Education for Creative Potential

Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2003

Education for Creative Potential MARK A. RUNCO California State University, PO Box 6868, Fullerton, CA 92834, USA and the University of Hawaii, Hilo, HI USA

ABSTRACT One trend in the creativity literature is towards unambiguous expressions of talent. This trend follows from an interest in scientific rigour, but if we are interested in children, it is creative potential that is the primary concern, rather than unambiguous creative performance. Educators and others working with children should define creativity in very literal terms, as thinking or problem solving that involves the construction of new meaning. This in turn relies on personal interpretations, and these are personal and new for the individual, not on any larger scale. This approach is consistent with the educational premise ‘to understand is to invent’, and it allows educators to target self-expression. The emphasis is thus on the individual, the self. Equally significant for educators is that this view of creativity posits that creativity is widely distributed. A wide distribution is implied because virtually every individual has the mental capacity to construct the personal interpretations that are involved. Creativity is, then, something we can find in every child, not just the gifted or highly intelligent.

Key words: creative potential; divergent thinking; personal interpretations; problem discovery; unambiguous cases

INTRODUCTION Various trends have been identified in the creativity research. Feist & Runco (1993), for example, reported that the most commonly studied topics in creativity research were enhancement, education, problem-solving/incubation, social influences and personality. The following topics were out of favour in the research: therapy, free will, intuition, humour and brainstorming. One of the most important trends suggests that creativity research is becoming more rigorous. Rigour, in the scientific sense, specifically refers to objectivity, and this in turn indicates that there is more quality control, more agreement about techniques to ensure that empirical work is reliable and valid and less opportunity for bias and unjustified speculation. This may explain why some topics, such as free will and intuition, are not often studied (or the studies are not often published). The benefits of this rigour are numerous. It should lead to greater respect from the other sciences, draw support and pay off in proven applications. One presupposition of the objective view is that we need to be very certain about creativity. This in turn often leads to least ambiguous cases of creativity, for ISSN 0031-3831 print; ISSN 1430-1170 online/03/030317-08  2003 Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research DOI: 10.1080/0031383032000079272

318 M. A. Runco there we can be most certain. These cases are the most objective because everyone agrees upon them; no one questions the creativity of Michelangelo, Mozart, Mark Twain or other ‘unambiguous cases’ of creativity. However, there are a number of problems with this view. One reflects the possibility that creative expression is sometimes personal and not easily compared with normative standards. The creative efforts of children, for example, are often original and meaningful for youngsters but not in comparison with some larger norms. Clearly, when interested in children, it is creative potential that is the primary concern, rather than unambiguous creative performance. This line of thought can be further clarified by examining originality. Originality is without a doubt required for creativity, but an original idea or solution might lack the aesthetic appeal or adaptiveness that characterises truly creative ideas. Moreover, the originality (and adaptiveness, for that matter) of anything is most convincing when it is compared with objective standards. This suggests that ideas given by one child can or should be compared with his or her peers in order to determine originality. However, this of course brings us back to the problem of objectivity: if creativity is defined only against certain social standards, creative efforts must be expressed, shared and socially recognised, and this precludes much of the work of children. A child’s potentially creative work might very well be original and adaptive only for that individual child but unoriginal when compared with ideas or insights that other individuals have had. A child’s creativity can be quite personal. I have suggested that the view of creativity as manifest only in socially recognised performances requires something in addition to creativity. In particular, it requires expression and eventual recognition (Runco, 1995). I further proposed that it would be more realistic to clearly distinguish creativity and expression from each other. My own view is that creativity can be defined in terms of personal constructions and the requisite cognitive processes, and these processes should be considered separate from expressiveness to maintain precision within our language. In addition, parsimony is an important premise of the scientific method, and that too suggests that creation be kept distinct from expression and social recognition. In the context of testing, such separation is required for ‘discriminant validity’. Creativity can be defined in very literal terms. The basic idea is that any thinking or problem solving that involves the construction of new meaning is creative. That may sound contrary to theories of creativity which emphasise originality and usefulness, but there is no incompatibility if you keep in mind that a personal construction will likely be original and useful to that one individual. Many examples of this kind of personally meaningful construction can be found in the writings of Jean Piaget; one of his most accessible descriptions is his short book aptly titled To Understand is to Invent. Importantly, although Piaget described new understandings as constructions and structures, he did not use the term creativity. He looked to invention (which I am tying to creative insight) as required for personal and authentic understanding. Without invention, Piaget felt that the individual was simply memorising information, but not understanding it. The definition of creativity as construction of personal meaning is also consistent with the notion that creativity is a kind of self-expression and self-actualisation.

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Each of these concepts emphasises the individual, the self. Equally significant is the premise in each that creativity is widely distributed. A wide distribution is implied because virtually every individual has the mental capacity to construct personal interpretations. Runco (1992) and Torrance (2003), for example, each recently discussed the distribution of creativity in disadvantaged children. Creativity is often found in gifted children, of course, and only a wide distribution will include disadvantaged and gifted children. (Admittedly, there are different kinds of disadvantages and different kinds of giftedness, but that extends the distribution even further.) Creativity and the potential for self-actualisation are not just for the eminent. Some individuals are extremely unfortunate in their basic neurological endowments and some clinical populations have great difficulty tying their ideas to reality. Both presumably have low levels of creative potential. A difficulty being realistic will preclude creativity if we define it such that ideas must be original and adaptive, fitting or somehow appropriate. Unrealistic ideas are not adaptive. Still, an overwhelming portion of the population has a functional neuroanatomy and does focus on ideas that are tied to reality. In this light, the vast majority of the population has the potential to construct personal meaning. When an individual does this, it may be appropriate to acknowledge the individual’s creativity. It may be mundane and everyday creativity, but it can be creativity nonetheless. This brings us to additional support for the view of ‘personal creativity’ being outlined here. A great deal of evidence now suggests that creativity is not just found in professional fields, but is instead often apparent in the natural environment. This is everyday creativity (Runco & Richards, 1997). Richards et al. (2002) developed a measure that targets everyday creativity, but of most relevance here is that children are not professional artists, scientists and the like. If we acknowledge that creativity need not impress experts in a particular field, it is much easier to accept children’s original insights as creative, at least in the everyday domain and personal sense.

PROCESS VERSUS PRODUCT On the one hand, the theory of personal creativity is very different from existing theories of creativity. Many existing theories are, as noted above, focused on objective performances and achievements. They tend to be product oriented. The theory of personal creativity is, on the other hand, focused on the creative process and the mechanism that underlies creative behaviour. There are other notable differences between the theory of personal creativity and other existing theories (Runco, 1995), but this difference is especially important for our current purposes because it leads directly to educational implications. If creativity is defined in terms of objective performances and actual achievement, children (i.e. students) have a poor chance of being identified as creatively gifted. In other words, their creativity is often not impressive enough when compared with adult creative achievements. Children’s creativity is often only original in reference to personal norms and not outstanding when compared with eminent standards. We must recognise the creativ-

320 M. A. Runco ity of children and relegate adult norms or we will never be able to recognise children’s potential. If we are unable to recognise their potentials, we certainly will not be able to fulfil them. On the other hand, the theory of personal creativity is connected to certain other views of creativity and development. There is the parallel between this theory and that of Piaget, mentioned briefly above. A slightly more detailed examination with help to clarify my thinking about personal creativity, confirm its distinctiveness and suggest specific educational implications. In Piagetian terms, assimilation is the key to creative thinking. It is there that the individual takes liberties with information. No wonder Piaget felt that imaginative play was primarily assimilatory. I have several times described personal creativity as interpretive, but it can also be described as assimilatory. Along the same lines, it de-emphasises the cognitive structural changes that Piaget felt were the result of accommodation. These structural changes occur in the individual’s schema or conceptual network. Admittedly, structural changes may be related to certain kinds of creative insights, but they are the quick insights, the a-ha (Gruber, 1988), sudden recognition of a solution or piece to a puzzle. These are most often entirely convergent. Original interpretations are assimilatory, while convergent insights involve accommodation. Assimilation occurs when the individual changes information; accommodation occurs when the individual reorganises structures to take new information into account. Defining creativity in terms of an assimilatory process suggests that creativity can be facilitated in two ways. These might even work together as a kind of two-step enhancement effort. The first step follows from the fact that individuals assimilate only when there is intrinsic interest. A great deal has been made about intrinsic motivation in the creativity literature, and the theory of personal creativity would also give significant weight to intrinsic motives. An individual is likely to put the effort into assimilation only when the situation is in fact something he or she cares about. This may mean that educators must give students the opportunity for work on idiosyncratic topics. Or, perhaps more practically, educators should find intrinsically interesting aspects of every assignment; find what each individual student enjoys within history, mathematics, the language arts and so on. The second part of this enhancement effort follows from the fact that people only assimilate (and, perhaps, eventually adapt to) information which is just slightly ahead of their current functioning. Piaget’s theory suggests that individuals need to be cognitively stimulated, but just as you cannot work under an individual’s level of functioning, for they will get bored, so too must you avoid challenging them with problems which are too far ahead of their current functioning. This idea has been explored in a variety of theories which point to the need for careful scaffolding on the part of parents; the same thing would be true of educators. It is also been described as ‘the problem of the match’, the idea being that care must be taken to match curriculum and experiences optimally with an individuals current level of functioning. Runco & Sakamoto (1996) explored the role of optimal factors in the creative process. The list of optima is quite extensive; creativity seems to be inherently optimal (see Runco & Gaynor, 1993; Runco & Sakamoto, 1996; Runco,


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2001). Note that an optimal curriculum or assignment can only be defined for an individual and not for a group. A second theoretical parallel exists between operant (behavioural) theory and the theory of personal creativity. It too suggests something about education. I touched on several of these in Runco (2001b). Consider, in this regard, the possibility of adapting the concept of ‘shaping’ from learning theory. Shaping, also known as the ‘method of success of approximation’, is designed specifically to develop entirely new behaviors. It begins with one behavior and yet ends up with another (new) behavior. In behavioral terms, it adds a new operant to the individual’s repertoire. This is exactly what parents and educators need to do for children who have creativity potential but who are not yet actually performing in a creative fashion. The goal is for the children and students to learn to actually apply themselves and perform in an objectively creative and perhaps productive fashion. But actual creative performance is the end point, the ‘terminal behavior’, the behavioral goal. It is therefore possible to deal with behaviors before they exist—in other words to enhance potential and avoid relying on actual performance. … Shaping requires three things. First is that the adult reinforces a behavior that already exists in the child’s repertoire. Second is that the initial behavior must be related, in some functional fashion, to the terminal behavior. Third is that there is an effective reinforcer, something which does in fact encourage the child. If you have these three things, you can then move gradually, in a step by step fashion, successively more approximate to the terminal behavior. The child may actually construct something creative, rather than just thinking, once in a while, in an original manner. The child may complete creative projects rather than simply have original ideas. Educators may see children add to their portfolios; parents may hear their children be more self-expressive and find media which allows them to explore their own thinking. I went on the assure readers that shaping is just one example of enhancement and of the applicability of learning theory (see also Runco, 1993; Epstein, 1999; Stokes, 2003) and to point out that great care must be taken whenever reinforcers, rewards or other contingencies are applied to creativity. DISCUSSION At this point it would be useful to summarise the key points of the theory of personal creativity and to itemise the educational implications. A critical assumption is that everyone has creative potential. Creativity is not only characteristic of eminent geniuses nor even only of productive professionals. This follows from the notion that creative potential is a part of the basic human tendency to construct (personal) interpretations and assimilate information as we experience it. Everyone does that, and sometimes we can use these interpretive capacities to construct original insights. These may remain personal and simply help

322 M. A. Runco the individual to understand or appreciate his or her experience, or they may be shared, applied, elaborated and so on, in which case they may eventually become an objectively creative product or performance. However, in both cases, the beginning is a process that children and students use and which educators can target. Second, and perhaps more controversial, is the notion that children who are already performing in an unambiguously creative fashion do not need us as much as children whose potential is unfulfilled. Third, if the mechanism underlying creative potential is widely distributed, what may be needed most is the extracognitive capacity to maintain originality. I think ‘ego strength’ is the best label for this extracognitive requirement. The individual needs to resist pressures to conform in his or her thinking, to stand up for his or her own ideas. This will sometimes be contrary to socialisation pressures and it may be especially difficult around age 9–10. This is when children in the USA enter Grade 4 and apparently there is a tendency (around the world) for children to become the most conventional and conforming at that age. Runco (1999) and Runco & Charles (1995) summarised that research. I am not suggesting that all of our educational resources should be directed to enhanced ego strength. If we did, we might end up with a huge number of megalomanics! Recall here what was said above about optima. This is the fourth point in my summary: ego strength may be the most important of our educational foci and it is an area that is typically relegated, yet no doubt we should not take this too far. What a child really needs to learn is discretion. This will allow the child to know when to be original (and assimilate freely and draw from ego strength to stand by the result) and when to conform. Both are useful, though at different times. Fifth, creativity is a complex (Runco & Albert, 1990) and educators should also encourage the other contributions to the potential for creative thought. The two tier model of the creative process (Runco & Chand, 1995) implies my preferred list of these. This includes motivation (both intrinsic and extrinsic) and knowledge (both procedural and declarative) on one tier and problem finding (problem identification and problem definition), ideation (fluency, flexibility and originality) and judgment (evaluative and valuative) on the second tier. Ideation can be maximised by ensuring that students have the opportunity to think divergently, by modelling divergent thinking for them and by giving them incentives and very clear-cut reinforcement for their divergent thinking (Runco, 1991, Ch. X). Yet as Cropley (1990) and Runco (1992) have suggested, any educational efforts designed for divergent thinking should also include critical thinking and evaluative skills. As mentioned above, divergent thinking by itself does not lead to much; in fact, divergent thinking by itself might be indicative of psychosis or at least bizarre responding. Problem finding can also be encouraged in the classroom (Runco & Nemiro, 1994). Evaluative skills can be brought t into the classroom. Methods from aesthetic education (Rosenblatt & Winner, 1988) are presumably also applicable here. Certainly we cannot rely on traditional methods for enhancing ‘critical thinking’, given that critical thinking in that sense is very different from the appreciative evaluations necessary to recognise and explore original ideas.


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Interestingly, the need for discretion and judgment implies that brainstorming procedures should not be used in the classroom. I say this because brainstorming is predicated on the idea of postponing judgement. This is very clearly inconsistent with my argument that divergent thinking and judgemental or evaluative thinking must work together for true creative thinking. The two tier model should not be viewed or used as a stage model. Although stage models have their theoretical value (Wallas, 1926; Runco, 1994), the idea of distinct stages seemed to be unrealistic. What occurs in the real world is best described as interactive rather than moving from one stage to the next. Incidentally, the idea of interactions is important because components like divergent thinking have been tested very often in previous research, however, these are usually tests of main effects, i.e. the tests are usually of divergent thinking or problem finding or evaluation. Main effects can contribute negligibly to predictions of creative or gifted performances, while interactions can contribute significantly. In the case of divergent thinking, we may not have found too much in previous research, but this may be because we really need to test divergent thinking as it interacts with problem finding and evaluation. Ideal educational tasks may involve problem discovery (Runco & Nemiro, 1994), whereby the student has some input as to the focus of the activity. The degree of student input will probably vary; sometimes students may choose the domain, while other times there may be a need to cover a particular aspect of the curriculum and student input is limited to specific aspects within an assigned domain. When there is a need to cover history, students may be allowed to focus on a particular historical figure, just to name one example. Problem discovery tasks allow each individual student to have some say in the focus. Recall here what was said above about intrinsic interests. The theory of personal creativity also suggests that certain tasks and exercises can undermine creative potential. Some of these (i.e. those focusing on the expression or sharing of ideas) would be helpful, but not for creativity, for ego strength and for the personal aspects of creativity. Sharing may help with expression, collaboration and persuasion, each of which can be useful, but sharing can lead students toward conformity and away from personal interpretations. Again, the idea of optima would suggest a balanced curriculum. Much of this line of thought is untested. From an empirical point of view, it would be wonderful to validate each aspect of the model of personal creativity and each educational suggestion given above. Yet questions about predictive validity beg the question of a criterion for creative and gifted performance, and here we must be especially careful. I say this because too often objective measures are used as criteria. It is nice to be objective, to have validity for one’s claims, yet not if it means children whose creative skills are not yet expressed will be overlooked, not if it takes us to educational practice with which we fail to recognise potential. REFERENCES CROPLEY, A.J. (1990). More Ways Than One: fostering creativity. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

324 M. A. Runco EPSTEIN, R. (in press). Generativity theory as a theory of creativity. In M.A. RUNCO & R.S. ALBERT (Eds) Theories of Creativity (rev. ed.). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. FEIST, G. & RUNCO, M.A. (1993). Trends in the creativity literature: an analysis of research published in the Journal of Creative Behavior (1967–1989). Creativity Research Journal, 6, 271–286. GRUBER, H.E. (1981). On the relation between ‘aha’ experiences and the construction of ideas. History of Science, 19, 41–59. RICHARDS, R. et al. (2002). Everyday creativity. In M.A. RUNCO (Ed.) Creativity Research Handbook, Vol. 3. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. ROSENBLATT, E. & WINNER, E. (1988). The art of children’s drawings. Journal of Aesthetic Education, 22, 3–15. RUNCO, M.A. (Ed.) (1991). Divergent Thinking. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. RUNCO, M.A. (1992). Creativity as an Educational Objective for Disadvantaged Students. Storrs, CT: National Research Center on the Gifted and Talented. RUNCO, M.A. (1993). Operant theories of insight, originality, and creativity. American Behavioral Scientist, 37, 59–74. RUNCO, M.A. (1994). Conclusions regarding problem finding, problem solving, and creativity. In M.A. RUNCO (Ed.) Problem Finding, Problem Solving, and Creativity. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. RUNCO, M.A. (1995). Insight for creativity, expression for impact. Creativity Research Journal, 8, 377–390. RUNCO, M.A. (1996). Personal creativity: definition and developmental issues. New Directions for Child Development, Summer (72), 3–30. RUNCO, M.A. (1999). Developmental trends in creative potential and abilities. In M.A. RUNCO & S. PRITZKER (Eds) Encyclopedia of Creativity. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. RUNCO, M.A. (2001a). Creativity as optimal human functioning. In M. BLOOM (Ed.) Promoting Creativity across the Lifespan. Washington, DC: Child Welfare League of America. RUNCO, M.A. (2001b). Identifying and fulfilling creative potential. Understanding our Gifted, 13, 22–23. RUNCO, M.A. & ALBERT, R.S. (1990). Theories of Creativity. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. RUNCO, M.A. & CHAND, I. (1995). Cognition and creativity. Educational Psychology Review, 7, 243–267. RUNCO, M.A. & CHARLES, R. (1995). Developmental trends in creativity. In M.A. RUNCO (Ed.) Creativity Research Handbook, Vol. 1. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton. RUNCO, M.A. & GAYNOR, J.L.R. (1993). Creativity as optimal development. In J. BRZEZINSKI, S. DINUOVO, T. MAREK & T. MARUSZEWSKI (Eds) Creativity and Consciousness: philosophical and psychological dimensions. Amsterdam: Rodopi. RUNCO, M.A. & NEMIRO, J. (1994). Problem finding, creativity, and giftedness. Roeper Review, 16, 235–241. RUNCO, M.A. & RICHARDS, R. (Eds) (1998). Eminent Creativity, Everyday Creativity, and Health. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. RUNCO, M.A. & SAKAMOTO, S.O. (1996). Optimization as a guiding principle in research on creative problem solving. In T. HELSTRUP, G. KAUFMANN & K.H. TEIGEN (Eds) Problem Solving and Cognitive Processes: essays in honor of Kjell Raaheim. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget Vigmostad & Bjørke. STOKES, P. (2003). Learned variability levels: implications for creativity. Creativity Research Journal. TORRANCE, E.P. (2003). Talent among children who are economically disadvantaged or culturally different. In J. SMUTNY (Ed.) Designing and Developing Programs for Gifted Students. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. WALLAS, G. (1926). The Art of Thought. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.