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Holy Land Studies 9.2 (2010): 185–207 DOI: 10.3366/E147494751000082X © Edinburgh University Press www.eupjournals.com/hls

NAZARETH IN THE WAR FOR PALESTINE: THE ARAB CITY THAT SURVIVED THE 1948 NAKBA Dr Mustafa Abbasi Tel Hai Academic College Upper Galilee, 12210 Israel [email protected]

ABSTRACT

Nazareth is the largest Palestinian Arab city inside Israel and one of the holiest Christian cities on earth. In the New Testament the town is described as the childhood home of Jesus and as such is a centre of Christian shrines and pilgrimage, with many shrines commemorating biblical events. Although according to the 1947 UN Partition plan the city was part of the Palestinian Arab state, it was conquered in 1948 by the Israeli army and annexed to the Israeli state. On 16 July, three days after the mass expulsion of the Palestinian cities of Lydda and Ramle by the Israeli army, Nazareth surrendered to Jewish forces and its inhabitants were allowed to remain in situ. In 1948 the Zionist attitude towards the Palestinian Christian communities in Galilee was generally less aggressive than the attitude towards the local Palestinian Muslims. This article addresses the question: how and why did Nazareth survive the 1948 Nakba and mass expulsion of Palestinians from the Galilee? While exploring this Christian dimension, the article focuses on the key roles played by the Muslim Mayor Yusuf al-Fahum, Israeli Prime Minister and Defence Minister Ben-Gurion and army commanders involved in deciding the fate of the city.

Introduction Between the months of April and October 1948 the entire region of Galilee was conquered. The Galilean cities of Arab and Jewish-Arab population, Tiberias, Safed, Acre, and Nazareth, and all their rural surroundings, fell one after another into the hands of the Haganah forces. The first to fall was Tiberias on 18 April 1948, the second was Safed on

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11 May, and the third was Acre on 17 May, while Nazareth fell about two months after Tiberias on 16 July 1948, the last in the series of fallen cities. It is interesting that even though, according to the UN Partition Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947, Nazareth was to have been included in the area of the Palestinian Arab state, this did not prevent the IDF forces from conquering it and annexing it to the Israeli part. It is also interesting that Nazareth was the only one of all the four cities mentioned above that was hardly damaged during the course of the war. While the Arab population in Tiberias and Safed was totally expelled, as was most of the Arab population of Acre, the population of Nazareth increased significantly during the war and in its aftermath, and even doubled itself.1 In this way this city became the largest Arab city within the Green Line, and has been from that time until today the political and cultural capital of the Palestinian Arabs in the State of Israel. The present article examines the story of the conquest of Nazareth during the war of 1948, and tries to answer a number of questions: • How did the city of Nazareth organise itself in the period between the UN Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947 and its conquest on 16 July 1948? • Who were the leaders of the city during that period, what was the composition of Arab forces active in the city, and what was the system of relationships between them and the city leadership? • Why was no battle fought in Nazareth as it had been in Safed and Acre, and how did this influence the fate of the city after its conquest? • What were the real factors that saved Nazareth from expulsion? Were they related to the decision of David Ben-Gurion not to expel the Arabs contrary to the request of some of his military commanders, or to the talented leadership and maneuvering ability of the mayor, Yusuf Muhammad ‘Ali al-Fahum, or to both of these factors? It is important to note that this article is not the first of its kind that has dealt with the conquest of Nazareth in the course of the ‘Dekel Campaign’, since this campaign has been written about in nearly all the literature concerning the events of the 1948 war in the Galilee region (Gelber 2000: 496–498; Pappe 2006: 154–159; Pappe 2004: 136–142; Tal 2004: 334–339; Morris 1987: 198–203; Morris 1997: 267–272, 509; Morris 2004: 414–461; Morris 2008: 278–285; Kadish 2004: 119–169; 1 In the census of 1922 the population of Nazareth was 7,424 persons, in 1932 it rose to 8,756, in 1945 it was 12,000, while in 1949 the population was estimated by the Minorities Minister, Bekhor Shitreet, as being between 25,000 and 30,000, which showed that it had doubled itself. See: From the Minister of Minorities to the Minister of Trade and Industry, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 308/44, Nazareth General Reports, Report, 21 July 1948.

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Carmel 1949: 195–217; Israel Defence Forces 1959: 247–252; Dunkelman 1977: 168–177). Nevertheless, the contribution of this article is in its attempts to examine in depth and at the micro level what occurred mainly within the city itself and not in the entire area that was conquered during that campaign. This area covered large portions of the Western Galilee in the north, and extended as far as the villages to the south of Nazareth. But it was Nazareth that was the largest and most important urban center that was conquered during the ‘Dekel Campaign’. In addition, the discussion of the written sources about the conquest of Nazareth will be placed within a much wider context than the ‘Dekel Campaign’, and will cover the history of the war in general, mainly derived from State publications written by military commanders, and to some extent also from the publications of Ilan Pappe, Benny Morris, and David Tal, in spite of their different approaches. Moreover, in most of the sources that refer to the conquest of Nazareth, there is a distinct absence of the local Arab narrative concerning it, in addition to a lack of Arab sources, and in particular of local memoirs, except for those of Elias Srouji (Srouji 2003: 134–140) .This deficiency is partly the result of the lack of local Arab archives, and even in the city of Nazareth itself no such archive yet exists. It is also the result of the inaccessibility of archives in Arab countries. However, in spite of the difficulties, the article will attempt to cope with this problem through interviews and the gathering of private and personal material, mainly from the Fahum family in Nazareth. It is important to stress from the very start in connection with the Fahum family that I am aware of the fact that over reliance on interviews with members of the family could be interpreted as acceptance of their narrative in full. I have taken precautions against this in spite of the fact that they played a decisive role in Nazareth, as will be shown further on. The contribution and originality of this article is therefore the attempt to discuss in a comprehensive and inclusive manner what took place in Nazareth during the eight months between the Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947 and the conquest of the city on 16 July 1948. Through a convergence of the various sources, both Arab and Jewish, the article will provide as far as possible a complete picture of what occurred in the city during this period of time. The discussion will first deal with the various local and external Arab elements that were active in the city on the eve of its conquest, and examine the relations between them. These include the municipality, the Rescue Army, the forces of the Mufti, and others. This discussion is essential for understanding all the developments that occurred during the conquest and its aftermath, and will explain why the behavior of Nazareth differed from that of other Galilean cities. The second part of

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the discussion will concern the conquest itself, and all that took place from the time the city was attacked until the signing of its surrender by the mayor, as well as the reasons why Nazareth was the only large Arab city from which its citizens were not expelled.2 Organisation of the City Leadership On 27 November 1947 the Arab Higher Committee, the main political organ of the Palestinians during the Mandate, decided to set up national committees in all the Arab settlements in the country. In its call upon the leaders and public figures in these settlements, the Committee demanded that they act without delay in setting up such committees. It also transmitted clear guidelines regarding their composition and the area of their activities. These areas included among other things the organisation and management of the lives of the citizens in the civilian sphere, maintaining order and security, collection of funds, organisation of volunteers, keeping in continuous contact with the Palestinian leadership, and so on (al-Hut 1984: 598).3 In the city of Nazareth, which had been identified since the beginning of the Mandate period with the Palestinian opposition, and whose leaders had fairly cool relations with Mufti Amin al-Husseini, a slightly different situation prevailed from that found in other cities of the Galilee. The Mayor, Yusuf Bey al-Fahum, who was the head of the strong and antiHusseini Fahum family, decided in advance to take matters into his own hands, and his slogan was: ‘The days of the 1936 revolt will not return’. His intention was to prevent the Mufti and his followers, and also the leaders of the former revolt, from taking control over the city and the decision-making process. As soon as the British retreated from the city, he took charge of everything with the help of a few city notables and public leaders who shared his views, most prominent among them being As‘ad Kamal al-Sa‘adi who was a senior officer and commanded the police forces in the city. However, in spite of the differences in approach between the mayor and most of the city leadership on one hand, and the Arab Higher Committee on the other, a national committee was nevertheless set up (Srouji 2003: 136). This was done during the month of December 1947, and was chaired by Ibrahim ‘Abd al-Majid al-Fahum.4 Ibrahim was a 2 It should be noted that the majority of the residents of Shafa‘amr were not expelled, but this city was at that time only a town. 3 On the guidelines and regulations for setting up the committees, see: State of Israel Archives, File No. Peh-320/11 Regulations for the Establishment of National Committees, 8 December 1947. 4 Since we only have a few documents from the file of the national committee, it is difficult to determine exactly when the committee was established and what was its full

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senior member of the Fahum family, one of the largest leading families in the city since the 18th century, and had served during the Mandate period as the director of the financial department in Jenin. A number of colleagues from all the communities in the city served together with him. The most outstanding of these were: Nakhla Bishara, a wealthy textile merchant, head of the Bishara family and leader of the Greek Orthodox community in Nazareth; Khalid ‘Othman ‘Awn-Allah, a property owner, a member of the municipal council, a leading member of the well-known ‘Awn-Allah family, and one of the Muslim notables in the city; Amin Salam, a property owner and a notable of the Orthodox community; Najib Banna, of the Latin community, and a deputy mayor of the city at the end of the Mandate period; Naif Batheesh of the Latin community, a member of the municipal council, an industrialist, and one of the owners of the cigarette factory; ‘Awad Taha Mansur, a notable of the Muslim Eastern quarter.5 It is interesting that the mayor, Yusuf al-Fahum, was not the head of the national committee. Apparently, it was his wish to keep a distance from the Arab Higher Committee leadership, to allow him the space to maneuver and the independence to make decisions. Besides which, most of the committee members belonged to the same political line as his own, and moreover Ibrahim was not only a relative but also his father-in-law, so that it all remained within the family circle. The Arab Forces: Composition and Internal Relationships Immediately after its establishment, the committee began to act by organising a volunteer force from among the local inhabitants which was called the ‘Nazareth Protective Force’ (‘Hamiat al-Nasirah’) under the leadership of Diyab al-Fahum, the director of the Water Department in the municipality. Again we see a member of the Fahum family given an important position, becoming the third member of the family involved in the high-level decision-making process. Since we do not have any files of the national committee, it is difficult to determine the exact number or even the composition of this protective force. But according to ‘Atif al-Fahum there were a number of Bedouin of the Arab Sabarja tribe from the Jezreel Valley region.6 IDF archival sources note that some of the Fahum family joined this protective force, including Taher al-Fahum, composition. But according to Kamal Ibrahim al-Fahum, the son of the committee head, it had already been established by the end of December. Interview held with Kamal Ibrahim al-Fahum, 30 August 2009. 5 Interview with ‘Atif al-Fahum, 26 August 2009. ‘Atif al-Fahum is the son of Yusuf Muhammad ‘Ali al-Fahum, the mayor of Nazareth from 1946–1954, and was witness to all the events relating to the conquest of the city. 6 Interview with ‘Atif al-Fahum, 26 August 2009.

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Tawfiq Naif al-Fahum, and Sami Ibrahim al-Fahum, the son of the national committee chairman.7 In addition to the organisation of the national committee and the local protective force, an additional force began to organise around Nazareth under the command of Tawfiq Ibrahim, called ‘Abu Ibrahim al-Saghir’ (‘the Younger’). This Abu Ibrahim was a resident of the village of Indur in the Jezreel valley, and had commanded one of the armed groups (fasel) during the revolt of 1936–1939 (Zu’ater 1992: 457). ‘Arif al-‘Arif noted that the number of recruits under whose command who had acted in Nazareth and the surrounding area after the UN Partition Resolution of November 1947 was about 210 fighters, and that this force was directly subordinate to the Mufti and refrained from having any connection or coordination with the commanders of ‘Jaysh al-Inqath al-Arabi’, or the ‘Arab Rescue Army’,8 in the north (Al-‘Arif n.d.: Vol. l: 130; Vol. 3: 627). It appears that the number of forces under Abu Ibrahim that Al-‘Arif mentions is slightly exaggerated, and in my opinion there were no more than a few score.9 It is interesting that according to some of the Israeli sources, the group of Abu Ibrahim mentioned above also included Syrian and Iraqi volunteers of the Sa‘adun tribe, in addition to the Palestinians among whom Isma‘il Tahbub of Hebron was prominent. The sources tell us also that after their entry into the city, Abu Ibrahim and his men took some of the equipment that the British had left behind, including a quantity of petrol and oil and various other supplies.10 It is important to stress that the relations between Abu Ibrahim and the mayor Yusuf al-Fahum had been very strained ever since the revolt of 1936–1939. The lands of the village of Indur from which Abu Ibrahim came were owned by the al-Fahum family,11 which was one of the large feudal families in the north, and all the inhabitants of Indur were their tenant farmers (harratheen). The al-Fahum family claimed that during the 7 See the list of Nazareth personalities and the functions they fulfilled during the period in question. The list appears under the title ‘Nazareth File’, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 116/100001/54, and is undated. 8 The ‘Arab Rescue Army’, also known as the ‘Arab Liberation Army’, was an army of volunteers from Arab countries led by Fawzi al-Qawuqji. It was set up by the Arab League as a counter to the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee’s ‘Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqaddas’ (‘Holy War Army’), a force of Palestinian irregulars, led in 1948 by ‘Abdel Qadir al-Husseini and Hasan Salama. In reality, however, the Arab League and Arab governments prevented thousands from joining both ‘Jaysh al-Inqath al-Arabi’ and ‘Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqaddas’ (Sayigh 2000: 14). 9 Interview with Kamal Ibrahim al-Fahum, 30 August 2009. 10 Report on the visit of the Minister of Minorities in Nazareth, 19 July 1948, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 308/44, General Nazareth Reports. 11 The lands of the Indur village were owned by two leading members of the family, Rafa’ and ‘Abd al-Majid al-Fahum.

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period of the revolt Abu Ibrahim was the chief of a rebel group, which was responsible together with other groups for injuring and eliminating some of their members. Additional attempts were made at elimination, including an attempt on the life of Yusuf al-Fahum himself. Against this background one may understand the strong opposition to accepting his authority or giving him a position of influence in the city during the period under discussion. On the contrary, the mayor adopted a policy line that was diametrically opposed to that of Abu Ibrahim and his superiors in the Husseini camp. Immediately following the British retreat, Abu Ibrahim entered the city together with his forces. At first he tried to take over the local police station that was under the control of the police commander, As‘ad Kamal al-Sa‘adi. The stubborn efforts of Abu Ibrahim nearly caused a violent confrontation between the two. At this stage the mayor, Yusuf alFahum, intervened and warned Abu Ibrahim against injuring al-Sa‘adi, and telling him that: ‘the days of 1936 will not return’. He demanded that he leave Nazareth immediately, and when Abu Ibrahim felt that this time he could not oppose Yusuf and his men he yielded and left the center of the city, stationing himself in one of the buildings outside Nazareth on the west side – the Schneller Building. From this we learn that from the very start the mayor maintained a distance from the forces identified with the Mufti and prevented them from controlling the city. We also learn that Yusuf al-Fahum was prepared to confront and not to surrender. He demonstrated leadership and was not ready to accept a situation in which any groups active in the city did not acknowledge his authority or were not coordinated with him. From a report written in July 1948 by the Israeli Minister for Minorities, Bekhor Shitreet, we learn more about the tension that prevailed in Nazareth between the various factions prior to its conquest. He also notes that once the British had left, Abu Ibrahim the Younger took over the police building in the city and treated the local police force with hostility. According to Shitreet, the change of attitude in Abu Ibrahim was also caused by pressure from the Rescue Army.12 This shows that both the mayor and the forces of the Rescue Army did not regard the activities of Abu Ibrahim favourably. We know that the Mufti and all the forces subordinate to him refrained from cooperating with the Rescue Army and that in most cases a sense of suspicion, and at times even hostility, was felt between them. It should be noted that the Rescue Army forces active in Nazareth and its environs throughout the period under discussion was from the Hittin 12 Report on the visit of the Minister of Minorities in Nazareth on 19 July 1948, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 308/44, General Nazareth Reports.

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Regiment. This regiment was under the command of the Iraqi officer, Madlul ‘Abbas (Al-Hut 1984: 907: Al-‘Arif n.d.: Vol. 3: 627; Srouji 2003: 139), and included four companies13 that were spread out in the city and in the surrounding regions of the Lower Galilee. The first company was stationed in the area of Tel and Shajara, the second in the area of Lubya, the third in three places within the city – the police station (the Maskubia), the Galil Hotel, and the high school. The fourth company was stationed on the western slopes of Nazareth facing Shafa‘amr14 and Haifa.15 From this we see that only the third and fourth companies were directly involved in protecting the city, while the other two companies were part of the forces that defended the villages of Shajara and Lubya and the surrounding area in the central part of the Lower Galilee. This was where the main strategic road lay, linking Nazareth and Tiberias and other places at the crossroads now known as the Golani Crossroads (‘Tzomet Golani’). According to Haganah sources, the number of men in these companies together with the volunteer force of Abu Ibrahim came to 500.16 It seems that the Haganah estimates are close to the realities, and that even if we add the number of volunteers who came from Acre, about 17 in all, who joined the Abu Ibrahim forces outside Nazareth, the picture is not essentially altered.17 Yet it is important to stress that these numbers changed from time to time, and according to ‘Arif Al-‘Arif, the numbers gradually decreased in time, and on the eve of the conquest, the city had only 200 Arab fighters from all the groups (Al-‘Arif n.d.: Vol. 3: 627). Contrary to the adamant position of the mayor not to cooperate with Abu Ibrahim and his men, we are told that he cooperated with the Rescue Army. According to his son, ‘Atif al-Fahum (b. 1930), this cooperation was mainly in the field of logistic and supplies. He says that there were good relations between his father and the commander of the Rescue Army forces in the city, Madlul ‘Abbas, and his two officer aides, ‘Ammar Bey Hasak and Shikhali Bey. Madlul was described as a tall, handsome and energetic young man, well behaved and polite, who took care to maintain strict discipline and order. Regular contact between the two sides was conducted by the communications officer, Ahmad Tawfiq al-Fahum, one of the mayor’s relatives. It appears that the municipality even decided some of the army positions, and designated three of its members to act as a supply committee: ‘Atif Yusuf al-Fahum, the son of the mayor, Khalid 13 IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 133/1046/70, undated. 14 This place name appears in two forms in this article. When the reference is to an Arabic source it is Shafa‘amr and when it is a Hebrew source it is ‘Shfar‘am’. 15 Instructions to the Hittin Regiment, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 276/100001/57, undated. 16 IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 133/1046/70, undated. 17 From the Jabal al-‘Arab Regiment to Commander Abu Ibrahim, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 116/100001/57, 21 May 1948.

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‘Awn-Allah, and Amin Zaybek, who were responsible for providing the needs of the army.18 According to ‘Atif al-Fahum, a member of this committee, contrary to other claims, the Rescue Army forces in Nazareth received supplies in an ordered way, paid for all the merchandise, and prepared food for themselves, and that no exploitation was made by them of the city residents. From the IDF archives we learn that the cooperation between the city leaders and the Rescue Army forces also included the area of security and intelligence. According to those sources, most of the people who cooperated with the Rescue Army forces in this area were from the Fahum family. Prominent among them were the above-mentioned Ahmad Bey Tawfiq al-Fahum who was a communications officer, Khalid ‘Abd al-Majid al-Fahum, Mamduh Fadel al-Fahum, Sobhi Hasan al-Fahum, Tawfiq ‘Abd al-Razzak, the Director of al-Umma al-‘Arabiyya Bank, and Salim Rajai Farah, an agricultural engineer, who was one of the close friends and advisers of the mayor.19 It seems that the estimations made by the Haganah were correct with regard to the tension and hostility between the heads of the Fahum family and the Mufti. According to the members of the family, they tended to cooperate with the Rescue Army forces in the various areas of municipal affairs, but the Haganah claims that this cooperation was also in security affairs. Whatever might have been the case, most of the sources show that Madlul ‘Abbas was a man of pleasant manners, a gentleman who knew how to deal with the residents of the city and refrained from any step that would hurt the local leadership, which undoubtedly made it easier for it to coordinate its actions with him. It should also be mentioned that in the camp of the Mufti forces the situation was not completely regulated, especially after the conquest of Tiberias by the Jewish forces on 18 April. Subhi Shaheen, who had been active in Tiberias for the Mufti and had commanded scores of fighters until the city fell, now came to Nazareth with his men. He was told to accept the authority of Abu Ibrahim, but refused to do so. From a letter sent by Abu Ibrahim to the Mufti dated 9 May 1948, we learn that Subhi was more engaged in matters of trade and other private affairs, and even though he had received arms and ammunition, he did not take part in the war effort. He eventually left the city and went to the village of Mughar far away from Nazareth.20 18 Interview with ‘Atif al-Fahum, 26 August 2009. 19 Nazareth file, personalities, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 116/100001/57, undated list in both Hebrew and Arabic. 20 From Abu Ibrahim, Nazareth Command, to Haj Amin, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 116/100001/57, 9 May 1948.

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On 11 June, Fawzi al-Qawuqji, the commander of the Rescue Army, visited Nazareth together with Lebanese Druze leader and emir (prince) Majid Arslan, who was then the Lebanese Defence Minister. They remained in the city for three days, and their visit was apparently intended to coordinate positions among the various camps in the city, and also to learn about the security situation in the city and its environs (Al-‘Arif n.d.: Vol.3: 629). Their visit was followed by Taha Pasha al-Hashemi, the General Inspector (al-Mufatish al-‘Am) of the Rescue Army.21 These two visits show us the importance of the city for the commanders of the Rescue Army after Tiberias and Safed had fallen to the Jewish side, and Acre had been conquered on 17 May, the greater majority of its Arab residents being either expelled or leaving it of their own accord. In addition to this, it should be noted that the civil situation in Nazareth was no less troubling for the commanders than the security situation. As stated before, most of the large cities such as Haifa, Tiberias, Acre, and Safed had already been captured, which put pressure on Nazareth mainly because of the thousands of refugees that streamed into the city from all directions. This stream of refugees increased daily, and in the letter sent on 10 May from the IDF Golani Brigade to the army General Staff Headquarters it was written that: In Nazareth the stream of refugees continues to increase from day to day. They are to be found in the city and some of them have also gone to Tzipori [Saffuriya], Kafr Kana, and other villages in the surrounding area. There is a feeling . . . that the Jews will not attack the city. No fortifications have been made in the city and no strong guard is posted. The arms held by the citizens are only for defence, and each family is suspicious of the other since there are a lot of internal disputes. What is more worrying is the economic situation. The local residents receive restricted rations and nobody takes care of the refugees. The black market is flourishing, the price of bread is high, although bread is obtainable and meat and vegetables can be had in plenty. If there was any possibility to return to Haifa, many would return there.22

This report, which was written on 10 May, shows us that contrary to the situation that prevailed during the first months of 1948 when food and supplies were relatively easy to obtain, the stream of refugees caused serious concern and a rise in the level of internal tension in the city. According to Bekhor Shitreet, Minister of Minorities, after the permanent residents of Nazareth, both Muslims and Christians, saw what had happened to their refugee brothers and their dismal state of near starvation, they opposed fighting against the Israeli army and brought 21 Report on the visit of the Minister of Minorities in Nazareth, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 308/44, General Nazareth Reports, 19 July 1948. 22 From the Golani Brigade to the General Staff Headquarters, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 1025/922/75, 10 May 1948.

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about the surrender of the city. In his view, it was the failure of Fawzi al-Qawuqji in the battle over Shajara on 12–14 July that apparently contributed considerably to their opposition. Shitreet says that on the day of the attack on the city, the mayor, Yusuf Bey al-Fahum, was called to the police building and met with 30–35 Syrian soldiers who asked his opinion whether the residents of the city were prepared to oppose the Israeli army and fight against them. According to him, the mayor refused to answer their question with the excuse that Nazareth could not protect itself. He was then requested by these soldiers to confirm this in writing, and did so.23 Shitreet’s words again show that Yusuf al-Fahum was once more prepared to assume full responsibility for the fate of the city, and even to give written confirmation that Nazareth was not capable of defending itself in view of the situation created in the country and in the northern regions. For him it was preferable to save the city from the fate of the other Arab cities in the Galilee, especially Safed and Tiberias that had been totally emptied of all their Arab residents, while Acre remained with only a small number of Arab Palestinian residents. Attack on the City and its Conquest Firstly, it should be said that the conquest of Nazareth and the surrounding villages was carried out in a wide operation called the ‘Dekel Campaign’. The commander of this campaign was Haim Laskov (Naor 1994: 218), and soldiers from three brigades participated in it: a) Forces from the First Regiment of the Carmeli Brigade (Commander of the Northern Front) under the command of Mordechai Maklef (Carmel 1949: 1–10). b) Forces from the First and Second Infantry Regiments, and the Ninth Armored Regiment of the Seventh Brigade under the command of Ben Dunkelman who was appointed commander of the Brigade from June 1948 (Dunkelman 1977: 172; Naor 1994: 111; Hadari 2004: 153). c) Three divisions of the Golani Brigade that had conquered Kafr M’alul and linked it with Kfar Hahoresh on the west side of Nazareth. (Israel Defence Forces 1959: 247–252; Pappe 2006: 154–159; Tal 2004: 334–339) From the composition of forces we learn that most of them were from the Seventh Brigade, and also that this was an extremely large force. If we compare it to the Arab forces of 500 fighters from all the 23 Report on the visit of the Minister of Minorities in Nazareth, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 308/44, General Nazareth Reports, 19 July 1948.

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different groupings, it is clear that the Israeli side enjoyed an overwhelming numerical superiority. As part of the preparations for the campaign, a week prior to the land attack, Israeli planes bombed the city from the air with the aim of hitting the police station that served as the base for the forces of the Rescue Army. During the bombing raids, the French hospital was hit and damage was caused to other buildings adjacent to it.24 Regarding the land operation itself, the conquest of the city of Nazareth preceded that of Shafa‘amr and its surroundings, and some areas to the west of Lower Galilee. Benny Morris notes that except for the conquest of Nazareth, the order given to the Israeli forces was to ‘completely root out the enemy from the villages around Nazareth’. According to him, there was some apprehension that Qawuqji was planning to attack Afula, and that it would be necessary to attack him before he did so (Morris 2008: 278). The conquest of Shafa‘amr began on 14 July 1948, and at the same time an attack was begun on the villages of Ma’lul and Mujeidel that lay close to Nazareth, and they were conquered on 15 July (Morris 2008: 280–281; Gelber 2000: 494; Dunkelman 1977: 170). IDF reports indicate that Arab opposition to the attack was weak, and the citizens began to flee from these two villages. On 15 July the infantry forces and the armored corps of the Seventh Brigade continued to advance towards Nazareth, and on 16 July, while the attack was being made on Nazareth, the conquest began of the villages of Saffuriya, Yafa, and ‘Ilut, and all the villages along the NazarethTiberias highway, Mt. Tabor and its environs.25 Control over the city necessitated control over the surrounding hills, especially the compound of the Schneller House in which the volunteer forces of Abu Ibrahim had installed themselves, as well as the police station building, which was large and well fortified. These locations not only provided good lookout positions but also firing positions that gave complete control over the city. In order to capture these hills it was necessary to take control over the villages of Saffuriya and ‘Ilut that barred access to Nazareth and the hills that circled the city. Here in the village of ‘Ilut a massacre took place during the conquest and afterwards. In 1945 the village had 1,310 inhabitants who remained in their village during the attack and after it, and surrendered without opposition. From IDF archival sources we learn that at the end of July searches were conducted in the village, 46 young men were arrested and led in an unknown direction. According to that same source, on 3 August 24 Information from Nazareth after its conquest, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 1/5205/49, 22 July 1948. 25 Comprehensive Report on the Dekel Campaign, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 56/1046/70, undated, pp.95–106. Israel Defence Forces (1959: 249).

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the slain bodies of some of these men were found by Arab shepherds in the mountains. The source also relates that on that same day 14 of the captives were murdered in the olive grove near the village of ‘Ilut in the presence of the villagers, including the women and children.26 On 4 September 1948 the deputy commander of the Golani Brigade, Nahum (Spiegel) Golan, wrote to the commander of the northern front, Moshe Carmel, about the massacre. Under the title: ‘Clarification of the facts concerning Nazareth and the surrounding villages’, he notes that: The Arab village of ‘Ilut in the vicinity of Nazareth was conquered in the morning of Friday, 16 July by units of the 13th Regiment after the opposition of the villagers and the foreigners that were in it. About 15 of the village inhabitants were killed during the battle, and the rest fled. After two days a patrol unit visited the village and warned those who had returned to the village that they should not be there. After a few days the village was attacked by our forces and both villagers and foreigners were found there who had been searched for by the Haganah intelligence services. Ten of the men who tried to escape during the search and identification process were shot and the rest were brought to the prison camp.27

Regarding the continuation of the attack on Nazareth, according to Israeli sources, because of the armored vehicles and canons held by the Arab side (ten in number),28 the attacking forces decided to make use of all the strong firepower they had in hand. They had precise information about the roads and the mined areas obtained from the Druze followers of Sheikh Salih Khnefis who had cooperated with them before and after the conquest of Shafa‘amr.29 According to the Israeli army’s publication: History of the War of Independence: ‘The conquest of Shfar’am [sic] by the IDF was coordinated with the representatives of the Druze living there. After an artillery barrage at the Muslim quarter, the IDF troops burst into the village on both sides . . . Muslim opposition was broken very quickly, and at dawn on 14 July Shfar’am was in our hands’ (Israel Defence Forces 1959; 249; Gelber 2000: 495–496). After completing the conquest of Shafa‘amr, the deployment of forces, and battle team preparation, the forces began to move. From a detailed report on the conquest of the city of Nazareth, the route of advance, and the composition of the Israeli forces, we learn that when these forces reached Point No. 17862361 on the west side of the 26 Personal letter from Nahum Golan, deputy commander of the Golani Brigade to the commander of the northern front, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 1/5205/49, 4 September 1948. 27 Ibid. 28 According to ‘Arif, there were six armored vehicles and two cannons. See: Al-‘Arif (n.d.: Vol. 3: 629). 29 Comprehensive Report on the Dekel Campaign, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 56/1046/70, undated, p. 96.

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city, six armored vehicles of the Rescue Army appeared and an exchange of fire began. The Israeli forces rapidly succeeded in neutralising the Rescue Army force, which then began to retreat northwards. The report goes on to describe the attack, saying that sniping shots came from all directions until an armored company was sent to take over one of the houses. A second company was sent to capture the Schneller House, after which some forces were dispatched with armed jeeps to break through the barriers set up in the city. This breakthrough was made under cover of two cannons placed at the northern entrance to Nazareth. The jeeps were also given the task of capturing the police station. When the obstacles were overcome and the forces reached the police station, they reported that it was abandoned. At about 16:18 hours the entire city was in the hands of the Israeli forces, the sporadic sniping lessened and then ceased completely. This means that no battle occurred in the city, but only an attack by the Israeli side and the retreat of the Arab forces accompanied only by light firing and sniper shots. Israeli sources also tell us that throughout the course of the ‘Dekel Campaign’ and until the conquest of Nazareth, the Israel side suffered one dead and two wounded, while on the Arab side there were more than 15 dead (besides the victims in ‘Ilut), some of them civilian. In addition, a number of Iraqi soldiers from the Rescue Army were taken captive by the Israeli forces, besides a variety of military equipment. During the conquest of the city itself, the Israeli side suffered no losses, only one soldier was wounded, and slight damage was caused to a number of jeeps that had burst into the city. Immediately after the conquest of the city, a general curfew was announced.30 At 18:25 hours the mayor appeared with a flag of surrender in his hand. At 20:40 hours approximately the headquarters of the Seventh Brigade informed the General Staff Headquarters that: ‘Nazareth is entirely in our hands’. At 22:00 hours the surrender agreement was signed. Special Attitude towards a Christian Holy City? Unlike the attitude shown towards other Palestinian Arab cities, the commanders of the forces that had conquered Nazareth seem to have displayed a different attitude towards this city. Even before the conquest, they took care to prepare the forces who took part in the attack. Instructions for a special attitude towards Nazareth came from the very highest level, from Ben-Gurion, who was then the Prime Minister and Defence Minister. In a letter that he sent on 15 July 1948 to Yigael Yadin, 30 Comprehensive Report on the Dekel Campaign, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 56/1046/70, undated, pp. 101–102.

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Chief of the Operations Division in the General Staff Headquarters, and to Moshe Carmel, Commander of the Northern Front, he wrote: If Nazareth is about to be conquered, you must prepare a special force, trustworthy and disciplined . . . and refrain from any possibility of plunder or desecration of monasteries and churches. Any attempt of plunder by our soldiers must be met with merciless fire. You must notify how you have carried out this instruction.31

Moshe Carmel was quick to obey the demands made by Ben-Gurion, and on 16 July, in the order of the day, he issued the following message to the forces participating in the conquest of Nazareth, giving strict instructions to abide by these demands and to preserve the holiness of the city: To the fighters attacking Nazareth, commanders and privates: You are now advancing towards the city of Nazareth, the city in which Qawuqji has placed his headquarters . . . the army of Qawuqji has been beaten and crushed by our units on the northern front. He has suffered heavy losses in Shajara and fled in panic, was beaten in Berwi and in Shfar’am, and ran away from our forces. The conquest of Ma’lul has driven him from his outposts overlooking the Jezreel valley. Our forces have continued to advance and defeat him, and we are now going to attack Nazareth where the remainders of the enemy in the city are disheartened and depressed. Strike them with force, and they will fall with the fallen. Commanders and privates: You are now about to enter the city . . . the cradle of Christianity, a city that is holy to many millions of people, and Christians throughout the world are turning their gaze upon you. There are numerous churches, monasteries and holy places. Our soldiers entering the city will fight fearlessly against the invaders and gangs if they find opposition, but will refrain altogether from desecrating holy places. Our soldiers will not enter churches, will not fight inside them or take fortified positions in them, except by necessity and special orders. No soldier will lay hands on any object in this city. The commander of this operation has received orders to take immediate measures again anyone who disobeys this instruction. Our soldiers are enlightened and civilised and will treat the religious sensibilities of others with respect and civility. Any person who behaves criminally will be put on trial immediately without hesitation and will suffer severe penalties. Forward! Strike at the enemy! Conquer Nazareth!32

It is interesting that, after taking full control over Nazareth, and in spite of what was written in Carmel’s missive, the battle headquarters of the Seventh Brigade sent an urgent telegram on 17 July to the General Staff Headquarters in which it informed them of the completed conquest of 31 From David Ben-Gurion to Yigael Yadin, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 1025/922/75, 15 July 1948; Morris (2008: 281). 32 From Moshe Carmel, Commander of the Northern Front to commanders and fighters, order of the day, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 1025/922/75, 16 July 1948.

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the city. But the most important subject in the telegram was the explicit question whether the residents of the city should be sent out of it or not. It also expressed the opinion that the residents should be expelled except for the religious clergy, as follows: From the battle headquarters of the Seventh Brigade to the General Staff Headquarters in Tel Aviv. Please notify immediately by urgent means whether the residents should be expelled from the city of Nazareth. In my opinion all of them should be expelled except for the religious clergy.33

It is interesting that on the back of the telegram Ben-Gurion wrote one sentence: ‘Do not expel people from Nazareth’, and signed it with his initials, D.B.G. The telegram was not signed with any particular name, but Benny Morris in dealing with this issue mentions three names in connection with it: Haim Laskov, the commander of ‘Operation Dekel’, Benjamin (Ben) Dunkelman (1913–1997), a Canadian Jewish officer who had served in the Canadian Army in the Second World War, who commanded the IDF Seventh Brigade, and Moshe Carmel, Commander of the IDF Northern Front. In the Hebrew edition of his book, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, Morris notes that Moshe Carmel was the one who issued the order. Morris writes that: Ben-Gurion claims that on July 17 Moshe Carmel issued an order to uproot all the residents of Nazareth, and according to him it was not clear whether Moshe Carmel meant to exile the population or merely wanted to evacuate the city . . . According to Ben-Gurion, the Commander of the Seventh Brigade, Ben Dunkelman, hesitated, and the Commander of the ‘Dekel Campaign’, Haim Laskov, asked the Defence Minister how to behave, and Ben-Gurion intervened in time and cancelled the order. (Morris 1997: 271)

In his work, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War, Morris notes that the order to expel the residents was given by Carmel and Laskov, and was sent to Colonel Ben Dunkelman who was at that time the military governor of the city. Dunkleman refused to carry out the order, and Laskov then sent Ben-Gurion that telegram demanding the expulsion of the residents, but was answered in the negative (Morris 2008: 282). From this we understand that Moshe Carmel at first accepted the request of Ben-Gurion, and demanded that his soldiers refrain from causing any harm to the holy city of Nazareth. But he then regretted this, and did the complete opposite when he issued an order to expel the residents. It was only the adamant demand of Ben Dunkleman that this action should first receive the consent of Ben-Gurion that changed 33 From the battle headquarters of the Seventh Brigade to the General Staff Headquarters in Tel Aviv, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 1025/922/75, 17 July 1948.

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the direction of developments. In this connection Hadari notes that the relations between Haim Laskov and Ben Dunkleman were tense. Dunkleman was given his command by the decision of Ben-Gurion and against the view of Yigael Yadin who wanted to appoint Laskov as Commander of the Seventh Brigade. Besides which, Laskov says that he used the headquarters of the Seventh Brigade as his own headquarters, claiming this was to avoid complications, and perhaps this annoyed Dunkleman (Hadari 2004: 153). As to what occurred in the city from the Arab viewpoint, this was described to me by ‘Atif al-Fahum, son of the mayor, Yusuf Bey al-Fahum. He also noted that no real battle took place in Nazareth, and that the Rescue Army retreated in a very orderly manner when the Israeli forces began to advance, and they informed the mayor of their retreat. On the other hand, the forces of Abu Ibrahim the Younger scattered in a disorderly fashion after their commander left his position in the Schneller Building, took a horse by force from a member of the al-Fahum family (Milad Amin al-Fahum) and left the city. During the attack of the Israeli forces, four civilian residents of the city were killed in isolated incidents. According to ‘Atif al-Fahum, the commander of the Israeli forces, who arrived in the city from the direction of the northern entrance, had preferred to wait before entering it. The army took control over the home of the Jiser family in which the qadi of the city, Sheikh Sa‘ad al-Din al-‘Alami, originally from Jerusalem, was then living. ‘Alami was asked to surrender in the name of the city, but he declined because he thought he did not have the right to sign the surrender since he was not a permanent resident of Nazareth. The army officers and the qadi then decided to send a messenger to the mayor and invite him to come to this same building. The messenger was called Jabir Salim Sayigh and he went to the mayor’s house to deliver the message. The mayor immediately went to his car, a Ford, and together with Salim they tied a white flag to a tall stick he took from his garden, and they both drove to the headquarters of Haim Laskov. During his journey the mayor’s car was attacked by an unidentified plane, but he was not hit, and continued towards Laskov’s headquarters. Here, he was received by Laskov and a number of officers who asked him to sign the document of surrender. He signed immediately, and declared that he accepted the Partition Plan and the 181 Resolution, meaning the UN Partition Resolution. Laskov requested that he take the document and obtain signatures from the other city leaders of all the communities. The mayor returned to the city center, made them sign, and returned the surrender form to Laskov.34 The surrender form included 11 paragraphs as follows: 34 Interview with ‘Atif al-Fahum, 27 August 2009.

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1. The city of Nazareth surrenders without conditions to the Israeli Armed Forces. 2. The military commander, Haim Laskov, who represents the Israeli Armed Forces and the Provisional Government of Israel, or whoever will be appointed by it, takes under his command the city of Nazareth at 21.15 hours on 16 July 1948. 3. All the soldiers, sergeants, and officers of the Arab army of all countries will be handed over to the military commander. 4. All weapons stores, ammunition, and any other kind of military equipment that is found in the possession of any individual or body will be transferred into the hands of the military commander. 5. In any instance of violation of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this document, the military commander will be authorised to impose the death penalty according to his personal decision. 6. The military commander pledges to protect the holy places, churches, monasteries and other sacred places in Christian tradition in the city of Nazareth and its environs. 7. The present mayor of Nazareth will continue to serve in his position as the elected head of the city council. 8. The mayor of the city will continue to conduct normal administration for the benefit of the citizens of Nazareth, and in all military matters he will conform to the orders of the military commander in the city. The military commander has the authority to determine what are military and what are civilian matters. 9. The Government of Israel represented by the military commander recognises the equal civil rights of all the residents of Nazareth together with all the citizens of Israel without prejudice of religion, race or language. 10. The representatives of the city of Nazareth who are signatories of this document take upon themselves full responsibility for carrying out the terms of this surrender in word and spirit. 11. The representatives of the Israeli Army and the Government of Israel who are signatories of this document take responsibility for fulfilling all its paragraphs. 12. Nazareth, 16-7-1948. 13. Undersigned are the representatives of Nazareth and signatories to this document: Yusuf al-Fahum, Ibrahim al-Fahum, Nakhla Bishara, Samuel Khamis 14. Undersigned are the representatives of the army and Israeli government and signatories to this document.35 35 Conditions of surrender of the city of Nazareth to the Israeli army, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 1025/922/75, 16 July 1948.

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From a review of the paragraphs in this surrender document we learn that it contained two main parts. In the first part, paragraphs 1–5 indicate unconditional surrender and the handing over of armed men, weapons stores, plunder etc. It is important to note that on the subject of plunder, Moshe Carmel instructed Haim Laskov to remove only military plunder from Nazareth. Carmel charged an administration officer of the front with the task of taking the plunder out of the city and distributing it among the various brigades. Carmel demanded that an organised list be drawn up of the plunder that had already been removed from the city.36 The second part is more important, and it determines that the holy places of Christianity, the churches and monasteries in the city, would be safeguarded, but without mentioning the places holy to Islam. In addition to this, there is the return of normal life, for which the mayor is required to continue serving in his capacity, and the clear declaration that the Israeli government recognises the principle of equal rights without prejudice of race, religion or language. It should be noted that in the city no irregular actions were recorded on the part of army men, and even the mayor expressed his satisfaction with the behavior of the army, mentioning only one case of the theft of 5 lira and 6 bottles of wine from the home of Yusuf al-Jena, brother of the deputy mayor, Najib al-Jena.37 The main additional question is that of the non-expulsion of the residents from the city. From the telegram that we saw earlier, we learn that Ben-Gurion was the one who decided the fate of the city on the Israeli side, and it was he who prevented the commanders in the field, Carmel and Laskov, from carrying out an expulsion of the residents. In my view, this was a very important order and, as far as I know, a rare one which proves that acts of expulsion and removal of Palestinians were carried out with Ben-Gurion’s consent or at least with his knowledge, and that in the case of Nazareth his position was adamant. The question is why did Ben-Gurion decide not to remove the residents of the city? In my opinion, the answer lies in the status of Nazareth as a holy city for the Christian world, and as we have seen prior to the attack on the city and its conquest, the commanders of the forces in their instructions lay stress on the need to preserve the holiness of the city. It is interesting that this sensitivity was not shown towards other Arab cities even though a large part of their population was Christian such as Haifa, Jaffa and the western parts of Jerusalem. If indeed the Christian factor played a part, the villages of Ma’lul and Mujeidel near Nazareth were inhabited by large 36 Moshe Carmel, Commander of the Northern Front, to Haim Laskov, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 1/5205/49, 17 July 1948. 37 Report on the visit of the Minister of Minorities in Nazareth, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 308/44, Nazareth General Reports, 19 July 1948.

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Christian populations, yet these populations nevertheless were expelled from their villages. On the question of the apparently different Zionist attitudes in 1948 towards Palestinian Arabs of the three faiths: Muslim, Christian and Druze, more research still needs to be carried out. However it may be said that in general the Druze community – whose notables collaborated closely with the Zionist leadership during the Mandatory period – was given special treatment by the Zionist forces; consequently not a single Druze village was uprooted or destroyed during 1948 War. However the picture regarding the fate of Christian villages and neighbourhoods is more complicated. By comparison with Muslim localities and neighbourhoods, the damage caused to Christian areas by Zionist attacks was less. More crucially, often the general Zionist attitudes towards the Palestinian Christian communities was less aggressive and in the (above-discussed) conquest of Shafa‘amr in Galilee there were clear instructions to the Jewish forces to attack the Muslim quarter and avoid causing damage to both Druze and Christian quarters in the town.38 Despite all that has been said above and the clear position of BenGurion concerning non-expulsion, I believe that the survival of Nazareth should be attributed to the mayor, Yusuf Bey al-Fahum, to the same degree as to Ben-Gurion. Although this statement seems exaggerated and perhaps naïve, yet a study of the material shows that this person did indeed take a personal initiative, and at the same time coordinated with the local commander of the Rescue Army who helped him to prevent the residents from leaving. The contribution of this man was to prevent the mass exodus of the residents before the Israeli attack. Yusuf decided adamantly and notified all the city residents that no one should abandon the city. He requested them not to panic about rumors of rape and injury to the honour of women.39 His energetic stand against some members of his family who favoured leaving Nazareth created a fait accompli for the Israeli authorities in entering a city where most of the inhabitants still remained and had also absorbed many refugees from the surrounding areas. It is difficult to decide which of the two factors determined the fate of Nazareth, and together with it, the fate of the many villages surrounding it. In my opinion the behaviour of Fahum and the city leaders was the first important step, while the decision of Ben-Gurion was a kind of concession to the situation, and was also due to his wish to appear before the Christian world as one who preserved the holiness of the city. But it may be assumed that if the city residents had left during the battle 38 IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 1046/70/56, pp. 96–97. 39 Report on the visit of the Minister of Minorities in Nazareth, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, File No. 308/44, Nazareth General Reports, 19 July 1948.

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or had submitted to pressures such as in the case of Acre and Tiberias, Ben-Gurion would not have regretted it. He would have received a city with the Christian presence consisting of foreign clergymen and monks without the Arab residents as is the situation today in Tiberias where only Christian sites were usually preserved, while the Arab population was expelled. In this connection, regarding the position of Ben-Gurion, Benny Morris mentions in a footnote that: ‘When Ben-Gurion visited Nazareth a few days after its conquest, he asked surprisingly: Why are there so many Arabs? Why didn’t you expel them? (Morris 1997: 509). This shows a certain regret about the instructions that were given earlier. After the surrender of the city, a new stage began in the history of the city of Nazareth, a stage no less difficult than the former one. From a city that had numbered 12,000 residents before the war, it now held 25,000 residents. From a city that had been economically wellestablished with a Christian majority, it had now become a city flooded with refugees who arrived there from all parts of the Galilee and even from Haifa. These refugees lived in the direst conditions. But in spite of the difficulties, Nazareth opened its arms to its people. The monasteries, churches, mosques, schools, hospitals, and even private homes took in the thousands of destitute refugees and offered them all the help they could give.40 Most of these refugees are still living in Nazareth today. This article does not intend to deal with the subject of the refugees in Nazareth and with the changes that occurred in it immediately after its conquest. The subject demands a separate study, yet in view of the events that occurred during the war we learn that it was the Israeli side that caused the greatest change in the social and communal conditions of Nazareth in 1948. Conclusion This article deals with the conquest of the city of Nazareth during the course of the ‘Dekel Campaign’ in the 1948 War. The article attempts to learn in depth and at the micro level what took place in this city that was one of the four important cities in the Galilee and the only one to survive the war nearly intact. This is therefore an exceptional case within the general picture of what took place in the 1948 war in the course of which scores of Arab settlements were conquered, their populations expelled, and the settlements themselves razed to the ground. The article shows that Nazareth was indeed unique, and the fate of the city was totally different from that other nearby Galilean cities, Tiberias, 40 On the situation in Nazareth after the conquest, see the reports of the Minister of Minorities, IDF and Ministry of Defence Archives, Nazareth file, General reports, No. Gimel-308/44, 18 July 1948 and 30 July 1948.

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Safed and Acre. It also shows that a combination of factors led to Nazareth being saved from a similar fate. Firstly, the presence of a determined and responsible leadership headed by the mayor, Yusuf Muhammad ‘Ali al-Fahum, who had personally experienced the lack of leadership during the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939. He exhibited an initiative and responsibility that few Palestinian mayors had shown during the 1948 War for Palestine. He simply did not rely on the national leadership of the Arab Higher Committee, nor trust the person who headed it, Haj Amin Husseini. Through his charismatic leadership he succeeded in maneuvering among all the factors until he brought his city to the shores of safety. It appears that in the situation of the total collapse of Palestinian leadership during the 1948 war and the leadership vacuum that was created, it was difficult to find leaders who could guide their people in surrendering after defeat. Surrender after defeat also demands leadership of no less courage than a fighting leadership, and only a handful of Arab leaders and mayors were prepared for this and to submit to the Israeli side that enjoyed outstanding superiority. This article also lays stress on a very central point – the expulsions in the 1948 war – showing that they were done in accordance with decisions agreed upon or with the knowledge of Prime Minister and Defence Minister Ben-Gurion. It is not true to say that they were carried out only at the initiative of commanders in the field. The case of Nazareth demonstrates that Ben-Gurion was capable at any moment of halting the process of expulsion or deportation, and that he did so in Nazareth out fear of antagonising the Christian world and because of the holiness of the city, and that he regretted this later on. In my opinion, the story of Nazareth illustrates once again the fact that research and writing about the history of the 1948 war both by the Arab and the Jewish side demands a profound study of Palestinian social history, especially the history of the social elites and notables who failed in leading their people at a time of crisis. Moreover, the history of the war should not be detached from the whole complex of events and developments that occurred during the Mandate period. There is an impression that few Arab leaders, including from the peripheral regions and in Galilee understood what was about to happen in the country, and that only a handful showed the initiative and courage to cope with the fateful crisis facing them and their people. References Al-‘Arif, ‘Arif (n.d. possibly 1958) Al-Nakba: Nakbat Bayt al-Maqdis wal-Firdaws al-Mafqud, 1947–1952 [The Catastrophe: The Catastrophe of Jerusalem and the Lost Paradise- 1947–52], 6 vols. (Sidon: Al-Maktaba al-‘Asriyya [Arabic]).

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Al-Hut, Bayan (1984) Al-Qiyadat wa al-Muassat al-Siyasiyya fi Filastin 1917–1948 (Acre: Dar al-Aswar [Arabic]). Carmel, Moshe (1949) Ma’arachot Tzafon [Northern Battles] (Tel Aviv: IDF-Ma‘arachot Press [Hebrew]). Dunkelman, Ben (1977) Dual Loyalty: Autobiography (Tel Aviv: Schocken [Hebrew]). Gelber, Yoav (2000) A Budding Fleur-de-Lis: Israeli Intelligence Services During the War of Independence, 1948–1949 (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence Press [Hebrew]). Hadari, Danny (2004) ‘War of Independence in the North’, in Alon Kadish (ed.), The War of Independence, 1948–1949: Renewed Discussion, Part I (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence Press [Hebrew]). Israel Defence Forces (IDF), General Staff History Branch (1959) Toldot Milhemet Hakomemiut [History of the War of Independence] (Tel Aviv: IDF-Ma‘arachot Press [Hebrew]). Morris, Benny (1987) The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). —(1997) The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949 (Tel Aviv: ‘Am ‘Oved [Hebrew]). —(2004) The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). —(2008) 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War (New Haven and London: Yale University Press). Naor, Mordechai (1994) (ed.), Lexicon of Defence Forces of the ‘Haganah’ (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence Press, 2nd ed. [Hebrew]). Pappe, Ilan (2004) A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). —(2006) The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Oxford: Oneworld Publications). Sayigh, Yezid (2000) Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Srouji, Elias (2003) Cyclamens from Galilee: Memoirs of a Physician from Nazareth (New York: I. Univers Inc). Tal, David (2004) War in Palestine 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy (London and New York: Routledge). Zua’iter, Akram (1992) Al-Haraka al-Wataniya al-Filastiniyya, 1935–1939 (Beirut: Muassat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya [Arabic]).

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