75
Impersonal Pronouns in Scandinavian and Romance1 Verner Egerland Department of Romance Languages, Lund May 2003
Abstract Impersonal pronouns such as man in Mainland Scandinavian, on in French or si in Italian appear to have some crucial properties in common. In particular, there are four major facts that need to be accounted for: (a) impersonal expressions with these pronouns are compatible with both plural and singular agreement depending on context; (b) the same pronouns are open for both generic and arbitrary interpretations; (c) in contexts with specific time reference, the arbitrary interpretation of these pronouns is excluded if the predicate is ergative or passive; (d) these pronouns cannot be syntactic objects. Firstly, it will be shown that these pronouns are generally different from other impersonal expressions, such as generic you or Icelandic maður, with regard to these properties. Secondly, it will be argued that the listed properties indeed cluster for principled reasons. The argument is that certain syntactic patterns relate to the lexical φ-feature specification of impersonal pronouns. Developing on some recent approaches, I will argue that Swedish man, French on, and Italian si radically lack a φ-feature specification, i.e. are inherently void of lexical content.
1.
Introduction
The pronominal subject man ‘man’, ‘one’, in Swedish can be associated to two impersonal readings, illustrated in (1a-b):2
1
For native judgements and interesting discussions on this and related topics, I am grateful to Jóhanna Barddal, Roberta D’Alessandro, Rose-Marie Déchaine, Cecilia Falk, Paul Hirschbühler, José Masullo, Halldór Sigurðsson, Michal Starke, Sten Vikner, and the audiences of Grammatikseminariet in Lund (2001), the Linguistic seminar in Padova (2002) and the Incontro di grammatica generativa in Urbino (2003). For useful criticism on an earlier version of this paper I am indebted to Christer Platzack. All remaining errors are my own. 2 Impersonal subjects may be quite difficult to translate literally and, for the purposes of this paper, I have chosen not to. Throughout the discussion, the relevant pronominal elements are not translated in the English glosses.
76 (1) a. Man måste arbeta till 65. MAN must work until 65 ‘people have to work until the age of 65’ b. Man arbetade i två månader för att lösa problemet. MAN worked for two months to solve the problem ‘some people / they worked for two months to solve …’ In an example such as (1a), under the salient reading, man denotes a quasi-universal set of individuals, and is roughly equivalent to ‘people’ (in some cases ‘everyone’ or ‘anyone’). In a sentence with a specific time reference as in (1b), man refers to a non-specific group of individuals, close to ‘some people’, unspecified ‘they’, or ‘someone’. Henceforth, the usage of man in (1a) will be called generic, and that of (1b) arbitrary. Now consider (2): (2) I går på eftermiddagen blev man avskedad. yesterday afternoon was MAN fired ‘yesterday afternoon I was fired’ In (2), the subject, man, has the specific reading of 1st person singular, ‘I’: (2) means that I myself was fired yesterday. I will call this usage the specific one.3 4 Alternations in meaning such as those illustrated in (1)-(2), and similar ones, are cross-linguistically attested (cf. the seminal work of Cinque 1988 and, more recently, D’Alessandro & Alexiadou 2003b). Interestingly, they are known to be highly idiosyncratic and context-dependent on the one hand, while on the other they obey to some quite fundamental and presumably universal principles of language. The present work intends to contribute to our understanding of this interaction between pragmatic usage and syntactic principles. The languages taken into
3 Traditionally, this latter usage has been considered substandard and not all speakers are inclined to accept it. For some, the usage of man for ‘I’ has the flavour of modesty, a communicative strategy to avoid the 1st person singular pronoun when the speaker does not wish to emerge as the focus of attention. This could perhaps be advanced as the historical origin of the construction, but as an explanation of its syntactic properties it is far from satisfactory, as we shall see. For many speakers the usage in question no longer has any particular stylistic implications. For further discussion on Swedish man, the reader is referred to Andersson (1972) and Teleman et al. (1999). 4 The reader should note that my definitions differ from some previous studies on this topic. In the literature, the term arbitrary sometimes refers to a class of pronouns, sometimes to particular readings associated to such pronouns, though not always the one in question here (cf. for a couple of examples, Cinque 1988 and Krifka et al. 1995, 124).
77 consideration are, primarily, Swedish, Icelandic, French, and Italian. To some limited extent, comparison will be made with Danish and Spanish. The discussion is organised as follows: in section 2, I start with presenting a number of empirical facts concerning impersonal pronouns. In the analysis in section 3, I will formulate, as a working hypothesis, that impersonal pronouns are not endowed with any inherent phi-feature specification, thereby developing on previous proposals that have been made in the literature (e.g. van Gelderen 1997; Rivero 2000). My claim is that a considerable part of systematic cross-linguistic variation follows from this supposedly lexical property of pronouns. In sections 4-6 the discussion is extended to issues of diachronic change and variation.
2.
Some Empirical Observations on Impersonal Pronouns
Under 2.1.-2.3. I will list some properties of impersonal pronouns that the following analysis in section 3 intends to account for. 2.1
Agreement Patterns
In the unmarked cases, Swedish man triggers singular agreement on an adjectival predicate in a copular construction as in (3) (Swedish finite verbs do not show morphological agreement): (3)
Sw.
När man är ung, … when MAN is young[sg.]… ‘when people are young…’
However, agreement patterns in such environments are somewhat elastic. Plural agreement becomes acceptable in cases like (4a-b) where context strongly favours a plural reading:5
5
There may be disagreement among speakers as for the acceptability of plural agreement in single examples. Still, plural agreement is not uncommon in usage: (i) Man är naturligtvis inom den kinesiska armén stolta över att ha utbildat en så känd person. MAN is of course within the Chinese army proud[pl.] of having educated such a famous person (“Den dansande översten”: Swedish Television 1, 2 January 2003) (ii) Svenskarna väl medvetna om att man kan vara utsatta för psykologisk krigföring. Swedes well aware that MAN may be exposed[pl.] to psychological warfare (Sydsvenska Dagbladet, p. A5, 28 March 2003)
78
Swedish: (4) a. Trots bevisföringen in spite of the evidence var man inte helt övertygad/övertygade om hans skuld. was MAN not completely convinced[sg.]/convinced[pl.] about his guilt ‘in spite of the evidence, people/they were not convinced…’ b. Om man inte är gift/gifta if MAN is not married[sg.]/married[pl.] måste man ha skilda rum på detta hotell. must MAN have separate rooms in this hotel (5) a. Inom armén är man stolt/stolta över henne. within the army is MAN proud[sg.]/proud[pl.] of her ‘people in the army/they are proud of her’ b. I Sverige kräver man att få avgöra detta själv/själva. in Sweden demands MAN to decide this self[sg.]/self[pl.] ‘in Sweden people want to decide this on their/our own’ The equivalent Icelandic form maður appears to be different from Swedish man with regard to agreement patterns. My Icelandic informants reject the plural variants of (6)-(7): Icelandic: (6) a. Þrátt fyrir sannanirnar in spite of the evidence var maður ekki alveg sannfærður/*sannfærðir was MAÐUR not completely convinced[sg.]/convinced[pl.] b. Ef maður er ekki giftur/*giftir... if MAÐUR is not married[sg.]/married[pl.]
um sekt hans. about guilt his
(7) a. Í hernum er maður stoltur/*stoltir af henni. in the army is MAÐUR proud[sg.]/proud[pl.] of her b. Á Íslandi verður maður ad fá að ákveða þetta sjálfur/*sjálfir. on Iceland demands MAÐUR to decide this self[sg.]/self[pl.] Thus, adjectival agreement patterns, suggest that Swedish man and Icelandic maður differ with regard to phi-feature specification.
79 Turning to Romance, it is a well-known fact that impersonal pronouns such as Italian si and French on are to some extent compatible with variations in agreement. In the unmarked case, Italian si requires singular agreement on the copula but plural (masculine) agreement on the adjective, as in (8) (e.g. Manzini 1986; Rizzi 1986; Cinque 1988): Italian: (8) Quando si è giovani, … when SI is[sg.] young[pl. masc.]… ‘when people are young …’ If, however, Italian si refers to a group of women, adjectival agreement may be feminine plural as in (9a). If the predicate is nominal as in (9b), si is compatible with singular agreement ((9a-b) from Salvi 1991, 237; also cf. Rizzi 1986, 506 f.n. 3):6 (9) a. Quando si è donne, when SI is[sg.] women, si è disposte a rinunciare a molte cose per i propri figli. SI is ready[pl. fem.] to renounce to many things for the children b. Quando si è il presidente degli Stati Uniti, … when SI is[sg.] the president[sg.] of the U.S., … French on normally triggers singular agreement in the copular construction (10). French: (10) Quand on est jeune… when ON is[sg.] young[sg.]… However, on is known to be compatible with other kinds of agreement, as for instance in (11a-b) ((11a) from Le Petit Robert; Rey & Rey-Debove 1984; (11b) from Grevisse 1980, 907): (11) a. Quand on est belles, … when ON is[sg.] beautiful[pl. fem.] … b. À nos âges, on a besoin d’être soignés. in our age, ON has[sg.] need to be taken[pl.] care of
6 Also, see Rivero (2000) for a similar observation for Spanish.
80 (11a) is well-formed if the subject is pragmatically understood as feminine plural. (11b) as well presupposes a plural reading. As in Italian, the finite copula (11a) and auxiliary have (11b) are invariably 3rd person singular. Consider for a moment the impersonal usage of the 2nd person singular ‘you’, attested in all of the languages in question. Impersonal ‘you’ is invariably singular and second person, witness (12)-(14): (12) Sw. (13) It. (14) Fr.
*Om du är gifta, … If you[generic] are married[pl.], … *Quando sei giovani, … when (you[generic]) are[2nd sg.] young[pl.], … *Quand tu es belles, … when you[generic] are[2nd sg.] beautiful[pl. fem.], …
In this regard, Icelandic maður seems to have some similarity with generic you, rather than with a historically closely related element such as Swedish man. To summarise our first empirical observation: Swedish man, Italian si, and French on are all to some extent compatible with variations in adjectival and (nonfinite) verbal agreement patterns. Impersonal you and Icelandic maður do not tolerate such variations. 2.2
Generic and Arbitrary Readings
Swedish man, Italian si, and French on are compatible with generic readings, as for instance in the sentences (15)-(17): (15) Sw. (16) It. (17) Fr.
Man måste arbeta till 65. MAN must work until 65 Si deve lavorare fino all’età di 65 anni. SI has to work until the age of 65 years On doit travailler jusqu'à l’âge de 65 ans. ON has to work until the age of 65 years ‘people have to work until the age of 65’
81 In a context with a specific time reference, man, on, and si may take on arbitrary readings.7 In (18)-(20), the impersonal subjects may correspond to ‘someone’, ‘some people’ or unspecified ‘they’: (18) Sw. (19) It. (20) Fr.
Man arbetade i två månader för att lösa problemet. MAN worked for two months to solve the problem Si è lavorato per due mesi per risolvere il problema. SI has worked for two months to solve the problem On a travaillé pendant deux mois pour résoudre le problème. ON has worked for two months to solve the problem ‘(some) people / they worked for two months…’
Icelandic impersonal maður is limited to a generic usage and cannot be interpreted arbitrarily. In this sense, maður shows a similarity with impersonal ‘you’. That is to say, (21)-(22) are both acceptable with a generic reading. In the episodic contexts of (23)-(24), maður is unacceptable and du ‘you’ takes on its specific 2nd person reading:8 (21) Ic. (22) Sw.
Maður vinnur til 65 ára aldurs. MAÐUR works until 65 years age Du arbetar till 65. you work until the age of 65 ‘people have to work until the age of 65’
(23) Ic. (24) Sw.
*Maður hefur unnið að því í tvo mánuði að leysa vandamálið. MAÐUR has worked for two months to solve the problem *Du har arbetat i två månader för att lösa problemet. you have worked for two months to solve the problem Intended reading of (23)-(24): ‘(Some) people have worked …’
7
In this paper, I will refer to “specific time reference” though, actually, it may be argued that the discriminating factor is properly spelled out in terms of perfective aspect (cf. D’Alessandro & Alexiadou 2003b; Egerland 2003). 8 Henceforth, generic ‘you’ will be exemplified only in Swedish. To my knowledge, there are no relevant differences between the languages as for the 2nd person singular in these contexts. Also note that (23) is ungrammatical in standard Icelandic under the relevant reading. See further section 6.
82 The conclusion is that Swedish man, French on, and Italian si may be either arbitrary or generic, whereas Icelandic maður and impersonal ‘you’ (cross-linguistically) may only be generic. Judging from our observations so far, there is a first generalisation to be captured: (25) Generalisation I (1st version) Impersonal pronouns that tolerate variations in agreement patterns are compatible with an arbitrary interpretation (man, on, and si). Impersonal pronouns that do not tolerate such agreement variations are exclusively generic (maður and you). 2.3
Arbitrary Readings and Events
Limiting the discussion to those pronouns that can have an arbitrary reading (man, on, and si), interesting differences related to the kind of predicate that is used emerge. Before proceeding, recall that Swedish man is also compatible with a specific reading, to wit, the 1st person singular (as shown in example (2) in the introduction). Likewise, Italian si and French on are easily interpreted as 1st person plural. This reading is sometimes referred to as the ‘inclusive’ one.9 Now consider the Swedish examples (26a-d) (henceforth, arbitrary and specific are abbreviated as Arb and Spec): Swedish: (26) a. I går klockan fem grep man den skyldige. Transitive (Arb/Spec) yesterday at five caught MAN the culprit b. Man arbetade i två månader för att lösa problemet. Unergative (Arb/Spec) MAN worked for two months to solve the problem c. I går på eftermiddagen kom man fram i tid. Ergative (*Arb/Spec) yesterday afternoon arrived MAN on time d. I går på eftermiddagen blev man avskedad. Passive (*Arb/Spec) yesterday afternoon was MAN fired
9 For many speakers, the usage of on or si for ‘we’ has become standardised. Thus, in colloquial French and regional Italian, the impersonal may double a strong 1st plural subject as in (i)-(ii): (i) Noi, si va all’estero. we, ‘si’ goes abroad (ii) Nous, on va à l’étranger. we, ‘on’ goes abroad
83 (26a-d) show that in sentences with a specific time reference, man may be understood as arbitrary or specific if the predicate is transitive or unergative.10 If the predicate is ergative or passive, man can only be interpreted as specific. That is to say, sentences like (26a-b) are ambiguous between arbitrary and specific readings, depending on the scene-settings. For instance, (26a) is compatible with a situation where I am a policeman and claim to have captured the culprit myself yesterday at five o’clock. In a different context, it could mean that somebody (or some people) yesterday captured the culprit. However, (26c-d) can only mean that I myself arrived or was fired yesterday afternoon.11 Now consider the Romance data. In the following examples, Italian (27a-d) and French (28a-d), two alternative interpretations are taken into consideration: what has been referred to as the inclusive one (‘we’; abbreviated Incl.), and the arbitrary one (‘they’, ‘some people’ or ‘someone’): Italian: (27) a. Ieri alle cinque, si è arrestato il colpevole. yesterday at five SI arrested the culprit b. Si è lavorato per due mesi per risolvere il problema. SI has worked for two months to solve the problem c. Ieri pomeriggio si è arrivati in orario. yesterday afternoon SI arrived on time d. Ieri sera si è stati licenziati. yesterday evening SI was fired
Transitive
(Arb/Incl)
Unergative (Arb/Incl) Ergative (*Arb/Incl) Passive
(*Arb/Incl)
French: (28) a. Hier soir à cinq heures on a attrapé le coupable. Transitive (Arb/Incl) yesterday at five ON caught the culprit b. On a travaillé pour deux mois pour résoudre le problème. Unergative (Arb/ Incl) ON has worked for two months to solve the problem c. Hier soir on est arrivé à l'heure. Ergative (*Arb/Incl) yesterday evening ON arrived on time 10 To my knowledge, the observation was first made by Cinque (1988) for Italian si (though stated in terms different from mine). Some of my examples are slightly adapted from his. 11 Christer Platzack (p.c.) points out to me that (i) (where the adverb åter ‘again’ has been added) is acceptable without the specific reading: (i) I går kom man åter fram i tid. yesterday arrived MAN again on time I suggest this is so because in (i), the adverb åter ‘again’ favours a generic interpretation. Whereas (26c) describes a single, specific event, (i) takes on the reading ‘Yesterday it was again possible to arrive on time’.
84 d. Hier soir on a été congédié. yesterday evening ON was fired
Passive (*Arb/Incl)
(27a-b) and (28a-b) can be understood as arbitrary or inclusive, by and large ‘some people’ or ‘we’. (27c-d) and (28c-d) can only mean that yesterday afternoon we arrived on time and we were fired. Hence, in those contexts where Swedish man is obligatorily specific, Italian si and French on are obligatorily inclusive. That is to say, with ergative and passive predicates. Crucially, the arbitrary reading of man/on/si is available only with transitive and unergative verbs. This brings us to a second generalisation, formulated as in (29): (29) Generalisation II (1st version) In a non-generic sentence, impersonal subjects of ergatives and passives cannot be interpreted as arbitrary. The generalisation in (29) is stated in terms of a restriction on arbitrary interpretation. An alternative would be to say that specific reading is forced in the relevant environments. I believe there are solid reasons to prefer the formulation in (29) to its alternative. Let us briefly consider a couple of closely related languages. First, in Danish impersonal man may have an arbitrary reading as in Swedish, but unlike Swedish man, Danish man can not be associated to any specific 1st person reading for my informants. The Danish sentences (30a-d) correspond to Swedish (26a-d) above: Danish: (30) a. I går ved fem-tiden fangede man endelig den skyldige. yesterday at five caught MAN finally the culprit b. Man har arbejdet på dette problem i flere år. MAN has worked on this problem for many years c. *I går eftermiddags kom man frem i tide. yesterday afternoon arrived MAN on time d. *I går eftermiddags bleve man afskediget. yesterday afternoon was MAN fired
Transitive (Arb) Unergative (Arb) Ergative Passive
85 Second, Spanish se shares with Italian si the property of being used as an impersonal subject. However, it is not systematically associated to any specific we-reading, unlike its Italian equivalent.12 My informants confirm the following pattern: Spanish: (31) a. Ayer a las cinco se arrestó el culpable. Transitive (Arb) yesterday at five SE arrested the culprit b. Se ha trabajado durante dos meses para resolver el problema. Unergative (Arb) SE has worked for two months to solve the problem c. *Ayer por la tarde se llegó a tiempo. Ergative yesterday afternoon SE arrived on time d. *Ayer a las cinco se fue despedido. Passive yesterday at five SE was fired Spanish and Danish appear to be alike in a crucial sense: with transitives and unergatives, impersonal subjects man and se are acceptable but only under an arbitrary interpretation; with ergatives and passives they are unacceptable under any reading. This strongly supports that the generalisation be formulated as in (29). What we observe is indeed a restriction on the arbitrary reading in a certain syntactic environment. When the arbitrary reading is barred, speakers recur to a specific one or an inclusive one if such readings are available in their language. Otherwise, the sentence is ungrammatical.
3
Analysis
In 3.1-3.3, I will pursue the idea that the first of these syntactic observations, hence the variable agreement patterns, may help to understand other properties of impersonal elements. 3.1
Agreement Patterns
Let us start out with two basic assumptions: First, suppose there are two sets of phi-features to be considered: one is a set of (abstract) features introduced into the syntactic derivation and checked at PF and LF, respectively, whilst the other is a set of lexically specified features inherent to 12
This is not to say that Spanish se cannot mean ‘we’. For all of the impersonal pronouns in question it is possible to construe arbitrary contexts where it is pragmatically understood that the speaker is included by the Arb subject.
86 (pro)nominal elements. These two sets need to be matched post-syntactically when morphology inserts a pronominal element corresponding to the abstract features of the syntactic derivation (cf. Chomsky 1995; Marantz 1993, 1997). Second, suppose that arbitrary pronominal elements such as man, on and si radically lack inherent lexical content with regard to the categories of person and number (and presumably also gender) (cf. van Gelderen 1997, 161-169; Rivero 2000). This amounts to saying, for instance, that although there is a clear historical link between French impersonal on and the lexical noun homme ‘human being’, ‘man’ (both derive from Latin HOMO), from a synchronic point of view there is a crucial difference; impersonal on does not have the lexical content of its doublet. Likewise, in Swedish there is a lexical noun man with the meaning of ‘man’. By hypothesis however, in a way similar to the French situation, I suggest impersonal man and lexical noun man are separate items (though of course historically related and homophonous). In the present view, impersonal pronouns like man/on/si are quite simply underspecified. One could consider them “dummies” or expletive elements of sorts, if it had not been for one semantic feature which is consistently present in impersonal constructions: they always denote human individuals (Chierchia 1995; Rivero 2000). Thus, the only lexical content that needs to be assumed is a [+human] feature.13 It follows from their lexical underspecification that the pronouns man/on/si are compatible in principle with readings in any person and number. To illustrate this, take an example such as (11a), repeated here as (32): (32) Quand on est belles, … when ON is[sg.] beautiful[pl. fem.] … Because the subject in (32) is pragmatically understood as plural feminine, the derivation includes the corresponding features. The nonfinite predicate belles ‘beautiful’ agrees with this abstract feature, and morphology picks a plural form of the adjective. In the higher portion of the structure, the subject on is inserted. Being inherently void of phi-features, on is compatible with the plural feature of the
13 On this point, my analysis crucially differs from Cinque (1988, 529), who assumes that Italian si is morphologically specified for plural number and masculine gender, though underspecified for person. However, Italian si is also a reflexive and a passivising element. If a unitary approach to the uses of si is to be pursued, si cannot be intrinsically human. I set aside this issue.
87 derivation. However, the finite copula is in a local agreement relation with on and is spelled out with default agreement, which is 3rd person singular.14 The same reasoning carries over to Swedish, of course with one independent difference; in Swedish, finite verbs do not show person or number agreement. With this difference, a Swedish derivation is formally equal to the French one. In the plural version of (4b), repeated here as (33), the derivation includes a plural feature that triggers adjectival agreement in the purpose clause. The subject, man, is compatible with this feature. (33) Om if
man inte är gifta måste man ha separata rum på detta hotell. MAN is not married[pl.] must MAN have separate rooms in this hotel
Italian is, in a sense, the inverse case with respect to French and Swedish. In Italian, arbitrary/generic interpretations are normally associated with the plural. Since (8) (repeated below as (34)) is a generic statement, a plural feature is involved in the derivation triggering plural adjectival agreement. The pronominal subject, si, has no phi-feature specification and triggers default agreement on the copula, as before. (34) Quando si è giovani, … when SI is[sg.] young[pl. masc.]… If it is clear that the subject is pragmatically understood as singular, as in the case of a nominal predicate in (9b) (repeated below as (35)), the singular feature obviously is compatible with si: (35) Quando si è il presidente when SI is[sg.] the president[sg.]
degli Stati Uniti, … of the U.S., …
In other words, agreement on the non-finite predicates in these sentences reflects the specification of the semantic or pragmatic, “understood”, subjects of the derivation, whereas agreement of the finite verbs (when visible) is default and reflects the lack of phi-feature specification on the arbitrary pronouns man/on/si.
14
The formulation is deliberately vague. In principle the intuition behind this proposal is compatible with Minimalism, though not dependent on any particular version of it. An alternative way of stating the derivation would be to say that the uninterpretable phi-features of the adjectival predicate are checked in overt syntax through Agree with the abstract phi-features of the arbitrary argument (hence the spell-out of agreement morphology on the adjective). The latter are interpreted at LF. The impersonal pronoun is inserted in [Spec, T] to satisfy the EPP feature of T (cf. Chomsky 1998).
88 Clearly, an element such as ‘you’ (Sw. du, Fr. tu, It. tu) is distinctly different. Unlike man/on/si, you-impersonals have an inherent phi-feature specification, namely that of 2nd person singular. Hence, even if ‘you’ is compatible with generic readings, it is not compatible with a syntactic plural feature. If the derivation contains any such incompatible feature (as in (12)-(14) above) it will not yield an acceptable result. Now suppose, as above, that Icelandic maður indeed has a lexical phi-feature specification of its own. A part from impersonal maður, there is in Icelandic a lexical noun maður ‘man’. Suppose the two usages of the element maður do not differ with regard to lexical phi-features; they are both 3rd person singular and masculine.15 Then, it is clear why agreement patterns in Icelandic maður-constructions are not elastic (as in (6a-b) above); the derivation may not include phi-features incompatible with the lexical content of maður. By this, we have arrived at what could be called a working hypothesis: Some impersonal pronouns are endowed with a lexical phi-feature specification. Others lack such content. I will now argue that this hypothesis has a number of implications for the syntax of impersonal pronouns, and may shed some light on the syntactic patterns reported on in sections 2.1.-2.2: 3.2
The restriction on arbitrary interpretation
In section 2.1., we saw that man/on/si are compatible with both generic and arbitrary readings, whereas maður and impersonal ‘you’ may only express generic readings. Generalisation I in (25) now may be restated in the following terms: (36) Generalisation I (2nd version) Only impersonal pronouns that are underspecified for lexical phi-features may express arbitrary meaning. In other words, only impersonal pronouns that are underspecified for lexical phifeatures are compatible with a specific time reference. I suggest to account for this observation in the discussion that follows. Whereas some fundamental (syntactic and semantic) properties of genericity have been successfully described and analysed in the literature, what I here call the 15 In fact, this opens the possibility that impersonal maður and lexical noun maður are not separate in the Icelandic lexicon. They could in fact be one and the same lexical element, unlike French homme-on and (by hypothesis) Swedish man-man. I will not pursue this particular issue here.
89 arbitrary reading appears to be a more evanescent phenomenon, less principled, and highly sensitive to pragmatic factors. Under standard assumptions, the generic reading is licensed by a generic operator (e.g. Krifka et al. 1995; Chierchia 1995). Now, by hypothesis, pronouns such as man/on/si are void of lexical content. Suppose that arbitrariness in the present sense is negatively defined. The kind of reading referred to here as “arbitrary” is what emerges when a pronominal element void of lexical content, apart from the human feature, is not under the scope of a generic operator. By and large, the meaning of such an element amounts to nothing but a [+human] entity in an episodic context. Whether the subject is understood as a single individual or a group of people is entirely determined by the discourse context and is not restrained by any syntactic principles. Essentially, this amounts to saying that the notion “arbitrary” as used in this paper has no theoretical status and that there is no natural class of “arbitrary pronouns”. Also, there is no “arbitrary” feature to be appealed to in syntactic derivations. Under this view, there is a principled ground for Generalisation I in (36). Certain impersonal pronouns allow for contextual manipulation of verbal agreement and may allow arbitrary readings for one and the same reason; lexical underspefication (man, on, and si). Pronouns that do have lexical content do not allow for variations in verbal agreement, and cannot be arbitrarily interpreted (maður and you). 3.3
The restriction on arbitrary interpretation with ergatives and passives
Let us turn to Generalisation II in (29). A part from its descriptive accuracy, what is the theoretical status of and the reason behind a restriction such as (29)? I suggest that the working hypothesis be pursued coherently and, hence, that Generalisation II should be properly understood in terms of lexical underspecification. Let us follow some assumptions that have been considered standard in generative literature for some time. Suppose the surface subject of an ergative predicate is a “deep object” (e.g. Burzio 1986). Likewise, suppose the surface subject of a passive is an internal argument promoted to subject position (e.g. Jaeggli 1986). Then, the restriction on impersonal pronouns with arbitrary reading is valid if such pronouns enter the derivation internal to VP, as is the case with the surface subjects of ergatives and passives. The subjects of transitives and unergatives, on the other hand, are external arguments and hence unrestrained in the relevant sense. This idea may be captured by a reformulation of Generalisation II (29), as in (37):
90
(37) Generalisation II (2nd version) If an impersonal subject is an internal argument it cannot be interpreted as arbitrary. Suppose, as is often argued, that internal arguments have a closer semantic relation to the predicate than external arguments. In traditional generative terms, the object is the “undergoer” of the event expressed by the predicate, whereas in aspect-oriented approaches, internal arguments are taken to “delimit” or “measure out” the event (e.g. Marantz 1984; Tenny 1987). Whichever approach we prefer, the relation between the internal argument and the predicate needs to be evaluated. In the vein of minimalism, suppose it is evaluated by feature checking at LF. It seems reasonable to assume that in order to establish whether an argument undergoes the event, does or does not put a limit to the event and so forth, the argument in question needs to have some inherent content or, informally speaking, a certain degree of referentiality. Suppose, crucially, that arbitrary pronouns are unable to check the relevant relation because of their radical lack of lexical content. Then, it follows that impersonal pronouns such as Swedish man, French on, or Italian si cannot be the “deep objects” (and hence not surface subjects) of ergatives or passives. However, man/on/si can indeed be subjects of ergatives and passives in generic sentences, as in (38)-(40): Swedish: (38) a. Man kommer alltid fram i tid, om man vill. MAN arrives always on time, if MAN wants to b. Nuförtiden blir man inte avskedad så lätt. nowadays is MAN not fired that easily French: (39) a. On arrive toujours à l'heure, si l’on veut. ON arrives always on time if ON wants to b. Aujourd'hui on n'est pas facilement congédié. nowadays ON is not easily fired Italian: (40) a. Si arriva sempre in orario, se si vuole. SI arrives always on time if SI wants to b. Oggi non si è facilmente licenziati. today SI is not easily fired
Ergative Passive
Ergative Passive
Ergative Passive
91 Assume that in generic environments like (38)-(40), the problem is overcome by operator binding. In other words, the operator licensing generic reading provides the semantic content for the argument, sufficient for the relation to be properly interpreted. If this is correct, we have arrived at a unitary account for impersonal pronouns, in the sense that some of their basic properties can be taken to derive from one underlying fact, namely their lexical phi-feature-specification.
4
The Syntactic Function of Impersonal Pronouns
It is a well-known fact that arbitrary pronouns such as man, on or si cannot be syntactic objects (neither direct objects to transitive verbs, nor prepositional objects):16 (41) Sw. (42) Fr. (43) It.
*De har sett man. they have seen MAN *Ils ont vu on./*Ils on ont vu. they have seen ON *Loro si hanno visto. they have seen SI
However, both generic ‘you’ (to my knowledge in all of the languages in question), and Icelandic maður can be syntactic objects (example (44) from Jónsson (1992)): (44) Ic. (45) Sw.
Svona tölur segja manni að eitthvað sé í ólagi. such figures tell MANNI that something is wrong Om de litar på dig får du inte göra dem besvikna. if they rely on you, must you not make them disappointed
This state of affairs might justify a generalisation such as (46):
16 Since Italian si is a passivising element, it may of course correspond to a syntactic object, but only if it is coindexed with the subject position (cf. Loro si sono visti ‘they saw each other’, ‘they met’). Si cannot be the object of an active structure as in (43).
92
(46) Generalisation III (the syntactic function of impersonal pronouns) Impersonal pronouns that are exclusively generic may appear syntactically as both subjects and objects (maður and you). Impersonal pronouns that can be used both arbitrarily and generically can only appear as syntactic subjects (man, on, and si). Synchronically speaking, there can hardly be any interesting questions to formulate regarding the syntactic function of these pronouns. Most probably, pronouns are acquired with their syntactic status. Hence, there is a perfectly trivial reason as to why Swedish man, French on, and Italian si cannot be syntactic objects, namely that they are lexically defined as nominative forms. In other words, in the synchronic grammars, man/on/si are acquired as subjects just like English he, as opposed to him. The question to ask is rather why such a situation has emerged in the first place. The interest of this issue is historical in nature and I here anticipate the discussion on diachronic syntax in section 5. Suppose that the discussion of section 3.3 is essentially correct: pronouns underspecified for phi-features do not qualify for object position because their relation to the predication cannot be properly evaluated. It is then natural to think that, as long as pronouns such as French on or Swedish man did retain some lexical content, they actually could qualify as syntactic objects, very much like Icelandic maður. The diachronic process that brings these elements to become “arbitrary” pronouns is likely to be a matter of subsequent loss of phi-features, as will be explicitly argued in section 5. When this process has been accomplished, and the pronouns have been lexically emptied, then they are restricted to subject position and hence defined as being nominative, precisely because they no longer can appear as objects. From that point onwards, the grammar turns to other means of expressing arbitrary or generic readings of objects. Consider that Swedish man has its oblique counterpart in the pronoun en ‘one’ as illustrated in (47): (47) Sw.
Om de litar på eni if they rely on onei,
får mani inte göra must MANi not make
dem besvikna. them disappointed
In Swedish, the distinction between nominative man and accusative/oblique en is systematic and hence equivalent to the distinction between he and him. Taking this viewpoint, it is significant that Swedish chooses the pronoun en ‘one’ for the purpose of expressing genericity in the object position. En is a numeral and hence endowed with an inherent number feature unlike man. In fact, impersonal uses of the
93 numeral one are far from restricted to Swedish. Whereas man-impersonals cannot be syntactic objects, one-impersonals do not obey to any such restriction crosslinguistically. This is a rather well-known discrepancy between these forms that in the present view may find a fairly natural account; numerals have an inherent phifeature specification, and thus can, in principle, be syntactic objects.
5
Diachrony and Learnability
In this section, I will briefly touch upon historical change and language acquisition. These are issues which I believe to be intimately related following a well-known line of generative inquiry (e.g. Lightfoot 1991). The historical development that changes an originally lexical noun such as the Latin HOMO ‘man’, ‘human being’ into an impersonal pronoun, has been studied and commented upon by many scholars. It has emerged in several studies that during such an evolution, the expression tends first to become generic. The second step, from the generic to the “arbitrary” or existential usage, is taken at a latter stage (cf. van Gelderen 1997 on man in Old and Middle English; Welton-Lair 1999 on French on). Therefore, it appears as if a diachronic path can be established, namely the one in (48):17 (48) The diachronic development of “HOMO” impersonals Lexical DP > Impersonal generic pronoun > Impersonal arbitrary pronoun French on, as well as man in Swedish and Danish, appear to be at the third stage of (48). Icelandic maður is at the second. Furthermore, note that an implicational scale emerges from (48), that is synchronically valid for all the impersonal pronouns we have seen so far. If a pronoun allows for an ‘arbitrary’ interpretation, it also has a generic one (like Italian si), but there are pronouns that have a generic interpretation without having an ‘arbitrary’ one (like impersonal ‘you’). The claim that historical change proceeds as in (48), and that certain morphosyntactic facts are linked to it, receives interesting support from Old Romance data. Consider the Old Italian noun uomo ‘man’ (< L. HOMO), which, in the 13th and 14th centuries, could be used as an impersonal pronoun, alongside its
17
Cf. Jónsson (1992) for a similar suggestion for Icelandic maður, but note that Jónsson’s three stages of diachronic development of maður do not correspond exactly to my (48). Presumably, the diachronic development involves more stages than the three shown in (48).
94 usage as a lexical noun. Among its properties, three are directly relevant to the discussion at hand.18 Firstly, whereas the generic/arbitrary interpretations in Modern Italian are normally manifested by plural agreement on adjectives and participles, in Old Italian uomo-constructions agreement is invariably masculine, singular. There are no attested examples of agreement patterns different from those illustrated in (49a-b): (49) a. ... e dico di dicere di quello 'valore' per lo quale and (I) say to say of that value for which uomo è gentile veracemente. UOMO is gentle[sg.] truly ‘and I say that I am talking about that value through which people/we are truly noble’ (Dante, Convivio, 268) b. nella conpangnia de' fedeli uomo dé essere in the company of faithful UOMO should be raunito e raghunato united[sg.m.] and summoned[sg.m.] ‘people/everyone/we should be summoned to the community of the faithful’ (Libro del difenditore, 180) Secondly, while Modern Italian si or Modern French on can be arbitrary, Old Italian uomo appears to have been generic in its pronominal usage. It is attested exclusively in sentences with generic time reference, as in (50a-b): (50) a. apena lo potea uomo riconoscere hardly him-could UOMO recognise ‘people could hardly recognise him’ (Tristano Riccardiano, 388) b. allotta altressì fu stabolito e ordinato perfetta comunaltà then also was established and ordered perfect community che uomo chiama città that UOMO calls town ‘a perfect sort of community was established that people/we call “town”’ (Libro del difenditore della pace, 1.3.5.20)
18 The data from Old Italian come from the database of OVI (Opera del Vocabolario Italiano), which is comprised of some 1500 documents from the 13th and 14th centuries (for a presentation, Dupont 2001). The electronic survey of this corpus was not exhaustive but has offered 3211 attested cases of uomo, including the phonological variants uom, om, and omo.
95 Thirdly, uomo appears in object position (51a-b), yielding interpretations that span from ‘somebody’, ‘anybody’ to ‘people’, or in fact ‘man’: (51) a. chi vuole gabbare uomo elli muove le labbra sanza neente dire, who wants to mock UOMO he moves the lips without anything say e fa sembiante di parlare, e neente dice. andmakes believe to speak and nothing says ‘who wants to mock anyone moves his lips without speaking and pretends to speak without saying anything’ (Zucchero Bencivenni, 82) b. vertute, dico, che fa l'uom felice ... virtue, (I) say, that makes UOMO happy … ‘a virtue that makes people/men/us happy’ (Convivio, 257) These properties of uomo, namely the facts that (i) it is invariably masculine singular, (ii) it appears exclusively in generic contexts, and (iii) it can be used as a generic object, all suggest a striking similarity with Icelandic maður. Moreover, they give yet another piece of evidence that these syntactic properties indeed pattern in a regular way.19 Our understanding of how HOMO-impersonals emerge, and the diachronic path they seem to follow, is dependent on our understanding of acquisition. According to the present view, the diachronic change should be attributed to a loss of phi-features. In brief, impersonal expressions in stage two of (48) retain a lexical phi-feature specification, while at the third stage they do not. The acquisitional perspective forces us to explain how phi-features are lost, taking into account that children only have access to positive evidence. The reason behind this change must lie in the absence of some kind of evidence in the input. Any lexical DP may be generically bound under the appropriate circumstances. If children were to ever hear something like a rhinoceros eats snakes, they will know that rhinoceros may appear in a generic context. Other independent occurrences of the word will offer positive evidence in favour of the conclusion that a rhinoceros may be specific and countable. Suppose instead that for some reason, some word comes to be used predominantly or perhaps exclusively in generic contexts. Then, evidence for features such as number or specificity will actually be 19
Also, it is clear that uomo in Old Italian had not arrived at the same point of pronominal status as Old French on in the same period (Welton-Lair 1999, 34-38). Also, consider that Old and Middle English man could be used as an impersonal. In the relevant period, agreement patterns in such constructions where subject to variation (Visser 1963-1973, 51; van Gelderen 1997, 161-169). Impersonal uomo survives in some contemporary Italian dialects with properties partly different from those attested in Old Italian (e.g. Rohlfs 1968 [1949], 232; D’Alessandro & Alexiadou 2003a; Manzini & Savoia forthcoming).
96 lacking. Their absence could presumably provoke the diachronic loss of such content. This is not very likely to happen to rhinoceros, but it could happen to man under the appropriate circumstances. Out of the attested cases of lexical uomo in Old Italian texts, a considerable number come from generic contexts, that is from environments where uomo is in fact ambiguous between a generic lexical DP and an impersonal pronominal-like expression. At least, it is licit to speculate that a high frequency of ambiguous contexts in language usage favours “grammaticalisation”. When language learners no longer have sufficient evidence for the conclusion that ‘HOMO’ may be countable and specific, diachronic reanalysis may take place.
6
Speculations on the Specific-Inclusive Readings
Lastly, that which is responsible for the readings that have been labelled specific (for Scandinavian) and inclusive (for Romance) remains to be discussed. Recall that those contexts where Swedish man is obligatorily 1st singular, are in fact the same where French on and Italian si are obligatorily inclusive, hence 1st plural. This parallelism is quite sufficient for us to speculate that what we are dealing with is one and the same phenomenon. However, this claim is not straightforwardly compatible with the search for principled explanations behind inclusiveness. Building on a suggestion by Paola Benincà, Cinque (1988) advances the idea that the identification of si with ‘we’ in Italian reflects a universal tendency for arbitrary subjects to be identified with a 1st plural reading. The reason for this is taken to be some basic facts of deixis, as illustrated in the following quotation: (52) [The 1st person plural] is the only combination of person and number features that may encompass all the other feature combinations. In its inclusive reading, we may comprise 1st, 2nd, and 3rd persons, whereas all the others exclude some. In other words, it is the most general (and arbitrary) of all personal referential pronouns. (Cinque 1988, 550) This way of reasoning is convincing on purely pragmatic grounds. A cross-linguistic survey could very well reveal that it is far more common that impersonals take on the ‘we’-reading than any other. However, the argument merely rests on plausibility, and pronouns such as Swedish man defy the generalisation. There are reasons to suspect that ‘inclusiveness’ may not be predictable. That is to say, whereas there are principled reasons behind the restrictions on generic and ‘arbitrary’ readings, it is more doubtful whether there are principles deciding
97 whether impersonal pronouns are interpreted as including or excluding the speaker. Depending on the function of the message and the communicative strategies of the speaker, the impersonal construction is pragmatically open to a variety of uses. Some such uses will be inclusive, others exclusive, not for syntactic reasons, but due to contextual (extra-linguistic) factors. Consider the Swedish examples (53a-c): (53) a. När barnen har flyttat hemifrån har man mycket mer tid över för varandra. when the children have left home has MAN much more time for each other. ‘when the kids have left home we / people (=parents) have more time …’ b. På den gamla goda tiden visade man respekt för varandra. in the good old days showed MAN respect for each other ‘… they / people used to show respect …’ c. Igår bestämde man i styrelsen att avgifterna skulle höjas. yesterdaydecided MAN on the board that the fees should be raised ‘yesterday the board decided …’ It is obvious that whether the speaker is included or not in (53a-c) is entirely dependent on the (extra-linguistic) context. In (53c) I am included if I am myself a member of the board, for instance. Furthermore, a specific interpretation that is originally seen as marked may become wide-spread in a language community. If examples of some such usage become sufficiently frequent in the input, language learners may come to a reanalysis yielding specific readings of various kinds. The fact that this seems to have happened in some varieties but not in others (as in Danish, see section 2.3) is not likely to derive from syntactic or logical principles of language, but is rather a historical accident. Likewise, there seems to be no ground for the claim that HOMO-impersonals should be inclined to take on some particular reading (as opposed to si-impersonals, for instance). Swedish man is specifically 1st person singular, French on specifically 1st person plural, whereas Danish man lacks a specific reading. Moreover, it is not possible to establish that specific readings emerge at some particular point of the diachronic path in (48). Swedish man, French on, and Italian si, allow for ‘arbitrary’ interpretations and may be specific. Icelandic maður is generic in standard language, but in colloquial usage, maður may be interpreted as 1st person singular, like Swedish man. That is to say, to some informants (23), repeated here as (54), is acceptable with maður = ‘I’:
98
(54) Ic.
%Maður hefur unnið að því í tvo mánuði MAÐUR has worked for two months ‘I have worked for two months …’
að leysa vandamálið. to solve the problem
Therefore, it seems that specific interpretations may emerge at any point of the diachronic development. Supposedly, the specific interpretation is available to maður because the inherent singular feature of maður is not in conflict with the 1st person feature of the derivation. In brief, the idiosyncratic nature of the specific/inclusive interpretations attested among these languages suggests that what we are dealing with may be lexicalised options. Admittedly, however, there seems to be an interesting crosslinguistic variation on this point as well, for which I am not able to account exhaustively. Jónsson (1992) mentions some interesting binding data from Icelandic. Consider (55a-b) (= (43) and (44b) in Jónsson 1992; to my understanding, the intended specific reading of maður in (55a) presupposes colloquial style): (55) a. Ic. Eg vona að maður verði ekki I hope that MAÐUR will-be not ‘I hope I won’t be late’ b. Ic. Maður vonar að eg verði ekki MAÐUR hopes that I will-be not ‘People hope I won’t be late’
of seinn. too late of seinn. too late
According to Jónsson, maður and ‘I’ may be coreferent in (55a) but not in (55b). In other words, ‘I’ may bind maður but not the other way around. Jónsson suggests to account for this in terms of a feature hierarchy, in the sense that a lower ranked feature cannot bind a higher ranked one. In addition, Jónsson assumes that the 1st person is ranked higher than the “3rd person”. Obviously, this way of reasoning rests on the assumption that Icelandic maður is inherently 3rd person. In my opinion, there is no obvious such contrast in Swedish. That is to say, man and ‘I’ can be coreferent in both (56a) and (56b): (56) a. Sw.
Jag får hoppas att man inte kommer för sent. I may hope that MAN not comes too late ‘I hope I won’t be late’ / ‘I hope they won’t be late’
99
b. Sw.
Man får hoppas att jag inte kommer för sent. MAN may hope that I not come too late ‘I hope I won’t be late’ / ‘They hope I won’t be late’ / ‘Let’s hope I won’t be late’
If Jónsson’s account for (55a-b) is on the right track, it follows that the inherent specification of Swedish man is indeed different from Icelandic maður, as I have argued. Obviously, man can bind ‘I’ in (56b). There may be two reasons for this. It could be the case that specific man in (56) is radically underspecified, featureless that is, and hence not ranked with respect to the feature hierarchy Jónsson assumes. Alternatively, specific man is inherently 1st person singular and hence not lower than ‘I’ on the hierarchy.
7
Conclusion
The field of impersonal pronouns offers an intriguing example of interaction between presumably universal principles of grammar and fine-grained crosslinguistic microvariation. Generic and arbitrary readings of impersonals are fundamentally, and presumably universally, restricted by semantic factors having to do with time reference and event. In contrast, the microvariation concerns those readings that in some grammars have been labelled inclusive, in others they may be defined specific. These patterns, I have claimed, are highly pragmatic. Only when we abstract away from such variations, the invariable properties of the system become transparent. Finally, a considerable part of the cross-linguistic variation observed in this paper, including cases of language change, is related to the lexical properties of pronominal expressions.
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100 Carlson, Gregory N. & Francis J. Pelletier (eds.), 1995, The Generic Book. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press. Chierchia, Gennaro, 1995, The Variability of Impersonal Subjects. In Bach, E., E. Jelinek, A. Kratzer & B. H. Partee (eds.) Quantification in Natural Languages, 107-143. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Chomsky, Noam, 1999, Derivation by Phase. MIT Occasional Working Papers in Linguistics, 18. Cinque, Guglielmo, 1988, On Si Constructions and the Theory of Arb. Linguistic Inquiry 19, 521-581. Dahl, Östen, 1975, On Generics. In Keenan, Edward L. (ed.) Formal Semantics of Natural Language, 99-111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. D’Alessandro, Roberta & Artemis Alexiadou. 2003a, Nome: a subject clitic in a Southern Italian dialect. Ms. University of Stuttgart. D’Alessandro, Roberta & Artemis Alexiadou. 2003b, Inclusive and Exclusive Impersonal Pronouns: a Feature-geometrical Analysis. Talk presented at the XXIX Incontro di Grammatica Generativa, Urbino, February 2003. Dupont, Christian, 2001, The Opera del Vocabolario Italiano Database: Full-Text Searching Early Italian Vernacular Sources on the Web. Italica 78:4, 526-39. Egerland, Verner, 2003, Impersonal Man and Aspect in Swedish. Ms. Department of Romance Languages, Lund. Gelderen, Elly van, 1997, Verbal Agreement and the Grammar behind its Breakdown. Minimalist feature checking. Niemeyer, Tübingen. Grevisse, Maurice, 1980, Le bon usage. 11 edition, 2nd reprint. Duculot, ParisGembloux. Hale, Ken & Samuel J. Keyser, 1993, On Argument Structure and the Lexical Expression of Syntactic Relations. In Hale, K. & S. J. Keyser (eds.) The View from Building 20: Essays in Linguistics in Honor of Sylvain Bromberger, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Hale, Ken & Samuel J. Keyser, 2001, Aspect and the Syntax of Argument Structure. Ms. MIT. Jaeggli, Osvaldo, 1986, Passive. Linguistic Inquiry 17, 587-622. Jónsson, Jóhannes Gísli. 1992. The Pronoun Maður in Icelandic. Ms. University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Krifka, Manfred, Francis J. Pelletier, Gregory N. Carlson, Alice ter Meulen, Godehard Link, & Gennaro Chierchia, 1995, Genericity: An Introduction. In Carlson, Gregory N. & Francis J. Pelletier (eds.) 1995, 1-124. Lightfoot, David, 1991, How to set parameters. Arguments from Language Change. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
101 Manzini, Maria Rita, 1986, On Italian Si. In Hagit Borer (ed.) Syntax and Semantics 19: The Syntax of Pronominal Clitics. New York: Academic Press. Manzini, Maria Rita & Leonardo Savoia, forthcoming, I dialetti italiani. Bologna: Il Mulino. Marantz, Alec, 1984, On the nature of grammatical relations. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Marantz, Alec, 1993, A Late Note on Late Insertion. In Y.-S. Kim et al. (eds.), Explorations in Generative Grammar: A Festschrift for Dong-Whee Yang, 396413. Seoul: Hankuk Publishing Co. Marantz, Alec, 1997, No Escape from Syntax: Don’t Try Morphological Analysis in the Privacy of Your Own Lexicon. In A. Dimitriadis et al. (eds.) University of Pennsylvania Working Papers in Linguistics 4.2. Proceedings of the 21st Annual Penn Linguistics Colloquium, 201-225. Rey, Alain & Josette Rey-Debove (eds.), 1984, Le Petit Robert. Dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue française. Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert Rivero, María-Luisa, 2000, On Impersonal Reflexives in Romance and Slavic and Semantic Variation. In Camps, Joaquim & Caroline R. Wiltshire (eds.) Romance Syntax, Semantics and L2 Acquisition, 169-195. AmsterdamPhiladelphia: John Benjamins. Rizzi, Luigi, 1986, Null Objects in Italian and the Theory of pro. Linguistic Inquiry 17, 501-557. Rohlfs, Gerhard, 1968 [1949], Grammatica storica della lingua italiana e dei suoi dialetti. Morfologia. Torino: Einaudi. Salvi, Giampaolo, 1991, L’accordo. In Renzi, L. & G. Salvi (eds.) Grande grammatica italiana di consultazione II: I sintagmi verbale, aggettivale, avverbiale. La subordinazione, 227-244. Il Mulino, Bologna. Teleman, Ulf, S. Hellberg, E. Andersson & L. Christensen, (1999). Svenska akademiens grammatik. Stockholm: Svenska akademien, Norstedts ordbok. Tenny, Carol L., 1987, Grammaticalizing Aspect and Affectedness. Doctoral Dissertation, MIT. Tenny, Carol L, 1994, Aspectual Roles and the Syntactic-Semantics Interface. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Tenny, Carol L. & James Pustejovsky, 2000, A History of Events in Linguistic Theory. In Tenny, Carol L. & James Pustejovsky (eds.), Events as Grammatical Objects: The Converging Perspectives of Lexical Semantics and Syntax, 3-32. CSLI Publications.
102 Welton-Lair, L. K. 1999, The Evolution of the French Indefinite Pronoun on: a Corpus-Based Study in Grammaticalization. Doctoral dissertation, Cornell University.
Old Italian Texts Tristano Riccardiano (Il), Anonimo, a cura di Ernesto Giacomo Parodi, Comm. testi di lingua, Bologna, Romagnoli-Dall'Acqua, 1896.) Convivio (Il), Dante Alighieri, a cura di Franca Brambilla Ageno, Firenze, Le Lettere (Società Dantesca italiana. Edizione Nazionale), 1995. Libro del difenditore della pace e tranquillità volgarizzato (Il), Anonimo, (Marsilio da Padova, Defensor pacis, nella traduzione in volgare fiorentino del 1363) a cura di Carlo Pincin,Torino, Einaudi, 1966. Esposizione del Paternostro, Zucchero Bencivenni. Luigi Rigoli, Volgarizzamento dell'Esposizione del Paternostro, Firenze, Piazzini, 1828.
Verner Egerland Department of Romance Languages Sölvegatan 7 223 62 Lund, Sweden
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