SDG 5 Gender Equality: percentage of villages with equal daily wage rates for men and women.  SDG 6 Clean Water and Sanitation: percentage of villages with good or very good quality of drinking water.  SDG 7 Affordable and Clean Energy: percentage of villages with public grid electricity.  SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth: percentage of villages with a local market to sell cash crops.  SDG 9 Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure: percentage of villages with access to an asphalt road.  SDG 10 Reduced Inequalities (including sustainable economic growth for the poorest): percentage of households inside the village earning enough income to allow savings.  SDG 12 Responsible Consumption and Production: percentage of villages where the main source of energy for cooking is not forest wood.  SDG 13 Climate Action: percentage of village headmen not reporting climate‐related shocks among the three major shocks faced by the inhabitants in the village.  SDG 15 Life on Land: percentage of village headmen indicating no changes or improvements in forest quality in the last two years.  SDG 16 Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions: percentage of villages perceived as safe by the village headmen.  SDG 11: “Sustainable Cities”, SDG 14: “Life below Water”, and SDG 17: “Partnerships for the goals” were considered not applicable for this report.

51


Appendix 2: Survey methodology Sampling procedure The sampling frame is composed of an updated village listing provided by the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) in Myanmar; however, it excludes the Western sections of South and North Shan where opium-poppy cultivation is ineligible (see Maps 1-4). The village listing includes names of villages, village tracts, townships, regions and their codes. The listing also includes the opium poppy growing history and the GPS latitude and longitude for the former surveyed villages. This listing or baseline data is regularly updated with information obtained through previous surveys to reflect changes in village locations or names, village mergers and relocations, and to delete double entries. For many village entries, GPS positions facilitate the unique identification of each village. The sample size is influenced by a number of requirements and constraints. The main requirement was the level of accuracy considered acceptable for the estimates, whereas the constraints were either economical or logistical. For the 2016 socio-economic survey, a total of 600 villages were randomly selected throughout Shan State, which was approximately 6.3% of the 9,501 villages from the sampling frame. About 230 villages in North Shan, 210 villages in South Shan and 160 villages in East Shan were selected.

Table 3: Sample selection and survey dates of the socio-economic survey, 2016

South Shan

East Shan

North Shan

Total

Start date

1-May-2016

6-May-2016

15-May-2016

1-May-2016

End date

15-Jun-2016

20-Jun-2016

30-Jun-2016

30-Jun-2016

Number of survey teams

16

10

17

43

Targeted villages

210

160

230

600

Surveyed villages

202

160

229

591

% of Villages achieved

96%

100%

100%

99%

Households covered

16,195

6,922

19,189

42,306

Rural Population covered

80,972

36,059

97,651

214,682

Survey organization As in previous surveys, the components of the socio-economic survey were coordinated by the UNODC Myanmar country office and operationally implemented in close collaboration with the Myanmar Government counterpart. Field operation of the survey was implemented by the CCDAC, while UNODC provided technical support, coordination and supervision with national and international staff throughout the survey.

52


Based on the number of survey townships and the number of sample villages per township, UNODC proposed the number of required surveyors for field data collection to CCDAC. This number was estimated based on experiences in previous surveys. The surveyor team was composed by members of CCDAC in collaboration with the State Committee for Drug Abuse Control (SCDAC) and local authorities. A total of 129 surveyors were selected, organized into 43 teams (17 teams for North Shan, 16 teams for South Shan and 10 teams for East Shan). Each team was composed of three surveyors. Each team leader was from the Myanmar Police Force (MPF) with one team member from the General Administration Department (GAD) and one from the Settlement and Land Record Department (SLRD). All surveyors were from township‐level offices based in each township. All the team leaders were graduated police lieutenant level officers from Myanmar Police Force. They are familiar with local geography and the general situation with regard to ethnic traditions, social characteristics and the security situation within their respective township. The team members from GAD were office clerks and some were township‐level deputy section heads. A majority were university graduates and only a few were current college students. The GAD team members are familiar with village tract‐level authorities and village headmen. They know key demographic information of their respective township. The members from SLRD are land‐record clerks and are familiar with information on land classification, land ownership and crop cultivation within their respective township. A majority of SLRD team members were also university graduates, and some were current college students. UNODC provided survey materials to the survey teams which were necessary in field operations. The items listed in the table below were provided to each survey team at the time of training. The materials were returned to UNODC when the field operations were accomplished. GPS device

to collect village location latitude/longitude

Digital camera

for collecting field pictures

Digital calculator

to use in data input with numerical calculation

Moreover, UNODC provided a few additional items to each survey team in order to facilitate their field work. Those items were for field use and there was no need to return to UNODC afterwards. Survey bag with UN logo

to put material together in field work

Cap with UN logo to each for safety purpose in some security risk areas surveyors Field note book/envelopes

to put questionnaires when send back to UNODC

Pencil/eraser/marker pen

to mark village codes in envelopes/form filling

Some medicines

to use in field operation

Socio‐economic questionnaire design The Myanmar socio‐economic survey was a village‐level interview survey. The questionnaire was developed by a research expert from UNODC headquarters, including inputs from the national technical team at the UNODC Myanmar office. The questionnaire contained a total of 91 questions which were categorised by relevant topics. A draft version of the questionnaire was sent to CCDAC for comments, based on which the final questionnaire was elaborated at UNODC headquarters.

53


The questionnaire was translated to a Myanmar version by the technical team at the UNODC Myanmar office. The survey questionnaire in both English and Myanmar version was shared with CCDAC before survey trainings. Surveyor training Some selected surveyors were trained by UNODC. The technical team from the UNODC Myanmar office gave trainings to the respective surveyors in each survey region. A research expert from UNODC headquarters accompanied the national technical team in the training at Taunggyi, South Shan. Not only 129 surveyors but also 9 area supervisors (3 persons per region) participated in trainings. An in‐charge officer from the CCDAC head office supervised each training. During the training, each survey question was discussed with surveyors based on their field experiences, and this improved some unclear and confusing terms in the questions. Interview questions were practised by asking questions and giving answers between the teams. Training materials such as powerpoint slides, terms definitions, guidelines, list of targeted samples, baseline villages list per respective township et cetera were provided to surveyors. The training also included practical sessions for handling GPS devices and collecting GPS latitude/longitude. It also included debriefing sessions on experiences encountered in past surveys. About 25% of the surveyors had field data collection experiences in past annual opium surveys. Table 4: Training village surveyors, 2016

Region

From

To

Trainees

Venue

South Shan

25‐Apr‐2016

26‐Apr‐2016

48

Taunggyi

East Shan

1‐May‐2016

2‐May‐2016

30

Kyaing Tong

North Shan

8‐May‐2016

9‐May‐2016

51

Lashio

Total

129

54


Map 5: Location of the surveyors’ training sessions, Shan State, 2016

55


Training of surveyors in South Shan, 2016

Training of surveyors in East Shan, 2016

Conducting the survey Field operation was started within one week after the training in each region. The operation period was set to about six weeks in each survey region. The time frame of field data collection in the whole survey area was set from 1 May 2016 to 30 June 2016. The surveyors of 37 townships out of the targeted 39 townships completed their fieldwork on time, but the surveyors of two townships delayed two weeks in data collection work because of security and transportation difficulties. The operation achieved field data collection in 591 villages out of the targeted 600. The surveyors could not conduct interviews in 9 villages (7 villages in South Shan and 2 villages in North Shan) because of security issues. The number of survey teams was justified according to the number of survey townships. Normally one survey team was assigned to each township and two teams were assigned to each of those townships with either a particularly heavy work load or difficulties related to accessibility (townships with more than 40 selected villages). The townships that were assigned two teams were three townships in North Shan (Tang Yang, Kutkai, and Lashio townships) and one township in East Shan (Kyaing Tong township). The number of questionnaires filled out by a survey team depended on the number of selected villages in its respective township. The number of questionnaires filled out by a team ranged from minimum 5 villages (Moemit, Namtu townships in North Shan and Linhkay, Mong Pan townships in South Shan) to maximum 25 (Thibaw township in North Shan).

Survey conduction in South Shan, 2016

56

Survey conduction in North Shan, 2016


Survey conduction in East Shan, 2016

Introducing the surveyors to headmen The surveyors were trained and instructed to establish a basis of trust before conducting the interview with the village headmen. When the survey team arrived the village, they first met the village headmen to introduce the survey; that it is a collaboration between the government and the UN in order to get attention by the headmen. The team explained to the headmen the purposes of data collection, how important the field data is for making planning regarding development concerns and the kinds of questions which would be made in the interview. The team leader, a police officer, explained and pledged that the answers would be protected and used only for analytical purpose to reflect the real situation. The surveyors were trained to prepare answers corresponding with any possible questions by the headmen and villagers. In order to ease the interviewing, and base on cultural norms in Myanmar, the surveyor team urged village headmen to form a group of villagers including women who were interested and willing to attend the interview. The size and formation of the group was not definitely specified. After establishing a basis of trust between surveyors and the group, the interview was started. A majority of the survey interviews took place at the house of village headmen or at the village monastery. One of the survey team members asked questions and another wrote down the answers on the questionnaire form. Another member recorded the village location ‐ latitude/longitude and field pictures ‐ and also crosschecked villagers’ answers with available information. The surveyors were instructed to write down the answers to the questionnaire form in front of the villagers. Annual opium surveys were conducted for the last 10 years, and most of the village headmen in survey regions had more or less already heard about this survey interview and they knew it did not cause distress to villagers. Data handling and collection During the survey field operation time, the area supervisors monitored and checked survey teams’ field work in their respective area. There were three area supervisors per survey region. When the

57


field data collection was completed, each team put the questionnaires in one A4 envelope per village tract and sealed it. All sealed A4 envelopes were put together into an A3 envelope and sealed again. Each survey team sent the sealed A3 envelope/envelopes to the respective regional supervisors who are heads of Drug Enforcement Units (former Anti‐Narcotic Task Forces) at Taunggyi in South Shan, Lashio in North Shan and Kyaing Tong in East Shan. The survey materials were packaged and sent along with the questionnaire envelopes to the region supervisors. The regional supervisors collected the sealed envelopes and material packages sent by each survey team. Each regional supervisor prepared a large package including the questionnaire envelopes and materials from his region and sent it to the UNODC Myanmar office at Yangon. The surveyed questionnaires from 37 townships were received on time but the questionnaires from two townships (Manton in North Shan and Mong Kaing in South Shan) were received two weeks later than targeted date because of security and transportation difficulties. Data entry, data cleaning and quality control During the field operation time, a MS Access database was developed by the UNODC technical team. Data entry was conducted by this team at the UNODC Myanmar office. Data entry was carried out from 13 June to 22 July 2016. The technical team successively carried out data verification and data cleaning. Whenever any confusing or unclear answer was observed, the technical team connected the respective survey teams and asked their clarification. After the data cleaning, the technical team prepared a data tabulation as instructed by the research expert from UNODC headquarters. The full dataset, an MS Excel table, contained 624 columns and 591 rows without blank cells. The full dataset was shared with the CCDAC head office before data analysis. Limitations of the village survey The main limitations in the data collection and analysis were:

58

-

The socio‐economic interviews were conducted in groups that consisted of village headmen and villagers. It is unclear exactly how these groups were formed, and thus, whether the information obtained would be the same if individual households were chosen randomly.

-

The data obtained were aggregated at the village level. The data collected cannot be used to draw conclusions about why individual people grow opium poppy or work in the poppy trade.

-

The interviewers were trained and instructed to establish a basis of trust before conducting the interview. However, since law enforcement was part of the group, a certain effect on the interview answers cannot be excluded (“social desirability” or reluctance to talk freely about illicit activities).


Appendix 3: Socio‐economic questionnaire 2016

59


D. Energy 13 What type of energy the majority of population use 13a for cooking? (cross only one option) Public electricity Crop residues or animal waste Gas Solar panel Charcoal Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Firewood 13b for lighting? (cross only one option) Public electricity Candles Lamp from kerosene or paraffin oil Gas

Batteries (e.g., dry cell) Solar panel Generators Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

E. Transportation and roads 14 Does the village have access to roads that connects the village with other villages? (cross only one option) 15 If yes, are they mainly Asphalt roads? Dirt (sandy/muddy) roads? 16 What is the quality of the roads? 16a During rainy season Very good 16b During dry season Very good

Yes

No

Gravel-surfaced roads? Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Good

Regular

Bad

Very bad

Good

Regular

Bad

Very bad

17 Do the villagers live close to these roads (30 walking minutes or less from their house)? Less than 1/4 of the villagers M ore than half to 3/4 Between 1/4 and half M ore than 3/4 Yes 18 Does some sort of vehicle pass these roads on which you can pay a fare for a ride? (e.g. bus, motorcycles, and similar)? 18a If yes, how often do these vehicles(e.g. buses) arrive/leave the village? Once per day Twice per week Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 18b How far in traveling time (minutes) is the next village where most of the transportation M inute 18c How much the does the fare cost to the next village? Kyats

No

III. CROPS CULTIVATED INSIDE THE VILLAGE A. Area per agricultural crop 19 What is the total agricultural area of the villagers of the total agricultural area ? (including communal agricultural land, but excluding forest land in acre) 19a What area corresponds to private households’ land? Acres 19b What area corresponds to communal land, including common land cultivated by organized group of people? Check that sum of 19a + 19b = total agricultural land (Question 19)

Acres

Acres

20 Which crops, including cereals, fruit trees and flowers, have been cultivated or harvested this season, as cash crops or for self-consumption in private households’ lan (Cross the corresponding crops and indicate the irrigated and rain-fed area ) Irrigated (Acres) Rain-fed (Acres) Irrigated (Acres) Rain-fed (Acres) Beans Opium poppy Orange Paddy (rice) Cannabis Peanuts Corn/maize Cheroot leaf Flowers Potato Leaf vegetables Sesame M elon Sugar cane M ustard Tea Garlic Tomato Onions Watermelon Tobacco Wheat Others. Specify - - - - - - - Others. Specify - - - - - - - Check that sum of (Question 20) = total hectares of private farmers’ land (Question 19a) Note: in the case of intercropping provide an estimate of the area per individual crop 21 How many geographically independent agricultural plots have on average each household?

60

Acres


22 Which crops, including cereals, fruit trees and flowers, have been cultivated or harvested this season, as cash crops or for self-consumption in communal or common land? Irrigated (Acres)

Rain-fed (Acres) Crop name - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Crop name - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Crop name - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Opium poppy Cannabis.

Check that sum of 22a+…+22e = total hectares of communal land (Question 19b) B. Current and previous poppy and cannabis cultivation 23 If there is opium poppy cultivation in the village this season (Only for villages with opium poppy cultivation this season) 23a how many households have grown poppy this season? 23b 23c 23d 23e 23f 23g 23h 23i 23j 23k 23l

how many how many how many how many

Households

grow poppy exclusively in their own agricultural land? Households exclusively rent agricultural land to grow poppy? Households exclusively use a share crop modality to grow poppy? Households use more than one modality (of the indicated above) to grow poppy?

Households

Check that sum of 23b+23c+23d+23e = total number of poppy households (Question 23a) do farmers in the village grow opium poppy twice per year (in the same plot area)? Yes No do farmers in the village stagger opium poppy planting? Yes No in which month(s) the opium poppy cultivation started? M onth do poppy fields were affected by diseases this year? Yes No do poppy fields were affected by drought, frost, heavy rain this year? Yes No in comparison to last year, the total opium poppy area under cultivation have Increased Decreased Remained the same Not applicable (no poppy last year) if poppy areas have increased, what are three most important reasons for this? (select the three most important ones, and rank them from 1=the most important, 2=second most important, 3=third most important, write the number next to the corresponding option) Access to credit and debt - Advance cash for poppy cultivation has been provided this year - Need money for a large expense (e.g. wedding), - difficult to be covered otherwise Higher debt this year than last year and need to repay it Access to labor and jobs - Cannot find non-poppy related jobs / high unemployment this year - There is higher availability of labor for poppy cultivation this year than last year Access to land, water and land ownership - Land area is small, or not suitable for other crops, or lack water - No land owner and I am trying to make money fast Agronomic and environmental conditions - Better climate conditions this year (e.g., not drought) for poppy cultivation than last year - Reduction on or no poppy pests or diseases this year - Failure with alternative crops, poor yield results in previous years - Have more experience cultivating poppy Addiction - Self-consumption (addicted to opium poppy) Eradication and forced activities - Forced to cultivate poppy - Less afraid of eradication this year than last year External or internal assistance - External or government assistance has decreased this year Income and market conditions - Higher demand for opium poppy this year than last year - Higher sale price for opium poppy this year than last year - There has been a reduction in the sale prices of alternative crops this year - Higher prices of agricultural (non-poppy related) inputs this year - The demand for non-poppy crops in the market has decreased this year Social and religious issues - It is common. Almost everybody does it. Transportation - Difficult to take non-poppy crops to the market due to bad roads or controls

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Others - Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 23m if poppy areas have decreased, what are the three most important reasons for this? (select the three most important ones, and rank them from 1=the most important, 2=second most important, 3=third most important, write the number next to the corresponding option) Access to credit and debt - Advance cash for poppy cultivation has not been provided this year - No large expense (e.g. wedding) that need to be paid this year - Lower debt this year than last year Access to labor and jobs - Can find non-poppy related jobs / high unemployment this year - There is low availability of labor for poppy cultivation this year than last year Access to land, water and land ownership - Bought or accessed more land, better access to water Agronomic and environmental conditions - Worse climate conditions this year (e.g., drought) for poppy cultivation than last year - Increase on poppy pests or diseases this year - Good results with alternative crops, good yields last year - Have limited experience growing poppy (only short time, do not want to risk a lot) Addiction - Afraid of family members become addict to opium Eradication and forced activities - Not forced to cultivate poppy this year - Afraid of eradication this year External or internal assistance - External or government assistance has increased this year Income and market conditions - Good results with alternative crops, enough income from them - There has been an increase in the sale prices of alternative crops this year - Lower prices of agricultural (non-poppy related) inputs this year - Lower sale price for opium poppy this year than last year - Lower demand for opium poppy this year than last year Social and religious issues - Poppy cultivation is not common. Almost anybody does it - Opium poppy cultivation has been banned by the government - Community associations have banned poppy cultivation Transportation - Easier to take non-poppy crops to the market due to improved roads or no controls Others - Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 23n Why farmers grow poppy inside the village? (select the three most important ones, and rank them from 1=the most important, 2=second most important, 3=third most important, write the number next to the corresponding option) Access to credit and debt - Advance cash for poppy cultivation has been provided this year - Need money for a large expense (e.g. wedding), difficult to be covered otherwise - Higher debt this year than last year and need to repay it Access to labor and jobs - Cannot find non-poppy related jobs / high unemployment this year - There is higher availability of labor for poppy cultivation this year than last year Access to land, water and land ownership - Land area is small, or not suitable for other crops, or lack water - No land owner and I am trying to make money fast Agronomic and environmental conditions - Poppy is easier to cultivate and harvest than other crops - Driven by yields, and opium poppy has high yield - Good climate conditions for poppy growing - Bad results with alternative crops, bad yields - Have experience cultivating opium poppy

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Addiction - Self-consumption (addicted to opium poppy) Eradication and forced activities - Forced to cultivate poppy - Not afraid of eradication Income and market conditions - Poppy is convenient. It provides higher net income than other crops or activities - I am poor. Need money for buying food and basic shelter - High costs of inputs for cultivating non-poppy crops - Poppy is easy to sell, high demand for opium poppy - Driven by prices, and opium poppy has high sale price Social and religious issues - It is common. Almost everybody does it. Transportation - Difficult to take non-poppy crops to the market due to bad roads or controls - Do not need to transport the opium poppy to the market (no transportation costs) Others - Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Households 24 If there is cannabis cultivation in the village this season, how many households have grown cannabis? (Only for villages with cannabis cultivation this season) 25 Regardless if there are opium poppy or cannabis cultivation this year, was there opium poppy or cannabis cultivation inside the village during the previous years Poppy Cannibas 25a In 2015 Yes No Yes No 25b In 2014 Yes No Yes No 25c In 2013 Yes No Yes No 25d In 2012 Yes No Yes No 25e In 2011 Yes No Yes No 25f Others - - - Yes No Yes No Year 26 If the villagers have not grown poppy this year but did it in the past (e.g. stopped poppy cultivation some years ago), 26a what do these households do instead of poppy cultivation? (select the three most important ones, and rank them from 1=the most important, 2=second most important, 3=third most important, write the number next to the corresponding option). - Cultivation of land with other crops. Which ones - - - - - - - - - - - Livestock raising - Daily wages - External or government assistance - Rental of land, cars or agricultural tools - Petty trade (Which products do they trade?) - Rely on remittance - Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 26b If farmers decided to cultivate land with other crops instead of opium poppy, do the total area cultivated with other crops is larger than the previous area where they used to cultivate poppy? Increased Equal Smaller 26c how have their household income changed without poppy income? Increased Equal Smaller 26d why did the villagers stopped poppy cultivation? (select the three most important ones, and rank them from 1=the most important, 2=second most important, 3=third most important, write the number next to the corresponding option) Access to credit and debt - Advance cash for poppy cultivation has not been provided - No large expense (e.g. wedding) that need to be paid this year - Have low or not debt that need to be repaid Access to labor and jobs - Can find non-poppy related jobs - There is low availability of labor for poppy fields Access to land, water and land ownership - Bought or accessed more land, better access to water

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Agronomic and environmental conditions - Bad climate conditions for poppy growing (e.g., drought) - High poppy pests or diseases - Good results with alternative crops, good yields - Have not or have limited experience growing poppy Addiction - Afraid of family members become addict to opium Eradication and forced activities - Not forced to cultivate poppy any longer - Afraid of eradication External or internal assistance - External or government assistance has increased Income and market conditions - Good results with alternative crops, enough income from them - There has been an increase in the sale prices of alternative crops - Low prices of agricultural (non-poppy related) inputs this year - Low demand for opium poppy - Low sale price for opium poppy Social and religious issues - Poppy cultivation is not common. Almost anybody does it. - Opium poppy cultivation has been banned by the government - Communal associations have banned poppy cultivation Transportation - Easier to take non-poppy crops to the market due to improved roads or no controls Others - Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 27 If the villagers have not grown poppy this year, and have never done it, why do the villagers do not grow poppy? (select the three most important ones, and rank them from 1=the most important, 2=second most important, 3=third most important, write the number next to the corresponding option) Access to credit and debt - Advance cash for poppy cultivation is not provided - If I have a large expense (e.g. wedding) I can access to credit (no need poppy) - Have low or not debt that need to be repaid Access to labor and jobs - Can find non-poppy related jobs - There is low availability of labor for poppy growing Access to land, water and land ownership - Have access to land or water to avoid poppy cultivation Agronomic and environmental conditions - Bad climate conditions for poppy growing (e.g., drought) - High poppy pests or diseases - Have not or have limited experience growing poppy Addiction - Afraid of family members become addict to opium Eradication and forced activities - Not forced to cultivate poppy any longer - Afraid of eradication External or internal assistance - External or government assistance has been provided Income and market conditions - Good results with alternative crops, enough income from them - Low demand for opium poppy - Low sale price for opium poppy - There has been an increase in the sale prices of alternative crops - Low prices of agricultural (non-poppy related) inputs Social and religious issues - Poppy cultivation is not common. Almost anybody does it. - Opium poppy cultivation has been banned by the government - Community associations have banned poppy cultivation

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Transportation - In comparison to other villages, it is easier to take non-poppy crops to the market (markets are close, there are roads or no controls over the roads) Others - Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

VI. INCOME-GENERATING ACTIVITIES A. Average income per household 28 What was the average income, after excluding expenses per household (including all working members of the household for each of the following sources over the last 12 months? (Indicate the number of households performing the activity, household income per activity and corresponding currency) Number of households Household income per activity (Kyats) Sales of paddy and rice (including by-products such as husk) Sales of other licit crops, fruits, and flowers (including by-products such as wheat, straw) Opium sales (including poppy straw and poppy oil from seeds) Cannabis sales. Livestock and by-products (e.g., eggs, milk, etc) Forest product sales. Daily wages (agricultural related) Daily wages (non-agricultural related) Salaried job or employee Petty trade. What products do they sell? Rental of property, vehicles, and tools Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Check that sum of number of households = total number of households (Question 2) B. Poppy prices and labour and contribution of poppy to the local economy (Only if there is opium poppy cultivation this season in the village) 29 What are the current farm-gate price of: 29a fresh opium (just after harvesting)? Kyat/Viss 29b dried opium? Kyat/Viss 30 This season, how many households (who live permanently in the village) were 30a Only growing their own poppy (but no earning labour on poppy fields run by others)? 30b Only earning from labour on poppy fields run by others (but not growing their own poppy)? 30c Growing their own poppy and earning from labour on poppy fields run by others?

Households Households Households

31 How many labourers do a poppy household hire on average (1 acre of poppy)? Labourers who live in the village Temporal labourers (who do not live in the village) 31a for poppy weeding? 31b for poppy lancing? 32 How many days on average a poppy household spend (1 acre of poppy in Myanmar)? 32a for poppy weeding? Days 32b for poppy lancing? Days 33 How much are labourers paid for 33a Opium poppy weeding (Kyats) 33b Lacing or gum collection for opium poppy (Kyats)

M ale M ale

Female Female

Yes No 34 Are labourers also paid with opium poppy? (only labourers do not include tenant and sharecrop modality)? Less than 1/4 of income Between 1/4 - 1/2 M ore than 3/4 No 35 Is daily food provided by the hiring household?

Yes

M ore than 1/2 to 3/4

No

36 What was the poppy income used for by villagers? (select the three most important ones, and rank them from 1=the most important, 2=second most important, 3=third most important, write the number next to the corresponding option) Food Buying agricultural tools or vehicles M edical expenses Village infrastructure Education Religious buildings Paying debt Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Buying land or house property

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C. Cost of agricultural production 37 What are the average cost in Kyat of cultivating one acre of - ? Rice Opium poppy Seeds Fertilizer Irrigation Ploughing Weeding Harvesting/Lacing Total cost D. Agricultural (non-poppy) and off-farm daily wages 38 What is the current daily wage (Kyats) inside the village for the following activities? M ale - Farm labor (non-poppy) M ale - Non-farm labor (construction of roads, houses, etc.)

Female Female

39 Considering the number of available positions, how difficult is to get a paid non-farm labor job inside the village? Very difficult Difficult M ore or less Easy Very easy 40 During which months are there high demand for farm-labor (non-poppy)?

M onth

E. Remittances and working abroad 41 For relatives sending remittances or working abroad, how many months during the year are they away from the househol All year round 11 to 6 months 5 to 3 months Less than 3 months 42 Where do most of the people working abroad are located (Cross only one option) Other village in the same region Neighbouring countries Other village in other region Other non-neighbouring countries F. Livestock 43 How many households possess cattle? (e.g. cows, bulls, other oxen) 44 How many cattle are in the village? 45 How many households possess the following 45a Chicken and poultry: Less than 1/4 45b Goats: Less than 1/4 45c Sheep Less than 1/4 45d Pigs Less than 1/4

Households

Cattles Between 1/4 -1/2 Between 1/4 -1/2 Between 1/4 -1/2 Between 1/4 -1/2

G. Industrialization and value addition 46 Inside the village, are there availability of 46a co-operatives or farmer associations? 46b small scale manufacturing industries or similar?

Yes Yes

M ore than 1/2 to 3/4 M ore than 1/2 to 3/4 M ore than 1/2 to 3/4 M ore than 1/2 to 3/4

M ore than 3/4 M ore than 3/4 M ore than 3/4 M ore than 3/4

No No

V. LAND OWNERSHIP, IRRIGATION AND SOIL QUALITY 47 How many households have property rights of their agricultural land inside the village? 47a If there is poppy cultivation, how many of them are poppy growers? Households

Households

48 How do most of the villagers irrigate their agricultural field(Cross only one option) Hosepipe Superficial canal or divert stream / river / lake Sprinkler Underground canal or divert stream / river / lake Flood Buckets Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 49 What is the main source of irrigation? (Cross only one option) Streams / springs (e.g. from mountain deglaciation) Rivers

Lakes Wells Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

50 How do villagers mainly extract irrigation water? (Cross only one option) Hand-pump M anually with buckets or similar Treadle pump Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - M otor pump 51 Overall, how is the quality of land for agricultural production? Very good Good Regular Bad 51a If the quality of soil is bad or very bad, what are the main soil quality problems faced by the farmers? Soil degradation / low organic matter and nutrients (farmers do not use enough fertilizers) Soil degradation / low organic matter and nutrients (farmers do not rotate crops) Soil erosion (e.g. due to deforestation and sharp slopes or heavy rain)

66

Very bad (Cross only one option)


Soil salinization (e.g. bad drainages) Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

VI. NATURAL AND FOREST RESOURCES 52 What is the total forest area in the traditional boundary of the village? 52a What is the extension of the forest area owned by individual households? 52b What is the extension of common forest area, owned by groups or the community? Check that sum of 36a+36b = total forest area (Question 36)

Acres Acres Acres

53 How often do the villagers use resources provided by the forest and surroundings? 53a Collect wood for fire Always Often Sometimes 53b Collecting plants, seed, mushrooms Always Often Sometimes 53c Hunting and fishing Always Often Sometimes 53d Pastures for animals Always Often Sometimes 53e Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - Always Often Sometimes 54 If there is communal forest…. 54a Who have access to the communal forest resources? (Cross only one option) Open access Regulated access. Who regulates the access? - - - - - - - - - - - - Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Seldom Seldom Seldom Seldom Seldom

Neve Neve Neve Neve Neve

Who has access? - - - - - - - - - - - -

54b Do the status of the communal forest over the last two years have? (Cross only one option) Deteriorated Remained the same Improved

VII. FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION STATUS 55 During the last 12 months, how many households have not had enough food or money to buy food? (less than 3 rations/full cups of wheat/rice per adult per day) For three months or less? For seven to nine months? For four to six months? For nine to 12 months? Check that sum of 73a+…+73e = total households (Question 2)

No food deficit

56 When the household do not have enough food, what do they usually do? select the three most important ones, and rank them from 1=the most important, 2=second most important, 3=third most important, write the number next to the corresponding option) Reduce number of daily meals or eat smaller meals Do not consume expensive food or eat cheaper but less preferred staples Reduce non-food expenditures Spend cash savings Borrow food from neighbors or relatives Hunt wild animals or collect plants from the forest Purchase food on credit Receive free-aid or help from organizations, government, others Sell livestock, household assets (e.g. farming tools) or land to buy food Rent out part or all their farmland Work longer hours or work more days Other household members who were not working go to work Remove children from school to work M igrate to other regions or areas Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

VIII. ACCESS TO MARKETS AND SELF-CONSUMPTION 57 In which type of market do most of the farmers sell their crops or agricultural produc (Cross only one option) Local market inside the village M arket outside the village Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - 58 What type of market is it? (Cross only one option) Daily Irregular, sporadic Weekly Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - M onthly 59 What is the most common mean of transportation to get to the market?(Cross only one option) Feet M otorcycle Horse or donkey Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - Bus or car 59a How long (minutes) does it takes to get to the market by this mean of transport? M inutes

67


60 How most of the farmers choose the buyer? (Cross only one option) Always sell to the same trader / They trust him/her Closest buyer Best price 61 Which cash crops are usually sold? Crop Name Paddy M aize/Corn

Unit

Contract to sell to buyer Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sale price Kyats Kyats Kyats Kyats Kyats Kyats

---------------------------------------------------------------------

62 If some farmers do not sell their products in the market, what is the main re (Cross only one option) The market is too far There is not demand for them The sales prices are too low and it does not worth to sell products in the market The roads are in bad shape for transporting products to the market The market is difficult to reach because there are controls imposed by government/ insurgents on road transit The market is difficult to reach due to violence and conflict make difficult to travel The sellers in the market only buy from people they know or they trust / Farmers do not know the sellers in the mark The quality of the products is too low or good enough for finding buyers in the market Low price / good quality products from neighboring countries are already available in the market It is inconvenient. Traders buy on credit. Lack of information on which agricultural products have demand or good prices Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - 63 How many households buy staples in the market for eating at home? Less than 1/4 of households M ore than 1/2 to 3/4 Between 1/4 -1/2 M ore than 3/4

IX. MAIN EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SHOCKS 64 In the last 12 months, was the village affected by (rank the three most important shocks: 1=most severe, 2=second most severe, 3= third most severe) Lower crop yields due to climate conditions (e.g. drought or floods) Crop diseases or crop pests Livestock died due to drought, floods, diseases or stolen End of regular assistance, aid Large fall in sale prices for crops Large rise in price of food Illness, accidents or deaths of household members Infrastructure (e.g., dwelling/houses, medical clinics, school buildings) or roads damaged or destroyed Vehicles, agricultural tools have been damaged or destroyed Lack of employment (large number of unemployed or unpaid people) Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

X. EXTERNAL AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE 65 What kind of external agricultural assistance have the villagers received during the last 12 mo(Multiple choice) 65a Seeds For which crops? - - - - - - - - - - - - 65e Agricultural tools Which kind? - - - - - - - - - 65b Fertilizers 65f Animal vaccinations 65c Herbicides 65g Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - 65d Pesticides and fungicides 65h No external agricultural assistance 66 Have the farmers participated in formal or non-formal training in the last 12 months?

Yes

No

67 Have the farmers received in kind or money transfers from social assistance programs in the last 12 months? Yes No

XI. DEBT AND RURAL FINANCE 68 How many households are in debt or have outstanding loans? 68a Of them, how many are poppy growers? Households

Households

69 What was the main reasons for obtaining loans?(Cross only one option) Purchase land Purchase non-farm inputs Purchase agricultural inputs Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - Purchase inputs for opium cultivation

68


70 What is the main reason why do some households do not borrow mon(Cross only one option) No need Inadequate collateral Have already failure to pay debt Do not like to be in debt Believed to be refused Do not know any lender Too expensive Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - Too much trouble for what it is worth 71 If there is poppy growing in the village this season 71a Did farmers get advance money or advance payments to cultivate opium poppy this season?

Yes

No

XII. INFORMATION, SECURITY ISSUES, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND RULE OF LAW 72 Do households in the village have their own 72a Radio: Less than 1/4 Between 1/4 and 1/2 72b Television: Less than 1/4 Between 1/4 and 1/2 72c Cell phone Less than 1/4 Between 1/4 and 1/2 73 How safe is currently the village? Very safe Safe/Secure

M ore than 1/2 to 3/4 M ore than 1/2 to 3/4 M ore than 1/2 to 3/4

M ore or less safe

M ore than 3/4 M ore than 3/4 M ore than 3/4

Insecure

Very insecure

74 In comparison to last year, has safety inside the villag(Cross only one option) Deteriorated Remain the same Increased 75 If villagers were in serious financial/economic troubles 75a do they have relatives or friends they can count on to help them? Less than 1/4 Between 1/4 and 1/2

M ore than 1/2 to 3/4

75b do they access to help through the organized community ? Always Usually About half of the time

M ore than 3/4 Seldom

Never

76 Which is the main method used to solve internal, neighbor-related or domestic disputes from villagers (formal or informal judicial mechanism)(Cross only one option) Government officials Anti-government organization Respected member of the community Traditional justice through community-based organizations M ilitary or police Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - 76a In general, how effective is this method in solving disputes? Very effective Effective M ore or less effective

Ineffective

Very ineffective

77 How many villagers (male adults in working age) participate in organized communal activities? (e.g. construction of common roads for the community) Less than 1/4 of male adults Between 1/4 and 1/2 M ore than 1/2 to 3/4 Between 1/4 and 1/2 78 In the last 12 months, would you say the villagers have become M ore united Less united

As always

Do not know

79 Who has been mainly controlling of the villag(final decision on access to territories and resources) 79a This year (Cross only one option) Government Insurgence M ilitia Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ceasefired ethanic force 79b Last year (Cross only one option) Government Insurgence M ilitia Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ceasefired ethanic force

XIII. AWARENESS AND ERADICATION CAMPAIGNS FOR OPIUM POPPY 80 Was there any initiative to convince farmers not to cultivate opium poppy inside the village before planting time? Yes No 80a If yes, what was the main source of the awareness information? (Cross only one option) Billboard TV Governador Community-based association Religious leader Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - Radio 81 If there was poppy growing in the village this season 81a has there been any poppy eradication in the village this season? 81b If yes, what proportion of the total poppy area in the village was affected? Less than 1/3 Between 1/3 - 2/3

Yes

No

M ore than 2/3

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XIV. MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT 82 How many people have permanently left the village in the last 12 months?

People

83 What are the main reasons for leaving the village? (select the three most important ones, and rank them from 1=the most important, 2=second most important, 3=third most important, write the number next to the corresponding option). Schooling Getting married Unemployment / lack of jobs Natural disasters / destroy or damage of crops Lack of access to food Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - Security issues 84 Where did they mainly leave? (cross only one option) Other village in the same region Other village in other region Neighbouring countries

Other non-neighbouring countries (e.g., as refugees) Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

85 How many people have immigrated to the village in the last 12 months?

People

86 From where did they manly come from? (cross only one option) Other village in the same region Other non-neighbouring countries (e.g., as refugees) Other village in other region Others. Specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - Neighbouring countries

XV. WELL-BEING, ETHNIC COMPOSITION AND FINAL QUESTIONS A. Assessment of well-being and ethnic composition 87 What different languages do the villagers speak at home? 88 How many households are under the following situations? (Indicate number of households and the languages these households speak at home) Number of households - Current income allows them to build their savings - Current income allows them to save just a little - Current income only just meets their expenses - Current income is not sufficient so they need to use their savings or sell assets to meet expenses - Current income is really not sufficient, so they need to borrow to meet expenses Check that sum number of household equal total households (Question 2)

Languages they speak at home ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Use of drugs and prevention of drug use 89 How many persons above or equal to 15 years old took 89a Opium in the last 4 weeks? Persons 89b Heroin in the last 4 weeks? Persons 89c Synthetic drugs in the last 4 weeks? Persons 90 During the last 12 months, were there any 90a awareness campaign in place inside the village to prevent drug use? 90b initiative in place inside the village to treat drug users?

Yes Yes

No No

C. Suggestions for government 91 What would be your suggestion for the government to stop poppy cultivation? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------D. Final comments 92 Do you have any final comments you would like to add? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific

United Nations Building, 3rd floor B Block, Secretariat Building, Raj Damnern Nok Avenue, Bangkok 10200, Thailand Tel. (66-2) 288-2100 Fax. (66-2) 281-2129 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific Twitter: @UNODC_SEAP

3/5/2017

In Myanmar's OpiumRich Shan State, Addicts Without Options

ASIA

In Myanmar's Opium-Rich Shan State, Addicts Without Options September 07, 2015 4:26 PM Daniel De Carteret

Simon Lewis

TAUNGGYI, MYANMAR — Phone Myint Han has been addicted to opium for eight years. The 26-year-old Myanmarese once attempted to come clean at a state-run facility, one of the few options available to addicts here. But he found little help in the place where addicts were seen as criminals rather than patients. “It is like a prison,” the 26-year-old says of the facility, which is based in the township hospital of Taunggyi. “I went there once and I felt that I didn’t have any freedom.” Failed by government services, Myint Han quickly fell back into a pattern of abuse. He would take a combination of “formula” — a concoction of diluted opium and cough syrup highly popular among young people in Taunggyi — along with methamphetamines and any other substances he could get his hands on. In Taunggyi, nestled in the hills of Shan State — the second-largest opium producing area in the world — a local U.N. official estimates that 40 percent of young people are using the readily available drug. But in Taunggyi and other ethnic minority regions, services to support addicts are seemingly non-existent. That means hundreds of thousands of young people could become lost to addiction, casting a long shadow over Myanmar's recent policy successes in other areas. China Market Fuels Drug Boom Opium production in Shan State has soared in the past decade, with the vast majority of the crop processed into heroin to feed growing demand in China.

http://www.voanews.com/a/myanmarsopiumusersfewoptions/2951334.html

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Since opium traders are known to use methamphetamine pills, or “yama,” for currency, the area is also awash with cheap uppers. “I can buy drugs easily,” said Myint Han, a jittery young man with “Skid Row” tattooed on his forearm. Now doing somewhat better, Myint Han spends most days at a drop-in center run by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, where former and current drug users can get advice, medical care, clean needles and medication to ease the pains of detoxification. Methadone, however, is not available, and the center is billed only as “harm reduction” clinic. Some 10-15 patients, mostly young men, come to the center every day to play board games, watch TV or sing along to a guitar. Dr. Than Myo Tun, who runs the center as the UNODC’s township supervisor for Taunggyi, says the facility has registered some 600 clients since opening last September. His work, he says, barely scrapes the surface of Taunggyi’s drug problem, which, according to his estimates, comprises more than 20,000 addicts in a population of about 300,000. “There is peer pressure. They want to be modern — cool,” he says. “They use quiet places, or they use it in the teashops as [formula that] just looks like a drink.” Few of the users here inject drugs, he adds, since heroin is expensive. But in nearby Kachin State and northern Shan State, heroin is more widely available, fueling similar levels of addiction among youth. 'War On Drugs' Since Myanmar claimed independence in 1948, these particular regions have been wracked by ethnic insurgencies, and many believe the government benefits from the failure of law enforcement to tackle the drug problem.


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“People can very easily get these drugs,” said Dr. Myo Tun. “Young people are not interested in politics if they are on drugs.” Tom Kramer, a researcher at the Netherlands-based Transnational Institute, said although some government officials appear to recognize the problem, Myanmar continues to take a counter-productive “war on drugs” approach that delivers harsh punishments to users without putting services in place for rehabilitation. “Most of the laws, most of the policies of the government, are about controlling the population rather than providing services,” said Kramer. “There’s still some mentality in the country that laws and regulations and policies are meant to control people, and you don’t see too many policies being made to provide services to people.” Nan Mo Mo Thidar, secretary of the Myanmar Anti-Narcotics Association in southern Shan State, said that “Methamphetamine is a big problem and it’s getting bigger.” “It has started to change the culture,” she said. “It is traditional to offer green tea and snacks to anyone who comes into your house. But these days when you go to their place, some people will just have a bowl of yama pills.” Local attitudes still cast drug users as criminals, making it hard for people to break the cycle of addiction, she said. For former addict Ko Wai Yan, 25, the difficulty of coming clean is worsened by discrimination. The stigma of being a drug user is difficult to shake, which forces him back to the same drug-using friends. “I’ve been clean for six months,” he says, “but it’s difficult to give up. When I see my friends using, I can’t control myself.”


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IRIN | The drug war in Myanmar's mountains

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FATURD TOPIC:

NWLTTR OLUTION AND INNOVATION DATA INVTIGATION TRNDING OPINION

Feature

The drug war in Manmar' mountain

Forgotten Con阅�icts - Manmar

Niels Larsen/IRIN https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2015/11/05/drugwarmyanmarsmountains

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PAHLAING VILLAG, 5 Novemer

2015

Jared Ferrie Asia ditor

The reaon ehind Manmar’ ix

decade of ethnic warfare are man and

varied, ut General “Roert” Ar Nun

can tell ou in a word wh hi group

egan 꼹�ghting the government four

ear ago: drug.

Ar Nun is a commander in the Ta’ang National Lieration Arm, which is drawn from the ethnic Ta’ang minorit. Also known as the Palaung, the live in a rugged swathe of land that stretches across northern han tate to the Chinese order. The Ta’ang are famous tea farmers, ut over the past decade a new crop egan spreading through the green hills of their homeland: opium poppies. Ar Nun accuses pro-government militias led  memers of Manmar’s ruling part of pushing popp cultivation and manufacturing its derivative, heroin, as well as amphetamine-tpe stimulants. He lames them also for the drug epidemic that has swept through Ta’ang communities, which he said has happened so rapidl that it has torn the social faric apart and threatens their entire culture. https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2015/11/05/drugwarmyanmarsmountains

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“We thought, if it kept going on, the Ta’ang would disappear in 10 ears, so we had to take up arms to 얞�ght drugs,” said Ar Nun on a recent morning after a reakfast of vegetale and mutton curr, and two small glasses of homemade rice wine. The TNLA is just one of aout two dozen ethnic armed groups operating in Manmar, which has een riven  con阅�ict since independence from ritain in 1948. ome groups have fought for a separate state, while others seek political autonom within a federal sstem. The TNLA shares the political aims of several other groups, most of which also represent minorities that have een marginalised  the ethnic ama-dominated government. A Nationwide Cease얞�re Agreement is meant to e the starting point for negotiations aout creating a federal sstem that would resolve ethnic grievances. ut the government refuses to allow the TNLA to participate ecause it is 얞�ghting alongside another insurgent group on the Chinese order in a con阅�ict that roke out in earl 2015 and has put a heav strain on the militar. The cease얞�re agreement is a ke plank in the reform programme initiated  the quasi-civilian government that took power in 2011 after 49 ears of militar rule. ut onl eight groups signed the accord, out of the 15 invited to do so. The TNLA’s political ojectives take a ack seat to its primar mission, according to Ar Nun. “The 얞�rst enem is the drugs, and the second is the government,” he said in an interview in Pahlaing, a remote village in northern han tate. Claims  an insurgent arm that it is 얞�ghting to eliminate drugs ma seem far-fetched, and perhaps even more so coming from a group operating in the “Golden Triangle”. That’s where the orders of Manmar, Laos and Thailand converge in an area that ecame notorious in the late 1960s for heroin production, which has funded the rise of drug lords and powerful ethnic armies. Yet, the TNLA appears to e genuine in its e䵱�orts to eradicate drugs. The group has usted dealers, and it has een destroing opium 얞�elds. Ar Nun sas that has rought them into armed confrontation with militias led  Kaw Mint and Ti Khun Mat – MPs with the ruling Union olidarit and Development Part – and Mahtu Naw, who https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2015/11/05/drugwarmyanmarsmountains

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commands the Kachin Defence Arm (KDA), which roke awa from the Kachin Independence Arm, an ethnic armed group, to ecome a pro-government militia.

Niels Larsen/IRIN

A TNLA soldier takes aim at government troops who joined forces with a pro-government militia in Nahmkam in Januar 2015

Tom Kramer of the Netherlands-ased Transnational Institute said he has interviewed popp farmers in TNLA areas who were unhapp that the group was destroing their crops. And he said man villagers in areas under Kaw Mint’s control veri얞�ed that his militia is involved in drug production. Kramer said opium and heroin production also happens in areas under the control of militias commanded  Mahtu Naw and Ti Khun Mat. “Clearl, the have a lot of involvement in the drug trade,” he said.

POPPI AND POLITIC While farming poppies and producing heroin and amphetamine-tpe stimulants are illegal in Manmar, it is clear to oservers like Kramer https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2015/11/05/drugwarmyanmarsmountains

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that the government has given a “free hand” to its militia allies to fund themselves through drugs. And the nexus of drugs, militias and politics goes even deeper than that. Ti Khun Mat, one of the ruling part MPs who is also a militia commander, is running for re-election to the national parliament in the 8 Novemer elections. The UDP is also running a KDA commander named Nan haung for Kachin thnic A䵱�airs Minister, according to ruling part o�cial Kaw Mint (no relation to the militia leader) in Lashio, the largest cit in northern han tate. He said his namesake, the militia commander, is not standing for re-election in the han tate Asseml this ear, ut his son, Min Tun Aung, will run in his place. The militias are authorised under the militar-drafted 2008 constitution. The are helpful to the militar in its 얞�ght against ethnic insurgents ecause their ranks are drawn from local communities and the know the terrain and languages. “As far as I know, it is impossile that the militia groups are protecting heroin production,” said Kaw Mint, the UDP o�cial who is a retired police commissioner, in an interview at part headquarters in Lashio. “The have contact with the militar alwas. The are just helping the militar operation.” Research groups and local sources tell a di䵱�erent stor. Groups including the Transnational Institute, the Kachin Women’s Association Thailand, han Drug Watch and the Palaung Women’s Organisation have documented the roles of militia-commanding politicians in the drug trade. ome have een fairl razen aout their involvement. During his 2010 election campaign, Kaw Mint pulicl promised opium popp farmers that their 얞�elds would e protected.

ADDICTION I A CRIM In rain season, Pahlaing is accessile onl  a motorike equipped with chains on its tires to negotiate the mudd track. The village of aout 700 people sits on a ridge overlooking an emerald patchwork of peaks and hillsides dotted with tea ushes. From a two-stor https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2015/11/05/drugwarmyanmarsmountains

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wooden house, with radios uzzing in the ackground, Ar Nun commands his territor. Ar Nun’s sidekick, a oung man with an eas grin who introduced himself as “A 1”, led a couple of soldiers with semi-automatic weapons through Pahlaing’s winding paths. The greeted women spreading out tea leaves to dr in the morning sunlight, and others heading out for the da to harvest fresh leaves in woven askets suspended  a sling across their foreheads. The soldiers turned o䵱� the main road out of town and descended a steep jungle path. At the ottom, next to a creek, was a crude structure on stilts with a tarpaulin roof, and walls made of logs that resemled the ars of a jail cell. In addition to attling militias and government soldiers, the TNLA is waging a war against drug addiction in its own communities. ut man ma alk at the group’s methods. To the TNLA, addiction is not so much a disease as it is a crime. ight people were huddled in the TNLA’s prison in the creek ed. “Those are drug dealers and drug users as well,” explained Ar Nun. He said large-scale drug dealers are sent to the TNLA central committee to deal with, ut if his o�cers capture small time dealers the are immediatel sentenced, with no trial. The are imprisoned for three months on a 얞�rst o䵱�ence, and six months plus a 얞�ne of three times the value of the drugs the sold for a second o䵱�ence. Drug dealers caught a third time are imprisoned for a ear. “For drug users, the are kept there until the can totall control themselves,” said Ar Nun.

https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2015/11/05/drugwarmyanmarsmountains

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Htoo Ta Zar/IRIN

Alleged drug dealers and users in a TNLA prison in Pahlaing village in eptemer 2015

The TNLA’s approach to dealing with addiction is not much di䵱�erent from the government’s or other ethnic armed groups. ut Kramer of the Transnational Institute said enforcing detox  locking people up does not work, and that relapse rates are etween 80 and 90 percent. “I can understand wh it’s happening, ecause the prolem is so ig,” he said. “ut it’s ine䵱�ectual and it violates human rights.” The dealers are also interrogated aout where the get supplies of heroin and amphetamine, and Ar Nun said the trail inevital leads to areas protected  the militias. “ver drug dealer sas it’s the factories over there, and sometimes we seize small factories." For the past few ears, the TNLA has een roaming the mountains of northern han tate and destroing popp 얞�elds just efore the harvest. This leads to clashes when the enter territor contested  militias, which then call for reinforcements from the militar. Kramer said a militia commander in Khutkai related an example of calling in militar reinforcements to regain territor lost in attle with the KIA. He said the militias “serve a strategic interest”  operating in https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2015/11/05/drugwarmyanmarsmountains

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areas etween territor controlled  ethnic armed groups and the militar. “The are like a u䵱�er force,” he said.

DRUG PIDMIC There is little o�cial data on the sensitive issue of drug use in Manmar, ut the Transnational Institute said in its report last ear that parts of Kachin and northern han states are facing a “heroin epidemic”. Other groups have carried out limited surves in areas of northern han and Kachin states, which suggest that the use of heroin and amphetamine-tpe stimulants has risen dramaticall in recent ears. The 2014 outheast Asia Opium urve  the United Nations O�ce on Drugs and Crime found the same trend. Manmar is the world’s second largest opium producer after Afghanistan and most of it comes from han tate, according to UNODC. Production has risen steadil after falling to a low in 2006, while drug use has also increased sharpl. In areas surveed  the UNODC, the use of opium increased  83 percent over the previous ear, while the use of an amphetamine-tpe stimulant known as “aa” grew  87 percent, and heroin use increased  115 percent. Lwa Poe Ngeal of the Palaung Women’s Organisation said violent con阅�ict has increased in northern han tate, partl due to the emergence of the TNLA, and it’s ecome too dangerous to carr out the kind of 얞�eld research the did a couple ears ago to surve levels of drug addiction and production. ut she said drugs still a䵱�ect man people. “It creates more violence inside families and communities,” said Lwa Poe Ngeal in an interview in Lashio. “It is ver hard for the Ta’ang people right now.”


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Htoo Ta Zar/IRIN

Drug users prepare heroin and "aa", an amphetamine-tpe stimulant, in Khutkai in Decemer 2014

CROROAD OF CONFLICT Driving north from Lashio ou clim a winding highwa that straightens out on a pine-forested plateau and leads to Khutkai, which is the last township ou can visit without needing special permission from the government. If ou drove northwest, ou would arrive in Namhkam Township, where Kaw Mint represents the UDP in the state parliament and maintains his powerful militia. Khutkai is at a crossroads of con阅�ict. The militar operates there as well as the TNLA and the KIA. Two of the militias 얞�ghting the TNLA are ased in Khutkai: the KDA and the group controlled  Ti Khun Mat. There have een frequent clashes over the past few ears etween various armed groups, and there are now half a dozen displacement camps inside the township capital and near. The most recent settlement is called Pansa camp, which houses an entire village of aout 500 people who 阅�ed there in April this ear after 얞�ghting intensi얞�ed etween the militar, KIA, TNLA and militias, according to camp leader ein Aung. https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2015/11/05/drugwarmyanmarsmountains

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“We didn’t dare to sta there anmore, as sometimes mortar shells fell into our village during 얞�ghting,” he said.

Htoo Ta Zar/IRIN

A camp in Khutkai for people displaced  con阅�ict in eptemer 2015

Another camp aout a half hour drive from the town centre houses people who came to escape 얞�ghting in 2012. arlier in the da, a team from the UDP had stopped there to campaign. An elderl woman displaed 阅�ers she’d een given, including one pro얞�ling Ti Khun Mat, although he had not personall visited the camp. Ti Khun Mat’s whereaouts were a it of a mster. ta䵱� at the UDP o�ce in the township capital said he was not availale and there was no one else who could speak to reporters. O�cials from the Khutkai and Lashio UDP o�ces who answered phone calls later on said the could not give out numers for Ti Khun Mat, Nan haung or Min Tun Aung. “The will not give interviews or comments to media as the are us,” said one o�cial. In contrast to the rather chill reception at the Khutkai UDP o�ce, Kaw Mint, the amiale former policeman helping the campaign in https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2015/11/05/drugwarmyanmarsmountains

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Lashio, was happ to talk. He was unale to provide contacts for the three candidates, ut gave assurances that an evidence of their involvement in the drug trade is false. “The are working to eliminate drugs with nationalist spirit,” he said.

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