The Manual is ;now not only a much better book than it was, .... or again. "Seben
iiberhaupt als originar gebendes Bewusstsein welcher Art immer, ist die letzte ...
EDMUND HUSSERL, Jakrbuch
fur Philosophie, eta.
587
meaning, i.e. in having it we think of an object again in a way which does not correspond merely to the primary meaning of the immediate experience, but is due also to previous like experiences and the thoughts connected therewith. But the phrase " ideal construction " seems on the face of it to imply that by thinking we put the object together. The new paragraphs contain a warning against taking the term in its obvious sense. The process really consists rather in finding than in making : it is a "transition from the apprehension of the actual to the thought of the possible". Briefly, it is not construction at all, except perhaps on the side of immediate experience (image), but is the discovery of fresh possible variations of a universal or common nature already known. Need we then continue to call it construction? For instance, in the chapter on the external world as ideal construction, when Dr. Stout is considering our belief in the continued existence of things when unperceived, would he not do better to speak outright, with Hume, of supposing, concluding, inferring? For he has a right to these notions, whether or not Hume had. It is significant that the chapter on the Self is no longer headed 'The Self as Ideal Construction,' but 'The Self as Ideally Apprehended'. The changes in the remaining chapters are few and of minor importance. I feel that this review has dealt too often with trivial points, and that the great merits of this new edition have not been allowed sufficiently to shine through. Dr. Stout has revised, I do not say his principles, but at any rate his language, with extraordinary determination and care. The Manual is ;now not only a much better book than it was, it is in my opinion the best of the very few very good books on Psychology that have been written in modern times. T. LOVEDAY.
Jahrbuoh jii1· Philosophie und Phanomenologisohe Forsohung, in Gemeinschaft mit M. GEIGER, Miinchen; A. PFANDER, Miinchen ; A. REINACH, Gottingen ; M. ScHELER, Berlin ; herausgegeben von EDMUND HussERL. Erster Band. Halle a.d. S. : Verlag von Max Niemeyer. 1913. Pp. vii, 847. PROF. HussERL's essay entitled "Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und Phii.nomenologischen Philosophie," containing the :first of three "books'' in which he proposes to deal with his subject, stands in every sense in the foreground of this valuable J ahrbuoh, occupying 323 out of its 847 pages, and laying down the outlines of a science which he conceives to be new, and to be the prologue to a new philosophy. The contributions of his colleagues, dealing with particular applications of the doctrine which they hold in
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common, are however of considerable independent interest, and are also of great service in illustrating the contentions of the main theory, which demands, as Prof. Husserl frequently, insists, a. special effort and a special point of view. Phenomenology as here spoken of is "pure'' or "transcendental" Phenomenology. In one section-heading there is mention of Phenomenology of the Reason (Vernunft). But as a rule the word is accompanied by no genitive case. It is not, I suppose, the Phenomenology of Consciousness as Hegel's was that of Mind. It is rather Phenomenology par excellence, whose method however consists in considering the vital experiences (Erlebnisse) of consciousness in a certain way. I will try at once to indicate its fullest import, premising, however, that the author, in complaining of misrepresentation, lets us see that the expression ''descriptive Psychology'' had at one time, in the days of Logische Untersuchungen, been applied to it by himself. Then, as often happens, the phrase came to be used by others as a facile clue, after the author's views had far outstripped it. The new science, as he now conceives it, is in a way descriptive, but is not psychology. For Psychology is a science of facts, while Phenomenology is a science of essential connexions, and these not "real " ; not part of the world of things and events, as the objects of Psychology must be. Phenomenology, then, if I have understood it right, is the science of the essential connexions of vital experiences (Erlebnisse), as rooted in their nature or character ; not, for example, of their causal connexions as events in time. An elementary example is the truism that sound, essentially, is not colour; or, to cite what I judge to be a favourite instance-colour is essentially inseparable from extension. For the purpose of letting us "see'' these connexions and distinctions our consciousness, as the familiar instrument which we exploit in order to our orientation in the actual world, is replaced by a ''preparation " which I might call a " statutory" 1 consciousness, that is, a consciousness that has been treated according to certain rules. The purpose of these rules is to throw us into the phenomenological as contrasted with the "natural " focus or attitude (Einstellung) of our.minds. Their operation is to eliminate, to put out of court (ausschalten) all the existent realities which in the natural focus of the mind our consciousness perpetually presupposes or affirms. To eliminate them, that is, as affirmed realities; but not to eliminate from our purview the fact that they are affirmed. They are, we are told, to be "bracketed,''" put between quotation-marks". Or, they continue to be for us, but with a. change of sign. We study not themselves, but the character of 1 It is my own phrase, drawn from such a fact as that we in England have to return for taxation a " statutory " income, i.e. not what we actually :receive in twelve months, but an artificial figure, prepared according to certain directions.
EDMUND HUSSERL,
J ahrbuoh jilr Philosophie, eto.
589
the "Erlebnisse '' by which consciousness affirms them, and the fact that it does imply or "intend" them. All "transceudences" are in this way ruled out-that of the spatio-temporal world, of God, even of the truths of abstract logical science. Nothing is directly accepted but what is immanent in vital experience itself, as, for instance, in some degree, the " pure ego ''. What, then, is the procedure of the science, and what has it to discover? The procedure is "intuitive". Ratiocination, and especially metaphysical deduction or argument "from above," are altogether excluded; as again is experience or induction in the sense of inference from facts to facts. The "principle of principles " is thus stated, "Every originary dator intuition 1 is a source of justification (Rechtsquelle), of knowledge, and everything in the intuition which offers itself as originary · is simply to be accepted as it presents itself, but only in the limits in which it presents itself. This no conceivable theory can make us doubt" (p. 43.), or again "Seben iiberhaupt als originar gebendes Bewusstsein welcher Art immer, ist die letzte Rechtsquelle aller verniinftigen Behauptungen ''. (p. 36). (It is here that we find the noteworthy observation, " ein Sehen mit einen anderen Sehen streiten kann und ebenso eine rechtmassige Behauptung mit einen anderen ".) You can see, in short, essential characters and connexions, as you can see that 2 + 1 = 1 + 2 and that nothing can alter this. And, finally, though descriptive of essence, Phenomenology is not "exact ''. Exactness is a feature of some regions, but some are essentially inexact. Phenomenology is not a Mathematic of Erlebnisse. The author points out that similes (club-shaped, serrate, etc.) do the work e.g. of botany in a way in which geometry could not. , The use of similes is a marked feature of all the papers. And what sort of thing does the science hope to discover? by what sort of truths will it enrich our philosophical equipment ? Here it is of interest to adduce a note in Logische Unterschungen 2 which shows us pretty clearly that the author came to his doctrine by the road of descriptive pRychological consideration of the factors actually (reell) "lived" (erlebt) in conscious experience. Thus he would arrive at, e.g. the relation of colour and extension, or the necessity of the spatial modifications (Absohattungen) apart froi». 1 The introduction of a number of new technical terms, some, I almost think, new German words, is characteristic of the theory, which takes itself as a new point of departure. "Originar" (Gegebenheit, geben, gebender Akt, gebende Anschauung) applies always to the best source, e.g. to sense-perception as compared with memory or Einfiihlung. "Erschauen" is by definition (Log. Unt. ii., 386) "unmittelbar adaquat erfassen ". W esenserschauen is a favourite term. "Eidetisch" knowledge or truth is that founded in intuition of the Eidos or W esen. "Einstellung "=mental focus or attitude. 2 IP. Part i. 397.
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which no spatial perception is possible, and which are essentially inexhaustible ; while an erlebniss or feeling itself is what it is, and can be apprehended through no such aspects or modifications, due to changing points of view. But his conception (see not. cit.) subsequently enlarged itself to include not merely the factors directly" lived" in consciousness, but also their intentional significance; so that the climax and main emphasis of the present essay lies in the relations of noesis and noema-the insight into the "acts " by which the grades and structures of actual (reell) consciousness (noetic) build up correlative grades and structures of intentional objects (noematic) from single objects of sense-perception to things and values of every complexity. Thus the consideration of intentionality in all its. forms-not only in judgment but in will and feeling, plays the principal part in the work before us, and we find given in principle the foundations of the general sciences of values and of ethics. The order of the work is briefly this. The author first explains, in a short logical discussion, the relation of fact to essence, pointing out how essence is inseparable from fact, but sciences of essence in no way depend on sciences of fact; and he draws out the conception of abstract and concrete as dependent and independent being. On this follows an account of the meaning of "region " and category, making clear that the formal logical region of "objects-in-general " is not a superior genus to which all concrete regions are to be subordinated. A region is the highest genus of a. concrete-a system of laws or forms, such as that which geometry provides for a single character-spatiality-of things. Every character of a "thing" falls within a similar inclusive determination, and the system of these determinations is the " region " "thing". Following on this is the author's criticism of empiristic fallacies, claiming for his own view, we may presume as against the school of Mach, the title "Positivist"-" if that means adhering to originary apprehension "; while on the other side he condemns the idealistic confusion which treats " Evidenz '' as established by a peculiar feeling of necessity. Then, as a preliminary to explaining the Phenomenological attitude, he deals in a most valuable section with the relation of consciousness to natural reality, with the province of pure consciousness, and the phenomenological reductions of which we have already spoken. The treatment of the sensuous and "physical " thing in their respective relations to consciousness and to each other is of the highest value and sanity, and the criticism of the "sign" theory is particularly effective. "Even the higher transcendence of the physical thing," he concludes, "indicates no reaching-out beyond the world for consciousness." Space forbids our saying much of the author's doctrine of the primacy of consciousness as against the world of things. I imagine
EDMUND HUSSERL,
Jahrbuch jilr Philosophie, etc.
591
that in his startling sentence-" Ein absolute Realitat gilt genau so viel als ein rundes Viereck," the word Realitat indicates an aggregate of things and events-not.reality in the pregnant sense which other theories ascribe to it. The world, so construed, presupposes consciousness, as whose meaning alone it is-this I take to be the doctrine, and prima facie I have nothing against it. Of course, as the author insists, it is not Berkeleyan Idealism. After these discussions follows the theory of Intentionality, which has already been referred to, and a :final section on the Phenomenology of Reason, dealing mainly with the nature of Einsicht und Evidenz as grounds of" the verdict of reason". I am sensible that I have done very scanty justice to this remarkable paper. The fullness of its matter and the sanity and acuteness of its observations and distinctions merit for it ampler treatment than is possible in a review. The one word of criticism, or rather of speculative suggestion, which I shall venture to throw out, will come best after referring to the remaining contributions. In Dr. Pfii.nder's paper" Zur Psychologie des Gesinnungen,'' our difficulty, for which, of course, so far as it concerns the resources of our language, the author is in no way responsible, is to know exactly how we are to render the term Gesinnungen. I should have thought that the word implies something persistent, and the author seems to recognise such an implication in his distinction between "aktuelle Gesinnungen " ( = Gesinnungsregungen) and "virtual'' and again "habitual" Gesinnungen. But as he decides to make "actual" Gesinnungen (or Gesinnungsregungen) the immediate subject of his paper, he disconcerts our desire to recognise the distinction between, say, a "sentiment" as a persistent attitude or structure, and an " emotion " as a temporary reaction. This point bears also on his complete severance of Gesinnung from conation (Streben). No one would say, perhaps, that it is a conation ; but it is another thing to deny that it bears an essential relation to a persistent conative system. I should have wished to render the word Gesinnung by "sentiment " or " emotional disposition''. But the restriction to "aktuelle Gesinnung" forbids this, and must make the subject of the paper pretty nearly equivalent to emotion. The author methodically distinguishes it from thought and opinion, from conation and will, from pleasure and pain. But perhaps he hardly gives an adequate positive account of the kind of permanent system in which the temporary emotion has its source. Though the "actual" Gesinnu1tg, then, seems rather like an emotion, the author is more concerned with what we should call a personal sentiment. He is thinking mainly of such phenomena as love and hate; he does not seem to have in mind such emotions as fear, suspense, anxiety, regret, surprise, elation, which refer to situations rather than to personal objects; th~:mgh he recognises as objects of sentiment things, communities, and opinions. Thus he
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is really dealing with temporary emotions based on quasi-personal sentiment; and is enabled to lay down the principle that Gesinnungen fall into two opposite classes, positive and negative, of the types of love and hate. In describing the essence of Gesinnungen he has much recourse to similes, and expresses his agreement with Husserl's view of their value. Every positive Gesinnung is a centrifugal outpouring of feeling (Gefuhlsausstromung), favourable, uniting, affirming. Every negative Gesinnung is of the same type, but injurious, dividing, negating. This centrifugal "dreizinnig" relation is essential both for love and hate. And further, in every Gesinnung the subject is either superior, equal, or inferior to the object. "Is ''-for the subject may not feel so. A man, I suppose, may feel hi.mself above his wife, but his attitude may show that in earnest he accepts her as above him. The whole account is framed on the basis of personal relations, and is couched in language of this kind. The spirit and thoroughness of the attempt are excellent; and the fact that I cannot recognise the aptness of all the above descriptive phrases may be due to my defects rather than theirs. A st:riking conclusion to the paper is a discussion of spurious psychical phenomena, both in the way of sentiment and of thought. Thus it is maintained that a lie is not a mere form of words or mere use of a rejected idea; the liar, in a way, even inwardly maintains it. He is really angry and offended (I add) when it is denied. Max Scheler's paper "Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale W ertethik " seems to me a very excellent and original piece of work. It is impossible here to dwell on its elaborate and valuable detail. The general contention is clear from the title. The object is, while accepting as final Kant's condemnation of all Ethic depending on experience of consequences or on prescription of Ends (Erfolg- and Zweck-Ethik), to defend against him another conception of a " material" Ethic, namely, one resting on a theory of a priori values. Such a contention involves not only the rejection of Kant's formalism, but ohe complete overthrow of his inverted egoism and hedonism, and his general " Misstrauen," to use Herr Scheler's phrase, of nature and the world. For nature (including human nature), the author urges, is no "chaos," to be organised from without ; it is inherently organic. Throughout it is his aim to establish life and conation as authorities, so to speak, in their own right ; in which, in their original and pervading orientation, the sense of values is involved, and their hierarchy progressively revealed. Not that conation is disciplined and habituatea: by the experience of pleasurable results ; it is against all these ideas, against, one might say, all imposition of ends ~y the environment, that the author is desirous to protest. Values are implied in conation (Streben) ab initio/ the pursuit of pleasure is a. late and artificial phenomenon. The originality and wholeness
EDMUND RUSSERL,
Jahrbuch fur Philosophie, etc.
593
of life, as against the notion of a mere response to a physical environment, is what arouses the author's enthusiasm. If you take the sense-organs separately, and estimate their reactions under artificial co;nditions, you may get what you call " sensations," and then if you go on to compound the external world out of these, you arrive at the " philosophie-von Mach ". " U nd im gleichen Weise,'' he breaks out in a later passage, "sollen dann auch die W erte ' subjective Erscheinungen ' sein die 'eigentlich ' nur Namen fiir wechselnde Leibzustande (sinnliche Gefiihle) darstellen ". But the life-process, organism and environment are not there to produce sensation and feelings ; sensation and feeling are in the service of the unitary life-process which gradually differentiates its reactions, revealing the fullness of qualities which exist in themselves, and the realm of values. Values then are given, and given a priori, and in a hieralChy. It is a prejudice that only the sensuous can be given, or that relation, value, time and space, movement, and the rest, are constructed out of it; on the contrary, a pure sensation can never possibly be given. "The true seat of all values a priori is the cognition or vision of values which builds itself up in feeling, preference, ultimately in love and hate." The signs of higher rank in values are duration, absence of extension and divisibility, absence of being • founded ' on other values, depth of satisfaction, absence of dependence for appreciation on the persons or functions in which they are embodied. I must pass from this remarkable paper, with which I have great sympathy 1, although I cannot but think that it is involved in the ultimate difficulty which appears to me to apply to this whole mode of thought. Moritz Geiger, in his "Beitrage zur Phanomenologie des asthetischen Genusses" first examines Genuss in general, distinguishing it from pleasure, e.g. from su
