DISSERTATIONES RERUM POLITICARUM UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS 5
DISSERTATIONES RERUM POLITICARUM UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS 5
VILJAR VEEBEL The role and impact of positive conditionality in the EU pre-accession policy
Institute of Government Studies, University of Tartu, Estonia Dissertation has been accepted for the commencement of the degree doctor philosophiae doctor of Philosophy (in Political Science), on 06.03.2012 by the Doctoral Committee of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Education, University of Tartu. Supervisor:
Eiki Berg, Professor University of Tartu, Estonia
Opponent:
Kristi Raik, PhD Researcher, Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Commencement: 13.04.2012 Publication of this thesis is granted by the Institute of Government and Politics, University of Tartu and by the Doctoral School of Behavioral, Social and Health Sciences created under the auspices of European Union Social Fund.
ISSN 1736–4205 ISBN 978–9949–19–958–7 (trükis) ISBN 978–9949–19–959–4 (PDF) Autoriõigus Viljar Veebel, 2012 Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus www.tyk.ee Tellimus nr 107
CONTENTS LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS .......................................................
6
AUTHOR’S CONTRIBUTION .....................................................................
7
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...........................................................................
8
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... Research questions .....................................................................................
9 12
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.................................................................. The essence of conditionality ..................................................................... Debate on positive conditionality...............................................................
15 15 17
THEORETICAL MODELS EXPLAINING POSITIVE CONDITIONALITY ...................................................................................... Neo-functional theory in terms of EU enlargement and positive conditionality ............................................................................................. Neo-liberal imperialist explanation in terms of EU enlargement and positive conditionality ................................................................................ Intergovernmentalist model in terms of EU enlargement and positive conditionality ............................................................................................. Neo-institutional model explaining EU enlargement and positive conditionality .............................................................................................
20 20 23 26 28
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ...............................................................
31
REFERENCES ...............................................................................................
35
SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN .........................................................................
38
PUBLICATIONS ...........................................................................................
43
CURRICULUM VITAE ................................................................................ 225 ELULOOKIRJELDUS ................................................................................... 228
5
LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS This dissertation is based on original publications which will be referred to in the dissertation by their respective Roman numbers. This dissertation is based on original publications which will be referred by Roman numbers. I
Veebel, Viljar (2004). Conditionality and Dependence as Key Elements in Simultaneous Democratization and Crises Prevention. Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2004, Varrak, pp. 63–84.
II
Veebel, Viljar (2009). European Union’s Positive Conditionality Model in Pre-Accession Process. Trames, vol. 3, issue 3 (63/58), pp. 207–231.
III Veebel, Viljar (2011). The EU Neighbourhood Policy, Positive Conditionality and Reforms in the Former Soviet Space. The European Neighborhood after August 2008. Republic of Letters, pp. 25–76. IV Veebel, Viljar (2011). Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-Accession Evaluation. STSS, Vol . 3/2011, pp. 3–23. V
Pettai, Vello and Veebel, Viljar (2005). Navigating between Policy and Populace: Estonia, its Accession Referendum and the EU Convention. Politique Europeenne. L’union Europeénne élargie. 2005/1 n° 15. L’Harmattan, pp. 113–135.
VI Veebel, Viljar and Loik, Ramon. (2012). Estonia: Life in Post-Communist Eastern Europe after EU Membership. Life in Post-Communist Eastern Europe after EU Membership. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 163–184. The articles are (re)printed with permission of the publishers: I Estonian Foreign Policy Institute – http://www.evi.ee; II Estonian Academy Publishers – http://www.kirj.ee/trames/ III Republic of Letters – https://www.rolpub.com/ IV Tallinn University Institute of Political Science and Governance and Tallinn University Institute of International and Social Studies – http://www.tlu.ee/stss/ V L’Harmattan – http://www.editions-harmattan.fr/index.asp VI Taylor & Frances Group, Routledge (Study VI) – http://www.tandfonline.com/
6
AUTHOR’S CONTRIBUTION I II III IV V VI
the author of the current dissertation was the sole author of the paper the author of the current dissertation was the sole author of the paper the author of the current dissertation was the sole author of the paper the author of the current dissertation was the sole author of the paper the author of the current dissertation was the second author of the paper the author of the current dissertation was the first author of the paper
The papers I, II, III and IV are the objects of single authorship, where the author is solely responsible for defining research problem, conducting research, interpreting research results and drawing final conclusions. The paper V is a co-authored work where Viljar Veebel is the second author. He contributed to the problem definition, gathered empirical data, prepared provisional data analysis, interpreted data, and finally drew preliminary conclusions. Vello Pettai as the first author of this paper provided a general research design, formulated a research problem, built theoretical framework, carried out analysis and drafted final conclusions. The paper VI represents a co-authored work where Viljar Veebel is the principal author. As the main author, Viljar Veebel was responsible for final research design, definition of the research questions and preparation of final analysis. The following tasks such as gathering and presenting the empirical data and preparing provisional analysis were accomplished jointly with his coauthor Ramon Loik.
7
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful to all friends and colleagues helping me to develop and finalize this dissertation. Greatest thanks are addressed to my supervisor Professor Eiki Berg, for years’ long active efforts and support, and to Ms. Ulrika Hurt for help and assistance to finalize this dissertation. There have been many supporters during the publishing period; I would like to thank additionally. First I would like to thank Mr. Michael Gallagher and Professor Jan Zielonka, who helped me with ideas and debates, which later developed to the basis for the articles. Second I would like to thank Professor Andres Kasekamp for the support and advice during my first publication; Professor Eiki Berg for the help and assistance when publishing my second article of this dissertation; doctor Vahur Made for cooperation and efforts when publishing the third article of this volume, Professor Raivo Vetik and Mr. Janno Kauts for cooperation and contribution when writing and publishing the fourth article; Professor Vello Pettai for cooperation during preparation of fifth contribution of this volume; and Mr. Ramon Loik and Professor Raul Eamets for cooperation and contribution during sixth article of this volume. Third, I would like to thank additionally the Earl of Carlisle, Mr. Illimar Ploom, Mr. Joel Hirv, Mrs. Kerly Espenberg and Ms. Annika Tartes for their efforts of reading, commenting and correcting different parts of this dissertation. There has also been great help from the European Union supported TULE and DORA programs allowing me to focus on my doctoral studies.
8
INTRODUCTION The European integration process has been serving two central goals since the Second World War: increasing security and prosperity for Europe – this is one of the most common answers to the question of why European states continue to integrate and the union itself keeps enlarging. In those two central goals the integration process has generally justified its founders’ expectations. Supranational institutions have been growing stronger during the half century and the union’s economic development has been remarkable. Uniting Europe and the convergence of less developed territories have been new and additional tasks, with growing importance. The successful integration and convergence of previous non-democratic states and societies has been more complicated. Public support for integration ideas has not always been there when needed and this has also influenced the popularity of enlargement. Deepening and widening have been two cornerstones of European integration: deepening of its common policies and widening of European Union (EU) borders. Both offering added value and both creating several risk scenarios and dilemmas. In some periods deepening and widening progressed simultaneously or were both absent, and in some periods these two processes were seen as alternatives to each other to keep European integration developing. Not all member states have supported both enlargement and deepening – when founding members have mostly preferred deepening then first-round newcomers United Kingdom (UK), Denmark and Ireland often found enlargement the better option. Greece, Spain and Portugal, which joined later, have often been against enlargements and using new accession rounds to get more privileges and resources. Austria, Finland and Sweden have moved back to the original integration ideas, where European integrity and clear conditions should be central components of the accession process. The enlargement process has remarkably influenced the nature of the EU over 60 years and six enlargement rounds, and the Community (EC) of the founding six members has grown to the present EU with 27 members. Enlargements have been different in all key aspects: enlargement rounds have ranged from one to ten candidates, lasted from three to up to ten years, have been based on clear agendas and criteria or depending mainly on bilateral diplomacy. At the same time general membership conditions, which were defined by the founding Treaties of Paris and Rome, were quite brief and remained unchanged until the fifth accession round. The function and profitability of enlargements has been more of a concern for the hosting union and its member states than for applicants. At the same time original integration ideas have offered more guidelines and models for a deepening aspect, while enlargement as a process has been analysed and conceptualised less. Accordingly the first enlargement rounds were based on general neo-functional integration logic. The accession experience of Greece, Spain and Portugal indicated that additional theoretical and methodological
9
input is needed for a successful and effective enlargement process. Previous experience with neo-liberal colonial relations leads to different models’ conditionality and the build-up of European pre-accession positive conditionality. Conditionality is generally considered as a theoretical method explaining the logical relations between two or more international relations actors (Killick 1998, Smith 2003). Conditionality can be seen in that sense as a norm or institutional agreement. Defined as “a mutual arrangement by which a government takes, or promises to take, certain policy actions, in support of which an international financial institution or other agency will provide specified amounts of financial assistance” (Santiso 2001: 8), it can be based on the belief that assistance will produce cumulative progress as if growth-forced reforms create political support and political support allows the reforms and modernisation to continue (Fierro 2003: 95). At the beginning of the 1990s, the wave of new democracies and enthusiastic candidate states brought new challenges, obligations and dilemmas to the existing EU. The situation, offering from one aspect a historical opportunity to remove the old borders of the Cold War, demanded additional efforts from the EU, as the ten new applicants were more than all the previous enlargements together. The EU was more prepared for an enlargement than ever before, after experiencing both successful and complicated pre-accession processes in previous rounds. The fifth enlargement also changed the importance and role of positive conditionality by making it a central concept in the pre-accession process. The belief that the upcoming enlargement may cause problems for the existing Union led to the building of a sophisticated conditionality. The costs and difficulties were seen as manifold, and a dilemma was sometimes noticed between the enlargement and internal efficiency. Accordingly, the fifth enlargement offered a superb example for evaluation and development of a positive conditionality model. Positive conditionality paired with the Copenhagen Criteria was seen as an ideal model of pre-accession, consisting of clear criteria, transparency, mutual interest and high convergence efficiency (Hay and Menon 2007: 140). The growing practical importance of positive conditionality has also increased the academic debates in the field. Researchers are focused mostly on questions of efficiency, legitimacy and sustainability, analysing which preconditions are needed and which principles must be followed to succeed. The recent EU preaccession experience allows for developing a traditional positive conditionality theory dominated by cases of aid and development cooperation partnership (the most well-known is Tony Killick’s “Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change”, 1998) to a more universal concept. Traditional studies of positive conditionality conducted by Paul Collier (1997) and Carlos Santiso (2001), which are mostly based on cases of African or Caribbean countries with weak economic and institutional development, focusing on governance efficiency, policy implementation and overall conditionality efficiency, are in the EU context more valuable when used in European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) initiatives instead of enlargement policy. The studies of Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedel-
10
meier have added a specific European dimension to conditionality studies, by focusing on the importance of values like “community”, “identity” and “solidarity” during conditional relations (Schimmelfennig 1999, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2007). Karen E. Smith has added the dynamic aspect to conditionality studies by researching “The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality”. She is also focusing on the motivational aspect in her research while describing the relationship between imposers and target countries developed in mutual cooperation (Smith 2003). Critical studies of positive conditionality (e.g. Fierro 2003, Burnside and Dollar 1997) focus on the efficiency aspect. Research has indicated that on the international arena there is no direct relationship between aid flows and policy reform. A theoretical debate on the values and logic of enlargement and pre-accession is going on between traditional camps of neo-functionalists, neo-liberal imperialists, intergovernmentalists and neo-institutionalists. Here the question is mainly, which of these theoretical models explains positive conditionality the most logical way? Helen Sjursen (2002), Robert Cooper (2003) and Jan Zielonka (2006) have been debating the philosophical nature and roots of positive conditionality after the 1990s, by asking which values have been behind the rhetoric and practical implementation of pre-accession conditionality. Robert Cooper (2003), for example, stresses the importance of accepting the de facto situation with different levels of socio-economic development, which causes double-standardisation and asymmetric relations between the parties of accession process. Jan Zielonka (2006) on the other hand offers a broader philosophical view of the logic of the enlargement and post-enlargement situation through a neo-imperial prism in his “Europe as Empire; the Nature of the Enlarged European Union”. Practical enlargement circumstances are at the same time already challenging the existing studies of positive conditionality mainly based on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) experience. New candidate states Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iceland, Serbia and FYROM are making use of the universal approach of positive conditionality complicated. Accordingly the previous researches with the focus on special circumstances of the CEE and based on the experience of 1991–2004 (for example Heather Grabbe 2001) are gradually losing their practical importance. What will this dissertation add to the scholarly field of positive conditionality? The practical need for additional research is caused by low efficiency of conditionality implementation during the last 50 years. Most of the conditional framework created by the UK, United States of America (USA) and Soviet Union (USSR) has failed in the long run to achieve their goals in political and economic terms. The EU pre-accession positive conditionality has been one of the rare cases openly seen as a success story, but both the environment for conditionality and target countries profile is changing, making success more complicated with every year. Accordingly positive conditionality itself needs changes and is already changing. The main question is how to make the changes so to contribute to broader European values, with existing practical reality.
11
Research questions This dissertation offers an in-depth analysis of the theoretical nature and practical use of the positive conditionality tool as an EU pre-accession instrument, especially in the fifth and sixth accession rounds. As a part of the analysis and conclusions this dissertation also indicates on-going developments in the positive conditionality model and its role in the EU enlargement policy in the future. It combines different methods based on historical observation, the case study approach, comparative analysis, statistical analysis and text analysis, with the central research goal of explaining the logic, theoretical roots, practical efficiency and motivation of EU pre-accession positive conditionality. The main research questions throughout the papers are the following: “What are the main pre-conditions and components that make positive conditionality effective?”; “Has the use of positive conditionality been based on similar principles during the accessions?”; “Has positive conditionality caused faster reforms and convergence in candidate states?”; “What were the main motivators of the EU’s pre-accession conditionality and what influence has this had on the accession process?”; “How has the EU’s positive conditionality influenced policy-making in applicant countries during pre-accession?” and “What have been the long-term consequences of pre-accession positive conditionality for target states?” These research questions have been thoroughly examined in the following individual papers published in the period of 2004–2012, which also form the core of the current thesis. To start, the first paper (“Conditionality and Dependence as Key Elements in Simultaneous Democratization and Crisis Prevention”) has a focus on the logic and efficiency of positive conditionality as a tool for the EU accession and neighbourhood policy. It aims to analyse the advantages and disadvantages of positive conditionality when used as an EU pre-accession and ENP component. Comparative analysis covers four test cases (Estonia, FYROM, Moldova and Georgia) offering both different levels of conditionality and different social outcomes. It analyses why some target states agree and succeed with conditionality, while others with similar starting points decide to reject the conditional relationship. In the final part the paper questions about the possibility of positive conditionality becoming the principal model of EU security policy. The second paper (“European Union’s Positive Conditionality Model in Preaccession Process”) analyses the evolutional aspect – the development of the pre-accession conditionality concept during the whole of EU history. The idea to study the dynamics of conditionality applications during the various EU accession rounds is provoked by the often-repeated claim from the fifth preaccession round of negotiations that all member states have followed the same conditions and criteria to accede to the EU, as it is the fastest and most effective way to enlarge. This argumentation has also laid ground for justification of unbalanced conditional relations between the EU and candidate states. Here the
12
applied method is observation and process-tracking, by searching for specific components indicating the existence and level of positive conditionality. The third paper (“The EU Neighbourhood Policy, Positive Conditionality and Reforms in the Former Soviet Space”) focuses on the question of the efficiency and profitability of positive conditionality from the perspective of the target country (both for the candidate states and ENP states, respectively). According to the common understanding, conditionality has been seen as the “golden carrot” for both sides as well as the best possible choice for target countries in terms of social and economic development to catch up to the existing member states. This paper draws on a comparison of the socio-economic indicators between member states and applicants in the beginning of pre-accession conditionality and in the year of accession. It examines the socio-economic effects of positive conditionality in terms of convergence (catching up) of the existing member states by testing if the gap between existing member states and candidate states narrowed during the pre-accession conditionality, or not. The fourth paper (“Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation”) analyses the practical implementation of positive conditionality while focusing on the levels of the transparency, impartiality and objectivity of the European Union pre-accession assessments. The main aim is to scrutinise whether the EU follows its own official criteria in its progress reports or if the evaluation is dominated by institutional and national interests. It compares selected candidate countries’ progress reports prepared by the EU Commission with the assessments of seven other respected research centres: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), Freedom House, the Bertelsmann Foundation, Transparency International, Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation. While combining text analysis with comparative evaluation and semiquantitative measuring tools the paper outlines differences in measurements and their practical impact on the eventual enlargement decision. The fifth paper (“Navigating between Policy and Populace: Estonia, its Accession Referendum and the EU Convention”) is a case study on practical reflection of pre-accession conditionality in the national political system of one applicant state (Estonia). It focuses on the decision and policy-making processes involved in the EU’s Convention in the context of a candidate country. Rather than a macro-analysis of the functioning of the Convention as a whole, this contribution focuses on actors on the national level to show how their involvement in the Convention on the EU level interacts with domestic constraints. While using the process-tracking approach, this paper examines the way politicians from a candidate country navigated the challenge of formulating a substantive European policy, while at the same time being concerned about the approval of EU accession itself. In this way it contributes to our understanding of how political leaders in CEE have learned to bridge these dual roles of
13
playing a part in European politics, while simultaneously explaining Europe at home. The sixth paper (“Life in Post-Communist Eastern Europe after EU Membership: Estonia”) is a case study about the outcome of applied pre-accession positive conditionality in the post-accession Estonia. It takes the socio-economic changes under the focus (measured in GDP/capita, unemployment and inflation figures, participation in civil society, social security and healthcare indicators) in the period of 2004–2010. It is based on the statistical method and comparative analysis, where Estonia’s development is compared to and contrasted with the reference bases provided by earlier periods and also with the development of other member states and the EU average. This introductory chapter makes an attempt to map the conceptual basis of positive conditionality, its main values, principles and components. It then covers the main debates on positive conditionality, critical aspects and recent trends in its development. It also elaborates the main theories influencing and explaining the practical enlargement process and conditionality, which values were central for actors and which models contributed the most in this respect to the debate and development of pre-accession positive conditionality. Finally, it draws some important conclusions that are based on the research findings and that contribute to the existing knowledge about positive conditionality effects on the EU enlargement process.
14
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The essence of conditionality Conditionality is often described as the “stick and carrot” approach, where both negative and positive motivators are possible (Smith 2003: 58), but conditionality itself has no clear connections to any set of values or ideology. There are different ways to categorise and measure conditionality (see e.g. Collier 1997, Killick 1998, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, Sedelmeier 2006). Negative conditionality aims to influence the already existing situation (for example trade regime or diplomatic relations), which is promised or threatened to be changed if the target country does not meet certain requirements. Negative conditionality implies imposing sanctions such as reducing, suspending or terminating benefits if the state in question does not comply with the criteria. A complicating aspect of negative conditionality is that it needs political consensus and the capability to carry through sanctions and the supportive attitude of third countries (Fierro 2003). Positive conditionality is technically more complex than the negative one, but can be implemented gradually and without a broad consensus (about its central components, see Killick 1998, Smith 2003, Fierro 2003). The motivation to use positive conditionality is thus to cause greater social, economic or political influence, while avoiding costlier or more dangerous methods (Fierro 2003: 95). Positive conditionality is quite demanding for its pre-conditions, as it can only succeed in a situation where the awaited benefits of the receiving party are greater than the cost of the adjustments (Sjursen and Smith 2004). Positive conditionality is based on the belief that assistance will produce cumulative progress and growth: forced reforms create political support and political support allows for continuing with reforms and modernisation. Positive conditionality has an ex ante nature. While negative conditionality aims at influencing an already existing situation that is threatened to be changed, positive conditionality is oriented to changing the current situation not satisfying the donor side (Fierro 2003: 100). Here the starting situation does not satisfy one party (imposer) and it motivates the other actor to change it. Influence is usually based on actors’ promises to provide certain resources or rewards, whenever the recipient country succeeds in meeting the conditions. Voluntarism and expected mutual benefit are the specific aspects, making positive conditionality different from the other forms of conditionality. The conditionality goal is equally satisfactory to both sides of the partnership. Positive conditionality is a peaceful method, with no resort to force, even in cases where the target country fails to fulfil any of the conditions. In cases where the target country fails to follow the conditionality, the promised reward is withheld, but the state imposing the conditions does not intervene either coercively to change the cost-benefit assessment of the target government by inflicting additional costs (Mitrany 1966, in Nelsen and Stubb 1998: 112).
15
One-way shared sovereignty is a controversial aspect of positive conditionality as, according to international law, a country can lose its statehood by starting to share sovereignty. Certainly, the status of statehood is different when sharing is a mutual as opposed to only a one-way process. Successful states take a stake from others’ sovereignty, but refuse to share their own power (Keohane 2002: 748). Policy-makers may certainly have an alternative view. To quote Geoffrey Howe, “Sovereignty is not like virginity, which you either have or you don’t /.../ It is a resource to be used, rather than a constraint that limits our capacity for action” (Howe 1990 in Keohane 2002: 749). Will that state, willing to share its sovereignty, receive in return a common sovereignty shared by others and to what extent will it be able to influence this new “joint sovereignty”? In terms of European integration positive conditionality is based on the precondition that countries are able and willing to share some of their sovereign rights but in accordance with their national interests (Kelstrup and Williams 2000: 23) . To ensure the success of a conditional relationship, the target country is often demanded to share its legislative and executive power with special agencies created by an imposing side. It means creation of executive and controlling bodies protected from local public opinion and the political elite. Their aim is to reduce the threats of political competition to the success of conditionality, by promoting meeting the conditionality as a prioritised national interest, above “political games” (Mitrany 1966, in Nelsen and Stubb 1998: 108–109). These bodies are not subordinated or responsible to national authorities of the recipient but influence the process via the donor’s executive agencies. Sharing power with the representative offices of a conditionality imposer also causes the reduction of sovereignty and democracy in the target state (Hay and Menon 2007: 141). As strengthening democracy in many cases is the central goal of positive conditionality, it creates a controversial situation, where a democratically elected parliament needs to share its power with nonelected international agencies, with the eventual goal of building stronger democracy (Stiglitz 1998: 10–11). The asymmetric nature of relations between the independent states refers to an extraordinary practice which is built around an absence of equality and reciprocity; transposition necessity of legal acts; and absence of option for optouts to the target state (Fierro 2003: 95). The absence of equality and reciprocity does not mean that the parties agree that each of them has a different legal status. The sides just agree on different obligations and control rules, but do not define their legal status. The recipient country has no right to demand from its contractual partner anything other than the agreed compensation. The party that grants the benefits, on the other hand, has an obligation to give the reward if the conditions are fulfilled. Conditions are offered as a package, without the possibility of selecting components. This approach can in practice lead to a situation where actors are not referring to adopting the acquis communautaire but simply to taking acquis (Nello 2002: 202).
16
When negative conditionality demands are usually clear and offer practical ground to measure success, then positive conditionality on the contrary tends in practice to have qualitative criteria of success, or not to have any clear, measurable criteria at all (Anastasakis and Bechev 2003: 8). Target levels and performance indicators may not even be properly qualified, measurable or reasonable concerning starting situation. Accordingly, target countries cannot evaluate themselves as they do not have a fixed target and are fully dependent on the donor’s evaluation (Santiso 2003). The absence of sufficient and clear criteria is motivated to appear in situations where the donor is not fully interested in fulfilment of the conditions or not interested in admitting that the criteria are fulfilled (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 2006). Installing additional non-contractual demands into conditionality frameworks is a delicate process, as the imposing side needs to have instruments to enforce fulfilment, but at the same time to keep it out from the official list of requirements (Boughton 2006: 19; in Ranis, Vreeland and Kosack 2006). The need for harmonisation of legal acts and bureaucratic procedures also highlights the question of possible cultural and ideological harmonisation. Even when cultural and ideological aspects do not find their way to official agreements both of them influence the fulfilment of official criteria. For example, the demand to create a full market economy (2nd Copenhagen Criteria) requires compliance with liberal ideology among policy-makers, and the transition to pluralist democracy (1st Copenhagen Criteria) presumes the introduction of pluralist and democratic values in the target countries. In some cases, “imposed Europeanisation” is seen as a sort of cultural harmonisation and the opposite value of nationalism (Farell, Fella and Newman 2002: 161–162).
Debate on positive conditionality When conditionality models are selected and evaluated, mostly the “efficiency” variable is seen as a central one. Efficiency in any practical case of conditionality depends on the expectations of the imposing side: if the goal is achieved with planned resources, conditionality has been successful. Conditionality goals can differ both in the economic and political aspects, have a short or long-term perspective, or be motivated by moral and psychological aspects (Killick 1998, Santiso 2001, Fierro 2003). Concentration and detailed action plans can add efficiency in a problematic environment but will also raise the costs (Gwin and Nelson 1997: 10). Use of conditionality has often been legitimised with the argument that assistance and cooperation will cause faster progress. Practical experience before 1991 however did not support this logic, as most studies indicated disappointing results of positive conditionality (Killick 1998: 8–9). Insufficient starting conditions were seen most often as the reason for failure and therefore hope that positive conditionality method would work when pre-conditions are met remained. Conditionality works more efficiently in a developed environ-
17
ment, but is usually far more needed in an underdeveloped environment. Accordingly the imposing party faces problems either with reasonability or the results (Santiso 2001). A practical problem is that there are very few target countries that have both a good policy environment and will to follow external conditional pressure (Collier 1999: 319). The criticism of the positive conditionality is based on four main aspects: sustainability, legitimacy, morality and popular support. All the critical aspects are based on practical starting circumstances that the target countries have accepted the positive conditionality model often only after they have gone through some internecine warfare or have lost all the other alternatives for fast modernisation and economic growth. Thus, conditionality is often interpreted by public opinion and political elite as the “second worst choice”, which could be revisited in case of better economic and political circumstances (Anastasakis and Bechev 2003: 4–5). Economically conditionality is often not sustainable as public spending and financial assistance tends to free up budget resources, which can then be allocated to alternative purposes. As a result, it becomes critical to assess and influence the overall quality of government spending, including budget and public finances management, rather than focus on sectoral spending as the importance of external aid is growing simultaneously with growth of public spending (Collier, Guillaumont, Guillaumont and Gunning 1997: 1401). The legitimacy and popular support problem can be summarised as the “you cannot buy policies” approach. Limitations on conditionality are seen as caused by unwilling recipients. It consists of factors that undermine the readiness of the recipient to implement the reforms combined with a lack of credibility of the donor or reasoned by monitoring difficulties (Sjursen and Smith 2004). Highlevel dependence also tends to weaken democratic governance when the imperatives of assistance management supersede the requirements of domestic decision-making (Santiso 2001). Conditionality thus encourages the “rationalist and unheroic” arts of bureaucratic compromise rather than the heroic stance of the visionary (Keohane 2003). In a situation where positive conditionality produces very little public popularity, can it still have value for the national elite during modernisation, as the most of painful reforms can be introduced as conditionality components “where government does not have a choice”. Jürgen Haberman’s (2007) model of deliberative democracy process can also partly explain the changes of the EU’s conditionality nature, even when open public debate is avoided. Accordingly the final balance point between obligations and rewards will be found as a result of rational arguing between sides, how to make conditionality as smooth and motivated as possible. It means that target countries do not find the load of conditions problematic if it is legitimised by additional funding (Habermas 2007). Regarding the question of sustainability, the main problem of positive conditionality is that if conditionality underestimates the development of domestic forces that would lead to good policies in the long run, then it has
18
served only to promote better short-run policies while contributing to the postponement of more fundamental home-grown reform efforts (see e.g. Burnside and Dollar 1997). Even if the conditionality is able to solve an immediate commitment problem of the recipient, this long-term effect is still a potential problem. Conditionality is sometimes also used to promote policies that for one reason or another tend to become irreversible once they are introduced. Building up a long-term and stable political culture requires that there be no competitors to the democratically elected government. The influence on the economic system can have the same effect: special rules and donations of the imposer will draw the target country away from the normal regional market situation, or build up a new economic system based on yearly donations and support (Collier, Guillaumont, Guillaumont and Gunning 1997: 1406–1407) Moral and economic arguments form a dilemma in which the conditionality imposer has to make progress-based decisions on whether to increase or decrease the support in the future. From the moral point of view additional funds are needed where the progress and development levels are the lowest and if the purpose is social development, and there is no moral justification to sanction target states’ society for government’s lack of progress. But such reasoning and action will inevitably send a message that less progress ensures more financing and in the long run will reduce the progress (Sjursen and Smith 2004). Progress-based conditionality, in which additional financing is provided to the countries that have progressed faster and have a higher living standard, will once again raise the question of why target countries that actually manage better than comparable target countries should be supported. Despite the low efficiency of the political conditionality, the popularity of this method was growing in the 1990s. This may have been caused by even lower cost-efficiency of military intervention measures compared to earlier periods, multilateral nature of the international arena and a will to follow a nonviolent line by some international actors. Among the alternatives, positive conditionality seemed to offer the highest level of mutual security and stability between the partners (Ferrero-Waldner 2006). In the 1990s multilaterals were so eager to propose so many different conditionality sets for the CEE states that, after accepting their conditions, there was very little room left for independent foreign, financial and social affairs (Hay and Menon 2007: 140–141). What is the additional value of positive conditionality in the context of European integration and enlargement policy? The main motivation to use positive conditionality was to safeguard and control the accession process. The fear that the possible enlargement could cause problems for the existing union, plays a key role in building the sophisticated accession conditionality. Especially in the fifth enlargement, costs and risks in financial and legal terms were considered to be so high (by existing member states and the EU institutions), that it was sometimes seen as a dilemma between the union’s enlargement and its internal efficiency. Accordingly additional measures were sought to reduce the risk (Witte 2002: 236).
19
THEORETICAL MODELS EXPLAINING POSITIVE CONDITIONALITY Theoretical models explaining the positive conditionality and enlargement logic are varying and combined both between the different accession rounds and also inside every single round. In terms of enlargement and pre-accession progress neo-functionalism, neo-liberal imperialism, neo-institutionalism and intergovernmentalism have been the main models to explain the goals and values behind the technical use of positive conditionality. It is of course a separate question of how much policy-makers actually followed theoretical models when designing positive conditionality to meet their practical needs. The aim of the theoretical comparison is to make an introduction to one of the central questions of research: which of the main theoretical models has played and is playing a central role in defining the ideological nature of pre-accession conditionality?
Neo-functional theory in terms of EU enlargement and positive conditionality The neo-functionalist integration theory has been one of the prevailing theories explaining the integration processes in Europe since the end of the Second World War. Functional and neo-functional logic is formed around the simple proposition that the provision of common need can unite people across nations and borders (Mitrany 1975, Rosamond 2000: 60). Its main value is the ability to explain the dynamic logic of integration and actors’ motives to integrate more deeply and widely (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006: 24–28). There are several theories (intergovernmentalism, institutionalism, transactionalism, etc.) next to neo-functional theory capable to provide alternative explanations, yet neofunctional theory has been able to operate with all the fields and periods of the practical integration process in Europe (Kelstrup and Williams 2000; Griffiths and O’Callaghan 2004). The traditional functional ideas of David Mitrany from “A Working Peace System” (1943) were combined by the practical solutions of Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann during the actual integration process and additionally fulfilled with the theoretical contributions of Leon Lindberg, Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas at the end of the 50s and early 60s (Nelsen and Stubb 2003). From the very beginning, neo-functional models paid more attention to enlargement motivation and principles due to practical necessity. The use and efficiency of the neo-functional model in the enlargement context is seen as limited by the need of interdependence between the actors. The bigger the integrity and interdependence is, the more motivated participants are for additional integration, and accordingly applicant countries that depend more on integrated partners have more motivation for fulfilling the conditions (Zielonka 2006: 45–48; Delors 1989, in Nelsen and Stubb 1998: 59). The
20
central interest in keeping the neo-functional integration process progressively spreading is the will to gain additional welfare – as sustainable political integration needs successful economic integration as a pre-condition to gaining the support of the public and elite (Mitrany 1975 in Nelsen and Stubb 1998: 180–181). Utilitarian reasoning and freedom from ideological influence is a central principle of neo-functional integration theory. Integration models and activities should not involve ideological or cultural goals – the main criteria for policymaking are welfare and the stability in society. Neo-functionalist authors monopolise the position of utilitarian ideology by trying to mix it with the efficiency of the Webberian bureaucracy model (Deutsch 1957 in Nelsen and Stubb 1998: 131–132). Supranational institutions are needed to grow political integrity and efficient integration (Wiener and Diez 2004: 64–66). These institutions have a dominant role in agenda-forming, legislation, execution and control and their competence and privileges have been growing during the integration process. In first stages these bodies worked in cooperation with nation states and their representatives, and later these bodies started to take over the role of national democratic institutions. This non-democratic system was justified as an effective way to collect experts into institutions and defend them against the turbulence of political groups and voters. The legitimacy of neo-functional integration is based on mutual benefit and voluntarism. Violence, pressure or sanctions are not used for setting up and developing an integrated union. Long-lasting integration is based on the assumption that countries and citizens join the integrated union voluntarily, without any coercion or violence. Their main motivation is functional – to achieve a higher standard of living, more income and a peaceful society. Integration should be a complete win-win game where all the participants are in every stage sure that they will benefit through additional deepening or widening. The pre-accession framework also works in the principle of voluntarism but also in a limited way (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006: 46–48). The level of integration, the areas of integration and methods are progressively developing. Integration should not only go deeper and wider, but also do so progressively. The spill-over effect also indicates that integration is not a development level but a process. The process starts from the economic area but is finally targeted at the political and social area (Etzioni 1965: 4). The message of the neo-functionalist theory is that policy-makers need to pay attention to economic integration and if it is successful, political integration will follow it. Every new enlargement should start on a more advanced financial and technical level and integrate the acceding countries faster (Haas 1964: 12–14). When motivated, candidate countries are ready to prioritise activities related to accession and delegate their sovereignty as much as asked by supranational bodies.
21
Participants agree mutually on the delegation of their sovereignty to a supranational level, where it will be used in common interests. Sovereignty is shared mutually (using mostly federal principles), and every member state, when sharing its sovereignty, can enjoy the advantages through other countries sharing their sovereignty. States still keep their sovereignty in the question of “competence of competence”, which means that additional sovereignty can be transferred only based on a consensus (Milward 1994: 11–14). Pre-accession sovereignty sharing should follow the same logic, if following neo-functionalist ideas. One-speed union as a central goal is achieved through harmonisation and standardisation. The logic of the integration is built on the idea of speeding convergence between different territorial areas and high economic development of all the regions (Weiler, Begg and Peterson 2004). The regions or the union itself are not divided into centre, semi-periphery or periphery. The aim is to develop a universally highly developed area. During the integration, when the economic resources accumulate, the speed of convergence will also grow. Equally high development is achieved by legal harmonisation and standardisation. Legal harmonisation is achieved by joint legislation on the supranational level and cooperation between national lawmakers, which should produce a logical and integrated legal space. As integration is a relationship between equal countries and is based on functional logic, there is originally no cultural harmonisation or pre-conditions in the ideological aspect (Rosamond 2000: 67). Neo-functional theory does not include supremacy of any ideological model – its purpose is to replace the ideological governance. Administrative harmonisation is at the same time an important component of the process, as it ensures efficient legal harmonisation and should contribute to the growth of security and economy. The enlargement policy follows the same logic, the best functional solution must be found considering the costs and the efficiency of both parties, less developed areas should receive proportionally higher support to ensure convergence (Nelsen and Stubb 1998), and the fastest inclusion and progress will lead to the fastest actual convergence. A more motivated environment for both sides during pre-accession will lead to faster and more effective accession, which serves the interests of both sides. Therefore, in practice it would be reasonable to support transparent, guided and motivational enlargement conditions and assessment, based on actual progress as widely as possible (Bomberg and Stubb 2003: 189–191). The functional arguments have been one of the most important motivators in designing enlargement principles in practice; as a result the EU-related activities became priorities in applicant states and helped to solve local problems. Public support was also often gained by the joint argument that all the efforts would be later compensated by a higher standard of living. The belief in European values also legitimised the process of harmonisation. Even when the candidate countries did not understand the
22
purpose of every legal act, there was a strong belief that it was a need to gain welfare (Sjursen 2002: 495). Where is the connection between the conditionality and neo-functional logic? Functional arguments to use conditionality are mainly based on utilitarian logic. Tony Killick (1998) for example points out that there is no need to look for justification for harder and asymmetric structural positive conditionality, as, according to earlier experience, this is far more effective than soft conditionality, ex-post conditionality or negative conditionality. Intensive structural components make positive conditionality less risky for those imposing them and financially more attractive for the target country, as both sides benefit through faster results and deeper changes in society. If faster and deeper reforms or convergence are needed even more radical measures are justified (Killick 1998: 6–10). Even if donors’ interests were served more than those of the applicants, it was part of a mutually beneficial partnership. Neo-functional logic is dominant in practical implementation of positive conditionality in the case where the centre or imposer dominates the agenda, but is doing it for the benefit for the whole community, by developing first the areas with a lower development level (as the average of the community can grow fastest by developing the weakest) and redistributing resources based on economic efficiency. Participants will not only be treated equally by sharing the same rules and standards, but the weakest ones even receive advantages to catch up to the average development level (Deutsch 1957, in Nelsen and Stubb 1998: 137). Central administrative and supranational institutions rule and legislation for all areas of union are safeguarded, no double-standardisation used. This process, based on neo-functional ideas, will be dominated by a functional– administrative centre quite independent from policy-makers in member states and financed by the transnational economic elite.
Neo-liberal imperialist explanation in terms of EU enlargement and positive conditionality Neo-liberal imperialism is based on the original works of J. A. Hobson (1965) and developed by Karl Kautsky (1964), Johan Galtung (1971), Paul Baran (1975), Harry Magdoff (1978), Jan Zielonka (2006) and Robert Cooper (2003); has been seen as alternative way to explain European integration, finding more support in the recent decade. Neo-liberal imperialism is based on the idea of functionality and is motivated by the economic reason that occupation is not practical in economic terms (Viotti and Kauppi 1993: 453). Neo–liberal imperialism includes the central idea of imperial theory of building and keeping a relationship of effective domination and control, political or economic, direct or indirect of one (or more) nations over another(s) (Chilcote 1994: 251). Neoliberal imperialism has had an advantage over traditional imperialism in the context of European integration, as it has concentrated mainly on gaining
23
welfare by grabbing resources and markets, when classical forms of realism are concentrated on direct political dominance, occupying and conquering territories. The connection between neo-liberal imperialism and positive conditionality is built around the concept of dependency, which is a pre-condition for positive conditionality and neo-liberal empire (Baran 1957). Central components of the EU pre-accession positive conditionality: dependence, integration and conditional relationship all tend to have a negative effect to nation-building and the development of democracy as well as support for neo-imperial domination (Binder 1964: 629–630). In practice it appears in frameworks of western multilateral organisations (IMF; WB, EU) where both models are used simultaneously. According to this theoretical approach, the main economic effect is based on the existence of different economic zones (centre, semi-periphery and periphery) inside the imperial entity having specialised economic roles. The zones are not a purpose in itself but serve the economic interests of the capital holders (Chilcote 1994: 253). Economic zones inside the empire are vital as the central problem of highly developed centre of an empire is in keeping long-term sustainable profit during inevitably growing surpluses of capital and rising labour costs, and lowering efficiency of production (Rothbard 1995). As every zone serves a specific function, they cannot replace each other’s functions. Even when re-distribution of resources is in favour of the centre and there is no support for convergence (Galtung 1971: 83) none of the zones are interested in losing their economic specialisation and advantages in partnership. The equal development is not seen as a purpose or even a reasonable situation (Hobson 1965). A multi-speed approach should be agreed to by both of the parties, the centre and distant areas, as it is the only possible combination where both parties can profit from cooperation (ibid). The centre is also constantly redistributing resources to avoid rapid development of periphery and semiperiphery, and accordingly no convergence appears even when all zones of the empire are more productive (Viotti and Kauppi 1993: 452–454). Voluntarism and mutual economic interest to participate are central components of neo-liberal empires. Neo-liberal imperialism can be seen as a voluntary cooperation method between states and regions as there is no straight military pressure to participate, but there is a strong economic and political reasoning. Cooperation is based on the precondition that the target country is economically less developed than the empire and also economically and politically dependent from the empire, and therefore unable to sustain the possible pressure. Accordingly the motivation of the neo-functional theory and neo-liberal imperialism overlaps in central aspects – to make economic profit and enjoy welfare without using violence. Neo-liberal imperialism, differently from traditional imperialism, relies on peaceful methods and voluntarism of all participants (Zielonka 2006: 53–55). The centre is motivated by capital efficiency, semi-periphery by creation of jobs and investments into the industry,
24
periphery relaying to growing market of the raw resources. Voluntarism of peripheral areas can also be based on a lack of alternatives for some areas of the empire (Galtung 1971: 81). In terms of political power neo-liberal imperialism is based on one-way sharing of sovereignty, where only the peripheral areas are sharing their sovereignty, but have almost no access to the centre’s sovereignty or political power and no federal structures with clear distribution of power are established, either (Magdoff 1978). The centre of the neo-liberal empire is not aimed to reduce self-determination or sovereignty by improving the status of distant territories. The centre is interested in a politically and administratively sustainable business environment, but their interference goes only as far as it is needed for economic profit. If the peripheral areas are relatively developed in political and administrative terms, the changes concern mainly harmonisation of the legal space, but in case of need the centre can also initiate deeper reforms on social, administrative and political levels. At the same time the symbolic and formal independence of the periphery is often respected (Hobson 1965, Cooper 2003: 38–39). Double-standardisation and lack of measurable criteria of cooperation is not based on two sets of official standards, but on the centre privilege not to follow some standards and norms (Baran 1975). Conditions for partnership in the neoimperial empire consist of a formal transparent part and an unofficial part. Officially the sides confirm mutual will for cooperation and openness for flexible solutions in practice. Even after fulfilling the partnership or membership criteria the double standards can continue as not all privileges are shared among all zones. Both the imposing centre and distant areas find no need to ask which principles and interests dominate the process, and whether it is legitimate, as the interests of the centre or union are dominant, but also welcomed and followed by the national elites of the target countries. Target areas usually do not bring about the question of the neo-imperial nature of the process, as being afraid of a possible negative reaction (Zielonka 2006: 33). Neither the semi-periphery nor periphery can have remarkable input for the empire’s cultural heritage (Farell, Fella, Newman 2002). Administrative, cultural and ideological harmonisation is motivated by economic reasons, as higher profitability can be achieved by a standardised legal environment and less corruptive governance. Transposition in this case means transfer of legal acts with slight adjustments to ensure their practical efficiency. During the transposition process the best possible solution is not the central aim, but the fastest on cheapest way of making the legal environment and social rules as similar as possible. In some cases it can include the official goal of copying “imperial best practice” or it is introduced at the grassroots level (Chilcote 1994: 251). Often these processes are described as the voluntary initiative of the target state or even as signs of progress (Zielonka 2006: 54–55). When positive conditionality is designed according to neo-liberal imperialism, the centre (imposer) is leading in the cooperation agenda, using it for its
25
own benefit, sharing only the rules and standards with target states or territories, treating these territories as second standard partners and redistributing the economic resources in favour of the centre. Soft cultural and administrative harmonisation is supported in target areas. Partnership represents the interests of the economic elite – transnational companies and bigger member states. The periphery or acceding states participate in bases of necessity or situations without better alternatives. The centre creates a conditionality system serving its long-term economic and political interests to dominate the region. For the existing union and member states, one of the main purposes of enlargement would be to new markets and labour forces, and to secure long-term gains through institutional agreements. The candidate states are offered a significantly weaker package of benefits, but are forced to follow most of the regulations and directives, leading to additional costs or loss of competitiveness (Zielonka 2006: 35). As seen in comparison, neo-imperialism and neo-functionalism have most of the key components overlapping in terms of integration logic and methods. The main difference is that in case of neo-imperial motivation the economic tools, legal norms and execution serve the centre's economic interests; in the neofunctional case the same tools will be used to benefit the whole community and especially the weakest member states.
Intergovernmentalist model in terms of EU enlargement and positive conditionality The intergovernmental model is seen as the main alternative to the neofunctionalist concept of supranationalism, when explaining EU integration. The intergovernmentalist model is based on broader neo-realist theory and explains the integration process as member-state-centric bargaining and competition, where other (supranational) actors play a minor role or represent national interests. According to the intergovernmental model, national interests are dominant over institutional or idealist interests and states have the power to block or regulate the speed of the integration process. The political priorities of the states overcome the administrative rules and criteria and also the economic interest of the interest groups. States do not need to obey non-state supranational actors and interest groups. National identity and original state sovereignty are seen as the main sources of loyalty and legitimisation (Hoffman 1966: 862–905). Integration and cooperation projects are methods to force competitive states into an ineffective or harmful situation. Joint institutions just represent the interests of the most powerful member states. The economic gains of integration or enlargement are important only as long as these do not threaten states’ sovereignty (Moravcsik 1998: 35–38). According to the intergovernmental model the main obstacles in the integration process are the national elites, who can lose their political and
26
economic importance during successful integration (Wiener and Diez 2004: 78). They will be supported by historical-cultural ideas of nation-state, autonomy and competition with neighbours. Participating states use all their power to be dominant and grow their power over the weaker actors inside the federation-like union as well, as all social processes take place in a “zero-sum game” where for every winner there must be a loser. Integration and cooperation projects are methods to force competitive states into a non-effective or harmful situation. Joint institutions just represent the interests of the most powerful member states (Farell, Fella, and Newman 2002: 147). The intergovernmental model is sceptical about sustainable integration or long-term cooperation between competing nations. Short-term forms of cooperation are seen as a manoeuvre to gaining an advantage in the “balance of power” model. Accordingly states should not create supranational bodies with “competence of competence” and allow them to set the agenda in crucial policy fields (Wiener and Diez 2004: 83). Policy-making and setting the priorities is dominated by the participating states and is the result of their competition. International organisations, supranational actors of international law play unimportant roles in the process (Moravcsik 1998). Intergovernmentalism can also be seen as an “anti-theory”, explaining why integration is not sustainable and not developing, so it offers less attention to the dynamic process of integration and accession. Intergovernmentalism also does not offer bases to research the role of conditionality led by a supranational institution (the European Commission) (Nugent 1999: 495). The intergovernmentalist model is also mainly interested in individual member states, while the overall number of members is growing and every single state plays a decreasing role in the enlargement process, while the role of supranational bodies like the European Commission is growing. By rejecting the idea of joint interest and supranational influence during enlargement, intergovernmentalism simply does not have enough tools to be an active participant in the debate of European integration (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006: 212). According to the intergovernmental model most existing member states should tend to follow realistic arguments and national interests, when designing the pre-accession assessment system based on the principle that the economic and political gains of accession are important only as long as these do not threaten states’ sovereignty or statehood (Moravcsik 1998: 35–38). The intergovernmentalist argument in explaining the enlargement process is that, even in case enlargement in general might be costly, it can be very beneficial for some states, by opening new markets or taking away resources and attention from policy areas that they want to block (institutional reform, Schengen and the euro). Member-state-centric bargaining, where other actors play a minor role, appears more strongly in the final stages of policy formulation, when different member states start demanding additional conditions in exchange for their support (Wiener and Diez 2004: 88). For example, in case of the pre-accession
27
process during the fifth and sixth enlargements it appeared as criticism and demands in the non-Copenhagen questions in annual EU progress reports. In case of the dominance of the intergovernmental model in practical implementation of positive conditionality, only limited transfer of sovereignty to supranational institutions appears. Political agendas (and criteria) will be dominated more by national interests than the general interests of community or even the integrated centre. The same logic concerns economic aspects, the level of regulation is low and re-allocations of economic resources are not influential or systematic, but are based on political compromises and necessities (Milward 1994: 11–15). Accession conditions would be a mixture of the central interests of existing member states (only represented by central institutions), reflecting their will to save their political position, economic power and profit by using the resources of new member states. During the conditionality political aspects play a greater role than clear and measurable criteria. Accordingly, this model in some aspects overlaps with neo-liberal imperialist logic, with three important differences: first, the centre does not dominate the agenda-setting process; second, as conditions and rules are not integrated and representing controversial interests they do not produce significant reallocation of economic resources and are not bases for membership selection; third, in neo-liberal imperialism the target area’s interest opposes imperial interests, and there is no competing national interests inside the empire.
Neo-institutional model explaining EU enlargement and positive conditionality The importance of the neo-institutional approach is growing with the expansion of EU legislation, institutional size, traditions and norms (Stevens and Stevens 2001: 14). Neo-institutional aspects in European integration have been researched by Aspinwall (2003), Caporaso (1999), Pollack (2005), Schneider (2003) and Jupile (1999). The neo-institutional model offers a possible explanation to European integration and enlargement based on the institutional and administrative dominance of the policy-making process. Decision-making in an institutional environment is dominated by habits, procedures, norms and compromises that prefer expectable, rational, continuing, regulated and less risky choices. Rules and norms tend to be dominant over idealist goals and broader gains (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938). The neo-institutional decisionmaking system can be seen as an evolutional set of norms and restrictions chosen and developed by active policy-makers, consisting of influential networking and standardised solutions. In neo-institutional reasoning administrative and legal reasons are dominant over economics and politics, and small administrative solutions guide bigger political choices, not vice versa. The institutional model also consists of the logic of bargaining situation, where existing policy-driving institutions use
28
policy areas for improvement of their positions (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006: 194–195). Neo-institutionalism also explains independent and intervening variables that crucially affect actors' strategies and goals in the integration process (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006: 194). Economic or political concerns get less attention as agenda-building is dominated by administrators. Official rules and procedures start to dominate, changing the starting goal of the process (Hall and Taylor 1996: 940). The neo-institutional model and conditionality also overlap in support of sharing sovereignty and using conditions to encourage the “rationalist and unheroic” arts of bureaucratic compromise. In a situation where positive conditionality produces very little public popularity, can it still have value for the national elite during modernisation, as the most of painful reforms can be introduced in period of conditionality and without risking with public support. During this process, leading institutions tend to choose secure and compromise solutions instead of following the original goals of the process. This is motivated by every unit’s interest in not taking additional challenges or risks, but rather in preferring slower and inefficient approaches to securing their personal position. It causes delays and rising costs during the process (Beach 2005). In later stages institutional actors can start manipulation of data and rules to go even further with process control and risk reduction. Neo-institutionalism also approaches political processes from the point of view of appropriateness, i.e. following the rules, habits, and rational choice from among the morally acceptable options. The norms and formal rules of institutions will shape the actions of those acting within them. “Compliance occurs in many circumstances because other types of behaviour are inconceivable; routines are followed because they are taken for granted as ‘the way we do these things’” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006: 194–195). “Path dependence” is on well-known model inside institutional theory. The cognitive element of new institutionalism suggests that individuals make certain choices because they can conceive of no alternatives (Pierson 1996). Inside the neo-institutional model the rational choice concept plays an important role as it explains the formulation of values and principles in the cooperation process between national and supranational actors. In terms of supranational agents and European integration the main interests are focused on the questions of why legislative policy-makers are delegating their agenda-setting power to inflexible institutional bodies and how “joint decision traps” influence policy formulation (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006: 195). In terms of European integration and enlargement process, it is evident that the interests of separate institutions can be (and often are) different from the general long-term interest of the EU – accession has often become a vital component in the institutional competition (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002). Acceding states can also have institutional motivation for partnership, as hoping that accession will bring a set of social habits, traditions and regulations
29
that will lead to a “good life” and all the efforts of harmonisation will later be compensated with higher standards of living (Sjursen 2002: 495). In the case of the dominance of neo-institutional motivation in pre-accession positive conditionality implementation, the centre or imposer is dominant over the values of agenda formulation and policy-making, with the key aspect being that not a political, but an administrative level provides the agenda priorities (in forms of criteria and conditions). The structural and personal motivation towards security and status quo are the bases for the legal and economic actions of the institutions. In the majority of cases it means supporting the powers that already have control over political and economic resources: transcontinental companies, bigger member states, and supranational institutions. New member states or small companies only have disadvantages in the eyes of neoinstitutional decision-makers, as they do not control the political process or possess economic power. Accordingly, the criteria and conditions finally tend to reflect the interests of the existing centre and ruling powers (Moravcsik 1998: 26). Neo-institutionalism differentiates from neo-functionalism and neo-liberal imperialism as the central motivation of policy makers is security and status quo, not economic gains or political power. Accordingly, groups with neoinstitutional motivation will support groups that control political and economic resources and represent reasonable standardised habits. In practice, neoinstitutional groups tend to be policy- takers; they can support either neofunctional dominance or the neo-liberal imperialist model depending on, which group offers more secure and more comfortable solutions. But essentially they are not about to support newcomers to the club, especially when they are economically weaker than existing club members. The ideas of convergence and equality are also not supported as disturbing existing allocation of power and resources.
30
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Positive conditionality has found intensive use by the European Union during the last 20 years in the fields of enlargement, neighbourhood policy and development cooperation. It has also been in the process of remarkable change during the period 1993–2011. Papers compiled in this doctoral thesis map and analyse the central aspects and development of pre-accession positive conditionality during the years 1993 and 2011. The first paper (“Conditionality and Dependence as Key Elements in Simultaneous Democratization and Crisis Prevention”) revealed that conditionality was not equally successful in all the cases even when the target countries were quite similar. A clear connection was found between the efficiency of conditionality and the commitment of the target area. Accordingly, positive conditionality cannot be seen as a universal toolbox widely used in the enlargement process and implementing neighbourhood policy because without “efficient sticks and attractive carrots” available target countries become disillusioned and unmotivated. The overall results of conditionality were directly dependent on possible positive outcomes, such as possible membership, increased financial support and economic growth; yet as a pre-condition sufficient economic dependence needs to exist. The second paper (“European Union’s Positive Conditionality Model in Preaccession Process”) debates the aspect of the historical legitimacy of preaccession positive conditionality. It showed that positive conditionality has not been used in similar terms during the six rounds of accession. On the contrary, the level of conditionality has varied during the enlargement history of the EU – no positive conditionality was used or attempted in the first accession round, and minor aspects of positive conditionality were attempted but not implemented in second enlargement round. Minor aspects of positive conditionality first appeared in practice during the third accession round, but were once again absent in the fourth enlargement. During the fifth enlargement the highest level of positive conditionality appeared, as it became “naturalised” from the very beginning of this accession round. During the sixth enlargement positive conditionality again started to lose its central role in some aspects. To sum it up, the use of positive conditionality has been growing during the enlargement history but it has not been an inevitable part of enlargement. It means that the often-repeated claim that “we have all followed the same conditionality to accession” does not hold. On the contrary, only the least developed and later acceded countries have had the obligation of following positive conditionality (fifth and sixth-round countries). The third paper (“The EU Neighbourhood Policy, Positive Conditionality and Reforms in the Former Soviet Space”) focuses on the question of the necessity, efficiency and profitability of positive conditionality from the perspective of the target country. It appeared that positive conditionality applications were justified in some fifth-round applicant countries, whereas
31
treating all the applicants the same way was not justified. In terms of economic development half of the candidate states were able to progress faster than the EU average whereas the rest were developing more slowly than or equal to the EU average. The effect of positive conditionality was fully negative in measured labour indicators, as unemployment in all candidate countries was growing faster than the EU average. In terms of inflation the effect was overwhelmingly positive, as only in Malta and Cyprus did inflation show a slower decline than the EU average; all the other applicant states showed faster progress than the EU average. In many ways the development of applicant countries was slightly faster than the EU average, but not all of them managed to make positive conditionality work for their own social and economic development. The fourth paper (“Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation”) analyses the practical aspects of positive conditionality when implemented in candidate countries, focusing on the levels of transparency, impartiality and objectivity of the EU pre-accession assessments. The paper revealed the existence of contradictory evaluation methodologies in EU pre-accession conditionality. In cases of Croatia and Romania, the European Commission’s evaluation results differ systematically from the calculated average of the impartial evaluators. The difference was also influential, as it was changing the actual standings in the pre-accession scoreboard. Apparently, the Progress Reports used by the European Commission did not serve their initial purpose – to select candidate countries and evaluate their progress, but also to justify political reality, which demanded the acceptance of Romania and Bulgaria and the rejection of Croatia despite the actual conformity with the Copenhagen Criteria. The fifth paper (“Navigating between Policy and Populace: Estonia, its Accession Referendum and the EU Convention”) is a case study from the preaccession positive conditionality period in Estonia. The aim of the paper was to research the influence of European integration and conditionality on small candidate states with limited resources. It became evident that EU pre-accession conditionality was seen as the highest priority of national policy-making. It led first of all to reduction of the role of national legislative and executive powers, public opinion and debate in general during the process and second of all to participation in the European Future Convention being handled with the resources available after pre-accession activities and national election campaigning. Accordingly, the Estonian example indicated that universal conditionality during pre-accession creates additional pressure on their administration and starts to withdraw human resources from other areas of external relations in addition to national policy-making. As a result small states in this situation have a dilemma of whether to accept a lower speed of pre-accession, lower efficiency in defending national interests or sacrificing their capability in other policy areas.
32
The sixth paper (“Life in Post-Communist Eastern Europe after EU Membership: Estonia”) studies the influence of pre-accession conditionality in the aftermath – during the first years of actual EU membership by using again the Estonian example. It demonstrated that successful EU policy and fulfilment of all the criteria were seen as the highest national priorities. When EU conditions conflicted with existing interests or positions, the latter were changed. Considering historical circumstances and the comparative progress of its Baltic neighbours, Estonia’s transition process is internally seen as a success story, at least in the opinion of local policy-makers and also by most of the electorate. On the other hand, Estonian transition choices have been quite specific, including radical currency reform, fast privatisation and “shock therapy” during the pension reform. Many of these reforms were motivated by the wish to join the EU and NATO as fast as possible and to fulfil the accession criteria and conditionality as the best pupil in the class of candidate states. As a result, Estonia finds itself at the top and bottom of most scoreboards where the fastest economic growth is combined with the weakest social protection, respectively. In terms of Estonia’s role in EU policy-making, brief membership experience and restricted reforms have allowed it mainly to act as a “policy taker”. What conclusions one can make based on these research findings? First, positive conditionality has not been a consistently used concept during the EU enlargement. In the very beginning it appeared in minor areas and was rediscovered only in the fifth enlargement starting in the 1990s. Only then (1993–2006) one could notice the positive conditionality application in full technical complexity, influence and importance. Second, the values and goals forming positive conditionality have been changing from the dominance of neo-functionalism, to the growing influence of neo-liberal imperialism and neo-institutionalism. While policy-makers point rhetorically often to neo-functional ideals, the policy-making outcome resembles a combination of neo-institutional motives and neo-imperial values. The change towards neo-liberal imperialism is not easy to explain, as the neoinstitutional or intergovernmental models seem to better serve the growing interests of member states and EU institutions. Third, the best results with positive conditionality were achieved in the field of enlargement and during the fifth accession round. Conditionality provided positive convergence effects in most candidate states, but the difference was not extraordinary and not all the candidate countries managed to use it for effective social and economic transition. Despite optimistic tone, the fifth and sixth enlargements were the longest in history and even after more than ten years of preparation Romania and Bulgaria were the poorest applicants to ever accede to the EU. It leads to the conclusion that either the convergence of target countries was not the central goal of imposers or conditionality simply did not fulfil expectations of target countries. The efficiency of positive conditionality appeared to be highly sensitive to the sufficient motivation and commitment of both sides, and destined to succeed only in case of mutually respectful cooperation.
33
Fourth, the opinion of the target countries about conditionality has been neither negative nor fully positive; however, most candidate countries have welcomed positive conditionality. Those being critical tend to see the EU operating in a neo-imperial manner while using the Copenhagen Criteria selectively and in their own interests to justify the opening or closing of the accession process. Indeed, one can conclude that actual accession often depends more on political interests and decisions, while the assessment procedure as a part of the conditionality instrument serves only as a tool of justification and legitimisation. And last but not least, the future of pre-accession conditionality seems less promising today than five years ago when the last enlargement took place. As enlargement has lost actuality for the crisis-ridden EU, so has the pre-accession conditionality become redundant for the Eastern and Southern neighbours of the EU. The lack of “efficient sticks and attractive carrots” does not create incentive enough for change.
34
REFERENCES Anastasakis, O. and Bechev, D. (2003). EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment to the Process. St Antony’s College University of Oxford. Aspinwal, M. and Schneider, G. (2003). Same Menu, Separate Tables: The Institutionalist Turn in Political Science and the Study of European Integration. European Journal of Political Research 38/1 (1–36). Baran, P. (1957). The Political Economy of Growth. Monthly Review Press. Baran, P. (1975). The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism. Monthly Review Press. Beach, D. (2005). The Dynamics of European Integration: Why and When the Institutions Matter? Palgrave Macmillan. Binder, L. (1964). National Integration of Political Development. American Political Science Review no 58, (622–631). Bomberg, E. and Stubb, A. (2003). The European Union: How does it Work? Oxford University Press. Checkel, J. (2000). Compliance and Conditionality. Arena Working Papers, WP 00/18. Chilcote, R. H. (1994). Theories of Comparative Politics, The Search for a Paradigm Reconsidered. Westview Press. Collier, P. and Guillaumont, P. and Guillaumont, S. and Gunning, J.W. (1997) Redesigning Conditionality, World Development, Vol 25/9 (1399–1407) . Collier, P. and Dollar D. (1998). Aid allocation and poverty reduction. World Bank Publications. Cooper, R. (2003). The breaking of nations. Order and chaos in the twenty-first century. Atlantic Monthly Press. Cooper, R. (1996). The Post-Modern State and World Order. Demos Print. Demmelhuber, T. (2007). The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and its Implementation in the Southern Mediterranean. ZEI Discussion Papers C170. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (2006). Debates on European Integration, Palgrave Macmillan. European Commission. (1998). Communication to the Council and Parliament on Democratisation, the Rule of Law, Respect for Human Rights and Good Governance: the Challenges of the Partnership between the European Union and the ACP States, COM(98) 146-final. European Council, (1993). Presidency Conclusions, European Council of Copenhagen, http://www.ena.lu/conclusions_copenhagen_european_council_extract_concerning_ enlargement_2122_june_1993-020006502.html, accessed in 12.01 2011. Farell, M. and Fella, S. and Newman, M. (2002). European Integration in the 21st Century. Sage Publications. Ferrero-Waldner, B. (2006). Speech given for Swedish Institute for International Affairs and the European Commission Representation in Sweden Stockholm, 7 March 2006 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/149&format= HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, accessed in 13.01 2011. Fierro, E. (2003). The EU's approach to human rights conditionality in practice. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Galtung, J. (1971). A Structural Theory of Imperialism. Journal of Peace Research 8 (2); Grabbe, H. (2001). How Does Europanisation Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 6, (10131031).
35
Gwin, C. and Nelson J.M. (1997). Perspectives and Aid and Development. ODC Policy Essay 22. Washington. Haas, E. (1964). Beyond the Nation State. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Habermas, J. (2007). The Divided West, Polity Press. Hall, P. A. and Taylor, R. C. R. (1996). Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Hay, C. and Menon, A. (2007). European Politics. Oxford University Press. Hobson, J. A. (1965). Imperialism: A Study. Ann Arbor. Ilves, T. H, (2003). The Grand Enlargement and the Great Wall of Europe, Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook (181-201). Jupille, J. and Caporaso, J. (1999). Institutionalism and the European Union: Beyond International Relations and Comparative Politics. Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2/1999. Kautsky, K. (1964). The Dictatorship of the Proletariat. University of Michigan Press. Kelstrup, M and Williams, M.C. (2000) International Relations Theory and The Politics of European Integration, Routledge. Keohane, R. O. (2002). Ironies of Sovereignty. Journal of Common Market Studies 40, 4, (743-765). Killick, T. (1998). Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change. ODI, London. Magdoff, H. (1978). Imperialism. Monthly Review Press. Mayhew, A. (1998). Recreating Europe. The European Union’s Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe. Cambridge University Press. Milward, A. S. (1994). The European Rescue of the Nation State, Routledge. Mitrany, D. (1975). The Functional Theory of Politics. New York: St. Martin's Press. Morgenthau, H. J. (1993). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. McGraw-Hill, Boston. Moravcsik, A. (1998). The Choice of Europe. UCL Press. Nelsen, B. F. and Stubb, A. (2003). The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration. Palgrave Nello, S. S. (1999). Implications of the Euro for Enlargement. RSC Publication, Policy Paper 99/3. Nugent, N. (1999). The Government and Politics of the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan. Peters, B. G. (2005). Institutional theory in political science: the 'new institutionalism. Continuum International Publishing Group. Pierson, P. (1998). The Path to European Integration: A Historical-Institutionalist Analysis, Sandholtz, in European Integration and Supranational Governance. Oxford University Press. Pollack, M. (2005). The New Institutionalism and EC Governance: The Promise and Limits of Institutional Analysis. Governance Vol. 9/4, (429–458). Ranis, G and Vreeland, R. J. and Kosack, S. (2006). Globalization and the Nation State, Routledge. Rothbard, M. (1995). Economic Thought Before Adam Smith: An Austrian perspective on the history of economic thought, Aldershot, Edward Elgar. Rosamond, B. (2000). Theories of European Integration. Palgrave Macmillan. Santiso, C (2001). Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality. The Georgetown Public Policy Review, Volume 7/1 2001, (1-22).
36
Schimmelfennig F. (1999). The Double Puzzle of EU Enlargement Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Decision to Expand to the East, European Union Studies Association. Schimmelfennig, F. and Engert S. and Knobel H. (2006). International Socialization in the New Europe: European Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic Change. Palgrave Macmillan Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2007). Candidate Countries and Conditionality, in Graziano, P. and Vink, M. (eds.) Europeanization: New Research Agendas. Palgrave Macmillan, (88-101). Schimmelfennig, F. and Engert S. and Knobel H. (2003). Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey. JCMS Vol. 41/3, (495–518). Schmitter, P (2001). International Context and Consolidation in L. Whitehead, The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas. Oxford University Press. Schumpeter, J. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York Harper and Row. Schumpeter, J. (1955). Imperialism: Social Classes. Meridian Book. Sedelmeier, U. (2006). Pre-accession Conditionality and Post-accession Compliance, in Après Enlargement: Legal and Political Responses in Central and Eastern European. European University Institute, (145-160). Sjursen, H. and Smith, K. E. (2004). Justifying EU Foreign Policy: The Logics Underpinning EU Enlargement, in Rethinking EU foreign policy: Europe in change, ( eds). Christiansen, T. and Tonra, B. Manchester University Press. Smith, K. E. (2003). The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality, in Marise, C. (ed) The Enlargement of the European Union. Oxford University. Solana, J. (2002). CFSP: The State of Union. Speech delivered to the EU ISS annual conference Paris 1st of July 2002. Stevens, A; Stevens, H. (2001). Brussels Bureaucrats. Palgrave. Stiglitz J.E, (1998). Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strategies, Policies, and Processes. Given as the Prebisch Lecture at UNCTAD, Geneva 19.10.1998. Stokke, O. (1995). Aid and political Conditionality. London: Franck Cass. Viotti, P. and Kauppi, M. (1993). International Relations Theory Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, Macmillan. Weber, S. (1995). European Union conditionality, in Eichengreen, B and Frieden, J. and Hagen, J. (eds.) Politics and institutions in an integrated Europe, Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. Weiler, H.H; Begg I; Peterson J. (2004). Integration in an Expanding European Union, Blackwell. Wiener, A and Diez, T. (2004). European Integration Theory, Oxford University Press. Witte, de B. (2002). Anticipating the Institutional Consequences of Expanded Membership of the European Union, International Political Science Review Vol 23/3, 235– 248 Zielonka, J. (2006). Europe as Empire. The Nature of the Enlarged European Union. Oxford University Press.
37
SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN Positiivse tingimuslikkuse tähtsus ja mõju Euroopa Liidu laienemispoliitikas Laienemisprotsess on viimase kuuekümne aasta jooksul Euroopa Liitu (EL) ja sellele eelnenud Euroopa Ühendusi märkimisväärselt muutnud, arvestades, et ühenduse loonud kuue riigiga on tänaseks liitunud veel kakskümmend üks uut liikmesriiki. Laienemised on olnud erinevad pea kõigis aspektides: kandidaatriikide arv on varieerunud ühest kümneni, liitumine on põhinenud nii riikidevahelisel diplomaatial kui ka põhjalikel kirjapandud reeglitel ning kestnud kolmest kümne aastani. Samas on laienemise eesmärgid, põhimõtted ja ametlikud reeglid säilinud üsna ühetaolisena kogu Euroopa Liidu eksistentsi vältel. Eesti jaoks olid laienemisprotsessi olulisimad aastad 1993–2004, mil laienemispoliitika põhimõtete ja tingimuste mõistmisest sõltus meie enda liitumise võimalikkus, tempo ja tingimused. Just antud perioodi alguses, 1993. aastal Kopenhaagenis Euroopa Ülemkogul, kujunes laienemispõhimõtete keskseks loogikaks nn. positiivne tingimuslikkus, mis määratles kandidaatriikidele seatavate tingimuste sisu, kriteeriumid, koostöövormi ja EL-i toetuse liitumiseelseks perioodiks. 1990. aastate alguses iseseisvunud, demokratiseerumisprotsessi läbinud ja EL-ga ühineda soovivate riikide arvukus ning ulatuslik reformide vajadus olid kesksed ajendid positiivse tingimuslikkuse väljakujunemises. Üksteist aastat hiljem, aastal 2004, mil kümme uut liikmesriiki ühinesid ELga, tõdeti varasemale liitumisprotsessile tagasi vaadates, et positiivse tingimuslikkuse ellukutsumine oli osutunud üle ootuste edukaks ning seda nähti ka edaspidi laienemispoliitika keskse mudelina. Positiivse tingimuslikkuse kasutamist laiendati ka EL-i naabruspoliitikasse ning arengukoostöö poliitikasse. Järgmiste liikmekandidaatide ja naabruspoliitika sihtriikide kaasamine ei osutunud paraku edukaks, mis omakorda tõstatas vajaduse positiivset tingimuslikkust kui meetodi toimimise eeltingimusi, loogikat ja keskseid muutujaid täiendavalt analüüsida. Uurimine on seda vajalikum ja ajakohasem, et möödunud kahekümneaastane positiivse tingimuslikkuse aktiivse kasutamise periood on pakkunud sobiva empiirilise pagasi, mille põhjal mudelit arendada ning tänastele praktilistele vajadustele kohandada. Käesoleva artiklitel põhineva doktoritöö eesmärgiks on pakkuda positiivse tingimuslikkuse toimimise loogika ja motiivide analüüsi ning teoreetilisi täiendusi EL-i laienemispoliitika kontekstis. Uurimus otsib vastust küsimustele, millised huvid, väärtused ja motiivid suunasid positiivse tingimuslikkuse kujunemist ning millised teooriad suudavad selle arengut kõige veenvamalt seletada. Doktoritöö moodustavad artiklid kasutavad kombineeritud metoodilisi lähenemisi, analüüsimaks EL-i positiivse tingimuslikkuse teoreetilisi juuri, ajaloolist arengut, praktilist toimimist ja selle sisemist toimeloogikat. Lisaks analüüsivad artiklid EL-i viienda ja kuuenda laienemisringi spetsiifilisi aspekte süvitsi ning annavad hinnangu EL-i väärtuselisele arengule laienemispoliitika näitel.
38
Doktoritöö sissejuhatav peatükk debateerib peamiste integratsiooniteooriate suutlikkuse üle EL laienemispoliitika positiivset tingimuslikkust kujundada ja seletada. Peatükk annab esmalt ülevaate positiivse tingimuslikkuse peamistest komponentidest, põhimõtetest, kriitilistest aspektidest, dilemmadest ja arengutest. See kaardistab peamiste integratsiooniteooriate komponendid ja põhiteesid ning analüüsib positiivse tingimuslikkuse peamiste komponentide kattuvust erinevate integratsiooniteooriate laienemist puudutavate teesidega. Doktoritöö publikatsioonide esimene artikkel („Conditionality and Dependence as the Key Elements in Simultaneous Democratization and Crises Prevention”) analüüsib positiivse tingimuslikkuse toimeloogikaid EL-i laienemispoliitika ja naabruspoliitika eesmärkide seisukohast. Kasutades võrdlevat meetodit, analüüsib artikkel tingimuslikkuse sihtriikide dilemmasid esitatud tingimuslikkusega nõustumisel või sellest keeldumisel, Eesti, Gruusia, Moldova ja Makedoonia näitel. Artikkel juhib tähelepanu positiivse tingimuslikkuse kasutamise riskidele ja piirangutele ning sellele, milliseid eeldusi ja kriitilisi muutujaid positiivne tingimuslikkus vajab, olemaks efektiivne vahend julgeoleku kindlustamisel ja demokratiseerimise läbiviimisel EL-i välissuhetes. Uurimusest järeldub, et tingimuslikkuse tulemuslikkus sõltub eelkõige sihtriigi motivatsioonist, mis omakorda sõltub eelkõige nn „lõplikust auhinnast”. Neil juhtudel, kus motivatsioon on ebapiisav, ei paranda efektiivsust ka strukturaalsed meetmed ega finantstoetused. Teine artikkel (“European Unionʼs Positive Conditionality Model in PreAccession Process”) vaatleb ja analüüsib EL-i laienemispoliitika positiivset tingimuslikkust ajaloolisest ja evolutsioonilisest aspektist. Siin tõusetub küsimus, kas ja kuivõrd on EL laienemisringide jooksul kasutanud positiivset tingimuslikkust samadel põhimõtetel ja samas ulatuses? Artiklist selgub, et positiivse tingimuslikkuse kasutamine EL-i laienemispoliitikas on olnud ebaühtlane ja ebajärjekindel, mis saavutas olulise tähtsuse alles viiendaks laienemisringiks. Seega ei pea paika viiendas laienemisringis kasutatud õigustus, et kõik liikmesriigid on pidanud täitma sarnaseid laienemiseelseid tingimusi. Artikkel toob välja, et varasemate laienemiste käigus ei pidanud EL positiivse tingimuslikkuse kasutamist otstarbekaks ja õiguspäraseks, mistõttu seda olulisel määral ka ei rakendatud. Kolmas artikkel (“The EU Neighbourhood Policy, Positive Conditionality and Reforms in the Former Soviet Space”) jätkab positiivse tingimuslikkuse praktilise mõju uurimisega. Artikli läbivaks teemaks on positiivse tingimuslikkuse kasutamise põhjendatus ja selle kasulikkus sihtriikidele. Sellest uurimusest selgub, et positiivse tingimuslikkuse intensiivistunud kasutamist alates viiendast laienemisringist ei saa põhjendada kõigi Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa kandidaatriikide nõrkade majanduslike ja ühiskondlike näitajatega, küll aga olnuks õigustatud positiivse tingimuslikkuse kasutamine viienda laienemisvooru nõrgimate riikide (eelkõige Bulgaaria ja Rumeenia) suhtes. Sotsiaal-majanduslikust aspektist lähtuvalt oli positiivse tingimuslikkuse mõju ebaühtlane, soodustades küll näiteks inflatsiooni kahanemist, aga samas ka tööpuuduse kiiremat kasvu.
39
Summas ilmnes positiivse tingimuslikkuse sihtriikidel keskmisest vähemal määral (alla ühe protsendi aastas) kiirem majanduskasv võrreldes EL-i liikmesriikide keskmisega. Neljas artikkel (“The Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: The Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation”) keskendub EL-i laienemispoliitika ning positiivse tingimuslikkuse hindamisprotsessi mõõdetavusele, läbipaistvusele ja erapooletusele. Uurimus analüüsib EL-i laienemisotsuste kujundamist kandidaatriikide suhtes ning väidab seda, et EL-i laienemisvalikud on mõjutatud paljuski liikmesriikide ja EL-i institutsioonide omahuvist. Uurimuse käigus kõrvutati Euroopa Komisjoni ametlike kandidaatriikide hindamisraporteid teiste rahvusvaheliste hindajate analoogsete töödega. Sellest võrdlusest ilmnes, et ühelt poolt on Euroopa Komisjoni hindamismetoodika olnud piisavalt sarnane teiste hindajate metoodikaga, pakkumaks vajadusel objektiivset hindamist. Teisalt on mitmetel juhtudel (näiteks Horvaatia ja Rumeenia puhul aastatel 2004–2006) ilmnenud poliitilistest huvidest tingitud süsteemseid moonutusi, mis kokkuvõttes mõjutasid ka lõplikke laienemisotsuseid. Järelikult on laienemiseelse positiivse tingimuslikkuse eesmärgid lõplike laienemisotsuste tegemisel viimasel viiel aastal vaheldunud: varasemalt trendiks olnud politiseeritud otsustamise ja institutsionaalsete huvide mõju on kasvanud ning mõõdetava arengu (Kopenhaageni Kriteeriumite osas) osatähtsus vähenenud. Viies artikkel (“Navigating between Policy and Populace: Estonia, its Accession Referendum and the EU Convention”) käsitles EL-i integratsiooni ja laienemiseelse tingimuslikkuse mõju sihtriigi poliitikate kujunemisele juhtumianalüüsi kaudu. Uurimus keskendus Eesti Vabariigi poliitilise eliidi prioriteetide kujundamisele EL-i liitumiskõneluste ja Euroopa Tulevikukonvendiga kattuval tegevusperioodil. Artikkel tõi välja väikeste kandidaatriikide puhul siseriikliku ressursside jaotumise olulisuse ja määravuse Euroopa integratsiooni küsimustes. Nii selgub, et kõikides kandidaatriikides universaalselt kasutatav positiivne tingimuslikkus toob väikeriikides kaasa täiendava surve poliitilisele ja administratiivsele eliidile ning asub ressursse ära tõmbama teistest poliitika valdkondadest. Seega seisavad väikesed kandidaatriigid ühinemiseelses olukorras dilemma ees, kas leppida madalama efektiivsusega EL-i positiivse tingimuslikkuse täitmisel või madalama võimekusega EL-i poliitikaga mitteseotud riikliku poliitika valdkondades. Kuues artikkel (“Life in Post-Communist Eastern Europe after the EU Membership: Estonia”) hindas tagasivaateliselt positiivse tingimuslikkuse mõju sihtriikidele tingimuslikkuse lõppemise järel, kasutades näitena Eesti Vabariigi sotsiaal-majanduslikku arengut aastatel 1991–2011, ning võrreldes Eesti arenguid teiste viiendas ja kuuendas EL-i laienemisvoorus liitunud Kesk- ja IdaEuroopa riikidega. Uurimus hindas ka positiivse tingimuslikkuse võimet valmistada kandidaatriike ette edukaks liikmelisuseks. Uurimistulemused näitavad, et EL-i positiivse tingimuslikkuse järgimine ja kriteeriumite täitmine oli Eesti puhul rahvuslik prioriteet. Eesti poolt reformiperioodil tehtud valikuid saab
40
ühelt poolt näha edu toovatena, kuid eelkõige on need olnud eristuvad ja radikaalsed, võrreldes teiste kandidaatriikidega. Selle tulemusel asetus Eesti 2010 aasta lõpuks enamike EL-i liikmesriikide sotsiaal-majanduslike arenguid kajastavate edetabelite esimestel või viimastel kohtadel, mille keskseks ühendavaks nimetajaks on olnud kiire ja kohanduv majandusareng ühes vähese tähelepanu osutamisega sotsiaalsele arengule. Summeerides doktoritöös kasutatud artiklite uurimistulemused, saab välja tuua järgmised olulised aspektid. Esiteks, positiivse tingimuslikkuse intensiivne kasutamine laienemispoliitika keskse instrumendina aastatel 1993–2006 oli erakordne nii oma mõju, komplekssuse, kui ka tähtsuse osas, arvestades seda, et varasemad laienemised ei sisaldanud mõjuvaid positiivse tingimuslikkuse komponente ning, et lähitulevikus aset leidvad laienemised, saavad üha enam põhinema poliitilisel valikul. Teiseks, laienemistingimuslikkuse eesmärgid ja väärtused on olnud pidevas arengus: kui esimestes laienemisringides domineerisid neo-funktsionalistlikud huvid, siis järgnevate laienemiste käigus kasvas esmalt valitsustevahelise mudeli mõju ning viimased kaks laienemisringi on toonud kaasa neo-liberaalse imperialismi ja neo-institutsionalismi mõju kasvu. See omakorda on tinginud laienemispoliitika praktilise teostamise eemaldumise varem domineerinud neofunktsionaalsest loogikast, mille tulemusel muutuvad laienemiskriteeriumid edaspidi pigem vähem läbipaistvateks ja rohkem poliitilisteks. Kolmandaks, positiivse tingimuslikkuse kasutamise perioodil on enamik kandidaatriike arenenud kiiremini ja stabiilsemalt, kui EL keskmiselt. Siiski ei ole kandidaatriikide statistilistes näitajates ilmnenud erakordseid edasiminekuid ja mitmed riigid on arenenud ka EL-i keskmisest aeglasemalt. Nii olid viies ja kuues laienemisring EL-i ajaloo pikima kestusega ja pärast rohkem kui 10 aastat kestnud tingimuslikkuse perioodi olid Bulgaaria ja Rumeenia endiselt vaeseimad liitujad EL-i ajaloos. Kui viienda laienemisringi käigus nähti positiivset tingimuslikkust kandidaatriikide universaalse ja efektiivse kaasamismeetodina, siis probleemide ilmnemine positiivse tingimuslikkuse kasutamisel viitab sihtriikide motiveeritusele kui kesksele riskitegurile selle meetme õnnestumisel. Viienda laienemisvooru edu tagasid pigem erakordselt koostöövalmid kandidaatriigid kui positiivse tingimuslikkuse tingimusteta rakendamine. Struktureeritud ja tehnilisel hindamisel põhineva positiivse tingimuslikkuse ideel on viimastel aastatel olnud aina vähem toetajaid ning mudeli tulevik näib olevat vähelubav. Ühelt poolt on laienemispoliitika ise muutumas politiseerituks ning mõõdetava progressi näitamine täidab üksnes osalist rolli lõplikes laienemisotsustes. Teisalt on täna vaid Horvaatial reaalne liitumisperspektiiv. Eelnevast tulenevalt vajab positiivne tingimuslikkus EL-i laienemispoliitika osana praktiliseks edasikestmiseks instrumentaariumi arendamist ja reformimist, kuivõrd tänasel kujul ei ole see olemasolevatele sihtriikidele motiveeriv ega paku ka EL-le oodatavat tulemuslikkust kandidaatriikide liitumisvalmiduse loomeks.
41
PUBLICATIONS
I
Veebel, Viljar (2004). Conditionality and Dependence as Key Elements in Simultaneous Democratization and Crises Prevention. Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2004, Varrak, pp. 63–84.
Conditionality and Dependence as K ey Ke Elements in Simultaneous Democratization and Crises Prevention Viljar Veebel
Introduction In 2003 two key documents summarized the EU security discussions over recent years: the draft Constitutional Treaty that described general methods of foreign and development policy, and Javier Solana’s “EU Security Strategy” which concentrated on defining EU interests, purposes, and areas of influence, as well as focusing on current crises, major problem areas, and problems associated with possible new partners. The main security problems for Europe were identified as regional conflicts which incited and fuelled terrorism, and instability on the borders of the EU, caused by poor governance, lack of democracy and ethnic conflicts. This article analyzes the European Union’s crises management choices in post-Cold War non-EU Europe. Is it possible to achieve, simultaneously, democratization, strong governance, sovereignty and peace in the region? One option is to let new states find their own way independently, prepare for possible crises by developing the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, and intervene when necessary. The second option is to develop dependent and conditional relations with unstable neighboring states – without waiting for possible crises to emerge, start guiding neighboring countries with ‘stick-and-carrot’ methods, using (and developing) their economic and political dependence and setting clear conditions for socio-economic reforms. In this article both models, and their possible combinations, will be discussed, but the primary focus will be on evaluating the efficiency of the dependence/conditionality model in providing crises management consistent
64
THE ESTONIAN FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK
with EU goals and interests. The main questions are: how conditionality develops, what are the preconditions, what is the logic behind success. As empirical input, efforts in 4 different countries over the last 13 years – Estonia, Macedonia, Moldova and Georgia – will be analyzed. Since many regional conflicts during the Cold War were the result of competing superpower attempts to widen their zones of influence (Brzezinski 1997), the collapse of the Soviet Union was seen as a good start for reducing the number and intensity of regional crises. Attention in security-building turned to solving and preventing regional low-intensity conflicts, worldwide democratization and a decreasing importance of using military measures in conflict resolution. Relying on the existing international law, world peace, democratization and sovereignty became the main values promoted by the developed world. Military conflicts were seen as rare and peripheral, avoidable by civil conflict prevention instruments. However, instead of “an end of history” the last 15 years the Eurasian region has witnessed an increasing number of highly difficult and complex conflicts. Both modern (reactive in Somalia) and postmodern (preventive in Kosovo) conflict management has not proven effective. At the same time, commitment of economic and human resources for the purpose of conflict resolution has tended decrease – societies are less ready to accept human losses and the high costs of intensive conflicts far away from home. However, staying out also proved not to be an option, as regional conflicts were seen as one of the main sources of terrorism (Solana 2003). This development has also been explained as a value shift from a modern to a postmodern stage (Cooper & Burrell 1988). The resources which were available before for reactive and military intervention are not available today. This process is reflected most of all in Europe. One of the main aims to create the EU with a three pillar system was to give member states more efficient tools for maintaining regional security and solving crises, using the already existing EC structures and resources. The main question was how to ensure stability, democracy and independence in transition countries while adhering at the same time to European value standards (the rule of law, the emphasis on human life as well as human rights). This new situation had three main characteristics: first, any escalated crisis in these regions that required reactive measures tended to bring with it automatically high (unacceptable) costs both in terms of economic and human casualties, but also cross-border influence; second, neither the European Union nor any of its member countries had any instruments for managing such complex crises; generally they also lacked the political will to create such instruments; and third, using reactive measures tended to escalate the conflicts.
VILJAR VEEBEL
65
One of the most intriguing conceptualizations of the problem can be seen if we combine two separate theories: Barrington Moore on democratization and the work by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder on the link between democratization and war. According to Moore, democratization that is imposed or driven by external influences will tend to cause a reemergence of regime instability and crises (Moore 1967). Following the research by Mansfield and Snyder, countries undergoing regime transition (and especially democratization) will tend to be more aggressive and war-prone (both outward and against autonomies or minorities) (Synder 2000). To this we can add a third consideration – to what extent does the promotion of democracy, by an organization such as the EU, realistically reduce that country’s scope for manoeuvre or reduce its self-determination or even sovereignty? These considerations imply that any democratization process can have three possible consequences–democracy, stability and self-determination–only, but only two of them can be achieved simultaneously. 1.Self-determination and democracy with instability. 2.Democracy and stability without self-determination. 3.Stability and self determination without democracy. As democracy is a priority value, and regional crises are unacceptable for regional powers such as the EU, an important thesis of this article is that in a process of democratization that is promoted or monitored by an external power, the principle of self-determination or/and economic and political autonomy of the democratizing country will be sacrificed. Put in practical terms: if the EU decides to promote democracy and stability, its prioritized instruments will be those which increase target country dependence and develop a conditional assistance relation such as an inbalance in the level of foreign trade with the EU, or dependency on substantial EU aid. Concerning the remaining two alternatives, the option of self-determination and democracy with instability is worth examining since it involves the emergence of areas of chronic conflict. In these cases the response of an organization such as the EU should be to develop a rapid reaction mechanism for humanitarian intervention. Dependence (as key variable) is defined in this article as a situation where the subject state(s) obtains from the EU some resource (mainly economic, but also political) vital for their national interest, and is not able to replace it or compensate for its absence (possible third participation can be a critical factor). Dependence is seen as the inevitable effect of economic or political reforms (modernization, transformation) (Gilpin 1987: 282-85).
66
THE ESTONIAN FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK
As an opposite term to dependence this article uses autonomy, sovereignty and self–determination. As they are describing different levels and aspects of independence (Bodin 2001: 58, 59), parallel use will even help to specify the type of possible dependence. Dependence in the form of interdependence can also be binding on all participants (European integration process), but reduces the ability to set conditions (Keohane & Nye 1977). Dependence is usually influenced by geographical and time factors. Conditionality has a clear connection with dependence, as it is usually possible only in a situation of dependence. Conditionality means in this context a situation where one county is setting demands and conditions on another one, for obtaining economic or political resources. Conditionality varies in scale – from general political or military partnership to very specific demands connected to ratifying essential treaties or lifting economic sanctions. Conditionality is also influenced by subject state willingness to follow conditions – in the 1990s the Baltic states had a quite similar level of dependence first on Russia and later on the EU. Both set conditions for ongoing partnership, with quite contrary results. Conditionality usually indicates waiting for change after the condition is met. It is either the continuation of status quo, or an improvement in relations. The first option could also be interpreted as the imposition of sanctions, the lifting of which is contingent on the subject state’s willingness to change. The theoretical conclusion of this study is that for countries in transition, whose degree of economic/political independence is likely to generate crisis situations, the use of conditionality and the generation of economical/political dependence represent the most effective and reasonable instruments of intervention for organizations such as the EU.
Dependence and conditionality in EU policy Conditional or dependence components can be readily observed in an analysis of the EU foreign relations network, beginning with the EEC in a wide area starting from development assistance and ending up with WTO. Some political economists (e.g. Robert Gilpin) see the developed dependence creation model, and the following conditionality, as a main source of economic and political success of the EU in world arena. The dependence/conditionality model has also proved to be useful in countering dynamic threats, and influencing crises outside Europe, before these crises impinged on Europe. In situations where crises management was seen inappropriate, and where international law did not support
VILJAR VEEBEL
67
use of force, economic and diplomatic (soft) measures were considered central. In the development of dependence and conditionality two different lines can be seen: Integrated dependence: with symmetric dependence, there exists a clear competence division between member states (and in some level with candidate countries). It is a stakeholder model, where the member state trades its own sovereignty for influence over other member states. In this situation, the power of the member state can even grow over a long period (as in the cases of Germany and Ireland). Robert Gilpin (1987: 285) introduces this possibility as inclusive and dependent development. The roots of the integrated dependence approach are already in the Schuman Plan and the creation of the ECSC. Key elements here were mutual economic benefit and security, which was later replaced by inseparable economic interdependence and long term solidarity. A half century of prosperity in Western Europe can be seen as the main result. The application of conditionality and dependence policies in the democratization process has proven to be highly successful in avoiding crises. Spain, Greece and Portugal are good examples. Dependence model: implies an asymmetric relationship between countries. Countries seen as possible crises areas are included, with their economic needs and weakness used as levers to advance EU interests. No mutual dependence develops. This approach contains both general post-colonial approaches and the special experience of Europe. Most complex examples here are networks created with developing countries through the Lomé and Cotonou conventions. These are formally presented as equal partnership networks, but are in practice the main EU instruments used to persuade and press ACP countries towards following human rights policies, with economic assistance offered as a “carrot”. The main difference from the previous model, and purposes in that model, is to keep the dependent country sufficiently provided with resources, but to avoid options for changing the patron country or develop independence. This model has also been seen as systematic exploitation: the centre needs for its success the periphery as a market and a raw resource provider. The difference from a neo-colonialist model (economic dominance, military interference, elite collaboration, etc.) is largely theoretical – increasing asymmetry in the dependence relationship is seen as leading to a more neocolonial relationship. The neocolonialist argument is also supported with the Lomé treaty’s 25years’ experience: the GDP of member states has grown slightly, but economic competitiveness and export quantity has fallen. This model has also faced some major setbacks, as in Middle-East, caused by third party interference by the USA or Russia.
68
THE ESTONIAN FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK
EU and candidate countries’ relationships qualify in most aspects for the integrated dependence model, but also have some asymmetric elements. The process was started in spirit of “sovereign self-determination”, but was followed by a conditional relationship in which sovereignty was shared only in one way – to candidate countries and by them. Relations between the EU and Russia or the USA can also be seen through a model of the interdependence prism with some conditional aspects. EC and US relations were supported during the Cold War period by a mutually beneficial partnership, where the military support of the US for European security was developed, using largely EC economic resources. While there was threat from Soviet Russia, the partnership endured. Inseparable dependence did not develop. EU and Russian relations have also in recent years developed towards dependence. On the one hand, trade resources are beneficial for both sides, on the other hand the economy (and dependence with conditionality) is the most effective tool in defending EU member states’ interest in Russia (and Ukraine), considering its military and political capability. This partnership is replaceable for both sides, but at high economic cost. The main conditions are connected to human rights and democracy questions and in some aspects of Russian behavior in the “near abroad”.
EU conflict prevention capabilities and instruments. Is ESDP the main alternative? In the management and prevention of crises, the EU did rely, before the 1990’s, on economic measures and conditionality policies. After failure in Kosovo and Bosnia, the last decade has been full of discussions to find alternatives and new models. New initiatives were needed in 20022003 to prepare the CFSP and ESDP articles in the Constitutional Treaty. Progress was mainly in institutional, financial and legal aspects, but discussions which general strategy to choose and how to divide roles with member states remained open. It was followed by Secretary General Javier Solana’s “EU Security Strategy” presented in 2003. Solana sees terrorism as a main problem, but as it is a result of regional conflicts and state failure, it needs a multilateral approach with preventive and cooperative solutions. The main areas of interest are Middle East, Balkans, Caucasus, Ukraine and Belarus and the main methods mostly are civilian, diplomatic and economic. Being quite successful in defining EU interests, purposes, areas of influence, and potential crises areas, as well as possible partners, it offered very little in developing a solution model.
VILJAR VEEBEL
69
But Solana’s Strategy document represents here only one side, developing ESDP and the creation of a defense dimension is ongoing simultaneously – when it comes to possible selection of options, it must offer more alternatives. When looking for new concepts for regional stability, the main idea is not to replace the existing framework, but to improve it by adding new components. So the question is where to concentrate new investments – to continue to invest in traditional non-military measures or to develop military resources as the least developed part of the EU security model. The tendency towards universality (and desire for universal package for crises management) appeared already in creation of CFSP in 1992 and continued in the creation of ESDP in 1999. This process has been supported by a restricted number of possible crises areas, starting from Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Middle East and North Africa. At the same time earlier experience and habit in using different models in those areas can be seen as obstacles. Table 1. Main possible crises areas, following Solana’s Strategy document AREA
TOOLS
PROSPECTIVE TOOLS
Ukraine
Economic conditionality
Economic conditionality
INFLUENCE Moderate
Belarus
Diplomatic
Economic conditionality
Low
Moldova
Diplomatic
Economic and political
Moderate
Middle-East
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Low
Croatia
Diplomatic and economic
Economic conditionality
Moderate
conditionality, RRM
Macedonia
Diplomatic and economic
Economic conditionality
High
Serbia and
Economic and political
Economic and political
High
Montenegro
conditionality, RRM
conditionality, RRM
Bosnia and
Economic and political
Economic and political
Herzegovina
conditionality, RRM
High
conditionality, RRM
After Kosovo and Bosnia a lot of attention was paid to the idea of using RRM (Rapid Reaction Mechanism) as humanitarian intervention tool for universal managing of emerging regional conflicts. A defined category called Petersberg task mission (Kosovo type) was seen as most appropriate and reliable. However, such a military approach could only be applied selectively – certainly the two biggest (Ukraine and Russia), as well as the intractable Middle-East crises, could not be treated with military measures. The development of the RRM has been heavily influenced by wider guidelines and values set in the Treaty: intervention follows UN, NATO and OSCE positions and action; international law and peaceful solution are seen as their main purpose: in-
70
THE ESTONIAN FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK
ternational need for civilian support in conflict prevention, regulation and rehabilitation. An already existing network, providing structure and co-operation within NATO was the second main obstacle between member states – NATO members see a duplicative structure as irrational and non-NATO countries mainly do not support the development of military intervention tools. In recent years, previous support by the USA for creating an autonomously capable EU force has gradually changed to concern and, more recently, to outright criticism. The development of the ESDP has also been hindered by its substantial cost to the member states, a cost that is additional to the funding provided for the conditionality and dependence model through the EU budget. Last but not least, doubts about a possible loss of sovereignty and autonomy are preventing some member states from supporting the development of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism and forces. Nevertheless, when compared with the previous 40 years’ efforts and results, recent progress has been quite remarkable. With the creation of the ESDP in 1999, the goal was set for the member states to be ready to provide, collectively, for a full Petersberg task mission consisting of 60 000 men with air and naval support and capacity to stay in the area of conflict for 12 months. Preparations also began for cooperation in intelligence, strategic transportation and subordination. The Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue and Helsinki Force Catalogue also defined detailed characteristics for member states for participating in Petersberg Task mission. The European Capabilities Action Plan increased the force catalogue to 100 000 men, 400 planes, and 100 ships in order to guarantee more rapid deployment of forces into the area of conflict. In order to avoid possible opposition inside the EU, the possibility for opting out of the ESDP was provided for member states. Denmark was the first member state to make use of it. After the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo, the member states showed some enthusiasm for the development of the RRM, however, this enthusiasm was significantly diminished after the terrorist attacks and anti-terrorist campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. By 2003 the emphasis had shifted back to long term, non-military conflict prevention and resolution measures.
Has conditionality and dependence proved to be successful? Evaluation of practical cases will help to identify elements of destabilization and elements which increase prospects for success in conflict prevention, with a particular focus on the conditionality and dependence model. To analyze the efficiency of dependence and conditionality
VILJAR VEEBEL
71
model, two aspects need to be taken into consideration: First, in the process of democratization and conflict prevention, which model of intervention has been used by the EU? Secondly, in comparison with the other main intervention models, how effective have been the EU intervention efforts. From the position of test-countries, the analysis will focus first on the type (economic, political or military, influencing either autonomy, sovereignty or self- determination) and level (low, moderate, or high in comparison with other cases) of dependence. As the main crises areas marked in Solana’s “Security Strategy” are in the Eastern Europe, where one additional variable is Russian influence, the analyzed cases make use of similar earlier experience. The cases – Estonia, Macedonia, Moldova and Georgia – were chosen since they are very different in dependent variable aspect, but are similar in size and geopolitical situation. Other problems in common are numerous minorities in border areas, claiming not just minority rights but autonomy, and the need for external influence to avoid conflict. All 4 countries selected for comparison are in the transition stage towards democracy, but starting conditions, choices, and outcomes by the year 2003 have differed substantially. Questions to be answered or tested: 1. Which type and level of dependence is presented? The ability to compensate or replace? Possible specific geopolitical, ethno-political or economic aspects? 2. What are the main preconditions and variables for conditionality emerging? 3. Type and level of conditionality, degree of progress, and changes during 13 years? 4. Extent of effectiveness of EU influence by use of dependence/ conditionality, possible alternatives? 5. What were the critical variables that provided a successful outcome with conditionality (if used)? From the theoretical research aspect the analysis could include one more test-country – Belarus, which has chosen a quite rare (for Europe) third option –independence and crises management without democracy and conditionality. But as the case provides very little added value for EU crises management model discussion, it is not tested. Of the selected countries, Estonia has certainly the longest experience with conditionality and therefore the analysis examines the Estonian case in more depth than the others.
72
THE ESTONIAN FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK
Moldova Moldova after independence was in a quite promising situation: cultural relations and common past with Romania and no border with Russia. Although it was the first former Soviet republic that elected a communist for president, Moldova headed towards Western Europe and partnership with Romania in the first half of the 1990s. The main problems were concentrated Russian minority (ca 30%) and Russian unwillingness to close its military bases. The economy was highly dependent on exports to Russia (43%). In the 1990s Moldova was westernizing, discussions about rejoining Romania and joining the EU were quite popular, but no practical steps were taken. Due the economic problems (and attempts to overcome them) support for Russian-oriented political parties grew and in 2001 pro-Russian V. Voronin was elected president (instead of pro-national M. Snegur). While limiting its partnership with Romania (trade ca 10%), Moldova has at the same time proved to be a very unstable partner for Russia, participating in most anti–Russian coalitions in the CIS. As a result, no clear dependence relation has developed with Russia or EU, mainly because of the lack of interest of both parties. The EU is not actively influencing Moldova’s democratization, as Romanian membership is only possible at the earliest in 2007, leaving Moldova far from EU borders for many years. Relying economically on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and politically on the OSCE has been proven insufficient. As a result Moldova today is a provisional state, attempting transition, which causes regional problems not because of its strength or aggressive foreign policy, but its weakness and its unstable government. The main difference from Estonia or Macedonia is that Moldova is continuing to follow unconditional relations with EU and Russia. The Russian approach has been more general and distant, but Moldova was invited to join the Russian-Belarus Union. In any case, Russia is satisfied with the current situation, having achieved its goals in Transdnestria - Russian forces have remained on Moldovan territory east of the Dniester River supporting the Slavic majority population, mostly Ukrainians and Russians, who have proclaimed a “Transdnestrian Republic” (which is officially part of Moldova but in practice self-governing). From a theoretical perspective Russian-Moldova dependence type qualifies more as “exploitative”. In the Moldovan case, similarities with condition setter change seen earlier in Estonia, can be found. The main reason why Moldovan President Voronin surprisingly supported the EU, not Russian, peace plan for Transdnestria, was the Russian supportive reaction in Transdnestrian presidential elections held in 2002. Moldovan political choices are also
VILJAR VEEBEL
73
slightly influenced by OSCE conditions for crises prevention, and a long border with Ukraine.
Macedonia Macedonia achieved independence in November 1991. Being the least developed of the former Yugoslavian republics it managed a fast-paced reform of its economy. The main economic partner was Yugoslavia. Relations with the EU were underdeveloped because of the conflict with Greece, therefore Macedonia was not among the first candidates invited to negotiate accession to the EU. Independent democracy building ended in year 2001, with the ethnic Albanian insurgency. To stabilize the situation in Macedonia, European countries (using EU and OSCE structures) demanded changes in ethnic policies. Macedonia has followed the path of traditional sovereignty building (reinforced by the geopolitical situation), trying to avoid any external pressure or conditionality. Of all the selected cases, Macedonia has the most balanced foreign trade: export is divided between Serbia and Montenegro 23.1%, Germany 20.6%, Greece 8.8% and Italy 8.6%. Main import partners are Germany 12.6%, Greece 10.9%, Serbia and Montenegro 9.3% and Russia. Foreign debt is also extraordinary low for a transition country: 1.3 bln USD or 650 USD per capita (compare for example with Estonian 2000 USD per capita). Before 2001 the Macedonian economy was interdependent with its main partners, but not causing dependence or conditionality. From a political perspective the situation was also conducive for independence: Serbia was not able or willing to pressure it and the EU did not have a sufficiently supportive starting situation (not enough economic dependence and co-operative political environment). Possible partnership with the EU was also blocked by the opposition of Greece. After the ethnic Albanian problems in 2001, Macedonia found itself in a new situation, with all OSCE member states stressing strong conditionality and autonomy for the Albanians. As the state had become economically vulnerable and earlier partners Serbia and Montenegro were also facing conditionality, no alternative options were feasible. After 10 years of a high level of independence Macedonia has ended up with the deepest conditionality level among the four test countries. But in contrast to Moldova and Georgia it has avoided state failure. Macedonia represents a model where a country in transition in supportive geopolitical and economic position, chooses democracy building
74
THE ESTONIAN FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK
without conditionality, missing at the same time both external pressure and guidance. After a successful decade it still ended up with a civil war, economic problems, and the necessity of following conditional relations with EU. The situation after the civil war is quite extraordinary, Macedonia being only lightly economically dependent and well-governed, faces strong pressures in the areas of state autonomy and self-determination. For the EU, the Macedonian case is providing an example of a possible scenario between humanitarian intervention mission and pure dependence/conditional scenario. Although it did not represent the most comfortable case, with a cooperative elite and strong economic dependence, an emerging crisis was effectively forestalled by European measures. The emergence of the crisis after 10 years of independence suggests that Mansfield’s and Snyder’s thesis about the instability of democratizing countries (even with stable starting conditions) needs to be considered, and that a sustainable peace requires a preventive conditional policy. When evaluating EU-Macedonia relations from the Gilpin model, change towards conditional/dependence/progress model is evident.
Georgia Of all the countries tested, Georgia had most complicated starting conditions. A strong former communist elite, and a lack of industry and technology-based economy. Three different autonomy claims have led to ethnic separation in Abkhazia, Ajaria and South Ossetia (all having their own governments today), and Russian military bases deny the government effective control over the entirety of the state’s internationally recognized territory. Problematic areas are also the Pankisi Gorge in the Akhmeti region and the Argun Gorge in Abkhazia, regarded as terrorist training areas. As a result, large swathes of Georgian territory are not controlled by the central government. Unlike other cases countries facing minority problems, Georgia has large numbers of temporary migrants living in Russia. Economic and trade relations are quite balanced: as only approximately 10 % of foreign trade is with Russia (Turkey is the main partner). Economic development and stability is highly dependent on successful balancing between traditional Russian pressure and a very active US interest (Georgia has one of the highest levels of US foreign aid per capita).Existing dependence is mostly military and political, brought about by a very low level of military expenditure (0.6% from GDP) and, a high number of
VILJAR VEEBEL
75
foreign troops on Georgian territory. Russia promised to withdraw its troops in 2002 but still has 2 military bases in Georgia. The USA also has military advisers in the country training Georgian troops. Additionally, the OSCE has a monitoring mission. A shift towards change can be seen also in military aspect: in 2001 Georgia hosted naval exercises of 14 NATO members and several post-Soviet countries called “Cooperative Partner – 2001”. In 2002 Georgia hosted similar army exercises called “Best Effort 2002”. The main problems however are political, Georgia, left alone (actually in-between Russian, OSCE, EU and USA influence) with its democratization process, faced at the end of 2003 a second political crisis and ‘rose revolution’ with President Shevardnadze’s resignation. The first was in 1991-92 with the overthrow of the government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. From an EU perspective Georgia belongs to the South Caucasus conglomerate of poor, weak, and unstable states (with Armenia and Azerbaijan), that are part of the Russian sphere of influence. The EU has therefore shown very little initiative in Georgia. To maintain Russian confidence and introduce European values in the region, The Council of Europe and the OSCE have made some joint efforts to improve the electoral system, failing, for the most part, to do so. Once again all three states were analyzed and jointly assessed. The absence of an EU strategy towards Georgia is simultaneously the cause and result of poor representation of EU interests. At the time when attention was focused on CEE countries, Georgia was left out because of lack of sovereignty and strong Russian and US interests in region. As there were numerous third party players, and central government was weak, no conditional model was possible. Nor did the EU at any time, have a vision or strategy outlining the type of relation or integration that should be developed. A lack of strategy makes it difficult to meet the interests of the Georgian local elite, (finding itself between Russian, EU and USA influence) for concrete institutional framework (like OSCE membership or NATO Euro Atlantic Partnership Council). The EU has only offered a general concept of Europeanizing, concentrating on building democracy, transparency, civilian control etc. as well as some financial support through OSCE for border security and observer missions. To improve the situation, an existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1999) will be supported by a Special EU Representative for South Caucasus, beginning in 2003. Developing a special strategy for the South Caucasus republics was discussed in General Affairs and External Relations Council of 16 in June 2003 and it was agreed to return to this question at a later stage. The EU’s economic influence has been
76
THE ESTONIAN FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK
growing, through the development of the TRASECA and INOGATE transcontinental transportation projects, as well through the oil pipeline being constructed from Baku to Supsa (in Georgia) and onwards to Jeihan in Turkey. Georgia qualifies as a non-conditional democratization case, ending up with active and repeated crises. Georgia represents a completely static example, following only one model during its 13 years of independence: dependence but no conditionality. The fundamental reason for that is the low level of administrative authority. The cases of Georgia and Moldova enable us to see linear relationship between, on one hand, the EU interests for conditionality and target country distance from EU, and, on the other hand, the political willingness of local elites to cooperate.
Estonia Estonia, with a common border with Russia and having a long history of Russian, German and Swedish rule, has strong geopolitical and historical support for a possible dependence/conditionality relation. After re-independence Estonia found itself in economic dependence and conditional relations with Russia. Economic dependence – about 50% of foreign trade with Russia and its CIS partners, was taken into account both in Russian foreign policy and by the EC (later EU). On the Russian side it consisted of strong demands in bilateral relations and a demand to include Russia in the negotiations between EU and Estonia. Relations between Russia and Estonia are seen as main potential source for conflict or crises. The basic framework for prevention is OSCE where both sides are represented. The Russian attempt to impose conditionality was unsuccessful due to the following factors: first, meeting its demands would not give any advantage, compared to continuing the status quo and signing some essential treaties. Secondly, after the Russian economic crisis in 1995, the level of exports to Russia diminished to the point of being theoretical. A rapid re-orientation took place in 1995–1997, and, by 2003, 85% of foreign trade and investment was with EU or with candidate countries. Conditionality relations can, accordingly, be divided into 3 different periods: · 1991-1994 Dependence and demands from Russia. No working conditionality, because of political unwillingness
VILJAR VEEBEL
77
· 1994-1998 Reorientation period, balanced trade and political interests. Beginning of conditionality with EU (general and indirect). OSCE as main condition setter. · 1997-2003 Accession negotiations with EU, growing economic dependence and clear conditions. Reorientation from a previous Russian dependency had strong political (but not economical) support immediately after re-independence. Rapid and influential change in the situation was caused by a chain reaction: the first nationalist and market liberal government introduced an uncompromising citizenship and language policy, Russia countered with economic sanctions and a list of demands (focused on the question of Russian minority status). Finding itself under strong Russian pressure, in the middle of 1995 the choice for Estonia was either dependence and conditions from EU and NATO, or meeting Russian conditions. Since Estonia had successfully negotiated the closing of Russian military bases, and since Russian political parties never succeeded in joining forces, the only dependence was economic: foreign trade and balance of payments. The main question was whether Estonia could compensate for, or replace, import of raw materials and oil, and find new markets for its products, however, as the Russian market was already closing, it was left with only one option. In the process of decreasing Russian economic influence and developing partnership with EU countries, Russia started to use the OSCE, Council of Europe and the EU in conditionality. From 1993-98, OSCE conditions played a central role in the EU-Estonia-Russia relationship triangle. After his visit to Estonia, CSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities Max van der Stoel made numerous recommendations regarding Estonian ethnic policy. As CSCE (OSCE) positive approval in human rights question was seen as a precondition for EU accession, and, at the same time Russia was actively following a line of sanctions and conditions against Estonia, this period can be seen as a transitional or double-conditionality stage. With the submission of her EU membership application in 1995 Estonia developed all main preconditions for irreplaceable economic and political dependence with EU. This led to marginalization of trade with Russia (generally to the same level as with Latvia). Following the government’s unwillingness to meet Russian conditions, the EU can be seen, from 1999 on, as the main condition setter. Political relations with the USA and economic relations with Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine provided some balancing effect for growing dependence. During the EU membership negotiations, the situation has continued to develop in the same direction: Estonian foreign trade bal-
78
THE ESTONIAN FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK
ance is growing and is in deep deficit, and is being balanced only by investments and pre–accession partnership with the EU. In exchange, Estonia has improved its citizenship policy, followed the EU rules in fiscal and economic policy, environmental policy, legal harmonization, etc. It was very logical for the EU in the middle of the 1990s to start conditional relation with Estonia: given its resource supply and export market problems, the highest trade deficit in the CEE countries (compensated by EU investments and aid), and the high foreign debt per capita, Estonia was in no position to reject the opportunity. Assistance has consisted of financial support, opening EU market for Estonian exports and administrative assistance. Support was directly connected to control, evaluation and conditionality. Detailed conditions were followed by the Copenhagen Criteria and at the same time took into account concrete Estonian problems. The main demands and conditions towards membership were: 1. Democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for minority rights. The main concerns were about Russian-speaking minority status – social and political inclusiveness. 2. Free market and the ability to manage in the EU single market conditions. A large foreign trade deficit was seen as a possible source for crises. 3. Administrative capacity and legal harmonization. In recent years, according to progress reports, these are seen as the most problematic. The EU Commission’s Delegation in Estonia acted as a central body and the annual Candidate countries’ Progress Reports were the main benchmark for documenting progress. Estonia’s size would leave the possibility also for an alternative approach (similar to Macedonia). As nationalist parties were highly influential during the 1990s, an Estonian government left without external conditions could follow a rather radical minority policy, which could cause Russian-supported unrest in northeastern Estonia and the need for external assistance. A “Macedonian scenario” could mean staying out from the first enlargement round and economical stagnation for Estonia. From the EU perspective, Estonia’s progress has certainly been one of success. From complicated starting conditions in 1991 – Russian military bases, minority problems evaluated as highly dangerous (OSCE), economic dependence on Russia, Estonia has emerged by 2004 as a new EU member state. In recent years political partnership with USA has developed rapidly, one the one hand it is based on similar traditional security and economic values, on the other hand some negative influence has been
VILJAR VEEBEL
79
caused by EU conditions to simplify language and citizenship policy. The Estonian conservative-national coalition finds partnership (and conditions) with USA more attractive on account of national sovereignty. Evaluating Estonia from a theoretical aspect, the pure dependence case can be seen (from 1996), with elements of integration and dependent development. The difference from other test cases is especially noteworthy, considering the quite similar starting conditions. Willingness to accept all the EU conditions to gain support and accession was the consistent policy of all Estonian governments. This model has also proved to be beneficial for Estonia – resulting in internal stability, successful administrative reforms, and currently one of the fastest rates of GDP growth in Europe. Data 1. Comparative conditions to Estonia RUSSIA 1991–1998: 1. Special status for Russian language and culture 2. Either Estonian or Russian citizenship by applicant’s preferral. (Later, citizenship for military pensioners and non-citizens’ children) 3. Handing over Nevsky Cathedral to the Russian Orthodox Church 4. Withdraw demand to refer to border line marked in the 1920 Treaty of Tartu 5. Withdraw claim to previously Estonian territory now in the Russian Federation OSCE 1993–2000 1. Soften citizenship policy and language exam demands 2. Take additional measures for minority integration 3. Political and economic inclusiveness 4. Solving identification and travel documentation problems EU 1995–2003 1. Democracy, rule of law, human rights and respecting minority rights 2. Free market and ability to manage in single market conditions. Big foreign trade deficit was seen as possible source for crises 3. Administrative capacity and legal harmonization. In recent years, seen as most problematic in pre-accession framework
80
THE ESTONIAN FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK
Comparative analysis All four countries tested were quite similar in 1991: small states, neighboring bigger state (Macedonia is an exception), problems with autonomy claims by minority groups supported by neighboring countries and inevitable economic dependence. To evaluate conditionality changes, dependence dynamics is critical variable Table 2. COUNTRY
Georgia
Moldova
Russia (low)
Russia (low)
Macedonia
Estonia
VARIABLE Dependence source and level
Yugoslavia
Russia
(low)
1991-1995
EU since 2001
EU 1995–2003
(high)
(high)
Dependence/
Dependence/
(moderate) US (low) Dependence purpose Economical dependence
Exploitation
Exploitation
development
development
Low
High
Low
High
Political dependence
High
Low
High
High
Geopolitical conditions towards
Strongly
Balanced
Not supportive
Supportive
dependence
supportive
State authority and autonomy
Failed
Low
Moderate
High
Democratization success
Low
Moderate
Moderate
High
Crises prevention success
Failed
Low
Failed
High
Economic development, GDP PPP
$3200
$2500
$5000
$11000
Conditionality model
No
No
1991- 2001: no Detailed
Conditions source
No
No
OSCE, EU
OSCE, EU
Conditionality progress with EU
No
No
Developing
Stable
Specialty
State failure
Separation
Minority
Full political
autonomy
support for
2001: detailed
conditionality
Estonia represents the highest degree and stability of dependence, the only change or progress is source of condition: first Russia and then the EU, with the difference that Russian conditions were rejected, whereas EU conditions have been seen as one of the most important political priorities. Macedonia is the most dynamic of the compared countries, where dependence on the EU was, until 2001, considerably lower for a long period, where the state was more sovereign, and where only local tensions and military fighting required external reactive measures.
81
VILJAR VEEBEL
Moldova, situated on the periphery of the EU regional security concept border and more within the Russian zone of influence, represents a strong case of a state not having high dependence or remarkable conditional relation with the EU, ending up with a provisional state. Moldova is facing the similar syndrome as Georgia: the economy is dependent and political elite looks for possible partners, but because of weak authority and resources, neither Romania, Russia nor EU have started cooperating in order to improve relations and conditionality relation. It does not mean that Moldova has not shown any attempts or dynamics – the first period of pro-Europeanism was replaced by a pro-Russian, and by 2003, the first signs of an U-turn towards EU and NATO can be observed. In the middle of axis (Figure 1) Macedonia and Moldova represent a dynamic pair moving from independence towards conditionality and co-operation. While dependence has grown in both counties, conditionality shows progress only in Macedonia: this highlights the importance of local political will and autonomy. Figure 1. Dynamics and level of conditionality
!
!
Estonia
Macedonia
Moldova
Georgia
Highly conditional
Highly conditional
Mostly unconditional
Fully unconditional
Stable/progressive
Dynamic/Progressive
Slow changes
Stable
Georgia represents a stable form of dependence in all of its aspects. Combined with a lack of self-determination and ability to control its territory, conditional relations are quite weak (restricted largely to negotiating with Russia and the US for military bases) and non-EU in origin. The Georgian example is more analogous to pure Russian neo-colonialism. To prevent possible confrontation with Russia or USA, the EU has attempted to develop conditional relations. The experience of recent history (civil war, 3 separations, and 2 overthrows of an elected president), suggests that isolation, or counting on the Russian conditionality model efficiency, is not conducive to regional peace. According to the test cases, the EU willingness and level of intervention depends on two main variables – distance from the EU border and political support for conditionality. Estonia, being less than 100 kilometers from the EU border, and ready to accept conditions, has received the most support. Moldova was for a long period the second favorite, but after the Romanian failure to stay among acceding member states, and the political elite’s re-orientation towards Russia, it gains less interest. Macedonia may gain some benefits from Slovenian membership, while the possible Alba-
82
THE ESTONIAN FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK
nian refugee problem, and its economic consequences, have induced the political elite to accept European conditions. The analysis also indicated once again that conditionality can emerge only at a level of high dependence, a situation supported by political willingness of both sides. While small states in principle tend to be more dependent, all test countries had at least 2 possible dependence choices, and some smaller partners for additional balancing. Therefore, the conditional relation thus created is a political choice not a historical or geopolitical process. The analysis supported the hypothesis that in the democratization process one or more of its main goals need to be sacrificed: either stability or independence. Why does conditionality work and develop once started? The logic is quite similar to the success of integration after the creation of the ECSC. Growth of wealth is at the heart of this process. By bringing stability (by minority status development, offering new markets or counterbalancing big neighbors), conditionality supports economic development. It leads to economic development, which brings new supporters among the elite and ethnic minority groups. Possible sources and initiators of instability – minority groups – benefit through economic development (like in Estonia) or representation (Macedonia), and begin to cooperate. Ending dependence with the EU resulted in economic setback and instability. No governing coalition has been prepared to face a possible loss of popularity among voters and financers.
Conclusions In a world where security considerations set democracy and sovereignty as priorities, and rapid reaction mechanisms as the main crises regulation tool, concepts of dependence and conditionality may seem obsolete. Economic suggestions and evaluations from EU and IMF to CEE countries, often offer criticism of the too dependent developing countries. States with imbalanced foreign trade, payments balance deficit and low military costs, are often listed as possible sources of regional insecurity and receive demands to improve their capacity to act independently. However, practical analysis indicates quite the opposite result: countries with continuous control and conditionality manage to avoid major crises. State failure or governance problems arise mostly in countries that have high levels of self-determination and sovereignty. In a crisis or provisional state stage, those countries have two options, either to head uncon-
VILJAR VEEBEL
83
ditionally towards full state failure (Georgia), or to turn to conditionality (like Macedonia). Conditionality relations from the EU proved to be stabilizing method, giving in a 13 years period not only economic advantages but also higher state authority and autonomy. But conditionality cannot be seen as a determined consequence of crises, dependence and EU neighborhood: a linear dependence between setting conditionality and existing autonomy appeared – even highly dependent countries do not have conditional relations when they do not control their territory. On the other hand, political willingness of the subject country is the second relevant factor for developing conditional relation. From a tactical viewpoint, conditionality proves to be more successful when presented within a positive framework – offering changes and advantages is more effective than offering continuing status quo. In situations where sufficient preconditions were met, the dependence/ conditionality model proved to work very effectively. The third main variable is motivation on the part of the EU to begin an intervention and development program with conditional method The Georgian example also proves quite clearly that attempts to get results without a “stick and carrot method” are very inefficient: years of OSCE mission and millions of euros did not prevent civil war and the overthrow of the president. Together with the Estonian experience it leads to the conclusion that the overall results of conditionality are directly dependent on positive outcomes, such as potential membership in an attractive club (EU), increased financial potential, and economic growth. Adding the Russian, Ukraine and Belarussian cards into the European crises management map, changes the situation only slightly – the key method is the creation economic dependence and the ensuing conditional relations. Since these countries do follow modern security values, the EU would also benefit from having appropriate military tools, which, it must be noted again, can not be used effectively for the purpose of achieving postmodern security goals.
84
THE ESTONIAN FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK
References Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: Basic Books, 1997. Berg, Eiki and Wim van Meurs “Borders and Orders in Europe: Limits of Nationand State-Building in Estonia, Macedonia and Moldova”, The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 18, no. 4 (2002): 51-74. Cooper, R. and G. Burrell. “Modernism, Postmodernism and Organizational analysis: An Introduction”. Organisation Studies vol. 9 (1988): 91-112. Gilpin, Robert. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. Gupta, Sanjeev; Clements, Benedict; Bhattacharaya, Rina; Chakravarti, Shamit. Fiscal Consequences of Armed Conflict and Terrorism in Low- and Middle-Income Countries. IMF Working Paper 02/142. Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little & Brown, 1977. Lahelma, Timo. “The OSCE role in conflict prevention: The case of Estonia”. Helsinki Monitor no. 2, 1999. Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. “Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, Southern America and Post Communist Europe”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 8, no. 2 (1997): 168-173. “Modernism, postmodernism and organizational analysis 2: the contribution of Jacques Derrida”. Organisation Studies vol. 10 (1989): 479-502. Moore, Barrington. Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: lord and peasant in the making of the modern world. Boston: Beacon, 1967. Peters, Ingo, ed. New Security Challenges: The Adaptation of International Institutions. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. Offe, Claus. “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in ECE”. Social Research vol. 58, no. 4 (1991): 865-881. Przeworski Adam. Sustainable Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Snyder, Jack. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist conflict. New York: Norton, 2000. Solana, Javier. “The EU Security Strategy: Implications for Europe’s Role in a Changing World”, Berlin, 12 November 2003, http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/ discours/77889.pdf Stoel, Max van der, Recomendations by CSCE High Comissioner on National Minorities upon his Visit to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, 1993, www.osce.org/ henm/documents/recomendations/lithua nia/1993/o2c1243.html
II
Veebel, Viljar (2009). European Union’s Positive Conditionality Model in Pre-Accession Process. Trames, vol. 3, issue 3 (63/58), pp. 207–231.
TRAMES, 2009, 13(63/58), 3, 1–1
EUROPEAN UNION’S POSITIVE CONDITIONALITY MODEL IN PRE-ACCESSION PROCESS Viljar Veebel University of Tatu
Abstract. The concept of positive conditionality has been seen as ‘the golden carrot’ of the EU’s external relations, enlargement and neighbourhood policies. Regarded as a mutually important and valuable method of partnership between the EU and its partner countries to develop social, political and economic progress with an effective motivation system, positive conditionality is nowadays used in areas ranging from development cooperation to neighbourhood policy, and most successfully in the enlargement agenda. The EU and its member states have characterised conditionality as a functional cooperation or preaccession method of integration, where guidance and strict rules are needed to provide effective convergence with the EU and to support transitional societies in the modernisation process. The motivation of conditionality has been characterised as functional and in the mutual interests of both the target states and the EU. This paper will study the driving force behind the pre-accession conditionality from the first to fifth enlargements: has it been a neo-functional motive to support the fulfilment of accession criteria by candidates, or a neo-imperial motive to use the accession conditionality mainly in the interests of the existing member states to fix their advantages in economic and political affairs? This paper will offer a comparative analysis on the pre-accession situation, conditionality levels and argumentation of motivation for the first five EU enlargements. DOI: 10.3176/tr.2009.3.?? Keywords: European Union, enlargement, positive conditionality
1. Introduction The EU and its member states have had a remarkable influence on the modernisation and development in candidate, neighbouring and colonial countries throughout its existence. Conditionality, integration, harmonisation and Europeanisation have been the main conceptual instruments of such partnership, and possible future membership has often been the main motivation for keeping this cooperation effective. It has been a specific type of partnership with an ever-growing set
2
Viljar Veebel
of criteria for democracy, market economy and administrative capacity in target countries and with remarkable financial and knowledge support on the EU’s part. Since the 1990s, the conditions have been developed into an official comprehensive form with demands, an evaluation model, rewards and possible sanctions. The EU and its member states have characterised conditionality as a functional part of integration, where guidance and strict rules are needed to provide effective modernisation, convergence and the use of funds. In many aspects the pre-accession conditionality has served as the best option to explain to candidate countries that they have a ‘take it or leave it’ situation. Solana (2003) simply describes it as, “We just ask the countries which are interested in participating in our structures to comply with our rules and to share our values”. This paper will focus on the driving forces which have been dominant in the pre-accession conditionality from the first to fifth enlargements: has it been a neo-functional motive to support fulfilment of accession criteria by candidates, or a neo-imperial motive to use the accession conditionality mainly in the interests of the existing member states to fix their advantages in economic and political affairs? It will offer a comparative analysis on the pre-accession situation, conditionality levels and argumentation of motivation for the first five EU enlargements. Finally the paper will analyse the developing trends in the components and levels of positive conditionality affecting the neighbourhood and pre-accession frameworks. Presumably these research results allow us to evaluate and project the logic and dynamics of the EU enlargement process and external relations in the future. But the analysis of conditionality principles also allows us to debate the nature and goals of the EU: is it still a functional and integrated union of member states or is it transforming into an empire with a centre and peripheries?
2. What do we mean by conditionality? Generally speaking, conditionality can be considered a theoretical sub-component or method explaining the logical relations between two or more actors. Conditionality provides a toolbox in linking the state or international organisation, or benefits desired by another state, to the fulfilment of certain conditions (Smith 1987). Conditionality can be perceived in that sense as a norm or institutional agreement. Killick (1998:6) has defined conditionality as “a set of mutual arrangements by which a government takes, or promises to take, certain policy actions, in support of which an international financial institution or other agency will provide specified amounts of financial assistance”. There is some analogy with legal norms, especially with negative conditionality, where any rejection or violation causes punishments and sanctions. The main functional argument for using conditionality is greater social, economic or political influence, while avoiding more dangerous or costlier methods. Conditionality is based on the belief that assistance will produce cumulative progress and
European Union’s positive conditionality model in pre-accession process
3
growth: forced reforms create political support and political support allows the reforms and modernisation to continue (Fiero 2003:95). Conditionality models can be divided into two quite different sets: first, those designed for development cooperation in the least developed countries (e.g. Killick 1998, Chekel 2001, Collier 1999), and second, those developed by the EU and NATO in order to impose a structural pre-accession conditionality (e.g. Grabbe 2001, Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 2006, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2007, Sedelmeier 2006, 2007, Stokke 1995, Zielonka 2006, Weber 1995). This paper applies to both sets of theory while assessing the need and motivation of the pre-accession conditionality with the help of the comparative quantitative method. One of the main findings in the previous studies has revealed that the implementation of conditionality tends to be ineffective and unreliable. Most conditional frameworks created by the UK, EC, US and the USSR failed in the long run to achieve their goals in political and economic terms (Killick 1998: 8). Moreover, it has become evident that the multilaterals are largely unable to impose sanctions due to expenditure targets, monitoring difficulties and political pressures and that conditionality or at least negative conditionality therefore does not work to impose policies upon unwilling recipients (Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2006). Despite the low efficiency of political conditionality in the 1970s and 1980s, the popularity of this method has grown in recent years. This may be explained by the even lower cost-efficiency of military intervention measures compared to earlier periods, the multilateral nature of the international arena and a will to follow a non-violent line by some international actors (Killick 1998:9). The practical problem remains: only few target countries can comply with a good policy environment and a desire to follow external conditional pressure, as conditionality can also bring about several negative effects (Sedelmeier 2007:198). As a consequence, “the extension of the practice of conditionality from the occasional circumstances of crisis management to the continuous process of general economic policy-making has implied a transfer of sovereignty which is not only unprecedented but is often dysfunctional” (Collier 1999:319). A high level of aid dependence most often weakens democratic governance when the imperatives of aid management supersede the requirements of domestic decision-making (Santiso 2002). European countries have a wide range of experience in implementing conditional relations with each other and developing countries outside Europe (Grabbe 2001:1013). Conditionality as a concept can be differentiated, categorised and measured according to three main aspects. First, ex post conditionality has a usual form of international law: conditions need to be met after ratification of an agreement or a treaty or a contract is signed. Ex ante conditionality means that conditions need to be fulfilled in advance or just before a treaty is signed (Santiso 2002:6). Second, conditionality can be unilateral or multilateral. Whereas the Cold War’s unilateral conditionality was dominant, since the 1990s the conditionality of the EU, the OSCE and NATO has started to replace the former unilateral conditionality (Stokke 1995:7). Third, conditionality can be both negative and positive in essence. Negative conditionality aims at influencing an already existing
4
Viljar Veebel
situation (trade regime, diplomatic relations, etc.), which is promised/threatened to be changed if the target country does not meet certain requirements. Negative conditionality implies that sanctions will be imposed, such as reducing, suspending or terminating benefits if the state in question does not comply with the criteria (Fierro 2003:100). Positive conditionality has an ex ante nature. Here the point of departure does not satisfy one party (imposer) and it motivates the other actor to change it. Influence is usually based on the actors’ promise to provide certain incentives, whenever the recipient country succeeds in meeting the conditions. Positive conditionality may include reducing trade barriers, creating a new cooperation network, providing financial aid and commencing a visa-free regime. Positive conditionality is also known as ‘the method of the carrot’ whereas negative conditionality can be considered as ‘the method of the stick’ (Fierro 2003:100, Crawford 2001:1). Positive conditionality is asymmetric by nature, as one contractor is asked to start fulfilling a contract earlier. It is also technically more complex than the negative, but can be implemented gradually and without broad consensus. It is demanding of its pre-conditions, as it can only succeed in a situation where the awaited benefits of the receiving party are greater than the cost of the adjustments (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2007:89). The moral aspect of positive conditionality enables ends to be met: the recipient country needs resources for reforms, and the donor country needs relocation of economic resources and conflict prevention in its neighbourhood (Sjursen 2002:494). Choosing the positive conditionality model from all the other options is motivated with the long-term aim of having prosperity, stability and security beyond the imposers’ borders. A softer approach of relations is usually preferred as it is perceived as the best option for a democratic and friendly relationship. With the imposer’s step-by-step socialisation of the target country, socio-economic values and habits are changed to more favourable combinations (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 2006, Sedelemeier 2006). When conditionality models are selected and assessed, ‘efficiency’ becomes the most important variable. But efficiency in any individual case depends purely on the expectations of the acting party: if the present goal is achieved with planned resources conditionality turns out to be successful. Sustainability and continuity are also important aspects in some conditional relations, where clear economic or social progress cannot be shown or achieved (for example in development cooperation) (Checkel 2000). Success is also a matter of the socio-economic environment and cultural background, influenced by ‘pathdependency’ during the modernisation process. For the acting side the success of conditional relations depends on the following variables: the degree of target countries’ dependence on the imposing party; third countries’ supportive or neutralising influence; and the degree of target countries’ willingness to follow conditions (see the model of the external motivator by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2007:93). In addition, positive conditionality may also include subcomponents such as legitimacy based on mutual benefit, interest and voluntarism; oneway shared (pooled) sovereignty; asymmetric contractual relations; functional and economic reasoning; and creation of independent institutions to safeguard the
European Union’s positive conditionality model in pre-accession process
5
process (Sedelmeier 2006:18, Stokke 1995:2). The following empirical part of this paper will first detect visible conditionality components and then analyse the motivation and logic for the detected conditionality model.
3. The EU’s positive conditionality: experience from founding process and colonial ties The EU’s positive conditionality approach has its theoretical and ideological roots derived from the Breton Woods conditionality model dating back to the end of WWII. Two newly established institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, applied the principles of positive conditionality for member states and applicant countries. In the beginning, conditionality shaped in Breton Woods merely covered monetary policy and some aspects of market economics. It was based on voluntarism and support instead of sanctions, without a clear set of benchmarks or rules (Fierro 2003:95–96). The next major step in the development of conditionality models was taken with the establishment of the European Communities with the Treaties of Paris and Rome. Starting with regulations and common rules in the area of steel and coal it developed into the most regulated economic union in the world. The EC’s conditional nature was most evident in its relations with Germany. After WWII, Germany regained its independence only as a ‘semi-sovereign state’. Its sovereignty was limited by using both EC and NATO institutions. The Paris Agreements of 1954 prevented Germany from developing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and assigned German forces to NATO’s integrated command. The Treaties of Paris and Rome positioned Germany in tight economic and legislative relations with the EC and the ECSC (Keohane 2002:745). The German example is the main argument even today when persuading applicant countries to follow the model of positive conditionality: fifty years after strong conditionality, Germany is a respected economic power, playing important political and even military roles as well. Engagement in and acceptance of a matrix of norms, rules, practices and organisations, even when perceiving such as an act of weakness, can give remarkable momentum for modernisation and development (Patten 1999). Simultaneously a neo-colonial conditional model was developed within the EC for the former territories of the EU member states on other continents from Africa to the Pacific (ACP). A central thrust of the EU-ACP agreements has been the strengthening of the ACP societies by introducing democracy clauses, adopting a sharper focus on state reform and recognising the centrality of political dialogue (Santiso 2002). A major development in terms of positive conditionality use was achieved by the Lomé Convention in 1975, establishing a new preferential trade agreement in exchange for political and social reforms in APC target countries. The conditional relationship between the EU and the ACP countries developed significantly during the 1980s but not towards higher progress, as in many cases better policy reforms and improving performance led to decreasing levels of development aid (Collier and Dollar 1998). New models of development coopera-
6
Viljar Veebel
tion in the period of 1990–2000 were fully built on conditionality when assistance was linked with respect to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Positive conditionality became the cornerstone in relations with less developed former colonies and neighbouring countries deemed to cooperate or join the EU, as stated by former commissioner of the EU Christopher Patten: “In all our programs, there is a clear conditionality linked to our assistance (for example, the human rights clauses in the Lomé Convention and in our Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the NIS, and the Copenhagen Criteria for EU accession, now extended with clarifications to Turkey). Figures show that assistance to states which do not respect the conditions set has been slowed down, whereas it has generally been strengthened, over time, to those showing a positive trend towards fulfilment” (Patten 1999).
4. The EU pre-accession conditionality in practice In the course of fifty-six years and six enlargement rounds the Community of the founding six members has grown to an EU with twenty-seven members. Enlargements have been different in all aspects: including from one to ten candidates, lasting from three to ten years, based on a clear agenda and criteria or even lacking a clear accession application (GDR in 1991). The applicants have also been on very different levels of economic and political development: varying from Greece, Portugal and GDR to Switzerland and Sweden. EU representatives have during the last enlargements stressed continuity in the principles and methods of the preaccession process and actual accession (Weber 1995:199). Conditionality in the first accession rounds has been debated based on the Paris and Rome Treaties provisions, allowing certain criteria and conditions for accession. To name a few here, the applicant country must fully accept the fundamental objectives of the basic treaties establishing the Community; its political institutions must have a democratic and pluralist character; and it must have the capacity to adopt the entire body of legislation adopted by the Community (acquis communautaire) (The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 1952). The main treaty-based conditions have been necessary to achieve support for accession from all the member states. As the interests of some member states can differ from common EU interests, some applicants have faced controversial demands from the European Commission on the one hand, and from a member state on the other (Sedelmeier 2007:203). Some conditions of the demands of applicant countries have also been debated during the first and the fourth rounds of enlargement, to safeguard their economic and social advantages and progress. Later new non-treaty criteria have appeared (final version as the Copenhagen Criteria) that have also added economic and social demands and clarified the political criteria. The use of conditionality has evolved alongside the growth of the complexity of conditions, reaching its highest level in recent years (Grabbe 2001). As will be demonstrated in the following subsections, EU conditionality reached
European Union’s positive conditionality model in pre-accession process
7
its climax during the last enlargement round. These subsections attempt to detect and measure conditionality levels by using the comparative quantitative method: GDP per capita, unemployment and inflation rates, innovation: patents per million, misery index (summarised level of inflation and unemployment), and the maturity of democracy. Criteria are selected on the basis of the adoption of official accession criteria (Copenhagen Criteria) and with the precondition of being quantitative in measures. 4.1. Pre-accession process and positive conditionality in 1960–1992 The first enlargement did not comprise any official and systematic assessment from the EEC’s side, as an EC legal base was much less developed and all candidate countries had enjoyed statehood long enough to be capable of harmonisation. As economic and political stability was not officially rated or evaluated, the arguments in support of acceptance are not available today. The EEC’s readiness to include applicants without any monitoring offers an interesting reference point for later enlargements. Indeed, accession conditions were very limited and negotiated on an ad hoc basis with every applicant separately in the first enlargement round (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 1971). Only Ireland’s economic reality created questions whether the EC was able to integrate a country with a nominal GDP of only 32% of the EC average (54% in nominal data) and with low economic innovation. As to innovations, Ireland had less than one-tenth the international patents of the EC average, even after ten years of EC membership. Finally, Ireland’s backwardness and low competitiveness were not seen as a reason for imposed conditionality (European Commission 1972). Just the opposite, several opt-outs and special clauses were accepted to meet the actual conditions set by the applicants. Switzerland and Norway were especially demanding, both declining their accession to the union in the end. It is also important to note that no ex-post or ex-ante criteria were used for actual accession – only consensual acceptance of the existing member states was demanded (European Commission 1972). Following ratification by the respective parliaments, the United Kingdom along with Ireland and Denmark joined the European Community on January 1 1973. The second round of accession with Greece was based on positive experience with Ireland and a vision that fast and functional accession can be the best solution for long-term problems even without conditionality (European Commission 1976). Greece had started its economic integration into the EC with the signing of the Athens Agreement on July 9 1961. The Association Agreement provided a customs union between Greece and the Community and free movement of persons, services and capital. Greece’s fast EC accession was interrupted by the military coup in 1967. Previous agreements and cooperation with the EC were restored only after the end of the military regime in 1974 after which Greece submitted its application to the European Community (EC) for a second time on June 12 1975 (European Commission 1976). There was a question of whether Greece would be able to catch up with the EC member states by being left out, having a transition period or receiving full membership at once. Arguments made
8
Viljar Veebel
by Greece supported guaranteed agricultural prices, influx of Community structural funds, growth of tourism and an inflow of capital with as quick convergence as possible. The European Commission on the other hand expressed doubts in the administrative capacity of Greece to apply for additional funds from EC sources. Greece, with its GDP PPP per capita higher than Ireland (Greece’s 63% of the EC average vs. Ireland’s 60%), was seen as the next possible success case. But when looking at nominal GDP per capita data, differences were significantly greater: Italy as the poorest founding member had GDP per capita of 57% of the EC-9 average and Ireland with 47% was also demanding additional economic resources to close the gap (European Commission 1976 and OECD 2008). To avoid postaccession problems the Council requested that the European Commission evaluate the economic situation in Greece. Aware of the political significance of this enlargement, the European Commission stressed Greece’s backward economy and agriculture compared with the nine member states of the European Economic Community (European Commission 1976). Table 1. GDP per capita of EC member states and Greece (nominal and PPP) GDP PPP per capita 1967 Germany EC-6 avg. Denmark Ireland UK EC-9 avg. Greece
10.243 9921 11.437 5352 10.049 -------
% of EC-6 103 100 115 54 101 -------
GDP PPP per capita 1977 14.219 13.696 14.655 7795 12.384 13.001 8255
% of EC-9 109 105 113 60 95 100 63
Nominal GDP per capita 1977 8378 6951 8450 2875 4390 6050 2879
% of EC-9 138 114 140 47 73 100 47
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board 2007 and Nation Master database 2008.
Greece’s primary export articles of olive oil, wine and fruit were already oversupplied by Italy and France. A quarter of a million Greek workers were already working in the EC and Germany, the UK and France were expecting more of them coming after Greece’s potential membership. The situation with Greece’s economic competitiveness and innovation was also questionable: Greece, with its 0.4 patents per million people, could not compete with the EC’s average of 38.5 patents per million or even with Ireland’s respective figure of 3.9 patents per million (European Commission 1976 and Eurostat 2008). Finally the European Commission proposed a seven to eight year transition period for Greece. After an ultimatum from Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis that “his country would rather abandon accession altogether than be accepted in a manner that failed to respect the dignity of the nation,” the EC Council of Ministers accepted Greece’s accession. The Council also stated that Greece did not need to go through any preliminary phase but would, instead, be
European Union’s positive conditionality model in pre-accession process
9
Table 2. Economic data in 1977: EC average, Germany as top result, former applicants compared to Greece
Germany EC-6 avg. Denmark Ireland UK EC-9 avg. Greece
Unemployment
Inflation
Misery index
Patents per. Mil
4.1 5.0 6.4 15.8 5.8 6.5 2.1
3.62 8.70 11.14 13.64 15.97 10.30 12.21
7.72 13.70 17.54 29.44 21.77 16.80 14.31
78.85 44.58 31.33 3.93 43.96 38.52 0.47
Source: Eurostat 2008 (Patents), International Labour Organization Bureau of Statistics 2008 (unemployment) and International Monetary Fund 2008 (inflation).
granted a transition period of five years to adjust to the EC rules (Gerson 1976:3). Finally, Greece achieved even more favourable conditions than candidate countries in the first round. Greece was also offered an exemption on the payments relating to value added tax (VAT), making Greece the second largest net beneficiary of the Community budget. Greece’s economy was also assisted with several aid programmes by the European Commission, particularly under the regional policy and the common agricultural policy (CAP). In exchange a compromise was demanded of Greece: free movement of Greek workers and of agricultural products was made subject to seven years of transitional period and did not come into effect until January 1 1988 (European Commission Communication 1978). Official accession talks began on July 27 1976 and were completed within less than three years on May 23 1979. The Greek Parliament ratified the Act of Accession on June 28 1979, making Greece the tenth Member State of the European Community on January 1 1981 (Bulmer and Lequesne 2005:230). The complications with Greek accession provided new competence for the EC to prepare enlargements but did not take away the positive attitude for upcoming enlargements. Portugal and Spain in many ways had a similar starting point as Greece when approaching the EC. All three had overcome major political problems and re-established democracy but at the same time suffered from an outdated economy and stagnant bureaucracy (Soares 1977:8). Portugal became actively engaged with the EC after the democratic revolution in 1973, by signing a free-trade agreement. The official membership application was submitted on March 28 1977. Spain followed suit two years later after the death of General Francisco Franco (Bulmer and Lequesne 2005:230–233). Similarly to Greece some member states supported the idea of the quick accession of the Iberian states and some were against it. “Politically understandable – economically impossible”, this short phrase summarises the opinions expressed in most of the member states of the European Community on Portugal’s application for accession (Thatcher 1993:545). In economic terms (GDP PPP per capita) Portugal would have been the poorest member state in 1984 and Spain bypassed only Ireland and Greece (both with 64% of the EC average). At the same time Spain had a remarkable unemploy-
10
Viljar Veebel
ment rate (20.5%) and labour migration pressure on its EC neighbours. Several Portuguese indicators were regarded as highly alarming: a large agricultural sector (22% of GDP), high foreign debt (70% of GDP) and high energy dependency (80% of internal consumption was imported). The same is true with inflation, which was also running at an annual rate of about 27% (European Commission 1978). As for the innovation records in the applicant states, they (Portugal with 0.8 and Spain with 2.8 patents per million inhabitants) could compete only with Greece (0.8), failing significantly to compete with the EC average (40.0) and that of Ireland as well (16.0) (Eurosat 2008). Both states had also thus far experienced a very short period of democracy and lacked administrative capacity according to the Commission’s evaluation in 1978 (p. 1) but were ready to join the EC. Table 3. Economic data in 1977 and 1984: EC average, Germany, former candidate states, Spain and Portugal Unemployment Germany EC-6 avg. EC-9 avg. Greece EC-10 avg. Portugal Spain
Inflation
Misery index
Innovation/Patents
1977
1984
1977
1984
1977
1984
1977
1984
4.1 5.0 6.5 2.1 ---7.5 5.2
8.7 9.4 11.5 8.3 10.2 8.5 20.3
3.6 8.7 10.3 12.2 ---27.1 24.4
2.4 6.1 6.3 18.5 7.5 28.8 11.3
7.7 13.7 16.8 14.3 ---34.6 29.6
11.1 15.5 17.8 26.8 17.7 37.3 31.6
78.85 44.58 38.52 0.47 No data No data No data
92.11 51.21 44.65 0.81 40.26 0.83 2.85
Source: Eurostat 2008 (Patents), International Labour Organization Bureau of Statistics 2008 (unemployment) and International Monetary Fund 2008 (inflation).
The European Commission as the main evaluator expressed the need and motivation in its report to the Council (European Commission 1978 and 1984) in supporting temporary restrictions and conditions. The Commission also proposed that concrete changes be made during the accession process: for example the elimination of the present imbalance in dismantling tariffs between the Community and the applicants, harmonisation of the basic conditions of competition, etc. (European Commission 1978:14). The Commission’s assessment clearly states that the Community was about to dictate conditions ensuring faster integration for Portugal: “The economic options of restructuring and renewed expansion are both dictated by and conditional upon integration in Europe – dictated by it because the development gap is a major obstacle to integration, which means that Portugal must achieve faster growth than the Community’s, and be conditional on it because the restructuring must dovetail into the economic coherence of an enlarged Community” (European Commission 1978). Pressure for conditionality and restrictions were initiated mainly by Greece to keep its existing financial support and market for its wine, fish and olive oil. Arguments used seven years earlier by Greece itself, that membership was a politically
European Union’s positive conditionality model in pre-accession process
11
important step towards long-term democracy and social development, and the EC should not look at the contemporary situation but possible potential of the acceding countries, were now seen as negative aspects leading to Spanish and Portuguese accession (Thatcher 1993:546). The Commission also sent a clear message regarding its position about the importance of meeting conditions, by stating that with such serious economic differences, there can be no common economic policy (Stadlmann 1977). However, imposing conditionality appeared to be complicated since political motivations in the Council seemed to prevail over the rational arguments of the Commission. Both acceding countries used the argument of historical opportunity to avoid uncomfortable political or economic comparison with the EC-10 and possible pre-accession conditions. But due to the experiences of the first and second enlargements the EC introduced a more complex set of conditions for accession (Ortega 1985). The European Commission submitted a favourable opinion regarding Spain’s application on November 29 1978. The lengthy and difficult negotiations began on February 6 1979 and culminated in the signing of Spain’s Treaty of Accession to the EEC on June 12 1985 in Madrid. The fourth enlargement comprised countries with high political and social stability and economic development. It started formally on July 9 1989, with Austria submitting its application for accession. It was followed by Sweden on July 1 1991, Finland on March 18 1992, Switzerland on May 20 1992 (the latter withdrew its application following its rejection of the EEA) and, finally, by Norway on November 25 1992 (European Commission 1992). For their part, the EC-12 looked favourably on the accession of the applicant countries, as they were all democratic, their standard of living was high, and they had no need for Community subsidies. All the applicant countries were geographically ‘more European’ than their predecessors and had a higher GDP than the average in the EC. They all benefited from membership in the EEA, which took them closer to the single market. None of the formal treaty accession criteria were under discussion (European Commission 1994). As was the case with previous accessions the European Commission provided their opinion on accession ability. Due to the applicants’ very high social and economic levels, no systematic survey was conducted. The European Commission found no need for pre-accession reforms in economic, political or administrative aspects. The main problems of the acceding countries turned out to be rather sceptical public opinion, specific economic interests and an attempt to keep their social model. Finland and Sweden were also concerned about the maintenance of special treatments for their polar regions (European Commission 1992). As candidate countries whose gross domestic product (GDP) and per capita income were among the highest in Europe and which, apart from Norway, were traditionally neutral, they sought fiercely to defend their economic interests and social systems, all the while carefully managing public opinion at home, which was marked by a strong current of Euro-scepticism. Moreover, the economic sectors of the Four, which were very export-orientated, were deeply divided over whether it was advisable to join the European Union. Usual pre-negotiation
12
Viljar Veebel
evaluations were also not necessary as most of the applicants had a sufficient administrative and political basis to start the accession talks. Accordingly, most of the demands and conditions were raised by the applicants, not the EU (European Council Conclusions 1992:6). Table 4. EC member and candidate states’ economic data in 1989 and 1992 Unemployment EC-9 avg. Greece EC-10 avg. Portugal Spain EC-12 avg. Finland Sweden Austria Norway Switzerland
Inflation
Misery index
1989
1992
1989
1992
9.6 7.5 8.6 5.0 17.3 9.1 3.1 1.5 3.1 3.8 0.6
9.0 8.7 8.9 4.1 18.4 9.3 11.6 5.2 3.7 5.4 2.8
4.1 13.7 5.0 12.6 6.8 5.8 ------4,6 1.9
3.3 15.8 4.5 9.0 5.9 5.0 2.6 2.4 4.0 2.5 5.9
1989 13.7 21.2 13.7 37.3 31.6 14.9 ------8.3 2.5
1992 12.2 24.5 13.4 13.1 23.4 14.3 14.2 7.6 7.7 7.8 8.7
Patents 1989
1992
52.03 1.29 46.95 0.30 4.39 39.52 74.22 93.25 54.09 35.12 187.67
44.69 1.36 44.69 0.68 4.31 38.05 93.25 107.70 42.16 41.89 174.60
Source: Eurostat 2008 (Patents), International Labour Organization Bureau of Statistics 2008 (unemployment) and International Monetary Fund 2008 (inflation).
Table 5. EC member states’ GDP per capita compared to candidate states’ GDP GDP PPP per capita Luxembourg Greece Portugal Spain EC-12 avg. Finland Sweden Austria Norway Switzerland
GDP PPP per capita
GDP nominal per cap GDP nominal per cap
1989
% EC-10
1992
% EC-12
1989
% of EC-10
22.862 10.111 10.372 11.582 15.470 16.946 17.524 16.360 18.157 20.935
148 65 67 75 100 110 113 106 117 135
24.852 10.201 11.417 12.414 16.132 15.058 16.980 17.481 19.561 20.831
154 63 71 77 100 93 105 108 121 129
26.358 6887 5831 10.387 15.010 23.420 23.819 17.237 23.506 27.788
176 46 39 69 100 156 159 115 157 185
1992 % of EC-12 39.203 9838 10.327 15.680 21.311 21.788 30.551 25.015 29.668 36.286
184 46 48 74 100 102 143 117 139 170
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board 2007 and NationMaster database 2008.
The most complicated demands were set by Norway, categorically refusing to adopt the Common Fisheries Policy or allow European vessels to access its territorial waters. Norway also refused to suspend whale hunting, although this was prohibited by a Community directive. In the end, Finland achieved the most opt-outs of continued financing for the northernmost regions of the country in addition to
European Union’s positive conditionality model in pre-accession process
13
securing new regional funds and Community agricultural aid (European Council Conclusions 1993). Austria succeeded in obtaining various derogations from the EC-12 enabling it to continue subsidising its mountain farming, to restrict heavy goods transit by road in the alpine regions and to protect the property of its own nationals by restricting the purchase of plots of land by foreign nationals in the regions popular among tourists. Sweden received preferential treatment in refraining from taking part in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and in retaining some of its distinctive social, ecological and health-related features. No EC-initiated conditions were set (European Council Conclusions 1992). The accession negotiations were the shortest in the EC history, lasting only from February 1 1993 to March 30 1994. Acceding countries also wanted to continue their democratic traditions by acceding only with the support of referenda. The results were as forecast: a clear ‘yes’ in Finland, a small ‘yes’ in Sweden, and another ‘no’ from the Norwegians (European Commission 1994). On January 1 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden became full members of the European Union. Accession of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to the EC is not usually described as a part of the enlargement as the GDR officially joined the Federal Republic of Germany, not the EC. But in practical terms the GDR provided influential experience for the member states before the upcoming fifth enlargement. Social and administrative reforms in the GDR provided empirical data as well as experience and an emotional background for the upcoming fifth enlargement. The GDR was economically and politically quite comparable to the previous accessions of Greece, Spain and Portugal, being problematic in all areas from democratic institutions to market economy. In the level of GDP PPP per capita the GDR with its 41% of the EC average was approximately one third that of the FRG, and less than one forth that of the Norwegian or Swiss level (Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board 2007, NationMaster 2008). Possible labour migration was also seen as a sensitive question for EU member states, so the unemployment level was seen as important. The GDR with unemployment of 17.8% was almost twice as high of the EC average (9.3%) or FRG (7.9%) (International Labour Organisation 2008). Independent political institutions (freely elected parliament) also only existed for a few months before joining the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the EU (Bulmer and Lequesne 2005). The GDR became a special case due to an agreement between the USSR/Russia, West Germany and France that they would all support the reunification of Germany and inclusion of the GDR in the EC. While the SU-German agreement played a vital role in starting the process, the German-French agreement played a decisive role in integrating the GDR area to the EC. The second special aspect of the GDR’s political and administrative capability compared to other CEE countries was the FRG’s readiness to put forth a full effort in terms of resourcing to fully reform or replace it. But the GDR’s political and administrative system in general needed as much reform as any other CEE administrative system (Seliger 2001). As the FRG was officially ready to finance and guide the GDR’s process of convergence to the EC, the question was
14
Viljar Veebel
who could have been supporting possible pre-accession conditions and on what legal basis and why, as the GDR was about to end its legal existence. Accordingly, no criteria or positive conditionality was demanded. When the FRG was ready to integrate the GDR without any conditionality or transitional period, it was an interesting experiment both for the CEE and the EC countries (Steinitz 2002:9). From an historical perspective the CEE countries misinterpreted the situation completely. Their hope was that relying on ‘historical guilt’ the FRG would offer them the same treatment as the GDR; reality, however, proved that the fast accession of the GDR would only be possible if the costs of other possible applicants were cut off and they were left to reform their societies with their own resources. With the unconditional acceptance of the GDR the EU created a precedent that economic and administrative capacity was not central when qualifying for membership. What matters is the political support of France and Germany (Steinitz 2002:3). Table 6. EC member states’ GDP per capita compared to candidate states’ GDP GDP PPP per capita Luxembourg Greece Portugal Spain EC-12 avg. Finland Sweden Austria Switzerland GDR
1989
% EC-10
22,862 10,111 10,372 11,582 15,470 16,946 17,524 16,360 20,935 8422
148 65 67 75 100 110 113 106 135 54
GDP PPP per capita 1992 24,852 10,201 11,417 12,414 16,132 15,058 16,980 17,481 20,831 6591
GDP nominal per GDP nominal per cap cap
% EC-12 1989 % of EC-10 154 63 71 77 100 93 105 108 129 41
26,358 6887 5831 10,387 15,010 23,420 23,819 17,237 27,788 ----
176 46 39 69 100 156 159 115 185 ----
1992 39,203 9838 10,327 15,680 21,311 21,788 30,551 25,015 36,286 ----
% of EC-12 184 46 48 74 100 102 143 117 170 ----
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board 2007 and NationMaster database 2008.
4.2. Pre-Accession conditionality in the fifth and sixth accession rounds The fifth round of enlargement was special for many reasons. It brought together more applicants (twelve) than all previous enlargements together (nine), while having countries with quite low economic development compared to the EU average and short of administrative capacity. It was also the first time some applicant countries were found not sufficiently developed for immediate accession (European Commission 1999). The existing EU-15 (in the beginning of accession EC-12) were more prepared for a guided accession than ever before as well, after experiencing both successful and complicated pre-accession processes in previous rounds. The group of candidate countries was not very homogenous, as it consisted of Malta and Cyprus next to the ten CEE countries (Official Journal 2003). The membership applications were handed over as follows: Hungary (March 31
European Union’s positive conditionality model in pre-accession process
15
1994), Poland (April 5 1994), Romania (June 22 1995), Slovakia (June 27 1995), Latvia (October 13 1995), Estonia (November 24 1995), Lithuania (December 8 1995), Bulgaria (December 14 1995), the Czech Republic (January 17 1996) and Slovenia (June 10 1996). But even in 1993 the European Council defined the cornerstones of the upcoming enlargement while meeting in Copenhagen: the 1 political, economic and the acquis criteria as a conditional relationship with the applicants (European Commission 1999, European Council 1993). In 1995 the European Commission presented a White Paper on “Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union.” It was followed by Agenda 2000, defining and evaluating the situation and needs in the applicant countries (European Commission 1995 and 1999). The results of the Commission’s evaluation indicated that the political criterion—to have a pluralist democracy – was by candidate states fulfilled before handing over the accession applications. All applicant countries had a parliamentary democracy. They had all ratified the UN Charter and basic human rights conventions, and joined the Helsinki Final Act and Treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe. Only the question of national and social minorities was seen as a possible source of cross-border threats and it was included in the accession conditions in a far more sophisticated way than it was stated in the acquis (European Commission 1999). The post-Soviet administrative system was also seen as a possible problem for the adoption of the acquis. The European Commission’s criticism was that the CEE countries’ administration was overstaffed but underproductive (European Council 1994). The applicants’ economies were also evaluated by the European Commission, based on the question: “Are they able to survive in the competition of the internal market?” Special attention was paid to the development of the agricultural and industrial sectors to control the level of EU subsidies to be needed after the possible accession. The twelve candidate countries comprised on one hand countries that were socio-economically close to 50% of the EC’s average GDP PPP level (Cyprus 64%, Malta 58%, Slovenia 58% Estonia 53%) and on the other hand countries with approximately one third of the EC’s average GDP PPP (Poland 30%, Hungary 34%, Turkey 35%). Romania, with its GDP PPP of only 17% of the EC average, was by far the lowest level in the history of enlargements (NationMaster 2008). The applicant countries were first evaluated with AGENDA 2000 in year 1995 and last by the final Comprehensive Monitoring Report of the European Commission in 1999 (European Commission 1995 and 1999). 1
According to the political criteria, countries must have achieved “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.” The economic criteria provided “the existence of a functioning market economy; the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union and stability of main macro-economic fundamentals (inflation, public deficit, current accounts).” The acquis criteria referred to an “applicant country’s administrative capacity and ability to assume the obligations of membership – that is, the legal and institutional framework, known as the acquis, by means of which the Union implements its objectives.” (European Council, Presidency Conclusions, European Council of Copenhagen, 21–22 June 1993).
16
Viljar Veebel
Table 7. Main economic data of candidate states in 1992 compared with the EU average and Luxembourg GDP per cap PPP 4884 Bulgaria 7254 Czechoslovakia 10,388 Cyprus 8587 Estonia 5528 Hungary 5992 Latvia 9363 Malta 6425 Lithuania 2797 Romania 9315 Slovenia 4842 Poland 5615 Turkey 5684 Applicants avg. 16,132 EC-12 avg. 24,852 Luxembourg
GDP per cap
% EC avg. Nom. 30 1215 45 2605 64 11,279 53 2601 34 3593 37 1842 58 7483 40 2314 17 1101 58 6272 30 2198 35 2722 35 5684 100 21,312 154 39,203
Unemployment
Inflation
Misery index
15.3 5.1 1.8 3.7 9.8 2.3 4.0 3.5 8.2 11.5 13.6 8.3 7.3 9.3 1.6
91.3 8.5 6.5 25.0 23.1 243.3 1.6 11.1 210.4 11.4 45.1 70.1 62.3 5.0 2.4
106.6 13.6 8.3 28.7 32.9 245.6 5.6 14.6 218.6 22.9 58.7 78.4 69.5 14.3 4.0
% EC avg. 6 12 53 12 17 9 35 11 5 29 10 13 27 100 184
Source: Eurostat 2008 (Patents), International Labour Organization Bureau of Statistics 2008 (unemployment), International Monetary Fund 2008 (inflation), NationMaster database and Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board 2007.
In the aforementioned monitoring reports the European Commission provided feedback in three different categories. The first level was the fundamental question of whether the country was ready to join the EU on January 1 2004. It meant that countries were not evaluated by their present ability to join, but by the ability to be ready for accession in 2004. The second level involved questions and issues needed to be solved before the actual accession. The third level covered questions that would block accession if left unresolved, despite the preliminary positive decision (European Commission 1999 and 2003). Comparative results were first presented in the Luxembourg European Council in 1997 and the candidate countries scored as follows (from 40 points as maximum): Table 8. Scores on Copenhagen Criteria Hungary Poland Czech Republic Slovenia Estonia Slovak Republic Lithuania Latvia Romania Bulgaria
33 32 29 25 24 23 19 18 13 10
Source: European Council 1997.
European Union’s positive conditionality model in pre-accession process
17
Based on the AGENDA 2000 evaluation results, a sophisticated system of positive conditionality was started. The most significant reform in the preaccession positive conditionality was the creation of the system of intermediate evaluation. Based on Agenda 2000, the European Commission started to produce a comprehensive ‘Progress Report’ every year that had both a comparative analysis for all candidate states and a chapter for every candidate county. The candidate countries were divided into two groups: the Luxembourg Group (with higher accession capability) and Helsinki Group (with lower accession capability). The evaluation on practical terms was also divided into two levels and time periods: overwhelming reports were prepared for the Luxembourg and Helsinki European Councils to qualify for accession negotiations and regular annual progress reports after the Helsinki Council. Progress reports provided simultaneous criticism and support for all the applicants. Progress reports included no clear benchmarks and offered no comments on the EU average levels or similar problems among member states (European Council 1999). In the complicated starting situation, where the EU set fundamental conditions (‘open market economy’, ‘consolidated democracy’, ‘administrative ability to adopt the acquis’) for membership but the candidate countries did not have the internal resources to meet them, the logical solution was to create a framework of structural support and financial motivation for demanded reforms. In the period from 1991 to 2004 four main pre-accession instruments (or pre-structural foundations) were introduced to assist the applicant countries: PHARE, ISPA, TACIS and SAPARD. In the first stage these were launched to assist Poland, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia. Later, these were used universally for all the CEE countries (European Commission 1999). The conditional relationship did not start with application and did not end completely with the approval for membership—it was gradually decreased but some elements remained, for example using an ‘internal market scoreboard’ on the transposition of internal market directives instead of ‘regular reports’ (European Commission 2003). During the fifth pre-accession process the EU was also very clearly emphasising that the accession terms must be kept as universal as possible, because of the high number of applicant states. The candidate countries did not have the right to opt-out from any policy or EU initiative, either: they mainly had a ‘take it or leave it’ scenario. At the same time the EU set several restrictions and conditions for possible new members in joining the Euro zone, Schengen visa area, agricultural subsidies, structural fund resources, etc. (Official Journal 2003). The so-called ‘hidden agenda’ has also caused official criticism from the applicant countries. The hidden agenda consists of demands which are not officially introduced and included in the accession partnership framework, but are still bases for judgment of the accession readiness of candidate states. The questions of the hidden agenda were addressed in the European Commission’s Reports to ease the candidate countries’ concerns about the importance and content of the hidden agenda. Within the hidden agenda human rights and minority treatment played a complicated role. In the final Monitoring Report the European Commission paid
18
Viljar Veebel
attention to the evaluation of several questions not related to the Copenhagen Criteria (labour migration, social security, non-citizen rights, etc.) (European Commission 2003). According to the final report of the Commission in 2003 ten applicant countries (Malta, Cyprus, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia) were accepted, and Romania and Bulgaria were required to show some additional progress before being accepted for membership three years later. The cases of Romania and Bulgaria clearly indicated that the EU’s positive conditionality is more than a soft guiding framework—it is a strict system of structural support and control where not all participants qualify for the prize.
5. Principles, motivation and justification of the EU pre-accession conditionality It would be good to know what the measurable rational criteria for the EU are, defining when to use conditionality and what practical methods to prefer. Is the reasoning rational or emotional? Is faster convergence or the political and economic gains of the member states the purpose of conditionality? The following comparison will search for functional reasons in the EU pre-accession conditionality. The applicant countries will be compared to the EU average, previous weakest applicants in their accession period and previous weakest applicants at the moment of comparison. The inclusion of both medium and problematic cases should ensure the validity of the comparison. The data is taken from the year before the European Commission Report on whether or not to start the conditional pre-accession relation. The criteria of measuring are based on the later Copenhagen Criteria, but using a simplified and quantitative approach. 5.1. Criteria of political stability and democracy The criteria of political stability and democracy are based on the Paris Treaty’s preamble paragraph stating that “democratic European states can be members of the founded Community.” During the accession consultations and negotiations, the criteria that the applicant country must have a democratic regime was under continuous debate. The first questions were: should the applicants’ democracies be ‘ready and consolidated’ before the application is accepted (as a pre-condition) and is it functional to demand that the applicants go on with their quest for democracy without community support? The second question has been how to measure a ‘sufficient democracy’ level and what components it should consist of. The third question is how long the democratic government should have existed to be listed as stable (Killick 1998, Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 2006). A structural and comprehensive list explaining the benchmarks for consolidated democracy first appeared within the Copenhagen Criteria (consisting of free elections and a government formed according to the results of the elections, the rule of law, minority tolerance, media freedoms, etc.). In the earlier accessions the
European Union’s positive conditionality model in pre-accession process
19
democracy criterion was only a general pre-condition and measured by the existence of a democratic constitution and holding free and fair elections (European Council Conclusions, Copenhagen 1993). In practice the quickest development from democratisation to EU membership was achieved by the GDR with only seven months. The longest period of suspension occurred in Cyprus, which had problems with borders and de facto sovereignty. Table 9. Democratic stability in candidate states Independent Last mil. democracy coup or war Greece Portugal Spain GDR Slovenia Estonia Cyprus Poland Hungary
July 1974 Apr. 1975 Jan. 1978 Mar. 1990 Jun. 1991 Aug. 1991 Oct. 1960 Aug. 1989 Mar. 1990
Apr. 1967 Apr. 1974 Feb. 1981 – July. 1991 Aug. 1991 July 1974 – –
EC/EU application
EC/EU Continuous democracy as of accession application and accession
Jan. 1976 Apr. 1977 Apr. 1977 – June 1996 Nov. 1995 Jul 1990 Apr. 1994 Mar. 1994
Jan. 1981 Jan. 1986 Jan. 1986 Oct. 1990 May 2004 May 2004 May 2004 May 2004 May 2004
17 months 24 months 0 months – 60 months 51 months 388 months 55 months 48 months
67 months 127 months 96 months 7 months 155 months 153 months 528 months 177 months 170 months
Source: CIA Factbook 2008.
The comparison of democratic stability between the CEE states and Greece, Portugal and Spain is most interesting. While Greece and Portugal needed a democratic tradition of two years to be able to submit the application and the Spanish application was submitted even before a fully functional democracy, the CEE countries had to wait from four to five years to be welcomed with their accession applications. The period from achieving an independent democracy to full membership has also differed during the accessions: Greece needed six and a half years, Spain eight and Portugal ten and a half. The CEE countries all needed from thirteen to fifteen years for full membership. Accordingly the fifth and sixth accession round countries were treated with much tougher criteria and conditions: their waiting time for application acceptance was circa two times longer and their waiting time for full membership circa 50% longer than that of Greece, Spain and Portugal. 5.2. Economic criteria Economic criteria are mentioned in the founding treaties only very briefly by marking the need for a market economy (Treaties of Rome 1957). Founding treaties or later reform treaties say nothing about ‘openness of economy’ or ‘the ability to sustain competition in the internal market’. Accordingly, it is interesting which specific criteria and justification has been chosen by the European Commission to evaluate candidate countries. The basic set for most monitoring reports has been: inflation, unemployment, GDP per capita (nominal and PPP),
20
Viljar Veebel
innovation (represented by the level of international patents), government debt and trade deficit. The fifth and sixth enlargements added the criteria of economic openness (European Commission 2003). When comparing member states and applicants in the most general economic category—GDP PPP per capita—there are no differences between the applicants of the first four rounds and the best prepared applicants of the fifth round. For example Greece was equal to Cyprus and weaker than Malta. Ireland, Portugal, the GDR and Estonia were all quite on the same level and the other CEE countries were further behind. The situation in Bulgaria and Romania was especially problematic, but they were also not accepted in their first accession attempt (Official Journal 2003). Table 10. GDP PPP and GDP Nominal levels is applicant countries GDP per capita % of EC average USD Ireland 1967 Greece 1977 Portugal 1984 Spain 1984 GDR 1989 Slovenia 1992 Estonia 1992 Cyprus 1992 Czechoslovakia 1992 Malta 1992
GDP PPP %
GDP Nom %
54 63 57 68 54 58 53 64 45 58
49 44 35 52 31 35 29 47 29 35
GDP per capita % of EC poorest USD GDP PPP % 63 105 91 113 64 91 84 102 71 92
GDP Nom % 75 100 43 79 --63 26 114 26 76
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board 2007 and NationMaster database 2008.
In terms of nominal GDP per capita, compared to the EC average, the situation was slightly different: Spain was closest to the EC average, followed by Cyprus, Greece and Ireland (all above 40% of the EC average). Portugal, Malta and Slovenia had 35% of the EC average; the GDR had 31% of the average and Czechoslovakia and Estonia and both 29% of the EC average (Groningen Centre 2007). All the remaining applicants of the first four rounds had higher levels of nominal GDP and all the other applicants of the fifth enlargement had lower levels of nominal GDP. Accordingly motivation for positive conditionality can be seen when comparing nominal GDP level, but it is not evident when comparing GDP PPP levels. Inflation and unemployment levels indicate the strength of the economy and society in sustaining competition in the EC internal market. With both indicators the ideal situation is not zero: 2% inflation is mainly considered to be the most effective and 5% unemployment as well (Barro 1997: 895). Among the candidate countries Cyprus and Malta represent an almost ideal example in both categories, being even better than the EC average and by far better than the worst EC member
European Union’s positive conditionality model in pre-accession process
21
state in the same year. The GDR also had an almost ideal inflation level but unemployment double that of the EC average (the GDR’s unemployment was only nominally lower than Spain’s 1984 level). Czechoslovakia had close to ideal employment and a level of inflation slightly higher than ideal, which was still on a far better level than in Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain. Slovenia had both unemployment and inflation over the EC average (inflation 226% of the average and unemployment 123%) but in both categories it demonstrated close to average results compared with the earlier weakest applicants in their year of evaluation. Accordingly in these main economic categories the need for positive conditionality among the fifth accession round does not appear. A supportive argument against conditionality and restrictions would be that inflation or unemployment that was double the EC average did not cause a labour or capital outflow from Greece, Portugal or Spain (Delattre 1997). Table 11. Inflation and unemployment in applicant states in the year of EC evaluation
Ireland 1977 Greece 1977 Portugal 1984 Spain 1984 GDR 1989 Slovenia 1992 Estonia 1992 Cyprus 1992 Czechoslovakia 1992 Malta 1992
Nominal
Nominal
% of EC average
% of EC worst
Inflation
Unemploy ment
Inflation
Unemployment
Inflation
Unemployment
13.6 12.2 28.1 11.3 2.8 11.4 24.9 6.5 8.5 1.6
15.8 2.1 8.5 20.3 17.8 11.5 3.7 1.8 5.1 4.0
132 118 383 150 48 226 496 129 169 32
244 32 83 198 191 123 40 19 55 43
74 66 155 61 20 72 157 41 53 10
169 13 54 130 96 62 20 10 27 22
Source: Eurostat 2008 (Patents), International Labour Organization Bureau of Statistics 2008 (unemployment) and International Monetary Fund 2008 (inflation).
The purposes of pre-accession conditionality for the EU have diverse general terms regarding economic gains, security gains and sharing cultural and social values. On the practical level there are also normative purposes for preparing candidate countries for the Copenhagen Criteria, administrative motivation for guided and measurable enlargement process and the mutual need to reduce the risks of possible failure of the pre-accession process. A clear link between the wish to help candidate states to fulfil accession criteria and conditionality was not detectable. Accordingly the motivation for conditionality could have been initiated from other aims: member states’ interests, institutional comfort, and possible neoimperial ambitions (Veebel 2004). Conditionality, while being introduced as a voluntary choice, was often hinted at as being the only rational or normal option: “Keep your eyes fixed firmly on your country’s interest and its aspiration to join the great European family of nations” (Prodi 2004).
22
Viljar Veebel
6. Conclusions The use of positive conditionality has been a growing trend in the EU. It started gradually in the framework of development cooperation and post-colonial relations and it has developed as the central method of the EU’s pre-accession process for the fifth round of enlargement and neighbourhood policy. Practical implementation of the concept of positive conditionality has changed remarkably during the last half century. The complexity of positive conditionality has also developed simultaneously with the criteria for cooperation and membership. The reasoning for pre-accession conditionality, which from a rational point of view should be helping the candidate states to fulfil accession criteria, is not so simplified, combining the interests of member states, institutions, idealistic lobby groups, etc., as well. Effective convergence and development has been the public goal for setting up positive conditionality, but in practical comparison the rational reasons and qualified criteria are hard to find. The use of positive conditionality has not been based on neutral evaluation but rather on the political and economic interests of member states and EU institutions, as conditionality still lacks clear measurable benchmarks and results are not evaluated by a neutral evaluator. The higher levels of criteria and conditions have also been initiated by candidate countries’ growing willingness to cooperate and fulfil the conditions. The opinion of the target countries about conditionality has been neither harmonised nor fully positive. While most candidate countries have welcomed positive conditionality, some countries have interpreted positive conditionality with neo-functional integration as a logical first step in integration; some countries on the other hand have been critical and characterised this type of partnership as a sign of neo-colonialist or imperialist thinking, the aim of which is not the fastest development of the target countries, but profitability for the EU and its member states. Any possible neo-colonialist ‘conspiracy theory’ has usually been blocked by the argument that “we all have met similar conditions for membership in earlier periods” and it is a logical first step towards closer cooperation. Despite some criticism, positive conditionality is certainly the favourite and strongest growing method in the EU’s external relations and enlargement process.
Address: Viljar Veebel Institute of Government and Politics University of Tartu Ülikooli 18 50090 Tartu, Estonia E-mail:
[email protected] Tel.: +372 737 5583
European Union’s positive conditionality model in pre-accession process
23
References Barro, Robert J. (1997) Macroeconomics. Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press. Batory, Agnes (2008) The politics of EU accession. Manchester, Manchester University Press. Börzel, Tanja and Thomas Risse (2000) “When Europe hits home: Europeanization and domestic change”. European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) 4, 15, available at http: //eiop.or.at/ eiop/pdf/2000-015.pdf, checked 03.03.2009. Bulmer, Simon and Christian Lequesne (2005) The member states of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Checkel, Jeffrey (2000) “Compliance and Conditionality”. Arena Working Papers WP 00/18. Collier, Paul (1999) “Learning from failure: the international financial institutions as agencies of restraint in Africa”. In The self-restraining state: power and accountability in new democracies. Andrea Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner, eds. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Collier, Paul and David Dollar (1998) “Aid allocation and poverty reduction”. (World Bank, Research Paper.) Washington, DC.: World Bank. Council of the European Union (1997) common position on conflict prevention and resolution in Africa. Brussels, Official Journal 2 June, No. L153. Crawford, Gordon (2001) Foreign aid and political reform: a comparative analysis of political conditionality and democracy assistance. London: Palgrave. Delattre, Lucas (1977) “Les pays candidats à l'entrée dans l'Union ont des atouts économiques encore insuffisants”. Le Monde 12 December. European Commission (1972) “Commission opinion on the applications for accession to the European communities by the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland”. Documents concerning the accessions to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic. Tome II. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. European Commission (1976) “Opinion on Greek application for Membership”.In European Navigator, available at http: //www.ena.lu/commission_opinion_greek_application_ membership_29_january_1976-020002562.html, checked 03.03.2009. European Commission (1978) “Opinion on Portuguese application for membership’ (transmitted to the Council by the Commission on 19 May 1978)”. European Navigator, available at http: //www.ena.lu/commission_opinion_portugals_application_accession_19_1978020002551.html, checked 03.03.2009. European Commission (1978) “Opinion on Spain’s application for membership (transmitted to the Council by the Commission on 29 November 1978)”.European Navigator, available at http: //www.ena.lu/commission-opinion-spains-application-membership-29-november-1978020002632.html, checked 03.03.2009. European Commission (1978) “Communication from the Commission on the transitional period”. European Navigator, available at http: //www.ena.lu/communication_commission_ transitional_period_1978-020003449.html, checked 03.03.2009. European Commission (1992) “The challenge of enlargement – Commission opinion on Austria’s application for membership”. European Navigator, available at http: //www.ena.lu/ commission_opinion_austria_application_membership_31_july_1991-020003546.html, checked 03.03.2009. European Commission (1994) “Commission opinion of 19 April 1994 on the applications for accession to the European Union by the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Norway”. Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC) 29 August, No. C 241, p. 3. European Commission (2000) “Communication Strategy for Enlargement”. European Navigator, available at http: //www.ena.lu/european_commission_communication_ii_agenda_2000_ challenge_enlargement_1997-020006132.html, checked 03.03.2009.
24
Viljar Veebel
European Commission (2001) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the European Union’s role in promoting human rights and democratization in third countries, available at http: //ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ human_rights/doc/com01_252_en.pdf, checked 03.03.2009 European Commission (2003) “Comprehensive monitoring report of the European Commission on the state of preparedness for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia”. Official Journal of the European Union 23.3.2004, EN C 73/79 European Council (1992) Presidency conclusions (Edinburgh 11-12 December 1992), SN 456/92 Part A. Brussels: Council of the European Communities, December, p. 6. European Council (1993) Presidency conclusions (Brussels 23 October), pp. 9–10. European Council (1993) “Presidency conclusions, European Council of Copenhagen”. European Navigator, available at http: //www.ena.lu/conclusions_copenhagen_european_council_ extract_concerning_enlargement_2122_june_1993-020006502.html, checked 03.03.2009 European Council (1994) “Conclusions of the presidency European Council of Essen”. European Navigator, available at http: //www.ena.lu/essen_european_council_essen_910_december_ 1994-020705181.html, checked 03.03.2009 European Council (1997) “Presidency conclusions, European Council of Luxembourg”. European Navigator, available at http: //www.ena.lu/conclusions_luxembourg_european_council_ 12_13_december_1997-020005307.html, checked 03.03.2009 European Council (1999) “Presidency conclusions, European Council of Helsinki”. European Navigator, available at http: //www.ena.lu/conclusions-helsinki-european-council-extractconcerning-preparations-enlargement-1011-december-1999-020005292.html, checked 03.03.2009 Fierro, Elena (2003) The EU’s approach to human rights conditionality in practice. London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Gerson, Harry (1976) “Un succès pour Constantin Caramanlis”. Le Figaro 11 February. Grabbe, Heather (2001) “How does Europanisation affect CEE governance? Conditionality, diffusion and diversity”. Journal of European Public Policy 8, 6, 1013–1031. Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board (2007), available at http: //www.ggdc.net/databases/, checked 03.03.2009 Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (1971) “The United Kingdom and the European communities”. Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty. London, July. Keohane, Robert O. (2002) “Ironies of Sovereignty”. Journal of Common Market Studies 40, 4, 743– 765. Killick, Tony (1998) Aid and the political economy of policy change. London: ODI. NationMaster, GDP per capita PPP, available at http: //www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_gdp_ percap-economy-gdp-per-capita, checked 12.06.2007 OECD, Unemployment 1952-1992 in OECD countries, available at http: //stats.oecd.org/ WBOS/Default.aspx?QueryName=251&QueryType=View, checked 12.06.2007 Official Journal of the European Union (2003) Documents concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union 46, L 236 23 September. Ortega, Andrés (1985) “No se renegociará la adhesión de España a la CEE en el terreno agriola”. El País 16 July. Patten, Christopher (1999) “The future of the european security and defence policy (ESDP) and the role of the European Commission”. Paper presented at the conference on the development of a common European security and defence policy, Berlin 16 December. Santiso, Carlos (2002) “Governance conditionality and the reform of multilateral development finance: the role of the group of eight”. G8 Governance 7 (March). Toronto: G8 Information Centre.
European Union’s positive conditionality model in pre-accession process
25
Schimmelfennig, Frank, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel (2006) International socialization in the New Europe: European organizations, political conditionality, and democratic change. Basingstoke Palgrave: Macmillan. Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2007) “Candidate countries and conditionality”. In Europeanization: new research agendas, 88–101. Paolo Graziano and Maarten Vink, eds. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2006) “Pre-accession conditionality and post-accession compliance in the new member states: a research note”. In Après enlargement: legal and political responses in central and eastern European, 145–160. Wojciech Sadurski, Jacques Ziller, and Karolina Zurek, eds. Florence: European University Institute. Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2007) “The European neighbourhood policy: a comment on theory and policy”. In Governing Europe's neighbourhood: Partners or Periphery?, 195–208. Katja Weber, Michael E. Smith, and Michael Baun, eds. Manchester University Press. Smith, Karen E. (1997) “The use of political conditionality in the EC/EU’s relations with third countries: how effective?”. EC/EUI Working Papers, SPS No. 97/7. Soares, Mário (1977) “Discours à la Commission européenne (Bruxelles 11 mars 1977)”. Bulletin des Communautés européennes 3, 8–9. Solana, Javier (2003) “A secure Europe in a better world”. Paper presented at the European Council, Thessaloniki 20 June. Steinitz, Klaus (2002) “The accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic – the first step to eastward expansion of the EU?”, available at http: //www.epoc.uni-bremen.de/publications/pup2003/ files/Budapest_Steinitz.PDF, checked 03.03.2009 Stokke, Olav (1995) Aid and political cConditionality. London: Franck Cass. Thatcher, Margaret (1993) The Downing Street years. London: Harper Collins Publishers. Veebel, Viljar (2004) “Conditionality and dependence as key elements in simultaneous democratization and crises prevention”. In The Estonian foreign policy yearbook. Andres Kasekamp, ed. Tallinn: Varrak. Weber, Steven (1995) “European Union conditionality”. In Politics and institutions in an integrated Europe, 193–222. Barry Eichengreen, Jeffrey Frieden, and Jurgen von Hagen, eds. Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. Wolf Susanna and Dominik Spoden (2000) Allocation of EU aid towards ACP-countries. (ZEFDiscussion Papers on Development Policy, 22.) Bonn: Center for Development Research (ZEF). Zielonka, Jan (2006) Europe as empire. The nature of the enlarged European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
III
Veebel, Viljar (2011). The EU Neighbourhood Policy, Positive Conditionality and Reforms in the Former Soviet Space. The European Neighborhood after August 2008. Republic of Letters, pp. 25–76.
CHAPTER 2 THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALITY AND REFORMS IN THE FORMER SOVIET SPACE
VILJAR VEEBEL
INTRODUCTION
The concept of positive conditionality has been described as “the golden carrot” of the EU's external relations, enlargement and neighbourhood policies. Seen as a mutually important and valuable method of partnership between the EU and its partner countries to develop social, political and economic progress within an effective motivation system, positive conditionality is nowadays used in areas ranging from development cooperation to neighbourhood policy and most successfully in the enlargement agenda. The EU and its member states have had a remarkable influence on modernisation and development in candidate states, neighbouring and colonial countries throughout its existence. Positive conditionality, integration, harmonisation and "europeanisation" have been the main conceptual instruments of such partnerships and possible future membership has often been the main motivation for keeping this cooperation effective. It has been a specific type of partnership with an ever-growing set of criteria in place for assessing the levels of democracy, market economy and administrative capacity in target countries, with remarkable financial and know-how support on the EU's part. The EU and its member states have characterised conditionality as a functional cooperation or pre-accession method of integration, where guidance and strict rules are needed to provide effective convergence with the EU and to support transitional societies in the modernisation process. The motivation of conditionality has been characterised as functional and as being in the mutual interests of both the target states and the EU. Since the 1990s, the conditions have been developed into an official comprehensive format with specific demands, an evaluation model, rewards and possible sanctions, reflected in the ENP and pre-accession V. Made, A.Sekarev (eds.), The European Neighbourhood After August 2008, 25-76. © 2011 Republic of Letters Publishing. All rights reserved.
26
VILJAR VEEBEL
partnership models. Both models have similar measures, a common ideology and a final goal - to bring the target states closer to the EU and enhance integration. The main target area has been former Soviet block states willing to join the EU. The EU and its member states have characterised this partnership as a functional part of integration, where guidance and strict rules are needed to provide effective modernisation, convergence and the use of funds. In many respects, the pre-accession conditionality has served as the best option to explain to neighbouring and candidate countries that they have a 'take it or leave it` situation. Positive conditionality has been seen as one of the success-stories of EU external policy-making, pushing target countries towards remarkable progress in social and economic affairs. However, even a brief analysis of economic development in applicant countries indicates that in several areas the gap between EU and applicant states was growing during the preaccession conditionality. This might suggest that convergence of the target countries with the EU may not have been the central goal or that conditionality did simply not live up to expectations. After more than 10 years of pre-accession positive conditionality and eight years of ENP, there is certainly a need to analyse the prevailing driving force behind the pre-accession conditionality and ENP. Has it been a neo-functional motive to support the fulfillment of accession criteria by candidates, or a neo-imperial motive to use the accession conditionality mainly in the interests of existing EU member states, enabling them to fix their advantages in economic and political affairs, or the interests of existing member states in target states? This chapter will describe the conditionality relationship between the EU and target states from 1991 until 2008: from hopes of rapid accession to development of Copenhagen Criteria and later the concept of ENP. This chapter will also offer a comparative analysis of the situation in the target states, conditionality levels and the motivation for the EU institutions and EU member states involved. Finally, the chapter will review the emerging trends in the components and levels of positive conditionality affecting the neighbourhood and pre-accession frameworks. It is also important to understand how the target states have perceived conditionality. There is also room to ask the question: in which cases has EU positive conditionality failed or not supported the integration process?
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY AND REFORMS 27 DEFINING POSITIVE CONDITIONALITY IN THE EU IN PRE-ACCESSION AND NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
Generally speaking, conditionality can be considered as a method explaining the logical relations between two or more actors. Conditionality provides a toolbox in linking the state or international organization, or benefits desired by another state, to the fulfillment of certain conditions (Smith, 1987). Conditionality can be perceived in the sense of a norm or institutional agreement. Killick (1998:6) has defined conditionality as "a set of mutual arrangements, by which a government takes\or promises to take, certain policy actions, in support of which an international financial institution or other agency will provide specified amounts of financial assistance". Conditionality is based on the belief that assistance will produce cumulative progress and growth: the reforms create political support and this political support allows the reforms and modernisation to continue (Fierro, 2003:95). Conditionality models can be divided into two quite different groups: firstly, those designed for development cooperation in the least developed countries to support democratization and market economy (e.g. Killick, 1998; Checkel, 2001; Collier, 1999), and secondly, those developed by the EU and NATO in order to support structural reforms in candidate countries, (e.g. Grabbe, 2001; Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2007; Sedelmeier, 2006, 2007; Stokke, 1995; Zielonka, 2006; Weber, 1995). One of the main findings in previous studies is that the implementation of conditionality tends to be ineffective and unreliable. Most conditional frameworks created by the UK, EC/EU, US and the USSR failed to achieve their goals in political and economic terms in the long run (Killick, 1998:8). Moreover, it has become evident that the multilaterals are largely unable to impose sanctions due to expenditure targets, monitoring difficulties and political pressur es and that conditionality or at least negative conditionality therefore does not work where policies are imposed upon unwilling recipients (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2006). Despite the low efficiency of political conditionality in the 1970s and 1980s, the popularity of this method has grown in recent years. Some authors (Jan Zielonka and Robert Cooper) even see positive conditionality as a neo-imperial continuum existing between highly developed countries and their less developed neighbours or former colonies. European countries have a wide range of experience in implementing conditional relations with each other and with developing
28
VILJAR VEEBEL
countries outside Europe (Grabbe, 2001:1013). Whereas the Cold War's unilateral conditionality was dominant, since the 1990s the conditionality of the EU, the OSCE and NATO has started to replace the former unilateral conditionality (Stokke, 1995:7). What is positive conditionality? Conditionality can be both negative and positive. Negative conditionality aims at influencing an already existing situation (trade regime, diplomatic relations, etc.), and implies a promise or threat if the target country does not meet certain requirements i.e. it fails to maintain or enhance an existing situation. Negative conditionality implies that sanctions will be imposed, such as reducing, suspending or terminating benefits if the state in question does not comply with the criteria (Fierro, 2003:100). Positive conditionality has an ex ante nature. Here the status quo does not satisfy one party (the one imposing the conditionality) and seeks to motivate the other actor to make positive changes. Influence is usually based on the promise to provide incentives whenever the recipient country succeeds in meeting the conditions. Positive conditionality may include reducing trade barriers, creating a new cooperation network, providing financial aid and commencing a visa-free regime. Positive conditionality is also known as 'the method of the carrot' whereas negative conditionality can be considered as 'the method of the stick' (Fierro, 2003:100; Crawford, 2001:1). Positive conditionality is asymmetric by nature, as one of the parties is asked to start fulfilling the terms for the receipt of the "carrot" first. It is also technically more complex than the negative, but can be implemented gradually and without a broad consensus. It is demanding in terms of its pre-conditions, as it can only succeed in a situation where the expected benefits to the beneficiary/recipient are greater than the cost of the adjustments required in order to receive the benefit (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2007:89). Positive conditionality can be considered to be "moral", as the objectives of the two sides meet at the end of the process: the recipient country needs resources for reforms, and the donor country needs relocation of economic resources and conflict prevention in its neighbourhood (Sjursen, 2002:494). The motivation for choosing the positive conditionality over all the other options is the long-term aim of having prosperity, stability and security beyond the borders of the partner (or party) which is offering the benefits which will result from compliance with the conditionality. A softer
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY AND REFORMS
29
approach to relations, that is, softer than negative conditionality implies, is usually preferred as it is perceived as the best option for a democratic and friendly relationship. With the step-by-step socialization of the target country by the party granting the benefits, socio-economic values and habits are changed to more favorable combinations (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2006; Sedelmeier, 2006). The EU's positive conditionality approach has its theoretical and ideological roots in the Bretton Woods conditionality model dating back to the end of WWII. Two newly established institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, applied the principles of positive conditionality to member states and applicant countries. In the beginning, conditionality a la Breton Woods merely covered monetary policy and some aspects of the market economy. It was based on voluntarism and support instead of sanctions, without a clear set of benchmarks or rules (Fierro, 2003:95-96). The EC's conditional nature was most evident in its relations with Germany. After WWII Germany regained its independence only as a 'semi-sovereign state'. Its sovereignty was limited by using both EC and NATO institutions. The Paris Agreements of 1954 prevented Germany from developing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and subordinated German forces to NATO's integrated command. The Treaties of Paris and Rome positioned Germany within tight economic and legislative boundaries inside the EC and the ECSC (Keohane, 2002:745). Even today, the German example is the main argument when persuading applicant countries to follow the model of positive conditionality: fifty years on, Germany is a respected economic power playing important political and even military roles as well. Engagement in and acceptance of a matrix of norms, rules, practices and organisations, even when perceiving such acceptance as an act of weakness, can give a remarkable momentum to modernisation and development (Patten, 1999). When the post-Soviet states started to question the need for structural conditionality in pre-accession and ENP, Germany was always presented as example to follow and copy. It was also claimed that all existing members have been following the same-level conditionality and sharing of sovereignty. COMPONENTS OF ENP AND PRE-ACCESSION POSITIVE CONDITIONALITY
Pre-accession conditionality and ENP conditionality have several joint components despite different political frameworks and purposes.
30
VILJAR VEEBEL
Legitimacy based on mutual benefit and voluntarism. Voluntarism and expected mutual benefit are the core components, making positive conditionality different from the other forms of conditionality. Conditionality is seen as leading finally to a situation where both sides can be equally satisfied with the new rules of partnership. Positive conditionality is a peaceful method, with no resort to force, even in cases where the target country fails to fulfill any of the conditions. In cases where the target country fails to follow the conditionality, the promised reward is withheld, but the state imposing the condition does not intervene either coercively or supportively to change the cost-benefit assessment of the target government by inflicting additional costs (Schimmelfennig 2003). As formal voluntarism is one of the key components of positive conditionality, the conditional relation can only start in a mutually beneficial situation for both parties: for the recipient, the promised benefits must outweigh the domestic political and economic costs of compliance and convergence (Schimmelfennig 2003). A mutually beneficial situation is possible only if the present situation is unpleasant enough or the recipient country has no alternative to compliance. This reasoning has been often stated by EU senior officials responsible for enlargement and external relations. Gunther Verheugen has stressed: "I am therefore confident that their accession to the Union on 1 May 2004 will take place under the best possible conditions." (Verhuegen 2004). Whilst Verheugen has concentrated on mutual benefits, Javier Solana has pointed to the importance of voluntarism and free will of both sides: "I want to underline that the European Union does not impose anything on anybody. We just ask to countries which are interested in participating in our structures to comply with our rules and to share our values'" (Kleibering 2005). One-way shared (pooled) sovereignty. There has been a growing trend towards shared sovereignty after WWII. The most important step was made by the UN Charter, which reduced the sovereignty of the member states (all but the permanent members of the Security Council, SC), asking them to support decisions of the Security Council over which they could not exercise a veto, and to accept the commitments this support implies. Sharing sovereignty is a controversial aspect of conditionality as, according to Jean Bodin, sovereignty cannot be shared and to lose sovereignty means to lose the monopoly of power and statehood: "the ultimate authority in the state must reside in one place: thus, by definition, sovereignty cannot be divided". (Keohane 2003). EU positive conditionality is based on the precondition that countries are able and willing to share some of th eir
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONAL^Y AND REFORMS
31
sovereign rights but in accordance with their national interests. They have to share concerns in economic, social and also political affairs. In the asymmetrical model of sharing sovereignty, only the recipient party will share its sovereignty to reform itself in political, military or economic sector. This means that, according to the international law, a country can lose its statehood by starting to share sovereignty. Certainly, the status of statehood is different when sharing is a mutual as opposed to only a one way process, as over three hundred levels of sovereignty have been associated with the political success. Successful states take a stake from others' sovereignty, but refuse to share their own power (Keohane 2002: 748). There is also a difference in how the shared sovereignty is to be used. Will that state, willing to share its sovereignty, receive in return a common sovereignty shared by others and to what extent will it be able to influence this new "joint sovereignty"? Interpretations of the influence of the EU sovereignty sharing principle are mainly positive: Robert Keohane has noted that "A major historic accomplishment of the European Union (EU) is that it has ended this association between sovereignty and success /... / the fact that European states no longer cling to their external sovereignty provides an opportunity to design new institutional structures for troubled societies, whose state structures have failed to provide order and create the basis for economic growth'7 (Keohane 2002:746). Geoffrey Howe has explained the mutual benefits of sharing sovereignty in the following way: "Sovereignty is not like virginity, which you either have or you don't /.../ It is a resource to be used, rather than a constraint that limits our capacity for action" (Howe 1990, cited in Keohane 2002:749). Christopher Patten has explained the possibilities and importance of sovereignty sharing in the following way: "My contention, and I am conscious of the paradox, is that the national interest can often be pursued most effectively by ceasing to consider it as the primary objective of policy. There is no choice to be made between multilateralism and the national sovereignty. Even for the greatest powers' national interest can only be defined in terms of wider considerations and wider responsibilities. The European Union should not aspire to eliminate national differences. What it should be seeking, at least in my conception, is a supra-national polity which can combine what is best about those differences: the variety that gives the EU its depth and fascination while overcoming what has been worst about them: extreme nationalism, xenophobia, mutually destructive trade and monetary policies, unstable balance of power politics, and above all war. The EU, in short, should seek to contain nationalism while retaining patriotism." (Patten 2002:1)
32
VILJAR VEEBEL
The asymmetric nature of contractual relations. In general, international law is based on the principles of equality, sovereignty and reciprocity: an international treaty can only be effective if based on the assumption that the signatory countries are equal, independent and that both of them are accepting obligations on a similar level. Asymmetrical components of positive conditionality therefore represent a quite extraordinary practice in international relations (asymmetric principles can be found both in formal documents and practical implementation in the pre-accession process). The pre-accession agreements contain the following components of asymmetric relations: a) an absence of equality in contractual relations, b) transposition of legal bases instead of adaptation, c) no possibility for optouts by the recipient party. The first principle, absence of equality and reciprocity, does not mean that the parties agree that each has a different legal status. The sides just agree on different obligations and control rules, but do not define their legal status. They may also agree not to have a right of control/oversight or neutral arbitration. The recipient country has no right to demand from its contractual partner anything other than the agreed compensation (Veebel 2009:4). The party which grants the benefits, on the other hand, has an obligation to give the reward if the conditions are fulfilled. The asymmetry in this case is based on the fact that only the side granting the benefit has the right to control and evaluate (i.e. to determine if the conditions under which the benefit is to be given have been met). The recipient party has no right to control or neutral arbitration in this process. In the most extreme cases, it is in a way a master-servant relationship: the servant is allowed to seek a new master but is not able to change the nature of relationship with the existing master. The second principle, "transposition instead of adoption", represents the method, by means of which proposed conditions are supposed to be fulfilled and accepted. The principle of adaptation is a part of the logic of integration; legislative acts are prepared together and adopted later into national legal framework. Based on an asymmetric relationship, positive conditionality tends, instead of a debate and adaptation, to use the method of transposition: the recipient country is asked to completely digest numerous international normative acts or the legislation of the partner from whom it expects to reap a reward. The third principle, abolition of opt-outs, represents the quantitative aspect. The receiving party is only offered the full set of demands and rewards and there is no option of "cherry picking". Conditions are offered
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY AND REFORMS
33
as a package, without the possibility of selecting components: especially when dealing with more than one country, the no opt-outs approach is proposed to ensure efficiency for the party setting the conditions and offering the benefits. The recipient countries are not offered opt-outs to ensure an efficient result. This approach has led to a situation in which even the policymakers and researches are not referring to "adopting the acquis communautaire" but simply to "taking acquis" (Nello 2002:202). Absence of measurable progress criteria and the importance of hidden agenda. Negative conditionality demands are usually very clear and offer practical measurement criteria for the country imposing the condition/granting the benefit (whom we will hereafter refer to as the "donor" in the original sense of this term of "she/he who gives") and the target country. Positive conditionality on the contrary tends to have unclear criteria of success which can be interpreted differently by the donor and recipient parties, or not to have any clear measurable conditions at all. The success criteria set by the EU consist over 100 targets (areas) but are usually based on the experts' qualitative judgment, using the reference base of the developed member states. Target levels may not be even properly qualified, measurable or reasonable: for example building a full market economy in a developing or transition country. Accordingly, tar get countries cannot evaluate themselves as they do not have a fixed target and are fully dependent on the donor's evaluation. A particularly controversial issue has been the definition of performance indicators of democracy and governance. To uphold the common objectives of the development partnership, the EC is increasingly relying on indicators of countries' performance, although it warns against their mechanistic use and stresses the importance of avoiding double standards (Santoso 2003). Evaluation itself is performed by the donor, no independent or target/recipient evaluation is needed or used in this case. Neutrality or impartial evaluation is not offered, as the donor sets the criteria, chooses the experts who will undertake the evaluation and sets the success level itself. The absence of sufficient and clear criteria appears typically in situations where the donor is not fully interested in fulfillment of the conditions. There are also several competing rational, practical and theoretical alternatives. First, the donor may not be interested in having the conditions fulfilled, in order to justify or explain why there is no requirement to give the reward. Second, the donor may be interested in having hidden conditions fulfilled, rather than fulfillment of open conditions. Thirdly, leaving matters unclear to the target country and the international partners as to whether conditions have been fulfilled or not,
34
VILJAR VEEBEL
leaves room for manoeuvre. The last two options can also be combined: hidden conditions may have to be fulfilled as first priority, leaving it up to subjective decision of the donor as to whether the official criteria are met or not. In some cases this combination is even the most beneficial for the donor. For example when the donor is not interested or unable to reward the target country, blaming it for insufficient progress or when the "real" demands cannot be introduced openly. Blocking the reward has stronger consequences, as the target country cannot reinstate the starting situation, even if it is not treated and rewarded as agreed. Undisclosed criteria and "hidden agenda" have received researchers' attention mainly in connection with the EU ENP, pre accession, enlargement and frameworks. Having hidden agenda imposes double standards in conditionality, as the donor has a right to demand action other than that which is officially stated. Installing hidden agenda into conditionality frameworks is a delicate process, as the donor needs to have instruments to enforce fulfillment, but at the same time to keep it out of official requirements (Boughton 2006:19, in Ranis, Vreeland and Kosack 2006). The "hidden agenda" can be defined as components of conditionality which are not openly introduced as criteria for the measurement of success, but are actually used for the evaluation of this success. For example, in the framework of the fifth enlargement, the Copenhagen criteria are the official agenda and any criteria outside the original Copenhagen Summit conclusions are the "hidden agenda". Questions, suggestions and guidelines from the EU to candidate countries concerning migration, social security, border management or relations with third parties (for example, with Russia) are most often referred to Commission Progress Reports and are used to measure accession readiness. Confusion about the dividing line between the hidden agenda and the officially stated conditionality is mainly due to a gradual process in which tic party imposing the conditions (donor) seeks to legitimize more demands than was openly agreed in the beginning, by including them in the unofficial conditionality. An example is the way in which new criteria are added to progress reports in each evaluation period, giving the impression that these additions have the same level of legitimacy as those originally included and agreed with the recipient (Smith and Vreeland 2006: 265-267 In Ranis, Vreeland and Kosack 2006). In practical terms, questions of Polish farmers' subsidies and Czech illegal labor force presence in the member states found their way into EU pre-accession Progress Reports in 2002 and 2003, in spite of the fact that such items were not included in the Copenhagen Criteria.
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY AND REFORMS
35
Some components of the hidden agenda can also be related to permanent circumstances, such as the existence of an insecure neighbourhood, historical and religious traditions, cultural preferences etc. The use of a hidden agenda can be to keep a back door open for legitimating the rejection of the reward. Creation of independent institutions outside legislative and executive power to support conditionality. Positive conditionality can include the idea of reducing national sovereignty and democracy, where a democratically elected parliament needs to share its power with non-elected international forces; to safeguard higher efficiency for the donor's interests. In cases (like the Copenhagen criteria) where one of the openly introduced conditions is strengthening democracy, then both have a dilemma: can better democracy be a target if democracy is reduced at the start? The party (donor) imposing the conditionality, in order not to depend on the sustainability and stability of the recipient, may create additional institutions with a functional purpose of ensuring the fulfillment of conditions. In this case, both parties often agree to create independent executive and controlling bodies, protected from public opinion and the political elite. Stiglitz has pointed to this paradoxical situation in the following way: "Rather than promoting the kind of open dialogue that is central to the democracy, it argues at best that such dialogue is unnecessary, at worst that it is counterproductive" (Stiglitz 1998:10-11). It leads to the situation where conditions may often reduce the sovereign power of the national executive and legislative power and democracy in general, but fulfillment of the conditionality may face attacks from the public opinion or political elite. The institutions created can be based on specialists from executive agencies (National Coordination Boards) or external experts chosen by the donor (the EU Commission Delegation or the OSCE Delegation). In the first case these bodies represent pro-conditional national elite from the civil service. Their aim is to reduce the threats of political competition to the success of conditionality, by promoting meeting the conditionality as a prioritized national interest, above "political games". These bodies are formally responsible to national governments and parliaments, but in practice tend to initiate the process and form the positions for the government and the parliament involved. In the second case, the bodies represent independent experts hired by the donor imposing the conditionality to provide continuing evaluation and advice. These bodies are not subordinated or responsible to national authorities of the recipient
36
VILJAR VEEBEL
but influence the process via the donor's executive agencies (Commission Delegation via European Commission). The multilateral nature of those imposing the conditionality. Most positive conditionality cases used after WW2 have been initiated by a multilateral body either by the OSCE, IMF, WB or the EC/EU. In the 1990-s multilateral were so eager to propose different conditionality sets for the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states, that, after accepting their conditions, there was very little room left for independent foreign, financial and social affairs on the part of the recipient When multilateral actors tend to be less convincing in the international arena, positive conditionality can make multilateralism effective (Biscop 2008:43). Among the alternatives, positive conditionality seems to offer the highest level of mutual security and stability between the partners. All the partners can only win in terms of security, as the possible costs are only financial (Ferrero-Waldner 2006). The multilateral nature also allows wider access to experts and finance and theoretically a higher quality of conditionality assistance and results. This tendency is based on two factors. First, multilateral bodies do not usually have military pressure as an option and therefore they have to play with the civilian and financial cards they have. Second is the motivation of the target countries, which are more willing to meet multilateral conditions, as less connected to possible imperial dominance, as might be the case in bilateral arrangements. Structural system of evaluation and assistance. Well-defined and wellstructured rules are the main advantage of the EU conditionality model compared with conditionality of the IMF and World Bank types, as target countries have less room for alternative interpretation during convergence. Well-defined rules lay down clear procedures to be followed by the target state/recipient The pressure is created through regular rules, support, evaluations and procedures. This structural aspect has been a corner-stone of the EU enlargement and ENP policies as stated by Javier Solana: "Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures should be an important element in a European Union security strategy:" "The EU will continue to support better governance through assistance programs, conditionality and targeted trade measures, " (Solana 2003) Cultural and ideological transition. Cultural and ideological transition is one of the most complicated aspects of positive conditionality. Firstly, it is closely connected to the question of how we define and measure cultural
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY AND REFORMS 37
and ideological transition. Secondly, a problematic aspect is the lack of official recognition by the donor that cultural or ideological transition is needed. Very often, cultural and ideological guidelines appear outside official criteria. On the one hand, multilateral imposers claim to push only for general social, political and economic reforms, but at the same time seek to reform judicial systems or market principles, making some cultural or ideological changes inevitable. It is not possible to build market economy or democracy before society is developed to a certain economic and political level. Whether to call this assisted development "cultural/ideological transition" is of course the key question. Most often ideological and cultural pre-conditions of western donors imposing conditionality are: pluralist democracy, good treatment of minorities, abolition of the death penalty, open market economy, rule of law, which, taken together, mean significant changes for some developing societies (for example in ACP countries). Empirical comparisons indicate that even when former colonial powers act inside a multilateral framework they tend to push for copying of the social, political or economic models used in their own state. In several cases, donors imposing conditionality even stress that their purpose is social, economic and political development or change, stressing at the same time that it is not connected to "westernization". Despite claims to the opposite, cultural and ideological criteria tend to be a regular part of each and every conditionality. Additional components and logic in positive conditionality Several additional sub-components have appeared within EU conditionality, most often a one-speed approach, progressive nature and path dependence are pointed out. The one-speed approach, where the EU demands similar progress from all target countries during conditionality, has been a central principle during the 5th pre-accession. Inside the ACP and ENP frameworks multispeed approaches are also followed. Path dependence has been an essential part of all forms of EU conditionality: every acceptance of conditions will lead to the introduction of more complicated and specific conditions and a matrix of conditional relations is introduced which becomes ever more complicated and expensive. At the same time, every initiative leading to fast and focused compliance with conditions will be eligible for additional reward. "The guiding principle is that those countries that advance faster on the path of reform will the rewarded with closer relations with the unions (Javier Solana 2005).
38
VILJAR VEEBEL THE ROLE OF POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY IN THE EU ENLARGEMENT
During half a century and six enlargement rounds the Community of the founding six members has grown to the present EU with 27 members. Enlargements have been different in all the key aspects: enlargement rounds have ranged from one to 10 candidates, lasted from 3 up to 10 years, have been based on clear agenda and criteria or depending mainly on bilateral diplomacy. The applicants have also been at very different initial levels of economic and political development and the conditionality levels also varied. The first enlargement, which took more than ten years to complete (1961-1973) and involved Denmark, Ireland and the UK, occurred without any official and systematic evaluation from the EEC side. At this stage, the EC legal system was much less developed and all of the candidate countries had a sufficiently long-term statehood, enabling them to undertake the harmonization process. As economic and political stability was not measured or evaluated officially, the arguments for enlargement in these areas were not stated. (Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1971). The EEC readiness to enroll new members without testing or evaluating their suitability offers an interesting reference point for later enlargements. Accordingly, only minor elements of conditionality appeared. The motivation was not to restrict the influence of applicant states or enact special rules, but, on the contrary, to find the best possible accession terms by accepting special treatment. The process was initiated by the candidate countries themselves, who set their pre-conditions for membership in terms of preferred conditions. The EEC institutions' role was to find a compromise between the interests of the founding members and the demands of the candidate countries. Despite administrative differences with the UK and Ireland and the economic challenges of Ireland, no ex-post or ex-ante conditions were proposed in the first accession round by member states and EC. The second enlargement to enroll Greece was seen as challenging but not problematic, as the experience with the first accession was positive. To avoid post-accession problems the Council requested the European Commission to evaluate the economic situation of Greece, but the political and administrative environment was not assessed. The European Commission proposed a 7-8 year transitional period for Greece after this evaluation: The Community's experience has already shown the need for a transitional period of some years even for countries with a highly developed industrial hose and an agricultural structure comparable to the other Member States. In the case of Greece, where structural changes of a
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY AND REFORMS
39
considerable magnitude are needed, it would seem desirable to envisage a period of time before the obligations of membership, even subject to transitional arrangements, are undertaken. During this period, which will in any case need to be limited, it would be necessary to do much more than simply press ahead with the final stages of the development of the Association. In the Commission's view what is needed is on the one hand a substantial economic programme which would enable Greece to accelerate the necessary structural reforms, and on the other, measures to bring Greece into a closer working relationship with the Community's institutions. (European Commission Report 1974) After the threat of Greece prime minister 'that his country would rather abandon accession altogether than be accepted 'in a manner that failed to respect the dignity of the nation \ the EC Council of Ministers accepted Greek accession. The Council also stated, that Greece need not go through any preliminary phase but would, instead, be granted a transitional period for adjustment to the EC (Gerson 1976:3). Finally, Greece achieved even more favourable accession conditions than the countries in the first accession round. It succeeded in making the warnings contained in the European Commission report work to its own advantage. As the Greek economy was assessed as highly vulnerable, the country was granted a transitional period of five years in which to adapt its economy to Community rules. At the end of that period, Greece had to be able to integrate into the Customs Union and bring its agricultural prices into line with those of the Community. The third enlargement, bringing Spain and Portugal into the Union, was subject to much more preparation from the EC side than the Greek accession. The Greek experience gave the EC more skills in preparing enlargements, but did not reduce or counter the positive attitude towards upcoming enlargements. Portugal and Spain had in many ways similar starting points with each other and the previous candidate Greece, when approaching the EC. All three had overcome major political problems and re-established democracy but at the same time suffered because of outdated economies and stagnant bureaucracy. Similarly to Greece, the Iberian states' territorial location caused some economic marginalization and tensions with the poorer regions of Italy and France in future competition for subsidies (Soares 1977: 8). The European Commission, as key evaluator, also dictated what was needed "The economic options of restructuring and renewed expansion are both dictated by and conditional on integration into Europe — dictated by it because the development gap is a major obstacle to integration..." (European Commission Report 1978)
40
VILJAR VEEBEL
The European Commission also sent clear message regarding its position about the importance of meeting conditions, by stating that with such serious economic differences, there can be no common economic policy (Stadlmann 1977). The pressures for conditionality and restrictions were initiated mainly from the Greek side, in order to maintain existing financial support levels and protect the market for its wine, fish and olive oil Using the main pre-accession criteria, that all member states must support new applicants, the Greek socialist government led by Andreas Papandreou promised to veto any accession, which did not lead to an improvement in their already agreed accession conditions (Thatcher 1993). The practical building of conditionality appeared to be complicated. Both accession candidates used the argument of historical opportunity to avoid uncomfortable political or economic comparisons with the EC-10 and possible pre-accession conditions. In 1990, between the 3rd and 4th accession rounds, German Democratic Republic joined simultaneously Federal Republic of Germany and the EC. As the acquis was harmonized folly and the cost covered by West Germany, no additional conditionality was demanded or used. The fourth enlargement brought Austria, Finland, and Sweden into the EU. There was no formal evaluation of these candidate countries even in question of acquis communautaire adaptation. Actually the membership negotiations were back to front: the candidate countries set their conditions for joining. The main joint demand that the need to avoid a start of the institutional reform planned in Maastricht Treaty before accession. The candidate countries met most of their conditions for accession because of the pressure by several member states interested in accessing their markets. Even though elements of positive conditionality appeared in earlier enlargements, the approach of structured positive conditionality was not used before die 5* pre-accession process. In previous rounds the issue of conditionality appeared in minor areas but no special transition period was used and demands from community side were never structured. Accordingly pre-accession conditionality was debated in earlier enlargement rounds and considered as an option, but not implemented. Reliance was placed on a neo-functional argument that conditionalities would only slow down the process of integration of candidate countries.
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALITY AND REFORMS 41 DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU POSITIVE CONDITIONALITY MODEL DURING THE 5TH ENLARGEMENT ROUND
The influence of positive conditionality was particularly notable during and after the 5th enlargement round in 2004 and 2007. Extensive use and the effectiveness of this approach during the 5th enlargement round encouraged the EU to use positive conditionality as a key method during upcoming enlargements and in the development of the neighbourhood policy. The fifth round of enlargement was special for many reasons. It involved more applicants (twelve together with Turkey) than all previous enlargements taken together (nine), while including countries with quite low levels of economic development compared to the EU average, and with a shortage of administrative capacity. The applicants were also very different, ranging geographically from Estonia to Cyprus and economically from Romania to Cyprus (see table no 1), which made the use of universal criteria and conditionality quite complicated. It was also the first time when some applicant countries did not fulfill the accession criteria for immediate accession (European Commission, 1999). The existing EU-15 (in the beginning of accession, EC-12) were more prepared for a guided accession than ever before, after experiencing both successful and complicated pre-accession processes in previous rounds. The group of candidate countries was not very homogeneous, as it consisted of Cyprus and Malta next to the ten CEE countries (Official Journal L 236, 2003). Accordingly, the 5th enlargement offered a superb example for evaluation and for development of a new conditionality model. This may also have been feasible because of the long timeframe of the applications: Cyprus (July 4,1990), Malta (July 16,1990), Hungary (March 31, 1994), Poland (April 5, 1994), Romania (June 22, 1995), Slovakia (June 27, 1995), Latvia (October 13, 1995), Estonia (November 24, 1995), Lithuania (December 8, 1995), Bulgaria (December 14, 1995), the Czech Republic (January 17, 1996) and Slovenia (June 10, 1996). The general membership conditions were defined by the Treaties of Paris and Rome and quite brief: • •
applicant country must be a European country, unanimous agreement of the existing Member States of the EEC is required,
42
VILJAR VEEBEL
• • •
democratic and pluralist character of candidate's political institutions, capacity to take over the entire body of legislation adopted by the Community (the acquis communautaire), acceptance of the fundamental objectives of the basic treaties establishing the Community.
Fears that upcoming enlargement may cause problems for the existing Union, in financial or legal terms, had played a key role in the rejection of the first applicants in the 1960s and led to the building of sophisticated conditionally within the 5th enlargement round. The costs and difficulties within the 5 th enlargement were seen as manifold, a dilemma was sometimes noticed between the enlargement and internal efficiency. The EU was seen as an altruistic actor putting its own existence at stake in order to reunite Europe. Possible delays and unpredictable costs were considered the main enlargement risks. These views led to backing for the supporters of conditionality, as it was acceptable to demand something from applicant countries in exchange for the EU taking such a great risk. As applicant countries promised all possible cooperation, the risk of a possible failure of enlargement was not considered in official evaluations and reports. The official starting position of the Union was that the accession terms must be kept as universal as possible. Candidate countries did not have the right to opt out from any policy or EU initiative. At the same time, the EU placed several restrictions upon possible new members in joining the Eurozone, the Schengen visa area, agricultural subsidies, structural funds resources, free movement of labour etc. It was evident for both the EU and applicant countries that modernization without financial and intellectual assistance, combined with calculated pressure, would cause instability in Central and Eastern Europe and prolong the overall modernization period. Reports of the Lisbon Council, June 1992, and the Edinburgh Council, December 1992; underlined the need for concrete accession criteria and structural cooperation with CEE countries. The aim of the EU member states was systematic and coordinated use of the EU instruments (European Council Conclusions 1993). In 1993 the European Council defined the cornerstones of the upcoming enlargement while meeting in Copenhagen, setting the political, economic and the acquis criteria as a conditional relationship with the applicants (European Commission, 1999; European Council, 1993). The Copenhagen Criteria were formulated, offering the first clear accession
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY AND REFORMS 43
criteria for candidate countries in EU history. The development of complex and universal conditions was motivated by the high total number of candidate and neighbouring countries and experience with former enlargements, especially absorption of the former East Germany into the Bundesrepublik, where unconditional accession led to inefficient and costly modernization. Conditional relations with all applicant countries were launched outside the Union's legal framework, as pre-accession conditionality was not defined in any of the founding or amending treaties. The main message was that the EU was ready to accept new members, but they had to modernize and reform their societies first. A clear promise of accession if conditions are fulfilled was seen as the main "carrot" in the accession process. The European Council also stated clearly that "the purpose of conditions is only narrowing the gap between CEE and the EU", and that "accession would take place as soon as the associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions". The European Commission presented a White Paper in 1995 on "Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union, to make accession process more structural and conditional." It was followed by Agenda 2000, defining and evaluating the situation and needs in the applicant countries (European Commission, 1995 and 1999). The results of the Commission's evaluation indicated that the political criterion - to have a pluralist democracy - was fulfilled by candidate states before handing over the accession applications. All applicant countries had a parliamentary democracy. They had all ratified the UN Charter and basic human rights conventions, and joined the Helsinki Final Act and Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Only the question of national and social minorities was seen as a possible source of cross-border threats and included in the accession conditions in a far more sophisticated way than stated in the acquis (European Commission, 1999). The post-Soviet administrative system was also seen as a possible problem for the adoption of the acquis. The European Commission's criticism was that the CEE countries' administration was overstaffed but underproductive (European Council, 1994). The applicants' economies were also evaluated by the European Commission, based on the question: "Are they able to survive in the competition of the internal market?" Special attention was paid to the development of the agricultural and industrial sectors in order to control the level of EU subsidies needed after the possible accession.
44
VILJAR VEEBEL
Despite the quite general evaluation that all candidate countries needed reforms to meet common market competition, the situation of applicant states was quite different. Most significant was the problem with economic innovation. Measured by patents per million inhabitants the candidates' average (2.6) was below 7 per cent of the EC-12 average (38). Only two CEE countries reached the level of over 1 patent per million (Slovenia with 7.7 and Hungary with 4.1). High inflation in some applicant states (Latvia, Bulgaria and Romania) and very low nominal GDP per capita, were also seen as highly problematic during pre accession process (see table no 1). Table no 1: Main economic data of applicant states in 1992 GDP per cap PPP$
Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Romania Slovenia Poland Malta Cyprus EC~12av.
GDP Unper employment cap per Nom.$ per cent cent EC EC av av 4997 27 1215 6 15.3 9376 50 2605 12 5.1 5705 31 2601 12 3.7 8557 46 3593 17 9.8 4898 46 1842 9 2.3 7430 40 2314 11 3.5 4725 25 1101 5 8.2 10407 56 6272 29 11.5 6010 32 2198 10 13.6 11076 59 7483 35 4.0 13812 74 11279 53 1.8 18627 100 21312 100 9.3
Inflation
Misery index
91.30 8.5 24.97 23.06 243.27 11.11 210.39 11.41 45.11 1.63 6.51 5.00
106.6 13.6 28.7 32.9 245.6 14.6 218.6 22.9 58.7 5.63 8.31 14.3
Data: Eurostat 2008 (Patents),International Labour Organization Bureau of Statistics 2008 (unemployment), International Monetary Fund 2008 (inflation), NationMaster database and Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board 2007.
The need for positive conditionality was not evident from the beginning. Its subsequent development rested on three assumptions: first that differentiation among the countries generates a positive climate of competition on the way towards accession; second that the reform process
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY AND REFORMS 45
enjoys consensus and support from the local elites and population; and third that the EU's guidelines and proposed reforms are equally beneficial for all of the countries, at least in the long run. Fulfilling the accession conditions was clearly seen as the candidate states' responsibility, where the EU could only provide technical and financial assistance. The EU institutions also reserved the right to carry out both periodical and ad hoc evaluations on pre-accession progress, and even to change or amend the accession criteria and ask for progress in areas outside the acquis. Moreover, the EU reserved the right to suspend or exclude any candidate country from the preaccession process if progress was not sufficient. Candidate countries had the right to withdraw from pre-accession conditionality without any financial or political sanction. The pre-accession strategy did not follow the principle of "simple prioritizing and listing", but provided methods for systematic harmonization of acquis in full. All of the accession countries received a situation report and priority list (which overlapped despite their different social and economic situations). Accession criteria (known as "Copenhagen Criteria") were developed in three groups of topics (political, economic and administrative) and first introduced in Copenhagen by the European Council in 1993. The same logic has been followed in the later build up EU of conditionality measures, values and goals. First, the political criteria: the countries must have achieved "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, checks and balances in the political system, inclusivity of the political/administrative power, respect for fundamental rights, civil society and media. Second, the economic criteria of competitive market economy for the applicant country to be able to sustain in the EU competition: the existence of a functioning market economy; the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union, stability of main macro-economic fundamentals (inflation, public deficit, current account). Third, the acquis communautaire or administrative criteria referring to applicant country's administrative capacity and ability to assume the obligations of membership - that is, the legal and institutional framework, known as the acquis, by means of which the Union implements its objectives, rule of law, administrative capacity and efficiency, ability to harmonize acquis communautaire, which consists of primary legislation (EC Treaties), secondary legislation
46
VILJAR VEEBEL
(regulations, directives), and jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice as well as a variety of non-binding acts - recommendations, guidelines (Council Conclusions Copenhagen 1993). In addition, the EU created a mechanism for evaluation, measures of structural support and a list of possible sanctions for unsuccessful implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria. The conditional measures consisted of a description of rules, sanctions and measures of structural support and modernization. Specific rules were set up in an Accession Partnership Program, Accession Agreement and Copenhagen Criteria. Possible sanctions that could be taken against candidate countries had only restricted impact and scope. The EU pre-accession sanctions would be imposed only as a last resort and were aimed at a temporary reduction of the Union's assistance and postponement or cancelation of the accession process. Sanctions were not to be used widely as they would challenge sovereignty and therefore reduce the quality of cooperation. Postponing or canceling the accession process would have weakened the incentive for economic reform, discouraged foreign investments and reduced economic growth. Sanctions were practiced partly against Bulgaria and Romania, by postponing their accession and temporally blocking use of some financial subsidies. Conditionally monitoring: The most significant reform in EU pre-accession conditionality was the creation of the system of intermediate evaluation, guided by European Commission. Later, a similar model was developed for the European Neighborhood Policy. In practical terms the evaluation was divided into two levels and time periods: annual reports prepared for Luxembourg and Helsinki European Councils to qualify for accession negotiations. An important step in conditionality development was the introduction of Agenda 2000 by the European Commission (in 1995), the core document of upcoming enlargement conditions and criteria, which described both the targets of pre-accession developments and gave first evaluation to the candidate countries.1 It included also a method for clear and open evaluation (made by European Commission) of the progress of applicant countries in meeting the Copenhagen Criteria. Agenda 2000 was also the first complex evaluation system, offering both quantitative and qualitative aspects, and served as the basis for later evaluations. The 1
Full text in http://aei.pitt.edu/3137/01/000033.PDF.
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY AND REFORMS 47
European Commission provided evaluation and feedback in three different categories in the Agenda 2000. The first level was the fundamental question of whether the country was ready to join the EU on January 1, 2004. It meant that countries were not evaluated by their present ability to join, but by the ability to be ready for accession in 2004. The second level involved questions and issues that needed to be solved before the actual accession. The third level covered matters that would block accession if left unresolved, despite the preliminary positive decision (European Commission, 1999 and 2003). Every sub-area was rated on a 3-point scale (except single market, administrative capacity and harmonization acquis, which used 4 point scale). Malta and Cyprus, also applying in the 5 th enlargement round, were not subject to Agenda 2000 evaluation, as only Central- and Eastern European candidate states were evaluated. The reasons why Malta and Cyprus were not included were different: Malta was seen as not needing additional evaluation, Cyprus on the other hand at that moment was waiting for a political compromise between Greece and Turkey to start the accession process and was in any case the most economically developed of the candidate states. The comparative results of evaluation were first presented in the Luxembourg European Council in 1997 and the candidate countries scored as follows (from 40 points as maximum, see table no 2): Table no 2: Scores on Copenhagen Criteria Hungary Poland Czech Republic Slovenia Estonia Slovak Republic Lithuania Latvia Romania Bulgaria
33 32 29 25 24 23 19 18 13 10
Source: European Council, 1997. The Agenda 2000 evaluation of candidate countries´ success in meeting the accession criteria was also a reason for granting the first "reward" - a regrouping of candidates into those who were ready to start accession negotiations and those who needed to show more progress before taking the
48
VILJAR VEEBEL
next step. The first group, 'the successful ones', consisted of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia and Estonia. The Slovak Republic was in the second group, together with the Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria. As mentioned earlier, Malta and Cyprus were not evaluated by Agenda 2000. However, the European Council of Luxembourg (December 12-13, 1997), wanting to avoid discrimination between the candidates, decided to associate them all into the process of enlargement, while beginning the formal negotiations only with the six countries selected by the European Commission. Based on the Agenda 2000 evaluation methods and results, a sophisticated system of positive conditionality was developed. The most significant reform in the pre-accession positive conditionality was the creation of the system of intermediate evaluation. Based on Agenda 2000, the European Commission started to produce a comprehensive 'Progress Report' every year that had both a comparative analysis for all candidate states and a chapter for every candidate county. The evaluation on practical issues was also divided into two levels and time periods: overarching reports were prepared for the Luxembourg and Helsinki European Councils to qualify for accession negotiations and regular annual progress reports after the Helsinki Council. The monitoring method was precise and detailed, covering every chapter of the accession treaty for every member state and also offering comparisons. "The individual Comprehensive Monitoring Reports which accompany this report assess for each of the 29 chapters of the acquis the state of preparedness in the respective acceding countries, both in terms of transposition of legislation and from the perspective of implementing structures, administrative capacity and enforcement. As a rule, only legislation actually adopted and measures actually implemented are taken into account for the assessment. In the conclusion for each chapter, a distinction is made between three categories of issues." (European Commission, Official Journal of the European Union 23.3.2004, EN C 73/79; As noted, the criteria of political stability and a market economy were in many aspects viewed in the light of administrative capability criteria (transposition and harmonization of acquis), as first the two criteria were measured in terms of adopted legal acts and institutional development. Progress reports resulted in simultaneous criticism and support for all the applicants, but also kept the very successful ones motivated. Progress reports included no clear benchmarks and offered no comments on the EU average levels or similar problems among member states (European Council, 1999). The main problem of evaluation was that no measurable levels were set for economic or social development. Economies of the
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY AND REFORMS 49
applicant states needed to be: "able to compete", "sustainable", "marketbased". Administrative systems had to develop to be able to deal harmonization with acquis. Political system needed to be democratic, stable and tolerant. In the complex initial situation, where the EU set fundamental conditions for membership ('open market economy´, 'consolidated democracy', 'administrative ability to adopt the acquis") but the candidate countries did not have the internal resources to meet these conditions, the logical solution was to create a framework of structural support and financial motivation for the reforms required. In the period from 1991 to 2004 four main pre-accession instruments (or pre-structural funds) were introduced to assist the applicant countries: PHARE, ISPA, TACIS and SAPARD. In the first stage these were launched to assist Poland, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia. Later, these were used universally for all the CEE countries (European Commission, 1999). The conditional relationship did not start with application and did not end completely with the approval for membership—it was gradually decreased but some elements remained, for example using an 'internal market Scoreboard' on the transposition of internal market directives instead of 'regular reports' (European Commission, 2003). The role of the EU institutions and specially European Commission during conditionality was seen as to "give further guidance to the acceding states in their efforts to assume the responsibilities of membership and give the necessary assurance to current Member States" (European Commission 2003). Practical safeguards were fully in the hands of the European Commission, which had to present its conclusions to the Council. During the fifth pre-accession process the EU also very clearly emphasised that the accession terms and conditionality must be kept as universal as possible, because of the large number of applicant states. The candidate countries did not have the right to opt-out from any policy or EU initiative, either: they mainly had to deal with a 'take it or leave it´ scenario. The fifth enlargement produced also a unique experience of accession process, where several countries were not accepted, due to insufficient progress, despite their great interest in joining. According to the final report of the Commission in 2003, ten applicant countries (Malta, Cyprus, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovenia) qualified for the 1st of May 2004 enlargement, Romania and Bulgaria were required to show some additional progress before being accepted for membership three years later- 1st of January 2007.
50
VILJAR VEEBEL
The cases of Romania and Bulgaria clearly indicate that the EU's positive conditionality is more than a soft guiding framework: it is a strict system of structural support and control where not all participants qualify for the prize. The European Commission announced the negative results of evaluation in a very discrete way, in order to encourage Bulgaria and Romania to continue their efforts. The EU also tried to avoid direct conclusions that Romania and Bulgaria did not fulfill the conditions, using soft wording such as "continuing enlargement" (European Commission 2003). The examples of Romania and Bulgaria provided ammunition to critics of positive conditionality, their argument being that there was a lack of measurable reasons as to why these countries were left to the next accession round. Three years later, both Romania and Bulgaria were found ready to join the Union. Starting from 2004, the pre-accession conditionality is continuing to develop in relation to the remaining and new candidate states. Turkey has been a candidate country since April 1987, Croatia since June 2004, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia since December 2005. After the Albanian application in April 2009 and Iceland's application in July 2009 the number of EU candidate countries has grown to five. Accession Partnerships for Turkey, Macedonia and Croatia were adopted in February 2008. IDEOLOGY, MOTIVATION, LOGIC AND IMPACT OF PRE-ACCESSION POSITIVE CONDITIONALITY
"... The real novelty of the last enlargement round was not the state of preparedness of the candidates (similar concerns had been voiced about the Mediterranean candidates in the 1980s). It was the use of conditionality. The EU used both the "carrot" of membership and the "stick" of exclusion to drive economic and political reforms in the candidate countries. The EU devised the "regatta principle " according to which each candidate progresses towards accession as fast as its own pre-accession preparations allow. Each country joins if and when it fully complies with the Copenhagen criteria. The main incentive for candidates to keep up the pace of change was the threat of exclusion from the first round of accession." (House of Lords, Committee of European Union 53rd Report, 2005:1)
From the EU side the main arguments for structural conditionality were the exceptionally weak economies of CEE states and the need for special additional measures for faster convergence, where usual neo-functional effects alone were seen as not being enough. A similar argument was also
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONAL^Y AND REFORMS
51
used for the political and administrative conditionality: applicant countries needed structural measures to close the exceptionally large gap between them and member states. To answer how large the gap actually was and how it differed from earlier enlargements, when conditionality was not used, depends on which data are used for comparison. Member states tended to compare candidate states with the EU average in nominal terms; candidate states preferred to make comparisons with the weakest member states or to use adjusted data (GDP PPP for example). CEE states also pointed out that they should not be compared with member states' current data, but with data from the pre-accession period. The convergence gap and need for conditionality was seen quite differently, depending upon which theoretical model is used for examining the situation. However, even if extraordinary gap existed, pro and contra arguments for positive conditionality ranged from economic to moral aspects (Veebel 2009:22). Economic and utilitarian arguments are mainly based on the structural-institutional logic (best represented in Tony Killick's "Aid and Political Economy of Policy Change"). Killick points out that there is no need to look for justification for harder and asymmetric structural positive conditionality, as, according to earlier experience, this is far more effective than soft conditionality, ex-post conditionality or negative conditionality. Intensive structural components make positive conditionality less risky for those imposing them and financially more attractive for target/recipient state, as both sides benefit through faster results and deeper changes in society. If faster and deeper reforms or convergence is needed even more radical measures are justified (Killick 1998: 6-10). Accordingly there can be no grounds for asking or demanding explanations the side imposing the conditions, as to why the conditions used were in this case more complex or whose interest they served. Even if donors' interests were served more than those of the applicants, it was part of a mutually beneficial partnership. However, if the situation is explained within a neo-imperial paradigm (Jan Zielonka "Europe as Empire" 2006), the main driving forces of the process were the interests of donors. Using a historical moment and the candidate states' wish "to do anything and everything to be part of the EU" (lives 2003), they created a conditionality system serving their long term economic (and partly political) interests to dominate in the region. For the existing union and member states, one of the main purposes of enlargement was to access new markets and the labour force, and to secure long term gains through institutional agreements. The candidate states were offered a significantly weaker package of benefits and subsidies during accession negotiations, but were forced to follow most of
52
VILJAR VEEBEL
regulations and directives, leading to additional costs or loss of competitiveness (Zielonka 2006:35). Even after fulfilling the membership criteria and accession into the EU the double-standards continued: the four freedoms were not imposed fully, newcomers were kept out of the Eurozone and were denied Schengen benefits. According to the neo-imperial approach there is also no need to ask which principles and interests were dominating the process, and whether it was legitimate, as the interests of "Empire" were dominating, but also welcomed and followed by national elites of the target countries, believing as they did that what the accession model offered was the best possible option. Candidate countries did not officially raise the question of the neo-colonial nature of accession conditions, being afraid of possible negative reaction and measures of the EU (Zielonka 2006: 33). The behaviour of the EU in this situation can be seen as fully rational, as applicant countries desired to do "everything and anything" reasonable to use the conditionality for longer term purposes, not only as preparation for membership. Comparing the behavior of candidate countries in the 5th enlargement round with the 2nd and 3rd enlargement rounds, the logical conclusion is that the applicants defined their status during pre-accession: the EU only pushed the conditionality as far as applicants were ready to accept it. Whilst Greece blocked all attempts at conditionality during the second enlargement and received no conditions, the Iberian countries accepted some conditionality during the third enlargement for membership preparation and received 'soft' conditionality, the CEE countries were ready to accept most of proposed conditions during 5th enlargement and the EU loaded them with conditionality levels which exceeded the needs of membership preparation. Apart from the dominating ideas of Tony Killick and Jan Zielonka, the conditionality logic in the 5th enlargement is often explained in terms of moral, institutional and intergovernmental motives. Idealist, moral and ethical motivation based on Protestant ethics and the German image of historical guilt, was most influential in the first stage of the 5th accession round. Ethical and moral explanations for enlargement are based on one hand on Weberian and Protestant ethics and on the other hand on the idea of historical guilt of Germany towards the CEE. Accordingly, the CEE countries deserved, despite their weaknesses after regime transition, an equal chance to join the EU. The role of existing member states should be supportive, not dominating or abusive. Enlargement is not a technical process with demands on one side and funding on the other side, but it is based on equal treatment of states and compensates historical injustice.
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY AND REFORMS
53
(Sjursen 2002:494). The question is not only the efficiency of the process but also its legitimacy and its message to society at large. In later stages of the 5 th enlargement, the idealist and ethical approach lost its influence for several reasons at the same time. First, its main initiator Germany was on the one hand experiencing a period of economic stagnation and on the other hand had to cope with restructuring costs of the former GDR. Having fewer economic resources and being better aware of costs of adopting former socialist states into EU social and economic space than other member states, Germany lost its initial optimism for fast "big-bang" enlargement. This has allowed other member states to push their interests more strongly, and as these interests did not involve images of historical guilt and giving an equal chance to the CEE, this type of motivation lost its importance after the first pre-accession stage. Its main value - highly legitimizing nature - was also replaced by CEE countries' complete readiness to legitimize all the pre-accession measures without serious doubts or negotiations. If the process had also been more influenced by norms of international law (sovereignty and equality of states) and ethical considerations, it would have not developed into a situation where EU used its powerful position to enact strong conditionality towards CEE states: furthermore, the complete readiness of the CEE countries legitimized conditionality in a way that the existing EU members wished. In a case where both sides - the EU and the applicant countries - were more interested in efficiency (speed and cost) within the enlargement process, ethical and moral arguments completely lost their importance. The new institutionalist approach explains the accession processes from the point of view of appropriateness, this being based on three components: adherence to rules, habits and rational choice from the morally acceptable options, which all influenced the choice of candidate states in the accession process. The norms and formal rules of institutions will shape the actions of those acting within them. "Compliance occurs in many circumstances because other types of behaviour are inconceivable; routines are followed because they are taken for granted as 'the way we do these things'"(Scott 2001:57). Decision-making in an institutional environment is dominated by institutions which tend to prefer expected, rational, continuing, regulated paths and are averse to risky decisions. Rules and norms tend to dominate over the idealist goals and broader gains. The cognitive element of new institutionalism suggests that individuals make certain choices because they can conceive of no alternatives. Accordingly, candidate states accepted the accession terms because they did not see any option for better conditions. In the new institutionalist reasoning, policy dominates the economy and politics, small administrative solutions guide
54
VILJAR VEEBEL
bigger political choices. In the case of the EU enlargement, new institutional reasoning can be caused upon the initiative of the EU institutions, especially by Commission. In many aspects, the concrete terms of accession were products of institutional habit or partnership principles already existing between the EU and candidate states. Intergovernmentalist logic played also influential role in some stages of pre-accession conditionality. Member-state-centric bargaining, where other actors play a minor role, appeared strongly the final stages of pre-accession, when different member states started demanding additional conditions in exchange for their support for accession. Annual Progress reports started to include criticism and demands in relation to nonCopenhagen questions and member states explained this by the need to collect support for upcoming enlargement among their electorate or repeated the neo-functional argument that "it is only in the applicants own interests". Intergovernmental policy makers explained the need for special deals and arrangements as a "zero sum game" where for every winner, there must be a loser. Integration and cooperation projects are methods to force competitive states into an ineffective or harmful situation. Joint institutions just represent the interests of the most powerful member states. The economic gains of integration or accession are important only as long as these do not threaten state sovereignty and statehood. (Moravcsik 1998:35-38). Intergovernmental policy-makers had only a restricted impact upon accession conditionality: as they rejected any joint intere st and supranational influence during the enlargement, intergovernmentalism simply had no tools to be active participant in debate. Integovernmental logic, when combined with Habermas's model of deliberative process, can also partly explain the changes of EU conditionality nature. From this viewpoint, the final balance between obligation and reward was found as a result of rational argument between the sides on how to make enlargement as smooth and motivated as possible. It means that CEE countries did not find the conditions problematic, provided it was legitimized by additional funding. Member states in that situation were able to buy more adoption and harmonization than they predicted at the beginning of conditional relations. From the candidate countries, only Poland had sufficient power to demand special exceptions and additional payments. Candidate countries' policy making was dominated by three types of analytic group. First, there were integration supporters ready to face any cost and any conditions (Baltic States according to Ilves 2003), with the sole aim of getting faster into the EU. This group also included the neofunctionalists who believed that deeper conditionality would lead to faster
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALITY AND REFORMS
55
convergence and social development: the held that anything coming from the EU was positive for society and state. The first group supported any type of conditional tools without criticism and questioning and even announced (often openly) that was ready to do more, if needed. The second group, intergovernmentalists (Poland's representatives in most of the preaccession period), were trying to find a balance between profitable accession conditions and fast accession. This group used as much bargaining as possible, even in the final stage of accession and was not always ready to follow new initiatives for advanced conditionality if not compensated sufficiently for doing so. The third group, utilitarian pragmatists were ready to accept positive conditionality as long as it was rationally substantiated and the two sides were treated according to the basic principles of international law. Positive conditionality was seen acceptable, if it was practically needed and did not imply too great an erosion of sovereignty. Romano Prodi has explained this process as follows: Conditionality while being introduced as voluntary choice was often hinted as only rational or normal option "Keep your eyes fixed firmly on your country's interest and its aspiration to join the great European family of nations." (Romano Prodi 2004) Earlier enlargements were seen as the basis for judgment as to whether the additional conditionality was justified. The basic logic was that the conditionality level applied could only be justified by the unfavorable starting position of the CEE applicant countries and not through claiming that positive conditionality itself was an ideal tool for convergence. Accordingly, the basis for treatment of candidate countries should be previous practice with states which performed similarly during their accession. A second contra argument for strong conditionality was: if this method is so efficient, why was it not used during the Irish, Greek, Spanish and Portuguese accession? The third contra argument was legal: the founding treaties did not provide a basis for positive conditionality, the accession criteria were described only in general terms and furthermore, international law does not include any possibility that independent states voluntarily restrict their sovereignty. A COMPARISON OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATIONS IN PREVIOUS ACCESSIONS AND THE 5TH PRE-ACCESSION STAGE SUPPORTS, AT LEAST PARTLY, THIS ARGUMENT.
Firstly, when looking at the main economic indicator, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita adjusted by purchasing power (PPP), differences between the first four round applicants and the best prepared applicants of
56
VILJAR VEEBEL
fifth round do not exist (see table no 3). Greece at the time of accession evaluation was equal to Malta and Slovenia, but clearly weaker than Cyprus. Ireland, Portugal, Czechoslovakia were all at the same level of around 50 per cent from EC average, other CEE states result were already more behind. Especially problematic was situation with Bulgaria and Romania, as they scored less than 30 per cent of the EC average. Table no 3: GDP PPP and GDP per capita levels is applicant countries (selection)
Ireland 1967 Greece 1977 Portugal 1984 Spain 1984 GDR 1989 Slovenia 1992 Estonia 1992 Poland 1992 Czechoslovakia 1992 Bulgaria 1992 Romania 1992 Latvia 1992 Lithuania 1992 Hungary 1992 Malta 1992 Cyprus 1992
GDP PPP per capita $
GDP PPP from EC average per cent 49 63 49 67 31 56 31 32 50
GDP PPP per capita from EC lowest per cent 63 106 92 113 52 81 45 47 73
GDP nominal per capita from EC lowest per cent 75 100 43 79 — 63 26 22 26
5676 8255 6972 9442 8422 10407 5705 6010 9376 4997 4725 4898 7430 8557 11076 13812
27 25 26 40 46 59 74
37 38 58 67 87 108
12 11 19 24 37 76 114
NationMaster database and Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board 2007
In terms of nominal GDP per capita compared to the EC lowest level (seen as an important category to avoid a situation, where most of new member states will be less developed than existing "least developed" member states) the situation was slightly different. Cyprus was most successful in this category with 114 per cent of the GDP level of the poorest member state, followed by Greece with 100 per cent, Spain with 19 per cent and Ireland with 75 per cent. Slovenia reached 64 per cent and
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY AND REFORMS
57
Hungary 37 per cent. The rest of the applicants of the first four rounds had a higher level of nominal GDP and all the other applicants of the fifth enlargement had lower levels of nominal GDP. To summarize: Cyprus achieved the best score among the states compared, both in nominal and PPP level. Among the other states Greece performed better than the weakest member state in PPP level and was equal that with the weakest in terms of nominal GDP (Ireland). From the former Soviet bloc, Slovenia achieved the best result compared with the EU average and weakest levels, followed by the Czech Republic and Hungary. Other key economic indicators offer the same conclusions (see table no 4). Cyprus and Malta represent almost an ideal result in both categories, being even better than the EC average, the Czech Republic was close to ideal in terms of employment and slightly higher than ideal as regards inflation, but still far better than the results of Ireland, Greece, Portugal or Spain in their last full year before Commission's evaluation (using data applied to actual evaluation). Slovenia had both unemployment and inflation above the EC average (inflation 226 per cent on average and unemployment 12.3 per cent) but shows in both categories close to the average results with the previous weakest applicants in their year of evaluation. GDR is also included in the table to provide a comparative basis, at a level which the Commission has found necessitates special ex-ante measures. Table no 4: Main economic data: inflation and unemployment in applicant states (per cent) Inflation Unemployment
Ireland 1977 Greece 1977 Portugal 1984 Spain 1984 GDR 1989 Slovenia 1992
Inflation from EC average
Unemployment from EC average
Inflation from EC worst
Unemployment from EC worst
13.64
15.80
132
244
74
169
12.21
2.10
118
32
66
13
28.09
8.50
383
83
155
54
11.30
20.30
150
198
61
130
2.80
17.80
48
191
20
96
11.41
11.50
226
123
72
62
VILJAR VEEBEL
Estonia 1992 Poland 1992 Czechoslovakia 1992 Bulgaria 1992 Romania 1992 Latvia 1992 Lithuania 1992 Hungary 1992 Cyprus 1992 Malta 1992
24.97
3.70
496
40
157
20
45.11
13.60
897
147
281
72
8.50
5.10
169
55
53
27
91.3
15.30
1815
165
569
81
210.39
8.20
4183
88
1312
43
243.27
2.30
4837
25
1517
12
11.11
3.50
221
38
69
19
23.06
9.80
458
106
144
52
6.51
1.80
129
19
41
10
1.63
4.00
32
43
10
22
Data: Eurostat 2008 (Patents), International Labour Organization Bureau of Statistics 2008 (unemployment) and International Monetary Fund 2008 (inflation).
The argument for or against the economic conditions from the data presented depends upon the reference basis. Should we compare applicants with the EC average at the moment of evaluation, or with the benchmarks of worst performers from earlier accession rounds? The 5th round applicants were not competitors to most member states or to the best earlier applicants, several of them were bypassing the existing most problematic member states and displayed better results than those of previous problematic applicants. Accordingly the main reason for CEE conditionality cannot be clearly based upon overall weak economic performance, but very problematic examples (in most areas - Bulgaria and Romania). In this situation some candidate countries clearly understood the need for conditionality: on the other side of the coin, those performing better felt discriminated against. Beyond economic goals, conditionality also served political and administrative purposes, where shortcomings and progress are more complicated and hard to define or measure.
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY AND REFORMS
59
During accession consultations and negotiations, the main Treaty criteria that "applicant country must have a democratic regime" had been the subject of continuous debate. The first question was: should applicants' democracies be "ready" before application (as a pre-condition) and is it applicable to expect applicants to fight for democracy without community support? The second question was: how do you measure a "sufficient democracy" level and what components it should consist of? The third question was: how long should democracy exist to be considered as stable? (Schimmelfennig 2006) A structured and comprehensive list appeared first as part of the Copenhagen Criteria (comprising free elections and government formed by results of elections, rule of law, minority tolerance, media freedoms etc). In earlier accessions, democracy was only a general pre-condition and measured by the existence of a democratic constitution and the holding of free elections. A Freedom House ranking could also be the possible alternative, but, as with the two other criteria, the European Commission preferred to use its own evaluation methodology. As more sophisticated criteria did not exist before 5 th enlargement, only two quantitative indicators appeared: free election of legislative bodies and establishment of a democratic governing system. Whilst Cyprus is a very specific and complex case (having the longest waiting period) and Malta on the other hand had long traditions of democracy, most CEE candidate states' independent democratic experience before accession is quite comparable with the democratic experience of former candidate states Greece, Portugal, Spain. Accordingly, during previous enlargements Greece and Portugal needed two years stable democracy to submit an application and the Spanish application was submitted before fully working democracy, the CEE states had to wait from four to five years to be welcomed with their accession application and even after that were seen as needing positive conditionality tools for the preaccession period. The period from (re)establishment of democratic institutions to achieving full EU membership lasted in Greece for 6.5 years, in Spain for 8 years and Portugal for 10.5 years. CEE states needed from 13 to 15 years from building democratic institutions to gaining full EU membership. Accordingly the 5th enlargement candidates were measured by much harder standards and even simultaneously forced to accept related conditionality. Their waiting for application acceptance was approximately two times longer and their waiting for full membership ca 50 per cent longer than of Greece, Spain and Portugal. Accordingly accession conditionality seems mainly being based on geographical location and political importance for the EU. This suggests that an economic criterion
60
VILJAR VEEBEL
was used most of all for arguments as to why accession should be postponed. During the negotiation process it appeared that the regional principle and political support played more important role than evaluation reports. For example, the Estonian attempt to achieve accession before its Baltic neighbours and of Romania to gain accession before Bulgaria were well reasoned by Copenhagen criteria, but due to lack of political will did not come to fruition. RESULTS AND LONG TERM INFLUENCE OF PRE-ACCESSION POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY IN THE 5TH ENLARGEMENT
The purposes of pre-accession conditionality for the EU have varied in general terms between economic gains, security gains and sharing cultural and social values. At the practical level there were also normative purposes in preparing candidate countries for the Copenhagen criteria, administrative motivation for guided and measurable enlargement processes and a mutual need to reduce the risks of possible failure in the pre-accession process. The EU officials and national policy-makers in former candidate states later stressed that efficiency gains and better results were the best justification for conditionality. It has also been pointed out that ENP will use more conditionality in future years as positive conditionality is "a golden carrot" of EU accession toolbox. The 5th enlargement with its specific set of conditionality finally produced "tremendously successful" result, with a momentous impact (Ferrero-Waldner 2006). EU representatives were completely satisfied with the results of the enlargements, at least in official remarks. For example, former Commissioner Gunther Verheugen has stated: "They were able to set new rules and new legislation based on EU law and learned to implement it properly. Human rights were respected and minorities protected. Nothing within this process is self-evident but is a fantastic result of a human driving-force for reform, mainly driven forward by the enlargement perspective. " (Vermeersch 2004) Measuring the influence of pre-accession conditionality involves not only a comparison of economic and political data during conditional measures, it is also important to compare the progress with the development of neighbouring states and previous pre-accessions, where conditionality was not used. Accordingly the influence of conditionality was justified as long it helped target states to close the gap with the EU during conditionality.
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY AND REFORMS
61
As general macroeconomic development has been seen as the greatest success during the pre-accession process, it is necessary to look first into dynamics of GDP per purchasing power. If we compare applicant states' GDP PPP levels (see table no 5) in 1992 and 2003, then statistics indicate that all of them had quite solid GDP PPP growth, in spite of political instability and the process of broad social reform. Growth was fastest in Poland, where GDP PPP level increased more than 300 per cent and slowest in Slovak Republic and Cyprus. But were the applicant countries able to catch up with existing EU average GDP per purchase power? Here we have first to take into consideration that, during this period, the EU average has grown by 64 per cent, from 18.627$ per capita to 29.639$ per capita. Poland as the fastest candidate state was able to grow by 34 per cent during this period. Next to Poland, Slovenia, Latvia and Estonia were able to show approximately 10 percentage points faster GDP growth, than the EU. At the same time, Bulgaria, Slovak Republic and Cyprus demonstrated a widening gap with the EU, whilst Lithuania showed exactly the same dynamics as the EU average. On average, applicant countries were 7 percentage points closer to the EU average in year 2003 than they were in 1992. The comparison of GDP growth indicates that candidate states were in general macroeconomic terms performing differently, despite the universal conditionality imposed by the European Union. A lack of performance similar to the EU can be caused in the absence of the influence of conditionality, where development affected by other variables. On the contrary, it can be caused by the nature of conditionality, which was suitable for some target countries and not fitting for the others, depending on their starting position. For example, both those countries with the lowest starting level (Bulgaria and Romania) and countries with highest level (Cyprus and Malta) showed slower development during conditionality, than the rest of the applicants (except Slovak Republic). This suggests that the conditionality environment, when being standardized to average candidate states' situation, served mainly those applicants with a median starting point, but offered no fast development opportunities to the most problematic or the most successful candidate states. The second important indicator of economic convergence during pre-accession was employment, as it was influencing both social security and economic development. For the EU, employment was also prioritized as possible labour migration was seen as being amongst the main threats during pre-accession.
VILJAR VEEBEL
62
Table no 5: GDP PPP levels and dynamics in applicant countries during pre-accession period 1992-2003 GDP PPP per capita 1992$
Slovenia
10407
19440
GDP PPP per cap. 1992 from EC average per cent 56
Estonia
5705
12302
31
42
Poland
6010
19440
32
66
Czechoslovakia Czech Rep.
9376 -
17627
50 -
59
Slovak Rep. Bulgaria Romania Latvia
4997 4725 4898
13439 7580 7556 10661
27 25 26
45 26 26 36
Lithuania Hungary
7430 8557
11786 15379
40 46
40 52
Cyprus Malta
13812 11076
21193 18196
74 59
72 61
EU average Applicants average
18627 7908
29639 15873
100 43
100 55
GDP PPP per cap.2003 $
GDP PPP per cap. 2003 from EC average per cent 66
Change from EC average per cent
+10 per cent +11 per cent +34 per cent +9 per cent -5 per cent -1 per cent +1 per cent +10 per cent 0 +6 per cent -2 per cent +2 per cent 0 per cent +7 per cent
NationMaster database and Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board 2007. Czech Republic and Slovak Republic data compared with Czechoslovakian data 1992.
Average unemployment in applicant countries grew between 1992 and 2003 from 7.1 per cent to 9.9 per cent. The employment was improving only in Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, but deteriorating in all other applicant countries. But were applicant states able to close the employment gap with the EU average? As average unemployment in the EU was falling during this period from 9.3 per cent to 7.4 per cent, none of the applicant states was able to keep EU-average employment dynamics.
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALITY AND REFORMS 63
Hungary was performing best in this category allowing the EU to close the gap by 8 per cent. Poland on the other hand, by letting unemployment grow to 20 per cent, widened the gap with the EU amongst fastest among applicants. Table no 6: Unemployment in applicant states before and after preaccession conditionality in 1993-2003 Unemployment 1992
Unemployment 2003
11.2
Unemployment from EU average 1992 124
Unemployment from EU average 2003 152
Slovenia
11.5
Estonia
3.7
5.8
39
78
Poland
13.6
20.0
146
270
Czechoslovakia Czech Republic Slovak Republic
5.1 -
10.3
55 -
140
Bulgaria
15.3
13.5
165
182
Romania
8.2
7.4
88
100
Latvia
2.3
8.6
24
117
Lithuania
3.5
9.8
38
132
Hungary
9.8
8.4
105
113
Cyprus
1.8
3.5
19
47
Malta
4.0
5.7
43
77
EU average Applicants average
9.3 7.1
7.4 9.9
100 77
100 127
15.2
207
Change from theEU average +28 per cent +39 per cent +124 per cent +85 per cent +152 per cent +17 per cent +12 per cent +93 per cent +94 per cent +8 per cent +28per cent +24 per cent 0 +50 per cent
64
VILJAR VEEBEL
Data: International Labour Organization Bureau of Statistics 2008. Czech Republic and Slovak Republic data compared with Czechoslovakian data 1992 In terms of inflation most of candidate countries showed fast progress 1992 and 2003: applicants' average inflation dropped from 61.1 per cent in 1993 to 3.81 per cent in 2003. The rapid fall in average inflation was mostly due to stopping hyperinflation in Latvia and Romania. The EU also showed great progress in terms of inflation, reducing it by more than 50 percentage points during this period. When comparing EU progress with that of candidate countries, then only Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Malta and Cyprus on average showed worse progress than the EU. Accordingly, in terms of inflation, eight candidate countries demonstrated results what would justify the use of conditionally. Table no. 7: Inflation in applicant states before and after pre-accession conditionally in 1992-2003
Slovenia Estonia Poland Czechoslovakia Czech Republic Slovak Republic Bulgaria Romania Latvia Lithuania Hungary Cyprus Malta EU average Applicants average
Inflation 1992
Inflation 2003
11.41 24.97 45.11 8.50 91.30 210.4 243.3 11.11 23.06 6.51 1.63 5.0 61.6
5.58 1.34 0.71 0.04 8.55 2.35 15.27 2.92 -1.18 4.73 4.14 1.30 2.15 3.81
Inflation fromEU average 1992 227 496 896 169 1815 4182 4836 220 458 129 32 100 1224
Inflation fromEU average 2003 253 61 32 2 387 106 691 132 -53 214 187 59 100 177
Change from the EU average +26 -435 -864 -167 +218 -1709 -3491 -4704 -273 -244 +58 +27 0 -1047
Data: International Monetary Fund 2008 and ERS Baseline Regional Aggregations. Czech Republic and Slovak Republic data compared with Czechoslovakia's data 1992
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALITY AND REFORMS
65
When summarizing the effects on GDP PPP, unemployment and inflation levels, it is possible to conclude that EU conditions had efficiently stabilized national currencies, but had mainly a negative effect to employment rates and social security. The impact on general macroeconomic development was also positive, as all the applicant countries increased their GDP PPP during reference period by at least 40 per cent. However, the main purpose of conditionality — to bring applicant closer to the EU average level quickly — was achieved only in approximately 50 per cent of target states, the rest showed slower or similar development dynamics as the EU in average. The fact that conditionality produced clear economic results only in those states which were close to the typical case of the fifth enlargement round, produces solid ground to criticize European Commission's attempts to standardize the enlargement conditionality in 1992-2003. Nonetheless, it is also possible to assume that the motivation for conditionality could have arisen from other aims, i.e. other than bringing all applicant states as fast as possible closer to the EU average economic level: these might be member states interests, institutional comfort, possible neoimperial ambitions (Veebel 2004). Despite all possible criticisms and not very clear results of the EU pre-accession set - Copenhagen criteria, positive conditionality remained popular among candidate countries' political elites and public opinion. The conditional relationship with candidate countries did not end completely with EU accession. Conditionality was gradually decreased but some elements remained, for example using the "internal market Scoreboard" on the transposition of internal market directives instead of "regular reports". Even after acceptance for accession a special safeguard clause was designed to deal with cases where a new Member State fails to fulfill its commitments undertaken in the accession negotiations, including the proper application of the acquis. If such a failure causes or risks causing a serious breach of the functioning of the internal market, the European Commission may take appropriate measures to deal with the situation. Such measures may seek to ensure the proper application of the acquis despite the failure of the administration of the new Member State to do so. They may result in temporarily excluding this new Member State or its citizens and economic operators from the benefits of certain internal market legislation and from the benefits of membership in specific areas, in order to protect the integrity of the internal market and prevent damage to others. Such safeguard measures will stay in place until the new Member State has met its commitments. The European Commission will not hesitate
66
VILJAR VEEBEL
to make use of such safeguards when circumstances require (European Commission 2003). POSITIVE CONDITIONALITY AND ENP
Technical know-how, institutional units and the motivational logic of positive conditionality developed during the 5th enlargement were found suitable for ENP new initiative starting in 2002. The main change in conditionality after the 5th enlargement was to introduce more differentiation. Specific action plans became a central element, setting out clearly the demands and rewards for every partner/applicant country (Ferrero-Waldner 2006). Every upcoming enlargement can affect the internal functionality of the EU, border security, create rivalry inside Union and be financially painful (Sjursen 2002:491). Accordingly, the EU has created a situation where the purpose of ENP conditionality is to develop target countries to be ready for further integration, but has given no guarantees that actual candidate status will be offered. ENP is seen as the EU's main future project, as support for future enlargement is low and economic integration might be in the final stage. The development of conditionality during the 5th pre-accession was only possible because of the acceptance and the unforeseen positive attitude of CEE states. EU member states were hoping to see the same positive attitude among ENP target states, when developing a new and more sophisticated conditionality. Support for the accession was based on three components: utility, values and rights. There is of course one major difference between pre-accession conditionality and ENP conditionality — it is the perspective of membership. This has changed the whole nature of model. As stated by Romano Prodi: "The goal of accession is certainly the most powerful stimulus for reform we can think of (Romano Prodi 2002). Whilst, during pre-accession conditionality, candidate states were ready to follow all given conditions and co-finance the reforms, just to get rapidly into the EU, the ENP conditionality target states lack this optimistic positive motivation and are looking at the situation much more from the viewpoint of their specific national interests, mainly because of the lack of a short-term accession prospect. In a situation where the EU guaranteed finance, the conditionality level could be significantly higher, without reducing or destroying the motivation of partner/target countries. Structural support measures served at the same time the role of reward (or "carrot") in the EU positive conditionality model. Formally, these measures concentrated on support of the Accession Partnership priorities. These measures are not described in the founding treaties or any other treaty.
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALITY AND REFORMS 67
Measures were initiated and executed by the European Commission and financed by the EU budget. Former pre-structural funds also found a use inside the ENP conditionality. Utilitarian logic has been a most influential stimulus. The promise to cover all necessary costs of ENP conditionality reform implementation had, in practice, a remarkable influence even without the promise of accession. Additional EU finance combined with cheap labour costs in target countries allow civil services to use EU money for their own activities, after meeting conditionality demands. Therefore, EU-related activities were supported when solving local problems and to compensate for lack of finance from state budgets. Next to functional goals neo imperial aspects were stressed: ENP partner states can be seen only in certain roles and too extensive economic competitiveness or political independence was seen not reasonable. The general role of semi-periphery was seen as most beneficial for existing member states. While pre-accession was kept as universal as possible, the ENP target states are treated quite individually. This approach is determined by the EU's special interest in certain areas and the need to give special status to some ENP target countries over the others (Sjursen 2002: 493). Privilege in status is due to economic interests and political preferences. In such cases, official progress criteria play only a secondary role and conditionality must guide target countries to their planned status in relation to the EU. The function of official progress criteria, according to such logic, is only to legitimate conditionality measures. Target countries have to follow the full set of norms if they hope to join the Union. This is based on the vision, that the EU brings set of social habits, traditions and regulations that will lead to a "good life" in candidate countries. All the efforts associated with harmonization and transposition will be later compensated for by a higher living standard. Belief in EU values also legitimized the process of harmonization without adoption: even when candidate countries did not understand the purpose of every legal act, there was a strong belief that they are needed to build an equitable society. (Sjursen 2002, 495). If target countries doubt any component of conditionality, they will be reminded that their beneficial cooperation opportunities and possible future accession is at stake if they do not fulfill the conditions that they question. The model becomes effective for the target country as acceptance is needed only at the beginning, whilst transformation of conditionality can continue during the whole process. Applicant countries find themselves in a position of dependency mode, where they have only the options to continue the process or to lose previous progress. As continuation does not need any
68
VILJAR VEEBEL
fundamental decisions, but cancellation does, the logical choice is to continue. The instruments and methods used in the ENP are similar to those used in pre-accession including country reports, action plans and progress reports. Country reports cover political and economic progress of the target state, supplemented by institutional and sectoral aspects, to assess when and how it is possible to deepen relations with that country. Country Reports were published in May 2004 on the first seven of the ENP countries to have Agreements in force with the EU. Further five Country Reports were published in March 2005 on the next countries to be included in the policy (Southern Caucasus) or whose Agreements had just come into force (Egypt and Lebanon). Country Reports are submitted to the Council which decides whether to proceed to the next stage of relations (European Commission 2008). Action plans represent specified policy plans for each target state and are tailor-made for each country, based on the country's needs and capacities, as well as their and the EU's interests. They jointly define an agenda of political and economic reform by means of short and mediumterm (3-5 years) priorities. They cover political dialogue and reform, economic and social cooperation and development, trade-related issues and market and regulatory reform, cooperation in justice and home affairs, sectors (such as transport, energy, information society, environment, research and development) and a human dimension (people-to-people contacts, civil society, education, public health) (European Commission 2008). However, in general the EU has learned from the main drawbacks of pre-accession conditionally, caused by standardization and lack of individual approach, giving the ENP good prospects for reaching its key objectives, even when accession as main "carrot" is missing. CRITICISM OF POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY
Criticism of the EU positive conditionality is based on four main aspects: sustainability, legitimacy, morality and popularity. These are grounded in the practical circumstances that the target counties have accepted the conditionality often only after they have gone through intensive crises, regime change, or have lost most of the other alternatives for rapid modernization and economic growth. So conditionality is often interpreted by the public opinion and political elite as the "second worst choice",
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY AND REFORMS
69
which should be revisited in the event of better economic and political circumstances. Regarding the question of sustainability, the main problem of positive conditionally is that if conditional aid underestimates the domestic forces required that would lead to good policies in the long run, then it has served only to promote better short term policies while contributing to the postponement of more fundamental homegrown reform efforts. Even if the conditional aid is able to solve an immediate commitment problem of the recipient, as suggested in Assessing Aid and as assumed in this model, this long term effect is still a potential problem (Anastasakis and Bechev 2003:11-12). Conditionality is sometimes also used to promote policies that for one reason or another tend to become irreversible once they are introduced. The general message of positive conditionality to a taxpayer and a citizen is that they elect and finance one share of their state, but another share has some sort of external motivation. Building up a long term and stable political culture requires, as a fundamental a precondition, that there are no competitors to the electors' will and that there are no alternatives to a democratically elected government. The influence on the economic system can have the same effect: special rules and donations of the donor may draw the target country away from the normal regional market situation, or even build up a completely new economic system based on yearly donations and support. One way to summarize the legitimacy and popularity problem on a practical level is known as the "you cannot buy policies" approach. Limitations on conditionality are seen as caused by unwilling recipients. This undermines the readiness of the recipient to implement the reform (because of "moral hazard" or simply because it does not want to) combined with a lack of credibility of the donor (because of incentives to disburse of the ex-post, particularly to the "needy", or because of monitoring difficulties). From the viewpoint of public popularity, sharing sovereignty and using conditions encourage the "rationalist and unheroic" arts of bureaucratic compromise (Schumpeter 1942:37) rather than the heroic stance of the visionary national leader, when America's modernist conception of external sovereignty reinforces its leaders' tendencies to strike heroic poses, satisfy only domestic constituencies, and seek to act with decisive military force (Keohane 2002:750). In a situation where positive conditionality produces very little public popularity, can it still have value for national elite during the
70
VILJAR VEEBEL
modernization, as the most of painful reforms can be introduced as conditionality components "where government does not have a choice"? Positive conditionality allows fundamental reforms without wider public debate, as once again governments can send a message to citizens that there is no alternative to stay in some economically beneficial network. The lack of legitimacy throughout positive conditionality model raises issues from two perspectives. First, there is the question of the target countries' government's authority to accept asymmetrical relations and restriction of its sovereignty. The critics stress that according to the Montevideo Convention, governments are not authorized to accept international treaties reducing their sovereignty and when countries are not treated as equal legal subjects. The second problem is the donors' rights to change the evaluation and success criteria during the process. Actually, the parties can agree that one of them has the privilege of changing conditions during the process, so in a way it is legitimate, but it leaves the receiving party without any possibility of forecasting and understanding the objective success criteria. Morality has also an important role to play when setting up the evaluation system and success criteria. As positive conditionality is mainly implemented by multilateral bodies with broader security and economic purposes, idealistic principles and the will to fix historical injustice or avoid future confrontations are of great importance. This motivation is sometimes directly stated, such as in the EC the cooperation framework with the ACP countries, sometimes visible but not clearly stated, vide the German will to undo its historical injustice to its eastern neighbours during the 5 th enlargement. In cases of compensating historical injustice the purpose is to help and assist. Evaluation and success criteria may develop on a lower level. Moral and economic arguments form a dilemma in which the party imposing the conditionality has to make progress-based decisions on whether to increase or decrease the support in the future. From the moral point of view additional funds are needed where the progress and development levels are the lowest and if the purpose is social development, there is no moral justification to penalize the target states' society for government's lack of progress. However, such reasoning and action will inevitably send a message that less progress ensures more financing - which in the long run will also reduce progress. CONCLUSIONS
The use of positive conditionality has been a growing trend in the EU. It started gradually within the framework of development cooperation and
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALITY AND REFORMS 71
post-colonial relations and it has emerged as the central method of the EU's pre-accession process for the fifth round of enlargement and neighbourhood policy. The practical implementation of the concept of positive conditionality has changed remarkably during the last half century. The complexity of positive conditionality has also developed simultaneously with the criteria for cooperation and membership. The reasoning for preaccession conditionality, which from a rational point of view should be helping the candidate states to fulfill the accession criteria, is not so simple, combining the interests of member states, institutions, idealistic lobby groups, etc., as well. Effective convergence and development has been the public goal for setting up positive conditionality, but in practical comparison the rational reasons and qualified criteria are hard to find. The establishment of conditionality has proven to have more political and geographical reasoning than economic reasoning. It is clearly visible when comparing states inside one accession round or countries with similar economic situations but different political importance and geographical location. Especially remarkable is the geographical historical argument: states which happened to be in the same accession round and region have to be evaluated simultaneously in order to be accepted in the same time. In practice it has led to situation where Ireland with less than 30 per cent of EC-6 GDP and Greece with less than 50 per cent of average EC-9 GDP did not have to follow conditions but Cyprus and Slovenian Republic, despite good economic performance, overcoming even several member states (Greece and Portugal), had to follow several evaluations and wait in line together with the rest of 5th enlargement round. The 5th enlargement also proved that standardization and structuralization, seen as one of the main strengths of conditionality, on the contrary reduce the positive effect for those target countries which differ from the average in terms of their development level. Accordingly, conditionality has proven successful only in those areas where it is adapted to local needs and problems. The use of positive conditionality has not been based on neutral evaluation but rather on the political and economic interests of member states and EU institutions, as conditionality still lacks clear measurable benchmarks and results are not evaluated by a neutral evaluator. The higher levels of criteria and conditions have also been initiated by candidate countries' growing willingness to cooperate and fulfill the conditions. The opinion of the target countries about conditionality has been neither harmonised nor fully positive. While most candidate countries have welcomed positive conditionality, some countries have interpreted positive conditionality with neo-functional integration as a logical first step in
72
VILJAR VEEBEL
integration. Some countries, on the other hand, have been critical and characterised this type of partnership as a sign of neo-colonialist or imperialist thinking, the aim of which is not the fastest development of the target countries, but profitability for the EU and its member states. Any possible neo-colonialist 'conspiracy theory' has usually been blocked by the argument that "we all have met similar conditions for membership in earlier periods" and that it is a logical first step towards closer cooperation. Despite some criticism, positive conditionality is certainly the favourite and fast growing method in the EU's external relations and enlargement process. REFERENCES Anastasakis, Othon and Bechev, Dimitar (2003) EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment to the Process, St Antony's College University of Oxford, http://www.cespi.it/STOCCHIERO/dossierBalcani/conditionality.PDF Batory, Agnes (2008) The politics of EU accession. Manchester University Press. Biscop, Sven (2008) The EU and the European security strategy: forging a global Europe, Routledge. Borzel, Tanja and Thomas Risse (2000) "When Europe hits home: Europeanization and domestic change". European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) 4, 15, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdff2000-015.pdf, checked 03.03.2009. Bulmer, Simon and Christian Lequesne (2005) The member states of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Burnside Craig and Dollar David (1997) "Aid, Policy and Growth", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 569252, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers, cfm ?> abstract_id=569252 Checkel, Jeffrey (2000)."Compliance and Conditionality". Arena Working Papers WP 00/18. Collier, Paul (1999) "Learning from failure: the international financial institutions as agencies of restraint in Africa". In The self-restraining state: power and accountability in new democracies. Andrea Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner, eds. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Collier, Paul and David Dollar (1998) "Aid allocation and poverty reduction". (World Bank, Research Paper.) Washington, DC: World Bank. Cooper Robert, (2003) The breaking of nations. Order and chaos in the twenty-first century, Atlantic Monthly Press Council of the European Union (1997) Common position on conflict prevention and resolution in Africa. Brussels, Official Journal! June, No. LI 53. Crawford, Gordon (2001) Foreign aid and political reform: a comparative analysis of political conditionality and democracy assistance. London: Palgrave.
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY AND REFORMS
73
Delattre, Lucas (1977) "Les pays candidats a l'entree dans FUnion ont des atouts economiques encore insuffisants". Le Monde 12 December. European Commission (1972) "Commission opinion on the applications for accession to the European communities by the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland". Documents concerning the accessions to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic. Tome II. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. European Commission (1976) "Opinion on Greek application for Membership". In European Navigator, available at h11p://www.ena.lii/commission_opinion_greek_ application_membership__29Januaiy_1976-020002562.html, checked 03.03.2009. European Commission (1978a) "Opinion on Portuguese application for membership9 (transmitted to the Council by the Commission on 19 May 1978)". European Navigator, available at http://www.ena.lu/commission_opinion_ portugals__application__accession__l 9_1978-020002551 .html, checked 03.03.2009. European Commission (1978b) "Opinion on Spain's application for membership (transmitted to the Council by the Commission on 29 November \97Sy\European Navigator, available at http://www.ena.lu/commission-opinion-spains-applicationmembership-29-november-1978-020002632.html, checked 03.03.2009 European Commission (1978c) "Communication from the Commission on the transitional period". European Navigator, available at http://www.ena.lu/ communication_commission_transitional_period_1978-020003449.html, checked 03.03.2009 European Commission (1992) "The challenge of enlargement - Commission opinion on Austria's application for membership". European Navigator, available at http://www.ena.lu/commission_opinion_austria_application__membership_31 Jul y_1991-020003546.html, checked 03.03.2009 European Commission (1994) "Commission opinion of 19 April 1994 on the applications for accession to the European Union by the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Norway". OfficialJournal of the European Communities (OJEC) 29 August, No. C 241, p. 3 European Commission (2000) "Communication Strategy for Enlargement". European Navigator, available at http://www.ena.lu/european_commission_ communicationju_agenda_2000_challenge_enlargement_l 997-020006132.html, checked 03.03.2009 European Commission (2001) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the European Union fs role in promoting human rights and democratization in third countries, available at http://ec.europa.eu/ externaljrelations/human_rights/doc/comO l_252_en.pdf, checked 03.03.2009
74
VILJAR VEEBEL
European Commission (2003) "Comprehensive monitoring report of the European Commission on the state of preparedness for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia". Official Journal of the European Union 23.3.2004, EN C 73/79 European Council (1992) Presidency conclusions (Edinburgh 11-12 December 1992), SN 456/92 Part A. Brussels: Council of the European Communities, December, p. 6. European Council (1993) Presidency conclusions (Brussels 23 October), pp. 9-10. European Council (1993) "Presidency conclusions, European Council of Copenhagen". European Navigator, available at http://www.ena.lu/conclusions_ copenhagen_european_council_extract_concerning__enlargement_2122June_1993O20006502.html, checked 03.03.2009 European Council (1994) "Conclusions of the presidency European Council of Essen". European Navigator, available at http://www.ena.Iu/essen_european__ council_essen_910_december_1994-020705181.html, checked 03.03.2009 European Council (1997) "Presidency conclusions, European Council of Luxembourg". European Navigator, available at http://www.ena.lu/ conclusions_luxembourg_european_council_12_13_december_l 997-020005307. html, checked 03.03.2009 European Council (1999) "Presidency conclusions, European Council of Helsinki". European Navigator, available at http://www.ena.lu/conclusions-helsinkieuropean-council-extract-concerning-preparations-enlargement-1011 -december1999-020005292.html, checked 03.03.2009 Ferrero-Waldner, Benita (2006), speech given in Swedish Institute for International Affairs, Stockholm 7 March, 2006. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases Action.do?reference=SPEECH/06/149&format=HTML&aged=l&language=EN& guiLanguage=en Fierro, Elena (2003) The EU's approach to human rights conditionality in practice. London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Gerson, Harry (1976) "Un succes pour Constantin Caramanlis". Le Figaro 11 February. Grabbe, Heather (2001) "How does Europanisation affect CEE governance? Conditionality, diffusion and diversity". Journal of European Public Policy 8, 6, 1013-1031. Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board (2007), available at http://www.ggdc.net/databases/, checked 03.03.2009 Her Majesty's Stationery Office (1971) "The United Kingdom and the European communities". Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty. London, July. House of Lords, Committee of European Union, 53rd Report, 2005
THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, POSITIVE CONDITIONALLY AND REFORMS
75
Keohane, Robert O. (2002) "Ironies of Sovereignty". Journal of Common Market Studies 40, 4, 743-765. Killick, Tony (1998) Aid and the political economy of policy change. London: ODI. Kleibering, Alexander, Pax Europea for the Balkans, Anee University 2005/2006 http://www. iehei. org/bibliotheque/memoires/2006/KLEIBRINK.pdf Moravcsik, Andrew, The Choice of Europe, 1998 UCL Press NationMaster, GDP per capita PPP, available at http://www.nationmaster.com/ graph/eco_gdp_percap-economy-gdp-per-capita, checked 12.06.2007 OECD, Unemployment 1952-1992 in OECD countries, available at http:// stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Defaultaspx?QueryName=251 &QueryType=View, checked 12.06.2007 Official Journal of the European Union (2003) Documents concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union 46, L 236,23 September. Ortega, Andres (1985) "No se renegociara la adhesion de Espana a la CEE en el terreno agriola". El Pals 16 July. Patten, Christopher (1999) "The future of the European security and defence policy (ESDP) and the role of the European Commission". Paper presented at the conference on the development of a common European security and defence policy, Berlin 16 December. Prodi, Romano (2002) "A Wider Europe - A Proxmity Policy as the key to stability", speech given in 6th ECSA World Conference on Peace, Stability and Security, Brussels, December 5 2002 Ranis, Gustav; Vreeland, Raymond, James; Kosack, Stephen (2006) Globalization and the Nation State, Routledge, Studies Santiso, Carlos (2002) "Governance conditionality and the reform of multilateral development finance: the role of the group of eight". G8 Governance 7 (March). Toronto: G8 Information Centre. Schimmelfennig, Frank, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel (2006) International socialization in the New Europe: European organizations, political conditionality, and democratic change. Basingstoke Palgrave: Macmillan. Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2007) "Candidate countries and conditionality' In Europeanization: new research agendas, 88-101. Paolo Graziano and Maarten Vink, eds. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2006) "Pre-accession conditionality and post-accession compliance in the new member states: a research note". In Apres enlargement: legal and political responses in central and eastern European, 145-160. Wojciech Sadurski, Jacques Ziller, and Karolina Zurek, eds. European University Institute.
76
VILJAR VEEBEL
Schumpeter, Joseph (1942) "Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy" Harvard University Press Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2007) "The European neighbourhood policy: a comment on theory and policy". In Governing Europe's neighbourhood: Partners or Periphery?, 195-208. Katja Weber, Michael E. Smith, and Michael Baun, eds. Manchester University Press. Sjursen, H. (2002) 'Why expand? The question of legitimacy and justification in the EU's enlargement policy' Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (3), 491 -513. Smith, Karen E. (1997) "The use of political conditionally in the EC/EU's relations with third countries: how effective?". EC/EUI Working Papers, SPS No. 97/7. Soares, Mario (1977) "Discours a la Commission europeenne (Bruxelles 11 mars 1977)". Bulletin des Communautes europeennes 3, 8-9. Solana, Javier (2003) "A secure Europe in a better world". Paper presented at the European Council, Thessaloniki 20 June. Steinitz, Klaus (2002) "The accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic - the first step to eastward expansion of the EU?", available at http://www.epoc.unibremen.de/publications/pup2003/files/Budapest_Steinitz.PDF, checked 03.03.2009 Stokke, Olav (1995) Aid and political Conditionality. London: Franck Cass. Thatcher, Margaret (1993) The Downing Street years. London: Harper Collins Publishers. Veebel, Viljar (2004) "Conditionality and dependence as key elements in simultaneous democratization and crises prevention". In The Estonian foreign policy yearbook. Andres Kasekamp, ed. Tallinn: Varrak. Veebel, Viljar (2009) European Union's Positive Conditionality Model in PreAccession Process, TRAMES, 2009, 13(63/58), 3, 1-1, Tartu University Publishing Verheugen, Günther, "The Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union: an opportunity for Tunisia", speech 21 January 2004, Tunis, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdftunis_en.pdf Weber, Steven (1995) "European Union conditionality". In Politics and institutions in an integrated Europe, 193-222. Barry Eichengreen, Jeffrey Frieden, and Jürgen von Hagen, eds. Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. Wolf Susanna and Dominik Spoden (2000) Allocation of EU aid towards ACPcountries. (ZEF-Discussion Papers on Development Policy, 22.) Bonn: Center for Development Research (ZEF). Zielonka, Jan (2006) Europe as empire. The nature of the enlarged European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
IV
Veebel, Viljar (2011). Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-Accession Evaluation. STSS, Vol . 3/2011, pp. 3–23.
STSS
Vol 3 / Issue 3
Studies of Transition States and Societies
Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation Viljar Veebel*
Abstract This paper will analyse the transparency, impartiality and objectiveness of the European Union’s (EU) preaccession assessment procedure. The principal aim is to test and analyse whether the EU follows official and objective criteria in its progress reports or if is it dominated by institutional and national interests. The central questions of the paper are: What were the main motivators of the EU’s independent closed assessment system for the pre-accession process and what influence did this have on the accession process during the years 2004–2006? To answer these questions, the paper will compare the European Commission’s (Commission) progress reports on selected candidate countries with the assessments of six other respected research centres: the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, Freedom House, the Bertelsmann Foundation, Transparency International, Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation. If the evaluation results of the EU differ significantly or systematically from the calculated average of the other evaluators, then there is a need to analyse the methods, logic and motivation of the European Commission during the preaccession evaluation, as there is a possibility of subjectivity and politicised evaluation. This analysis covers the main areas of the Copenhagen Criteria. The test cases will be pre-accession progress assessments of Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM and Romania in 2004–2006. Test areas will consist of: Governance efficiency; Existence and quality of rule of law; Level of corruption and efficiency of anticorruption activities; Efficiency of legal system, and Economic liberties and freedoms.
Keywords: European Union, enlargement, conditionality, evaluation.
Introduction The 5th enlargement of the European Union, which was unique in many respects, starting from the magnitude of the accession and its political importance, was also the first enlargement of the EU to contain a list of accession criteria known as the Copenhagen Criteria and a administrative system of conditionality to support criteria fulfilment and a regular progress assessment. What had earlier been an overwhelmingly political process of pre-accession negotiations (even when not admitted openly) was gradually replaced with a technical system of conditions, measurable criteria and assessment. The European Commission’s official aim was to provide a transparent and competitive environment for candidate states during the whole pre-accession period. It was also clearly stated in the 1993 Copenhagen Council’s conclusions and the ‘White Paper on Enlargement’ that possible acceptance in the upcoming enlargement conditionality is clearly connected with the progress shown in the fulfilment of accession criteria. The Copenhagen Criteria and the supportive conditionality were officially introduced as a fair and open way to compete for EU membership, obtain practical feedback and finally fulfil the criteria in the most effective way. Applicant countries were encouraged to open their economies and societies in an unprecedented way in exchange for a fast and supervised accession process. EU institutions and * E-mail:
[email protected]
3
4
Viljar Veebel
member states alike emphasised that only a joint and transparent effort, where both sides trusted each other, was the fastest and the most effective enlargement strategy. The EU used both the ‘carrot’ of possible membership and the ‘stick’ of exclusion, to drive economic and political reforms in the candidate countries. Each applicant country was offered membership when it fully complied with the Copenhagen Criteria (Copenhagen Council Conclusions 2003). On the other hand, critics claimed that by establishing the Copenhagen Criteria, the EU went only half way towards transparency and functionality—the criteria were not quantitative or clearly measurable, they were not fixed for the whole period of enlargement, they were not measured by an impartial body, and assessments tended to include additional categories outside the official criteria. In a situation where most of these shortcomings were caused not by a lack of technical ability, but mainly political choice, the question of the functional purpose and objectivity of the accession criteria was raised (for example Anastasakis & Bechev 2003). But why did the EU need to create an entirely new assessment system, when most components of the Copenhagen Criteria were simultaneously regularly and impartially measured by several international organisations and agencies? The two most logical answers might be: a) deeper, more sophisticated and quantitative research was needed; and b) there was a need for adjusted results. Important questions are also how and why objective assessment, transparency and trust are important for the efficiency of the conditionality during the pre-accession process, and what the prior motivation is of the European Commission as an evaluator? Sceptical analysts have pointed out the possibility that the accession criteria were established in a ‘semi-quantitative’ way to control the speed and cost of the pre-accession process from the EU side instead of supporting actual progress-based accession. Some criticism has also been based on the fact that strict criteria and evaluation did not seem important in previous enlargements. The following paper will focus on one of the central aspects of the pre-accession process: the actual measuring and assessment of candidate states’ progress in order to analyse the connection between the progress in the fields of the Copenhagen Criteria and their influence on actual membership prospects. To put it in a nutshell, the questions What were the main motivators of the EU evaluation system’s design and what was its actual influence in practice during the 2004–2006 pre-accession assessments? will be the main questions to be answered in the following paper. The paper will also analyse what role conditionality plays in pre-accession logic—was it a function and efficiency creation tool, or a control and manipulation tool? The following analysis will be based on the pre-accession assessment cases of Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM and Romania during their joint candidate status years in 2004–2006. The applicant states were selected on the basis of similarity in regional, historical and cultural aspects, in many ways comparable but clearly chosen in a way that some of them should be accepted by the EU and some not during the years following the observation period. Comparison will be as quantitative as possible, to highlight the possible difference of the EU’s and other evaluators’ results. The main method of analysing the evaluation’s objectivity and connection between progress and assessments will be a comparison of the EU Progress Report results with the results of other main evaluators in this field. The EU assessment results of the EU will be compared with assessments of the IMF, WB, the Bertelsmann Foundation, Transparency International, Freedom House, Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation. Categories to be compared in this paper will be: a) rule of law; b) level of corruption and efficiency of anti-corruption activities; c) economic liberties and freedoms; d) governance efficiency; and e) judicial efficiency. These are areas where an evaluator can choose a qualitative or semi-quantitative way of assessment. By choosing a semi-quantitative approach, rankings and indices are the main components of evaluation. By choosing the qualitative option, the comments and opinions are the bases of a final decision. The European Commission has decided on a qualitative evaluation model, while most other independent evaluators have decided on a quantitative model.
Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation
The methodology, criteria and test cases The research is based on a functional and idealistic assumption that in order to serve the wider integration process goals, pre-accession assessments are aimed at reflecting candidate countries’ actual (measureable or recognisable) progress, as it provides a logical basis for assistance and creates competition for further progress. The assumption that objective evaluation is regarded as necessary is supported by the Commission’s statement, “Progress is measured on the basis of decisions taken, legislation adopted and measures implemented. This approach ensures equal treatment across all reports and permits an objective assessment” (European Commission 2006b: 5). The logical starting point of the analysis is that if the European Commission and other international institutions are professionally and impartially evaluating the same criteria, in general, they should receive similar results. Or if the results differ slightly, in general, it is not systematic and does not purposely discriminate against any of the candidate states. There is, of course, an alternative critical view that EU assessments and reports are not only aimed at mirroring the actual progress of candidate states, but also at regulating the accession speed and conditions. Accordingly, if the European Commission’s Progress Report results do not match the results of impartial international evaluators, there is a need to research the core reasons, nature and motivation of this difference. The EU Commission’s assessments of a candidate state’s progress will be taken as a reference point, and the data will be compared with the assessments of other international evaluators (at least four organisations in each criterion. Annual and Special Reports of the IMF, WB, the Bertelsmann Foundation, Transparency International, Freedom House and the Heritage Foundation will be used as sources of comparison. The evaluations of independent evaluators will be summarised and the average will be compared with the EC evaluations.). The wider the difference between the EU and other evaluators is, the more evident the possible subjectivity of the EU assessment. As the second step, the logic of differentiation will be analysed to find out if subjectivity is random or systematic in supporting some candidate states. It will be followed by a short motivation analysis. The main criteria in data source selection are their quantitative nature and similarity with the EU evaluation categories. The reports also need to cover the whole reference period (2004–2006). No criteria that are by nature fully based on quantitative measuring (GDP growth, inflation, unemployment, budget deficit, public debt) are used, as these offer no possible option for subjectivity. Comparison categories are broadly based on the Copenhagen Criteria and more concretely on special categories described in candidate countries’ Progress Reports in 2005–2006. As Progress Reports are standardised, based on the accession treaty structure, all Commission reports consist of the same sub-chapter numeration (‘Rule of law’, for example, chapter 2.1). The Copenhagen Criteria form also three general areas of evaluation. The first group of criteria covers democracy, rule of law, institutional stability, level of corruption and minority treatment. The second group of criteria covers: general level of market economy, ability to sustain in common market competition, economic liberties and defence of ownership. The third group of criteria covers the administrative ability of the harmonisation of EU laws and the ability to take further membership obligations (European Commission 1993, and European Commission 2006e: 22). As the Copenhagen Criteria themselves are too general to be measured quantitatively, in practice, these are replaced by a modified list of criteria that is best represented in Progress Reports. Progress Report chapters include both the criteria, which have a direct connection to pre-accession (Copenhagen Criteria), and numerous sub-areas, which have a questionable connection with the original criteria: budgetary control, security and defence policy, public procurement, human rights, employment and social policy, etc. Most of the non-Copenhagen Criteria are fitted into a third part of the Progress Report (under the chapter ‘Ability to harmonise and adapt EU laws and obligations of membership’). The empirical part of the paper will analyse the following specific criteria from the Progress Reports:
5
6
Viljar Veebel
-
Governance efficiency: indicates the level of democracy, stable institutions and respect of minority rights (based on the 1st Copenhagen Criteria and located under chapters 2.1, 2.2, 5 and 22 in the Progress Reports). - Rule of law (based on the 1st and 3rd Copenhagen Criteria and located under chapter 2.1 in the Progress Reports). - Level of corruption and efficiency of anti-corruption activities (based on the 1st Copenhagen Criteria and located under chapters 4.4, 4.5 and 5 in the Progress Reports). - Economic liberties and freedoms (based on the 2nd Copenhagen Criteria and located under chapters 3.1, 4.3 and 4.4 in the Progress Reports). - Judicial efficiency: actual ability of legal protection (based on the 2nd and 3rd Copenhagen Criteria and located under chapters 2.1, 4.6, 7 and 23 in the Progress Reports). The comparison will only cover the fields where the EU is using opinion-based assessment, but the other agencies are using quantitative measuring. These are the areas where quantitative measuring is technically possible and the other evaluators provide numeral evaluations, but the EU has chosen to prefer a non-measureable approach. An attractive and intriguing part, however, is that both the EU Commission and the independent evaluators offer the rankings of selected states and the magnitude of their difference. The purpose of comparison is based on these rankings, to test the objectivity of the EU Commission’s evaluations. The second level of the analysis is to summarise which countries have received an advantage or discrimination in the scoreboard ranking from the European Commission. It is also important whether those advantages and discriminations actually played a role in the actual selection of which country is ready for membership. The test cases are the pre-accession assessments of Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM and Romania on the social economic and legal progress during their joint pre-accession period in 2004–2006. Selection was based on the criteria of comparing ‘as similar cases as possible’ among the applicant states, where all selected states shared a quite comparable socio-economic development level, cultural background and motivation for reforms to achieve EU membership. The test period is limited due to practical reasons since Croatia joined the actual accession talks in 2005, and FYROM was also accepted as a candidate state in 2005; Bulgaria and Romania ended their pre-accession negotiations on EU accession on January 1st, 2007. All four were similarly evaluated by the EU Commission only during the years 2005–2006.
Theoretical logic of pre-accession conditionality and assessment EU pre-accession and assessment analysis brings together two research frameworks: first, the positive conditionality paradigm and second, the accession and pre-accession logic of the EU. The traditional conditionality paradigm is dominated by models based on development cooperation studies; the most well-known among them is Tony Killick’s Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change. While offering a wide-range systematic overview of the evaluation methodology and efficiency of multilateral donors in Africa, these approaches do not include critical variables of EU pre-accession: membership perspective and a far-developed level of integration (Killick 1998). The theoretical logic of conditionality efficiency has also been thoroughly researched by Paul Collier and his associates, but once again mainly in the cases of African states, where a starting situation initiates a different logic and actual tools from the EU pre-accession situation. The main similarity to the EU pre-accession process is the core logic of structural conditionality: a step-by-step model, positive motivation and tools to safeguard already achieved reforms (Collier 1997: 1401). The conditionality analysis of Carlos Santiso focuses on governance efficiency during the conditionality based on the broader experience of the G8. In this case, the 5th and 6th enlargement rounds once again provide different results, which cannot be explained by a single logical model or connection (Santiso 2002).
Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation
Traditional studies on EU enlargement offer the second part of the theoretical package for this paper. The motivation for enlargement as well as rules and practical results are seen differently depending on the authors’ theoretical background. Jan Zielonka in his Europe as Empire; the Nature of the Enlarged European Union has offered a broader philosophical view of the logic of the enlargement and post-enlargement situation through a neo-imperial prism. Zielonka’s questions of the applicants’ loyalty and the importance of the geographical location of candidate states will be taken into account in this paper as well. He focuses on the importance of voluntarism when forming the new European empire (Zielonka 2006: 53–56). Most authors bring those two paradigms of conditionality and enlargement together. Heather Grabbe describes how third important concept- Europeanisation affects CEE governance, when influenced by conditionality, diffusion and diversity. Grabbe offers a specialised and focused approach, where a special empirical situation in the CEE is the source of new logic and models, instead of attempting to adapt already existing models for the latest EU accession cases (Grabbe 2001). Mapping and defining the main components and logic of EU conditionality towards candidate countries has been the main focus of Frank Schimmelfennig in his multiple joint writings with Ulrich Sedelmeier and Stefan Engert (‘Candidate Countries and Conditionality’, ‘Pre-accession Conditionality and Post-accession Compliance in the New Member States: A Research Note’). They also focus on the importance of constructed values like ‘community’, ‘identity’ and ‘solidarity’ during conditionality and on the accession process. Especially important are their guidelines on the efficiency of conditionality, by proposing ‘soft, step-by step’ tactics instead of using force (Schimmelfennig 1999, Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2007). Karen E. Smith has added a dynamic aspect to pre-accession conditionality studies, by researching ‘The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality’, which offers some aspects of motivation explanations in this paper. She also describes and analyses how the relationship between imposers and address countries developed in mutual cooperation (Smith 2003). To answer the central research question, it is important to start with the question of how and why objective assessment, transparency and trust, as a part of conditionality, are important for the efficiency of the whole pre-accession process, and how these values serve the interests of existing member states, institutions and applicant countries. Conditionality (and a criteria of success, as the main part of it) is a technical method to achieve cooperation efficiency. Basically, conditionality should provide the playground for two or more actors for the most efficient cooperation. The main question for the imposing side of the conditionality is how to motivate the target country to follow certain rules and achieve results in exchange for a reward (Killick 1998: 5). Asymmetry in a conditional relationship is quite unavoidable, as the receiving side (applicant country) is partly or fully dependent on the imposer’s assistance and rules (Fierro 2003: 95). The system of conditionality and assessment needs to serve the efficiency of the process and be as free of ideology as possible. The conditionality situation, which is often described as the ‘stick and carrot’ approach, offers in practice several choices for the motivation: the final reward (membership for example), the temporary financial support and the nature of the relation (Smith 2003: 58, Zalewski 2004: 3-5). When looking at the conditionality and assessment logic in the context of EU integration theory, according to the dominant neo-functional paradigm, the fastest inclusion and progress will lead to the fastest actual convergence. In pre-accession logic, it means that a more motivated environment for both sides will lead to faster and more effective accession, which serves the interests of both sides. Therefore, at least in theory, it would be reasonable for EU institutions to support transparent, guided and motivational enlargement conditions and assessment based on actual progress as widely as possible (Rosamond 2000). Where accession is the main reward, the rules of assessment and the nature of relationship play the central role. A more transparent system offers more space and a clearer status for applicant states, and also motivates them more as the final decision actually depends on their pre-accession progress.
7
8
Viljar Veebel
It seems to be a win-win situation for all those around the pre-accession table. In the 5th and 6th enlargements, the main motivation to fulfil the accession criteria was based on proof and the hope that progress really mattered and that the assessment was fair, so there was no rational need to look for political support, but only a need for faster progress. Quite often it was just based on an idealist hope that the EU and the West in general and contrary to the habits of the former Soviet Union, were based on fairness and progress. The accepted and rejected countries alike have later underlined the importance of a clear promise of accession if the Copenhagen Criteria are met. The conditional framework offered by the EU was seen as a solution to achieving a quick transition from the previous regime to a liberal capitalist system. The nature and purpose of conditionality in practice was questioned mainly only in academic writings or post-rejection announcements from Bulgaria and Romania (Anastasakis & Bechev 2003: 5-6). The central question remained practical—how to bring conditionality efficiency into practice? The utilitarian argument has been the second most important motivator for candidate countries: at first based on the promise of donors to cover up to 80% of necessary costs for reform implementation, later also providing some additional reward resources for social and institutional reforms. Therefore, the EU-related activities became priorities that helped to solve the local problems and to compensate the lack of finance within state budgets. Public support was also often gained by the joint argument that all the efforts would be later compensated through a higher standard of living. The belief in European values also legitimised the process of harmonisation without adaption. Even when the candidate countries did not understand the purpose of every legal act, there was a strong belief that it was a need to gain welfare (Sjursen 2002: 495). As long as the candidate countries believed that the accession process was open, transparent and objective, it remained popular among the candidate countries’ political elite and public opinion. Critique was provided mainly after the rejection of Romania and Bulgaria from the 2004 enlargement, where both state-based and independent Balkan analysts started to debate the logic and motivation of the pre-accession conditionality (Anastasakis & Bechev 2003: 5). Also the content of the criteria and the growing nature of the Progress Reports’ fields were not seen as problematic as long as they were supported by a clear promise of accession. In the 1990s and less after the millennium, the utilitarian view was counterbalanced by morality and the idea of equality. Ethical and moral explanations were based on Webberian administration ideals, protestant ethics and the idea of the historical guilt of Germany in relation to the CEE. Accordingly, the CEE countries deserve an equal chance to join the EU, despite their weaknesses after the regime transition. The role of existing member states should be supportive, not dominant or discriminative. Enlargement is not a technical process with demands on one side and funding on the other side, but it is based on the equal treatment of states and compensating historical injustice (Sjursen 2002: 494). The logic was based on the assumption that in case of enlargement conditions the question was not only the efficiency of the process but also its legitimacy and message to society. On the one hand, a clear motivating system seemed the simplest and most ethical, and on the other hand it offered almost no control over the speed and conditions of the enlargement. A completely qualitative or politicized system on the other hand would have been de-motivating for candidate states and would direct their efforts to political negotiation, not to the actual process of modernisation. The decision for a more flexible and semi-quantitative system was introduced, and surprisingly most applicant countries did not raise any counter-arguments to the non-quantitative assessment, leaving them to complete dependence on the European Commission’s opinion, while the Commission itself was one of the interested actors in the accession process. This is close to the rationalist point of view, where cost/benefit calculations are the main factors in the conditionality, determining the partners’ decision to cohere with the norms of the international organisation or refuse cooperation (Schimmelfennig & Knobel 2006).
Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation
One central motivation for the member states and the EU institutions (especially the European Commission) during pre-accession was (as it is today) to safeguard and control the accession process. Fear that the possible enlargement could cause problems for the existing union, in financial or legal terms, played a key role in building the sophisticated accession conditionality in the 1990s. The CEE enlargement costs and risks were considered (by existing member states and EU institutions) to be so high that it was sometimes seen as a dilemma between the union’s enlargement and its internal efficiency. At the time of pre-accession, the EU was shown as an altruistic actor putting its own existence at stake to re-unite Europe. Possible delays and unpredictable costs were seen as central components of enlargement risks. This approach worked very supportively for conditionality supporters, as it allowed to them to demand something in exchange from applicant countries for such a great risk taken by the EU. As applicant countries offered all possible cooperation, the risk of possible failure of enlargement was not considered in official assessments and reports. Among the member states, motivation was different. Some of them were interested in fast enlargement (UK); others tried to postpone it (Greece, Spain and Portugal); the third group was interested in controlled accession (France and Benelux), where the pre-accession conditionality would provide them with better access to new resources and markets; the fourth group (Austria, Finland and Sweden) was interested in legal and historical justice. During the accession period, the motivation of those groups also changed and diverged, but officially the transparent and functional accession process still remained the only purpose of the accession criteria (Germany, in different pre-accession periods, covered most of the mentioned positions: first being motivated by idealistic historical justice reasoning and ending finally with a pure profit-motivated approach, where advantages based on political influence and economic size were fully utilised). Most member states tended to follow realistic arguments and national interests, when designing the pre-accession assessment system based on the principle that economic and political gains of accession were important only as long as these did not threaten the states’ sovereignty or statehood (Moravcsik 1999: 35-38). Accordingly, there was some fear of a zero-sum game among existing member states, based on the logic that for every winner, there must be a loser. The strongest idealistic and ethical arguments were used by Germany at the beginning of the formulation of the Copenhagen Criteria, but were abandoned as neither the other member states nor the applicants appreciated the German approach, but supported faster accession with more asymmetrical conditions. It is also evident that the accession interests of separate institutions can be (and often are) different from the general long-term interest of the EU—accession has often become a vital component in the institutional competition between the Commission, Council and Parliament. In that situation, the possibility to delay accession by adjusting Progress Reports offered needed additional time to the European Commission for institutional reform and a new financial approach package. A non-quantitative assessment methodology was needed to convince applicants that the reason for delay was their slowness in the reform process, not the EU’s unwillingness (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2002). There were serious doubts whether democratic candidate states should share their legislative and executive power in an asymmetrical way as it was demanded during the pre-accession conditionality, even if it was a strategic goal for a nation, as it is implemented in a way that is in some aspects both anti-constitutional and anti-democratic. Final willingness to accept sovereignty sharing was justified by the idea of mutual interests and benefit. Integration is seen as a complete win-win game, where all the participants are at every stage certain that they will benefit through an additional deepening or widening of the integration process. But in such cases of asymmetry, at least the final result needs to indicate an actual benefit for both sides. When combined together, this logic fitted well with a neo-institutionalist approach of the appropriateness of social processes, which is based on three components: rule following, habit, and rational choice from the morally acceptable options. The norms and formal rules of institutions will
9
10
Viljar Veebel
shape the actions of those acting within them. “Compliance occurs in many circumstances because other types of behaviour are inconceivable; routines are followed because they are taken for granted as ‘the way we do these things’” (Scott 2001: 57). To summarise: the creation of an assessment system and conditionality can be dominated by three main groups (all on the imposers’ side): net payers, non-gainers, and separate institutions (i.e. the European Commission). In rare cases, conditionality can be without a clear dominant side or dominated by applicant states. In certain areas, the criteria and the conditionality are supported by the representation of special interests of existing member states via giving special status to some applicant countries over others (Sjursen 2002). Preferences were caused by economic interests and political arguments/preferences; in both cases, the official accession criteria only play a secondary role and the conditionality must guide the applicant countries to their place in the union.
Comparison of candidate countries’ progress reports: European Union versus independent evaluators The governance efficiency The governance efficiency criteria indicate the level of democracy, the stability of institutions and the respect of minority rights (based on the first Copenhagen Criteria and on some aspects the third Copenhagen Criteria)1. Governance efficiency criteria are next to European Commission regularly evaluated by the World Bank, the Bertelsmann Foundation and Freedom House. The main sub-components for the European Commission’s assessment are the administrative capacity of the public sector, the competence of the civil service, the regional administration capacity, the integrity of public interests and the ability to conduct reforms in the public sector. The European Commission assessment is published in the annual Progress Reports for all the applicant states. Governments’ efficiency criteria in the cases of FYROM and Croatia also consist of a non-treaty addon stating: “It also monitors regional cooperation, good neighbourly relations and the respect for international obligations, such as cooperation with the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia” (European Commission 2006b: 6). In the Commission’s evaluation, no quantitative categories are used; also no levels of progress are indicated. A central measurable aspect is that the Commission found some countries (Bulgaria and Romania) to have a sufficient level for accession and other countries required continuing reforms and efforts. Accordingly, on the scoreboard Bulgaria and Romania, which were ready for accession, were in the lead over Croatia and FYROM. The main evaluative categories of the European Commission are: ‘the country has achieved success’, ‘the country is developing’, ‘the country has several challenges’, ‘limited progress’, ‘reforms need to be faster’. The first two (positive categories) have been used to describe the progress in Bulgaria and Romania (European Commission 2006a: 5 and European Commission 2006d: 5) and the remaining three negative categories to describe Croatian and FYROM developments (European Commission 2006c: 6 and European Commission 2006b: 7). Independent qualitative evaluators offered indexed evaluation, enabling us to see the difference in percentages. Based on the 2004–2006 reports, Croatia could be considered as the best performer with an almost 10% advantage over Bulgaria. FYROM is ranked in the last position by all evaluators. Summarising the governments’ efficiency indices from the World Bank, Freedom House and the Bertelsmann Foundation in the period of 2004–2006, Croatia scores the highest average in every year, whereas Bulgaria achieves second place, Romania third and FYROM fourth. Table 1 offers an example of the evaluation of the impartial evaluator (World Bank 2006). 1 Evaluations on government efficiency can be found under chapters 2.1, 2.2, 5 and 22 in the Progress Reports.
Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation
Table 1: World Bank evaluation on governance efficiency 2004–2006 on a 100-point scale Bulgaria Croatia FYROM Romania
2004 60.7 71.1 54.5 57.3
2005 61.6 69.7 45.5 56.9
2006 58.3 70.1 52.1 57.8
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/, World Bank 2006 Table 2: Governance efficiency 2004–2006: European Commission versus independent evaluators Country Bulgaria Croatia FYROM Romania
EU ranking2 1–2 3–4 3–4 1–2
Index-based ranking3 2 1 4 3
Difference +0.5 positions -3.5 positions +0.5 positions +1.5 positions
Source: European Commission 2006a; 2006b, 2006c, 2006d)
Table 2 indicates that the difference between the Commission’s assessment and the index-based assessments is the smallest in terms of Bulgarian and FYROM progress, and the Commission supported both by a 0.5 position. Romania gained a respectable 1.5 position support, and Croatia is the most discriminated. While being at the top of the independent scoreboards, Croatia shares the worst result with FYROM in European Commission Progress Reports.23
Existence and quality of the rule of law The rule of law indicates the level of judicial process, the competence of judges, the possibility of disputes, non-discrimination in the judicial process and the efficiency of the police (based on the 1st Copenhagen Criteria and in some aspects the 3rd Copenhagen Criteria)4. Subcomponents for the European Commission assessments are: treatment of minorities, treatment of prisoners, gender equality, protection of children’s rights and treatment of handicapped people. In this category, the EU is quite critical of all four applicants and fully positive categories are avoided. The main problems are seen in areas of the witness protection, integrity of the legal system, prisoner treatment, impartiality of the legal system, lack of reforms in the judicial system, etc. (European Commission 2006a: 7, European Commission 2006b: 8 and European Commission 2006c; 10). The European Commission’s Progress Reports use the following categories for evaluation: ‘significant progress’ (Romania), ‘partial success and necessity of further progress’ (Bulgaria), ‘long way to transparent and efficient rule of law’, ‘limited changes and progress’ (Croatia), ‘important challenges needed to create an effective reform program’, and ‘Parliament has so far failed to enact new rules’ (FYROM) (Commission 2006a: 7; European Commission 2006b: 8 and European Commission 2006c: 10). Also as a rare example, some measurable facts were offered as an example: ‘The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered 25 judgements concerning Croatia’ (European Commission 2006b: 9). Accordingly, the European Commission assessment indicates that Romania has the highest development, Bulgaria is in second place, Croatia is ranked third and FYROM last in this comparison. In their conclusions, the European Commission also indicated that Bulgaria and Romania have a positive membership perspective, but Croatia and FYROM required deeper reforms. 2 Based on data presented by the European Commission in 2006 Country Reports. 3 Based on the data of independent evaluators. 4 The Commission’s evaluations are located under chapter 2.1 in the Progress Reports.
11
12
Viljar Veebel
Table 3: Quality of the rule of law according to the Bertelsmann Foundation 2003–2004 2005–2006
Bulgaria 7.8 8.5
Croatia 8.3 8.0
FYROM 7.0 6.8
Romania 7.3 8.3
Source: Bertelsmann Foundation report 2006 Table 4: Rule of law 2004–2006: European Commission versus independent evaluators Country Bulgaria Croatia FYROM Romania
EU ranking 1–2 3 4 1–2
Index-based ranking 1 3 4 1
Difference -1 position No difference No difference +1 position
Source: European Commission 2006, Bertelsmann Foundation 2006, Freedom House 2006 and World Bank 2006
Next to the EC, the existence and quality of the rule of law is regularly evaluated by the World Bank, the Bertelsmann Foundation and Freedom House. Independent evaluators included similar subcomponents for comparison, adding also the transparency aspects and level of bureaucracy. Combining all indices in this regard, Bulgaria was ranked at the top, but was seen to have structural problems. Romania and Croatia, while not having any specific critique, were placed in equal 2nd and 3rd places, and FYROM is ranked last since it had several problems with its prison system, police, religious discrimination and recruitment principles. The best score in all the reference years and evaluators was achieved by Bulgaria, followed by Romania in 2nd and Croatia in 3rd place. FYROM was ranked last by all the evaluators during all those reference years. But the differences are only by one point on the 10-point scale. The difference between the European Commission’s assessment and the index-based assessments is very small. Croatia and FYROM have achieved similar positions, Bulgaria has an advantage of one position and Romania has lost a place when compared with independent index-based results.
Level of corruption and efficiency of anti-corruption activities The level of corruption and the efficiency of anti-corruption activities (based on the 1st Copenhagen Criteria) indicate the general environment for the residents and the investors in terms of corruption and the government’s efforts and success in fighting corruption, as well as the rules of public procurement. The level of corruption and efficiency of anti-corruption activities are regularly evaluated by the European Commission5, the World Bank, the Bertelsmann Foundation, Transparency International and Freedom House. The main subcomponents for the European Commission assessment are: the judicial framework for anti-corruption activities, the existence of the necessary institutional structure and experts and public interest for implementation. The main evaluative categories for the European Commission and independent evaluators are overlapping: the level of corruption cases on the top level (politicians) and low level (education and medicine), cost of corruption for society, acceptance of corruption in society. The European Commission assessment published in annual Progress Reports uses in this category no qualitative measuring. Evaluative categories are as follows: ‘proof of high level fight against corruption’ (Bulgaria), ‘showing progress’ (Romania), ‘situation is serious and critical’, ‘measures have 5 Located under chapters 5, 4.4 and 4.5 in the Progress Reports.
Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation
Table 5: Transparency International rating on corruption 2004–2006 Bulgaria Croatia FYROM Romania
2004 4.0 3.4 2.7 3.0
2005 4.0 3.4 2.7 3.1
2006 4.1 4.1 3.7 3.3
Source: Transparency International 2006, http://www.transparency.org/ Table 6: Anti-corruption activities 2004–2006: EU Commission versus independent evaluators Bulgaria Croatia FYROM Romania
EU ranking 1 3 4 2
Index-based ranking 1–2 1–2 4 3
Difference +0.5 position -1.5 positions No difference +1 position
Source: European Commission 2006, Bertelsmann Foundation 2006, Freedom House 2006 and World Bank 2006
been taken’; however, ‘corruption remains a serious problem’ (Croatia), ‘corruption is widespread’, ‘low political will to fight corruption’ (FYROM). The EU Progress Report is most positive for Bulgaria, slightly positive for Romania, Croatia is evaluated as having serious problems in the fight against corruption, and FYROM is in the worst situation, having low political interest in anti-corruption activities (European Commission 2006a: 8; European Commission 2006d: 8; European Commission 2006b: 8; European Commission 2006c: 12). In the Croatian case, the Commission points to the crucial importance of the negative evaluation: “Progress on tackling corruption will also be an important indicator of Croatia’s readiness for eventual membership” (European Commission 2006b: 9). Independent index-based evaluators find that the level of the anti-corruption fight is highest in Bulgaria (highest by the Freedom House index) and Croatia (highest by WB). The Bertelsmann Foundation and Transparency International find the level to be equal. Romania is clearly seen in third place and FYROM is in a league of its own (average results 15-20% lower than Romania’s results). The comparison indicates that the European Commission reached the same conclusion as the independent evaluators in terms of FYROM (last place) and by Bulgaria, being in first and second places. The difference with the independent evaluators appears in terms of Romania and Croatia. Romania, which according to the independent evaluators is seen clearly in third place, is in a positive light and in second place in the European Commission’s Progress Report. Croatia, on the other hand, has been downgraded 1.5 positions by the European Commission, while ranked as one of the best by the independent evaluators. It is seen as far behind Bulgaria and Romania in the Commission’s Progress Report. The Commission’s negative attitude towards Croatia also appears in the year-toyear evaluation: where the Progress Report in 2006 points out that the level of corruption is growing compared to its previous level (European Commission 2006b: 52), other evaluators see the situation as improving. For example, Transparency International states the Corruption Perception Index in Croatia is improving from 3.4 to 4.1 on a 10-point scale. While the European Commission’s Progress Reports assess the four applicants as positive/progressive (Bulgaria and Romania) and negative (Croatia and FYROM) groups, independent evaluators are more critical and divide the groups in a way that Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania are more similar (having serious problems but showing the will to reform) and FYROM is far behind demonstrating a lack of will for reforms in this area.
13
14
Viljar Veebel
Efficiency of the legal system The legal system’s efficiency indicates the level of speed and transparency of legal procedures, disputes, property protection and the level of competition laws, (third Copenhagen Criteria)6. The efficiency of the legal system is regularly evaluated by the World Bank, the Bertelsmann Foundation and Fraser Institute, to be used in the following comparison. The main subcomponents for the European Commission’s assessments and other evaluators overlap: efficiency in the fight against cartels, intellectual and industrial property rights and efficiency in property disputes. The main evaluative categories of the European Commission state: remarkable progress´ (Bulgaria, Romania), ‘partial success’, ‘efforts have been made’, ‘special attention is needed’, ‘lack of success in several aspects’, and ‘budget remains insufficient’ (Croatia and FYROM). No quantitative categories are used; also no levels of progress are indicated. A central measurable aspect is that the Commission found some countries to have a sufficient progress level concerning some chapters (competition law) for accession (Bulgaria and Romania) and some countries ‘needing continuing reforms and efforts’ (Croatia and FYROM). Accordingly, on the scoreboard Bulgaria and Romania are ranked higher than Croatia and FYROM (European Commission 2006a: 21; European Commission 2006d: 21, European Commission 2006b: 20 and European Commission 2006c: 24). The problems of applicants are not seen in Community legislation harmonisation, but in terms of practical implementation and efficiency (European Commission 2006e). In the cases of Croatia and FYROM, they are seen as not yet ready for accession: ‘There has been some progress in the area; however, a number of important challenges still remain’, and ‘substantial efforts will still be required overall’ (European Commission 2006c: 55). When comparing the two successful (Romania and Bulgaria) and the two unsuccessful (Croatia and FYROM) applicants, then Bulgaria receives more positive comments than Romania, and Croatia is seen as the worst even compared to FYROM. Croatia receives a most negative comment in this aspect: ‘The judicial system has continued to suffer from slow and inefficient court proceedings, poor case management and low administrative and professional capacity’ (European Commission 2006b: 31). The following Table 7 offers an example of evaluation by an impartial evaluator (World Bank 2006). Summarising the legal system’s efficiency indices from the World Bank, Fraser Institute and the Bertelsmann Foundation in the period of 2004–2006: Bulgaria is seen as the best performer in the field, followed by Croatia and Romania. The average differences are small (less than 3%) and, for example, the Fraser Institute ranks Croatia in first place and Bulgaria only in third place. FYROM is ranked as last by all evaluators. Independent evaluators also evaluate the reform progress dynamics in this field differently. FYROM is seen showing the best progress, while Bulgaria and Croatia are seen stagnating throughout the period. A comparison indicates that the European Commission reached the same conclusion with other evaluators in terms of Bulgaria being the best. FYROM and Romania both received one position advantage in the Progress Report, while Croatia received -2 positions’ discrimination.
Economic liberties and freedoms Economic liberties and freedoms indicate the level of market accessibility, market safeguarding efficiency, the market accessibility of other EU residents, acceptance of EU qualifications and standards, and limits of bank procedures (a concern of the 2nd Copenhagen Criteria)7. The main subcomponents for the European Commission’s assessment and other evaluators cover: the simplicity of starting up and closing down companies/enterprises, access to the labour market, limits for non-national 6 Commission evaluations can be found under chapters 3.1, 4.3 and 4.4 in the Progress Reports. 7 Evaluations are located under chapters 3.1, 4.3 and 4.4 in the Progress Reports.
Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation
Table 7: World Bank evaluation on judicial efficiency 2004–2006, 100-point scale (100 is the most efficient) Bulgaria Croatia FYROM Romania
2004 72.7 68.6 53.2 60.5
2005 69.8 65.4 50.7 58.5
2006 66.8 63.4 54.1 64.9
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/; World Bank 2006 Table 8: Legal system efficiency 2004–2006: European Commission versus independent evaluators Bulgaria Croatia FYROM Romania
EU ranking 1 4 3 2
Index-based ranking 1 2 4 3
Difference No difference -2 positions +1 position +1 position
Source: European Commission 2006, Bertelsmann Foundation 2006, Fraser Institute 2006 and World Bank 2006
residents, accessibility of foreign investment instruments, conditions for real estate ownership for foreigners, measures to stop money laundering, intellectual property law, and development of corporate legislation. There are some differences in the composition of specific sub-components of different evaluators, but the majority of components overlap. The most detailed is the Fraser Institute’s research, while the Heritage Foundation offers a composite index, and the Bertelsmann Foundation’s report is the most comprehensive. The European Commission’s assessment is published in annual Progress Reports. The main evaluative categories are ‘absence of sufficient progress’, ‘urgent need for additional efforts’ (both FYROM); ‘limited progress’ and ‘partial success’ (Croatia), and ‘remarkable progress’ (Bulgaria). No quantitative categories are used; also no levels of progress are indicated. None of the applicants have been able to close this chapter in negotiations with the EU in time for the Progress Report being issued (European Commission 2006a: 15-20; European Commission 2006b: 27-30; European Commission 2006c: 26; European Commission 2006d: 26). In general, progress Reports are critical and offer recommendations as well as guidelines to all candidate states. The Commission is critical of all applicant countries concerning anti-money laundering activities and credit market regulations. The European Commission is most critical of FYROM’s lack of results and demands further efforts. Critics of Croatia’s progress are softer and partial progress is acknowledged, but it is not combined with a positive evaluation: ‘no progress can be reported’ and ‘continued efforts needed’. In Croatia’s case, it is again highlighted that the lack of progress is a possible obstacle for accession: “Legislation in the area of the fight against money laundering needs further alignment and administrative and enforcement capacity should be strengthened. Increased efforts will be needed to meet the requirements of this chapter.” Romania partially receives a positive assessment (but the fewest number of comments in this area), while Bulgarian progress is seen as remarkable in several sub-areas of economic liberties and freedoms. Accordingly on the scoreboard, Bulgaria is in first place, followed by Romania, Croatia and FYROM (European Commission 2006a: 15-20; European Commission 2006b: 27-30; European Commission 2006c: 26; European Commission 2006d: 26).
15
16
Viljar Veebel
Table 9: Bertelsmann Foundation’s evaluation on economic liberties on a 100-point scale 2004 Bulgaria Croatia FYROM Romania
83.3 86.6 64.4 77.7
2005 and 2006 summarised 86.6 83.3 72.2 83.3
Change +3.3 -3.3 +7.8 +5.6
Source: Bertelsmann Foundation Report 2007 Table 10: Economic liberties 2004–2006: European Commission versus independent evaluators’ average Bulgaria Croatia Macedonia Romania
EU ranking 1 3 4 2
Index-based ranking 1–2 1–2 4 3
Difference +0.5 positions -1.5 positions No difference +1 position
Source: European Commission 2006, Bertelsmann Foundation 2006, Fraser Institute 2006 and Heritage Foundation 2006
Based on the calculated average of the Heritage Foundation, Fraser Institute and the Bertelsmann Foundation’s assessments during the period of 2004–2006, Bulgaria and Croatia are the two best performers with the same average; Romania is third and close behind. FYROM is in fourth place, but the difference is similar to the difference between the first two and Romania. The average differences are small, less than 2% (see Table 9 as an example). Assessments of Croatia’s progress are the most controversial, since the quantitative results and index values are high, but at the same time Croatia receives the highest number of critical comments. Romania, at the same time, receives lower index values but also fewer critical comments (both from independent evaluators and from the Commission). The comparison indicates that the European Commission arrives at the same conclusion as the other evaluators in terms of FYROM’s progress. Bulgaria receives a half position advantage; Romania gains an advantage of one position, while Croatia loses 1.5 positions.
Similarities and differences between the European Commission and independent evaluators To answer the main research question, ‘What were the main motivators of the EU evaluation system’s design and what was its actual influence in practice during the 2004-2006 pre-accession assessments?’, there is a need to first specify the scope and nature of differences between the European Commission’s rankings and the rankings of other respected evaluators. If systematic and influential differences appear, the next task will be to analyse the opportunities and motivation of the Commission for adjustments in the Progress Reports. The logical starting point of the analysis was that if the European Commission and other international institutions were in their best ways, objectively and impartially evaluating candidate countries by using the same criteria and statistical data, they should in general receive a similar result. Or if the results differed slightly, it was not systematic and in general purposely discriminatory against any of the candidate states.
Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation
The following analysis (see also Table 11) summarises which countries have received an advantage or been discriminated against on the scoreboard ranking from the European Commission when compared with the average of other evaluators. It is also an important question whether those advantages and discriminations actually play a role in the selection process. The analysis indicates two types of results concerning differences of assessments. The Commission’s evaluations of Bulgaria and FYROM in 2004-2006 show minimal differences from the independent evaluators, as the difference is only 0.1 positions in both cases. This can be considered an almost ideal overlapping result and proof that the methodology of different evaluators is comparable. In comparison, the assessments of Croatia and Romania show a remarkably higher difference between European Commission assessment results and the average of other evaluators. In the Romanian case, the average difference is positive by 1.1 positions and in the Croatian case the difference is negative by 1.7 positions. There is also a need to take into account that in the comparison of four states, the maximum difference can be three positions. The second important aspect is that all differences in both cases are non-balanced: in all cases where the difference of positions appears, it appears in the way that Romania is being given a comparative advantage and Croatia a disadvantage.
Table 11: Comparative rankings of European Commission Progress Reports and independent evaluators Bulgaria
Croatia
FYROM
Romania
Governance efficiency (European Commission) Governance efficiency (Neutral evaluators) Position advantage by Commission Report
1–2 2 +0.5
3–4 1 –3.5
3–4 4 +0.5
1–2 3 +1.5
Rule of law (European Commission) Rule of law (Neutral evaluators) Position advantage by Commission Report
2 2 -1
3 3 0
4 4 0
2 1 +1
Anti-corruption activities (European Commission) Anti-corruption activities (Neutral evaluators) Position advantage by Commission Report
1 1–2 -0.5
3 1–2 -1.5
4 4 0
2 3 +1
Efficiency of legal system (European Commission) Efficiency of legal system (Neutral evaluators) Position advantage by Commission Report
1 1 0
4 2 -2
3 4 +1
2 3 +1
Economic liberties (European Commission) Economic liberties (Neutral evaluators) Position advantage by Commission Report
1 1–2 +0.5
3 1–2 -1.5
4 4 0
2 3 +1
0.5
-8.5
0.5
5.5
-0.1
-1.7
0.1
1.1
1.3 1.6
3.3 1.8
3.7 4
1.9 2.6
Summarised position advantage given by Commission Reports Average position advantage given by Commission Reports Average rank by the EC Average rank by independent evaluators
Source: European Commission 2006, Bertelsmann Foundation 2006, Fraser Institute 2006 and Heritage Foundation 2006.
17
18
Viljar Veebel
The Commission Report shows Bulgaria and Romania (average positions in the Commission ranking: 1.3 and 1.9) as one group, which is clearly more progressive and worthy of accession, while putting Croatia in the same boat as FYROM (average positions in the Commission ranking 3.3 and 3.7). When looking at the independent evaluators’ side, which is based on a comparison of the indexbased data, the results are different. Croatia scores the best result and seems to be the most prepared for membership. Bulgaria receives the second result and is also seen as ready for accession. Romania and FYROM are clearly left behind, as not having sufficient social and administrative progress. As a result, European Commission assessments have exchanged the Croatian and Romanian positions in question regarding which of them deserves the accession invitation. Clarification of the motivation for this exchange is even more important when considering that the actual accession selection was mainly about the evaluation of Romania and Croatia, and as a result Croatia was left out and Romania was accepted for the 2007 accession round (this decision was justified with the Progress Report results).
The main motivators of the EU assessment system 2004-2006 Parallel to the long-term organisational needs of the EU to use the assessment system to reflect actual progress in the candidate states and motivate them for further progress, practical circumstances and political pressure may have played an important role in the assessments of Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM and Romania. Contrary to the original 5th enlargement round, where both Bulgaria and Romania participated with eight other CEE states, Malta and Cyprus, in the period of 2004-2006 candidate states with different accession perspectives were included in one assessment procedure. Bulgaria and Romania were the rejected countries from the original 5th enlargement group, having had long and complicated accession talks, both having high social expectations of being accepted for membership, and both putting heavy political pressure on the EU to be accepted as soon as possible. Even when seen as quite similar by EU public opinion, the socio-economic development and harmonisation has been quite different for those two countries. Bulgaria, according to neutral evaluators, was quite progressive and more or less acceptable for membership in most of the evaluations, while Romania, on the other hand, had difficulties in several areas with fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria. According to independent evaluations—Bulgaria was already ready for accession in 2004 and Romania’s progress fluctuated even in 2006—these two countries should have been treated differently. In this situation, the political and geographical aspects started to become dominant—in terms of practical policy implementations and public support, it became quite uncomfortable for the EU to reject Romania while Bulgaria was accepted. After understanding the circumstances, the Romanian policymakers started to play even more on the emotional and political aspect rather than on showing actual progress in terms of the Copenhagen Criteria. Politically and administratively it seemed most rational to many other EU member states and EU policymakers to accept the two neighbouring countries together. The need to evaluate Croatia with Bulgaria and Romania over the same period of time using the same criteria and assessment logic made the situation even more complicated for the EU. First, it made it more difficult simply to conclude that this time both Romania and Bulgaria had met the criteria as Croatia served as a reference base, according to the results between Bulgaria and Romania in terms of fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria (according to the data of independent evaluators). This situation was even more complicated due to the wish of some member states and EU institutions to force Croatia to fulfil some additional (non-Copenhagen Criteria) conditions before receiving positive assessments in terms of the pre-accession progress.
Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation
According to the terms of the accession partnership, only progress in the Copenhagen Criteria is legally binding in the final decision. But as there was strong political and administrative pressure in the EU to accept both Bulgaria and Romania and not to accept Croatia, the starting point of the assessment was not neutral. On the other hand, as the Commission already had its favourites, adjustments to the Progress Report were mainly needed to justify political preferences and necessities (to accept Bulgaria and Romania and reject Croatia and FYROM). The Commission’s influence over the accession selection is even more evident when considering that Romania was accepted for membership in 2006 (accession in 2007), but Croatia is still outside the EU in 2012—after six years of efforts with more progress still to be made with the Copenhagen Criteria. Additionally, a general broader international image of Croatia being ‘the troublesome part of former Yugoslavi’ was used to prepare most of the audience emotionally to admit that Bulgaria and Romania were more suitable candidates than Croatia. Adding FYROM to the same assessment reports only supported this logic, as Croatia and FYROM were introduced as countries that had made similar socio-economic progress. Adjustments in the assessment results were possible by broadening the criteria and losing the quantitative aspect, which was technically conducted by using the gap between the actual Copenhagen Criteria and a modified list of criteria used for the Progress Reports. Once the candidate states accepted that the Progress Report evaluates questions outside the original Copenhagen Criteria, every new Progress Report continued to raise additional ‘non-criteria’ questions. The European Commission even made it no secret that the Progress Reports were only partly based on the actual Copenhagen Criteria (for example, the first chapter of the FYROM Progress Reports states, “This section examines the progress made by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia towards meeting the Copenhagen political criteria, which require stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. It also monitors regional cooperation, good neighbourly relations and respect for international obligations, such as cooperation with the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia” (European Commission 2006c: 5). Candidate countries, while relying on objective criteria and trying to achieve positive feedback in the Progress Reports, trusted the EU fully (at least in their open statements), even when in some cases not clearly understanding the actual motivation of some requirements. The EU, of course, stated often that the only way to accession is the way through conditionality and fulfilling all demands pointed out in the Progress Reports. “The pre-accession conditionality has in many aspects served as the best option to explain to candidate countries that they have a ‘take it or leave it’ situation. We just ask countries that are interested in participating in our structures to comply with our rules and to share our values” (Solana 2003). This process found no counterarguments as the European Commission was the only official evaluator, and candidate countries accepted the broadening of criteria. The use of qualitative measuring worked according to the same logic—as none of the participants demanded use of quantitatively measurable benchmarks, the European Commission continued the use of qualitative assessment methods. It can also be seen as a strategic choice of the EU to signal to the candidate countries that all the demands of the member states and institutions must be fulfilled, even if these are not included in the Copenhagen Criteria. Otherwise, Progress Reports would not find sufficient progress in the criteria field, even when most of the other impartial evaluators do so. The question What is right or legal? loses its importance when applicant countries have clearly accepted the whole set of accession measures. The model becomes an effective conditionality factor as acceptance is needed only in the beginning, but transformation of conditionality can continue during the whole process. Applicant countries find themselves in a path-dependence model, where they have the options to continue the process or lose previous progress. As continuing to follow the path does not need any fundamental decisions, but cancellation does, the logical choice is to continue.
19
20
Viljar Veebel
This created a conditionality situation, which was clearly asymmetrical and discriminatory towards candidate countries, providing a possibility of subjective treatment, without the possibility of impartial arbitrage. Basically, the candidate countries have found themselves in a situation where they had no options against the possible misuse of conditionality, which started to encourage the European Commission for political use of assessments as seen in cases tested in this paper.
Conclusions The creation of the Copenhagen Criteria and the evaluation system based on a wide range of subcriteria, regular assessments and a reward system has been seen as one of the success stories of the EU during the last 20 years. The original goal of the European Commission was to create a transparent and competitive environment for candidate states for the whole pre-accession period. The aim of this paper was to analyse the motivation and actual purpose of the pre-accession assessment process in the examples of Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM and Romania in the period of 2004–2006. The practical case studies conducted in the research also provided some arguments with which to answer the question, Why did the EU need to create a separate assessment system instead of summarising the already existing reports of the OSCE, OECD, WB, IMF, the Bertelsmann Foundation, the Frazer Institute, the Heritage Foundation and Freedom House? and What influence did it have on the actual accession process during the years 2004–2006? This study was motivated by criticism in the end stage of the fifth enlargement both about the general conditionality logic and the practical assessment methods. First, the criteria were seen as too universal and idealistic. Second, the evaluation process itself was not transparent or measurable, causing some member states to fail (and complain), especially when these countries showed quite reasonable progress when evaluated by the IMF, WB or other impartial international evaluators. The possible existence of the so-called ‘hidden agenda’ and the importance of political support instead of actual progress in the criteria area were raised by candidate countries. After the hard treatment of Slovenia, the rejection of Bulgaria and Romania in 2003, and later evaluation problems with Croatia, the critique became more systematic. The main findings proved the importance of the research question, as it was possible to locate five important accession criteria, which can be measured quantitatively, but where the European Commission prefers to use semi-quantitative assessments. As a result, EU assessments in these criteria offer a possibility for a subjective image of applicant countries. Third, the EU uses Progress Reports to inform applicant states that non-Copenhagen Criteria need to be fulfilled as well, as results in official criteria depend on the EU’s general political will and attitude towards the applicant state. The research results also indicated the existence of two different evaluation methodologies in the EU pre-accession conditionality. The evaluation cases of Bulgaria and FYROM showed that the European Commission’s results almost fully overlap with those of independent evaluators—accordingly, the methodology and criteria components are sufficiently similar to be compared in other cases as well. In the cases of Croatia and Romania, the European Commission’s evaluation results of the EU differ significantly or systematically from the calculated average of the impartial evaluators The difference was both systematic and influential, as it was changing the actual standings in the pre-accession scoreboard. The differences also reflected the practical motivation of the European Commission and member states in the cases of Romania and Croatia, where the first needed to be accepted (due the practical interests of the European Commission and member states) and the second rejected despite the better results and actual progress in the areas of the Copenhagen Criteria.
Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation
Regular assessments and Progress Reports were not used only to select candidate countries and evaluate their progress, but also to justify political reality, which demanded the acceptance of Romania and Bulgaria and the rejection of Croatia despite actual progress in the Copenhagen Criteria. The EU’s evaluation impartiality and transparency are also important topics five years later in 2012, as the European Commission announced that Croatia would not be ready for accession before 2013.
References Anastasakis O. & Bechev D. (2003). EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment to the Process. South East European Studies Programme European Studies Centre St Antony’s College University of Oxford. Available at http://www.emins.org/sr/aktivnosti/konferencije/solun/pdf/ostala/conditio.pdf, accessed at 15.05.2011. Bertelsmann Foundations (2006). Toward Democracy and a Market Economy. Available at http://www. bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-0A000F0A-BD9584C7/bst_engl/hs.xsl/publikationen_18459. html, accessed at 15.05.2011. Checkel, J. (2000). Compliance and Conditionality, Arena Working Papers WP 00/18. European Commission (2000). Communication Strategy for Enlargement. Available at http://www.ena.lu/ european_commission_communication_ii_agenda_2000_challenge_enlargement_1997-020006132.html, accessed at 15.05.2011. European Commission (2004a). Regular Report on Bulgaria’s progress towards 2004. Available at http:// ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/rr_bg_2004_en.pdf, accessed at 15.05.2011. European Commission (2004b). Opinion on Croatia’s Application for Membership of the European Union: Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/com2004_0257en01.pdf, accessed at 15.05.2011. European Commission (2004c). Working Paper: Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Stabilisation and Association Report 2004. Available at http://www.delmkd.ec.europa.eu/en/bilateral-relations/SAP%20 Report%202004%20cr_fyrom_en.pdf, accessed at 15.05.2011. European Commission (2004d). Regular Report on Romania’s progress towards 2004. Available at http:// ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/rr_ro_2004_en.pdf, accessed at 15.05.2011. European Commission (2005a). Romania 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report. Available at http://ec. europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/sec1354_cmr_master_ro_college_en.pdf, accessed at 15.05.2011. European Commission (2005b). Croatia 2005 Progress Report. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/package/sec_1424_final_progress_report_hr_en.pdf, accessed at 15.05.2011 European Commission (2005c). 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0561:FIN:ET:PDF, accessed at 15.05.2011 European Commission (2006a). Bulgaria 2006 Monitoring Report. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/ enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/monitoring_report_bg_en.pdf, accessed at 15.05.2011. European Commission (2006b). Croatia 2006 Progress Report. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/hr_sec_1385_en.pdf, accessed at 15.05.2011.
21
22
Viljar Veebel
European Commission (2006c). The Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia 2006 Progress Report. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/Nov/fyrom_sec_1387_en.pdf, accessed at 15.05.2011. European Commission (2006d). Romania May 2006 Monitoring Report. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/ enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/monitoring_report_ro_en.pdf, accessed at 15.05.2011. European Commission (2006e). Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006–2007. Available at http:// ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/com_649_strategy_paper_et.pdf, accessed at 15.05.2011. European Commission (2007b) Croatia 2007 Progress Report. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/croatia_progress_reports_en.pdf, accessed at 15.05.2011. European Commission (2007c), The Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia 2007 Progress Report,. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/fyrom_progress_reports_en. pdf, accessed at 15.05.2011. European Council (1993). Presidency Conclusions, European Council of Copenhagen. Available at http://www. ena.lu/conclusions_copenhagen_european_council_extract_concerning_enlargement_2122_june_1993020006502.html, accessed at 15.05.2011. Freedom House (2011). Nations in Transit. Available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=17 &year=2008, accessed at 15.05.2011. Fraser Institute (2008). Economic Freedom of the World. Available at http://www.freetheworld.com/2008/ EconomicFreedomoftheWorld2008.pdf, accessed at 15.05.2011. Grabbe, H. (2001). How Does Europanisation Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity, Journal of European Public Policy 8((6): 1013-1031. Killick, T. (1998). Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change. ODI, London. Santiso, C. (2002). Governance Conditionality and the Reform of Multilateral Development Finance: The Role of the Group of Eight, G8 Governance No. 7 (March). G8 Information Centre, Toronto. Schimmelfennig F. (1999). The Double Puzzle of EU Enlargement Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Decision to Expand to the East. European Union Studies Association. Schimmelfennig, F & Engert, S. & Knobel, H. (2006). International Socialization in the New Europe: European Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic Change. Palgrave Macmillan. Basingstoke. Schimmelfennig, F. & Sedelmeier, U. (2007). Candidate Countries and Conditionality, in P. Graziano & M. Vink (eds.), Europeanization: New Research Agendas (88–101). Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.. Schimmelfennig F. & Engert, S. & Knobel H. (2003). Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey. JCMS 41(3): 495-518. Sedelmeier, U. (2006). Pre-accession Conditionality and Post-accession Compliance in the New Member States: A Research Note’, in Sadurski, W & Ziller, J.(eds.), Après Enlargement: Legal and Political Responses in Central and Eastern European (145–160). European University Institute. Sjursen, H. (2002). Why expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy, JCMS 40(3): 491-514. Smith, K. (2003). The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality in M. Cremona, (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union (105-140). Oxford, Oxford University. Transparency International (2011). Electronic database. Available at http://www.transparency.org/, accessed at 15.05.2011. World Bank, (2007). Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). Available at http://info.worldbank.org/ governance/wgi/, accessed at 15.05.2011. Zielonka, J. (2006). Europe as Empire. The Nature of the Enlarged European Union. Oxford University Press.
Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation
Viljar Veebel is researcher at Tartu University EuroCollege and at the Institute of Government and Politics. He is also participating actively as a consultant in ENP projects in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. His recent researche studies are focused on the influence of the EU enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe. His main publications cover the following topics: The EU neighbourhood Policy, Positive Conditionality and Reforms in the Former Soviet Space (in V. Made & A. Sekarev (eds.) European Neighbourhood after August 2008. Republic of Letters. Dordrecht; European Union’s positive conditionality model in pre-accession process, Trames 2009(13); Navigating Between Policy and Populace: Estonia, its Accession Referendum and the EU Convention, Politique Europeenneelargie 2005 (1).
23
V
Pettai, Vello and Veebel, Viljar (2005). Navigating between Policy and Populace: Estonia, its Accession Referendum and the EU Convention. Politique Europeenne. L’union Europeénne élargie. 2005/1 n° 15. L’Harmattan, pp. 113–135.
Vello PETTAI Viljar VEEBEL NAVIGATING BETWEEN POLICY AND POPULACE: ESTONIA, ITS ACCESSION REFERENDUM AND THE EU CONVENTION* The Convention on the Future of Europe represented an unprecedented test of the EU’s capacity for deliberation and political consensus formation. In the candidate countries of the time, this challenge was even greater given the coterminous tasks of completing accession and facing a popular referendum. In Estonia’s case, we argue that the promise of the Convention’s deliberative process was largely lost, since not only was there a gulf between state administration and civil society, but also within the state to the extent that most policy was formed by a narrow set of civil servants working in the Eurointegration Office.
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
With the announcement of a Convention on the Future of Europe in 2001, Europe set out on an ambitious project to create a deliberative forum, which would help reduce the democratic deficit as well as produce a blueprint for a new European political structure (European Council 2001). The aspiration to include as many voices as possible, and especially from civil society, naturally raises the question of how successful this endeavor ultimately was. This issue is all the more important in the context of the candidate countries of that time, since in most cases their civil societies had already been shown to be far too weak to realistically take advantage of this opportunity to contribute.1 In principle, it would have required a double effort among candidate country politicians to incorporate civil society into the decision-making process. Was this at all the case? This article will examine the decision- and policy-making processes involved with the EU’s Convention on the Future of
* Research for this article was supported by a targeted financing grant (nr 0182573) from the Estonian Ministry of Education and Science. 1 Concerning the weakness of civil society in Eastern Europe, see Howard (2003). On civil society and NGO participation in the EU more generally, see Warleigh (2001), DeSchutter (2001).
politique européenne, n°15, hiver 2005, p. 113-135
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
Introduction
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
Europe in the context of a candidate country at the time, Estonia. Rather than a macro analysis of the functioning of the Convention as a whole, this contribution focuses on actors at the national level to show how their involvement in the Convention at the EU level interacts with domestic political situations. The central theme of the paper will be to examine how politicians from a candidate country navigated the challenge of formulating a substantive European policy, while at the same time being concerned about approval of EU accession itself. Estonia provides an interesting examination of the Convention vs. accession nexus because its final accession referendum took place relatively late, September 14, 2003, following the other candidate countries. In this respect, initial results from the Convention could have easily filtered into the EU debate, and it was the argument of numerous Eurosceptics that in addition to its final terms for accession, Estonia should pay equal attention to what was going on in the Convention in order to gauge just what kind of Europe the country was joining. This placed a particular burden on Estonian politicians to steer innovative policy through shifting popular attitudes. How did Estonia’s political elite keep one eye on participating meaningfully in this unprecedented European-wide consultative forum, while at the same time convincing a surprisingly Eurosceptic public about joining the EU at all? The aim of the paper is to contribute to our understanding of how political leaders in Central and Eastern Europe have learned to bridge these dual roles of playing a part in European politics, while simultaneously explaining Europe at home.2 In the Estonian case, we draw attention to four particular variables: (1) the timing of and interaction between European and domestic political events, (2) the existence of competing domestic institutional interests and rivalries, (3) a shortage of qualified experts and analysts, and (4) the weakness of civil society in a postcommunist state. Given all of these factors, we show how the deliberative and decision-making processes were in fact dominated by political elites, and in particular by those officials narrowly responsible for European integration. As a result, we argue that the promise of the Convention’s deliberative process was largely lost in accession countries such as Estonia. At the same time, this 2 For a similar analysis of political coordination involving the actual EU accession process, see Nakrosis (2003).
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
114
115 concentration of decision-making in the hands of certain officials allowed for more effective participation within the fast-moving Convention process, since political positions could be formulated more operatively than in countries where the mechanism was either broader (Poland) or underdeveloped (Latvia). We begin with a brief overview of Estonia’s political context, including background on political parties and public opinion regarding the EU. Next, we examine the country’s general EU integration structures together with an ideal-typical look at how the Convention’s deliberative process might have taken place. With these two models of previous as well as ideal EU policy-making in view, we will be better able to see how Estonia’s subsequent performance during the Convention compared with both earlier European integration in Estonia as well as the specific political-consultative event that was the Convention. At the end of the article we present a figure, which brings out these differences.
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
Throughout its nearly decade-long campaign to join the EU3, Estonia represented somewhat of an enigma to the extent that despite staunch support for membership from amongst the country’s political class and business elites, the Estonian population as a whole maintained a strong undercurrent of Euroscepticism, which at one point in early 2001 threatened to scuttle the entire accession project. Since re-gaining independence in 1991, Estonia had been relatively successful in throwing off its Soviet past by adopting very rapidly a new Constitution in 1992 and carrying out far-reaching economic reforms in 1993-94. Although political stability was sometimes disrupted by cabinet shake-ups or electoral alternations, a party system did gradually emerge, which reflected all major political orientations and generally filled the political spectrum.4 Right-ofcenter governments tended to dominate, although the leftist Center Party was often the largest party in the 101-seat Riigikogu. [cf Table 1.]
3 That is, from the moment of its official application to join on 28 November 1995 up until its official accession on 1 May 2004. 4 The only exception being the lack of a major ex-communist party, since the erstwhile Estonian Communist Party essentially collapsed in 1990 and has only marginally continued to exist as the Social Democratic Labour Party.
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
Background Context
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
In terms of European policy, these same parties all had a pro-EU stance, although in some cases it was tinged with Eurorealism.5 Openly anti-EU parties were marginal, never scoring above one or two percentage points in public opinion polls. In this respect, there was very little organizational base for mass mobilization against the EU. Yet, as an element in Estonian politics Euroscepticism was very palpable. In particular, a continual decline in Estonian support for EU accession from 1997 to 2001 seemed to presage a possible rejection of membership if a final referendum were held too soon (Pettai 2004). For example, in March 2001 one tracking poll suddenly reported opponents of accession topping supporters by a total of 14 percentage points (Mattson 2001). More than a year later and despite a change of government (see Table 1), popular sentiment was still phlegmatic with more than 80 per cent of Estonians reporting that they were either ‘not at all informed’ or ‘not very informed’ about their accession process and only a third believing that EU accession was ‘a good thing’. Fully 30 per cent vowed to vote against EU membership (European Commission 2003, Annex Tables 4.8a, 4.7a and 6.6). Thus, it was this Eurosceptic backdrop that ultimately prompted both Estonian and EU officials to agree that Estonia’s final referendum on accession should be placed toward the end of the cycle of referendums to be held in Central and Eastern Europe, along with that of Latvia, where Euroscepticism was also notable. The reasoning was that the other, earlier ballots (for example, in much more pro-EU Lithuania) would help generate a cascade effect, which would then be difficult for most Estonians and Latvians to resist. Still, Estonia’s politicians would have their own job to do in terms of shepherding the country to this final outcome, and especially through the stages of completing accession negotiations and simultaneously participating in the Convention.
Organizing European Integration As part of the mammoth task of preparing Estonia for EU membership, the Estonian government had developed by 1996 a 5 For example, liberal parties such as the Reform Party were against harmonization of tax policy in the EU, although otherwise in favor of European integration.
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
116
117
The Promise of the European Convention The December 2001 Laeken Declaration laid out the three pillars on which the Convention on the Future of Europe was to stand: government representatives, national parliament members, and civil society (the Forum).8 Each of these players was to have its distinctive 6 After May 2004 the Eurointegration was officially renamed into the European Union Secretariat in connection with Estonia’s actual accession. In this article, however, we will stick to the name Eurointegration Office, since the office carried this name throughout the main 2002-2003 period that we discuss. 7 See Raunio (1999), also König and Slapin (2004). On Central and Eastern Europe see Sadurski (2004). Exceptions to this rule are Denmark and Finland. 8 Naturally, the Convention would also include members from the European Parliament, the European Commission and many of the Union’s Committees and other sub-institutions. However, for our purposes we highlight the three pillars of government
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
relatively centralized and tight-knit system of ministerial and political coordination. After a brief experiment with appointing a formal minister for European affairs (in 1995-96), the accession was henceforth structured around a Eurointegration Office, which was under the direct subordination of the prime minister.6 The Office was responsible for chairing and organizing the work of Estonia’s EU Coordination Council, which brought together senior officials from government ministries and other major departments. In addition, the Office was responsible for mediating conflicts between ministries during the accession negotiations; thus it had a powerful arbiter role. Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained in charge of the actual negotiations (i.e. interacting with Brussels through the Estonian Mission to the EU), the Eurointegration Office represented the real fulcrum of political decision-making. This role would continue during the period of the European Convention as well. [cf Figure 1.] Figure 1 presents a schematic view of Estonia’s general European integration model. Already in this context we see that the Estonian parliament had a relatively marginal role. Indeed, although the parliament did form a special standing committee on European Affairs in 1997, the vast majority of EU-related legislation was legislated by respective sectoral committees (e.g. agriculture, economics, culture). In this respect, Estonia has been consistent with the broader European trend, where the influence of parliaments in EU affairs has been low.7
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
function and role. The government representatives were to provide expertise and a systematized approach, the parliamentarians were to provide popular legitimacy, and civil society was to provide a counter-weight against the tendency of politicians to maximize their power. In addition, civil society was to play the important role of initiating public debates in order to enlighten the citizens of Europe and to head off any possible counter-reactions from society. Such debates would also have the benefit of opening up supplementary expertise outside of government, which in turn would help legitimize any final decisions as well as provide impartial critiques of governmental proposals. Thus, the initial model foresaw a continuous interaction taking place among these three sides and on two simultaneous levels: on the one hand, within the Convention itself, on the other hand, within each country’s own national context. The input from all these different interactions and consultations was to be channeled into the final constitutional document itself. Yet this kind of model, which assumed a strong civil society and vibrant political culture, put a majority of the new accession countries to the test. For if the existing members could approach the debate from a relatively secure position (knowing that they would not necessarily face a verdict from the voters on the new constitution unless the governments themselves agreed to it), in the accession countries the political establishment had to reckon with a real popular endgame, since in most cases the accession referendums would be seen as a universal judgment not only on the accession treaties, but also in relation to the entire European integration process. Public opinion polls had already shown that most voters would not really distinguish between accession and the debate on the Future of Europe. Moreover, since citizens in the accession countries would not be allowed to vote separately on the constitution at some later date, it made all the more sense to see in the upcoming referenda a mega decision-making moment and to express one’s feelings about different aspects of European integration. (Veebel 2003).9 The problems that so many representatives, national parliament members and civil society, since they were the ones most intended to combat the perception of a democratic deficit. This idea was also stated in some of the background papers to the Convention and in Declaration 23 annexed to the Treaty of Nice. 9 For instance, a jumbling of the debate over whether there was any need for a European constitution vs. whether there would be a rise in consumer prices after accession. Or a discussion of voting shares in the new constitution vs. whether
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
118
119 referendum theoreticians see with conducting such polls (issue confusion, populist reductionism, inconclusive mandates) were very much present in these upcoming ballots. Hence, the later each accession country would hold its final referendum (e.g. Estonia and Latvia), the more pronounced this dilemma was likely to be.
Competing events In Estonia’s case, this predicament was exacerbated by a confluence of additional events, which not only detoured attention to other matters, but more importantly occupied the attention of key political actors, who might otherwise have been able to participate more meaningfully in the debate on Europe. Namely, Estonia was in a relatively unique situation where European accession dovetailed considerably not only with the final referendum, but also with both local and national electoral campaigns. While such overlaps are by no means unprecedented in the democracies of the EU (indeed, democracies are almost perpetually in a state of electoral stir), the degree to which these events were particularly compounded in Estonia can be seen in Figure 2.
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
Jan.2002
June 2002
Jan. 2003
June 2003
Local election
Parliamentary
campaign
election campaign
ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS
events
influencing
Jan 2004
Referendum campaign
CONVENTION
IGC
Policy dominance level of Eurointegration Office
membership would open the floodgates to unwanted Third World immigration and threaten Estonian national identity.
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
Figure 2. Compounding electoral-political Estonia’s debate on the future of Europe
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
First, the Future Convention competed with debate over the final outcome of Estonia’s overall accession negotiations. In general, Estonia’s negotiations had gone well to the extent that national positions on energy policy, corporate income tax policy, and agricultural supports had survived. For example, Estonia was able to preserve its 0% tax on reinvested corporate profits, which has been a cornerstone of Estonia’s liberal economic policy and is in stark contrast to most other EU member-states (Parts 2003), where such rates are sometimes over 30%. Nevertheless, Eurosceptics voiced criticism over the level of agricultural production to be used as a baseline for determining future support payments. In addition, the question of how long Estonia would be allowed to continue producing electricity via oil shale—despite the latter’s environmental effects—also generated concern, since oil shale constitutes Estonia’s only major natural resource. Although none of these issues generated passionate public debate per se, they were part of the general backdrop of processes, which detracted attention from the Convention. In particularly, they preoccupied one set of officials, who might otherwise have also contributed to the Convention process, namely, officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To the extent that they were responsible for completing the course of accession talks, this imperative overrode active involvement in the Convention until the December 2002 Copenhagen summit and the final conclusion of an enlargement deal. Secondly, during the key 2002-2003 period of agenda-setting and momentum-building in the Convention, Estonian politicians were heavily involved with two electoral campaigns—first local, and then national, in October 2002 and March 2003, respectively. These elections were all the more trying, since a new center-right party, Res Publica, was making its debut and was expected to do well.10 This forced the remaining political parties to devote extra attention to campaigning and mobilization. Although EU matters did not directly come up during the campaign (since most Estonian parties favored
10 Although Estonia’s party-political landscape had become relatively stable since 1999, in August 2002 a new center-right party called Res Publica was launched with a claim that there was a crisis of legitimacy among the existing parties and that a new era of honesty and straightforwardness was needed. The party grew out of a long-standing political club with the same name and was led largely by young (under 30) professionals. At the same time, it attracted a number of older supporters, who saw in it a fresh impulse. Although the party was soon accused of being populist and empty in its promises, it retained a high degree of popularity through 2003 and 2004.
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
120
121 accession), this absence of European themes also concerned public debate about the Convention. Moreover, and most critically, the preoccupation of politicians with electoral matters meant that little time was left over for monitoring and influencing what Estonian ministerial officials and civil servants were working on in relation to the Convention. As the next section of our article will show, a notable imbalance developed in terms of the role the Eurointegration Office would acquire amidst the vacuum created by the civil servants’ and politicians’ preoccupation with other affairs. At the same time, once this vacuum faded during the first half of 2003 and both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Estonian parliament came more into play, a new, noticeably more nationally-oriented position would impose itself, which in turn would change the way Estonia would participate in the final Convention process.
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
The interaction of political actors, interests and events during the European Convention played itself out over three distinct stages. During the first phase, starting from the beginning of the Convention on 28 February 2002 through to the ninth session on 3-4 October, the disproportionate influence of the Eurointegration Office resulted in an early period of innovative and ambitious thinking in relation to the future of Europe. In a situation where narrower national interests had yet to be strongly defined (both in Estonia, but also in many other participating countries), far-reaching proposals were put forward instead. These included, for example, ideas to reduce the number of legislative procedures with the EU and to abandon the pillar structure in order to improve EU efficiency in the external relations area (Hololei 2002a). While both of these suggestions were rejected during the first Convention phase, they found overwhelming support in the final version of the Constitutional Treaty (Veebel 2004). In the meantime, input from Estonia’s parliamentary delegates to the Convention was weak, since both members (Tunne Kelam and Peeter Kreitzberg) were leaders of major political parties and were thus often preoccupied with domestic political campaigning. Indeed, a certain pall had been cast over the Riigikogu’s overall participation in the process, since the selection of Kelam and Kreitzberg in February 2002 had been quite acrimonious. Among many parliamentary
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
Three Phases of Decision-Making
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
leaders, the one considered to be the ideal candidate to represent Estonia at the Convention was the former foreign minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves. As an émigré Estonian with fluent English, he had generated a positive international image for the country. As foreign minister (from 1997-2001), he had played an instrumental role in securing Estonia’s inclusion in the original ‘first-wave’ group of accession countries in 1997.11 Now as an opposition MP, Ilves seemed perfect as a Convention observer, able to bring stature to Estonia’s delegation. In early 2002, however, Estonia’s governing coalition changed (see Table 1), and Ilves came under attack from the left-leaning and slightly Eurosceptic Center Party, which had come to power. In Ilves’s place, the Center Party supported another MP and professor of international economics, Janno Reiljan. However, Reiljan was a known Eurosceptic, having at various times called for the use of quotas and tariffs in pre-accession trade with EU and for favoring Estonia’s national currency, the kroon, over the euro. He thus posed quite a contrast to the pro-European Ilves. In the end, both candidates were withdrawn, and although the two remaining candidates (Kelam and Kreitzberg) were respected parliamentarians, the rancor surrounding their selection had seriously dampened the Riigikogu’s enthusiasm for the upcoming Convention. Likewise, Estonia had problems with its original governmental representative, former president Lennart Meri. Again chosen as a high-profile figure for a very auspicious new assembly, Meri nevertheless disappointed by showing little interest in the proceedings and essentially attending only the opening session. In subsequent sessions, he was continually substituted by his alternate, the head of the Eurointegration Office, Henrik Hololei. In this situation, therefore, the Office acquired even greater influence. Thus, as both the parliamentary and governmental dimensions to Estonia’s participation in the Convention started to sag, a cascading effect soon began to emerge, whereby, for example, briefing reports to the European Affairs Committee of the Estonian Parliament were submitted long after decisions were made and parliamentary scrutiny became superficial at best. Similarly, input from government ministries (ostensibly meant to influence Estonia’s government 11 All of these qualities eventually helped Ilves to a spectacular win in the European Parliament elections in June 2004, when he personally racked up an astounding 33% of all votes cast in the country, and thereby secured for his Social Democratic Party 3 out of Estonia’s 6 seats. Indeed, this was in a situation where the SDP itself actually only registered just 6% in the public opinion polls.
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
122
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
representative) became erratic or largely delegative back to the Eurointegration Office. In truth, this indifference arose partly because there was no formal procedure by which the government ministries would have a say in formulating the position to be defended by the governmental representative. At the same time, once this passive attitude had taken hold, the Eurointegration Office itself began frequently sending out already-formulated positions, instead of drafts, which generally encountered little response. During the second phase of the Convention—from late October 2002 to April 2003—work proceeded toward drafting the actual Constitution. Here, the absence of parliamentarians was particularly crucial, since work in the Convention now shifted to the committees, where delegates and observers were expected to contribute with their professional knowledge. In Estonia’s case, participation in some working groups was forsaken altogether; difficulties arose with covering other key issues like the Charter on Fundamental Rights, the EU’s legal status or foreign policy and defense questions (Veebel 2003). On the other hand, with Estonia’s accession negotiations largely completed, it was now possible for the government ministries to come back into the game, especially the Foreign Affairs, Defense and Internal Affairs ministries. The original, ambitious Convention proposals drafted by the Eurointegration Office were slowly cast aside, as national priorities came more pointedly into view. Likewise, efforts to participate actively in the Convention itself increasingly gave way to simply commenting on drafts already prepared by the main members of the assembly. Thus, as the big-vs.-small state dividing lines of the Convention became more and more clear (see Magnette and Nicolaïdis 2004), not only did the need to begin actively defending a small-state position arise, but also the institutional involvement of some of Estonia’s previously indifferent actors became more palpable. For example, with the election of a new Riigikogu in March 2003, the parliament was in a better position to re-assume its scrutiny of the process. It reappointed one of its two delegates to the Convention (Tunne Kelam), while replacing the second one with the new chairman of its European Affairs Committee (Rein Lang). It also passed a declaration in June 2003 defending national sovereignty concerning the future of the EU’s institutions. (Riigikogu, 2003) Meanwhile, the new centerright government of Juhan Parts (formed after the March elections and led by the start-up Res Publica Party along with the liberal
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
123
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
Reform Party and the rural People’s Union) also developed a harder line on the EU’s future, mainly in terms of defending the principles of the Nice Treaty (Hololei, 2003b) as well as supporting the initiatives of other small states, such as the Austrian Non-Paper opposing large state domination of qualified voting. Regarding proposals for an extension of the EU’s competencies in the area of economic coordination, the governmental representative Henrik Hololei delivered a vigorous critique (Hololei, 2003a), while Estonia also stood in opposition to the creation of a European prosecutor. In all of this, the government was spurred on by the Foreign Ministry, which also wanted to restore its role in the process now that the elections had passed, the foreign minister (Kristiina Ojuland) had been reappointed, and the ministry’s senior officials had themselves been freed up from the earlier rigors of accession negotiations. (Ojuland 2003) In this respect, shifts in the Convention were paralleled by shifts in Estonia’s domestic political configuration, and this made the simultaneity of the two European- and national- level dynamics even more impressive. Nonetheless, during this last phase of the Convention (May and June 2003), it was not at all clear how much either the parliamentary representatives or the Foreign Ministry would be able to catch up with developments in Brussels. The interaction of Estonian political players had altered somewhat, but the Eurointegration Office continued to perform the bulk of analysis and position-paper writing, meaning a narrow group of actors continued to prevail. At the same time, in order to maintain this frontline role, the Office, too, had to change its ideological-political course from audacious ideas favoring deeper integration (during the first two phases of the Convention) to more pragmatic stances defending national interest (during the final stage) (Lobjakas 2004). In sum, while the ideal-typical model of Convention policy formation - characterized by the primacy of parliament, and then followed by the government, the ministries, and finally coordinating bodies such as the Eurointegration Office - was reversed, this outcome was in some ways unavoidable because of the coincidence of competing events and the consequences of bureaucratic overload. Key players at the higher levels of this chain of authority were simply pre-occupied with other things at the moment of the Convention. On the one hand, this seemed a dangerous delegation of authority. At the same time, one could not say that the concentration of Convention policy into the hands of the Eurointegration Office was necessarily negative as such, for the work
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
124
125 done by the Office (in the other actors’ stead) was not capricious or beyond any bounds. It simply meant that in contrast to the Convention’s master strategy of having broad-scale political and social participation, Estonia would not fulfill the political dimension of this consultative dream. We turn, therefore, to the civil society dimension of the question.
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
Alongside the representatives of governments and legislatures, the EU’s Convention also foresaw an important place for civil society. On the one hand, the inclusion of civil society was essential to stem the continuing decline in popular support for European integration just as the latter was about to take a major step in its 50-year-long history. At the same time, this strategy seemed promising for minimizing any potential difficulties with future ratification of the Constitution. Thirdly, civil society was seen by both government officials as well as politicians as a useful source of information and expert analysis where necessary.12 Yet, the degree to which both interest groups as well as research institutes would be engaged in the practical process was left largely to the good will of the member and accession states. The Convention’s original strategy of having civil society provide input at both the European and national levels soon floundered on the continental level, as only one major international forum for civil society was organized by the EU on 24-5 June 2002 and only a few scholarly institutions (such as the European University Institute in Florence) were directly involved in drawing up plans for institutional reform. A convention of young people about Europe’s future was also organized, however, subsequently most observers agreed that all of this participation had been largely perfunctory (Convention Watch 2003). In the candidate countries, such inclusion was even thinner, owing not only to the weakness of civic organizations, but also to the lack of any meaningful tradition of consultation. Moreover, where groups did exist, but represented opposing views, they should have been (but generally were not) accorded equal access to information, finances and media exposure. In the Estonian case, the participation of civil 12
For more on the impact of EU accession on Estonia’s civil society, see Raik (2003).
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
The Role of Civil Society
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
society was conditioned firstly by the government’s desire to avoid any controversy over the future of Europe, which in turn might endanger passage of the accession referendum. Since 1999, Estonia’s public opinion toward the EU had become one of the most Eurosceptic among all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Ehin 2001, Ehin 2002/2003, Vetik 2003, Pettai 2004). Although the placing of Estonia’s referendum toward the end of the balloting cycle was meant to compensate for this low enthusiasm, a ‘yes’ vote was far from guaranteed. Secondly, Estonian governmental officials generally saw little need to involve third-sector groups (unless the latter pressed for it themselves), since on the whole the officials did not see any value-added from such participation. To this was added the fact that since Estonia was still an accession country, a majority of its European-oriented civic groups had emerged in connection with the forthcoming referendum, meaning they had a relatively narrow agenda. They were not long-standing European interest groups with broad experience in European affairs or opinion-formation. This all the more prompted government officials to expect from these groups little worthwhile input, especially regarding complex questions such as a European Constitution. In such a situation, one of the shrewder responses among government officials was to support (and even call into being) certain pro-EU groups, who in turn would develop position papers on the Convention or other EU issues. In early 2003, the Estonian State Chancellery directly sponsored the creation of an NGO called “JahEuroopa Liikumine” (“Yes-European Movement”), while the European Commission’s Delegation to Estonia funded an organization called “Kontaktgrupp” (“The Contact Group”). Both groups in turn prepared ‘independent’ opinion papers about the draft European Constitution, which overlapped roughly 90% with those of the Estonian government. Meanwhile, in terms of helping to generate broader public debate, both groups had external credibility problems, not only because of their financing, but also because in some cases their leaders were official members of political parties or otherwise linked to government officials. Lastly, because of these institutional linkages, the groups often ended up being fairly vacuous in their any positions, since the “Jah-Euroopa Liikumine” group, for example, could not afford to be too federalist without offending its increasing nationally-oriented sponsor, the Estonian State Chancellery. At the same time, the “Kontaktgrupp” could not adopt any strident sovereignty positions without alienating the European Commission
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
126
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
delegation. As a result, the two groups who were meant to create debate were actually quite constrained in what they could put forward. The ability of NGOs to actually influence government policy was essentially ruled out. The only real stimulus for reaching out to civil society came from the government’s need to nevertheless secure certain outside analysis about European constitutional affairs, relying in this regard on universities and research institutes. This need was especially acute due to the fact that most of the officials preparing position papers (mainly in the Eurointegration Office) were under 30 and usually with less than 5 years experience in civil service. This dimension of civil society outreach therefore entailed commissioning academic studies about the Convention and its effects from individual scholars and universities (Kalev, Raig, Raik, Terk 2003). While these reports occasionally provided new perspective, the lag with which they were prepared (in relation to the fast pace of events at the Convention) often meant that they would reach a conclusion about some position, which had long since been decided. Or they would offer idealistic visions, which were readily discounted in the world of Realpolitik. The result was that academic input to the Convention in Estonia was limited, and was rarely included in the final government positions. At best, individual researchers were hired as consultants later in the Convention process. Finally, the role of Eurosceptics as a branch of civil society in the European debate was relatively weak, primarily because of the lack of access to direct information about the Convention, such groups were unable to mount a credible critique or generate an alternative vision. Their position was much easier in relation to the EU referendum as such, since here the slogan could take the form of a simple ‘No’. Concerning the Constitution, however, a deeper perspective was needed—one which the Eurosceptic groups not only did not have, but which also would be more complicated to explain to average Estonians. Indeed, during the second half of the Convention, the Estonian government saw one way of neutralizing the Eurosceptics’ standing by actually commissioning some academic studies from them as well. On the one hand, the government hoped to pre-occupy the Eurosceptics with work (instead of campaigning), while at the same time using their acceptance of a research contract as evidence that the Eurosceptics were basically ready to go along with the government. Lastly, the Eurosceptics found little solace from among Estonia’s political parties, since practically all of the major
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
127
128 organizations supported EU accession. When in summer 2003 the left-leaning Center Party (which had received 25% of the vote during the March 2003 elections) did begin tilting toward a Eurosceptic position (Kesknädal 2003), this was too late to influence debate about the Convention.13 Moreover, although Peeter Kreitzberg (one of Estonia’s two parliamentary observers at the Convention) was a Center Party member, he fought vigorously for a pro-European stance within the party, and therefore equally defended the Convention.14 All of Estonia’s other parliamentary parties—the Pro Patria Union, the People’s Union, Res Publica and the Social Democrats—openly derided the Eurosceptics. A fourth component of civil society concerns the media. Here, too, the input was limited to the extent that most media organizations lacked their own set of independent experts, and therefore their opinion relied heavily on official information. Rarely were they a source of new ideas or debate. Instead, their attention was focused on the various 2002-2003 elections or on other domestic political events. This left the stage open for government officials to write their own (largely unedited) opinion pieces in the newspapers, which then became the major centerpieces for debate, rather than independent reporting or investigation.
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
In June 2004, the leaders of the now expanded European Union agreed on the final institutional provisions for the new Constitutional Treaty, and with that decision, the work begun by the Convention on the Future of Europe (and temporary closed in June 2003) was largely completed. Although the idea of having a completely open and deliberative Convention was probably utopian, the case of Estonia shows that in many respects the outcome was much more centralized and narrower than expected. Moreover, this gulf emerged not only between the state administration and civil society, but also within the 13 More specifically, the Party held a special congress in August 2003 to determine its position on the upcoming referendum. In a surprise outcome, a plurality of congress delegates voted for a resolution rejecting EU accession. The Party leader, Edgar Savisaar, had called on members to support a neutral resolution, but even he lost control over the gathering, as anti-EU activists carried the day. 14 Indeed, this European issue would ultimately be one among many, which drove Kreitzberg and several others to leave the Party in spring 2004.
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
Conclusion
129
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
In Figure 3 we show how many of these relationships were altered or distorted. If under the ideal model, national debate was supposed to feed directly into the Future Convention, then in Estonia this was largely non-existent. Secondly, if NGOs were intended to represent citizen interests and opinion through their national parliaments or government consultations, then in Estonia this, too, was lacking. On the contrary, as we saw, the Estonian government (through its State Chancellery) was heavily involved in the formation of both NGOs and NGO opinion, and the Estonian parliament never consulted with NGOs. Likewise, academic groups played a much weaker role than expected, failing to appear in the media debate and only partially contributing to policy-making. This left the terrain open largely to the politicians. Within Estonian state institutions, the standard model of government ministries exercising general political control over coordinating bodies such as the Eurointegration Office held true, but only to a point. Due to the simultaneous need to complete accession negotiations, most ministerial officials were unable to become involved in the initial Convention debates. In this respect, the Convention represented a kind of unexpected supplementary task, which in turn become taxing for anyone else to manage except the most centrally placed civil servants. There was simply no spare bureaucratic capacity to deal extensively with this new and additional focal point of European activity. Only after accession negotiations were over and the Convention itself reached a crescendo did a broader political dynamic develop. But by then Estonian officials felt a need to defend conservative national positions, which represented a reverse compared to the original far-reaching proposals made in early 2002. It was here that more politically imperative considerations came to the fore, including the desire to show a tough stance in the face of
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
state itself. Even among those state institutions formally encompassed within the policy-making process (e.g. MPs, but also ministries and political parties), there was a surprising absence of participation and awareness about the Convention. The real formulation of national positions and opinions took place within a limited circle of advisors and officials gathered around the Eurointegration Office of the State Chancellery. Those NGOs that did participate in the debate were ad hoc groups, formed essentially to promote Estonia’s entry into the EU to begin with. Eurosceptic voices were marginal. [cf Figure 3.]
130 the September 2003 accession referendum. The protective mode of politicians seeking to make sure the most important things go through—first accession, and then the referendum—resulted in a very tightly navigated EU Convention process. After the text of the new constitutional treaty was finalized in June 2004, a summary analysis prepared by the Eurointegration Office expressed general satisfaction with the results, although issues such as the national composition of the future Commission remained a worry (Kasemets and Lepassaar 2004). Still, true to the previous trend of directly managed European integration, Estonia did not intend to hold a popular vote on the Constitution; rather, the document would be submitted to the Riigikogu for ratification, where a majority in favor was all but guaranteed.
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
Convention Watch (2003), 11 September. Internet source: http://eucon.europa2004.it/Watch.htm Crum, Ben (2004), “Politics and Power in the European Convention”, Politics, 24 : 1-11. DeSchutter, Olivier (2002), “Europe in Search of its Civil Society”, European Law Journal, 8/2 (June), pp. 198-217. Ehin, Piret (2001), “Determinants of public support for EU membership: Data from the Baltic countries”, European Journal of Political Research, 40/1, pp. 31-56. Ehin, Piret (2002/2003), “Estonian Euroskepticism: A reflection of domestic politics?”, East European Constitutional Review, 11-12, 4/1 (Winter/Spring), pp. 96-100. European Commission (2003), “Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002”. European Council (2001), “Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union”, 14-15 December. Hololei, Hendrik (2002a) “Institutional reform and future division of powers”, Intervention at the fourth plenary session of the European Convention, 23-24 May. Hololei, Hendrik (2002b) Intervention at the seventh plenary session of the European Convention, 11-12 July. Hololei, Hendrik (2002c), Overview of European Future Convention for the Government of Estonian Republic Hololei, Hendrik (2002d), Statement in European Convention on Subsidiarity, 3 October. Hololei, Hendrik (2003a) Intervention at the sixteenth plenary session of the European Convention, 27-28 February.
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
REFERENCES
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
Hololei, Hendrik (2003b) Intervention at the eighteenth plenary session of the European Convention, 3-4 April. Howard, Marc Morjé (2003), The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kalev, Leif, Ivar Raig, Kristi Raik, Erik Terk (2003), Scenario Texts (Contract Report for Eurointegration Office). Kasemets, Keit and Juhan Lepassaar (2004), “Valitustevahelise konverentsi tulemuste analüüs” [“Analysis of the Results of the Intergovernmental Conference”], report for the Eurointegration Office, 8 July. König, Thomas and Jonathan Slapin (2004), “Bringing Parliaments Back In”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 16 : 357-95. Lobjakas, Ahto (2004), “Estonia Adrift: Caught in the Crosswinds of the EU’s Constitutional Debate”, in Andres Kasekamp, ed., The Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2004, Tallinn: The Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, 85-98. Magnette, Paul and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (2004), « Coping with the Lilliput Syndrom: Large vs. Small Member States in the European Convention », Politique européenne, 13 : 69-92. Mattson, Toomas (2001) ‘Üle poole kodanikest on euroliidu vastu’, Postimees, 28 March. Nakrosis, Vitalis (2003) “Assessing Government Capabilities to Manage European Affairs: The Case of Lithuania”, Vello Pettai et Jan Zielonka (dir.), The Road to the European Union, Volume 2: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Ojuland, Kristiina (2003) “Cooperation is needed against the big countries”, Baltic News Service, 7 September. Parts, Juhan (2003), Speech before the Riigikogu, Estonian Parliament, 25 September. Pettai, Vello (2004), “The Phantom that Didn’t Materialize? Euroscepticism in Estonia and Latvia”, Jacques Rupnik (dir.) Les Européens face à l’élargissement: Perceptions, acteurs, enjeux, Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. Raik, Kristi (2003), Democratic Politics of the Implementation of Inevitabilities? Estonia’s Democracy and Integration in the European Union, Tartu: Tartu University Press. Raunio, Tapio (1999), “Always one step behind? National legislatures and the European Union”, Government and Opposition, 34 : 180-202. Riigikogu, “Riigikogu avaldus Euroopa Liidu institutsioonide kohta”, [“Statement by the Riigikogu on the Institutions of the European Union”], adopted 12 June 2003. Sadurski, Wojciech (2004), “Accession’s Democracy Dividend: The Impact of the EU Enlargement upon Democracy in the New Member States of Central and Eastern Europe”, European Law Journal, 10 : 371-401.
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
131
132
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
Veebel, Viljar (2003) “Estonian choices influencing the Debate on the Future of Europe”, in Andres Kasekamp, ed., The Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003, Tallinn: The Estonian Foreign Policy Institute. Veebel, Viljar (2004) “Euroopa Põhiseaduslik leping: Eesti ja Euroopa valikud: [“Europe’s Constitutional Treaty: Estonian and European Choices”], Sirp/Diplomaatia, 7 May. Vetik, Raivo (2003) “Élite vs. People? Eurosceptic Public Opinion in Estonia”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 16, 2 (July), pp. 25771. Warleigh, Alex (2001), “‘Europeanising’” Civil Society: NGOs as Agents of Political Socialization”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39/4 (November), pp. 619-39.
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan *Merged
with Pro Patria in 1995.
in 2001.
= Prime Minister’s party
Siim Kallas
28.01.0210.04.03
║ = intervening parliamentary election
Mart Laar
Mart Siimann
25.03.9928.01.02
until 30.11.96)
Tiit Vähi
17.03.97 25.03.99
Tiit Vähi
06.11.95 – 17.03.97
Andres Tarand
Mart Laar
17.04.9506.11.95
08.11.9417.04.95
21.10.9208.11.94
**Dissolved
National Independence Party (natl-conserv., 1989)* Pro Patria Union (natl-conserv., 1992) Moderates; Social Democrats (centrist, 1995) Reform Party (liberal pro-market, 1994) Res Publica (center-right, 2002) Coalition Party (centrist, 1992)** Country People’s Party; People’s Union (agrarian, 1994) Center Party (center-left, 1992) United People’s Party (minority Russian, 1994)
Political Party (orientation, year of founding)
Table 1. Estonia’s major political parties, their ideological orientations and years in government Cabinets (dates in office, prime minister)
Juhan Parts
10.04.03present
133
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
Estonian position
EU proposal
Estonian Mission to EU
Estonian position
EU proposal
Source: Eurointegration Office
Working Groups
COREPER
EU
COUNCILS
Ministries
EU Coordination Council
GOVERNMENT
Figure 1. Estonia’s general EU integration model
134
Opinion
Eurointegration Office
Other standing committees
Opinion
European Affairs Committee
PARLIAMENT
135
Figure 3. The ideal vs. actual model of consultation/deliberation over the European Convention in Estonia GOVERNMENT
ACADEMIC GROUPS
MINISTRIES :
NGOs
MIN OF FOR. AFFAIRS MIN OF DEFENCE
NATIONAL DEBATE
MEDIA
NATIONAL DEBATE
PARLIAMENTARY
MEDIA
MIN OF JUSTICE
EU COMMISSION
EUROINTEGRATION OFFICE
POLITICAL PARTIES
GOVERNMENT DELEGATE
PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATES
EUROPEAN FUTURE CONVENTION
GOVERNMENT
ACADEMIC
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
NGOs
MIN OF FOR. AFFAIRS MIN OF DEFENCE MIN OF JUSTICE
SUPPORT BOARD PARLIAMENTARY EU COMMISSION
EUROINTEGRATION OFFICE POLITICAL PARTIES
GOVERNMENT DELEGATE
PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATES
EUROPEAN FUTURE CONVENTION
Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 46.131.36.167 - 15/07/2011 14h55. © L'Harmattan
GROUPS MINISTRIES :
VI
Veebel, Viljar and Loik, Ramon. (2012). Estonia: Life in Post-Communist Eastern Europe after EU Membership. Life in Post-Communist Eastern Europe after EU Membership. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 163–184.
In: Life in Post-Communist Europe after EU Membership Ed. O’Beachain, D. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2012, pp. 163-184
8
Estonia: Life in Post-Communist Eastern Europe after EU Membership
Viljar Veebel and Ramon Loik
Introduction The modernisation of Estonia started during its first period of independence between 1918 and 1940. It offered not only the experience of democracy-building and the development of a market driven economy but also the voluntary transition back to an authoritarian regime after experiencing democracy. This first period of Estonian independence was followed by almost 50 years of Soviet occupation, which has had both a strong cultural and demographic influence upon the country. Estonia’s transition after its re-independence in 1991 has been fast and radical in terms of both choices and results: by choosing liberal economic reforms and decisive political independence, Estonia, together with Latvia and Lithuania, played an important role in reforming the Soviet Union and encouraging other republics towards modernisation and independence. Further prospects of membership in Western organisations such as the European Union and NATO were the main motivators for decisive social, economic and political reforms framed by the 1993 Copenhagen criteria. Estonia has been in some aspects more successful than its Baltic neighbours, as it managed to join the OECD in 2010 and the eurozone on 1 January 2011. Multilateral partners played an important role in choosing the transition strategy and implementation methods after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In the beginning the process was guided by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and by the Council of Europe and at a later stage by the European Union and NATO. It is also important not to underestimate the impact of the USA and Scandinavian neighbours in helping build-up the appropriate bases for the successful transition from a post-communist legacy towards a Western-type democracy and a functioning market-economy. The European Union’s role in Estonia’s transition process during 1991–2004 was central, as the European Union itself was ready to supervise and advise in more structural and effective way than ever before in its history. The clear promise of membership if accession conditions were fulfilled was seen as the main ‘carrot’ for accelerated transition and modernisation processes. Fulfilling the accession conditions and obligations was clearly seen as Estonia’s own responsibility, whilst the European Union could only provide some technical and financial assistance. The European Union was also seen as an altruistic or friendly actor by
164
Viljar Veebel and Ramon Loik
the Estonian public and elite. Strict EU rules, evaluations and conditions were also seen as a normal part of the accession partnership. Accession to the European Union and NATO has also triggered high expectations of fast progress in welfare and security in Estonian society. Public attitudes towards integration into the European Union and NATO were quite non-committal and sceptical at the beginning of the accession process with around only 50 per cent of the population in their favour. Among other causes, this situation might also be explained by the European Commission’s cautious attitude and rather slow interest towards the Baltic States during the first half of the 1990s, when its decisive support was much needed. During the accession process public support grew steadily and reached 66 per cent before the accession referendum in 2003. Public support towards EU membership continued to grow after gaining membership, reaching almost 80 per cent in 2008, and starting to drop slowly after that (Standard Eurobarometer, 2009). In 2003–2004 most of Estonia’s strategic goals were connected to achieving membership of the European Union, NATO and the OECD or improving its status by joining the Schengen agreement and the eurozone. The Estonian political elite appreciated the clear and structural approach of the Copenhagen criteria and the AGENDA 2000 evaluation method. Pre-structural and structural support funds were seen as useful by Estonia’s target groups, even when late in reaching the end-users. EU interference has efficiently stabilised the national currency, but has had mainly a negative effect on employment rates and social security. The impact on general macroeconomic development has also been positive. In the period 2004–2006, in total 371.4 million euros from the EU structural funds and 428.2 million euros from the cohesion fund were allocated to Estonia. In the period 2007–2013, more than 3.4 billion euros from the Structural Assistance Fund will be allocated to Estonia. The latter will be mainly channelled to energy saving, entrepreneurship, administrative capability, the information society, education, environment protection, regional and local development, and research and development, as well as to health care and welfare, transportation and the labour market. It was and still is evident for both the European Union and Estonia, that continuous transition without appropriate and sufficient financial as well know-how assistance, combined with calculated pressure for reforms, would only prolong the overall modernisation period.
Political developments After the collapse of the Soviet Union on August 20, 1991 the Resolution on the National Independence of Estonia was adopted. Diplomatic relations with other states were re-established, and the Constitutional Assembly was formed for drafting the constitution. The Republic of Estonia was re-established as a parliamentary democracy on the basis of the Constitution adopted in June 1992. The principle of legal continuity was one of the central constitutional debates during the beginning of the 1990s. This is still the case as Russia’s and Estonia’s perspectives on the country’s joining of the Soviet Union in 1940 are still divergent. While the first
Estonia: Life in Post-Communist Europe after EU Membership 165 sees it as voluntary, the second considers it to be a result of its violent occupation by the Red Army following the secret protocols of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact. Estonia’s single-chamber parliament, the Riigikogu, has 101 deputies. The elections are universal, uniform and direct and they are conducted every four years. In 2010 the possibility of electronic voting was introduced in parallel to traditional voting. Members of the parliament are not permitted to be employed in any other governmental nor non-governmental institution. The legislation process is based on simple majority voting in the Riigikogu after three readings. Supported legislative acts are presented to the President of the Republic for proclamation, who may use the right of veto if needed and return the draft of the law to the Riigikogu. If the parliament does not amend the draft of the legislative act, the President also has the right to advise the Supreme Court to declare the indicated law unconstitutional (Riigikogu, 2011). This system should guarantee the balance of power, as well as coherence with the Constitution in terms of every legal act. In the election process, only those with Estonian citizenship can vote in general elections, whilst in local and European Parliament elections people with permanent resident status can also participate. The minimum age for voting in elections is 18, and 21 for running as a candidate. Candidates can be nominated either on candidate lists of some political parties or as independent candidates. The election results are based on the principle of proportionality. After its independence Estonia faced several political challenges, such as international recognition, having 30 per cent of its population (mostly the Russianspeaking minority) without Estonian citizenship and trying in this situation to rebuild a sustainable parliamentary democracy. The Soviet legacy in the political system, a corrupted bureaucracy and a regulated economy made rapid reforms even more complicated. Between 2004 and 2010 political changes in Estonia were the result of the joint efforts of the local elite, a supportive electorate, and multilateral donors and partners assisting the whole process. Integration in the European Union changed Estonia’s political culture both in terms of institutions and power division. Probably the biggest political change has been to accept sharing sovereignty with EU institutions. Political and administrative changes in the mid-1990s were accepted in exchange for much sought-after economic growth and additional security (Laar, 2002: 360), as there was broad societal agreement on the benefits of EU membership and Euroscepticism was not widely prevalent in Estonia (Standard Eurobarometer, 2009). After Estonia’s independence, its central foreign policy goal was to join the European Union and NATO. The first important landmark in gaining EU membership was on 28 November 1995, when Estonia submitted an official application for accession, based upon the unanimous decision of the parliament approving the Europe Agreement between Estonia and the EU member states from August 1995. The European Community’s Madrid summit in 1995 mandated the European Commission with the task of compiling reports on the candidate countries. At the 1997 Luxembourg summit it was decided on the basis of the Commission’s
166
Viljar Veebel and Ramon Loik
reports to start accession negotiations with five Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries – Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary, as well as with Cyprus (also known as the Luxembourg Group). Negotiations with the European Union were held from 30 March 1998 until 11 December 2002 and were based on Estonia’s readiness to adopt the acquis communautaire. In order to facilitate the negotiations, the EU legislation, consisting of approximately 12,000 legal acts, was divided into 31 chapters covering 5,000 pages. Most of the EU acquis communautaire was screened and negotiated by the Estonian government and the European Union by autumn 1999. Estonia signed the Accession Treaty on 16 April 2003. It was followed by the constitutional referendum on EU accession on 14 September 2003. The referendum on the constitutional changes demanded by EU membership was supported by 66.83 per cent of the voters, while 33.17 per cent voted against. Consequently, on 1 May 2004 Estonia became an EU member state, together with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The next major step forward came on 21 December 2007 when Estonia joined the Schengen visa area. Finally, on 1 January 2011, Estonia also joined the eurozone. The first European Parliament (EP) elections in Estonia were held in June 2004. The turnout was surprisingly low (only 26.8 per cent), much lower than for example the 64 per cent in the EU accession referendum in 2003, but not so low when compared with the rest of the Central and Eastern European states. Turnout increased substantially for the second European Parliament elections (7 June 2009) when the level of participation surged to 43.2 per cent. It was also the first time for Estonian voters to vote via the Internet during the week immediately before polling day, using the same procedure as in general elections. Of all voters, 14.9 per cent used this new opportunity. Apparently the e-voting system played an important role in increasing the participation rate slightly above the EU average (National Electoral Committee, 2009). In both EP elections Estonians elected six members to the European Parliament. The 2004 elections were won by the Social Democratic Party (Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond), receiving three seats, while the highest personal score was received by later Estonian President, Toomas Hendrik Ilves. The remaining three seats were divided equally between the national conservative ProPatria and Res Publica Union (Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit), the liberal Reform Party (Eesti Reformierakond) and the left-centrist Centre Party (Eesti Keskerakond). As a result of the 2009 EP elections the Estonian Centre Party gained 26.1 per cent of votes with two seats while the leading governmental party, the rightliberal Estonian Reform Party secured 15.3 per cent of the vote and one seat. The three members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from both parties belong to the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). The Pro Patria and Res Publica Union collected 12.2 per cent of votes and received one seat, later joining the European People’s Party (EPP). The Estonian Social Democratic Party collected one seat with 8.7 per cent of the vote and their elected member belongs to the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament. The Estonian Greens (with 2.7 per cent of votes) and Estonian
Estonia: Life in Post-Communist Europe after EU Membership
167
People’s Union (2.2 per cent of votes) failed to gain any seats in the EP (European Parliament, 2011). The biggest surprise of the elections was the score of independent candidate Indrek Tarand who, with 25.8 per cent of the vote, gained the best personal result of the election. The success of liberals was not surprising as at the time of the elections both the position of prime minister (Reform Party) and that of mayor of the national capital (Estonian Centre Party) were held by them. Estonia started its participation in the European Union in 2000–2005 with attempts to actively influence the European Future Convention and the accession negotiations. However, during recent years Estonia’s participation has become more passive and collaborative as Estonian representatives prefer to support the majority opinion when possible. Estonia ratified the Lisbon Treaty and is a strong supporter of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) without displaying any close public debate on the issue. Accordingly, Estonia also prefers policies supporting competitiveness and sufficient economic growth, continuing the deregulation and liberalisation of the internal market, which enables member states to maximise the use of resources for the creation of more competitive conditions for both enterprises and citizens (Veebel, 2010: 8). Since 2010, Estonia has supported the build-up of the European Stability Mechanism to finance the assistance to Greece, Portugal and Ireland, based on the ideas of solidarity and a ‘common family’, which differs diametrically from previous positions of ‘own responsibility’ and ‘market rules’. The government is often using the rhetoric that ‘this is the price we have to pay to be in the union’ and no unnecessary in-depth debates seem to be needed. There have been three main priorities for the Estonian government since accession. First, continuing the liberalisation of the internal market and improving the competitiveness of the European Union, where market values and signals must be economic guidelines and the role of subsidies must decrease. The second priority is carrying out the action plan for the Growth and Stability Pact in order to build a sustainable economic basis for the European Union. The third priority is keeping the euro area stable and growing, even when joint efforts and solidarity are needed. On the other hand, the everyday participation of Estonia’s government is filled with questions of energy security, cyber security, the ESM, and EU–Russian relations. The gas crisis that hit Europe in January 2009 indicated the need to increase EU member states’ readiness to handle gas supply disturbances. In 2009, developments continued for increasing the European Union’s energy security, which began with the Second Strategic Energy Review. Estonia’s official position is that in order to increase the European Union’s energy security it is necessary to develop a functioning internal market and establish additional energy connections. In order to increase the energy security of the Baltic region, it is necessary to establish new energy connections and develop a common Nordic–Baltic energy market. Therefore, the most important achievement for Estonia is the approval of the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) by the European Commission. Estonia has also been a supporter of the European Union’s climate package development, even when for the most part it creates additional obligations and cost to Estonia given its colder climate.
168
Viljar Veebel and Ramon Loik
Estonia considers enlargement as one of the European Union’s most successful policies, which will improve the European Union’s competitiveness and security, as well as increase its role in a globalising world. Enlargement must be based on transparent rules, where the countries wishing to join must fulfil all the prescribed criteria, and the European Union should not turn back from its accession promises. Estonia is also interested in long-term stability and the accession perspectives of the Western Balkans. Keeping Turkey on the reform path is one of the priorities but it is essential to explain the benefits of enlargement more clearly to the public. Influenced by the passive attitude of other member states, Estonia has also been changing to less supportive positions towards Turkey’s accession after 2010. It is also a priority to give additional momentum to the European Union’s cooperation with its close southern and eastern neighbours through the European Neighbourhood Policy’s (ENP) regional initiatives, such as the Eastern Partnership and the Mediterranean Union. In the case of the Eastern Partnership, Estonia supports developments towards concrete and comprehensive policy instruments that motivate partner countries to get closer to the European Union, including association agreements, economic integration, visa freedom, and practical cooperation in energy and transport matters. It is also essential that financing for the Eastern Partnership is allocated equally between the southern and eastern interest areas of the ENP. In the area of development cooperation, Estonia continues its cooperation with its priority partners Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. Estonia welcomed the conclusions of the European Council in 2007 calling on the European Commission to develop a Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. A corresponding resolution was approved in the EP a year earlier. The main goal of this new EU initiative is to merge previous policies to address the specific needs of the Baltic Sea region, particularly areas that impede the region’s development. The statement prepared for the Commission in June 2009 outlines the topics that the strategy addresses with four primary points – the environment, competitiveness, infrastructure, and the safety of the maritime environment. Estonia was an active supporter of the strategic EU justice and home affairs policy for the years 2010–2014 (the Stockholm Programme) approved at the end of 2009, and is primarily interested in cyber security and the fight against cybercrime, including effective personal data protection. Attention was also given to migration questions and to the principle of voluntary acceptance and equal distribution of asylum seekers. However, the most important factor in the Stockholm Programme was the creation of an IT agency for justice and home affairs, which will be partly located in Estonia. Estonia will receive 4.5 billion euros from the EU budget during the budgetary period 2007–2013, of which close to 3.3 billion will go to regional aid, about 0.6 billion to rural life, and about 0.5 billion to agriculture. During the same time the country will contribute about 0.9 billion euros to the EU budget over seven years. Additionally, as negotiated at the beginning of 2011, Estonia will actively participate in the creation of the European Security Mechanism. The country is ready to become proportionally the biggest payer to the ESM by contributing 9.6 per cent from its gross domestic product (GDP) (1.5 billion euros). Whilst being a net
Estonia: Life in Post-Communist Europe after EU Membership
169
receiver, Estonia supports reducing the importance of subsidies in the EU economic strategy and introducing more market principles to increase competitiveness and export ability (Government of Estonia, 2007). The government’s approach towards the EU foreign and defence policy tends to be passive and can be described as a ‘potential policy taker’. As a small new member state, Estonia has been constantly adopting the main political lines of the European Union. As both the actions and threats relating to Estonia’s external affairs have strong connections with Estonian–Russian relations, the European Union is wishfully seen as the main political counterbalance to the Russian influence in the CEE countries. The main pillar of Estonian security policy is its active membership in multilateral defence alliances, among which NATO is the most important. In the political rhetoric of the Estonian political elite, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has also often been seen as an unreasonable ambition and its institutional structures only duplicating already existing NATO structures. Thus, Estonia has used its military capacity mainly for NATO missions, leaving only a little for those of the ESDP. However, this does not mean that Estonia is negatively inclined towards European defence initiatives. While the enlargement of NATO and the European Union proceeded in parallel, there was no conflict of interest between supporting both the EU and the US policies. A change of attitude in this matter is positive as in its first membership years Estonia was more critical towards the EU security policy developments, as it saw these as competing with its role in NATO. More active participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and in ESDP will offer additional opportunities to contribute to European regional security. In 2011 Estonia is a supporter of both central initiatives of CFSP: the development of the External Action Service and European Defence Agency. Estonia is also actively participating in the Battlegroup formation by joining the Nordic battle group (Veebel and Kasekamp, 2007: 19).
Economic developments Estonian economic developments after the EU accession have consisted of several radical choices, producing equally radical results. Indeed, after having the highest economic growth in the European Union in 2007 (15 per cent) Estonia also had the highest decline in 2009 (−15.6 per cent). During the last seven years the Estonian government and political elite have been focusing on economic growth in liberal terms, such as economic freedom, inflation, governance cost, GDP dynamics and external trade, and have tried to avoid considering social categories like the Human Development Index (HDI) or unemployment. The Estonian government economic policy has mostly been procyclic by supporting both the growth and decline of GDP. As the last elections in 2011 indicated, the majority of voters continued to support the liberal economic policies mixed with some conservative components offered by the ruling coalition of the Reform Party and Pro Patria Res Publica Union. Medium-term expectations for the Estonian economy are optimistic, although the risk of a long-term slowdown has increased (Veebel, 2011). The
170
Viljar Veebel and Ramon Loik
precondition for continued long-term growth involves maintaining productivity growth. The long-term aim of Estonian economic policy is to raise the income level close to the level of the old EU member states. The Prime Minister’s long term goal and main election promise is to see Estonia among the five wealthiest economies in Europe in the year 2020. Radical economic reforms in Estonia actually started even before independence was recognised in 1991. In 1987–1988 Estonia started to consider a possible mixed economic model and economic autonomy inside the Soviet Union. Although it did not result in any deep changes in the economy, it prepared public attitudes for subsequent debates about political independence from the USSR. The most influential economic reforms were launched in 1992 consisting of privatisation and currency reform. The main starting condition of the Estonian economy was the high concentration of industry in certain geographical locations and the production-dependence of the Soviet planned economy. Estonia, while being economically one of the most developed Soviet republics together with Lithuania, lagged behind the most advanced CEE countries. At the beginning of economic reforms in 1992 the GDP PPP per capita was only 31 per cent of the EEC average. In parallel, in the same year, unemployment was only 3.7 per cent and inflation reached 24.9 per cent. As a result of radical and decisive structural reforms, changes in the statistical system, currency devaluation and the growing underground economy, the decline of economic production after the collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the greatest among the former Soviet bloc countries (Veebel, 2009a). The Estonian economy, while being statistically quite comparable with Greece or Portugal after their democratisation, was functionally not effective in open market conditions. The dominant heavy industry was deeply integrated into the Soviet Union’s economy, as its demand logic and production chain depended on central planning. At the same time the agricultural sector was employing almost half the population but with very low efficiency. The consumer industry and the service sector needed complete restructuring or rebuilding in order to meet market economy demands. Rapid privatisation at the beginning of the 1990s also caused a sharp decline in industrial production as buyers of privatised companies were often interested more in market-share, materials or buildings, rather than in actual production and development. In June 1992 the first step towards radical reforms was taken to attract foreign investors, as Estonia introduced its own currency the Estonian kroon (EEK). Currency reform also established the Currency Board system, where the exchange rate was fixed to the German mark (later euro) and was fully covered by reserves (Bank of Estonia, 2007). Key choices for Estonian economic reforms were highspeed privatisation, pro-cyclic economic policies, a liberal trade policy, fixed exchange rate currency and an annually balanced state budget. The liberal economic agenda of the ruling coalition also involved the acceptance of above average inflation and unemployment (Laar, 2002). The privatisation process in Estonia was considerably faster and more far-reaching than in most other postsocialist countries. Foreign investors were warmly welcomed due to the undervalued local currency exchange rate (Terk, 2000).
Estonia: Life in Post-Communist Europe after EU Membership
171
Table 8.1 Scores on Copenhagen criteria in 1997 (AGENDA 2000) The Luxembourg
Group
The Helsinki
Group
Hungary Poland Czech Republic Slovenia Estonia
33 32 29 25 24
Slovak Republic Lithuania Latvia Romania Bulgaria
23 19 18 13 10
Source: House of Commons, 2000.
The most vital economic reforms were completed in order to fulfil the accession criteria for the forthcoming EU membership. Estonia’s social and economic progress was rated as the fifth best among enlargement applicants, as measured in 1997 by the European Commission in the AGENDA 2000 evaluation (see Table 8.1). In 1997–1998 the Estonian economy was hit by the global crisis, causing an intensive restructuring process and reorientation towards EU partners instead of Russia. The service sector started to grow quickly and the agricultural sector, in contrast, began to decline (Government of Estonia, 2003). Rapid economic growth started in 2000–2001, as foreign economic actors started to invest in greater numbers, the better to grab a share of the market before EU accession. The growth was largely fuelled by loans from Nordic banks pumped into the Estonian real estate sector, by the interest of foreign investors in buying agricultural enterprises and also by pre-structural funds from the European Union. Estonian economic reforms after EU accession were mainly influenced by three ideological groups. First, there were liberal integration supporters ready to face any cost and any conditions (Ilves, 2003) with the sole aim of becoming quickly integrated into the European Union and NATO. This group also included believers in (neo-)functional integration, who followed the idea that complete obedience to the European Union and NATO rules would lead to faster changes and social development. This first group supported any type of reform tools and compromises without close criticism and questioning, and even announced openly that they were ready to do more. The second group were the national conservatives who tried to find some balance between attracting foreign investors and keeping their popularity among the conservative part of the electorate, by asking for more barriers against foreign ownership. This group bargained as much as possible when liberals attempted to establish a fully open market economy. The third group consisted of utilitarian pragmatists and agreed with both competing groups so long as it was rationally substantiated and looked sustainable. The most recent elections have been most rewarding for the coalition of economic liberals and political conservatives. The economic boom that started in 2002 caused the rise of labour and rent costs and ended with an economic slowdown in 2007, a small recession in 2008 (a fall of −3.6 per cent GDP) and extreme decline in 2009 (−15 per cent). This process was mainly caused by labour cost dynamics, which started to grow faster than productivity, and was assisted by the real estate bubble as well as by the international financial
172
Viljar Veebel and Ramon Loik
15 10 5 0 −5 −10 −15 −20 1994
1999
2004
2009
Percent change
Figure 8.1 Estonia’s annual GDP evolution, 1994–2010. Source: Estonian Central Office of Statistics, 2011.
crisis. Accordingly, Estonia temporarily lost some of its competitiveness, until 2009 when wage growth stopped and productivity on the other hand started to grow again. Economic decline has caused a rising budget deficit and absorbed most of the government’s reserves, and additionally led to growing unemployment, which reached 15 per cent in 2009 (Government of Estonia, 2009). In 2011, when the economy started to grow again, Estonia’s economic structure was focused on services and subcontractual industrial production, mainly for Nordic and German companies. Innovation has been quite low compared with the EU average and has been dropping during 2004–2010. Production has focused on textile products, transport means, paper products, wood products and computer software. At the EU level Estonia supports continuing the deregulation and liberalisation of the internal market, particularly initiatives aiming at removing the remaining obstacles to the functioning of the internal market, including the free movement of persons (Veebel, 2009a: 9). Estonian governments have also stressed the importance of creating a fully integrated financial market, consolidating the existing EU legislation, and minimising regulatory differences. Figure 8.1 shows Estonian GDP growth rate dynamics. The central line of the Estonian government’s economic policy after the EU accession has been radical reforms and pro-cyclic economic policy, combined with low level interference and a low level of public debt. Ruled during the last five years by Prime Minister Andrus Ansip, the Estonian government has prioritised keeping the economic and fiscal environment as simple and as liberal as possible. The main instruments of Estonian fiscal policy have been the simplicity of the tax system and zero taxation of commercial reinvested profits. Private income tax is flat (21 per cent), motivating earning and the declaring of higher incomes, but
Estonia: Life in Post-Communist Europe after EU Membership
173
fuelling increased social inequality (Government of Estonia, 2008: 56). Due to the size of its economy, its openness to the global economy and the government’s procyclic economic policy, fast growth alternated with shocks in the years of global crisis, 1997–1998 and 2008–2009 (Bank of Estonia, 2009: 110–123). Willingness to fulfil the Maastricht criteria and join the eurozone was a central motivator of budgetary policy in the years 2008–2010, which led to strong budget discipline combined with pressure on salaries to reduce inflation. The government’s fiscal policy concerning expenditure has also been procyclic. During the best growth years in 2004–2006 the state budget grew by approximately 20 per cent per annum. Due to the crisis and the need to meet the eurozone criteria, the government budget was cut by 10 per cent in 2009 (Bank of Estonia, 2009). The central budget has also been in deficit by approximately 3 per cent in recent years, but is becoming balanced in 2011. The Estonian government has also been able to collect special stabilisation reserves to prevent the need for public loans in crises years. Collection of these reserves started in 1997 and peaked in March 2009 when reserves reached 470 million euro. The idea of the reserve was introduced after the stock market crash in 1997. By the end of March 2009, the reserve stood at a market value of 7.33 billion EEK (468 million euros), but in April 2009 the government decided to use about 3.5 billion EEK of the reserve in order to balance increased expenditures and decreased revenues resulting from the economic recession, mainly to reduce risks and to pay salaries, pensions and benefits without delay. The collection of reserves will start again in 2013, when the first annual budget without deficit is planned. In the area of public debt, Estonia scores one of the best results in the European Union through 2009 to 2011. By the end of 2007, the public debt to GDP ratio dropped to 3.5 per cent, but in 2008 the indicator increased again to 4.3 per cent, which still remained rather small compared with most of the European Union. In 2008–2009 the rise in government lending was motivated by the co-financing needs for the EU structural funds’ investments. Higher borrowing levels were planned after joining the euro for the fiscal years 2011 and 2012. By the end of 2010, public debt had reached 7.2 per cent of GDP. Public sector foreign loans have been mainly used for investments into infrastructure and public enterprises (Government of Estonia, 2009). At the same time general debt (public, private and commercial debt all together) has grown to one of the highest levels per capita among CEE countries, reaching 135 per cent of GDP in 2010 (Estonian Central Office of Statistics, 2011). As both the economic growth and the lending boom have been initiated by Nordic banks that offered cheap credit and thus fuelled internal consumption, they are also partly accountable for the crises. One of the main long-term strategies of Estonian governments’ economic policy has been to attract foreign direct investments (FDI) at almost any cost. It was initiated by radical privatisation and currency reform in 1992. Dramatic inflation before the currency reform and selected exchange rate made local investors and property holders mostly unable to buy the local enterprises. Accordingly Estonia reached one of the highest levels of FDI per capita among CEE countries in its
174
Viljar Veebel and Ramon Loik
60 50 40 30 20 10 0
1994
1999
2004
2009
Percent change
Figure 8.2 Annual average inflation rate in Estonia, 1994–2010. Source: Estonian Central Office of Statistics, 2011.
transition period. As a result, all commercial banks, telecoms and main industrial producers are fully foreign owned. Joining the eurozone has caused some additional changes. The Currency Board system was terminated and replaced by a more credible international currency (the euro), also distinguishing Estonia from its Baltic neighbours who have not managed this far to meet the Maastricht criteria. General official (Bank of Estonia) expectations are positive: bigger investments, lower interest rates and the creation of new jobs are hoped for in the near future. In terms of European fiscal and taxation initiatives, Estonia has been against any tax harmonisation initiatives at the EU level. This especially concerns corporate taxation, which has been seen by Prime Minister Andrus Ansip as the cornerstone of Estonian attractiveness to foreign investors. The first influence of euro area membership has been in taming inflation to around 5 per cent annually and reducing unemployment levels. The third main concern is the Estonian share in the ESM, which still needs open public debate. High inflation was one of the reasons for radical reforms in Estonia during the 1990s. Due to the difficult experience with high inflation in Soviet times and during the first years of independence, this question started to be one of the main benchmarks for the electorate in assessing the government’s economic success or failure. Accordingly, social, labour or educational policies were often sacrificed in order to fulfil the electorate’s inflation expectations (Masso and Paas, 2007). The result was, however, remarkable (Figure 8.2). From a high of 1,076 per cent in 1992, inflation dropped to 8 per cent in 1998 and to 1.3 per cent in 2003. The EU accession caused a new rise in inflation that reached 3 per cent in 2004, 4.4 per cent in 2006 and 10 per cent in 2008. In 2009 Estonia managed to push inflation under 3 per cent to fulfil the Maastricht criteria and join the eurozone. If we compare Estonian inflation with its Baltic neighbours during the period 2004–2008 then in general terms the developments have been quite similar. Even after the accession, Estonian inflation has been problematic (quite often higher than 5 per cent annually),
Estonia: Life in Post-Communist Europe after EU Membership
175
as it started to drop during the global financial crisis of 2009–2010, but to grow again after entering the eurozone. The Estonian economy is quite open and thus dependent on the global economy; foreign trade has reached around 80 per cent of Estonia’s GDP during 2004–2010. In general, Estonian trade has been growing fast. During 1994–2006 both Estonia’s exports and its imports increased almost eight-fold. Moreover, their annual growth rates reached double-digit numbers in most years during this period (Saks, 2008: 21). The main partners of Estonian foreign trade before the EU accession were Russia and Finland. While Russia dominated at the beginning of the 1990s, Finnish shares went up at the end of the 1990s. Sweden and Latvia have been its next most important trade partners. In general, Estonia’s external trade deficit was situated at approximately 20–25 per cent of its trade. Latvia is the only big trading partner offering a stable positive trade balance for Estonia. The deficit in the trade balance has been covered by surpluses in FDI (Saks, 2008: 18). After the accession to the European Union, Estonian foreign trade has been more balanced, as Finland’s share has decreased from 21 per cent in 2004 to 15 per cent in 2009. Russia’s share has remained relatively consistent (at around 10 per cent), while Latvia’s and Lithuania’s importance has been growing slightly and Germany’s share has decreased. During the growth years of 2004–2008 Estonian imports were growing faster than exports, increasing its trade deficit to around 25 per cent of its trade volume. The largest deficits were with Finland, Germany and Russia (Bank of Estonia, 2009). EU membership has changed import and export flows mainly in agricultural products, due to the EU system of subsidies. On the one hand, support to the agricultural sector increased several times due to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union, but on the other hand, Estonia had to stop importing food products at world market prices from non-EU countries (Tamm and Varblane, 2004: 28–29). The European Union has had a generally positive effect on Estonian economic developments. After Estonia acceded to the European Union, Estonian companies got the opportunity to access the European Common Market. Both exports and imports grew by 24 per cent on average annually through 2004 to 2006. In 2008 the weight of the EU-27 in total Estonian goods export turnover was to the tune of 70 per cent, while that of the Commonwealth of Independent States was only 13 per cent. Moreover, 80 per cent of total import turnover was with the EU states. One of the most important resources for reforms and development are investments from EU structural funds, as 798.8 million euros from the EU structural funds and cohesion fund were allocated to Estonia during 2004–2006. Various fields were supported during these years, such as education and employment, business, updating infrastructure, environmental preservation, and the sustainability of farming. Also more than 75,000 Estonians participated in training sessions financed by EU structural funds. In order to raise the competitiveness of enterprises and develop employment, the aid was granted to almost 9,000 companies. Between 2007 and 2013 Estonia will get around 3.4 billion euros from the
176
Viljar Veebel and Ramon Loik
structural funds, which will be mainly channelled to energy saving and production technologies, entrepreneurship, administrative capability, education, information society, environment protection, regional and local development, research and development, health care and welfare, transportation and the labour market.
Social developments While Estonia’s economic transition has been both radical and in many ways effective, its social developments have been less guided and reformed by its mostly right-liberal governments. In parallel to rapid economic changes, social reforms have been conducted mostly on the basis of liberal economic needs. The most successful has been the reform of the pension system, which has been fundamentally transformed to consist of three pillars: a low fixed state pension pillar, a income based second pillar and a voluntary contribution option. The health care system is still completely state-financed and based on a flat social tax contribution (Masso and Paas, 2007). The educational system has gone through some reforms, mainly in the area of higher education (the complete transfer to the Bologna higher education system, for example), but still needs additional reforms at the basic and high-school levels. The system of ‘parental pension’ or ‘parental salary’ has been introduced, which, by providing a monthly payment from the state for the same amount as the salary earned before the birth of the baby, allows young parents to stay at home with their baby until the infant is one and a half years old,. EU interests in the social policy of Estonia mainly concern the treatment of minority groups and the inclusion of less well-off groups. Health care, unemployment, social protection and non-discrimination questions have been developed gradually in most cases and still rely on some Soviet legacies. Low prioritisation of social security is also reflected in Estonia’s position in the Human Development Index (HDI). The best ranking (36) achieved in 2002 has not been surpassed and the last report in 2009 ranked Estonia only 40. This position is better than its Baltic neighbours or Poland, but lower than the scores for Slovenia and the Czech Republic (Eesti Koostöö Kogu, 2009). While GDP growth and literacy have been the main contributors to Estonia’s HDI growth, life expectancy and the health care system have been the main causes of its slow progress. Indeed, social security, health care and education expenditures per capita are among the lowest in the European Union. With a Gini coefficient of 36 points (higher than the EU average of 30–31) Estonia has one of the highest levels of inequality in the European Union. Estonia also has one the highest rates of HIV and tuberculosis in the European Union. Gender differences in Estonia are still important, with the average life expectancy of Estonian men at 67.5 years (which is in world ranking comparable with Mongolia and East Timor), while the average life expectancy of women is 78.5 years (which is higher than in Denmark or Ireland). The pension age for men is 63 years of age and for women between 58 and 63.
Estonia: Life in Post-Communist Europe after EU Membership
177
Educational reforms have also been influenced by political turbulence at ministerial level. The most debated question has been the necessity and scope of state-funded education and the role of private schools and universities. Reforms in the educational system have mainly focused on higher education to follow the Bologna standards. The number of students has been growing from 39,000 in 1997 to 69,000 in 2009, but the number of publications and successful doctoral promotions has been dropping. One of the long-term social problems also receiving broader attention has been the integration of the Russian-speaking minority. Apart from the ethnic Estonians, Estonia is also home to substantial minorities of Russians (25.6 per cent), Ukrainians (2.1 per cent) and other nations (4.5 per cent). The official position of Estonian governments has been that most of this Russian-speaking minority are migrants, as they arrived in Estonia after the beginning of Soviet occupation (Estonia was quite mono-ethnic before 1940). Accordingly, they can apply for citizenship, but only after quite complicated examinations (language, Constitution and culture). During Estonia’s 20 years of independence, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and also the European Union have made attempts to convince its governments that at least part of that minority deserves privileged treatment regarding the question of citizenship, as they have been living in Estonia for more than 50 years. In practice, the integration has been slow but peaceful, the only open protest having been caused by the removal of the statue of the ‘Bronze Soldier’ (the symbol of Soviet domination in Estonia) from Tallinn’s city centre in 2007. On the positive side, the permanent residents of Estonia have from the very beginning had access to education, pensions, unemployment and other subsidies equal to Estonian citizens. The hottest debate has been caused by the question of the future of the Russian-language schools. According to the official ‘Estonian Integration Strategy 2008–2013’ the government’s priority is to increase the number of citizenship holders by relaxing some Estonian language requirements and offering free language training. The population dynamics of Estonia is characterised by two central tendencies that have become especially influential in recent years, with both necessitating reforms in the social security system. First, the population decrease which started in the 1990s continues (Figure 8.3) and, second, the population is ageing. By the beginning of 2009, the Estonian population had decreased to 1.34 million, i.e. approximately 32,000 fewer people than in 2000. In 2008, the rate of people aged 65 or older was 25.3 per cent when compared with the working-age population (aged 15–64) and this indicator has continuously increased since 2000. The ageing of the population has a very strong effect on the labour market. Considering the proportion of people aged 5–14 and people aged 55–64, it can be estimated that more people will leave the labour market than enter it in the forthcoming decade. The natural increase of Estonia’s population continues to be negative. Mortality has decreased and the average life expectancy has increased both for men and women. While in 2008 the life expectancy of Estonian women at birth was 79.2
178
Viljar Veebel and Ramon Loik
60 50 40 30 20 10 0
1994
1999
2004
2009
Percent change Figure 8.3 Estonia’s population evolution, 1994–2010 (million persons). Source: Estonian Central Office of Statistics, 2011.
years, for men it was 68.6 years. The mortality rate of men aged below 65 is almost three times higher than the mortality rate of women. Another characteristic trend in birth and partnership indicators is that a decreasing number of children are born to married parents. While 45.5 per cent of the children were born to parents in a registered marriage in 2000, this figure dropped to 40.9 per cent of the children in 2008 (Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs, 2009). In 2009, new financial motivators were introduced for mothers that led to a growth in the birth rate; 2010 saw the first positive birth rate after 1993 as 15,881 children were born, while 15,847 people died. During the years 2004–2010 social services and priorities in Estonia have been seen in a liberal perspective: the state is offering only the minimum level needed. Accordingly, pensions and unemployment assistance are lower even when compared with CEE member states. Social services and benefits in Estonia are mainly financed from the state budget and local government budgets, as well voluntary pension and insurance funds. Social expenditure includes pensions and pension supplements, state family benefits and parental benefits, benefits for disabled persons and other benefits and allowances payable to families financed from social taxes. According to the data of the Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs (2009), 78 per cent of the state social budget expenditure is dedicated to pensions. In 2008, child and family benefits, including the parental benefit, formed another 15 per cent and the portion of social support for disabled persons was 3 per cent. The percentage of social insurance expenditure in GDP has increased slowly over the period 2001–2008. While in 2001 the expenditure on state social insurance constituted 7.9 per cent of GDP, this level increased to 9.2 per cent in 2008. However, in the same year, the share of social insurance expenditure in the state budget has also decreased by 3.4 per cent (to 25.7 per cent in 2008) (Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs, 2009). The trend, however, is towards higher social protection costs, caused by the ageing of the electorate and growing welfare expectations.
Estonia: Life in Post-Communist Europe after EU Membership
179
160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1994
1999
2004
2009
Index; 2000=100 Figure 8.4 Development of the consumer price index in Estonia, 1994–2010. Source: Estonian Central Office of Statistics, 2011.
Estonia has managed to adhere to the minimum standards of the European Code of Social Security, whereby the average pension should amount to at least 40 per cent of the average gross wages of an unskilled production worker. In 2006, an average pension formed 44 per cent of the average gross wages of an unskilled male production worker. A positive trend in the period 2000–2007 was the reduction in the gap between the average disposable income in Estonia and the average disposable income of households in rural areas. In 2004, the absolute poverty rate in Estonia was almost 15 per cent. By 2007, the proportion of poor households had decreased by around two and half times (2.39), dropping to 6.2 per cent of all households living under the absolute poverty line. In Estonia as in the other EU member states, the relative poverty line is considered to be at 60 per cent of the median income. Even though the threshold value of relative poverty almost tripled between 2000 and 2007, the general rate of relative poverty in Estonia only changed by 1.2 percentage points, increasing from 18.3 per cent in 2000 to 19.5 per cent in 2007. In comparison to other EU member states, the Estonian relative poverty rate in 2007 was close to the average level of the EU-27 (17 per cent), similar to those of Lithuania and the United Kingdom, but twice as high as in the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Iceland (Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs 2009). The dynamics of the consumer price index and inflation has been important topic in political debates and election campaigns: first, because of the high inflation of the rouble before the introduction of a national currency; and second, because it is one component of the Maastricht criteria to join the euro area. The Estonian government has taken active measures to control inflation and consumer price index to meet the eurozone criteria in 2009–2010 (Figure 8.4). At the EU level the Estonian government is not supporting common social security initiatives, seeing it as an additional cost to budget for, and also as a barrier to
180
Viljar Veebel and Ramon Loik
maintaining national competitiveness. The only supported initiative is the idea of a common European pension age, as it would be higher than the existing Estonian pension age and would therefore help the government to cut social costs even further. Labour supply and flexibility play a crucial role in Estonia’s long-term economic development. Problems are caused by a negative birth rate, an ageing population, and the migration of young skilled workers. Moreover, Estonia’s productivity was only 47.8 per cent of the EU average in 2008, when adjusted per purchasing power. It is comparable only with Latvia and Lithuania and bypassed by all other EU member states (Eamets and Paas, 2007). Labour supply in Estonia has also been constantly decreasing since independence. The reasons for this are both the negative birth rate and the quite high level of labour migration to other EU member states. This process has been increasing during 2004–2008 and decreasing in 2009 due to higher levels of financial support provided for childbirth (Estonian Central Office of Statistics, 2010). The Estonian employment structure is close to the structure prevailing in other developed countries in Europe. The role of the agricultural sector is even lower than the EU average, and the share of industry has remained rather high. The share of employment in the service sector is one the lowest in the EU (Eamets and Arro, 2000: 122). The Estonian labour market has been highly unstable. At the end of 2007 unemployment was less than 5 per cent, but reached more than 15 per cent at the end of 2009. The low level of official unemployment has been caused by low unemployment benefits at only 16 per cent of the minimum salary in 2004, and 23 per cent of minimum salary in 2008. The official unemployment rate in Estonia has never reflected real unemployment very well. Labour surveys have in some cases even showed unemployment levels to be twice as high as the official rate (Arro et al., 2001: 20). The government’s official policy has also been to stay quite passive on the question of labour market stability no matter how low or high the unemployment levels are. In 2008, Estonia’s level of unemployment was still lower than the EU average, but at the beginning of 2009 Estonia joined Spain, Latvia, Lithuania and Ireland in the group of the EU member states with the highest level of unemployment. Expenditure on active labour market measures has increased, thanks to the implementation of the European Social Fund. After the joining the eurozone in January 2011, unemployment started to gradually decrease. Less than 25 per cent of the members of the Estonian parliament have been women during the re-independence period. In 2007 the percentage of women among MPs was 24 per cent, which is the largest proportion since 1992. An important prerequisite for women’s election into parliament is their representation among election candidates. The 2007 general elections indicated a positive shift, as in comparison to the general elections of 2003, the percentage of women among election candidates increased from 21 to 27 per cent. Among civil servants in the ministries the balance between genders is quite the opposite, where, because of low salary levels, more than 77 per cent of civil servants are female (Toomla, 2011). Men and women in Estonia are also employed in different fields of activity and occupations. Women are traditionally dominant in those fields and occupations
Estonia: Life in Post-Communist Europe after EU Membership
181
somehow less valued in society, for instance as child-minders, teachers or social workers in welfare services (but also as civil servants as mentioned before). Men on the other hand dominate criminal statistics with 94 per cent of prisoners and 89 per cent of criminals being men (Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs, 2009). The difference between the average hourly gross wages of men and women in Estonia is larger than the EU average. According to 2007 data the wage gap between men and women in Estonia (30.3 per cent) was the largest in the European Union. Education is also an important resource that is accessed differently by gender. The majority of school dropouts in Estonia are boys, who may or may not continue their education and whose future in the labour market is therefore problematic. Accordingly, in 2009, a majority of students (66 per cent) were female. In 2008/2009 female students were dominant in the fields of education (92.2 per cent), and health and welfare (88.8 per cent), while the proportion of female students was lowest in the field of technology, production and construction (Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs, 2009).
Conclusion Successful EU membership and being ‘the best pupil in the class’ has been seen as the first priority both for the political elite and the electorate in Estonia during the first six years in the Union. European integration has been seen as a best possible hope for building up the welfare state and guaranteeing social security. Copying the existing EU legal solutions and other member states’ political systems was often seen as being better than rebuilding and developing Estonia’s own unique approach. Accordingly, Estonia has been quite effective in the harmonisation process of EU legal acts. Considering historical circumstances and the comparative progress of its Baltic neighbours, Estonia’s transition process is internally seen a success story, at least in the opinion of local policy-makers and also by most of the electorate. On the other hand, Estonian transition choices have been quite specific, including a radical currency reform, fast privatisation and ´shock therapy` during the pension reform. As a result, Estonia finds itself at the top or at the bottom of most scoreboards where fastest economic growth is combined with the weakest social protection. According to the human development (HDI) scoreboard in 2009, Estonia finds itself at the same place as 15 years beforehand (ranked around 40). The same effect appears in terms of purchasing power, as Estonian purchasing power is approximately 68 per cent of the EU average, but the gap has not closed during the last four years. In parallel with GDP growth, the total debt of the private and public sector had grown to 120 per cent of GDP in 2010. The main question concerning Estonia’s long-term economic prospects is if innovation and export ability actually start to grow with EU support to provide sustainability. Compared with other CEE countries, Estonia did well in institutional integration, achieving political stability and economic liberalisation, but has been lagging behind in social development. While Estonia headed towards the thin liberal state after its independence, accession to the European Union in 2004 changed it in many aspects. At first, a
182
Viljar Veebel and Ramon Loik
fast labour migration started, pushing the salary levels higher and, combined with the real estate boom, reduced Estonia’s export competitiveness. In parallel, the economy turned more towards internal consumption and became less innovative. On the other hand, the importance of the agricultural sector and food production started to grow again due to EU subsidies. EU regulative aspects and support measures also influenced regional development and external trade. At the same time the government kept its original approach of limited government interference and budget stability during the initial EU membership years. In the year of its accession Estonian society was one the most polarised among EU member states. This difference has been lowered during Estonia’s EU membership, mainly due to EU regional and agricultural supports but not following structural changes in the Estonian legal or economic system. There has been no significant development in terms of participation and democracy since the EU accession in 2004. Public debate on important EU matters is decreasing and the government is dominating the policy-making process. For example, a public debate on the Lisbon Treaty was found unnecessary as there had already been a debate on the Constitutional Treaty. Voters also feel that the European Union’s and civil servants’ role in policy-making is growing, while the parliament’s role is actually decreasing. Mandatory relations matter less and less every year and legislation becomes more anonymous. The European Union has also re-created a tradition of guided debates, where some criticism of new EU initiatives is allowed and sometimes also funded, but not the direct opposition of states’ pro-Europe policies. The balance between the pressures of Europeanisation and the challenges of internal politics is still under discussion in Estonia. For instance, most concerns towards the accession criteria and evaluation were related to political criteria, especially the question of the treatment of minorities. While EU criticism was seen impartial in many aspects, it was deemed to be subjective when the local Russian-speaking minority was categorised as a minority by the European Commission, but as migrants by the Estonian government. These different points of view are understandable due to 50 years of Soviet rule and the policy of the Russification of Baltic territory. In 2011, when questions of minority treatment have lost most of their importance, the Estonian public and media wonder with concern whether they really have the active power to influence the European Financial Mechanism build up and energy relations between the European Union and Russia. On the other hand, Estonia would like to see the European Union as a unified security and economic partner, especially in relations with Russia, hoping that this trilateral partnership will be beneficial for all sides. But what is Estonia’s role today as a member state? According to the researches conducted by Tartu University (Veebel, 2009b, 2010), the majority of civil servants participating in committees and council workgroups see the Estonian state as a ‘policy taker’, ‘potential policy taker’ or ‘conditional policy supporter’. In rare cases was Estonia also seen as a potential ‘policy opposer’ if it’s vital interests were not met, for example in energy policy, or a ‘policy killer’ in areas where some new rules are seen to be against liberal market principles,
Estonia: Life in Post-Communist Europe after EU Membership
183
such as tax harmonisation proposals. Estonia is a ‘policy driver’ in only a very few cases, mainly concerning integrating, setting up electronic databases or pushing its so-called common e-market initiative. In conclusion, most of the Estonian population and elite sees the country’s accession to the European Union as a very successful project which has fulfilled its goals. There has been less analysis about what price was paid for developing Estonia’s welfare state, as well as if the growth is sustainable. The Estonian government is also often pointing to the need to have solidarity with the ESM and the Euro Pact. At the same time, popular support for EU membership and pro-European governments also seems to remain strong, according to reports from ‘Estonia Today’ (2008), an official poll by the Press and Information Department, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Bibliography Arro, R., Eamets, R., Järve, J., Kallaste, E. and Philips, K. (2001) Labour Market Flexibility and Employment Security – Estonia, Employment Paper No.25, Geneva: International Labour Organization. Bank of Estonia (2007) Fifteen Years of the Estonian Kroon, Tallinn: Bank of Estonia. Bank of Estonia (2009) Estonia’s Economy in 2009, Tallinn: Bank of Estonia. Eamets, R. and Arro, R. (2000) Cross-Country Analysis of Employment Policies in Candidate Countries, Aarhus: European Training Foundation. Eamets, R. and Paas, T. (eds) (2007) Conclusion – Labour Market Flexibility, Flexicurity and Employment, New York: Nova Science. Eesti Koostöö Kogu (2009) Estonian Human Development Report 2009, Tallinn: Eesti Ekspressi Kirjastuse AS. Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008) Estonia Today: Public Opinion on the European Union, Press and Information Department, Tallinn. Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs (2009) Health, Labour and Social Life in Estonia 2000–2008, Tallinn. Estonian Central Office of Statistics (2010) Online. Available at: http://www.stat.ee/mainindicators (accessed 29 June 2011). Estonian Central Office of Statistics (2011) Online. Available at: http://www.stat.ee/mainindicators (accessed 29 June 2011). European Commission (2003) ‘Comprehensive monitoring report of the European Commission on the state of preparedness for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia’, Official Journal of the European Union, 23.3.2004, EN C 73/79. European Parliament (2011) EP Elections, Results by Country. Online. Available at: http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/staticDisplay.do?language=EN&id=212 (accessed 30 June 2011). Government of Estonia (2003) Pre-accession Economic Program, Tallinn. Government of Estonia (2007) Estonian Government’s European Union Policy for 2007– 2011. Online. Available at: http://www.riigikantselei.ee/failid/ELPOL_2007_2011_ EN.pdf (accessed 30 May 2011). Government of Estonia (2008) State Budget Strategy 2009–2012, Tallinn. Government of Estonia (2009) State Budget Strategy 2010–2013, Tallinn.
184
Viljar Veebel and Ramon Loik
House of Commons (2000) ‘EU enlargement: From Luxembourg to Helsinki and beyond’, Research Paper 00/62. Online. Available at: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2000/rp00-062.pdf (accessed 29 June 2011). Ilves, T. H. (2003) ‘The Grand Enlargement and the Great Wall of Europe’, in A. Kasekamp (ed.), Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003, Tallinn: Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, pp. 181–201. Laar, M. (2002) Estonia: Little Country that Could, London, CRCE. Masso, J. and Paas, T (2007) ‘Social protection systems and labour market policies in the Baltic States’, in T. Paas and R. Eamets (eds), Labour Market Flexibility, Flexicurity and Employment: Lessons of the Baltic States, New York: Nova Science, pp. 143–182. National Electoral Committee (2009) EP Elections Results 2011. Online. Available at: http://www.vvk.ee/?lang=en (accessed 29 June 2011). Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament) (2011) ‘Riigikogu Rules of Procedure and Internal Rules Act’. Online. Available at: http://www.riigikogu.ee (accessed 29 June 2011). Saks, Ü. (2008) ‘Estonia’s foreign trade during thirteen years’, Kroon & Economy, No.1. Standard Eurobarometer (2009) Public Opinion in the EU, No.72. Online. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb72/eb72_ee_ee_nat.pdf (accessed 29 June 2011). Tamm, D. and Varblane, U. (2004) Changes of Estonian Foreign Trade After the EU Accession, Tartu: Tartu University Press. Terk, E. (2000) Privatisation in Estonia: Ideas, Process, Results, Tallinn: Estonian Institute for Future Studies. Toomla, R. (2011) Political Parties in Estonia 2001–2010, Tartu: Tartu University Press. Veebel, V. and Kasekamp, A. (2007) ‘The Baltic States and ESDP’, in K. Brummer (ed.), The North and ESDP, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Veebel, V. (2009a) ‘European Union’s positive conditionality model in pre-accession process’, Trames, 13, 3: 207–231. Veebel, V. (2009b) The EU New Member States as Agenda Settles in Enlarged European Union: Estonia, Sofia: Open Society Institute. Online. Available at: http://eupi.osi.bg/ fce/001/0070/files/EstoniaCountryReport_OSI-Sofia_EuPI_April2009_.pdf (accessed 29 June 2011). Veebel, V. (2010) ‘Estonia’s involvement in EU policy-making’, in Z. Lisoňová (ed.), Preference Formation in the New EU Member States, Bratislava: Comenius University. Veebel, V. (2011) The Estonian Elections of March 2011, EuPI Policy Brief, March 2011, Sofia.
CURRICULUM VITAE Name: Date of Birth: Nationality: Contact:
Viljar Veebel 07.01.1977 Estonian Institute of Government and Politics, University of Tartu, Lossi 36, 51003, ESTONIA, E-mail:
[email protected] Education
2001–2012 1999–2001 1996–1999
Ph.D. studies in Institute of Government and Politics, University of Tartu, Estonia. M.A. studies in Department of Political Science, University of Tartu, Estonia. B.A. studies in Department of Political Science, University of Tartu, Estonia Professional employment
2001–2012 2002–2003
Lecturer of international relations theory, University of Tartu, Estonia. Academic advisor of Estonian Government in delegation to the EU Future Convention. Academic publications
Veebel, Viljar and Loik, Ramon. (2012). Estonia: Life in Post-Communist Eastern Europe after EU Membership. Life in Post-Communist Eastern Europe after EU Membership. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. To be published in May 2012. Veebel, Viljar (2011). The EU Neighbourhood Policy, Positive Conditionality and Reforms in the Former Soviet Space. The European Neighborhood after August 2008. Republic of Letters, pp. 25–76. Veebel, Viljar (2011). Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-Accession Evaluation. STSS, Vol . 3/2011, pp. 3–23. Veebel, Viljar (2011). The Estonian Elections 2011, EuPI Policy Brief n29, Sofia Veebel, Viljar (2009). European Union’s Positive Conditionality Model in PreAccession Process. Trames, A Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, vol. 3, issue 3 (63/58), pp. 207–231.
225
Hurt, Ulrika and Veebel, Viljar (2009). Estonian Civil Servants Attitudes towards EU Members States’ Interests and Basics of the Coalition-forming, Riigikogu Toimetised (RiTO), 20/2009. Veebel, Viljar (2008). The Positive Conditionality of the EU: Methods, Dynamics, Principles, RSR Yearbook 2008, Tartu University Publishing. Veebel, Viljar and Kasekamp, Andres (2007).The Baltic States and ESDP, Andres Kasekamp and Viljar Veebel, The North and ESDP, Bertelsmann Stiftung, pp. 3–23. Veebel, Viljar and Kasekamp, Andres (2007). Overcoming Doubts: The Baltic States and European Security and Defence Policy, The Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook, edited by Andres Kasekamp, Varrak, pp. 9–32. Pettai, Vello and Veebel, Viljar (2005). Navigating between Policy and Populace: Estonia, its Accession Referendum and the EU Convention. Politique Europeenne. L’union Europeénne élargie. 2005/1 n° 15. L’ Harmattan, pp. 113–135. Veebel, Viljar (2004). Conditionality and Dependence as Key Elements in Simultaneous Democratization and Crises Prevention. Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2004, edited by Andres Kasekamp, Varrak, pp. 63–84. Veebel, Viljar (2003). Estonian choices influencing the Debate on the Future of Europe, The Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook, edited by Andres Kasekamp, Varrak, pp. 131–163. Media publications Veebel, Viljar (2012). Thinking on Europe, Sirp, 27.01.2012. Veebel, Viljar (2011). Merkozy – New ruler of Europe, Eesti Ekspress, 8.12. 2011. Veebel, Viljar (2011). Is helping Greece justified, Postimees, 11.10 2011. Veebel, Viljar (2011). Destructive Unity of Two Great Powers. Eesti Päevaleht, 8. 8. 2011. Veebel, Viljar (2011). Greece: All debts will be paid day-after tomorrow, Eesti Päevaleht, 1.7.2011. Veebel, Viljar (2011). Pensioners ruling the EU, Eesti Ekspress, 30.06.2011. Veebel, Viljar (2011). Saving PIGS from the Market Forces. Eesti Päevaleht, 10.05. 2011. Veebel, Viljar (2011). New European Values. Eesti Päevaleht, 29.03 2011. Veebel, Viljar (2010). Intellectual Stagnation of European Thinking, Sirp, 29.07 2010. Veebel, Viljar (2007). What Can We Learn From That? Sirp, 16.11.2007. Veebel, Viljar (2005). Looking for the new world order, Sirp 14.01.2005. Veebel, Viljar (2005). Balkan and Baltics, Sirp, 14.10.2005. Veebel, Viljar (2004). Constitutional Treaty: Choices for the EU and Estonia, Sirp, 07.05. 2004. Veebel, Viljar (2004). Force gives the Legitimacy, Sirp, 20.10.2004.
226
Veebel, Viljar (2003). Fight with Non- existing Threats, Eesti Päevaleht, 31. 01.2003. Veebel, Viljar (2003). Economic miracle of Chile, Eesti Ekspress, 10.02.2000.
227
ELULOOKIRJELDUS Nimi: Sünniaeg: Rahvus: Kontakt:
Viljar Veebel 07.01 1977 Eesti Tartu Ülikool, Riigiteaduste Instituut, Lossi 36, Tartu 51003,
[email protected] Haridus
2001–2012 1999–2001 1996–1999
Doktoriõpe (Ph.D.), Tartu Ülikool, Riigiteaduste Instituut Teadusmagistrikraad (M.A.), Tartu Ülikool, politoloogia osakond Bakalaureusekraad (B.A.), Tartu Ülikool, politoloogia osakond Teenistuskäik
2001–2012 2002-2003
Tartu Ülikool, Riigiteaduste Instituut, rahvusvaheliste suhete lektor Vabariigi Valitsuse nõunik EL Tulevikukonvendis Teaduspublikatsioonid
Veebel, Viljar and Loik, Ramon. (2012). Estonia: Life in Post-Communist Eastern Europe after EU Membership. Life in Post-Communist Eastern Europe after EU Membership. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. To be published in May 2012. Veebel, Viljar (2011). The EU Neighbourhood Policy, Positive Conditionality and Reforms in the Former Soviet Space. The European Neighborhood after August 2008. Republic of Letters, pp. 25–76. Veebel, Viljar (2011). Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-Accession Evaluation. STSS, Vol . 3/2011, pp. 3–23. Veebel, Viljar (2011). The Estonian Elections 2011, EuPI Policy Brief n29, Sofia Veebel, Viljar (2009). European Union’s Positive Conditionality Model in PreAccession Process. Trames, A Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, vol. 3, issue 3 (63/58), pp. 207–231. Hurt, Ulrika and Veebel, Viljar (2009). Estonian Civil Servants Attitudes towards EU Members States’ Interests and Basics of the Coalition-forming, Riigikogu Toimetised (RiTO), 20/2009. Veebel, Viljar (2008). The Positive Conditionality of the EU: Methods, Dynamics, Principles, RSR Yearbook 2008, Tartu University Publishing.
228
Veebel, Viljar and Kasekamp, Andres (2007).The Baltic States and ESDP, Andres Kasekamp and Viljar Veebel, The North and ESDP, Bertelsmann Stiftung, pp. 3–23. Veebel, Viljar and Kasekamp, Andres (2007). Overcoming Doubts: The Baltic States and European Security and Defence Policy, The Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook, edited by Andres Kasekamp, Varrak, pp. 9–32. Pettai, Vello and Veebel, Viljar (2005). Navigating between Policy and Populace: Estonia, its Accession Referendum and the EU Convention. Politique Europeenne. L’union Europeénne élargie. 2005/1 n° 15. L’ Harmattan, pp. 113–135. Veebel, Viljar (2004). Conditionality and Dependence as Key Elements in Simultaneous Democratization and Crises Prevention. Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2004, edited by Andres Kasekamp, Varrak, pp. 63–84. Veebel, Viljar (2003). Estonian choices influencing the Debate on the Future of Europe, The Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook, edited by Andres Kasekamp, Varrak, pp. 131–163. Ajakirjanduslikud publikatsioonid Veebel, Viljar (2012). Mõeldes Euroopast, Sirp, 27.01.2012. Veebel, Viljar (2011). Merkozy – Euroopa uus valitseja? Eesti Ekspress, 08.12. 2011. Veebel, Viljar (2011). Kas Kreeka abistamine on õiglane? Postimees, 11.10 2011. Veebel, Viljar (2011). Kahe suure ennasthävitav üksmeel, Eesti Päevaleht 08. 08. 2011. Veebel, Viljar (2011). Kreeka kriis: kõik ülehomse varna, Eesti Päevaleht, 1.7.2011. Veebel, Viljar (2011). Euroopa Liit pensionäride meelevallas, Eesti Ekspress, 30.06.2011. Veebel, Viljar (2011). Võlgnikriikide päästmine turujõudude käest, Eesti Päevaleht, 10.05. 2011. Veebel, Viljar (2011). Tõbine kannab tervet, Eesti Päevaleht, 29.03 2011. Veebel, Viljar (2010). Euroopa intellektuaalne allkäik, Sirp, 29.07 2010. Veebel, Viljar (2007). Mida me sellest õppida saame? Sirp, 16.11.2007. Veebel, Viljar (2005). Uut maailmakorda otsides, Sirp, 14.01.2005. Veebel, Viljar (2005). Balkan ja Baltimaad, Sirp, 14.10.2005. Veebel, Viljar (2004). EL Põhiseaduslik Leping ja Eesti valikud, Sirp/Diplomaatia, 07.05. 2004. Veebel, Viljar (2004). Jõud annab õiguse, Sirp, 20.10.2004. Veebel, Viljar (2003). Võitlus olematute ohtudega, Eesti Päevaleht, 31.01. 2003. Veebel, Viljar (2000). Tšiili majandusime, Eesti Ekspress, 10.02. 2000.
229
DISSERTATIONES RERUM POLITICARUM UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS 1. 2.
3. 4.
Allan Sikk. Highways to power: new party success in three young democracies. Tartu, 2006. Holger Mölder. Cooperative security dilemma – practicing the hobbesian security culture in the Kantian security environment. Tartu, 2010. Heiko Pääbo. Potential of Collective Memory Based International Identity Conflicts in Post-Imperial Space. Tartu, 2011. Mihkel Solvak. Private member’s bills in parliament – a comparative study of Finland and Estonia. Tartu, 2011. 217 p.
![(1.1) G(u), u(O) uo. A [(1 e)G(U ) + for e [0,1].](https://m.moam.info/img/260x300/11-gu-uo-uo-a-1-egu-for-e-01_5ba8bbad097c47a8508b45f2.jpg)
