Drukyul Decides

Drukyul Decides Gyambo Sithey Dr. Tandi Dorji

ISBN: 978-99936-775-0-5 MRP. Nu. 719

Gyambo Sithey Dr. Tandi Dorji

:InthemindsofBhutan’sfirstvoters

Drukyul Decides : In the minds of Bhutan’s first vot-

The story of Bhutan’s first democratic election

Drukyul Decides InthemindsofBhutan’sfirstvoters

Gyambo Sithey Dr. Tandi Dorji The story of Bhutan’s first democratic election

Drukyul Decides: In the minds of Bhutan’s first voters

Gyambo Sithey Dr. Tandi Dorji Centre for Research Initiative Near Changangkha Lhakhang P.O. Box: 1358 Thimphu, Bhutan Phone : (2) 337068/336464 Email : [email protected]

Concept & Design Tashi Loday & Bhutan Times

First published: September-2009

© Gyambo Sithey All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior permission in writing from the publisher and author. The views expressed in this book are those of the author and not necessarily of the publisher. The publisher is not responsible for the view of the author and authenticity of the data, in any way whatsoever.

ISBN 978-99936-775-0-5

Drukyul Decides In the minds of Bhutan’s first voters

Gyambo Sithey Dr. Tandi DORJI

The story of Bhutan’s first democratic election

Gyambo Sithey

Acronyms APP BHU BNP BPUP CBS CID CPS DPT DYT ECB EVM FYP GNH GYT HSS LSS MP MSS NA NC NFE ORC PB PDP PHCB PS RAC RCSC RGoB VPIC

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All People’s Party Basic Health Unit Bhutan National Party Bhutan People United Party Centre for Bhutan Studies Citizenship Identity Card Community Primary School Druk Phuensum Tshogkpa Dzongkhag Yargay Tshogdu (or committee ) Election Commission of Bhutan Electronic Voting Machine Tenth Five Year Plan Gross National Happiness Gewog Yargay Tshogchung Higher Secondary School Lower Secondary School Member of Parliament Middle Secondary School National Assembly National Council Non-Formal Education Out Reach Clinic Postal Ballot Peoples Democratic Party Population and Housing Census of Bhutan Primary School Royal Adivisory Council Royal Civil Service Commission Royal Government of Bhutan Voters Photo Identity Card

Glossary Chimi Chiwog Dratshang Lhentshog Desi Druk Zhung Drukpas Drukyul Drungtsho Dzongkha Dzongkhag Dzongkhag Yargye Tshogdue Geog Yargye Tshogchung Gewog Gup Gyalyong Tshogde Gyalyong Tshogdu Kasho Kidu Lhakhang Lhengye Shungtshog Lhenkhag Lhotshampa Lyonpo Mangtsug-Zhung-gi-Lamlug Nangi Lhengye Zhi Penlop Throm Thromde Tsa Thrim Chhenmo Tshogpa Wangtshey

People’s representative and member of National Assembly Sub Block Monastic Body Civil ruler of Bhutan before the establishment of monarchy Royal Government of Bhutan Bhutanese Land of Bhutan Indigenous physicians National Language District District Development Committee Block Development Committee Block, sub administrative unit of a district Elected Block Leader National Council National Assembly Royal Decree Royal Pardon Monastery Cabinet Ministry Southern Bhutanese Minister Democratic Governance Four Cabinet posts Governor of a region consisting of several districts Town Municipal Bodies The Constitution Village Representative Authority/ Power

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CONTENTS

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Contents

Contents

CONTENTS

Preface Acknowledgements

Section I Towards Democracy

1

The parties are formed

13

Politicking and Politics

39

Democracy and civic knowledge

59

In the mind of the voters

79

Financial analysis of the 2008 elections

103

Section II National Council Election Results

133

National Assembly Election Results

227

Voter turnout and postal ballot

355


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PREFACE & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Preface

I

f a generation is calculated to be 25 years, the story of the Kingdom of Bhutan spans four generations; a story, well-scripted to a glorious climax by the fourth king, His Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuck. As the Kingdom celebrated 100 years of monarchy, the country became a democracy, with the king himself ushering in changes and discussing the draft Constitution with the people. The voter turn-out for the election to the National Assembly was a remarkable 79.3%. The voters included many 100-year olds and also students who turned 18 last year, making them the youngest voters. At the time of publishing this book, Bhutan has already celebrated the first year of democratic governance. The Druk Phuensum Tshogpa, led by Lyonchen Jigmi Y. Thinley, steers the direction of this country with the world’s smallest opposition party of just two members in parliament. This book attempts to mark the historic times and document for future generations the story of Bhutan’s first elections. The following pages delve into educative details on “why Bhutanese people voted the way they did” giving an overwhelming 95.7% of the National Assembly seats to one party. Our journey into the minds of the voters started from there. Writing of this book has been challenging. A generally reluctant population was unwilling to speak their minds. Since the whole government machinery including the election commission of Bhutan was engrossed in running the elections to success, the need to document the other side of the voting fabric was not well attended to. Therefore it took a grueling 14-month research, (April 2008-May 2009) cross tabulating the data, talking, learning and writing, to come up with this work. The first three chapters briefly explain the emergence of Bhutan as a nation, evolution of democracy, formation of political parties and the infamous tshogpa politics. Chapter 3-5 is an outcome of our research conducted between April to November 2008 in 24 constituencies; (Goenkhatoe-Laya, Goenkhamey-Lunana, Lingmukha-Toewang, Kabji-Talo, Sombaykha, Bji-


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Preface

PREFACE

Katsho-Uesu, Nubi-Tangsibji, Drakteng-Langthel, Shompangkha, Gelephu, Radhi-Sakteng, Bartsham-Shongphu, Thrimshing, Kanglung-Samkhar-Udzorong, Wamrong, DremitseNgatshang, Mongar, Kenkhar-Weringla, Bardo-Trong, Panbang, Pagli-Samtse, Sipsu, DorokhaTading, Ugentse-Yoeseltse). It was a semi-qualitative cross sectional study administered with a pre-designed interview guide. Five hundred people from the 24 constituencies and 120 civil servants and business people from Thimphu were interviewed for the research. The research project was first consulted with the National Statistical Bureau. About twenty five graduates were involved in the study. Quantitative and qualitative data were analyzed using STATA and Ethnograph respectively. The findings of this Rural District Survey are presented in chapters 3, 4 and 5. Chapter 6 is the financial analysis. Section II of the book gives the profile of the National Council and National Assembly candidates, a detailed analysis of the Council and Assembly results, voter turnout and the postal ballot. We hope this book will be used as a resource material and also as the first draft of history for people who attempt a detailed analysis of Bhutan’s journey towards democracy. The achievement of the birth of democracy that we celebrate today is but a step, an opening of an opportunity, to the challenges that lie ahead.

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Preface

Acknowledgements

Acknowledgements Many people and institutions have helped to make this book possible.

W

e wish to acknowledge our special thanks to DANIDA and UNDP for sponsoring the study, and The Election Commission of Bhutan, Ministry of Home and Cultural Affairs and The National Statistical Bureau for all their assistance, help and advice. We also like to express our sincere thanks to Mr. Toshihiro Tanaka (UNDP), Mr. Henrik A. Nielsen and Mr. Tek Bahadur (DANIDA), Dasho Kunzang Wangdi, Chief Election Commissioner (Bhutan), Ms. Deki Pema and Mr. Chogyal Dago, Dr. Phuntsho Namgyel, Mr. Kibu Zangpo, and Mr. Ugyen Gonphel all from ECB, Mr. Dodo (NPPC), Ugyen Lhendup & Kezang Thinley from CRI, Aby Tharakan, Jayesh & Tshering Wangdi from Bhutan Times, Tashi Loday from Dzongkha Development Commission, and dzongdags, dzongkhag electoral officers, gups and the people of the study area for all their support and valuable information. Finally we wish to acknowledge Ex-councilors Dasho Sigay Dorji and Dasho Chang Ugyen, Dr. Samdrup Chettri, Dr. Ritulal Sharma, Dasho Penjore Dorji and National Council and National Assembly members who consented to be interviewed.


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The fourth Druk Gyalpo, His Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuck, His Majesty Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, King of Bhutan and His Holiness the Je Khenpo (Chief Abbot) at Puna Dechen Phodrang Dzong, 1st November 2008.

The Father of Modern Bhutan, late His Majesty Jigme Dorji Wangchuck and The Father of Bhutan’s Democracy His Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuck.

Section I The story of Bhutan’s first democratic election

His Majesty Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, King of Bhutan and The fourth Druk Gyalpo, His Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuck.

1 Towards Democracy

Towards Democracy

I

t was already spring with the third week of March. A young farmer in her early 20s, from the semi-nomadic community of Sakteng, awaited her sister at the end of a trail that almost disappeared into the woods. The year was 2008. New leaves have sprouted. She watched a bud that would bloom in a week. But the winter chill had refused to leave the highlands; she pulled to herself a hand-woven scarf to guard against an unexpected breeze that whizzed past her. Her sister, a maid in the capital, is returning home after seven years. She is returning home, first to vote in Bhutan’s maiden national elections; and then, to see her.

“Now this is a great burden, an awesome mandate that I and my colleagues must shoulder,” a seemingly composed Jigmi Y. Thinley, the leader of the winning party, said. The furrows on his forehead changed patterns as he spoke with emotionally-laden pauses at his house in Pemagatshel. Meanwhile, the party supporters were celebrating victory across Bhutan.

Meanwhile, Tshewang Dema a 65-year-old woman had walked almost 600 kilometers from the capital to her village in Trashiyangtse. By casting her vote on March 24, she walked into history.

As hundreds of foreign news organizations reported the day’s events to the world, Bhutan was cautiously coming of age. From an age of earthquakes that buried documents, and fires that licked its tongues into written stories of men and gods, Bhutan was finding a new path into its future, shrugging off lethargy, the hill people are often accused of.

Every single moment had history on the Election Day. Bhutan gave to the world, the smallest opposition party which won only two of the 47 seats in the National Assembly.

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The present perfect political tense

Around the same time, hundreds of kilometers away, in the courtyard of his house, the president of the defeated party sat on a plastic chair as a lone photographer’s camera flashed. Sangay Ngedup, who a year later resigned from the party president post said, “I have learnt to be a better Buddhist out of this.”

Gampo, set a foundation, though theocratic, to the formation of Bhutanese polity.

It is said that sometimes, geographical and psychological conditions induce into a country’s inhabitants a certain sense of lethargy from penning down the stories of their lives. Instead, it is sung and danced before deities and people. Into the choreographed verses are weaved, not just what happened, but also what is expected. These verses thus become not just the biography of a nation and its people, but also carries its fears, and hopes. Therefore, while telling the story of ancient Bhutan, it is difficult to unthread the social, political, economic and religious lives of the country and present them separately. Fact and fiction intertwine, confusing the students of history as dates and events in the past appear in a mixed bag, and not in chronology.

The establishment of the Kagyudpa school of Buddhism and the formation of secular rules by masters from Marpa (1012-1097), and Milarepa (1040-1123), to Phajo Dudjom Zhigpo (1208-1276) and their descendants set the backdrop for the arrival of a refugee monk from Tibet in 1616 who would become the political force to unify Bhutan. Long before Max Weber conceived the classic triangle of statehood, Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyel (1594-1651) in his 35 years of rule in Bhutan, defined a geographical territory, formed a government, and a set of institutions.

Evil spirits, hailstorms, diseases, and death, says the legend of King Sindu Raja, prompted him to bring the Indian saint Guru Padmasambhava between AD 746-758 to the tiny tract of present day Bumthang he ruled. The Guru subdued the spirits and built temples: Kurje Lhakhang in Bumthang, Ashang Nge in Mongar, Gomphu Kora in Trashiyangtse and the Taktsang Monastery in Paro. These temples and others like Kyichu Lhakhang in Paro and Jambey Lhakhang in Bumthang, attributed to the seventh century Tibetan King Songtsen

In the political journey to fulfill the modern criteria of a Nation State, he subdued warring chiefs and overlords of various districts, repelled numerous invasions from Tibet and created a social base inclined towards the new leader. The neighbouring rulers of Cooch Bihar, Nepal, western and south-western Tibet and Ladakh acknowledged Zhabdrung as their supreme leader. With Punakha as the capital of Bhutan, he established the Palden Druk Zhung or the glorious State of the Drukpas, through promulgation of the “Nga Chudruma” or the founding document. But his death, kept a secret for 54 years, started shaking the edifice he built. Temporal


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With a search-light into the past

and spiritual leaders ruled in his name. Though the country was under the Druk Desi, to the post of which saw intriguing political games, the Paro and Trongsa penlops held the reins of the western and eastern regions of Bhutan. In times of discussions with neighboring states, the penlop, powerful at the time called the shots overshadowing the desi. Thanks to the powerful penlops, a desi’s life was short-lived: either killed or removed by force. 55 desis ruled Bhutan from Zhabdrung’s death till the institution of hereditary monarchy in 1907.

From the Black Regent to the Raven Crown Towards the end of the 19th century, a dark complexioned boy who used to fetch firewood and water for Trongsa Penlop Ugyen Phuntsho rose to become the Penlop. The black horse he rode to battles, and the black robe he wore, gave Jigme Namgyel the name- Black Regent. This stubborn warrior, for whom a Tibetan lama designed the first Raven Crown, braved several feuds to topple him. Although Bhutan was compelled to sign the treaty of Sinchula after the Anglo-Bhutanese war in 1865, Jigme Namgyel proved himself by managing all the war efforts and thus became the Desi in 1870. When he died in 1881 at Semtokha, peace and stability was still afar. But there was Ugyen Wangchuck, his son, to carry the mantle.

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In a battle at Changlimithang, a ground which is today one of the world’s highest stadiums in altitude, Ugyen Wangchuck defeated the Thimphu and Punakha dzongpoens in 1885. He not only won the respect of warring chieftains but also accompanied the British to Tibet in 1904 as a negotiator. The next year, he was conferred the Knight Commander of the Indian Empire that further strengthened his standing. The time was ripe for Ugyen Wangchuck: people were fed up with internal strife. The country needed someone who could manage the state and who everybody would pay allegiance to. In Ugyen Wangchuck they saw a person whose capabilities had already been proven. Moreover, a weak Desi who held spiritual and temporal powers had died in 1907. The Lhengye Tshog who were people’s representative unanimously decided to elect Ugyen Wangchuck as the first hereditary King of Bhutan. On 17 December, 1907, at Punakha, the First King was “elected” and crowned according to the historic genja (contract) signed by members of the Lhengye Tshog, central monastic body, government officials and representatives of every province. “..we, the undersigned, abbots, lopons, and the whole body of lamas, the state councillors, the choilas of different districts, with all the subjects, having discussed and unanimously agreed to elect Sir Ugyen Wangchuck, Trongsa


Penlop, the Prime Minister of Bhutan, as the Hereditary Maharaja of the state, have installed him, in open Durbar, on the golden throne on this 13th day of the 11th month of Satel year, corresponding to 17 December 1907 at Poonakha-Phodang ,” reads the English translation of the document. During the first half of the 20th century, the king was the only political institution in the country as no need was felt necessary for discussion or popular consensus. Communities were structured through feudal hierarchies, and political consciousness was low or limited to small elite subgroups. There was hardly any dissent and even when there was one, it was never publicly expressed. It was not as if people feared the government but there was peace, and change was not what most people desired. In fact the popular reluctance for change can be seen throughout the process of democratic evolution — this aspect will be highlighted in all relevant sections. The first king began the task of building a nation state with assistance from British India. The treaty of Punakha ensured friendly relationship with the southern neighbour and also established mutual respect between the two countries. Many developmental activities were initiated that focused largely on education.

The 1907 genja

After Ugyen Wangchuck’s death, the second king was enthroned on March 14, 1927 at Punakha. He further consolidated the work initiated by his father establishing the Nangi Lhengye Zhi, comprising of four cabinet posts and centralized a system of revenue collection. Although most of these taxes were collected in kinds, it nonetheless helped in paying the large array of administrators and workers. The Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949 signed in Darjeeling, India, marked the beginning of an exemplary and mutually beneficial relationship with India that continues to this day.


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Moving forward from the 1907 election

boundaries were based on the existing gewog boundaries and usually one chimi represented 3-5 gewogs.

Politics started moving at a swift pace from the 1950s after the enthronement of the third king, Jigme Dorji Wangchuck. By establishing the National Assembly he transferred authority from the palace to the people through representatives in National Assembly. Since then, the path to democracy has been an “evolutionary rather than a revolutionary” one with the king as the main agent of change.

The council of ministers was established even before the time of the second king, with four cabinet posts and was known as the Nangi Lhengye Zhi. However their role and responsibility is not clear from records. The Royal Advisory Council (RAC), constituted in 1965, was a powerful body which consisted of six representatives of the people, two representatives from the clergy and the Zhung Kalyon nominated by the king. The Council, as a watchdog made sure that the government executed programs in the best interest of the people. It functioned as the advisory body to the king, the final court of appeal on the command of His Majesty, and ensured that the laws passed by the National Assembly were implemented.

The First National Assembly of 1953 at Punakha was based on an eight-article document titled: “Manifesto of the people’s government consisting of representatives of humans and gods” (Bangs gzhung lha mi srid sde gcig sgril gyi spyi mi’i tshog gtam) signed by 36 representatives. The first session had 138 members: officials from the central government, the district administration, monk body and representatives of people. There are no records of the 2nd to the 10th sessions. From the 11th session onwards there were roughly 150 members although the number varied from 145 to 155. These members were known as thuemis, a term which is used today for lawmakers or more popularly as chimis. The method of electing the chimis was also unique. There was no electoral roll and they were elected by voters consisting of one member of each household. The electorate

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Universal adult franchise was held only after preparation of the national electoral roll for the National Council and the National Assembly elections in December 2007 and March 2008. Earlier, only representatives of individual households, usually the head of the household attended the Gewog Yargay Tshogchungs, where open discussions were held and then usually through consensus a chimi was elected. Where there was more than one candidate, various forms of elections were held — through show of hands, casting of bal-

Secret ballots on the other hand were used much earlier during the establishment of the National Assembly in electing the speaker, the RAC members and for most parliamentary posts. The first documented secret ballot was held during the 29th session of the NA in 1968 for electing the speaker, which was won by Dasho Kelzang of the High Court. In 1969, a system of casting secret votes was also established for the king who had to secure a vote of confidence by a two third majority of NA members. In 1970 the RAC members were also elected through secret ballot. One of the most significant changes in introducing elections using both universal adult franchise and secret ballot took place in 2002. His Majesty issued a royal edict which made it necessary for the gup to be elected through secret ballot cast by all eligible voters, defined as all residents of the gewog who were 21 years of age or older. Although universal suffrage had been included as a provision in the Gewog Yargay Tshogchung Act of 1999, it was passed only in July 2002 by the NA. Accordingly, the first nationwide elections for the post of gups were held in November 2002. That was the first time that elections where all eligible voters could vote. What emerged from that experience helped in gaining knowledge and preparing better for future

elections. The voter turnout was however low at 34.4% and that too varied between 19%67%. Most voters consisted of rural people with very little participation from those residing in urban areas. Out of the 199 gups who were elected, there was not a single woman. Another feature of the elections was that in 86 gewogs the incumbent gup won the elections indicating that people did not vote for change and stuck to the one with experience. The next significant elections were held in 2003, when His Majesty again commanded direct elections in the National Assembly for the post of ministers. There were however two systems of voting; for certain portfolios with only one candidate, voters had to cast either a “yes” or “no” vote similar to gup elections. By securing a majority of “yes” votes, the candidate would be deemed elected. On the other hand, for four portfolios there were seven candidates and each had to go through the same process. The four candidates with the highest number of “yes” votes would be elected ministers. On 17 December 2005 the country was stunned when His Majesty announced that he would be relinquishing his throne in favour of the Crown Prince, Trongsa Penlop, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck: the rest is history, as Bhutan geared up to embrace democracy and became a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary democracy.


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lots or simply by counting the number of fingerprints against the name of the candidates.

The man who scripted democracy

in recent years, the process of democratization at the grass roots is a phenomenal story that dates back to three decades.

If you discount the size of this country, what has happened in Bhutan was unheard of elsewhere in the world. in other places. Writers have wondered why and how people settled in these hills, with deep ravines and treacherous mountain passes. But it was King Jigme Singye Wangchuck, who told the world, in vision and practice, that Bhutan is not just a dot on the world atlas.

This is also the story of King Jigme Singye Wangchuck who assumed the throne at the age of 17, who grew with the country, and learnt from its culture and people. He gifted to its citizens, a state based in the wisdom of traditional values but enriched by the life and times of the changing world. Decentralization of political power began full throttle with the establishment of Dzongkhag Development Committees or Dzongkhag Yargay Tshogdu (DYT) in 1981, one year after the birth of the crown prince. The DYTs established in all 20 districts had to formulate local development plans for the next five years, thus removing the scripting of five year plans from the centre.

After three decades in power, in his prime age of 51, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck decided to abdicate against peoples’ wish to welcome a democratically elected government. “As I hand over my responsibilities to my son, I repose my full faith and belief in the people of Bhutan to look after the future of our nation, for it is the Bhutanese people who are the true custodians of our tradition and culture and the ultimate guardians of the security, sovereignty and continued well-being of our country,” read the last kasho (royal decree) of His Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuck, signed as king on December 9, 2006. The stature of this tiny country rose with the declaration, and found its proud place in the map of nations that initiated unprecedented political changes. Although the royal decisions that led to the first elections in March 2008, gained attention in the international press only

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The DYTs included people’s representatives and bureaucrats who met four times a year and discussed issues to be tabled in the National Assembly in Thimphu. By the time, the apex national body had already become independent, with a decision moved by the third king. In November 1968, it was ruled that a decision by the National Assembly could not be overruled by the king. If the king has misgivings about a decision, he could personally ask the National Assembly to reconsider it. Carrying forward the reforms and shocking everyone, the third king pushed the National

The present perfect political tense The Father of Bhutan’s Democracy: His Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuck.

Assembly to hold a vote of confidence on the monarch. The confidence motion, which was to be held every three years, could remove the king if two-third of the National Assembly members voted against him. In the first vote of confidence on the King in 1968, it is said that against the 135 members who voted for the monarch’s continuance, the king with the help of some members arranged two ‘no’ votes.

politically. King Jigme Singye Wangchuck established the Block Development Committees or the Gewog Yargay Tshogchung (GYT) in 1991, taking the decision-making process to every village in the country. Instead of the central government scripting plans for the districts and villages, the local bodies were now fully involved in identifying and drafting solutions to their own needs.

While the third king concentrated his reforms at the centre of power, his son took it forward to the villages, empowering them

Following the establishment of GYTs, His Majesty relinquished the first official responsibility that his father entrusted to him


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two decades back, the chairmanship of the planning commission. In 1998, the fourth Druk Gyalpo devolved full executive powers to the elected council of ministers and said it was his “wish and request” to register a vote of confidence in the Druk Gyalpo requiring him to abdicate after a two-third vote of no confidence of the Tshogdu Chenmo. “No blood, no coup; Bhutan king gives up power,” wrote the Indian Express. “The members felt like a flock whose shepherd was leaving them behind for the next valley,” noted a foreign journalist who witnessed the moment in the National Assembly. Bhutan’s first national election took place in 2002 when universal adult franchise (21 years and above) was exercised for the gup election. Till then a representative from each household voted for the GYT elections. But the king was determined. A true visionary he was, each decision he took was well-thought, analyzed to its minutest detail and then implemented. In 2005, His Majesty defied royal continuity and declared it was time for change. “Monarchy is not the best form of government because a king is chosen by birth and not by merit. The people of Bhutan must be able to establish a system which works for them,” he had told earlier. Celebrating the national day in Trashiyangtse, the fourth Druk Gyalpo said the first democratic elections will be held

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in 2008. The next announcement took the country by surprise when His Majesty proclaimed he will step down before 2008. The fourth king along with the Crown Prince Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck travelled to all districts of the nation, discussing the nation’s draft constitution with farmers, yak-herders, shamans and engineers alike. Months later, on 18th July 2008, His Majesty Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck signed and endorsed the finalized Constitution on dark shona paper. The nation watched the live event at the Tashichhodzong on television. The father of the Constitution and democratic Bhutan, Druk Gyalpo Jigme Singye Wangchuck, stood beside the golden throne, watching his son sign the document. “This is the people’s Constitution,” His Majesty Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck said just before the signing. The document will protect and guide as Bhutan journeys in the light of Gross National Happiness.

Need to fill up

His Majesty Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck signing,


The Constitution of The Kingdom of Bhutan, 18 July 2008

Drukyul Decides: in the minds of Bhutan’s first voters

11

The presidents of the two parties (L-R: the PDP President Sangay Ngedup and the DPT President Jigmi Y. Thinley) faced each other on 10 February 2008, in the first televised debate held at the RAPA,Thimphu.

2 The parties are formed

The parties are formed Democratic Constitutional Monarchy

B

hutan’s Constitution says that the country will be a Democratic Constitutional Monarchy with the monarch as the head of state and also the upholder of the Chhoe-sid. All legislative powers would rest with parliament which would consist of the Druk Gyalpo, the National Council and the National Assembly. The National Council (Gyalyong Tshogde) consists of 25 apolitical members comprising of one member each elected by the voters in all 20 districts; and five eminent persons nominated by the Druk Gyalpo. A chairman has to be elected from among the candidates to conduct the proceedings of the House. The National Council’s main function as stated in the Constitution, is to act as “the House of review on matters affecting the security and sovereignty of the country and the interests of the nation and the people that need to be

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The political parties are formed

brought to the notice of the Druk Gyalpo, the Prime Minister and the National Assembly”.[1] It is mandated to remain apolitical, with candidates barred from being affiliated to any political party. It is to assemble minimum twice a year and its term of office is for five years. The National Assembly (Gyalyong Tshogdu)will have 47 elected members from the two political parties. The number of seats was determined and finalized by the Delimitation Commission of Bhutan on 16 March 2007. The representation in the National Assembly shall be by two political parties elected through a primary round of elections in which all registered political parties may participate. The two political parties obtaining the first and the second highest number of votes in the primary election shall be declared as the two political parties for the purpose of representation in the National Assembly and to contest [1] The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan.


in the general elections. The party that wins the majority of seats in the National Assembly in the General Election shall be the ruling party and the other the opposition party. The main function of parliament is to safeguard national interest and to fulfill the aspirations of the people through public review of policies and issues, bills and other legislation, and scrutiny of the state functions. Financial bills shall originate only in the National Assembly whereas any other legislative bills may originate in either House. A bill passed by parliament will come into force upon assent of the Druk Gyalpo. Election of members will be in accordance with the provision of the electoral laws of the Kingdom. Druk Gyalpo will summon the first sitting of parliament after each general election and a person shall not be a member of the National Council as well as the National Assembly or a local government at the same time.

Formation of Political Parties Until the democratic system was introduced in Bhutan, people were alien to the concept of party politics. Politicians had no place either in the Assembly or in the government. Most top positions in the government sector were given to bureaucrats and even for the post of ministers under the monarchial system, only bureaucrats of or above a government secre-

Various kinds of promotions were made by ECB for people to form political parties

tary level was considered. However, parties with ‘Bhutan’ in its name have been functioning mainly in the refugee camps in Nepal. But none of the parties have not made any major impact within the country or could influence the maiden electoral process. When the Election Commission of Bhutan (ECB) came to existence under a royal decree, one of their first task was to encourage and call for the formation of political parties. Learning from experiences in other countries where parties were formed on the basis of region, religion, social origin, language and ethnicity, electoral laws in Bhutan mandates that political parties should promote national unity and that its members are “broad-based with cross-national membership and support, and are committed to national cohesion and


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The political parties are formed Drukyul Decides: In the minds of Bhutan’s first voters

17

stability”. They were not to receive money or assistance from foreign sources and they had to be registered with the ECB. In early 2007, people began to get more and more aware about politics and the inevitable changes that were taking place. The chimis in the National Assembly were best placed to take the initiative and most of them began to plan and maneuver to establish parties. It was a common feeling that the coming together of a large group of elected chimis would be invincible. They were secure and absolutely confident that people would elect them again given that many of them had been representing their respective constituencies for many years. At that time however the qualification criteria for a Member of Parliament (MP) were not in place and therefore many of them rightly presumed that they were perfectly positioned to continue in the Assembly by facing the ballot boxes. It was not so important to look for potential candidates, as they were already in place but what most of them wanted was a leader who could head the party. During the 87th National Assembly session, there were several debates on the qualification criteria for future MPs but nothing was decided. In the end the ECB, in accordance with the provisions of the Election Bill imposed the possession of a formal university degree as a criterion to contest both the National Council and National Assembly elections. In response to numerous complaints and conflicts, they further defined 18


formal university degree as “a degree not lower than a bachelor’s degree conferred on a person after having pursued a formal course of study at a university of higher learning recognized by the Royal Government of Bhutan and attested by a competent authority in the Kingdom”[2]. This requirement categorically extinguished the aspirations of the serving chimis and led to many civil servants considering joining politics. The ministers in the government who had served for a number of years in that capacity and were well known were thus looked upon as the most promising leaders. As far as civil servants, the business community and the rest of the country were concerned, there was a lot of apprehension and anxiety between leaving a secure profession and taking on the unknown. The stage was thus set up and it was in this environment that the political party formation began. There were four parties in the making, Bhutan National Party (BNP), Bhutan People United Party (BPUP), Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). However, only DPT and PDP could qualify to be registered as political parties by the ECB for the first parliamentary election. [2] �� Election Commission of Bhutan. Guidelines for interpretation and implementation of sections 173 (d) & 174 (d) of the Election Bill regarding the academic qualification requirement for a candidate. 2007 p. 1.

Yeshyey Dorji (PDP) campaigning in Tangmachu,


Lhuntse. (ECB Photo)

People’s Democratic Party (Misar Mangtshoi Tshokpa) The genesis The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) was the first party to be formed in the country. It was initiated by a group of chimis during the 86th National Assembly (December 2006- January 2007). There was no common political ideology or particular interest that bound them together. For many of them that was the only

work they knew. It was with this thought that 76 chimis from the National Assembly got together and laid the foundation of the PDP. The most active members of this new party were Namgay Phuntsho (Punakha), Jambey (Bumthang), Humagai (Sarpang) and Sonam Dorji (Trashigang). Harvard-educated Tshering Tobgay, the director of a vocational training department, had always been interested in politics and took the opportunity of the transition to resign from his post and join the


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PDP Candidates ‘ group photo, left to right : 5th Row : Garab Dorji, Jigme Cholen Yoezer, Tshering Tobgay, Kaka Tshering, Pema Gyaltshen (Media officer) 4th Row : Tandin Wangchuk, Yeshey Dorji, M. K. Chettri, Chencho Dorji, Rinzin Namgay, Chungdu Tshering, D.N Dhungyel, Weyesel Lhundup, Tenzin Lekphell, Pelzore Rumba, Dr. Jigme Singye, Sonam Jatso, Ritu Raj Chettri, 3rd Row : Lily Wangchuk (women’s wing), Karma Choden, Namgyel Dukpa, Mingo Dukpa, Lam Kezang Chhoephel (Party Secretary), Dr. Jigme Singye, Sangay Ngedup, Damcho Dorji, Namgay Dorji, Jigme Drukpa, Dr. Tandi Dorji, Namgay Om, Dorji Choden

20


The political parties are formed 2nd Row : Nim Dem, Chhimi Dorjee (treasurer), Tandin Dukpa, Kaencho Sumpai Dhendup, Sonam Dondup Dorji, Karma Tshering, Dorji Pavo Phuntsho, Rinzin Namgay, Lekey Dorji, 1st Row : Dr. Pema Choephyel, Nima Sangay Tshempo, Sangay Dorji, -, Kunzang Dorji, Pelzang Wanghcuk, Sonam Tobgay Dorji, Lham Nidup, Dr. Tobgyal Wangchhuk, Tashi Tshering (Spokes Person) PDP Candidates not in the Picture : Thukten Tshering, Nim Karma Sherpa and Tshering Dolkar


21

PDP. This core group then went about building the party. The next step was to look for a leader. They approached Sangay Ngedup who was then the agriculture minister. He had also served as the Minister of Health and Education and had built a reputation of being people-friendly. He was well known to all sections of the people as he had toured the country extensively in various capacities. The response from the minister however was not conclusive at that point in time. In the meantime the party decided to lay the foundation and set up the structure of the party at the grassroots. The organizational set up was drawn and being the first party, it had the advantage of roping in many influential local leaders as party workers. In every gewog and constituency former gups, chimis and other influential people were appointed as gewog and chiwog coordinators, while many were simply party workers (tshokpas) . In July of 2007, two ministers, Lyonpo Sangay Ngedup and Lyonpo Jigme Singye formally resigned to join the PDP, one as the President and the other as the Vice President. The search for candidates also began. In a matter of months, the party managed to build a team of candidates consisting of highly qualified and experienced individuals. Many looked at the PDP as a strong party both for its leadership and the strength of its candidates. By mid-2007, the PDP had built itself as a strong

22


party and most potential candidates wanted to join the PDP. Many party workers also coerced and convinced capable individuals to join the party and contest as candidates. This resulted in there being more than one candidate in some constituencies and it became rather difficult for the party to choose one over the other. In selecting a candidate to represent the party, it was then decided to hold local elections among party workers. This was first implemented in the Gelephu constituency. Achyut Bhandari and Garab Dorji were put to the test and all the PDP party workers in Gelephu voted to elect their candidate. Garab Dorji won and was nominated by the party as its candidate. However the ECB was not happy with the procedure and announced that such local elections were unlawful and that in future such elections would not be allowed. In Trongsa, a similar tussle followed for the Drakteng-Langthel candidacy between Namgay Dorji and Pem Tshering. The PDP decided to hold talks with local party leaders. After a detailed study it was decided that since Namgay Dorji enjoyed more support, he would be the candidate. This however led to a series of events that worked negatively against the PDP. The Trashiyangtse candidate Namgay placed his resignation to the PDP as he was related to Pem Tshering and also he was the one who convinced the latter to resign and join politics, he felt morally obliged to

The party structure was established by the core group at the very beginning itself. Realizing that the majority of Bhutanese voters were in rural areas, the party’s strategy was to build a strong party base at the grassroots. However, equally important was to have an efficient Central Secretariat that would conduct the day-to-day work and support the regional and district offices.

Sangay Ngedup resigned as the PDP president one year after the election.

step down too. The PDP accepted his resignation but had difficulty in getting a suitable candidate to replace him. The PDP applied for party registration on 5 August 2007 and it was formally registered with the ECB on 1 September 2007. It became the first political party to be registered. By December 2007, 45 candidates had been identified and only Bomdeling Jamkhar constituency in Trashiyangtse and Khar-Yurung constituency in Pemagatshel were left vacant. With only one month to go for elections, Thukten and Tshering Choden (both teachers) were identified and nominated as the respective candidates for the two constituencies.

In June 2007, Lam Kesang, principal of the Zorig Chusum Institute in Trashiyangtse was appointed as the Secretary-General of the PDP. The party’s office was established at Kawa Jangsa. Posts of other office–bearers, such as Treasurer, Media Officer, Administrative Officer and Spokesman were duly filled over the next few months. The party’s office was later relocated to Motithang for want of space and need for more privacy. The four Regional Coordinators formed the next chain of command. All of them were former chimis. Besides their salaries each of them was provided with a car (Maruti Alto) to facilitate their movement between dzongkhags. Although there were several debates within the party regarding the utility of such posts, it was common understanding that these former chimis could defect and take away a substantial number of voters and party workers. Dzongkhag coordinators were responsible for the party in each dzongkhag. They were each


23


Organizational structure

assisted by an assistant. They were elected to their posts by party workers of the dzongkhag and were mainly responsible for performing organization and finance functions for the party in their respective dzongkhags. In addition they would identify the priorities of dzongkhags and also coordinate and campaign for the party and its candidate(s) during time of elections. They also recruited party members and planned the activities in districts. Although the charter called for formation of a constituency committee to coordinate the activities within a constituency and also to nominate prospective candidates to the Executive Committee, in reality this committee did not function effectively in many constituencies. Instead, the next link in the chain of command was taken by the gewog coordinator. Similarly, a chiwog coordinator was appointed in every chiwog. Besides these appointees, there were a number of tshokpas or party workers, some being women tshokpas and many just supporters. The party called for a party convention to be held once a year with the main role being election to the various party posts, laying down the broad policies of the party and also amending the charter, as and when required. The highest decision-making authority of the party, besides the convention, was the Executive Committee of the party, which consisted of the following: 24


• Chairman and Deputy Chairman; • Four elected representatives from among representatives of constituencies; • Five members of the National Assembly; • Treasurer; and • Secretary as Member Secretary. The Party symbol: The party chose a galloping white horse (signifying dynamism, advancement and purity of the party) against a clear sky (signifying peace and prosperity of the country) as its symbol. Vision: The vision of the Party is a peaceful Kingdom of Bhutan that is politically united, culturally harmonious, socially just, economically prosperous, environmentally rich, and secure in its sovereignty enabling all Bhutanese to pursue and enjoy happiness. Mission: The Party’s mission, inspired by the unique philosophy of Gross National Happiness, shall be:  To safeguard the independence, sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Bhutan;  To strengthen the unity of the nation through adherence to the principles of equality, tolerance and justice, and to infuse in our people a sense of national identity;

 To achieve social justice, equality and fairness for all our people, regardless of ethnicity, religion, region, gender, social origin, disabilities or language and ensure that all have access to basic necessities such as food, shelter, health care and education;  To practise and advance democratic governance with the participation and representation of all sections of our society;  To safeguard the rights and freedom of our people through democratic governance, justice and the rule of law, and to encourage healthy public debate through a free and vibrant media and civil society;  To promote economic growth and selfreliance while ensuring equity, balanced regional development, and the sustainable use of natural resources;  To provide equal opportunities and gainful employment to our people regardless of ethnicity, religion, region, gender, social origin, disabilities or language so that they may realize their full potential, and endeavour with the knowledge that merit shall be the only path to success in our country;

 To protect and conserve our rich and pristine environment and respect the right of future generations to a healthy environment and to all the natural resources our generation enjoys;  To preserve and promote our unique cultural, religious and spiritual heritage as the essential basis of our national identity and as a source of enrichment and happiness in the lives of our people;  To promote friendly relations with the international community on the basis of peace, cooperation and the sovereign equality of states; to play a responsible and constructive role in regional and global affairs; and in particular to further strengthen the unique, warm and friendly relationship and economic cooperation with India;


25


 To foster professionalism at the workplace, and the efficient and responsive delivery of public services by the government and public sector;

 To conduct ourselves strictly in accordance with the Code of Conduct for Political Parties in all Party affairs; and  To bear true faith and allegiance to our beloved Monarchs and the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan.

Druk Phuensum Tshogpa The genesis On 11th July 2007, APP and BPUP merged together and came out as new political party called the “Druk Phuensum Tshogpa” (DPT). Therefore, the birth of DPT is also the story of how BPUP and APP ceased to exist. One of the most vocal members in the erstwhile National Assembly was Dasho Sigay Dorji who was the Royal Advisory Councilor from Wangduephodrang. Being an active Assembly member who could garner support, he started mulling a party. At that time only PDP was in the political fray. Therefore during the 86th National Assembly (22 December 2006 – 8 January 2007) when all representatives from the district were in the capital, he began to discuss and form a core founding group of seven member. The core group included four councilors (Dasho Sigay Dorji, Dasho D. B. Sincheuri, Dasho Jangchub Dorji, Dasho Zeko) and three chimis (Samtse chimi Sangay Khandu, Bumthang Chimi Dorji Wangchuk and Mongar Chimi Pem Dorji). They came 26


together and eventually formed the Bhutan People’s United Party (BPUP) that claimed the support of 73 chimis. Meanwhile, Dasho Chang Ugyen, also an ex-councillor, was working to form a strong lobby group for Thimphu and was planning to join any political party that would consider their demands. He later admitted that the idea of forming a political party was not within his concept. He was eventually invited to join the BPUP by Dasho Sigay Dorji and became its active member. A network of supporters and well-wishers spread the word about the party that began to draw a significant number of members. Again, being limited by the qualification criteria, the founders of the party could not by themselves stand for election, and therefore faced difficulty in identifying and influencing potential candidates to join the party. Another important issue being considered by those wishing to join the party was that of leadership, someone who could lead the party and be presented as a potential prime minister. Party leadership became an urgent topic for both founding members and for those wanting to join the party. Several options were discussed and the first on the list was the Chief Justice Lyonpo Sonam Tobgay who declined the offer as he was entrusted by the King to see through the draft Constitution. The Chief Justice felt that abandoning the task, which personally for him, marked a lifetime honorary opportunity, would be a betrayal to the King and the coun-

However, along the party formation process, differences emerged among the party founding members particularly between Dasho Sigay Dorji and Dasho Chang Ugyen. Dasho Sigay Dorji, as the founder of the BPUP assumed a de-facto working party president role, thereby sending a subtle message that he intended to remain in that position. In an interview with Bhutan Times in April 2007, Dasho Sigay Dorji said, “On the other hand, the party president will not be the candidate for the Prime Minister’s post”. The other difference was regarding the choice of the minister to lead the party.

While one group was not in favour of having any serving ministers as party candidate, the other group wanted either Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba or Lyonpo Jigmi Y. Thinley. All this led to frequent clashes and slowly the differences between the founders of the party began to deepen. It was no surprise then that the party split into two, one led by Dasho Sigay Dorji that continued as the BPUP, while the other led by Dasho Chang Ugyen was named the All People’s Party (APP). The APP was formally launched on 2 June 2007 without any probable leaders to head the party nor with a strong base except for a few members from the Bap area in Thimphu. The Bhutan Times reported that five ministers might join the APP. In reality, the APP disclosed that no ministers had been approached as the party had just been launched. According to the party, the news was equally surprising and worrying as all the ministers were still serving. APP once again approached Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba who had not given any concrete reply earlier but had agreed to get back to the party. Finally, on 24 June 2007 the members from the APP approached Lyonpo Jigmi Y. Thinley to lead the party. Lyonpo gave his word that he would consider the request after he had discussed the matter with his other minister colleagues. At the same time, the BPUP also approached


27


try. The other persons in line for consideration were Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba and Lyonpo Jigmi Y. Thinley. Finally, they decided to approach Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba in the second week of April 2007 and requested him to lead the party. He was also asked to rope in a few other ministers into the party. Lyonpo agreed to discuss and get back to the party with a definite answer. In the meantime, BPUP was setting its groundwork of appointing party positions and identifying tentative candidates. By 20 May, 2007, the BPUP had divided the districts into four zones, appointed Wangcha Sangay as Political Adviser, Bap Kinga as the Secretary–General, Dasho Jangchub Dorji as the Eastern Zone Coordinator, Dasho D.B Sincheuri as the Southern Zone Coordinator and Dasho Chang Ugyen as the Northern Zone Coordinator.

On 21 July 2007, Members of the DPT party gathered at Pangrizampa and formally announced the joining of five serving ministers.

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The political parties are formed Drukyul Decides: in the minds of Bhutan’s first voters

29

Lyonpo Jigmi Y. Thinley and both parties claimed him to be their trophy. In the end, Lyonpo Jigmi Y. Thinley disclosed that he might consider joining the party provided that the BPUP and the APP united as one party — that was his ultimatum. A series of meetings followed between members of the two parties. It was commonly felt that it was necessary for both parties to unite together to form one party so that they could affectively challenge the PDP, which till then had looked formidable and unbeatable. Therefore on 11 July, 2007, the APP and the BPUP merged together and ultimately came to be called the Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT). On 21 July, 2007, four of the five ministers who were earlier speculated to either join the BPUP or the APP came out in the open at Pangrizampa monastery in Thimphu to join the party members, candidates and well-wishers. Five days later on 26 July, 2007, all five ministers led by the Prime Minster, Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk submitted their resignations and were formally released from the government on 6 August, 2007. In the meantime, another party, the Bhutan National Party (BNP) led by Dasho Penjor Dorji, the ex-dzongdag had also been formed. It allied itself with the BPUP and by default joined the consolidated party. On 15 August, 2007, the DPT organized a general meeting with over 500 people at the

30


Kelki Higher Secondary School, Thimphu to nominate and elect the party president and the Secretary. Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba nominated Lyonpo Jigmi Y. Thinley. It was seconded by Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk. With just one nominee, the party members were asked to vote “yes” or “no”. All 351 votes were in favour of the party president. Thus Lyonpo Jigmi Y. Thinley became the DPT president. Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba was designated as the coordinator for candidate selection and recruitment; Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk as the party spokesperson; Lyonpo Wangdi Norbu as treasurer, Lyonpo Ugyen Tshering as the drafting coordinator; and Thinley Wangchuk as the party secretary. The party applied for registration on 15 August, 2007, and was formally registered on 2 October 2007. Its manifesto, based on Gross National Happiness was released on 13 February, 2008. DPT flagged off its campaign from Trongsa on 22 February, 2008. Organizational structure The party claimed to have been formed not by its leaders but by the people themselves. In keeping with this the party’s organizational structure also considered the inputs of all sections of party workers. The Head Office was located in Thimphu, and it established dzongkhag party offices in every dzongkhag as per the requirements of the ECB. The initial days of the party were difficult because of lack of funds. The party was compelled to appeal

In dzongkhags, besides the dzongkhag party office and functionaries, a committee was also formed to be the highest decision-making body for the dzongkhags. It comprised party representatives and registered members of the party. In addition to this a constituency coordinator was appointed for coordinating all party activities in each of the respective constituencies. Next in line were the gewog coordinators and then the chiwog coordinators. Several tshokpas were also appointed, some as


for funds from the public in the media. Despite all teething problems, the Secretariat was set up and all the posts were filled. Thinley Jamtsho, Principal, the Royal Academy of Performing Arts resigned and took up the post of Secretary of the DPT. A spokesman, treasurer and other office-bearers were appointed. An interim Central Committee was formed on 4 August, 2007. Subsequently the first General Assembly was held on 8 August, 2007. The Executive Committee was the highest decision-making body of the party and the day-to-day functions of the party were carried out by the Secretariat. The Executive Committee consisted of (as per DPT Charter): • Cabinet Members • Elected members to the National Assembly; • Elected members from the dzongkhag committees; and • Members elected by the General Assembly.

DPT Party President, Jigmi Y. Thinley

women party workers and some as just supporters. The party charter called for convening of the General Assembly once a year. This body acted as the highest policy-making body, which would provide authority, control and direction to the party. The party symbol The party symbol was represented by three black-necked cranes soaring in the sky. It was chosen to reflect the party’s commitment to balance material development with enrichment of inner peace and happiness, which is “a basic premise for the promise of Gross National Happiness.” It also represented the party’s pledge to honour, serve and to protect the kings, the country and the people.


31

DPT candidates group photo, left to right : 5th Row : Sonam Jamtsho, Sangay Thinley, Ms. Khandu Om (DPT woman’s wing), Tshering Penjore, Ugay Tshering 4th Row : X- , Rinchen Dorji, Karma Wangchuk, Namgay Wangchuk, Lhatu, Yangku Tshering Sherpa, Passang Thrinlee, Ugen Tenzin, Kesang Wangdi, Ugyen Dorji, Nidup Zangpo, Dr. Pema Gyamtsho, Minjur Dorji, Nanda Lal Rai, Durga Prasad Chettri 3rd Row : Dorji Wangdi, Nar Bahadur Gurung, Thakur Singh Powdyel, Zangley Dukpa, Jigme Tshultim, Wangdi Norbu, Jigmi Yoezer Thinley, Yeshey Zimba, Khandu Wangchuk, Ugyen Tshering, Ms. Leela Pradhan, Dr. Samdrup Chettri

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The political parties are formed 2nd Row : Prahlad Gurung, Thinley Jamtsho (Party Secretary) Ugyen Wangdi, Tshewang Rinzin, Ms. Norbu Wangzom, Chencho Dorji, Chencho Dorji, Ms. Karma Lhamo, Dupthob, Ms. Choeki Wangmo, Choida Jamtsho 1st Row : Hemant Gurung, Sonam Penjor, Prem Kumar Gurung, Tshering Tenzin, Karma Rangdol, Tshering Dorji, Gyem Dorji DPT candidates not in the picture : Kinley Dorji


33

DPT’s mission 1. To realize the vision of His Majesty the King for a truly vibrant and progressive democracy wherein sovereign power will lie with the people and the purpose of government shall be to fulfill their hopes & aspirations. 2. To always strive to ensure that national unity, security, justice, fundamental rights and freedom are never compromised. 3. To abide by the Constitution and uphold the Rule of Law. 4. To preserve with endeavors to build and strengthen conditions for the happiness of the Bhutanese people. 5. To ensure stability and serve as a standard for constancy and trustworthiness amid the vagaries of party politics and the ever changing political landscape. 6. To establish standards and norms for party politics and behaviour by the way of example so that parties and individuals choose to follow them or be so inspired, as to give all voters true and comparative choice.

34


7. To be guided, demonstrably, by the highest management and social ethics and principles, so that the party shall be worthy of the loyalty of its own members and the trust and confidence of the people. 8. To recognize and give opportunity to potential leaders to rise to position of political office irrespective of their social standing or economic status. 9. To govern, when given the mandate, with transparency, accountability and compassion in keeping with the ideals and purpose enshrined in the Constitution of our country.

With the five ministers joining the consolidated party (DPT), an informal meeting was held on 11 July, 2007. After the meeting, the founders of BPUP and BNP were not happy with the outcome of that meeting. The main point of difference was under-representation of the BPUP and the BNP as compared to the APP. Approximately four candidates of the BPUP were given party tickets compared to 15 APP candidates. Therefore, Dasho Sigay Dorji, Dasho Penjor Dorji, Nanda Lal Rai (current Minister for Information and Communication), Dasho Jigme Tshultim (Speaker), Dr. Samdu Chhetri, Ganesh Ghimiray, and Dr. Ritutlal Sharma (all members of BPUP) sent a signed letter expressing their discontentment to the five ministers. However, it was later found that the letter never reached the ministers. Eventually, the internal politics resulted in the main founding leader of the BPUP, Dasho Sigay Dorji, and the founder of the BNP, Dasho Penjor Dorji, leaving the DPT. They tried to resurrect the BPUP but then, most of the influential supporters and potential candidates opted to stay with the DPT seeing the probability of wining alongside the ministers. The BPUP, now armed with a very small base hurriedly applied for party �� registration on 15 October, 2007.

ECB after reveiwing the BPUP charter, rejected the aplication on 27 November, 2008 as the charter had no clear ideology, vision and mission, indicating lack of leadership.[3] Furthermore, the ECB noted that the BPUP did not have the capacity to run the government and did not have candidates who could assume cabinet posts or become members of parliament. The group had only 13 members who were officially listed in the electoral roll and failed to have a broad-based membership. However, the founding members of the BPUP remained firm that the DPT had stemmed out of the BPUP and in fact was a hijacked product of the BPUP.

[3] Press Release, No ECB CEC-PP/2007/2066, Disqualification for registration as a political party, Election Commission of Bhutan


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Dissolution of BPUP

36


The political parties are formed The meeting of the two party presidents with the Chief Election Commissioner on 28th December 2007: (Left to right): the DPT party president Jigmi Y. Thinley, the Chief Election Commissioner Dasho Kunzang Wangdi and the PDP party president Sangay Ngedup .


37

3 Politicking and Politics

Politicking and Politics Formation of lobby groups

T

he people of Southern Bhutan are considered by many to be more politically conscious than the rest of the population. During the 1950s some members of Lhotshampas, had challenged His Majesty, the third king’s government and raised issues concerning more rights for the people of Southern Bhutan. Most of them left the country and while in exile formed political parties outside the country. They tried to influence the government for more recognition and democratic changes. Similarly in the early 1990s, following the sweeping changes by the government on immigration and citizenship, the Lhotshampa community once again revolted against the establishment. They formed numerous political parties in exile but did not get any support from within. The government had to take tough measures and because of the violence initiated by some of the more radical groups, many developmental 40


activities were affected. Schools, hospitals and other major developmental projects had to be halted largely for security reasons. Frequent acts of terrorism carried out by refugees settled in Nepal also led the government to take more stringent action in issuing No Objection Certificates (NOC). As a result of all this, when elections were announced and democratic changes brought about by the official announcement to start the formation of political parties, the Lhotshampas took this as an opportunity to solve their problems. A number of prominent Lhotshampas from the government and the private sector met informally to discuss these issues. The main players were Dr. Samdup Chetri and Mr. Ganesh Ghimiray and the main issue concerning them was the citizenship issue. The group felt that many people of Southern Bhutan did not possess citizenship papers and government documents that were required for all official purposes. They felt that this could

Various strategies were discussed and some members thought that the best approach would be to form their own party to really bring the issue to the forefront. However, the rules and regulations governing political parties disallowed formation of parties based on regionalism or ethnicity; this strategy was therefore discarded. The group finally decided to approach the existing political parties with their demands and bargain for inclusion of their concerns in the party manifesto in return for guaranteed votes. They first approached the PDP and held discussion with them but were categorically told that such demands could not be accepted. Because of the lukewarm reception from the PDP, the group decided to stick by the BPUP. Later, when the five ministers were approached to lead the BPUP, the Lhotsham group approached Jigmi Y. Thinley who told that he would attach top priority to the Lhotshampa issue and do his best to solve it once for all as this would foster greater sense of security and peace in the country. Following this, the group stayed with the DPT.

During the campaign, candidates of various constituencies in Southern Bhutan began to make promises to the people in solving their citizenship and other problems if they were elected. Some, like the Sarpang DPT candidate even had his local manifesto printed in Nepali, which was revoked by the ECB. The ECB also issued a notice to political parties and candidates that such issues could not be used in their campaign speeches and that false promises of providing them citizenship to win votes were illegal. Even after that, accusations were hurled at each other by candidates. This continued till the elections. Even after the results were declared, the PDP candidates accused the DPT of having won as a result of these promises. Likewise, Dasho Chang Ugyen, an excouncillor from Thimphu, was also forming a lobby group for South Thimphu Throm and to support any party that would consider their issues. In the process he got involved in the BPUP party formation and slowly became an active member of BPUP. His differences with Dasho Sigay Dorji, the main founder of BPUP, led to the formation of an offshoot of APP. Even as one entity they were trying to rope in more than a few ministers for their party, namely Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba, Lyonpo Jigmi Y. Thinley and Lyonpo Ugyen Tshering. After splitting into two different parties, both BPUP and APP lobbied desperately to get in


41


be solved expeditiously with the introduction of democracy and by the new government. They could build the whole of the southern region as a vote bank for political parties contesting the elections and bargain with them to address their issues after the formation of the government.

Women in politics

ion

nat rms rhaes sig fi n o c PM npo Khandu Wangchuknis, whteroin the

mi last prime ll resign within Thimphu: Lyo wi tory as the entered his tem of government, present sys s Voice of America. d six other ort weeks, rep VoA News that he an inet will leave ber cab called He told the 10-mem he members of join politics at whattory. st till the to st early Augu po n’s his ir the re” in Bhuta ter will take over by ctu jun al “critic from me minis d. pri wn r do ke nd eta A car is forme it requires us to sta u would have vernment interim go the political process se if we continue yo proper for us “To join ponsibilities becau told VoA. “It is not as prime f, t res ” he our presen l conflict of interest, ters or even for mysel P what we cal our function as minis cal activities.” bly as an AP e to continu d yet undertake politi for the National Assem g an , nin ter run nis mi reportedly ro. be ll wi He r Pa from uppe candidate

a

either Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba or Lyonpo Jigmi Y. Thinley. Lyonpos on the other side had already decided that they would either join the same party or not join any party at all. An interesting phenomenon in party politics was that the main founders of BPUP and BNP (Dasho Sigay Dorji and Dasho Penjor Dorji) were ultimately out of the very parties they had nurtured. Party members and supporters of BPUP and BNP chose to stay with the five ministers rather than accompany their founding members. 42


Participation of women in politics was always an important concern for the government and even for many international organizations. From the experience of many countries worldwide, it was felt necessary to include and encourage as many women as possible in active politics. In the past there had been quite a number of women who had shouldered the responsibility and contested in local elections. There were women who as chimis and gups had served their communities. The first female Councillor was appointed in 1979 and in 2002 first woman chimi was elected. After that the proportion of female National Assembly member ranged from 3% to 11%. First women Gup was elected in 2005 and the second one was elected in 2006. Though women in Bhutan enjoy considerable power compared to women in other countries in the region only a few women came forward to join politics. Several discussions and seminars were also conducted by international and national organizations to look at ways to get more representations from women. Several articles were run by the print media and Solution Exchange, an initiative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Bhutan, also discussed the issue and produced an e-discussion summary: “Women in Politics”. The quota system for women was also discussed in several forums highlighting that as many as

Political parties very well understand the role of women in politics and more so due to the fact that more than 50% registered voters constituted women. Thus, for any political party, the women population was indispensable. During the National Council election there were 158, 766 registered women voters compared to 154, 051 registered male voters. The trend remained the same for National Assembly election with 161, 169 females and 157, 296 males registered as voters. Against this background, the PDP and DPT announced its women’s wing. The women’s wing of the PDP had Aum Bidha (eldest sister of Sangay Ngedup) as president and DPT’s women’s group had Aum Rinsy Dem (wife of Jigmi. Y. Thinley) as president. The first official meeting of the PDP women’s wing was held on 11 September, 2007, in Serbithang, followed by the DPT’s women’s wing’s meeting on 16 September, 2007, in the DPT President’s house in Babesa. Following this, both the presidents visited the districts to meet with women groups and to educate them on the electoral process, the role of women


77 countries had constitutional, electoral or political party quotas for women. However the majority Bhutanese opinion was that the role of women was important but that it did not warrant a quota or leniency towards any gender as this in itself would be an indication of discrimination.

in politics and to seek their support for their candidates and parties. Several reasons were given for the formation of women’s wing such as to: ensure greater participation by women in politics and to exert more influence in any government to take up women’s issues; represent the vast majority of rural women who till now had no voice; and as a lobby group for women in any forum and as a means to effectively enact and change policies beneficial to women. Although all of these were relevant and indeed crucial for a successful democracy, the bottom line in most cases was to garner votes for the party and the candidates from women voters who rep-


43

Tshogpa politics resented nearly half the population. A series of familiarization trips were made by heads of the respective women’s wing of political parties covering all districts in the country. By disguising messages on issues concerning women and their rights, most of these meetings ended with subtle messages to support and vote for the party. All these activities did not escape the watchful eyes of the ECB, which monitored the movements of respective parties closely. After a spate of accusations and complaints from various quarters, the ECB was forced to bring out a notice announcing the illegality of forming separate women’s and youth wings by the political parties. Towards the beginning of the campaign, the ECB finally passed an order directing both parties to stop separate public meetings of women and youth unless carried as part of the election campaign team of the candidate concerned. Six women candidates contested for the National Council and nine for the National Assembly. PDP had five women candidates while the DPT had four. Also, from the onset, four of the five serving female National Assembly members joined the PDP at the end of the 87th National Assembly session: they became the first female party workers to register with the party.

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Bhutan’s first national parliamentary election was flawed with personal accusations and counter accusations of bribery, compulsory and forceful registration and membership fees, etc. As of March 2008, the ECB registered a total of 111 cases, which did not include some cases being directly addressed by election officials in districts and constituencies[1]. The implementation of the democratic process, no doubt, divided the communities, households and family members along party lines. A majority of these problems were primarily attributed to “party workers” or the so-called tshogpas. This gave birth to the infamous term of tshogpa politics that remained dominant all along the process. As such, it is worth looking into this issue much more deeply. There is no doubt that party workers or the tshogpas were perhaps the first people to actively take politics to communities and into rural homes. In general, most rural communities were familiar with the mechanical process of voting as they had participated in elections of gups, chimis, mangi-aps, as well as in National Mock elections and the National Council elections. The major difference in this election pertained to candidates. Earlier the candidates contesting local elections were known to the people who came from the same [1] Press release, ECB (ECB(PPD-08)2008/1017

In order to understand the creation of tshogpa politics, we must explore the party organizational structure particularly at the district level and the party registration and membership process instituted by the respective parties.

Party organizational structure The organizational structure at the party headquarters remains similar to that prescribed by the ECB, namely the posts of party President, Executive Committee, Secretary-General, Treasurer and Internal Audit, apart from units handling administration, finance and media functions. Differences arise at the district level: the PDP had four Regional Coordinators, 20 District Coordinators, 205 Gewog Coordinators, and, on an average one Chiwog Coordinator for each chiwog. The DPT did not have regional coordinators. It had 20 District Coordinators, 47 Constituency Coordinators and 205 Gewog Coordinators and one Chiwog Coordinator for each chiwog. All these party workers were paid (refer table 1). Since the PDP was the first party to be formed, it had the advantage of inducting most of the ex-gups, chimis and other influential people as party workers. It believed that getting these prominent people would be an advantage. The DPT did not have much of a choice other than having a strategy to go in for what was left of the PDP. Therefore, when the second party came in the form of DPT, most of those disgruntled with the PDP actively volunteered and joined the DPT.


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backgrounds as themselves and being residents of villages were well aware of the concerns of the rural people. For General Elections, most candidates were relatively unknown, represented the educated society and having spent the larger part of their years either in educational institutes or in government service, were seen to be unfamiliar with the concerns of rural masses. In addition, the formation of political parties was a totally new concept and it was necessary to have a strong grassroots support to garner votes. Therefore, like elsewhere in the world, one of the first activities to be taken up by the party was to identify influential people in the village and to appoint them as tshogpas. Persons who had assumed leadership posts in the past and those who wielded influence were given posts such as regional, district, gewog and chiwog coordinators. These tshogpas or party workers primarily helped in coordinating party meetings and election campaigns, and were entrusted to sell the candidates’ profiles in constituencies. They were actually the marketing agents of political parties and lobbied for votes. However, the tshogpas were paid for their services.

Table 1: Salary structure for the party workers PDP Party Workers Regional Coordinator (4) Nu 20 000/month Dzongkhag Coordinator (20) Nu 11 000/month Gewog Coordinator (205) Nu 5000/month Chiwog Coordinator Nu 300/month

There are a number of hypotheses on the number and manner in which the tshogpas were appointed. In general, the parties claim that they appoint one tshogpa per gewog/ chiwog, while some larger gewogs/chiwogs have more than one tshogpa. However, in reality, to quote a few examples, the PDP has a total of 997 tshogpas in Bumthang, Paro, Samdrup Jongkhar and Wangdue, whereas the total number of gewogs and chiwogs is only 453. This goes on to prove that tshogpas are actually not restricted to the number of gewogs and chiwogs but are purely based on the recommendation of regional and district coordinators. The appointment of party workers was fairly independent of candidates in majority of districts for both parties owing to the fact that party work began from early January 2007. Most candidates for parties joined only after the last National Assembly election (87th NA session) in June 2007, when the serving ministers formally resigned. By that time, the party structure and the appointments were all set. Few candidates did appoint a few additional coordinators in consultation with the party

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DPT Party Workers Dzongkhag Coordinator (20) Nu 10 000/month Constitutional coordinator (47) Nu 8000/month Gewog Coordinator (205) Nu 5000/month Chiwog Coordinator Nu 300/month

where it was deemed crucial. The appointment of party workers was controlled by the party because the workers were paid from the party fund. Therefore the candidates had to provide convincing reasons for any additional party worker requirements. Unofficial sources claimed that almost 50% of households in the East had at least one member as a political worker in either of the parties. In a few constituencies of the Western region, there was almost one party worker per household, who were paid. Financial analysis indicates that DPT and PDP spent 44.9% and 45.9% of party funds towards payment of remuneration of party workers.

Party membership and recruitment A political party must have a credible number of members to fulfill the requirements of the ECB regarding its registration. ECB guidelines clearly stipulate the requirements of party members, particularly Chapter 8, Article 134(a), which states that an application for

To be a member of a political party, one has to pay a one-time registration fee and an annual membership fee. The fee structure is left to the parties. The Election Act states that “A political party shall provide for the fixation of the registration fee in its charter.” Regarding membership fee, it states that “A political party may provide for the fixation of the membership fee in its charter”. The registration fee, membership fee and voluntary contribution, according to the Election Act, are the only three sources of income for parties. Voluntary contributions from registered members shall not exceed Nu 100 000 per membership. The PDP initially set its registration and membership fees as Nu 100 and Nu 1200 respectively. However, it became apparent that not many people, especially the rural farmers, could afford these high amounts. Subsequently, these were revised to Nu 1 and Nu 4 respectively. As for the DPT, it set Nu 100 as registration fees and Nu 200 as membership fees. With no limit on the number of members nor on the fee structure regarding registration

and membership, the parties took complete advantage of the situation. The democratic process in the rural areas was mostly concentrated on the recruitment of as many members as possible. Party members are not paid. Therefore, the process of registration and fee structure emerged as one of the biggest controversies of Bhutan’s first national parliamentary election. The DPT accused the PDP party workers for forcing people to become members and also using threats and other means to coerce them to join the party. Throughout the campaign and during the ECB/BBS-sponsored debates between candidates, the DPT candidates systemically raised the issue of membership and opined that the PDP had been going around the villages, literally knocking on the doors seeking membership. There was an erroneous belief then that by becoming members of the party, it was binding for them to vote for the same party. The DPT being aware of this was apprehensive that this may lead to many voters casting their votes for the PDP, which by then had recruited a large number of members. The PDP had about 21,422 registered members while the DPT had only 6,313 registered members. This was in fact a big worry for the DPT[2]. Hence it adopted a strategy to capi[2] ECB maintains PDP and DPT registered members as 1113 and 4050 respectively. The difference arise when ECB issued a notification late in February 2008 that only with VPIC number will be considered as registered members. While the party membership registration began from early 2007. Therefore this differences occurred.


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registration must contain “the name of the party and a list of its members”. Regarding membership, the Political Parties’ Rules of the Kingdom of Bhutan state that any person can be a member of a political party provided that s/he is not a member of the Royal Family, a treulku, lam, members from religious bodies, members of the armed forces or civil servants.

talize on the ECB/BBS-sponsored debate to inform the public that lowering the fees to Nu 5 and indulging in door-to-door registration were not ethical. They also repeatedly used the debate forum to inform the viewers that voting was their right and that they could vote for anyone irrespective of his/her membership status. The whole tshogpa and party membership registration was a big confusion as many people who were being exposed to real politics for the first time began to fear and have doubts on the need for membership. In the end, the ECB had to issue a notification suspending temporary recruitment of new members by political parties with effect from 20 February, 2008 till 25 March, 2008[3]. There were accusations that by not being a member of a certain party and in the event that the party won the elections, they would be marked and be isolated from all kidu. They feared that in order to avail of the opportunities and kidu, it was necessary to become a member. However since there were two parties and it was difficult to say who would win, many families adopted a practice whereby half of them would become members of the PDP and the other half would be in the DPT. Even those who could not afford tried to place one family member each in the two parties. Furthermore, the combined [3] �� Notification, ECB CEC-14 2008/596, Election Commission of Bhutan.

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effect of tshogpa politics and party membership registration led to the division of communities, villages, households and families along party lines.

Cases and ECB decisions Party workers frequently clashed with each other and by March 2008, 111 cases were registered with ECB. Although most cases were petty and did not warrant investigations, some were serious and invited harsh decisions. One of the most serious of these was the case of the


PDP party workers following the DPT President on his tour to Zhemgang where, besides asking him sensitive questions at meetings, they noted down numbers of all DPT party vehicles. The ECB subsequently debarred them from all further political meetings and issued a warning to this effect. The second case that received most attention was the case of the Chimithangkha bribery case, probably because of the two high profile nature of the candidates involved. The case in point related to an alleged donation of

Nu 200,000 to Chimithangkha Lhakhang. The PDP stated that the money was donated by Ugen Tshechup, the elder brother of the PDP candidate (Sonam Tobgay) to lhakhang, who had been doing so every year. It was claimed to be a coincidence that Sonam Tobgay happened to be there on that particular day. It was explained that he was requested to make the donations on behalf of his brother as a formal gesture and that it was not intended to bribe anyone. The DPT however contested by saying that the money was donated to the four


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chiwogs of Mewang gewog and that as it was given to influence voters. The DPT continued to push the ECB to take strong action against the PDP with some members even insisting on boycotting the elections if the matter was not resolved appropriately.[4] PDP counter alleged that Yeshey Zimba had also given gifts and money to a lhakhang. Finally in March 2008, the ECB settled the dispute by ordering the money to be deposited with the ECB, reprimanding Sonam Tobgay for “his failure to conduct himself in a manner expected of a candidate and also by warning both parties especially those party workers involved in the case not to indulge in politicizing community activities.[5] There were also complaints by the DPT that PDP members were screening audiovisual materials highlighting the achievements of its President and that this was influencing votes. The ECB had taken out an order in the second week of January 2008 stating that no one was allowed to “screen any audiovisual products or documentary clips or distribute any written or pictorial materials which attributes or depicts the past achievements of a particular aspiring candidate or individual members of the political party while in government service.”

A frequently raised concern, which was also officially put up to the ECB by the PDP, was that of the DPT president using fear tactics to garner votes and instilling fear among voters against the PDP. They alleged that the DPT President, in the guise of educating people on good and bad politics, was actually projecting the PDP as a bad party and DPT as a good party. They accused Jigmi Y. Thinley of making statements such as, “People have to know which the good party is and which is the bad one, and it is better not to listen to the bad party and the bad people”.[6] Furthermore a news release from the PDP commented on other statements made by the DPT president

[4] Bhutan Times. DPT not happy with ECB verdict. March 5th 2008. [5]

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Election Commission of Bhutan. Press Release. ECB/ CEC-PR/2008/675


[6] Bhutan Times. Politics getting down and dirty? February 27th 2008.

The DPT on the other hand maintained that the messages delivered by their President were intended to educate people and inform them of bad practices prevalent in other countries. They denied that it was a cover-up to accuse the PDP of wrong-doing and that the statements were definitely not defamatory against any particular person or party. The ECB after completing the investigations and on reviewing the charges found them to be baseless and cleared the DPT of any wrong-doing. The most unique of all accusations that raised eyebrows across the globe was the one regarding involvement of gods in politics. It led to the issuance of a notification by the Election Commission of Bhutan barring the political parties, candidates and party workers from organizing any religious activities, such as propitiating gods and deities, conducting tordogs and gyeg-treg to invoke or seek support of divine mediums for political reasons from

17 January - 25 March 2008[7]. In Lhuntse, one of the major accusations that came up for discussion was that of the PDP against the DPT candidate, Karma Rangdol for having performed a religious ritual invoking deities. Bhutan being a Buddhist country and with its people being deeply religious, religious activities had always been practised and performed during important occasions. However there had been instances where the same religious activities had been performed to harm and bring bad luck to others. The case in Lhuntse pertained to the performance of Dolmoi Torjab by Karma Rangdol (DPT candidate) as per the PDP accusation. However, the DPT claimed that Dolmoi Yueldhog was performed by one of its party worker as an annual ritual to avert misfortune and Karma Rangdol happened to be there by coincidence. The case was finally settled by the investigating team of the dzongkhag that ruled in favour of the DPT.

Slogans and symbols of the party The slogans adopted by parties for campaigning were also debated upon and at times criticized. Each of them will be discussed and analysed [7] �� Notification, Election Commission of Bhutan (no reference number cited in print media)


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such as, “food given to you now is a sign that later you will go hungry, blankets given now is a sign that later you will go naked, sweets put in your mouth just now are signs that later your mouths will go dry”. These they said were in reference to the food being served during public meetings conducted by the PDP and that these were actually “thinly veiled accusations” against the PDP.

below. The PDP slogans: “Walk the Talk” and “Service with Humility” were stressed throughout the familiarization and campaigning. This was built around the successes of its President who during his tenure in the government had delivered to the people all the promises made by him during his visits to villages. Similarly the PDP promised to fulfill all the promises made by the party. As far as the second part of the slogan was concerned, the party projected humility as the basis for serving the people after the elections. As the power to vote and choose their leader had been handed down to the people, it was stressed that the people were the real masters and the politicians, merely servants to serve them. In keeping with our tradition, masters were to be respected and served faithfully by the servants. In addition the party also formulated rules for all its candidates and if in power, it promised that there would be no difference between the ministers and other candidates. Ministers would have to remain humble, travel frequently and address all the concerns of the people. This being said, there were many skeptics of the slogans and many even doubted the seriousness and ability to abide by them. Many however appreciated and felt that these were appropriate and relevant to the changes that were taking place. The DPT slogan was “Equity and Justice”. They propagated that with the democratic

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changes taking place and in keeping with the principles of democracy all citizens would be considered equal. They stressed that no distinction would be made between people based on social status, caste, ethnicity or hierarchy. Similarly justice would be impartial and delivered as per the laws of the country. In addition, the DPT repeatedly mentioned the link between its slogan and the importance of this in achieving Gross National Happiness. Although the manifesto of the DPT clearly outlined GNH as its goal, the party sold the slogan of equity and justice along with it. Many people thought that the stand taken by the DPT was very good and that the slogan it had adopted was appropriate. They identified with it and although it seemed unlikely that it would ever happen, the fact that it was being addressed was seen as the right move.

In the end, it was really difficult to say whether the slogan or the symbol had any major effect on the outcome of the election results. From the analysis, it seems unlikely that the voters were swayed by the messages alone. Moreover, the fact was that the ideals and goals of both the parties were essentially the same i.e. to fulfil His Majesty’s vision of a successful transition to democracy and to achieve GNH.

Familiarization and campaigning Since democracy was being introduced for the first time and involved formation of political parties and selection of candidates, it

would also be the first and the last time that a distinction was being made regarding the terms, familiarization and campaigning. The long period from party formation and actual campaign as defined in the Election Bill gave an opportunity to the party and candidates to visit their constituencies and meet voters. However, each party had to identify candidates and because, in some instances, the process was long, it gave an unfair advantage to those who were already identified. Rival candidates would get a head start and the promises that they would make would not be in keeping with the party manifestos that were yet to be published. In fact, the ECB later made sure that local manifestos and promises made by candidates were in line with the overall party manifesto for the Nation. Thus, it was decided that during familiarization, candidates would only be allowed to introduce themselves and the party. They were allowed to inform the public on their slogans and the party charter but were debarred from making any promises. This however came to be very contentious as the line between familiarization and campaigning was very thin. It was often difficult to differentiate party charter objectives from promises for development and also the slogans from actually providing services. All of these led to further accusations and complaints.


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When it came to the symbols of the party, the horse and the crane were not spared in poking fun and in criticizing the parties. The white horse representing the PDP was touted as being unable to carry the load of the government. It was joked that being good to the horse would result in the person getting kicked in return, which was a common saying in Dzongkha. As for the crane, the symbol of DPT, it was debated whether the bird was indigenous to Bhutan and that it would fly away to distant shores, meaning the DPT would not be able to deliver. When some cranes were found dead in Phobjikha in January 2008, it became a fuel for further jokes by PDP supporters.

During familiarization, presidents of the two parties also toured extensively, to introduce candidates to their respective electorates and also to garner votes for the party. It was during this time that the PDP accused the DPT President of negatively influencing the voters, by highlighting the pitfalls of democracy and sowing seeds of doubts against the PDP. The PDP submitted complaints against the DPT President of making thinly-veiled accusations of a corrupt party that would do anything to seize power and of influencing the voters to turn against the PDP. The ECB however did not find anything wrong as the statements were general in nature and said that the DPT was educating voters on the negative aspects of politics. During the campaign stage, what was most noticeable was the number of promises being made by candidates to win votes. Most of these promises pertained to provision of roads, electricity, schools, hospitals and strategies to alleviate poverty. Raising farmers’ income and providing user-friendly services such as “one–window” services were the most common promises made by both parties. Both party candidates had prepared local manifestos that addressed all existing problems. They continued to remind the people that with the ushering in of democracy, it would be possible to solve all problems. Many observers however pointed out, mostly in the media, that most

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of these would not be possible as the Tenth Five-year Plan had already been finalized, and that it would have to be in line with national priorities and with a budget that the country could afford. During the campaign stage one of the most serious setbacks to the PDP took place in the form of disqualification of its Gelephug candidate. Garab Dorji was accused by the DPT of maliciously spreading rumours about the DPT President among the southern Bhutanese and to this effect had distributed a document entitled “Bhutan: A Kingdom Besieged”. The paper was written and presented by the DPT President, when he was Secretary of Home Ministry in 1993. The ECB after investigating

[8] Election Commission of Bhutan. Disqualification of PDP’s Gelephu candidate from contesting the National Assembly election 2008. Press Release, ECB/CECPR/2008/674

Civil servants The role of the civil servants during the first National Elections was marred with controversy especially after the declaration of results. The PDP accused the civil servants of not following the rules and regulations as stipulated in the Constitution and that they had played a major role in influencing rural voters. As outlined in the Election Bill and the Constitution, civil servants were to remain apolitical. However the massive movement of people especially those eligible to postal ballots raised the suspicion of the PDP. The party claimed that several civil servants were campaigning on the eve of elections even during the 48 hours prior to 24 March 2008, which was the deadline to stop all campaigning. Of the 17,119 valid postal ballots cast in the National Assembly, 77.8% voted for DPT and only 22.2% voted for PDP which made PDP feel that the postal ballot voters swing the undecided voters during the last two days. Initially when the parties were being formed and candidates were being sought, there were general discussions that civil servants should be allowed to take part in politics. Some even questioned whether it would really be possible for anyone to remain apolitical especially given the fact that if one was eligible to vote, then by voting for a particular candidate or party, he/she would in effect get politically aligned. Despite these arguments, the ECB made it


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and confirming the act issued a press release stating that “the act of giving copies of the document and carrying out activities aimed at creation of ill-will and incitement of regionalism for political gain is a violation of Article 15(3) of the draft Constitution”.[8] They also found that it contravened Section 290 (c) of the Election Bill, which stated that no political party or candidate “shall indulge in any activity, which may create ill-will, difference or cause tension between different communities, and religious or linguistic groups”. Accordingly Garab Dorji was disqualified from contesting the National Elections on 1 March 2008 — only three weeks before the day of elections. This was a big setback to the PDP, which in turn issued a notice saying that Garab had only given the copy to two people, both of whom were known to him and that the document was neither a secret nor a confidential document and that the case did not warrant such a severe reaction from the ECB. The European Union (EU) observers in their report also noted that the case did not deserve such a drastic action on the part of the ECB. In any case, the PDP was left without a candidate and had to come up with a new candidate, Tshering Dolkar, with only weeks to go before the elections.

clear that anyone wishing to contest had to resign and at the same time follow the RCSC rules, which stated that once resigned from service, no one would be allowed to return to his/her previous post on a regular basis. Civil servants were also restrained from attending any political meetings or being associated with any party. As a result of this, observations were often made on the reluctance and uneasiness of district officers and GYT members to even talk to party officials. Most civil servants and local leaders felt that they were breaking the law and that it was illegal to even be seen with candidates or party workers. Most candidates also complained that it was difficult to consult and seek assistance from dzongkhag officials because of this rule. On the other hand, accusations and complaints were repeated by both parties that these very officials were either supporting or helping rival candidates and party in influencing voters. Some of these allegations were found to be true and a couple of civil servants were relieved of their services.[9] [9] Election Commission of Bhutan. News release for public Information. ECB/CEC-17/2008/125

The PDP party president Sangay Ngedup campaigning in Serigang, Kabisa Punakha.

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The DPT party president Jigmi Y Thinley


campaigning in Gedu, Chukha.

(L-R): Jigme Dukpa contesting against the DPT party president and Tshering Penjore contesting againt the PDP party president Sangay Ngedup pose for photo.

Democracy: Dawn of a New Era

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Electronic Voting Machines being prepared for the mock election in Paro, May 2007.

4 Democracy and civic knowledge

Democracy and civic knowledge Introduction: Knowing the basics

D

emocracy gave Bhutanese the right to vote and choose representatives to be their voice in parliament. And if a handful of post-election news articles are to be believed, voters are taking this right to all possible degrees, from sending messages to lawmakers on why they are silent in parliament to requesting them to pick up someone from bus stations. In fact this voter enthusiasm can be attributed to changes in the media just about a year before the announcement of elections. In 2006, private players were allowed in the media, and the new newspapers, joining Kuensel, followed the unfolding of the political process with excitement and vigor. The newspapers, with reporters shuttling between districts, supplemented the election commission awareness programs with articles on how urban and rural Bhutan came into grips with the election process and eventually 60


helped in the democratization of information. We present in this chapter, the findings from our district rural survey and the findings from our in-depth content analysis of the print media (Kuensel, Bhutan Observer and Bhutan Times). Therefore this chapter looks at the civic knowledge of average citizens, their information sources, and the role of media in information flows. The essence of democracy is that the government listens to the people. Thus, in reviewing the success and problems of the 2008 elections in Bhutan, let us turn to their voices in making an initial assessment. The majority of survey respondents (83.6%) stated that the elections were free and fair — in agreement with national and international election observers in their positive assessment of Bhutan’s elections.[1] However, 5.5% reported otherwise. Though these negative responses may reflect some degree of frustration of voters due [1] For example, refer European Union Election Observation Mission: Kingdom of Bhutan 2008. May 2008.

The media and elections The media plays a central role in every democracy as it provides the tools to communicate between the government, political parties and the people. As the average citizen negotiates his/her perception of government and politics through the eyes of the media, the media must be responsible for conveying an accurate and transparent account of politics. The positive response on the question of free and fair elections points to the success of the Bhutanese media in carrying out a constructive role in the past election season. Of interest to the ECB, parties, and media outlets alike, the primary source of information cited by Rural District Respondents was “radio” at 46.3% and television at 15.6%. National surveys estimated that 62.4% population owned a radio.[2] This suggests that radio would not be the primary source if all media options were available. It is likely that two factors play a part in this. Firstly, highly educated citizens may lean towards more in-depth information found in newspapers. Secondly, the impact and excitement of visual

[2] Bhutan Living Standard Survey 2007, National Statistical Bureau

television probably make it a more engaging source when both radio and television are the options. Nevertheless, in terms of reaching the greatest number of citizens and the greatest range of geographical areas, radio remains the most important communication outlet. From 2006 to 2007, 5.6% Bhutanese purchased a radio set, whereas only 3.17% of Bhutanese purchased a television set. Both statistics suggest relatively strong growth patterns, but we should recognize that radio will continue to have primacy for quite some time in the future.[3] Newspapers scored much lower than other forms of media, with only 6.9% respondents citing them as the primary source of political information, again primarily due to the fact that many newspaper readers were in urban areas. Also, while access to newspapers is quite high, it may be that low literacy rates and the lower level of stimulation compared to the audiovisual media reduced the role that newspapers played as the primary source of political information. Roughly a quarter of the Bhutanese population did not have access to either radio or television. Roughly the same percentage of the election survey sample cited other sources as primary sources of political information; just under a quarter of the survey sample obtained [3] Bhutan Living Standard Survey 2007, National Statistical Bureau


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to defeats of their candidates, the ECB must nevertheless continually strive to improve its report card in the eyes of its own citizens.

their information either from interpersonal communication (13.8%) or through their gup (10.2%). While we do not know whether people who did not own a television or a radio were the same who received political information through conversation, it is likely. This makes roughly a quarter of the Bhutanese population effectively impenetrable to ECB announcements through government media outlets. Other means must continue to be explored so that these people can be reached. The election survey points to the importance of interpersonal communication, whether it involves family members, community members or local leaders. Further studies could attempt to trace the source of political information that was passed through informal discussion networks. This would enable the government to ensure that such sources, if they are other than the existing government media, are well informed on relevant matters. A clear example of this is ensuring the quality of information supplied to the local leadership. As gups have a strong impact on their local areas, the ECB must look to the gup as a key access point in conveying necessary political information. Formal and informal conversation (external to media outlets) can, in fact, be considered a primary form of media in Bhutan. Rumours and “talking points” will have much more impact in Bhutan than in other countries that do not covert into democracies from an oral culture. It is difficult to evaluate the “conversation media” in terms of its content without an extended ethnography. It is important to

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note its power and that it may operate interdependently with the media, in that it both influences and is influenced by media outlets. In addition to sources of political information, the type of content that is obtained reflects if the communication is being rightly prioritized. Of the total election survey respondents, 18% said that voters’ education was the most prominent election topic they heard in the media. Given that these were the first parliamentary elections in Bhutan, this was a reassuringly high percentage. As would be expected, another 30.3% said that they heard most about political parties.

Balance of total coverage time One way in which the media coverage of elections can be evaluated is by the total amount of time devoted to the parties or candidates. Equal coverage helps the voter to have equal access to necessary information on the options available. The Rural District Survey respondents were asked as to which party they heard about most in the media; 17.6% responded that they heard about the DPT the most, while 8.9% responded that they heard about the PDP the most; 54.1% claimed that the coverage was equal. It is unlikely, however, that these results are accurate. In fact, in the European Union Election Observation Mission Final Report, it is made clear that BBS TV and Radio provided equal time to candidates in debates and interviews according to

It is more than likely that the results appeared to be biased due to the increased coverage of the DPT post-election, when the respondents were interviewed. Also, informal discussions often influence public perception of what is in the media. The higher rating of the DPT in the media was probably due to these two issues: post-election coverage and the distortion of informal conversation. However, a detailed review of newspaper content during the election campaign does reveal some potential influences on total coverage. The European Union Election Observation Mission also conducted a content analysis of newspapers. By both accounts, all three newspapers were able to maintain relatively balanced positions with numerous articles reporting favorably for both contesting parties. In total there were 289 articles published by three newspapers related to the two parties during the election campaign period. By our analysis 51% of them were more concentrated on DPT and 49% were more focused on PDP which indicate that DPT received slightly more coverage than the PDP. However, to further determine the impact of newspapers [4] European Union Election Observation Mission: Kingdom of Bhutan 2008. May 2008.

on election outcomes, the tone of the coverage must be examined.

Balance in tone of coverage It must be acknowledged, nevertheless, that the quality of exposure does matter. If all of a party’s coverage is negative, it might sometimes wish for less attention. Another reason why people may have perceived a high level of media coverage dedicated to the DPT may be due to the tone of coverage used to communicate stories on the two parties. For example, the coverage may have been roughly equal in total exposure, but with one party receiving much more positive press than the other. Continuing with the detailed view of the content analysis, the results reviewed the political coverage in terms of the percentage of positive, negative and neutral articles. Overall of the total political articles produced during the election campaign period related to two parties (n=289), 63% were neutral, 25% positive and 12% negative. Kuensel published an equal percentage of neutral articles on the two parties, along with more positive and negative articles focused on the DPT, as compared to the PDP. However, the negative articles on the DPT were only four. Bhutan Times had a slightly greater number of positive articles on the DPT compared to its positive articles on the PDP. In addition, it published a slightly greater number of


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regulations. In the news section, BBS radio presented party information on the DPT 49% of the time and on the PDP 51% of the time. For BBS TV, the DPT was accorded 47% party-based news time, compared to the PDP’s 53%. Paid airtime and print space were almost exactly equal between the two parties.[4]

Table 2: Tone of articles published by newspapers during the election campaign period

Number of articles

DPT

PDP

Total

Neutral Kuensel

44

50.0%

44

50.0%

88

Times

31

50.8%

30

49.2%

61

Observer

17

53.1%

15

46.9%

32

Kuensel

12

54.5%

10

45.5%

22

Times

23

52.3%

21

47.7%

44

Observer

3

42.9%

4

57.1%

7

Kuensel

4

66.7%

2

33.3%

6

Times

11

47.8%

12

52.2%

23

Observer

3

50.0%

3

50.0%

6

Positive

Negative

negative articles on the PDP, and more neutral articles devoted to the DPT. In other words, in all three accounts, Bhutan Times appeared to have provided a slight edge to the DPT. This may further confirm Bhutan Times’ bias towards the DPT that was observed in respect of the total coverage time by both the CRI and the European Union content analyses. Though such a bias may be entirely unintentional, such leanings must be carefully monitored to ensure that future coverage of elections moves towards greater balance. Bhutan Observer had an equal percentage of negative articles, but had a slightly greater number of positive articles in favour of the PDP. Bhutan Observer’s neutral articles had a

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greater number focusing on the DPT. Bhutan Observer had some of the healthiest results in terms of election articles, as not only did it have a healthy mix of positive, negative and neutral articles, those were well distributed between the two parties. A greater number of articles focused on the DPT, though there were slightly more positive articles on the PDP. However, these small differences effectively cancelled each other out, resulting in a predominantly balanced coverage on all fronts.

The negative press and its allegations A negative press plays multiple roles in the campaign season. In some forms it can be useful in its ability to point out negative trends in a candidate’s record. Also, it can be part of arguments evaluating the leadership potential and lack of corruption in a candidate. All too often, however, the negative press becomes an ugly game of allegations and drastic state-

Bhutan Observer also registered many neutrals (71.1%) in its political articles. Bhutan Times registered only 47.7% of its articles as neutral, with greater percentages of both positive and negative articles compared to other papers. This may reflect a greater editorial flex-


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ments. In these cases, the allegations serve only to draw more negative press and less attention to matters of importance to voters. It also helps to sell the media, as negative press is often portrayed like gossip with dramatic statements and headlines. 15% of respondents reported that allegations were the dominant political information conveyed by the media. Allegations are relevant only to the extent that they help establish trust or distrust in a party or candidate in the minds of eligible voters. However, they can also be a game played by parties that distracts citizens from more important criteria, such as the type of priorities and decisions the party or candidates will take once in power. If it is true that allegations took up 15% of media content in the election, then the media needs to seriously limit the coverage of allegations and work to promote in-depth knowledge on key policy issues. In looking at the positive and negative articles in the three newspapers we can see some definite differences. Kuensel clearly maintained a high level of neutrality in 75.9% of its articles. It was a safe player, making few critical comments on parties, and potentially not revealing key critical information to the public with only 5.2% of its articles carrying a predominately negative tone.

ibility in permitting a more diverse range of article types to be presented to the public. While it is always ideal to present both sides equally in an article, a combination of positive and negative articles can also expand the range and sources of information on political issues available to readers. Bhutan Observer and Bhutan Times were both much more willing to make critical presentations of party issues. However, both papers had a greater percentage of positive articles than negative articles, a positive sign of the effort to control excessive negative political coverage. Due to the strong regulation of the government broadcast media and conscientious participation of the print media, the overall impact of the media in Bhutan elections was very positive. Not only did active participation take place from all sides, the coverage was impressively balanced in terms of both total coverage time and tone. In future elections, the Bhutanese media would do well to place more effort in being critical of the stances of parties and candidates on issues of concern to individuals. While a certain percentage of press time should ensure the quality of leadership of candidates, and point out any corrupt or negative records of candidates, the negative press should exploit the negative press for its own sake, but only if it is constructive. Issuebased investigation and cover stories would better assist the public in determining which party or candidate was ideal for them; this would be equally popular as well and more constructive in achieving the fusion of GNH development and democratic practices.

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Participation and political exposure Meetings Due to the lack of communication facilities in many regions of Bhutan, meetings play an important role in contributing to the knowledge of citizens on topics of political interest. Aside from allowing candidates to introduce themselves, meetings hold candidates responsible for promises and images of themselves that they project to the audience. As much as 73.8% Rural District Survey respondents reported to have attended meetings, thereby showing a strong interest in political outcomes. Meetings were the primary interaction between candidates and their constituencies, and thus were crucial in the creation of informed options for voters. While other indicators such as literacy remain low among the Bhutanese population, political participation has already shown itself to be very strong for the first year of democratic elections. This active interest is a positive sign for the building up of civil society organizations, which play a key role in democracies around the world, both focusing public interests and increasing the level of citizen knowledge on key topics. For example, the level of interest in women’s meetings revealed a strong potential for women’s issues to become the platform for civil society organizations. It is unfortunate that current legislation in the Civil Society Organization Act prevents political activity by

Debates Given the present limitations on media communications, the media was effective in carrying the debate coverage to Bhutanese citizens; 52.8% respondents mentioned that they heard the debate either on television or radio, while 16.8% respondents actually attended the debates — a very impressive number. Of those who attended or heard the debates, full 17.4% reported no understanding of the debate content. This could be partly due to language barriers, as all debates were conducted in Dzongkha. Another possible factor that limited debate comprehension was the use of new or unnecessarily difficult terms. Candidates and party platforms would do well to emphasize simple, understandable terminology and phrasing to ensure communication. Of those who attended or heard the debate, 20.2% reported that the debate did influence their vote. In other words, despite difficulties in understanding the debates, they did have significant influence on the decision-making process of many voters. Debates can continue to play an even more constructive role in the future as a platform for differentiating the views of candidates on issues. If the communication value is improved, the number of eligible voters who report the debates as a source of influence on their vote will increase. Thus, it is in the interest of a vibrant democracy to

continue to strengthen the existing debate programme, and for parties to take the debates as serious moments in the campaign that have a lasting impact on the audience. Table 3: Did the debate influence your vote? Yes

20.2%

No

50.4%

Not applicable

0.8%

Missing

28.5%

Total

100.0%

Overall, the level of participation in politics was very strong for Bhutan’s transition election. It is important to ensure that such levels of participation remain high in future elections even when not surrounded by the excitement of a new system. Reducing language and education barriers to information exchanges will be a key step to nurturing that participation. An increase in issues-based discussions will also pull people into the sphere of political participation. Greater flexibility in the format of debates, including audience-generated questions, will assist in making candidates responsible to voter interests. Local broadcasts of political meetings will also expose the greater audience to more informal interactions between members of constituencies and their prospective representatives.

Civic knowledge Operational knowledge We have seen the strengths of information flows and participatory behaviour in Bhutan’s


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civic organizations. This provision ought to be reviewed so that levels of political interest and citizen impact are not obstructed.

first elections, as well as some of the areas needing improvement. However, the flow of information and exposure to ideas is only one half of the equation. At the end of the day, the key criterion is the evaluation of whether citizens have the necessary political information in their mind. Eligible voters need to know how to recognize defining characteristics of the options available and how to conduct themselves at the polling station in order to ensure that their choice translates into a counted vote. As people become more active participants in Bhutan’s young democracy, the government must encourage them by taking their participation seriously and providing them with the tools necessary to be knowledgeable participants. The most crucial information was successfully conveyed, notably the importance of showing up at the polls as demonstrated by the high voter turnout (79.3%). Moreover, the knowledge of how to use the voting machines appeared to be strong, especially in the light of the 85.8% of Rural District Survey respondents who claimed that they had attended the training on the Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) use prior to the National Assembly elections. Table 4: Did you attend the training on EVM? Yes

85.8%

No

13.4%

Missing Total

0.8% 100.0%

Source: Rural District Survey

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A strong indicator was the knowledge of the number of registered parties in the election. Most respondents accurately cited the number as two. However, 9.1% thought that there were three registered parties in the election; the fact of the unregistered Bhutan Peoples United Party (BPUP) could have caused some confusion. Beyond the basic idea of selecting between parties, the rural Bhutanese public remained unclear on the further processes of elections, such as parliamentary government formation. This could be seen in the result that only 14.0% knew how many rounds of National Assembly elections were required if there had been more than two parties (the answer is two: a primary round and a final round), and 40.9% stated outright that they had no idea. Knowledge of election rounds is crucial in defining the reason one is voting for; an informed vote calculates the impact of voting into the decision. If one is unsure of the number of rounds, then the purpose of the vote is obscured. Another possible point of confusion could be the inability to separate the National Assembly and National Council elections, thus leading to an incorrect number of “rounds”. This possibility also spells out the need to improve public knowledge on the consequences of votes in terms of parliament and its functions. The successes in informing the voting public on the importance of voting and the use of voting machines needs were also partly met by the operational knowledge of the election process, at least in the basic sense of the out-


Voters education in Merak-Sakteng


69

come. However, this start needs to be strongly supplemented by more in-depth knowledge of the meaning of the vote and its consequences for party politics and the formation of the upper and lower houses. While some of this information will be filled in through direct experience of the first parliamentary administration, it must also be actively pursued in preparation for the next election. If this were the only information gap, it would be somewhat understandable as it is difficult to expose an audience to a new governing system in the abstract. The real knowledge of how a new political system will work comes from citizens having a direct week-toweek experience of the role of parliament in their lives. However, even more condemning results show that even some of the most basic and critical data were absent from the public realm; 11.9% respondents of the Rural District Survey believed that the losing candidate would still be a parliament member. Table 5: If a candidate loses from your constituency, will he still be an MP? Yes

11.9%

No

70.3%

Do not know

14.2%

Missing

15.8%

Total

100.0%

Source: Rural District Survey The most basic outcome of a vote is who will be in office and who will not be. A lawmaker’s functions in the parliamentary system are just as important as who reserves a seat in Parliament and its various committees/bodies. The survey

70


data strongly suggest a lack of knowledge of even this most basic aspect. A further 14.2% Rural District Survey respondents admitted that they did not know the answer. In fact, 30% respondents were unable to provide an accurate response, demonstrating confusion on the topic. Even more surprisingly, 32.5% civil servants[5], the most educated and politically aware sub-group of the population, did not know that the losing candidate would not be a Member of Parliament. Not only is such information consumable, but it is critical to the capacity of voters to weigh the balance of factors in a decision. For example, if a voter likes a local candidate from one party, but overall is interested in the qualities of another party, then it would be absolutely necessary to know that the local candidate will not have any place in the government should that candidate lose. It appears that many Bhutanese people may have assumed they were choosing a ranking rather than winners and losers. If such information deficiencies are as strong in both the urban and rural areas, this indicates that it was not sufficiently transferred in election education programmes. In Bhutan’s political system, a candidate who loses on the voting day does not receive any recognition for the number of votes achieved. There are other systems of voting and candidate selection that considers votes that did not go to the most popular candidate.

[5]

The rural district survey also included a sub sample of civil servants.

Party knowledge Another set of indicators on election knowledge is familiarity with party specifics. This information, however, also depends on the ability of respective parties to penetrate various locales around the country with their images, personalities and details. The institution of the political party is new in Bhutan and confusion persists on the entity of a “party” versus “zhung” or the government. People are unclear as to how a “party” could sometimes be the government and other times, and in parallel, be an institution separate from the government. This vacuum of knowledge needs to be addressed soon in order to aid the fledgling parties to define themselves. Parties are subject to the will of the people through membership, financial contributions and votes. When asked to name a political party as a test of knowledge of the election context, most respondents were able to name one or the other. In fact, the majority of them, at that time could name both. However, 7.3%

respondents (all of whom reportedly voted) could not name either party. A Spearman coefficient of 0.85 further reinforces the claim that those who did not know the name of one political party also tended not to know the name of the other. It may be that people were focused only on candidates or party symbols when selecting at the voting booth. In other words, certain people were deprived of the knowledge of political parties and the election context. There also was a suggestion that both parties had equal penetration, with no one party having an advantage in terms of its general visibility. The visibility of the president is relevant to both the civic knowledge of the election context as well as to the relationship between the party and its president. When asked if the respondent knew the name of a party president, 8.9% were unable to name the DPT party president and 6.7% were unable to name the PDP president. The Spearman coefficients between knowledge of party name variables and knowledge of party president variables are somewhat low ( ranging from .39 - .48). What we can conclude from this is that some people who did not know the name of the party also did not know the name of the president. However, many of those who did not know the party name did know the president’s name (and vice versa). In other words, the visibility of the party and the president do not necessary go hand in hand. In quite a number of cases, such information came separately and was not


71


For example, sometimes there are a supplementary parliament seats that are not filled by a constituency but rather filled proportionally by the party with the highest number of votes going to losing candidates. This effectively attempts to count those votes that had no representation but were otherwise significant in number. The difference between these two systems is enormous and voters must recognize the impact of their decisions on respective candidates.

simultaneous. The most worrisome response came with regard to local candidates, with 13.3% respondents unable to name either of their local candidates for the National Assembly elections. More people knew the president of a party than they knew their own local candidates. In one sense, this implies that the party itself was more strongly connected to presidents than candidates and backs the assumption by some that people voted for the party symbol in the voting booth rather than for any picture of a candidate. If it is true, this is suggestive of votes for the party president over constituency-level dynamics, this proves a serious weakness in the public education efforts conducted for the election. More work must be done therefore to highlight the importance of selecting a local candidate who meets the expectations of his constituency. People must understand that when voting in sessions of parliament, each candidate has one equal vote, regardless of other posts in the cabinet, etc. While the party president is clearly pivotal to the future of the nation, it is constituency-level candidates who provide the direct link between citizens and policy outcomes. There is a structural problem in Bhutanese democracy where previous systems of governance are all based on the charisma of a single individual, a trait inherited from monarchy. People are likely to continue to perceive government leadership in this way, not realizing that a session of parliament can entirely oppose the will of the Prime Minister if it so wills. The concern authority,

72


must promote a vision of government beyond both the president and the party that stresses the community of parliamentarians and their efforts to pass legislation by majority through the power of the individual Member of Parliament. In general, people had a strong knowledge of both parties, their presidents and candidates. Obviously, information reached the majority of respondents and these topics were the subject of numerous conversations in villages around the country. However, there were pockets of society that remained confused on the identity and function of political parties, as well as on their relationship with party presidents and candidates. The outcome of elections, especially in terms of the fate of the loser, and the role of candidates in parliament are areas of deep concern, the absence of which have made the recent election less democratic than optimal. What is clear is that parties, despite their strong efforts, were unable to penetrate quite as deeply as portrayed. While the national media and party rhetoric reflected a battle between two well-known party giants, approximately 8-13% of the sampled voters who participated in the elections were unaware of some aspects of the parties, presidents or candidates. A part of this responsibility must continue to fall on the ECB as the election season-awareness is a joint effort of parties and the government. However, parties should look into the matter not only because of their public responsibility to provide informed choices to citizens, but to

Conclusion: Reaching the uninformed Demographics of the uninformed The strongest inference from the election survey was that certain groups of people had trouble answering the civic information questions. Who were these people whom the government was not able to bring into informed political spheres? An analysis revealed some trends among the uninformed. First of all they were almost always older people. For example, the average age of those who knew the name of a political party was 40.4 years, whereas the average of those who did not know was 53.9 years. This suggests that those unaware of the party name were the elderly. A 8-14 year difference in mean years between those having knowledge and those lacking it held true for questions on the number of parties, party president names, and local candidates’ names as well. This age split, again, was not primarily due to a more educated younger generation, as the numbers of the uneducated in both generations of the sample were high. Further research needs to be carried out to determine the causes and practices that lead to a less-aware political consciousness in the older population. A second characteristic that is always important to track in political knowledge and participation is that of sex. On most ques-

tions, the uninformed numbered roughly equal in terms of males and females. This demonstrated the significant role that women made in household-level information-sharing and decision-making. Bhutan’s traditional respect for women has provided them with a much stronger starting point for electoral participation compared to many other traditional societies. While traditional leadership positions have been male-dominated, a new generation of women leaders are in formation as was evidenced by the number of women who were recently elected as Members of Parliament. This is a promising trend that will surely encourage greater political participation at the grassroots level as well. However, Bhutan should remain wary of gender bias in politics. By consciously expanding on the current strengths, Bhutan can ensure a steady increase in female political roles at both grassroots and leadership levels. For example, as per one knowledge-testing indicator, females tended to be less informed; 6.8% male respondents thought there were three parties, whereas the percentage of females who thought the same was double that at 13.0%. As mentioned before, there were three parties for some time, however one did not qualify to become a registered party. It may be that there is a tendency for women to have less contact with official sources of information, a common limitation in developing countries. In such situations, women have strong information-sharing in informal information networks while they face some trouble pen-


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seek greater levels of penetration for their own advantage.

etrating formal information networks relative to men. In other words, there is still a need for public communications to target women as key information recipients.

Knowledge and information gaps The status of civic knowledge in Bhutan is sufficient for conducting elections that are free, fair and effective. Citizens are familiar enough with parties and candidates to make robust choices upon reaching the ballot box. However, there is a lack of knowledge regarding the impacts of votes in terms of nationallevel political outcomes and institutional consequences. There are several impediments, as well as areas of action to help resolve these weaknesses. Firstly, roughly a quarter of the Bhutanese population lack communication facilities. Certain policies can alleviate this impediment, such as rapid provision of electricity to rural areas, increased reach of BBS TV, and improvements in the quality of political coverage. As these changes occur, more direct action can be taken in conducting studies to target the sources of informal discussion networks. This will enable the ECB to ensure that such typical sources have accurate and useful information, and to inject such information, along the chain of interpersonal communications. Secondly, language barriers need to be addressed. In the long term, this means the promotion of Dzongkha as the national language. For the short term, however, meetings should be taken as an example as they can be

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conducted in any language appropriate to the community. Similar efforts at being linguistically flexible should apply to the printing of election materials. Moreover, public announcements and debates should take place in minority languages alongside Dzongkha and English. More broader groupings of concerned individuals should be encouraged to go beyond meetings and to build a civil society. Civil society organizations are knowledge-building institutions encompassing a wide array of social interests and issues. Their ability to assist in the translation of public will into political outcomes must be encouraged. This requires changes in the current law so that civil society organizations can participate in political discussions at both local and national levels. The Rural District Survey revealed a clear pattern of strong support for the DPT and strong belief in its ability to win. Nevertheless, the overwhelming victory of the DPT was a surprise to many. This suggests that the realm of public information was limited in some forms. While public information and knowledge has been discussed elsewhere, it is important to note its potential impact on voter outcomes. In most democracies, there are polling or data collection firms that enable the public to observe trends in public opinion, not only at national level but also in terms of regional, occupational and gender groupings. This information can stimulate like-minded voters to cluster around issues that are relevant to them, forming the phenomena of “block”

Political parties and information gateways Much of the information on civic knowledge can also be viewed from the perspective of political parties. This is especially true in the case of preparation of campaign strategies for future election seasons. Of the greatest importance is the need to build the identity and definition of political parties as key institutions. As the existence and potential impact of parties are dependent on public support, clarifying the roles of parties in and out of the government will go a long way in justifying the integral parties’ play in the new governing system. Dependent and independent roles of presidents and candidates with the party itself should be clarified as well, with the relationship between candidates, constituencies and political outcomes emphasized.

Aside from media outlets, the primary means of impact remains public meetings. These should be emphasized in campaign strategies as they also help to target populations unreached by other political information efforts. Meetings play an integral role in stimulating the informal discussion networks that comprise the information source for approximately a quarter of the rural population. Political parties should take advantage of these networks as they are unregulated in terms of time slots and allow for some of the most rapid and expansive information flows in Bhutan. The surprise results of the past election point to the fact that media outlets are not in control of public opinion at this point in time; other determining factors of public opinion can thus be the key strategic points for campaigns. A key demographic revealed that those who were less informed about party and election information were the elderly. Political parties would do well to target such a group. This will not only assist in increasing the scope of informed citizens, but will simultaneously provide an avenue for parties to target the interests of the elderly in an attempt to gain their support. Finally, parties should improve their preparedness and performance in debates as small but significant impacts were reported on voter decisions.


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or “issue” voters. This does two things. First, it builds pressure on parties to respond to issues with distinct positions in order to win over voters. Second, it creates grassroots momentum clustered around issues and demographics that expands the focus on local development returns (roads and electricity) to national level priorities and a national political consciousness. Thus, the support of apolitical research institutions and public opinion polling efforts would go a long way in building knowledge capacity and stimulating issue-based politics in Bhutan.

A typical Bhutanese political campaign in a remote village. A turn out of 5-15 people is considered a large number in majority of villages.

5 In the minds of the voters

A woman casts her vote

In the minds of the voters

F

or Bhutanese, every journey is like a pilgrimage. With packed lunches and dressed in colourful attire, they walk to monasteries, festivals or archery matches. Before the deities they ask blessings; at the archery match they tease the rival team: one’s intentions at a pilgrimage are clear. But Bhutan’s political pilgrimage toward democracy surprised everyone. Polling stations in hospitals, schools and under snow-capped roofs brought around 80% of the country’s registered voters to decide the first elected parliament of Bhutan. Young women who were not even known in local villages defeated renowned and experienced heavy weights. Former ministers who till the elections bemused only about their victory margin and not failure were trounced into oblivion by unheard upstarts. Spin doctors where trounced too – for the Bhutanese voter baffled everyone. This research attempted to return to the voters again after the political dust had settled. People who smiled and

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The Political Parties

promised votes for both candidates before the election told us what really was in their minds as they sat hearing campaign promises and ate lunches offered by candidates. We asked voters what “Mangtsu-Zhung-gi-Lamlu” (Democractic Governance) meant to them. Respondents defined democracy as either “power”, “authority” (Wangtsey), “choice”, “freedom”, “change” or something new that had been given by His Majesty, the Fourth King. When asked to elaborate, they said the new power will help them to voice out “local” issues and they wanted to elect a candidate or the party who could address the issues. Democracy was understood to bring about “fast” and “rapid” development in the form of new roads, schools, health facilities and rural electrification. For some democracy just meant black-topping of existing farm roads, up-gradation of existing schools and Basic Health Units, and medical doctors. Though schools, roads, and doctors can define democracy in action, most respondents

Common responses to the question: “What is democracy?” • Change; power; choice; responsibility • Equal power; rapid development; more roads; schools and health facilities; • People’s welfare; freedom; authority to choose or elect; • It means shifting of power from the King to the elected ministers; • Democracy means “wangtsey” given by the King; • Something “new”; • Change from “old” to “new”; • More schools, hospitals and electrification; • A gift from the Fourth King; • The King giving back power to the people; • Freedom bestowed on the people by the King; • Choice given to people: new form of government; • Election of ministers; • Government “by the people”; • Power in people’s hands, people have the right;

• Election of ministers; voting and election; “Can do whatever we want!”; and • Delivering of promises made by candidates. Change. For the past hundred years people have enjoyed peace, security and prosperity under the kings. Now people understand that the responsibility for their welfare is in the hands of the people they elect. The old government represents the King and the new government is the one that will be formed. People do not expect their individual lives to change but they definitely anticipate rapid gewog- level development. In general, the majority expects new farm roads where there are none at present, and black-topping of existing farm roads; provision of adequate, safe drinking water; irrigation canals; new schools to come up and old ones to be upgraded; enhanced supply of agricultural seeds, farming technologies and easy access to government facilities through gewog development centers. Raised expectations: People’s expectations were raised by the political candidates through their exotic local manifestos. Even though many rural people cannot read, the messages are quite effectively communicated by candidates and party workers. As a result, people’s expectations are influenced, and things that seemed impossible the other day suddenly appear to be possible and available.


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could not comprehend the applicability of their newfound choice, power and freedom at the national level. In a nutshell, majority voters in the villages understood political change at the praxis level and did not worry about the ideological aspects of it.

An analysis of the expectations of people were cross-checked with relevant local manifestos, revealed that the expectations quoted by people were just mirror imprints of the local manifestos. This goes to prove that respondents are usually aware of the contents of the promises made by the local party candidates. These promises are very close to their hearts, such as tourism promotion for Gasa; census and security problem in the south; bridge over Maokhola in Sarpang; and airports in Gelephu, Punakha and Bartsham, etc. The important point to note is that 77% respondents anticipated change — a change occurring as a result of the implementation of the manifestos of the party candidates. Only 12% respondents felt that everything would remain the same and that there would be no face-lifting of gewogs as promised by party candidates. Respondents were also optimistic and confident that the winning party would go beyond achieving the goals and objectives of the Tenth Five-year Plan so as to win the next election too. This is what the people are hoping for. At the time of the study, it was difficult for respondents to fully acknowledge their trust and confidence in this new-found democratic form of government as they were yet to see its true face. But now, after a year of the first elections, people are holding on to the promises made during the campaign period by candidates. This therefore places a strong

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social responsibility on the first government to lay a good foundation of democracy.

Party campaigns and their impact When election campaigns began, the question of holding election rallies where discussed, as rallies are integral to political campaigns. But both parties preferred to have just meetings and door to door visits. Bhutan’s unique culture and strong traditional values make it impossible to merely copy campaign strategies of foreign countries. In this context parties had to go through the tough struggle of coping up with their maiden campaign attempts. This was made doubly difficult as it was the first time for citizens as well, and thus the learning curve of both citizens and parties were challenges to successful campaigning. As discussed in chapter 9, meetings play a large role in campaigns. While 27.9% respondents did not attend meetings, it was likely that someone in their families did and that they were influenced through subsequent interpersonal communication. Those who attended both the DPT and the PDP meetings, averaged approximately 1.8 meetings, and many of these were the same people attending both parties’ meetings. Moreover, 75.1% respondents cited “public meetings” as their preferred campaign style over the other option of “household visits”.

Table 6: Did the candidate visit your household? Yes

14.6%

No

82%

Table 7: Did the party workers visit your household? Yes No

32.8% 64.2%

One serious defect in campaign strategies highlighted in the recent election was the redundancy of household visits. 11.5% households were visited by both party workers and candidates at various times. This is an ineffective use of human resources to carry the message of the candidate and the campaign to the people. With a proper household visiting strategy, party workers and candidates can

avoid visiting the same household and spread out their efforts among as many households as possible. Such a strategy may also play a strong role in increasing the number of party members, as well as in the likelihood of their making financial contributions.

Participatory behaviour A high percentage (73.8%) of respondents reported attending meetings, thereby showing a strong interest in political outcomes. However, 16.8% of them cited such meetings as compulsory. At no point is it legitimate for any citizen to be forced to attend a political meeting. This statistic does not tell us as to who made the meeting compulsory, whether it was the work of party workers, local leaders, government officials or even other family members. To make a meeting compulsory on political considerations strips away the labour time for farmers, housewives and other workers. More importantly, the majority of these meetings were based on political parties; if parties got a free audience due to compulsion at any level, then they were trampling the free choice of an individual that is inherent in a democracy. Every citizen should have the right to attend or not to attend a meeting, based on his/her own free will without any repercussions, positive or negative.


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“Household visits” were cited by only 14.2% respondents as the favoured campaign style. Correspondingly, there were fewer reports of visits by candidates; only 14.6% households reported visits by candidates. Another 32.8% households reported that party workers came directly to their house for campaigning. These numbers are relatively strong compared to most political contexts. However, knowing the small population of most constituencies in Bhutan, it is definitely possible to target more households, especially if party workers take on a larger role and are heavily trained in the art of canvassing.

Table 8: Did you attend party meetings? Yes

73.7%

No

23.3%

Missing Total

3% 100%

Table 9: Why did you attend meeting Compulsory

16.8%

Voluntarily

65.2%

Other reasons

3%

Missing

15%

Total

100%

Excepting those who claimed compulsory attendance, only 65.2% respondents attended voluntarily — still a very healthy number. There did not seem to be any large discrepancies between the mean amount of meetings attended at the invitation of the two parties. While 27.2% respondents did not attend any political meetings, of those who did, the average number of meetings was 3.31. These meetings were roughly evenly distributed between the PDP and DPT. Of those who attended the PDP meetings, the average number of meetings was 1.86, and for those who attended the DPT meetings, the average number was 1.80.

Manifestos Manifestos offer a chance for a party to declare their intentions, their vision for the country,

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The Political Parties Drukyul Decides: In the minds of Bhutan’s first voters

85

and their positions on various issues of importance. The manifestos issued by the two registered parties were very similar in much of their content, focusing on GNH-oriented economic growth with strong social benefits. There was little difference regarding most social issues. Nevertheless, the manifestos were widely circulated and approximately 50% of the survey respondents saw a copy of the manifesto. However, only 27.3% actually read the document. Two aspects of the printed manifestoes should be considered here. First of all, the impact of the design: many of those who saw it judged it in terms of its appearance, whether it looked like it was put together by professionals. Secondly, the impact rested on whether the content appealed to educated citizens, as well as commoners. More than likely, those who did read the document continued multiplying its effects through later discussions.

There was no limit to the number of workers a party could employ. Thus, the party with greater finances could hire more party workers. Though there were complaints against PDP having more party workers, respondents of the district election survey felt that the DPT party workers were much more active; 25.7% responded that the party workers of DPT were more active, while 16.6% reported that the party workers of PDP were more active. Another 40.9% reported that the activity level of workers of both parties was the same. Though this does not reflect the number of party workers employed, it does suggest that even if PDP did have more party workers, there was no perceived benefit for it in terms of activity. Rather, the DPT seemed to have a more active party workerbase.

The case of party workers

If it is true that the PDP had more party workers and the DPT party workers were perceived as more active, then maybe the number of party workers does not translate into results.

Party workers had one of the more complicated roles in the first elections. Accusation were hurled in informal discussions and the media against both party workers for disturbing the community fabric of Bhutan and even breeding corruption. Party leaders were blamed for not being able to guide and discipline their workers. However, the election survey results dispel some of the rumours and accusations.

The number of party workers was indirectly assessed by asking respondents to comment on whether the number should be increased or decreased. The answers were roughly equal — with 21% suggesting that the number be increased and 25.3% suggesting a decrease. The rest either thought that the current numbers were fine or claimed that they had no opinion. An exception was a group of 8.5% people who

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Table 10: Do we need to change the number of party workers? Increase

21.0%

Decrease

25.3%

Fixed number

8.5%

Same as now

13.2%

Do not know

15.8%

Source: Rural District Survey When asked if candidates or party workers tended to create problems, 37.4% respondents cited party workers. However, many said they did not know (20.9%) and over 90 respondents recorded missing values, possibly reflecting their unwillingness to answer the question. Thus, it was clearly a sensitive issue and it was complicated by the fact that a further 18.8% cited ‘others’ as the source of problems related to the election. A high percentage (69.6%) of respondents, however, did say that it was good to have party workers in the course of campaigns. At the same time, 14.6% were less

sure, and reported that it was not good to have party workers during an election campaign. Clearly, there were some negative experiences with party workers in certain areas. However, many people still saw a positive role for them. A fixed number of party workers (per party/per constituency) would go a long way in maintaining balance and harmony in local villages. However, the quality of party worker activity must also be improved. Like any job, certain qualifications must be met in order to carry out the job successfully. Parties should screen potential candidates as party workers very carefully as wrong people could also hurt their chances. Thus, it is beneficial to hire a party worker only if there is some assurance that activities will be carried out which would benefit to parties. In addition to screening, the parties must spend some time and resources to train party workers for their roles and activities. This will not only have a positive impact on the party, but will also help in reducing disruptions in community relations that may be linked to party worker activity.

Influences and timings of votes Personal influences on voter preference One of the hardest voter influences to identify is that of interpersonal communication and advice. This is difficult both because it is not


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responded that the number of party workers should be fixed. While there was no clear consensus on the ideal number of party workers, the mention of either a fixed number or a decreased number pointed to the fact that party workers were looked upon unfavourably in more than a few circumstances.

something one can easily track and because people, when asked, sometimes wish to respond that they made the decision themselves. From the Rural District Survey, only 5.7% of survey respondents said that they asked for advice when voting; 10.5% of respondents said that they had been offered advice on voting. From the Civil Servant Surveys, 20% respondents noted that people had sought their advice. Thus, there is a clear trend of advice-giving and advice-taking in Bhutanese political discussions. It is not an overwhelming figure, suggesting that many citizens make political decisions independent of seeking or receiving advice. However, there are many instances in interpersonal communication where the conversation influenced the decision of a voter without formal requests or offers of advice, much banking on the indirect conversational style of Bhutanese that tends to avoid direct statements on matters of sensitivity. We must also consider that there was a reticence to discuss political leanings with someone from outside the respondent’s local community (such as the interviewer), someone in whom there was no existing trust. This, in itself, can tell us that Bhutanese citizens tend to consider their voting preferences as a private issue to be discussed confidentially. Those who did mention asking for or receiving advice were asked about their relationship with the person who was the source of

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information. In many of these cases (41.8%), this person was a party worker. This was followed by “other relatives” at 22.4%; children at 11.9%, and parents at 10.4%. With Bhutan’s strong tradition of extended family, it is clear that relations play a significant role in advice on voting preferences. However, ”other relatives” is the most common family category, suggesting that the source of advice is often outside of the immediately family, possibly related to the practice of seeking advice from those in the extended family who are more educated or are in positions of greater influence. It is clear that education plays a role in sources of advice. This would be the likely explanation as to why children are slightly more commonly as sources of voting advice compared to parents. Most telling, however, is the fact that party workers scored as the most common interpersonal source of voting advice. In one way, this makes sense as it is the party worker’s job to seek out undecided voters and provide justifications as to why the voter should vote for their party. At the same time, people reported party workers as the source of voting advice at a much higher level than their own immediate family members and roughly equal to the entire family structure. This means that party workers had significant penetration in many

Timing of voting decisions A big factor that acts as a determinant of votes is the moment in time when voters decide upon the party/candidate to which/whom their vote will be cast. 73.3% of the voters made up their minds month before the election. However, a surprising number of people decided at the polling station itself; 10.5% of the Rural District Survey respondents were unable or unwilling to make a decision prior to the moment before they voted. The foremost consequence of this was that candidates were not able to fully convince voters of their superiority over other candidates. Either candidates were unable to differentiate themselves from opponents, or they were unable to promote their strengths and unique capabilities in a fashion that would enable voters to prioritize their choices. This figure also means that interactions at the polling booth may have played a role in voter decisions.

Table 11: When did you make up your mind to vote? Polling station

10.5%

Day of voting

0.8%

A day before the election

2.0%

Two days before the election

5.1%

One-two months before the election

32.6%

Three-six months before the election

40.7%

Other timing

5.5%

Missing

2.8%

Total


contexts and that their levels of interaction were high. This may also point towards the potential trend of families being split in their voting decisions, as half of the time advice comes from a non-family conversation. Thus, the primacy of family decision-making, while still strong, may be challenged by party workers and the efforts of parties to maximize their voter base in the future.

100.0%

Source: Rural District Survey Most importantly, it may suggest that too much emphasis was placed on telling people to vote and not enough on telling people how to come to a decision. This goes beyond the failure of the parties to justify their candidates — it extends to the responsibilities of the ECB in educating citizens on how to make assessments and how to understand the relationships between votes and their impacts. Swing voters, or those who could vote for any given party depending on the election time, can partly be identified through their last-minute switches. These are those who voted on the day of voting or one or two days before. Their number amounted to 18.4% of the Rural District Survey respondents and 11.4% of the Civil Servants Survey respondents; a very large number of swing voters did not even include those who could vote either way but had decided earlier.


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There are enormous implications of having such a large number of swing voters. The DPT won resoundingly on the basis of the number of seats obtained by it in the National Assembly. It won slightly less resoundingly in the number of votes cast as the PDP picked up roughly a third of total votes. The identification of a large numbers of swing voters suggests that even in terms of the number of votes, the DPT’s grasp on the voters may not have been as strong as the number of seats obtained would suggest. This is because a swing voter can easily vote for another party at the next election as he/she may not feel heavily bound to any party. Neither the DPT nor its opponents nor the general public should assume that the absolute number of votes received by the DPT is an accurate reflection of sentiment, which is much more complex than a single vote can capture. Civil Servants’ influence The last-minute swing voters also raise the argument of civil servants influencing their villages on their trip home to vote. The idea expressed in the press during the weeks after the results suggested that civil servants, many DPT supporters, urged, or even forced, their relatives and community members to vote for their party of choice. It is quite possible that this occurred, to a certain degree, because of those last-minute voters. However, it is un-

90


likely that this made a significant impact on the outcome in most constituencies. There are two reasons for this. The first one is that very few respondents mentioned having changed their minds the day of, or the days before the election. A greater percentage decided at the polling station itself. A civil servant returning to the village is not likely to change minds at the polling booth but rather in family gatherings held on the day of or days before the election. The second reason why it appears unlikely that civil servants’ influence played a last-minute role is that 73.3% of the Rural District Survey respondents reported having decided more than one month before the election date, with more than 40% deciding three months prior to voting. This suggests that it was not the arrival of civil servants in the village that sparked a flurry of last-minute preference changes. This also suggests that probably much more than 40% voters were quite sure of their choice prior to the official start of campaigning. In other words, while campaigns were very decisive for certain groups of voters, much of the electorate was convinced by other factors prior to the campaign season. This may even point to certain cases where decisions were clear prior to the existence of a candidate, making the party or its president the determining factor.

Table 12: Do you think Civil Servants influenced the vote? Yes

42.6%

No

53.8%

Missing Total

3.8% 100.0%

Source: Civil Servant Survey Table 13: Will Civil Servants influence the next election?

Table 14: Do you think Civil Servants will remain apolitical in future? Yes

27.5%

No

52.5%

Missing

20.0%

Total

100.0%

Source: Civil Servant Survey It was also suggested that civil servants will continue to play a role in influencing future elections. There were a few factors behind this, one of them being their continued influence on their relations and home villages. Another key factor is the relationship between the elected government and the civil servants serving under the various ministries and bodies. As civil servants must legally refrain from political activity of any sort, there arises a tension between the knowledge and influence of the civil servant and her/his ability to act upon that knowledge in a political manner; 52.5% civil servant respondents did not believe that Civil Servants would remain apolitical in the future.

Voter preferences Preference for the party

Yes

37.5%

No

45.0%

Based on the Rural District Survey, there was a

Missing

17.5%

Total

100.0%

clear preference for the DPT with nearly triple

Source: Civil Servant Survey

the number of respondents opting for it over


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The civil servants themselves believed that they had a significant influence on election outcomes; 42.6% Civil Servant respondents suggested that there was civil servant influence on other voters, though a greater percentage (53.8%) affirmed that civil servants did not play an influencing role. What these estimates reveal is that civil servants, and other educated/urban citizens, play an important role in influencing relatives and other members of their respective communities. Civil servants, however, are likely to influence their relations over a period of time and not in a last-minute rush. Communication between urban families and rural relatives are frequent and all manner of discussions take place, leaving plenty of space for political opinions to be formed slowly over time and across long distances.

the PDP. There also was a strong indication that most expected the DPT to win, with

Table 15: Who did you think would win?

slightly less than two times the respondents

DPT

203

41.1%

believing in DPT’s win over the PDP rather

PDP

117

23.7%

than the reverse scenario. However, as per the Civil Servants’ Survey, there was a much narrower gap between those who thought that

Same

14

2.8%

Do not know

120

24.3%

Missing

40

8.1%

Total

494

100.0%

the DPT would win (55.0%) and those who thought that the PDP would win (38.8%). This could be the result of a lack of information flow between urban and rural areas, leading the DPT supporters in urban areas to fear

Source: Rural District Survey Table 16: Who did you want to win? DPT

239

48.4%

PDP

81

16.4%

that the early campaigns of the PDP might

Same

76

15.4%

give that party an edge and outdo the smaller

Do not know

51

10.3%

Missing

47

9.5%

Total

494

100.0%

number of urban voters. It is most important to note that the levels of perception of political conditions definitely differ between urban and rural residents, taking civil servants as an urban proxy. It does seem that those in rural areas who wanted the PDP to win were more confident; 16.4% wanted them to win, however, a greater percentage (23.7%) thought they would win. This probably meant that some DPT supporters also thought that the PDP might win. The DPT, with much greater numbers, appeared slightly less confident with 48.4% desiring a win and only 41.1% thinking it would take place.

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Source: Rural District Survey It is important to note that 15.4% respondents wanted both to win equally. This has two possible reasons: first, the evidence discussed elsewhere supports the hypothesis that many voters were unaware that their votes would translate into a “win and lose” situation. Thus, it could be that the survey respondents appreciated both parties and thought they would serve together under an arrangement that would be beyond “ruling” and “opposition” party categorization. The second reason may be that the parties’ political positions were not well differentiated, leaving them indistinguishable in terms of policy positions. Thus, there

The fact that 24.3% respondents had no idea who would win, especially in the light of the landslide victory, revealed that neither the press nor informal discussion networks were able to capture enough free flow of information to properly assess the public opinion. We have a landscape of voter preference that reveals schisms between urban and rural perspectives and community-to-community knowledge. This suggests a certain level of privacy, possibly secrecy, involved in one’s selection. In other words, people were not aware of each other’s preferences in many cases. This could have been the result of communication gaps across regions in the country, but was also likely the result of the need for privacy in decision-making. Such numbers may also suggest a certain level of social distrust or fears of consequences if one’s opinion was made public. Preference for a political party goes beyond which party was chosen and must also consider whether the party institution itself was the object of choice. Other factors may have been primary in the voters’ minds when they indicated their preferences at polling stations. In fact, parties ranked relatively low on most questions. When asked who was the most im-

portant, only 9.5% rural respondents replied “parties”. Again, only 9.1% reported that they actually voted with the party as an institution in mind. Roughly 5% rural respondents cited the party as an institution being responsible for the victory or defeat of a candidate. In other words, the party structure, though clearly influential, was not foremost in the minds of many voters. This implies the need for parties to be aware of different aspects of their image. A party is not only built out of individual members but must strive to form a visible whole, an institution that thrives because of its values, motivations, credibility and track record.

Preference for the President of the party In the election, due to the absence of party difference on political issues, most factors appeared to be questions of leadership style or experience. The rural respondents mentioned that “Presidents” were the most important consideration (41.5%) when voting. However, when asked as to whom they actually voted for, they placed “President” as the second choice at 39.3%, followed by “candidates” at 45.2%. The voter-mind is clear here — respondents understood the importance of voting for candidates but felt that the role of the Prime Minister would be of greater significance.


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was little pressing need to decide between one or the other if the voters’ criteria were focused on policy outcomes.

Table17: Who according to you is the most important in a Democratic Institution? Party

9.5%

President

41.5%

Candidate

39.7%

Same

3.8%

Do not Know

2.4%

Missing

3.1%

Total

100.0%

Source: Rural District Survey Table 18: Who did you vote for?

As regards the reasons for voting and interpretation of the election outcomes, both rural and urban citizens recognized the enormous importance of the President of a political party being the next Prime Minister. People are accustomed to placing their trust and hopes in a single, dynamic individual and may relate more strongly to individual leaders rather than to party institutions. Table 19: Why did the DPT win? President

43.5%

Party

9.1%

Candidates

10.7%

President

39.3%

Campaign

8.3%

Candidate

45.2%

Five ministers

14.8%

Others

3.4%

Party workers

8.1%

Same

0.6%

Missing

2.4%

Don’t know

4.9%

Missing

9.7%

Total

100.0%

Source: Rural District Survey As for reasons why the DPT won and the PDP lost, most rural respondents gave weightage to the respective party presidents once again; 43.5% rural respondents suggested that the DPT won because of its President; 25.5% rural respondents suggested that the PDP lost because of their President or because of their inclination towards the DPT’s President. Likewise, the reasons for candidates winning or losing was most often attributed to the influence of the presidents of the two parties (see Tables 19 & 20).

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Total

100.0%

Source: Rural District Survey Table 20: Why did the PDP lose? President

25.5%

Candidates

8.3%

Campaign

6.1%

Five ministers

5.5%

Party workers

15.0%

Don’t know

19.4%

Missing

20.2%

Total

100.0%

Source: Rural District Survey

look to those 320 respondents as a proxy for voter preferences in our sample and test them against other variables.

Age and source of information as determinants

The most striking result was that the preference for one party showed a difference in age groups. The PDP supporters were slightly older with an average age of 43.1 years, whereas the DPT supporters carried an average age of 39.4 years. While only suggestive, this revealed a potential age gap between party supporters. This gap becomes especially noteworthy when placed in the context of media discourse on DPT’s win as a reflection of conservatism. In most societies, the older generation tends to be that which prefers less change and less rapid change. Thus, the view that the older generation would vote for the party often characterized as new, dynamic, and younger in leadership is contradictory to the claim that the DPT won due to conservatism. There may be other factors that explain the slightly older age group supporting the PDP.

Respondents from the Rural District Survey were not directly questioned about who they voted for. Slightly more indirectly, they were asked which party they wanted to win. Only 64.8% respondents mentioned that they wanted one or the other party to win. Aside from those who wanted both, those who answered “do not know” were still reticent to share their preference. For some rough estimates, we can

In fact, the elderly population may itself be neutral and the younger voters may have strongly favoured the DPT, thus creating the mean age difference in our sample. However, as was mentioned elsewhere, age seems to be a key demographic measurement. Both parties need to look to capture voters across a wide range of ages and target different age groups in their campaign strategies in future.

Preference for the candidate Candidates, the actual subject of votes in the polling booth, were perceived differently by different groups. For rural respondents, as mentioned above, “Presidents” were the most important at 41.5% compared to “candidates” at 39.7%. However, when asked as to who they actually cast their votes for, they placed the choice of “candidate” first at 45.2%, followed by “president” at 39.3%.


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However, most people were again not willing to answer the question as to why the PDP lost as revealed by the 19.4% “do not know” response and the large number of missing values (20.2%). Again pointing to the emphasis on leadership and experience, the five previous ministers who were DPT candidates were cited as reasons, both for the DPT’s victory (14.8%) and the PDP’s defeat (5.5%).

The other difference between the PDP and the DPT supporters was their sources of political information. While the majority of both party supporters looked to radio for political information, the difference was in interpersonal communication that accounted for an information source of 23.9% for PDP supporters compared to only 9.4% in the case of the DPT. The PDP seemed to appeal to populations in the remote corners of the country; people who were off the information grid. These citizens, probably due to their poverty, as well as due to the lack of electricity and road access, had received little development support from past governments. Thus, they may have been attracted to the promises of new leadership and believed in their power to reach out to those most deprived. The fact that the PDP was formed much earlier than the DPT may also have started informal discussions about the PDP at an earlier stage and thus penetrated more deeply into the remote areas as a result. As mentioned elsewhere, parties should not fail to recognize the power of informal discourse in forming political opinions, especially in the case of Bhutan. Most other potential factors, when measured against voter preferences, came out equal. Indicators of knowledge, visits by party workers and candidates, and attendance of meetings all revealed relatively equal percentage of inclination towards the two parties. In 96


other words, in terms of campaign strategies and differences, the majority of criteria were perceived as equal by the people. In addition to age and information source, the primary factors appeared to be those that have been discussed above; the relative weight of party Presidents and candidates, and to some extent, the positive and negative impacts of party workers.

A closer look at constituencies of interest: Sombaykha, Haa Sombaykha, Haa

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