Emotion

Emotion Forecasting the Duration of Emotions: A Motivational Account and Self-Other Differences André Mata, Cláudia Simão, Ana Rita Farias, and Andreas Steimer Online First Publication, July 12, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/emo0000455

CITATION Mata, A., Simão, C., Farias, A. R., & Steimer, A. (2018, July 12). Forecasting the Duration of Emotions: A Motivational Account and Self-Other Differences. Emotion. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/emo0000455

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Forecasting the Duration of Emotions: A Motivational Account and SelfOther Differences André Mata

Cláudia Simão

Universidade de Lisboa

Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Lisboa

Ana Rita Farias

Andreas Steimer

Universidade do Porto and Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Lisboa

University of Heidelberg

This research investigates the forecasts that people make about the duration of positive versus negative emotions, and tests whether these forecasts differ for self versus for others. Consistent with a motivated thinking framework, six studies show that people make optimistic, asymmetric forecasts that positive emotions will last longer than negative ones. However, for other people, wishful thinking is absent, and therefore people make less optimistic, more symmetric forecasts. Potential implications of these motivated forecasts and self– other differences are discussed. Keywords: affective forecasting, motivated reasoning, self– other differences

bert and Wilson (see Wilson & Gilbert, 2003, for a review) has demonstrated an impact bias in affective forecasting, such that people tend to overestimate the emotional impact of both positive and negative events. However, research on affective forecasting has not systematically explored whether people’s forecasts about the duration of emotions are influenced by wishful thinking, and whether such forecasts differ for self versus for others. Do people expect positive events to make them feel happy for longer than negative events will make them feel sad? And are such wishful forecasts more pronounced for the self than for other people?

Some emotions are so desirable that people wish that they could last forever. Other emotions are so unpleasant that people wish that they could last as little time as possible. For instance, a couple in love will surely want their happiness to last throughout their lives, whereas victims of unrequited love will probably want nothing more than for their sadness to end. In this paper, we explore the role of motivated thinking in affective forecasting. Specifically, we propose that individuals engage in wishful thinking, estimating that positive emotions will last longer than negative ones. Previous research on affective forecasting has assessed people’s estimates of how they will feel in the future as a consequence of some event and compared it to how they actually feel when that future arrives. The extensive research program developed by Gil-

Forecasting Duration Literature reviews on affective forecasting typically conclude that people overestimate the intensity and duration that certain emotional states will last (e.g., Wilson & Gilbert, 2003, 2005). However, in most cases, the expected duration of emotions is not actually measured. Rather, researchers detect temporal overestimation (i.e., impact bias) when participants overestimate how strongly they will feel about a certain event sometime in the future (e.g., 2 years from now) as compared with how they actually feel when that future arrives. This approach is certainly well-suited to detect overestimation of the emotional impact of events at a concrete time in the future, but it precludes a more sensitive and direct exploration of people’s estimates of emotion duration and how these might be influenced by wishful thinking (i.e., expecting positive emotions to last longer than negative ones). In order to investigate the role of wishful thinking in forecasting of emotion duration, the present studies directly assess how long people expect themselves or others to experience desirable versus undesirable emotions. Whereas in previous research time is mostly used as an independent variable (comparing present forecast to future experience), in the present research it will serve as a dependent

André Mata, Centro de Investigação em Ciência Psicológica, Faculdade de Psicologia, Universidade de Lisboa; Cláudia Simão, Católica Lisbon School of Business and Economics, Católica Research Centre for Psychological, Family and Social Wellbeing, Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Lisboa; Ana Rita Farias, Center for Economics and Finance, Faculty of Economics, Universidade do Porto, and Católica Research Centre for Psychological, Family and Social Wellbeing, Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Lisboa; Andreas Steimer, Department of Psychology, University of Heidelberg. André Mata and Cláudia Simão are co-first authors. The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the Portuguese Science Foundation under the following grants: UID/PSI/ 04810/2013; IF/01612/2014. All data have been made publicly available via Open Science Framework and can be accessed at https://osf.io/m4c72/. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to André Mata, Centro de Investigação em Ciência Psicológica, Faculdade de Psicologia, Alameda da Universidade, 1649-013 Lisboa, Portugal. E-mail: [email protected] 1

MATA, SIMÃO, FARIAS, AND STEIMER


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variable, influenced by valence (positive vs. negative emotions) and target (self vs. others). We believe that the present paradigm addresses an important question. Very little research directly measures forecasts concerning the duration of emotion (most studies assess forecasts of the strength of emotion at different time points). However, research on forecasting emotion duration is relevant in its own right. Intensity comes and goes but enduring happiness is what people aim for, and enduring sadness can be crippling. Therefore, duration is an important aspect of the emotional experience, which does not always match intensity: One can make a case for why a person might prefer to experience a moderately pleasant but long-lasting emotion to an extremely pleasant but fleeting one (more about intensity-duration dissociations in the General Discussion).

Motivational Accounts Extant research on affective forecasting has focused mainly on nonmotivational, cognitive factors to account for the impact bias (e.g., focalism; Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000; immune neglect, Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). The role of motivation in affective forecasting has received less attention, with the exception of recent work looking into the adaptive function that the impact bias might have for goal-driven action planning: Some authors argue that people’s tendency to overestimate the emotional impact of both positive and negative events might serve to motivate adaptive behavior, that is, to strive to attain positive outcomes and avoid negative ones (Baumeister, Vohs, & Oettingen, 2016; Miloyan & Suddendorf, 2015; Morewedge & Buechel, 2013). The present studies add to this research by exploring affective forecasting from the perspective of another form of motivated reasoning: Specifically, we are interested in whether people’s predictions of emotional duration are subject to wishful thinking: Do people expect certain emotions to last longer than others because they are more desirable?

Previous Research There is at least one previous study that investigated the expected duration of positive and negative emotions: Finkenauer, Gallucci, van Dijk, and Pollmann (2007) asked participants to forecast the intensity of emotions that they would expect to feel on five consecutive days if they passed or failed an upcoming test, and then compared forecast against experience. They were interested in people’s expectations about the trajectory of emotional intensity, and, more importantly, in the accuracy of those forecasts. We, on the other hand, are interested in the expected duration of emotions, and therefore ask directly about the forecasted duration of emotions (i.e., we directly ask how long people expect to feel a certain emotion, rather than how intense people expect a certain emotion to be throughout several points in time). To be sure, Finkenauer et al.’s measure of the trajectory of emotional intensity gives some indication of people’s expectations about emotion duration (e.g., if one expects emotional intensity to be greatly reduced after a short period). However, it can only provide an indirect measure of our main variable of interest— expected emotion duration—and it is limited in its narrow scope (forecasts are limited to 5 days), not being able to capture expectations of longer durations.

Moreover, Finkenauer et al.’s (2007) findings were framed within the scope of a different framework, which cannot account for the predictions that we put forward (and the results that we find): Their results were interpreted in light of the aforementioned goal-oriented approach, whereby people should overestimate the emotional impact of both positive and negative events, as that motivates them to attain positive outcomes and avoid negative ones. We, on the other hand, are interested in a different motivational force, wishful thinking, and whether the target of the forecasts is the self or other people. Specifically, wishful thinking might lead people to expect positive emotions to last longer than negative ones. Furthermore, this difference should hold only when self-relevance is high (i.e., when making forecasts for the self or other people whom one likes), and not when it is low (i.e., for unrelated other people). Finkenauer et al.’s goal-driven framework would have predicted undesirable emotions to last long, as that would motivate people to try to avoid them. Moreover, such framework would not predict that people would make more optimistic versus pessimistic forecasts for others whom they like versus dislike, as that would not serve a goal-relevant purpose, whereas our framework does (a prediction tested in Study 5). We now focus on this motivational framework, grounded on previous findings about the influence of wishful thinking on forecasts.

Wishful Thinking Desires and wishes influence a wide range of psychological processes, including memory (Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990), perception (Balcetis & Dunning, 2006), and reasoning (Mata, Ferreira, & Sherman, 2013; Mata, Garcia-Marques, Ferreira, & Mendonça, 2015; Mata, Sherman, Ferreira, & Mendonça, 2015). We suggest that wishful thinking might also affect the estimation of emotion duration. Of particular relevance in the domain of forecasting, people are generally optimistic, such that they expect more positive than negative things to happen to them (Baker & Emery, 1993; Braga, Mata, Ferreira, & Sherman, 2017; Calderon, 1993; Hoch, 1985; Irwin, 1953; Marks, 1951; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Mitchell, Thompson, Peterson, & Cronk, 1997; Pruitt & Hoge, 1965; Shepperd, Ouellette, & Fernandez, 1996). For example, people have optimistic expectations about how their personality might develop: They expect their strengths to remain constant, but they believe that their weaknesses will improve in the future, and this difference is mediated by the desirability of the different traits, and whether or not people wish to change them (Steimer & Mata, 2016). Consistent with the abundant evidence for wishful thinking and optimism, we expect that people are also optimistic in their estimates about the duration of emotions, such that they might predict a longer duration for positive emotions than for negative ones.

Self–Other Differences Although people hold optimistic views about themselves and their futures, the same is not the case for others, for whom self-relevance is not a factor. People in general place themselves above others (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Mata, Fiedler, Ferreira, & Almeida, 2013; Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002), and the same is true for optimistic predictions about the future. People believe themselves to be more likely to experience positive outcomes in the


MOTIVATED AFFECTIVE FORECASTING

future and less likely to experience negative ones when compared with other people, a comparative bias that is frequently designated as unrealistic optimism or optimistic bias (Larwood & Whittaker, 1977; Perloff & Fetzer, 1986; Weinstein, 1980). Similarly, in the aforementioned research on lay theories about personality development (Steimer & Mata, 2016), it was shown that while people tend to perceive their weaknesses to be more malleable than their strengths, the same does not hold for their beliefs about the personalities of other people. Therefore, we predict that, though people are optimistic in the affective forecasts that they make for themselves, estimating positive emotions to last longer than negative ones, this will not be the case in their estimates about other people; for others, the difference between the predicted duration of positive and negative emotions should be smaller or even null. However, there is a caveat: We predict that people are more pessimistic in the forecasts that they make about others than in the forecasts that they make for themselves. However, if these forecasts are based on motivated wishful thinking, people should not be invariantly more pessimistic about others. In particular, if they like the other people whom they are making forecasts about, then they should also show optimism. Indeed, comparative biases, such as the better-than-average effect, have been shown to be attenuated for friends and family (Pedregon, Farley, Davis, Wood, & Clark, 2012). Therefore, we predict that whether or not people show optimism in their affective forecasting about others will depend on whether or not they like those others (see Study 5).

Overview Across six studies we tested the predictions that (1) wishful thinking produces different estimates of the duration of positive and negative emotions, (2) this difference is accounted by the desirability of the forecasted emotions, and (3) this generates an asymmetry in the forecasts that people make for themselves versus others. Study 1 tests whether the expected duration of the happiness that comes from a positive event exceeds the expected duration of the sadness caused by a negative event, and whether this differs for self versus for others. Study 2 seeks to replicate these findings, and in addition it measures desirability, in order to test whether it mediates the link between valence and estimated emotion duration. Study 3 manipulates desirability by making a certain event seem more or less desirable via a positive or negative counterfactual social comparison, and it tests whether that influences how long people expect to experience the emotional consequences of that event. Study 4 directly tests the effect of the desirability of emotions on their expected duration. People should expect positive emotions to last longer than negative ones to the extent that this is considered to be desirable. If what would normally be considered positive emotions are deemed undesirable, people should not predict that they last long. In yet another test of our motivational account, Study 5 tests whether people make similar estimates for others as they do for themselves (i.e., duration of positive emotions greater than that of negative ones) when they like those other people. Finally, Study 6 examines the generalizability of these results, by testing whether the effect of desirability on forecasts for self versus for others holds for a range of different emotions and different scenarios.

3 Study 1

As a first test of our prediction, we manipulated the valence (positive vs. negative) and target (self vs. other) of certain events, and we measured how long participants expected themselves or others to feel good or bad about those events. We predicted a valence-by-target interaction: for the self, the happiness caused by a positive event should be expected to last longer than the sadness caused by a negative event; for another person, the expected duration of happiness versus sadness should not differ.

Method Participants Seventy-five participants with a mean age of 27.59 years (SD ⫽ 8.01, 80% female) completed the survey either in exchange for course credit or for a €5 ($6.18487) voucher. In all studies, the sample size was not calculated a priori with any power analysis, but we aimed to collect roughly 35 to 40 participants per condition. Data were not analyzed prior to terminating collection.1

Design In a mixed factorial design, the target of the forecasts (self vs. other) was manipulated between-subjects and the valence of the events (positive vs. negative) was manipulated within-subjects. Participants were asked to imagine the events either as if they were to happen to the self (n ⫽ 38), or as if they were to happen to another person (n ⫽ 37). In the valence manipulation, participants were asked to consider 10 events adapted from Weinstein (1980), presented in random order: five positive events (“traveling around the world,” “having a good job offer right after graduation,” “graduating in the top third of class,” “having one’s work recognized with an international award,” and “winning the lottery”) and five negative events (“being betrayed by one’s love,” “being fired from a job,” “being sterile,” “having a heart attack,” and “having cancer”).

Procedure Participants were asked to read about several everyday life events and try to imagine each event as vividly as possible. Participants were shown each of the 10 events, with a reminder above the event description to try to imagine the situation. After each event, participants were asked to estimate the duration of the emotions caused by each event. Specifically, participants were asked to report, “How long do you think that you/another person would feel happy/sad?”, ranging from 0 (very little time) to 100 1 For our main statistical analysis, we observed a power calculation of 76% in Study 1, and therefore maintained the sample sizes equivalent in all subsequent studies. Even though post-hoc analyses (performed after a study has been conducted) “are less ideal than a-priori analyses because only ␣ is controlled, not ␤,” they can still provide “a critical evaluation of the (often surprisingly large) error probability ␤ associated with a false decision in favor of the H0” (Mayr, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Faul, 2007, p. 52). Based on that, and to ensure that we had sufficient statistical power in our analyses, we calculated the statistical power for all the remaining studies: Study 2 ⫽ 98%; Study 3 ⫽ 100%; Study 4 ⫽ 96%; Study 5 ⫽ 99.9%; Study 6 ⫽ 100%.


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(very long time).2 The estimated duration of happiness is an index of the five positive events combined (␣ ⫽ .74) and estimated duration of sadness is an index of the five negative events combined (␣ ⫽ .63). As a manipulation check that the forecasted events induced clearly positive and negative emotions, participants were also asked to report, “How happy/sad do you think that you/another person would feel in this situation?”, from 0 (not at all) to 100 (completely). Intensity of happiness is an index of the five positive events (␣ ⫽ .78) combined and intensity of sadness is an index of the five negative events combined (␣ ⫽ .60).


Results In order to test our main hypothesis that, for the self, the happiness associated with positive events is expected to last longer than the sadness associated with negative events, but that this does not hold for others, we conducted a 2 (valence: happiness vs. sadness) ⫻ 2 (target: self vs. other) mixed GLM, with valence as the within-subjects factor, and target as the between-subjects factor. A significant main effect was observed for valence, F(1, 73) ⫽ 4.75, p ⫽ .032, ␩p2 ⫽ .06, qualified by an interaction of valence by target, F(1, 73) ⫽ 7.34, p ⫽ .008, ␩p2 ⫽ .09 (see Figure 1). Simple pairwise comparisons revealed that, when the target was the self, the happiness associated with positive events was estimated to last longer than the sadness associated to negative events (M ⫽ 76.95, SE ⫽ 2.91, 95% CI [71.16, 82.74] versus M ⫽ 65.95, SE ⫽ 2.64, 95% CI [60.68, 71.28]), F(1, 73) ⫽ 12.11, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .14. In contrast, when the target was another person, the estimated duration of happiness and sadness did not differ (respectively, M ⫽ 69.34, SE ⫽ 2.94, 95% CI [63.47, 75.21] vs. M ⫽ 70.53, SE ⫽ 2.68, 95% CI [65.19, 75.87]), F ⬍ 1, p ⫽ .712, ␩p2 ⬍ .01. As a manipulation check, one-sample t tests compared the intensity ratings for both positive and negative events against the midpoint of the scale (50), and revealed that they elicited strong feelings of happiness and sadness: for happiness (M ⫽ 90.19, SD ⫽ 12.57), t(74) ⫽ 27.70, p ⬍ .001; for sadness (M ⫽ 81.96, SD ⫽ 14.92), t(74) ⫽ 18.55, p ⬍ .001. In addition, even though that was not our hypothesis of interest, we also tested whether the same pattern that was predicted for duration holds for intensity. In a mixed GLM, with valence (positive vs. negative) as the withinsubjects factor and target (self vs. other) as the between-subjects factor, the main effect of valence was significant, F(1, 73) ⫽

Figure 1. Positive–negative asymmetry of emotion duration as a function of target, Study 1. Bars represent standard errors.

24.71, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .25, but the interaction was not (F ⬍ 1, p ⫽ .418, ␩p2 ⫽ .01). Overall, and regardless of the target, participants predicted more intensity associated to the positive events (happiness: M ⫽ 90.16, SE ⫽ 1.43, 95% CI [87.31, 93.01]) than to negative events (sadness: M ⫽ 81.94, SE ⫽ 1.73, 95% CI [78.50, 85.39]). Possible reasons for the different results for intensity and duration shall be addressed in the General Discussion.

Study 2 Study 2 seeks to replicate the valence-by-target interaction found in the previous study. More importantly, it includes a measure of desirability, in order to ascertain that, as predicted by our motivational framework, differences in wishful thinking (activated in predictions about the self, but not others) account for the predicted interaction pattern. A moderated mediation effect is predicted, whereby the different desirability of positive versus negative events should generate different forecasts for the self, but not for others.

Method Participants Sixty-four participants (78% female) contributed with data to the current study in exchange for course credit. The mean age was 20.95 years (SD ⫽ 4.95). Data were not analyzed prior to terminating collection.

Design, Procedure, and Dependent Variables Similarly to Study 1, target (self vs. other) was manipulated between-subjects, and valence (positive vs. negative) was manipulated within-subjects by using the same five positive and five negative events (adapted from Weinstein, 1980), presented in 2

Across the studies we measured additional variables (all of which are reported in the paper), either as manipulation checks (that the forecasted events induced clearly positive and negative emotions) or as control variables (imagery, in Study 1, mood, in Study 3, and belief in a just world, in Study 5). At the end of Study 1, we included two questions concerning imagery/perspective taking. One of them pertained to first- vs. third-person perspectives: “There are different ways of imagining an event: sometimes we imagine an event as if it would be happening to ourselves, whereas other times we imagine an event as if we were observing the event happening to someone else. To what extent did you imagine the events presented before? This was rated on a scale, ranging from 0 (as if it was happening to me) to 100 (as if it was happening to someone else). When the self was the target, participants imagined the events more as if they were happening to the self (M ⫽ 12.61, SD ⫽ 20.28) than when the target was another person (M ⫽ 29.19, SD ⫽ 27.35), t(73) ⫽ 2.98, p ⫽ .004. The second item pertained to ease of imagining: “Overall, to what extent it was easy for you to imagine the events.” This was rated on a scale, ranging from 0 (not easy at all) to 100 (extremely easy). There was no significant difference in how easy it was to imagine the events when the target was the self (M ⫽ 78.16, SD ⫽ 17.14) vs. another person (M ⫽ 71.30, SD ⫽ 22.29), t(73) ⫽ 1.50, p ⫽ .139. Even when controlling for these perspective-taking scores as covariates, the critical target-by-valence interaction remained significant. The only effect that these scores had on estimated duration was a simple main effect of the second item, such that the easier it was for participants to imagine the events, the longer the duration they estimated, both for positive (r ⫽ .33, p ⫽ .004) and negative events (r ⫽ .21, p ⫽ .068).


random order. After each event, we measured the expected duration of emotions (positive: ␣ ⫽ .78, negative: ␣ ⫽ .71), as in Study 1, and desirability (“How desirable would it be if this event were to happen to you/another person?” This was rated on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all desirable) to 100 (extremely desirable). As in Study 1, we also asked for ratings of the intensity of emotions (positive: ␣ ⫽ .65, negative: ␣ ⫽ .81) as a manipulation check. At the end, participants were thanked, debriefed, and dismissed.

Table 1 Moderated Mediation Results for Study 2 Using Linear Mixed Models Analysis 95% CI Predictor

Constant Valence

Estimate SE

4.18 76.24


Results Expected Duration and Intensity of Emotions To replicate the findings from Study 1 concerning the expected duration of emotions, we conducted a mixed design GLM, entering valence (happiness vs. sadness) as the within-subjects factor and target (self vs. other) as the between-subjects factor. The results yielded a main effect of valence, F(1, 62) ⫽ 15.23, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .20, qualified by an interaction of valence by target, F(1, 62) ⫽ 4.92, p ⫽ .030, ␩p2 ⫽ .07. Simple pairwise comparisons showed that, when the target was the self, participants expected the happiness caused by positive events to last longer (M ⫽ 83.66, SE ⫽ 2.80, 95% CI [78.07, 89.26]) than the sadness caused by negative events (M ⫽ 63.38, SE ⫽ 2.97, 95% CI [62.44, 74.31]), F(1, 62) ⫽ 18.73, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .23. When the target was another person, the expected duration of happiness (M ⫽ 77.37, SE ⫽ 2.80, 95% CI [71.78, 82.96]) and sadness (M ⫽ 73.16, SE ⫽ 2.97, 95% CI [67.23, 79.01]) did not differ, F(1, 62) ⫽ 1.42, p ⫽ .238, ␩p2 ⫽ .02. The intensity manipulation check (i.e., one-sample t tests comparing intensity ratings against the midpoint of the scale) confirmed that the events that participants imagined were thought to induce strong feelings of happiness for positive events (M ⫽ 88.03, SD ⫽ 14.68), t(63) ⫽ 20.72, p ⬍ .001, and sadness for negative events (M ⫽ 79.01, SD ⫽ 17.85), t(63) ⫽ 13.00, p ⬍ .001. Again, it was not our hypothesis of interest, but we also tested whether the same interaction pattern that was found for duration holds for intensity. We observed a main effect of valence on intensity, F(1, 62) ⫽ 14.38, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .19, qualified by a marginal two-way interaction of valence by target on intensity, F(1, 62) ⫽ 3.28, p ⫽ .075, ␩p2 ⫽ .05. Simple pairwise comparisons showed that when the target was the self, participants forecasted more happiness associated to the positive events (M ⫽ 90.52, SE ⫽ 2.58, 95% CI [85.37, 95.67]) than sadness associated to negative events (M ⫽ 77.19, SE ⫽ 3.16, 95% CI [70.86, 83.51]), F(1, 62) ⫽ 15.70, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .20. When the target was the other, the intensity of happiness for positive events (M ⫽ 85.54, SE ⫽ 2.58, 95% CI [80.38, 90.69]) and sadness for negative events (M ⫽ 80.83, SE ⫽ 3.16, 95% CI [74.50, 87.15]) did not differ, F(1, 62) ⫽ 1.96, p ⫽ .166, ␩p2 ⫽ .03.

Moderated Mediation by Desirability To examine whether the different desirability of positive versus negative events influences the expected duration of the resulting emotions for the self, but not for others, we tested a moderated mediation model, using a linear mixed models analysis (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). A significant moderated mediation effect emerged (see Table 1 and Figure 2), with simple slope analyses

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Constant Valence Target Desire Target ⫻ Desire Note.

73.39 3.89 ⫺.05 5.76 ⫺5.95

Statistical test

p

Predicting the mediator 1.26 t(63) ⫽ 3.38 .001 3.03 t(88.16) ⫽ 25.18 .000

LB

UB

1.67 6.70 70.22 82.26

Predicting the outcome variable 3.78 t(120.32) ⫽ 19.40 .000 65.90 6.69 t(83.23) ⫽ .58 .563 ⫺9.42 3.31 t(66.61) ⫽ ⫺.02 .987 ⫺6.67 3.51 t(85.56) ⫽ 1.64 .104 ⫺1.22 2.60 t(68.81) ⫽ ⫺2.29 .025 ⫺11.13

80.88 17.20 6.56 12.74 ⫺.76

LB ⫽ lower bound; UB ⫽ upper bound.

showing that desirability significantly and positively predicted estimated emotional duration for the self, t(63) ⫽ 4.54, p ⬍ .001, but not for others, t(63) ⫽ 0.87, p ⫽ .386.

Study 3 Study 3 provides a conceptual replication: A more versus less positive scenario was created by inducing favorable versus unfavorable counterfactual thinking and social comparison. Participants were either asked to imagine that a moderately desirable event (e.g., finding 30€) happened to them while a much more desirable event (e.g., finding 500€; an upward comparison) happened to someone else, or vice versa. Thus, Study 3 manipulates counterfactual desirability (high vs. low) and target (self vs. others), and measures expected emotion duration. We again predict a Desirability ⫻ Target interaction: the happiness produced by counterfactually desirable (undesirable) events should be expected to last longer (shorter) for the self, whereas the forecasted duration of someone else’s happiness should not differ as a function of desirability. Moreover, in the method section below, note that whereas in Studies 1 and 2 positive and negative events were different, here they are equivalent, ruling out the possibility that any difference in predicted duration can be attributed to the events in question. Yet another difference from the previous studies pertains to the dependent measure of duration: Whereas in Studies 1 and 2 participants completed a subjective measure (from very little time to a very long time), in the current study participants were asked to estimate the exact number of days that the emotions would last.

Method Participants Sixty-four individuals with a mean age of 23.27 years (SD ⫽ 4.24; 78% female) participated in exchange for a 5€ gift voucher. Data were not analyzed prior to terminating collection.

Design Desirability was manipulated between-subjects by making a positive event seem more versus less desirable by comparison with another event. Participants were given the following scenario:



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Figure 2. Emotion duration as a function of desirability (⫾1 SD) by target in Study 2.

Imagine the following situation as vividly as possible: Imagine that you are walking down the street and you find 30€ (in the less desirable condition vs. 500€ in the more desirable condition). There is no way to know who lost that money. Therefore, it is not even possible to try to return it. Later, when you tell everyone about this event, this friend of yours (name or initials would appear here) tells you that both of you were lucky, given that s/he had found 500€ (vs. 30€).

Thus, in the more desirable condition the participant imagined that he found 500€ whereas another person found 30€, and the opposite was the case in the less desirable condition. The target (self vs. other) was manipulated as the within-subjects factor.

Procedure Participants started by filling out a measure of mood as a control measure.3 Next, they were asked to think about three friends and list them (either their names, or their initials). In the subsequent task, participants read the scenario, where one name from this list was randomly selected and included in the scenario. After the scenario, and in order to involve participants in the task, we asked them to list up to 10 items that they and the other person (10 items each) would buy with the money that they imagined having found. Afterward, participants completed the dependent measures.

estimated duration of happiness should not differ as a function of desirability. In a mixed GLM with target (self vs. other) as the within-subjects factor and desirability (more vs. less desirable comparison) as the between-subjects factor, a significant interaction emerged, F(1, 62) ⫽ 17.24, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .22 (see Figure 3). Simple pairwise comparisons revealed that, as predicted, when the target was the self, participants expected happiness to last longer in the more desirable condition (M ⫽ 70.00, SE ⫽ 10.15, 95% CI [49.72, 90.28]) than in the comparatively less desirable condition (M ⫽ 18.83, SE ⫽ 9.23, 95% CI [0.37, 37.29]), F(1, 62) ⫽ 13.91, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .18. When the target was another person, the expected duration of happiness in the more desirable comparative condition (M ⫽ 51.76, SE ⫽ 12.69, 95% CI [26.40, 77.12]) did not differ significantly from the expected duration of happiness in the less desirable comparative condition (M ⫽ 44.00, SE ⫽ 11.55, 95% CI [20.92, 67.09]), F ⬍ 1, p ⫽ .653, ␩p2 ⬍ .01. The manipulation checks confirmed that both measures of happiness were significantly above the midpoint of the scale (selfhappiness: M ⫽ 77.55, SD ⫽ 20.77, t(63) ⫽ 10.61, p ⬍ .001; M ⫽ 81.00, SD ⫽ 19.41, other-happiness: t(63) ⫽ 12.78, p ⬍ .001). As in the previous studies, we also examined whether being the target (self or other) of a more (vs. less) desirable event increased the intensity of reported happiness. Thus, we conducted a mixed design GLM, entering target (self vs. other) as the within-subjects factor, and event desirability (more vs. less desirable) as the between-subjects factor. The main effect of target was not significant, F(1, 62) ⫽ 1.05, p ⫽ .309, ␩p2 ⫽ .02. However, the results yielded a significant interaction of target by desirability on intensity of happiness, F(1, 62) ⫽ 30.31, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .33. When the target was the self, the intensity of happiness was higher in the more desirable event condition (M ⫽ 82.86, SE ⫽ 3.78, 95% CI [75.31, 90.42]) than in the less desirable event condition (M ⫽ 73.14, SE ⫽ 3.44, 95% CI [66.27, 80.02]), F(1, 62) ⫽ 3.62, p ⫽ .062, ␩p2 ⫽ .06. The same pattern was reported for the other person, though for this other target it was even clearer: higher intensity of happiness in the more desirable event condition (M ⫽ 87.77, SE ⫽ 3.05, 95% CI [81.67, 93.87]) than in less desirable event condition (M ⫽ 72.83, SE ⫽ 3.35, 95% CI [66.13, 79.53]), F(1, 62) ⫽ 10.87, p ⫽ .002, ␩p2 ⫽ .15).

Study 4

Dependent Measures Estimated duration of happiness. Participants were asked to estimate in days the duration of their happiness (self-duration: “How long do you think your happiness would last?”) and the duration of the other person’s happiness (other-duration: “How long do you think the happiness of your friend would last?”) on a scale ranging from 1 day to 365 days. Intensity of happiness. Participants were also asked to predict (“Overall, how happy do you think you would feel in this situation?”) and other-happiness (“Overall, how happy do you think your friend would feel in this situation?”) on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all happy) to 100 (extremely happy).

Results We predicted that, when the self was the target of a desirable event, the estimated duration of happiness would be greater than for a comparatively less desirable event. For other people, the

Study 4 directly tested whether the desirability of specific emotions would influence estimates of their duration. If people predict certain emotions to last longer than others because the former are more desirable than the latter, then making an emotion seem more or less desirable should influence its predicted duration. Specifically, we predicted that inducing participants to believe that happiness has certain downsides, and that sadness has its upsides, would reduce the asymmetry in forecasts of how long each of them will last. 3 Previous research has shown that the optimistic bias may vary as a function of mood (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001) and that mood has an impact on judgments of happiness (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Therefore, we measured mood using the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and included it as a control measure. The interaction effects of desirability or target with mood on estimated emotional duration were not statistically (all Fs (1, 60) ⬍ 1.84, ps ⬎ .180, ␩2p ⬍ .03).



Figure 3. Happiness duration as a function of counterfactual desirability by target, Study 3. Bars represent standard errors.

Method Participants Eighty-two individuals participated in this study in exchange for course credit. We excluded two participants from the final analyses, as they indicated having participated in one of the previous studies (they said that they remembered most of the questions). Thus, our final sample was comprised of 80 participants (85% female), with a mean age of 23.60 years (SD ⫽ 5.71). Data were not analyzed prior to terminating collection.

Design, Procedure, and Dependent Variables The desirability of emotions was manipulated between-subjects. In the control condition (n ⫽ 41), participants were asked to imagine as vividly as possible several events without any further information. In the experimental condition (n ⫽ 39), participants were first given a description about how sadness can have positive outcomes and how happiness can have negative outcomes (see Appendix A). Next, they were asked to imagine as vividly as possible the same events. The valence of the events was manipulated within-subjects, using the same five positive events and five negative events as in Studies 1 and 2, presented in random order. Participants were asked to estimate the duration of emotions (happiness or sadness) that would follow from each of those events (positive: ␣ ⫽ .60, negative ␣ ⫽ .68), followed by the manipulation check pertaining to the intensity of emotions (positive: ␣ ⫽ .57, negative ␣ ⫽ .60), as in Studies 1 and 2.

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sadness (M ⫽ 65.53, SE ⫽ 2.64, 95% CI [60.28, 70.78]), F(1, 78) ⫽ 22.96, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .23. As predicted, in the experimental condition the mean difference in the expected duration of happiness versus sadness was smaller, although still significant (happiness: M ⫽ 72.86, SE ⫽ 2.11, 95% CI [68.67, 77.05], sadness: M ⫽ 67.87, SE ⫽ 2.70, 95% CI [62.49, 73.25]), F(1, 78) ⫽ 4.25, p ⫽ .043, ␩p2 ⫽ .05. The intensity manipulation check again confirmed that the positive events were thought to induce happiness (M ⫽ 86.55, SD ⫽ 10.23, comparing to the midpoint), t(81) ⫽ 32.35, p ⬍ .001, and the negative events were thought to induce sadness (M ⫽ 77.70, SD ⫽ 14.07), t(81) ⫽ 17.84, p ⬍ .001. And again we explored whether the same valence-by-desirability interaction that was observed for duration holds for intensity. The results revealed only a main effect of valence on intensity, F(1, 78) ⫽ 34.86, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .31. Neither the main effect of research condition, nor the two-way interaction effect of valence by emotion desirability were significant (all Fs ⬍ 1, all ps ⬎ .534, ␩p2 ⬍ .01). Overall, participants estimated the emotions caused by positive events as more intense (M ⫽ 86.71, SE ⫽ 1.10, 95% CI [84.51, 88.90]) than those caused by negative events (M ⫽ 77.51, SE ⫽ 1.58, 95% CI [74.37, 80.64]).

Study 5 Study 5 provides yet another direct test of our motivational account: It involves making affective forecasts for another person only (not the self) who is either described as likable (e.g., kind to animals, considerate to people in need) or dislikeable (the opposite). Participants were asked to forecast how long the other person would feel happy versus sad if he experienced positive versus negative events. Ultimately, our motivational account does not assign any special role to the self, other than the fact that most people usually prefer feeling positive emotions rather than negative ones, and that is what they like to think the future will be like: more positive than negative. The main force presumed to underlie the effect of valence on estimated duration of emotions is wishful thinking: desiring certain emotions to last longer than others. Even

Results We conducted a mixed design GLM, entering valence of emotions (happiness vs. sadness) as the within-subjects factor, and emotion desirability (control vs. experimental condition) as the between-subjects factor. Results revealed a significant main effect of valence on estimated duration of emotions, F(1, 78) ⫽ 23.25, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .23, qualified by a marginal interaction of valence by desirability, F(1, 78) ⫽ 3.49, p ⫽ .065, ␩p2 ⫽ .04 (see Figure 4). Simple pairwise comparisons showed that participants in the control condition estimated the duration of happiness as longer (M ⫽ 76.83, SE ⫽ 2.05, 95% CI [72.75, 80.92]) than the duration of

Figure 4. Positive–negative asymmetry of emotion duration as a function of emotion desirability in Study 4. Bars represent standard errors.


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if the self is removed from the equation, and the simulation is all about a different person, if one wishes that person to feel positive emotions (as people do for themselves), then one should estimate a longer duration for positive versus negative emotions. Therefore, happiness should be forecasted to last longer than sadness for a likable, but not a dislikeable, other person.

Method


Participants Eighty-two participants with a mean age of 21.78 years (SD ⫽ 6.53; 77% female) collaborated in exchange for course credit. Data were not analyzed prior to terminating collection.

Design Between-subjects, we manipulated whether the other person was described in a positive manner, as a good and altruistic person (n ⫽ 42; see Appendix B), or in a negative manner, as a bad and selfish person (n ⫽ 40). The valence of events was manipulated withinsubjects via the same positive and negative events used in Studies 1, 2, and 4.

Procedure Participants were instructed to read a description about a person (see Appendix B) and then imagine how this person would react in different situations. Specifically, they were asked to imagine several events as vividly as possible, and to estimate how the person would feel about each of them. The valence of the events was manipulated within-subjects, and the events were adapted to the target person (e.g., Imagine that James wins the lottery; Imagine that James is fired from his job). For each event, participants were asked to estimate for how long the person would feel happy (for positive events, ␣ ⫽ .87) or sad (for negative events, ␣ ⫽ 73), followed by the intensity manipulation check (“How much happiness/sadness would the person feel?” for positive events, ␣ ⫽ .89; for negative events, ␣ ⫽ 77) as in Studies 1, 2, and 4. Additionally, there was a manipulation check asking participants to rate “How happy do you wish James to be?” on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely).4

Results The results of the manipulation check confirmed that participants wished that the good target person would be happier (M ⫽ 90.31, SE ⫽ 3.85, 95% CI [82.66, 97.96]) than the bad one (M ⫽ 54.28, SE ⫽ 3.94, 95% CI [46.43, 62.12]), t(51.47) ⫽ 6.43, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .35. We hypothesized that when the target was likable, participants would expect him to feel the happiness associated with desirable events for longer than the sadness associated with undesirable events. When the target was described in a negative manner, on the other hand, we predicted this difference to be reduced or even reversed. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a mixed design GLM, entering valence (positive vs. negative) as the withinsubjects factor and target (likable vs. dislikeable) as the betweensubjects factor. The results yielded a significant main effect of

valence on estimated duration, F(1, 80) ⫽ 5.13, p ⫽ .026, ␩p2 ⫽ .06, which was qualified by an interaction effect of target by valence, F(1, 80) ⫽ 11.17, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .12 (see Figure 5). Simple pairwise comparisons showed that when the target was likable, participants estimated the duration of happiness as higher (M ⫽ 69.73, SE ⫽ 3.48, 95% CI [62.82, 76.65]) than the expected duration of sadness (M ⫽ 57.11, SE ⫽ 2.98, 95% CI [51.18, 63.05]), F(1, 80) ⫽ 16.10, p ⬍ .001, ␩p2 ⫽ .17. However, when the target was dislikeable, the expected duration of happiness (M ⫽ 49.28, SE ⫽ 3.56, 95% CI [42.19, 56.36]) did not differ significantly from the expected duration of sadness (M ⫽ 51.70, SE ⫽ 3.06, 95% CI [45.62, 57.78]), F ⬍ 1, p ⫽ .454, ␩p2 ⬍ .01. The intensity ratings again confirmed that positive events were imagined to bring about strong feelings of happiness (M ⫽ 68.21, SD ⫽ 24.52), t(81) ⫽ 6.73, p ⬍ .001, just as the negative events were imagined to produce feelings of sadness (M ⫽ 64.51, SD ⫽ 21.13), t(81) ⫽ 6.22, p ⬍ .001. Additionally, as in the previous studies, we explored whether the valence-by-target interaction also holds for intensity ratings. Results revealed a marginal main effect of valence on intensity, F(1, 80) ⫽ 2.79, p ⫽ .099, ␩p2 ⫽ .03, qualified by a significant two-way interaction of valence by target on intensity, F(1, 80) ⫽ 4.91, p ⫽ .030, ␩p2 ⫽ .06. Simple pairwise comparisons showed that when the target was a good person, participants expected more intensity for happiness associated to the positive events (M ⫽ 79.22, SE ⫽ 3.38, 95% CI [72.50, 85.09]) than for sadness associated to negative events (M ⫽ 70.88, SE ⫽ 3.12, 95% CI [64.67, 77.08]), F(1, 80) ⫽ 7.74, p ⫽ .007, ␩p2 ⫽ .09. When the target was a bad person, the intensity of happiness for positive events (M ⫽ 56.66, SE ⫽ 3.46, 95% CI [49.78, 63.54]) and sadness for negative events (M ⫽ 57.83, SE ⫽ 3.20, 95% CI [51.47, 64.19]) did not differ (F ⬍ 1, p ⫽ .704, ␩p2 ⬍ .01).

Discussion This study sought to further test a desirability-based mechanism: Desirability is usually not a factor when people make judgments about other people. But if we make it a factor, as in this study, where participants presumably wished for good things to come to the likable target, and for the unlikeable target to experience bad outcomes, then we should observe the same optimistic pattern in forecasts for the likable other as for the self, and a more pessimistic forecast for the unlikeable target. Even though the results fit this prediction, some degree of caution is necessary in interpreting these findings, as there are potential confounds to be considered: namely, the manipulation of the likability of the other person is potentially confounded with other factors, such as their general level of happiness. Specifically, the likable person is described as a person who has many friends and does nice things for people, whereas the unlikable person is described as a person who has almost no friends and is negligent to others. Therefore, this difference in character might account for the difference in affective forecasts across targets. 4 At the end of the study, participants were also asked to fill out the Belief in a Just World (BJW) scale (Dalbert, 1999) to test whether the predicted effect is moderated by individual differences in the tendency to believe that good (bad) things happen to good (bad) people. Adding BJW scores to the analysis did not change the results: the critical Target ⫻ Valence interaction remained significant, and BJW did not interact with any of the other factors (Fs ⬍ 1.62, ps ⬎ .207, ␩2p ⬍ .02).


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children in Africa are starving. Conversely, it is presumably undesirable to feel happy (a positive emotion) if a family member dies and as a consequence you inherit a lot of money. Therefore, we had participants make forecasts about various emotions, positive and negative, both of which could be desirable or undesirable. We predicted that the Desirability ⫻ Target interaction that was found in the previous studies would be replicated, importantly, both for positive and negative emotions.

Method


Participants Figure 5. Positive–negative asymmetry of emotion duration as a function of target desirability, Study 5. Bars represent standard errors.

Still, Study 5 is only one of six studies showing the predicted effect in different ways, using different manipulations and analyses. That is, while we cannot completely rule out the possibility of confounds for each specific study, in their whole these studies provide several conceptual replications of the effect. Moreover, among other goals, Study 6 aims to address this issue by generalizing the effect to generic targets that are not construed in specific (and possibly confound-ridden) ways.

Study 6 Study 6 sought to address potential confounds in the previous studies: it could be that the results that we found were about specific emotions such as sadness and happiness, and not positive versus negative emotions in general. Or it could be that there were confounds in the vignettes that we depicted. For instance, in Study 5, participants made forecasts about a very particular person, whose character might account for such forecasts. Therefore, in this final study, we had participants make forecasts about themselves versus other people in general (thus eliminating any possible confounds related to the way a specific other person is construed or to his or her inferred personality traits) and asked them to estimate the duration of 10 different kind of emotions (five positive, five negative—thereby going beyond happiness and sadness and generalizing our findings across a wide range of positive and negative emotions) across 20 different situations (thus making the scenarios much more plentiful and diverse) and, more importantly, by manipulating the valence of the emotions (positive vs. negative) orthogonally to their desirability (desirable vs. undesirable), thus showing that different emotions, even negative ones, have the same pattern of optimistic forecasting for self versus for others, to the extent that it is thought to be desirable to experience them. For instance, it is more likely considered to be appropriate to be proud when you and your team defeat another team at the big game when you put a lot of effort into it and deserved to win, rather than when luck was involved and the victory was undeserved. To the extent that the former is more desirable than the latter, we expect participants to estimate that they would feel pride for longer in the former case than in the latter and that this difference is less pronounced when making forecasts about other people. We used various such examples. To give another example, it is desirable to feel upset (a negative emotion) upon hearing that

Ninety-eight participants with a mean age of 31.23 years (SD ⫽ 9.81; 47% female) recruited from Prolific Academic (www.prolific .ac) collaborated in exchange for payment. Data were not analyzed prior to terminating collection.

Design Target was manipulated between-subjects: Participants had to imagine several events as if they were to happen to themselves (self: n ⫽ 49), or to another person (others: n ⫽ 49). Emotions, valence and desirability of events were manipulated withinsubjects (see Appendix C for details).

Procedure Participants were instructed to read several events and to imagine each event as vivid as possible, and then report the duration associated with each emotion involved in the different situations (see Appendix C). For each event, participants were asked to estimate for how long the target would feel its associated emotion (for positive emotions, ␣ ⫽ .65; for negative emotions, ␣ ⫽ 76) on a scale ranging from 0 (very little time) to 100 (very long time).

Results We hypothesized two distinct effects: an interaction of target by valence, replicating the previous findings; and more importantly, an interaction effect of target by desirability, independent of valence. We conducted a linear mixed model analysis to test our hypotheses. Duration was entered as the dependent variable. As fixed effects, we entered target, valence, and desirability, as well as all the interaction terms. As random effects, we had intercepts for emotion and subjects to adjust for possible variation. The results yielded a significant main effect of valence (estimate ⫽ 18.53, SE ⫽ 2.46, t ⫽ 7.53, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 1.5, 95% CI [13.70, 23.37]) and a main effect of desirability on estimated duration (estimate ⫽ ⫺22.28, SE ⫽ 2.44, t ⫽ ⫺9.14, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 1.8, 95% CI [⫺27.07, ⫺17.50]). As predicted, target interacted with valence (estimate ⫽ 6.80, SE ⫽ 3.48, t ⫽ 1.96, p ⫽ .051, d ⫽ 0.4, 95% CI [⫺0.03, 13.64]) and with desirability (estimate ⫽ ⫺9.44, SE ⫽ 3.45, t ⫽ ⫺2.74, p ⫽ .006, d ⫽ 0.6, 95% CI [⫺16.21, ⫺2.67]; see Figure 6), independently. The interaction effect of valence by desirability was also significant (estimate ⫽ ⫺18.68, SE ⫽ 3.40, t ⫽ ⫺5.50, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ 1.1, 95% CI [⫺25.34, ⫺12.01]). The three-way interaction of Target ⫻ Valence ⫻ Desirability was not significant (estimate ⫽ ⫺2.54, SE ⫽ 4.81, t ⫽ 0.53, p ⫽ .598, d ⫽



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Figure 6. Desirability– undesirability asymmetry of emotion duration as a function of target, Study 6. Bars represent standard errors.

0.1, 95% CI [⫺6.89, 11.96]). The random effect of emotion was marginal (estimate ⫽ 30.61, SE ⫽ 17.74, Z ⫽ 1.73, p ⫽ .084, 95% CI [9.83, 95.30]). Looking at the interpretation of Cohen’s (1988) d, the magnitude of the effect size of target by desirability qualifies as strong, whereas the effect size of target by valence qualifies only as intermediate. When decomposing the Target ⫻ Valence interaction effect, the results showed that the asymmetry between positive and negative emotional duration was higher for the self (Mpositive ⫽ 56.87, SE ⫽ 2.11, 95% CI [52.69, 61.05]; Mnegative ⫽ 39.60, SE ⫽ 2.14, 95% CI [35.38, 43.83]; Mdifference ⫽ 17.27, SE ⫽ 1.70, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [13.94, 20.60]) than for another person (Mpositive ⫽ 53.29, SE ⫽ 2.11, 95% CI [49.11, 57.47]; Mnegative ⫽ 44.10, SE ⫽ 2.14, 95% CI [39.87, 48.32]; Mdifference ⫽ 9.19, SE ⫽ 1.70, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [5.86, 12.52]). Similarly, the Target ⫻ Desirability interaction also showed a higher asymmetry for undesirable versus desirable emotional duration for the self (Mundesirable ⫽ 28.34, SE ⫽ 2.11, 95% CI [24.17, 32.51]; Mdesirable ⫽ 68.14, SE ⫽ 2.14, 95% CI [63.90, 72.37]; Mdifference ⫽ ⫺39.80, SE ⫽ 1.70, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [⫺43.13, ⫺36.47]) when compared with another person (Mundesirable ⫽ 32.88, SE ⫽ 2.11, 95% CI [28.71, 37.06]; Mdesirable ⫽ 64.50, SE ⫽ 2.14, 95% CI [60.27, 68.74]; Mdifference ⫽ ⫺31.62, SE ⫽ 1.70, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [⫺34.95, ⫺28.29]). When decomposing the valence-by-desirability interaction, results show that the same positive emotion is estimated to last shorter when it is undesirable (M ⫽ 32.87, SE ⫽ 1.74, 95% CI [29.44, 36.30]) than when it is desirable (M ⫽ 77.29, SE ⫽ 1.68, 95% CI [73.96, 80.61], Mdifference ⫽ ⫺44.42, SE ⫽ 1.67, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [⫺47.70, ⫺41.13]). And for the same negative emotion, the pattern is the same: undesirability makes forecasts about the same emotion shorter (M ⫽ 28.35, SE ⫽ 1.67, 95% CI [25.05, 31.64]) when compared with its desirable version (M ⫽ 55.35, SE ⫽ 1.81, 95% CI [51.79, 58.91]; Mdifference ⫽ ⫺27.01, SE ⫽ 1.72, p ⬍ .001, 95% CI [⫺30.39, ⫺23.62]).

General Discussion Six studies provided systematic evidence for the influence of wishful thinking on the estimated duration of emotions. In Studies 1 through 3, desirable emotions triggered by positive events were

expected to last longer than undesirable emotions triggered by negative events, but this difference only held for the self, not for other people. Additionally, Study 2 showed that desirability mediated the effect of event valence on expected emotional duration only for the self, not for other people. Studies 4 through 5 directly tested our motivational account: Study 4 revealed that manipulating the desirability of certain emotions (happiness depicted as less desirable, and sadness as more desirable) influenced the forecasted duration of those emotions. In Study 5 the same positive–negative asymmetry that was found for the self in Studies 1 through 4 was also observed for another person that was described as likable, but not when the other person was described in a negative manner. And Study 6 replicated the pattern of more optimistic forecasts about the self versus about others, for a wide variety of emotions, and importantly, both for positive and negative emotions: To the extent that an emotion is desirable, be it positive or negative in valence, people expect it to last longer for themselves than for others. These results suggest that desirability is one of the factors driving the forecasts that people make about how long they will experience certain emotions: People expect themselves (or others) to feel certain emotions for a longer while to the extent that that is desirable. This research extends the body of findings in the optimism literature by showing that people not only expect to experience more positive events than negative ones, but they also expect the positive emotions produced by the former to last longer than the negative emotions resulting from the latter.

Differences From Previous Research The vast majority of research on affective forecasting has focused on demonstrating people’s inability to accurately predict future emotional reactions at a certain point of time in the future: People overestimate their future emotional reactions to both positive and negative events, as compared with how they actually feel when the time comes. In the present studies, we did not compare forecasts against experience, but rather assessed in a direct way estimates of emotion duration. This methodology revealed two novel findings: first, people expect positive emotions to last longer than negative ones, and second, this asymmetric pattern only holds for themselves, not others. At first, it might appear that our results contradict previous findings in this field (see Wilson & Gilbert, 2003, for a review). Indeed, previous studies typically show that the overestimation of experienced affect when compared with forecasts is greater for negative versus positive emotions, whereas the present studies show that people forecast a longer duration for positive versus negative emotions. This apparent discrepancy can be resolved if we consider (1) differences in method and (2) differences in the time course of positive versus negative emotions. First, differences in method: Typical studies of affective forecasting compare the intensity (and not the duration) of forecasted (T1) versus experienced (T2) emotions. The present studies, on the other hand, compared forecasts (T1) about the duration of positive versus negative emotions (as well as the critical social comparison dimension: self vs. others). Thus, the present research cannot and does not make claims about the accuracy of predictions, as it neither tests nor shows whether there is overestimation about positive versus negative emotions, but simply demonstrates that positive emotions are estimated to last longer than negative ones. There is a difference in the measures and contrasts that are relevant



to test different hypotheses: Research examining the impact bias is concerned with comparing forecasts of intensity against intensity of experience, whereas the present research is concerned with testing a desirability bias in forecasts about the duration of positive versus negative emotions. More importantly, research on emotions and how they develop across time reveals a crucial clue that reconciles our findings with those of previous studies: People might predict a longer duration for positive versus negative events (as was consistently observed in the present studies), and yet overestimate the impact of negative events to a greater extent, provided that negative emotions fade more quickly than positive ones. Indeed, there is a great deal of evidence suggesting that negative emotions fade more quickly than positive ones (Ritchie, Skowronski, Hartnett, Wells, & Walker, 2009; Ritchie et al., 2006; Skowronski, Gibbons, Vogl, & Walker, 2004; Walker, Skowronski, Gibbons, Vogl, & Ritchie, 2009; Walker, Skowronski, Gibbons, Vogl, & Thompson, 2003; Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003; Walker, Vogl, & Thompson, 1997). This is known as the fading affect bias (Walker et al., 2003), and it is explained by strategic memory rehearsal. For instance, Walker et al. (2009) document different types of memory rehearsal that prevent emotions from fading, such as “rehearsal for maintaining memory for events” or “rehearsal for the purpose of re-experiencing the emotion associated with the event”, and they find that (1) memory rehearsal is more frequent for positive events than for negative ones and (2) events that are frequently rehearsed are associated with less fading of emotions. Thus, to the extent that positive emotions are kept alive for longer, forecasts that such emotions will last long might not be off target. On the other hand, to the extent that negative emotions fade more quickly (for instance via coping mechanisms such as reappraisal or memory suppression), people might err by a greater margin in their forecasts, such that they predict that they will have a certain duration (though shorter than positive emotions—the optimistic bias that we found), but fail to take into account the immune system (immune neglect; Gilbert et al., 1998) and therefore fail to see how they will last for much shorter than they predicted. For instance, forecasters might predict that the duration of positive emotions is x times longer than that of negative ones, but to the extent that the difference in decay for negative versus positive emotions is larger than x, we might observe both an optimistic bias in predictions (predictions at T1: positive ⬎ negative) and a greater impact bias for negative versus positive emotions (comparing predictions at T1 to experiences at T2). Thus, the self-protective and enhancing nature of memory helps to both legitimize the asymmetry that we found (i.e., forecasters might be accurate in predicting that positive emotions last longer than negative ones) and reconcile it with the typical findings in affective forecasting research: For positive emotions, people actively work to keep them alive, whereas for negative emotions they work at suppressing them, and so it will be easier to overestimate the duration/impact of negative emotions. In addition to the relevance of studying forecasts about emotion duration, we also believe that the asymmetry in affective forecasting that we find for self versus for others might be important in explaining well-documented effects, such as the difference in choice (for self) versus advice (for others), as we explain in the following text.

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Moreover, this research goes beyond the valence dimension that previous research has focused on, by showing that regardless of whether certain emotions are positive or negative, to the extent that it is desirable to experience them in a certain situation, forecasters predict that they will feel such emotions for a long time (even clearly negative-valenced emotions such as shame, envy or disgust; Study 6). In this sense, these results do not allow for a simple portrayal of our findings as merely showing that people make optimistic predictions. In Study 6, it is not easy to define optimism. What is more optimistic: to expect a positive emotion that is nevertheless undesirable (or at least socially proscribed), or to expect a desirable emotion that is nevertheless negative and upsetting? Indeed, it has recently been suggested that: biases in emotion attribution might not always reflect a desire to view one’s self as experiencing more positively valenced emotions, but should flexibly tune individuals towards the belief that they experience more desirable emotions, irrespective of valence. This is also a natural prediction of theories of motivated cognition (e.g., Hughes & Zaki, 2015). Future work should test this prediction by varying the goal consistency of emotions across a variety of contexts. (Ong, Goodman, & Zaki, 2018, p. 124)

Study 6 offers precisely this test.

Potential Mechanisms Several mechanisms might contribute to the present findings. Starting with misconstrual (Gilbert et al., 1998), people might overestimate the emotional impact of events because they imagine them in an overly simplistic way, neglecting important characteristics of the event as it will actually be experienced, characteristics which are incongruent with, and might potentially counteract, the imagined emotional reaction to the event. A self-serving form of construal might account for the present findings. Specifically, people might be more likely to consider external circumstances when forecasting the emotional impact of negative events than when making forecasts about positive emotions. This is consistent with a great deal of research on the self-serving bias, whereby people are sensitive to external factors when explaining their failures, whereas they attribute their successes to internal factors such as their abilities and dispositions (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Frieze & Weiner, 1971). Thus, when making forecasts about negative emotions for the self, people might strategically consider those mitigating aspects in order to support their optimistic expectations. This is also consistent with findings in other areas of motivated reasoning, where people are known to scrutinize and put greater deliberation into refuting negative conclusions (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Mata et al., 2013). For forecasts about others, however, this is not the case. Research on the fundamental attribution error and the correspondence bias shows that people are not usually prone to consider situational circumstances when explaining others’ behaviors (Jones & Nisbett, 1971). The same neglect might hold for forecasts about how others will feel. Another mechanism suggested by Gilbert et al. (1998) that is relevant to this discussion is motivated distortion, according to which affective forecasting can serve several types of motives. For instance, people might make predictions that make them feel good. Gilbert et al. suggested that “people may overestimate the duration of their affective responses to the positive events they anticipate . . . because the mere act of making that forecast induces positive affect” (p. 618)


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or that people might make forecasts that serve their goals: “people may even use dire affective forecasts to motivate themselves to expend effort in the pursuit of desirable ends” and “people may exaggerate the negative affective consequences of certain outcomes to motivate themselves to pursue one course of action over another” (p. 618). Of these two, only the first type of motivation (wishful thinking) is relevant to the present research. However, only the second one (goal-driven forecasting) has been systematically investigated. Indeed, several authors have suggested that the reason why people overestimate the impact of positive and negative experiences is to motivate them to pursue positive outcomes and avoid negative ones (Baumeister et al., 2016; Miloyan & Suddendorf, 2015; Morewedge & Buechel, 2013): “the impact bias may exist to motivate future behavior” (Morewedge & Buechel, 2013, p. 1) and prospection is said to be “pragmatic to the extent that it is useful for helping the person to act or not to act in the present or to decide how to respond in the future” (Baumeister et al., 2016, p. 4). Our approach also relies on motivation. However, the motivation that the present studies focus on is wishful thinking, what people wish to believe in, not the motivation to strive toward certain outcomes and avoid others. Indeed, some of the scenarios that were used involved hypothetical and unlikely events. Presumably, these did not involve motivation to engage in any kind of behavior. Moreover, this motivation to pursue certain behaviors was absent in the case of forecasting other people’s emotions, and yet we found that wishful thinking (i.e., wishing that good vs. bad outcomes fall on the other person) exerted the predicted influence even for those others (Study 5). More importantly, according to goal-oriented approaches, people should exaggerate the emotional impact of negative events, as that would impel them to avoid such events. However, we found that people estimate the negative emotions produced by undesired events to be more short-lived than the positive emotions produced by desired events. In sum, when Gilbert et al. (1998) discuss potential influences on affective forecasting, by and large they focus on the overestimation of both positive and negative emotions (increasing motivation to pursue positive events and prevent negative events, or managing affect by promoting positive affect or defensive pessimism). The present research, on the other hand, looked into a motive that had not yet been systematically explored, one that boosts positive forecasts and counteracts negative ones: wishful thinking. Yet another mechanism that might account for the present findings is knowledge of coping resources. Indeed, our research is not the first to explore self– other differences in affective forecasting. Igou (2008) compared people’s predictions of affective responses to negative events for self versus others, and found that participants predicted a longer duration of negative emotions for others than for themselves. This self– other asymmetry in affective forecasting was explained by differences in knowledge of coping resources, such that people have better insight into their own versus others’ coping strategies (i.e., less immune neglect for self vs. others). Thus, differences in knowledge of coping resources for self versus others might explain different forecasts with regard to negative emotions. This, together with the fact that people are in tune with their thoughts, motives and their potential when making assessments and forecasts for themselves, such that their hopes and intentions are part of how they imagine their future, but they do not use this information for inferences and forecasts about others (Helzer & Dunning, 2012; Pronin, 2009; Williams & Gilovich,

2008; Williams, Gilovich, & Dunning, 2012), might help explain the present findings: People might be aware that they make active efforts to prolong their positive emotions, or that they possess coping resources that they can use to deal with negative emotions, but as they do not possess or use this knowledge when making forecasts about others, they might believe that they are better able to manage their emotions strategically than others. Even the mere difference in affective reactions when making forecasts for oneself versus others might account for the present findings. Research shows that desirability influences likelihood judgments directly via automatic affective reactions that are associated with thinking about specific future events: To the extent that certain events make people feel good when thinking about them, they are judged as more likely to occur (Lench, 2009; Lench & Bench, 2012; Lench & Darbor, 2014). The same mechanism that drives this optimistic bias in likelihood judgments might underlie the self– other difference in duration estimates: If the affective reaction that a person experiences when imagining positive outcomes is stronger when making forecasts for the self than when making forecasts about others, then the former should be more optimistic than the latter (for negative outcomes, one might counteract those negative reactions by strategically construing the situation, as stated in the preceding text). Finally, even though we did not test for potential moderators related to individual differences, we suspect that, just as for other comparative biases and motivated reasoning effects in general, the degree to which forecasters show the optimistic pattern that we found depends on whether the person has a high or low selfesteem, or whether they tend toward chronic optimism or pessimism (Brown, 1986; Brown & Gallagher, 1992; Brown & Smart, 1991; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987; Harris, Griffin, & Murray, 2008; Jussim, Yen, & Aiello, 1995; Kuiper & MacDonald, 1982; Lin, Lin, & Raghubir, 2003; Suls, Lemos, & Stewart, 2002).

Duration Versus Intensity In addition to forecasts about duration, in Studies 1 through 5, we also measured the predicted intensity of emotions, as a manipulation check that the forecasted events induced clearly positive and negative emotions. Even though that was not the goal of the present studies, we explored whether the same interaction pattern that was predicted for duration also holds for intensity. In Studies 2 and 5, this interaction was observed, such that people expect the happiness produced by positive events to be more intense than the sadness associated with negative events, but this only holds for themselves (or the likable other, as in Study 5). In other studies, however, this pattern was not observed or it was not significant (Studies 1, 3, and 4). There are several reasons why results for intensity are not as clear as those for duration. First, duration and intensity are different aspects of emotional experience (Brans & Verduyn, 2014; Frijda, Ortony, Sonnemans, & Clore, 1992), so that their predicted patterns are not necessarily parallel. Moreover, it might be easier to engage in wishful thinking about the duration of emotions than about its intensity. That is, there might be plausibility constraints (Kunda, 1990) that prevent people from imagining that they would not feel quite sad upon experiencing a very negative outcome. However, it is less certain how long that sadness might last, and therefore there might be a greater margin for optimism in predictions about duration. This also follows from research on how wishful thinking and self-enhancement are



more prevalent for ambiguous attributes (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). It is relatively unambiguous that a rejection would hurt, for instance. However, it is less clear how long that pain would last, which would make it more likely that optimistic forecasts are made about the latter dimension (duration) than the former (intensity). One final reason for the discrepancy between forecasted duration and intensity can be found in Igou’s (2008) account of affective forecasting, focusing on knowledge of coping resources: People might not predict emotions to differ in intensity for self versus for others right away. However, because they have greater insight about their coping resources than about other people’s resources, they might expect to adapt more quickly to a negative event than other people. Coping resources would presumably take some time to assuage the emotional consequences. If people interpret the intensity question as measuring how intensely they would expect to feel immediately after the event (which is likely), then their beliefs about having better or worse coping resources than others should make little difference. It is only after some time that differences in coping resources should start to show. Therefore, to the extent that forecasters base their estimates at least partly on their coping resources, self– other differences should emerge more clearly for the measure that takes into consideration the temporal factor: duration. Still, we do find this effect for intensity in some studies, though not all of them. Thus, the effect might exist, although smaller in size for intensity than for duration (for the aforementioned reasons). More importantly, even though we did not find the same self– other difference as consistently for intensity, we did find consistent evidence for wishful thinking in intensity forecasts for the self. That is, people make optimistic forecasts for themselves, estimating greater intensity for positive or desirable emotions versus negative or undesirable ones. A meta-analysis combining the data from all the studies where we measured forecasted intensity for the self (i.e., Studies 1 through 4) clearly shows that optimistic forecasts also hold for intensity. Indeed, this internal meta-analysis shows a significant desirability effect for the aggregated data (overall effect size: d ⫽ .30), following the same pattern of duration. Thus, even though the self– other difference in affective forecasting seems to more robust for duration forecasts than for intensity forecasts (for the aforementioned reasons), both types of forecast follow the same pattern with regard to wishful thinking, as shown in the optimistic forecasts that participants made for themselves.

Implications Our findings have potential implications for the choices that people make. Indeed, affective forecasting has been shown to influence choices and actions (e.g., Mellers & McGraw, 2001; Richard, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996; Shiv & Huber, 2000). Therefore, if it is indeed the case that people estimate positive emotions to last longer than negative ones, then they might be more willing, for instance, to be risk seeking (e.g., in gambling or dating), as the negative emotions that would result in case the outcome was bad would not be expected to sting for as long as the positive emotions associated to a good outcome. Moreover, our findings may help to understand the different choices that people make for themselves versus others. There is a well-documented asymmetry between advice and choice, such that what people choose for themselves often differs from the choices that they advise others to make. In particular, people tend to be more cautious in the choices that they advise others to make than

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in the choices that they make for themselves (see Atanasov, 2015, for a meta-analysis; see Dana & Cain, 2015, for a review). It might be that this asymmetry between choice and advice is in part due to the asymmetry in affective forecasting for self versus for others that we found. Specifically, because people estimate that positive emotions will last longer than negative ones for themselves, this might encourage them to be more risk seeking, as aforementioned. However, for others, if people expect that negative emotions will be as long-lasting as positive ones, then they might be more cautious in their advice and therefore less prone to advise others to take risks. Future research should explore consequences of this self– other difference in affective forecasting. Finally, we know that people learn to anticipate the emotional outcomes of their behaviors, and that anticipated emotions are important driving factors determining the way people behave and the choices they make (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999). An interesting question is what dimension of anticipated emotions is more influential in people’s choice and behavior: intensity or duration? As an example, people might be more willing to take a risk if they expect that, in the case of a negative outcome, they will experience intense but short-lived emotions, than if those emotions are expected to be less intense but longer-lasting. Future research should disentangle these different types of forecast and test which of them carries more weight in people’s actions and decisions.

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(Appendices follow)

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Appendix A


Text Used in Study 4 The current study investigates the beliefs people have about emotions, such as happiness and sadness. Sadness is essential to human functioning. Being constantly sad, with the feeling of being trapped in sadness is harmful. However, some recent research has found that being sad for a certain amount of time creates important benefits. These studies show that sadness is essential to mature human personality and to make us grow as human beings. Feeling sadness in the right moment helps to develop the ability to be resilient toward adversity. Specifically, sadness helps us to better memorize cues associated to negative experiences causing it. That allows us to learn how to avoid the same future experiences if one wishes to do so. Additionally, research on cognitive psychology suggests that sadness facilitates a deeper processing of the meaning of life experiences. Conversely, when we are happy, we think in a more

superficial way about our experiences. This means that individuals who immediately overcome sadness do not learn valuable life lessons. Finally, several studies showed that being sad makes us more attentive to signals from other people who need our attention. So-to-say, sadness promotes empathy toward those with whom we share the same negative affect. On the contrary, this is more difficult to grasp when one is happy: when in a positive affective state, it is very complicated to take the perspective of someone else who is in a negative affective state. As a consequence, when feeling happy, individuals may become unconsciously negligent toward others who need attention and care. This is called the happiness myopia: Happy people are not so aware of their social environment.

Appendix B Texts Used in Study 5 Desirable Other

Undesirable Other

James is the type of person who has lots of friends. Everyone who knows him says that he is a great person. Even though he is a huge soccer fan (whenever he can, he doesn’t miss a match of his soccer club), he puts his passion aside every time someone needs help. For example, every Sunday, even when his favorite team plays an important game, he spends the afternoon with his ill grandmother (the person who raised him). Not only is James thoughtful to others, but he also has a huge concern and caring for animals. For example, he recently adopted an abandoned, one-eye-blinded dog.

James is the type of person who has almost no friends. Everyone who knows him says that he is a terrible person. For example, since he left his ill grandmother’s home (the person who raised him), he never went back, not even once, to visit her. Instead, James, who is a huge soccer fan (whenever he can, he doesn’t miss a match of his soccer club), would rather watch a game than help his grandmother. Not only is James negligent towards others, but he is also negligent and cruel towards animals. For example, he recently abandoned his one-eye-blinded dog.

(Appendices continue)


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Appendix C


Events and Emotions Used in Study 6 Valence

Undesirable

Desirable

Emotion

Positive

Imagine that you[another person] read[s] about a person who is very famous and has great wealth, and is at a top place in society, despite the fact that he made it to the top out of personal connections and not true merit. Imagine that a friend or acquaintance invested a large sum in your[another person’s] personal project with money from donations that was supposed to help third–world countries. Imagine that you and your[another person and his] team defeat another team at the big game and thus win the tournament, but luck was involved and the victory was undeserved.

Imagine that you[another person] read[s] about a couple who has decided to adopt a deaf child, despite all the challenges that such decision implies.

Admiration

Imagine that a friend or acquaintance invested a large sum in your[another person’s] personal project with money from his own savings, because they truly believe in you[the other person]. Imagine that you and your[another person and his] team were the underdogs at a tournament and, through hard work, you[they] manage to defeat another team that is much more prestigious and superior (even arrogant), and thereby you and your[the other person and his] team end up winning the tournament. Imagine that that you[another person] see[s] a despicable person (e.g., a member of a racial hate organization) trip and fall when speaking on a rally on national TV. Imagine that you[another person] hear[s] on the news that environmental–protection efforts are paying off, such that the rate of extinction of species throughout the planet is slowing down. Imagine that you[another person] find[s] out that you[he] were[was] outperformed by a colleague, so that you[he] might feel inspired by this colleague’s example to work harder and do better. Imagine that you[another person] have[s] a sibling who is handicapped, and that once, out of embarrassment, you[he] hid that fact from other people. Imagine that you[another person] hear[s] that an acquaintance of yours[his] watches pornography featuring very young women who are still in their teens. Imagine that you[another person] are[is] applying for a job that you[he] very much desire[s], and an acquaintance is in the position to select you[him]. Even though you[the other person] are[is] better qualified, your[his] acquaintance ends up selecting another candidate who is a personal friend.

Gratitude

Imagine that you[another person] see[s] someone overweight trip and fall when crossing the street. Imagine that a member of your[another person’s] family dies and you[that person] inherit[s] a lot of money. Negative

Imagine that you[another person] find[s] out that you[he] were[was] outperformed by a colleague, so that you[he] might wish your[his] colleague misfortune. Imagine that you[another person] have[s] a sibling who is handicapped, and that your [his] friends find out about this sibling. Imagine that you[another person] hear[s] that an acquaintance of yours[his] is dating a person who is 40 years older than him. Imagine that you[another person] are[is] applying for a job that you[he] very much desire[s], and an acquaintance is in the position to select you[him]. Even though you[the other person] might expect to be chosen out of friendship, your[his] acquaintance ends up selecting another candidate who is better qualified. Imagine that you[another person] hear[s] on the news about how the government and local authorities are becoming increasingly represented by members of different ethnicities.

Imagine that you[another person] hear[s] on the news about how the children in Africa are going hungry and lacking basic medical assistance.

Pride

Impulse to laugh Happiness

Envy

Shame Disgust Anger

Upset

Received January 24, 2017 Revision received March 21, 2018 Accepted March 24, 2018 䡲