EFFECT OF ECONOMIC SELF-INTEREST AND POLITICAL ...

EFFECT OF ECONOMIC SELF-INTEREST AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION ON COLORADO’S PROPOSITION 105 Howard G. Ling University of North Carolina at Pembroke Gaye Acikdilli Baskent University ABSTRACT Genetically modified foods (GM) have been included in the food chain in the United States for almost three decades. The nations of the European Union, as well as several other countries, have adopted a policy of mandatory labeling of GM ingredients in food, while the United States has followed a policy of voluntary disclosure. Colorado Proposition 105 called for the implementation of mandatory labeling of food with GM ingredients for sale in the state. This paper assesses the literature regarding national policies toward GM food labeling in the United States and other nations. It compares the favorable and negative arguments about GM labeling. The results of the 2014 referendum in Colorado are examined as to the economic selfinterest in the form of median household income and agricultural intensity affecting the outcome of the election. Additionally, the political orientation centered on health-related concerns, environmental concerns, and the rights of consumers to product information in relation to the Colorado Proposition 105 were tested. A multiple regression analysis strongly suggests the impact of these independent variables on the election outcome. The implications for policy changes regarding mandatory GM food labeling in the United States are explored. Keywords: GMO Labeling, Colorado Proposition 105, Economic Self Interest, Political Orientation

INTRODUCTION The process of genetic modification, defined as “any change to the heritable traits of an organism achieved by intentional manipulation” (Health Canada, 2015), has been debated within the mass media and in scientific journals ever since genetically modified organisms (GMO) were first introduced, with US Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) approval in 1982, to manufacture insulin utilizing recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology for medical use (Quianzon, 2012). Genetically modified (GM) food is defined as “food containing, consisting of or produced from GMOs” (Official Journal of EU, 2003). The first commercial GM crops were planted in the United States and Canada in 1990. The first GM commercial release of a licensed GM food for human consumption was a tomato in 1994 by Calgene, a California company. Their “Flavr Savr” tomato included a gene that stops a protein causing softening, and appeared in grocery stores with promises of a longer shelf life and delayed ripening (Xu, 2016). Mass production GMO crops started in the mid-1990s with 1.7 million hectares (4.2 million acres) and reached 170.3 million hectares (421 million acres) in 2012 (Korkut & Soysal, 2013). As of 2012, the top five largest GMO production countries (as measured by hectares cultivated) were the US (69.5 million), Brazil (36.6 million), Argentina (23.9 million), Canada (11.8 million), and India (10.8 million) (Carroll, 2016). More significantly, the adoption of GMO crop production in US reached 40.8% in 2012, and has been increasing as GMOs may offer International Journal of Business and Public Administration, Volume 13, Number 2, Winter 2016

63

insect resistance and herbicide tolerance. Similarly, the greater use of GM in food and food products has intensified the controversies surrounding GMOs. The importance of food and the need to fulfill human and livestock nutritional requirements ensures that the debate will continue to attract interest. In turn, the controversy about the genetic modification of food has created differing views regarding labeling policies for GM foods. These disputes, together with a relatively low level of public understanding and consumer awareness, has brought about divisions in labeling policies between proponents and opponents of GM foods, including governments, corporations, and activist groups (Ho, Vermeer, & Zhao, 2006). Underlying the divide in the debate is that the primary objective of GM labeling is to provide consumer information, not food safety (Gruere & Rao, 2007). The rationales supporting the provision of consumer information differ depending on the type of regulation adopted. For example, whether GM food labeling supports the principle of consumer autonomy (McKay, White, & Veeman, 2007) that is usually associated with product labeling (Siip & Uusitalo, 2011). Labeling policies focused on the production process are supported by the belief that purchase decisions are based not only on the actual product related issues, but also on environmental, religious, or ethical concerns (Gruere & Rao, 2007). National policies regarding GM food labeling fall into one of two camps: mandatory labeling of GM products or voluntary labeling of non-GM products. The most common illustration of labeling of non-GM products is the use of designations such as “natural” or “organic”. The US and Canada have adopted a policy of voluntary labeling of non-GM products while China, Australia, the European Union, Russia, Japan, and Turkey have endorsed the mandatory labeling of GM products (Gruere, Carter, & Farzin, 2009). Colorado Proposition 105 represented a recent and substantial challenge to US policy regarding GM food labeling. It followed the 2012 referendum in California, and together with a simultaneous ballot measure in Oregon, was another electoral-based challenge to GM food labeling policy. The measure mandated that all processed foods that contain GM ingredients sold at retail in Colorado would be labeled. In addition, all raw fruits and vegetables with genetically modified origins would also be labeled either on the packaging or shelving where the product would be displayed. Proposition 105 offered several prominent exceptions to the mandate, including prepared foods sold at retail establishments or in restaurants, alcoholic beverages, and all meats, poultry, and dairy foods (Colorado Secretary of State, 2014). In the November 4, 2014 election, Proposition 105 was defeated by a statewide margin of 55.5% against and 34.5% for. A total of 694,738 Colorado voters supported the measure while 1,317,288 were opposed. This paper analyzes the results of the Colorado election at the county level and attempts to determine if political orientation and economic self-interest played a role in the outcome. It builds on the initial exploratory reviews of the California referendum by one of the current coauthors (Ling & Lakatos, 2013). This presentation consists of five components. The first part of the literature review summarizes the scope of global trends in government-mandated GM food labeling policies while the second offers a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of mandatory GM food labeling policies. The third section examines the content of Colorado Proposition 105 followed by an analysis of the 2014 election results to determine the research question of effect of political orientation and economic self-interest. Finally, the paper discusses the implications of Proposition 105 for policies on the labeling of GM foods.

64

International Journal of Business and Public Administration, Volume 13, Number 2, Winter 2016

Trends in GMO Labeling Policy The prevailing divide regarding GM food labeling policy between those countries that require mandatory labeling and those that have adopted a voluntary labeling policy originated with the initial commercialization of GM food technology in the early and mid-1990s. Since then, more than 40 countries adopted labeling requirements for GM food. Their policies largely reflect the opening positions of two key players: the United States and the European Union (Gruere, Carter, & Farzin 2009). The main international biosafety regulations over GM food include the “Environmental Release of Organisms Regarding Voluntary Instructions” (1991) by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), “Plant Biotechnology Directive” (1991) and “Agenda 21” (1992) by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); “Biosafety Manual” (1997) by the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), as well as the UN Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2003) that was prepared by United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to guide the creation biosafety capacity in developing countries (Korkut & Soysal, 2013). Labeling of GMO-containing products is on an entirely voluntary basis in the US, according to the Food and Drug Administration’s policies in 1992 (Pollan, 2012). On the other hand, organic products labeling, which are inherently non-GMO, is stringently regulated by US authorities and utilizes a standardized “Certified Organic” seal for identification (Wunderlich, Gatto & Vecchione, 2016). Canadian policy regarding GM food labeling evolved along similar lines, with no requirements for the labeling of foods containing GM ingredients, but voluntary labeling of non-GM foods is allowed (Gruere, Carter, & Farzin, 2008). The net effect of this approach is a marketplace where GM foods are widely available, yet awareness on the part of consumers that their food has been genetically modified is relatively low (Premanandh, 2011). GM labeling evolved completely differently in the European Union (EU). Labeling is used as the basis for stringent restrictions on imports of GMO foods for protecting European consumers and farmers. Unlike the US, the EU adopted a relatively cautious stance regarding the emerging GM food technology and implemented a moratorium on the production and distribution of new GM products coupled with a mandatory requirement that existing GM food products be labeled (Carlsson, Frykblom, & Lagerkvist, 2007). By 1997, any food prepared from GMO had to be so labeled in the EU (Carroll, 2016; Lucht, 2015). Mandatory labeling in the EU applies to foods that either contain or consist of GMOs or are produced from or contain ingredients produced from GMOs, whether sold to final consumers or restaurants and commercial kitchens (Official Journal of EU, 2003). This was essentially a ban on the distribution of new GM foods within the EU, as well as serving a challenge to the practices of the major importers of GM-based grains and crops into the EU. The US, together with Canada and Argentina, filed a complaint against the EU with the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2003. This action claimed that the EU moratorium on newly developed GM products was a violation of previous free trade agreements and amounted to an illegal restraint of trade. The WTO determined the EU imposed a de facto restriction by way of GMO labeling and was an obstacle to free trade (Korkut & Soysal, 2013). In a parallel action following their principles, the EU members and more than 170 nations, signed and ratified the International Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, which was activated in 2003. The EU then deregulated from labeling any foods containing material that contains, consists of, or is produced from GMOs in a proportion no higher than 0.9% (in France 0.1%) of the food ingredients considered individually International Journal of Business and Public Administration, Volume 13, Number 2, Winter 2016

65

or food consisting of a single ingredient, provided that this presence is adventitious or technically unavoidable (Official Journal of EU, 2003). The EU also adopted a process governing the introduction of new GM food products. Approval must first be obtained from the European Commission in consultation with the European Food Safety Authority. If accepted, the new GM food product is then subject to confirmation by a committee of national experts and their respective environmental ministers. If an endorsement is not achieved, the process reverts back to the European Commission for a decision. However, this is not an ultimate conclusion because each EU country can over-rule the decision of the European Commission and institute a ban on a national basis (Carlsson, Frykblom, & Lagerkvist, 2007). The effect of these procedures in conjunction with mandatory labeling policy has resulted in an almost nonexistence of GM food products in EU’s retail marketplace (Siipi & Uusitalo, 2011). A mandatory GMO labeling policy emerged between 2001 and 2004 in Australia, Russia, and many other nations, that mirror those of the EU (Gruere, Carter, & Farzin, 2009; Carroll, 2016). However, the mandatory labeling regulations vary in regard to proportions of GMO. For example, the product ingredients of GMO should be higher than 0.9% in Israel, Russia, and Turkey; 5% in Japan, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Thailand; 3% in South Korea; 2% in Norway and 1% in China, Brazil, Switzerland, Australia, and New Zealand (Korkut & Soysal, 2013). Many researchers have noted the relationship between GM food labeling policies and international trade patterns. Gruere, Carter, & Farzin (2009) reported that major producers of GM crops tend to have less stringent labeling policies more closely resembling the policies of the US and Canada, while major importers of agricultural products tend to have more stringent labeling policies. Developing countries such as Turkey did not have any regulations related to agricultural biotechnology in force until 2009, and imports of transgenic commodities entered Turkey without hindrance. On October 26, 2009, the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs published a regulation covering biotechnology in food and feed. The total value of US transgenic crops exported to Turkey in 2008, including cotton, corn, soy and their derivatives, was valued at more than $1 billion, while the EU is the main export market for Turkey (Nelson, 2009). Consequently, major exporters of agricultural products to the EU have a higher probability of adopting mandatory GM food labeling practices. For example, many African and other developing nations, concerned with both the potential health risks to their own populations and the risks of losing access to valuable European markets, have similarly sought to restrict GMOs, with Zambia going so far as to categorically reject GMO-containing food aid. Other African countries, including Zambia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Egypt, and Ghana, have instituted strict regulations, restricting, or outright banning GMOs (Carroll, 2015). Countries in Asia appear to be following a similar pattern as the EU. Japan was an early adopter of mandatory GM labeling policies. This was in response to pressure and activism by consumer and farming groups. As of 2001, all food products were required to be assessed for GM content before entering the Japanese marketplace and GM labeling is mandatory (Kim & Boyd, 2006). Japan is a major food importer and its consequent trade patterns in agricultural products have resulted in GM labeling throughout much of Asia. Countries such as Azerbaijan, China, Japan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam have adopted GM labeling policies, whether mandatory or voluntary (Gruere, Carter, & Farzin, 2009).

66


Support for GMO Labeling The arguments in favor of mandatory GM food labeling are largely centered on health of human and environmental concerns, as well as on the rights of consumers to product information. The controversy in Europe, causing store shelves to be free of GM foods (Knight, Mather, & Holdsworth, 2005), arose from consumer fear of the potential negative long-term impacts on human and animal health, as well as on the environment. From a health perspective, GM foods spark concern over safety, altered nutritional quality, and the possible creation of new viruses and toxins (Azadi & Ho, 2009). Criticisms of the labeling requirements include that its benefits are over exaggerated and there is no proof of the actual safety of these foods. Concerns regarding GM corn rapidly spread in 2013 article in a mass-market magazine, about the small change in the proteins of genetically modified corn “provoking a multisystemic disorder marked by the overproduction of a type of white blood cell called eosinophil” (Murray, 2016). The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations claims that among the negative impacts that have held back the wide use of genetically modified foods, and an important argument against GMOs, is uncertainty about genetics and mutations. Unknown effects could potentially endanger both the environment and human health. For example, when herbicide resistant crop mutations get passed on to weeds, making them also resistant to being killed. However, research has made scientists divided and the results remain speculative. These debates over the benefits and safety of GMOs persist, among consumers, academicians, and policy-makers (Xu, 2016). According to Murray (2016), research shows that the increased risk of hidden food allergens, transferrable through genetic engineering, is one of the strongest consumer concerns for labeling foods with GMO ingredients. Opponents of GM food manufacture and cultivation, as well as farmers, relay several concerns related to the potential negative impacts on the environment (Azadi & Ho, 2009). Azadi and Ho (2009) state that GM food opponents fear the loss of biodiversity and the possible extinction of natural plants. Other fears include the rise of secondary pests, the increased probability of cross-pollination and/or unintentional gene transfer due to spatial contamination (i.e. lack of sufficient farming acreage dedicated to GM food farming), difficulty accessing seeds given patenting of GM food plants, and the risk of GM plants themselves migrating to non-GM cultivated areas. In response to claims about safety risks, GM food producers emphasize that GM crops can only be grown after extensive testing and approval, and therefore, do not present a safety issue for humans, animals, or the environment (Premanandh, 2011). In countries with mandatory labeling requirements, GM food producers find themselves criticized by activist groups who launch negative campaigns targeting GM foods and the retailers carrying them. As a result, companies have found it less risky to avoid GM ingredients altogether. This creates a first mover disadvantage, in which a company seeking to market a GM product faces tougher competition from its rivals and high hurdles with consumers (Carter & Gruere, 2003). GM labeling is assumed to maintain customers freedom of choice to decide to buy products based on GM ingredients, or avoid them. Most of the consumers seek labeling of GM foods while shopping. Consumer demands to know what is in their food has resulted in over 60 countries requiring some form of labeling when food is made with GMOs, and more than 20 US states have proposed legislation initiatives to require labeling, paving the way for states to model aspects of the EU regime and require labeling of GMOs (Murray, 2016). Research on the demand of GM food products in US is increasing. Wunderlich, Gatto, and Vecchione (2016) International Journal of Business and Public Administration, Volume 13, Number 2, Winter 2016

67

studied Northern New Jersey and analyzed both consumers and supermarket representatives as to their knowledge of GM-containing foods, awareness of labeling, and the impact of labeling on purchasing behavior. They found a moderate relationship between customers’ knowledge and purchasing behavior of non-GMO foods. They found that supermarket about 53% of supermarket representatives believed that the presence of non-GMO labeling influenced all consumer behavior. According to Lucht (2015) the lack of GM food products labels on the market preserves a preexisting negative attitude of customer acceptance products. Thus, retailers want to avoid negative publicity from environmental activists and other protests against GM food products that send “gene detectives” into supermarkets to look for GM labels. While approaches to GM food risk management have promise, the outcomes in the EU and other nations suggest that GM food labeling may not be the best solution to provide consumer choice because it actually takes away from the options available to consumers. GM producers and retailers have experienced losses in sales as a result of the negative reputation of GM foods (Gruere & Rao, 2007) despite the absence of convincing evidence that GM foods are harmful to humans or the environment. Chang (2007) found that total product market share decreased by 2% after the imposition of GM labeling in China. Moreover, labeling results in an additional cost of up to 30% owing to segregation and identity preservation requirements, as well as the expensive genetic testing to ensure labeling thresholds (Premanandh, 2011). Furthermore, testing and detection methods suffer from limitations, including deficiencies in reporting on certain types of food components that inhibits reliable disclosure of GM ingredients. In addition, sample testing of larger masses has proven unrepresentative (Weighardt, 2006), thereby, creating more uncertainty and confusion over GM foods. Opposition to GMO Labeling The arguments against mandatory labeling of GM foods are largely based on the decrease of consumer food options, higher consumer costs, inefficiencies in the international trade of food and agricultural products, as well as the higher costs of regulation and compliance. While promoting consumer choice through information was the goal of mandatory GM food labeling policies in regions such as the EU and Japan, these policies have unintentionally resulted in the disappearance of labeled GM food in the marketplace (Gruere & Rao, 2007). This outcome stems from the controversy over GM food in the EU, as well as consumer perceptions concerning GM food (Knight, Mather, & Holdsworth, 2005). In turn, European food processors and retailers avoid using GM ingredients (Kalaitzandonakes, 2004; Kalaitzandonakes & Bijman, 2003) to reduce their risk of loss in market share due to consumers’ negative attitudes toward GM foods. Therefore, more than 60 GM crops are authorized for import into the EU as food or feed, and almost no labeled GM food products are found on grocery shelves in most EU countries (Lucht, 2015). In sharp contrast, the Food and Consumer Products Manufacturers of Canada (FCPMC) estimated that about 60% of the food products on retail shelves in US contain GM ingredients and 60 to 70% in the entire North America market. Although the FDA has not enacted regulations, US companies such as Gerber, Frito-Lay, McCain Foods, and McDonalds have recently decided not to “purchase any foods made with genetically altered seeds” (Murray, 2016). Consumers in Canada and the US, while showing a relatively strong consensus favoring GM food labeling, continue to be unaware of the products that contain GM ingredients because labeling requirements remain voluntary (Premanandh, 68


2011). Moreover, according to Lucht (2015), a minority of European consumers buys correctly labeled GM food in their ordinary shopping. While the barriers to GM food market introduction and penetration are high, some researchers assert that proper education and training about GM foods can overcome those hurdles, not only in farming and production, but also in supplying consumers with information to make knowledgeable purchases and decisions about consumption (Azadi & Ho, 2009). Education should address the safety concerns of GM foods and the probable advantages GM would have on food security, especially for small-scale farming in developing countries (Azadi & Ho, 2009; Wisniewski, et al, 2002). Similarly, Xu (2016) found that individuals with higher income and education are likely to be in favor of environmental ballot measures. The study indicated that individuals with degrees in education and business, or employment in agriculture, typically to oppose labeling legislation, while workers in health care, food services, and public administration are likely to support new GM requirements according to analysis of the California Proposition 37 voting (Xu, 2016). Potential benefits of GM foods include the improving nutritional value and food quality, higher crop yields, and lower overall costs of production given reduced need for chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Furthermore, GM foods have been shown to strengthen drought/frost/salt/pH resistance, abbreviate growing duration, and extend the shelf life of food products, as well as increase the variety of food available while providing stability in anticipated crop yields. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (2015), biotechnology can drastically change a farmer’s annual crop by making it less susceptible to weeds, pests, and plant diseases while keeping the production costs low. The USDA estimates that biotechnology is now used to produce 88% of corn, 94% of cotton, and 93% of soybeans (Xu, 2016). According to the USDA, genetic engineering has been studied and tested to ensure that all modifications pose no significant risk to consumers (Xu, 2016). Moreover, genetic engineering can increase a farmer’s yield and could be the key to feeding the world’s growing population (Xu, 2016). Azadi and Ho (2009) emphasize that the potential benefits of GM food technology are pervasive, particularly in developing countries where hunger and crop consistency are larger issues than in developed countries. However, the introduction of GM crops in developing countries has been met with resistance. Farmers in developing countries tend to be reluctant to use new technology because benefits are not always immediately apparent. Farmers often express resistance when there is uncertainty about product suitability. There are questions if GM products could lessen the problems farmers face with drought, crop stability, and pests. According to Azadi and Ho (2009), successful introduction of GM food technology in developing (and in developed) countries requires a focus on education and training, as well as for the GM solutions accurately address the problems at hand. The US and Canada had a head start in GM agriculture, but the developing nations are catching up. Korkut and Soysal (2013) reported that GMO production growth rate in developing countries was 11% with 8.7 million hectares, compared to that of the developed nations with only a 3% growth rate and 1.6 million hectares under cultivation. In 2012, a total of 28 countries were producing GMO, with only eight being developed countries ranked in order of production: the US, Canada, Australia, Spain, Portugal, Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia (Korkut & Soysal, 2013). The potential benefits of GM food technology are jeopardized by the lack of international consensus for GM food labeling, in turn leading to non-compliance by competing countries. This has caused unfair cost advantages in international markets (Souza, Rugimbana, Quazi & Nanere, 2008). Some studies warn that mandatory labeling will act as a trade import barrier and International Journal of Business and Public Administration, Volume 13, Number 2, Winter 2016

69

ultimately curtailing the widespread adoption of GM food crops (Carter & Gruere, 2003). Moreover, international trade disputes have risen, particularly between the US and EU because of their contrasting GMO labeling policies (Souza, et al, 2008). There is evidence that regulation and compliance with GMO labeling increases costs. For example, introducing Mandatory Labeling of GM food in California after the November 2012 referendum had a fiscal impact by increasing the annual state government costs by almost $1 million to monitor and regulate GMO labeling (Xu, 2016). COLORADO’S PROPOSITION 105 According Colorado Secretary of State website, Proposition 105 would explicitly require the regulation of genetically modified foods sold at retail locations such as grocery stores, but not at restaurants. More importantly, the measure would require processed foods produced entirely or in part with genetically engineered technology be labeled with the words “Partially Produced with Genetic Engineering” or “May be Partially Produced with Genetic Engineering”. Proposition 105 also required that raw foods such as fruits and vegetables with GM origins contain the label “Genetically Engineered” on the packaging or if there is no packaging the mandatory label must appear on the shelf where the item is displayed. Furthermore, for each product that is not labeled as GM, a retailer generally must be able to document why that product is exempt from labeling. The measure proposed that there are two primary ways a retailer could document that a product is exempt. First, by obtaining a sworn statement from the provider of the product (such as a wholesaler) indicating that the product has not been intentionally or knowingly genetically engineered. Secondly, exemption could be obtained by receiving independent certification that the product does not contain GM ingredients. Other entities throughout the food supply chain (such as farmers and food manufacturers) would also be responsible for maintaining these records (Colorado Secretary of State, 2014). Proposition 105 included several prominent exemptions. For example, alcoholic beverages such as wine and beer, restaurant meals, as well as other prepared foods to be eaten immediately, would not have to be labeled. Animal products that were not directly produced through genetic engineering, such as beef, dairy products, and poultry, would also be exempted, regardless of whether the animal had been fed GM crops (Colorado Secretary of State, 2014). Unlike the 2012 California Proposition 37, Colorado Proposition 105 offered a single mode of enforcement: regulation by the Colorado Department of Public Health. The election was characterized by large expenditures by the major food and agriculture firms. Major corporations, such as Monsanto, Kraft, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, and General Mills, invested approximately $7.6 million in the effort to defeat Proposition 105. Opponents of the mandatory labeling provision argued that passage of the measure would result in higher economic costs that in turn would be passed on to consumers. The results of a study commissioned by opponents estimated that passage would result in a $400 increase in food cost for the average household (Wall Street Journal, 2012). Media coverage of the mandatory GM labeling issue was extensive and editorial opinion was largely against passage of the measure. For example, The Denver Post editorial described it as “a badly flawed measure that will hurt Colorado farmers and food producers without providing any health benefit to consumers... The world’s prestigious scientific bodies are in overwhelming agreement that GMO food poses no greater health risk than food created through traditional breeding...” (Denver Post, 2016) The Post Independent also editorialized against 70


passage of the measure: “Those who want food without GMOs — and we don’t have room to discuss the likelihood of accuracy on labels — should lobby the federal government to require such labels. And they should immediately work to build demand for food that is voluntarily labeled as such — something that won’t lead to lawsuits and won’t cost taxpayers money or put Colorado farmers at risk. Food labeled USDA organic is barred from including GMOs. If the demand is there, companies will make more labeled non-GMO products. This is a vote you should make with your grocery cart.” (Post Independent, 2014). Proposition 105 was defeated by a statewide margin of 65.5% (1,317,288 ballots) to 34.5% (694,738 ballots) that supported the measure. Figure 1 below provides a county map of Colorado. Results by county from the voting are available in column 7 of Table 1. Figure 1 County Map of Colorado

Traditionally more “conservative” counties such as Cheyenne, Crowley, Kiowa, Jackson, and Logan are far more reliant on agriculture and were strongly opposed to Proposition 105 (Colorado Secretary of State, 2014). Given this reliance on agriculture, the following hypothesis is presented. H1a: Agricultural intensity is associated with negative attitudes toward Proposition 105. Another dimension of economic self-interest can be conceptualized in terms of the widely cited cost of $400 per household associated with the implementation of mandatory GM food labeling. Given the estimated cost of mandatory labeling and its effect on median household budgets, the following hypothesis is proposed. H1b: Median household income is positively associated with support for Proposition 105.


71

Conceptually, the results of the November 4, 2014 election would suggest that traditionally “liberal” and more urban counties such as Adams, Denver, El Paso, Boulder, Arapahoe, and Jefferson, would strongly support the measure to make GM labeling mandatory. Conceptualized as a formal hypothesis, this study seeks to determine if a political orientation centered on health-related concerns, environmental concerns, and the rights of consumers to product information led to positive attitudes toward Proposition 105. H2: Political orientation centered on health-related concerns, environmental concerns, and the rights of consumers to product information is associated with favorable attitudes toward the measure. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS The first hypothesis, H1a, states that agricultural intensity is associated with negative attitudes toward Proposition 105. To test this hypothesis, the available results for agricultural production on a county-by-county basis were compiled utilizing the data from the Colorado Agricultural Products Market Value Statistics Review (2012). The results, expressed in $1,000 increments, are stated in column 2 of Table 1. Per capita agricultural production was calculated utilizing the demographical statistics from the latest census (Colorado Counties by Population, 2014) and is displayed in column 4 of Table 1. This index of per capita agricultural production was chosen as a surrogate for economic self-interest at the county level. An analysis of correlation was then conducted between the measure of economic selfinterest and county-by-county favorable attitudes toward to Proposition 105 (Table 1). The correlation coefficient is an index number constrained to fall between -1.0 and +1.0 and the strength of the association is communicated by the absolute size of the measure. In this case, the correlation coefficient was found to be -0.620 indicating a substantial negative association. The statistical significance of the correlation coefficient was found to be highly significant at the 0.01 level is reported in Table 2. According to the results, agricultural intensity is negatively associated with attitude toward Proposition 105; consequently support for H1a is found. In column 5 of Table 1, other variables of economic self-interest, the median household income for 2010 was used to test the hypothesis H1b. A correlation coefficient of hypothesis of H1b is 0.426 with significance at the 0.01 level. Therefore, median household income was found to be positively associated with favorable attitudes toward to Proposition 105. The results provide support for H1b. To test the hypothesis H2, the 2012 presidential elections results (Colorado Secretary of State, 2012) were used as a surrogate for political orientation. In column 6 of Table 1, the results of the election are portrayed in terms of “liberal” political orientation, i.e., the percentage of the vote on a county-by-county basis for the Democratic Presidential candidate, Barack Obama. In a similar fashion to the preceding analysis, a correlation analysis was then conducted. The results of this analysis indicated a correlation coefficient of 0.798 with significance at the 0.01 level. Consequently, the political orientation variable was found to have a very high correlation with voting behavior on the GM labeling measure, suggesting support for H2.

72


Table 1 Agricultural Intensity, Household Income and Political Orientation of Colorado 1 - County Adams Alamosa Arapahoe Archuleta Baca Bent Boulder Broomfield Chaffee Cheyenne Clear Creek Conejos Costilla Crowley Custer Delta Denver* Dolores Douglas Eagle El Paso Elbert Fremont Garfield Gilpin Grand Gunnison Hinsdale Huerfano Jackson Jefferson Kiowa Kit Carson La Plata Lake Larimer Las Animas Lincoln Logan Mesa Mineral Moffat Montezuma Montrose Morgan Otero Ouray Park Phillips Pitkin Prowers Pueblo

2 - Agricultural Production (in $1,000) 116,464 92,528 31,659 15,495 125,299 70,794 33,883 1,537 9,618 87,084 343 42,743 28,965 161,485 8,193 55,639 10,083 13,653 7,938 43,902 44,961 21,207 22,670 165 13,506 12,986 712 11,256 23,601 9,099 96,066 499,775 24,991 862 128,647 28,431 75,567 566,903 84,582 89 26,994 46,371 103,221 615,319 144,235 4,274 7,745 208,006 2,962 318,249 51,091

3Population 480,718 16,177 618,821 12,244 3,645 5,630 313,333 62,138 18,363 1,871 9,187 8,265 3,568 5,360 4,361 29,870 663,862 1,978 314,638 52,921 663,519 24,195 46,502 57,461 5,851 14,546 15,725 786 6,462 1,396 558,503 1,402 8,072 53,989 7,357 324,122 14,052 5,510 22,524 148,255 698 12,928 25,772 40,873 28,328 18,488 4,629 16,345 4,363 17,626 12,034 161,875

4 - Per Capita Agricultural Production 242.27 5,719.73 51.16 1,265.52 6,940.74 12,574.42 108.14 24.74 523.77 46,544.09 37.34 5,171.57 8,117.99 30,127.80 1,878.70 1,862.71 5,097.57 43.39 150.00 66.17 1,858.28 456.04 394.53 28.20 928.50 825.82 905.85 1,741.88 16,906.16 16.29 68,520.68 61,914.64 462.89 117.17 396.91 2,023.27 13,714.52 25,168.84 570.52 127.51 2,088.03 1,799.28 2,525.41 21,721.23 7,801.55 923.31 473.85 47,674.99 168.05 26,445.82 315.62

5 - Median Household Income 54,666 35,935 58,719 56,068 36,017 36,412 64,839 75,590 42,941 47,125 60,426 33,627 24,388 38,189 39,909 40,451 45,501 43,058 99,198 71,337 78,958 56,268 37,847 64,902 58,036 60,433 49,356 74,659 30,058 37,222 66,075 40,089 41,678 41,103 56,422 56,447 38,134 41,616 40,961 52,067 53,438 53,587 44,103 46,590 43,111 34,142 58,393 64,098 44,084 64,502 33,969 40,699

6 - Liberal Political Orientation % 57.11 56.75 53.90 39.78 22.17 41.97 69.69 51.76 48.61 15.74 54.31 53.96 72.95 35.62 31.97 29.02 73.59 26.83 36.35 56.43 38.54 25.41 32.84 46.32 56.68 45.00 58.20 38.17 52.58 25.47 51.21 14.37 22.64 53.07 60.49 51.47 50.20 24.14 29.72 32.69 44.77 21.56 36.87 30.49 36.30 44.52 51.41 41.23 25.96 67.98 31.24 55.85

7 - Voted Yes % on Prop 105 30.16 30.56 32.18 40.35 16.69 18.18 48.90 33.73 38.15 14.41 38.81 25.88 36.62 18.71 29.37 26.37 43.15 25.21 30.40 49.34 35.24 24.40 29.57 40.90 39.54 32.85 47.05 40.62 32.04 16.32 31.94 9.83 10.13 55.23 38.11 34.39 31.66 11.58 12.63 24.51 30.34 21.95 38.83 25.12 14.24 21.97 43.62 33.96 10.88 62.65 14.88 31.24


73

Rio Blanco 24,412 6,707 3,639.78 Rio Grande 106,491 11,607 9,174.72 Routt 46,460 23,865 1,946.78 Saguache 109,988 6,196 17,751.45 San Juan* 720 San Miguel 4,737 7,840 604.21 Sedgwick 101,263 2,348 43,127.34 Summit* 29,404 Teller 1,254 23,389 53.61 Washington 220,713 4,780 46,174.27 Weld 1,860,718 277,670 6,701.18 Yuma 1,150,344 10,202 112,756.71 * Data of the agricultural production of these counties are not available.

57,992 39,871 60,876 30,430 43,783 66,399 37,625 68,750 58,080 39,735 55,596 42,114

16.86 44.79 56.67 63.61 52.57 70.30 31.32 61.04 32.32 18.06 42.33 21.56

18.95 24.69 40.64 45.39 47.07 65.64 16.35 46.46 37.01 10.84 24.18 10.11

3 -.518** .178 1 .798**

4 -.620** .426** .798** 1

Table 2 Correlation of Measures 1 1 -.345** -.518** -.620**

1. Agricultural Intensity 2. Household Income 3. Political Orientation 4. Voting Yes on Prop 105

2 -.345** 1 .178 .426**

**p < 0.01

Table 3 Multiple Regression Analysis R2 .746

Model Agricultural Intensity Household Income Political Orientation * p < 0.05

F 58.857

Beta -.199 .241 .652

Sig. 0.000** .015* .001** .000**

**p < 0.01

A regression analysis was conducted utilizing the three independent variables of agrıcultural intensity, median household income, and political orientation. The results are reported in Table 3. The dependent variable in column 7 of Table 1 was favorable attitude toward the mandatory labeling of GM food as called for in Proposition 105 election (Colorado Secretary of State, 2014). The adjusted R Square indicates that the strength of the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable is 0.746, indicating that a linear relationship is present. The ANOVA F is 58.857 with a highly significant (p