Energy Transition in the Netherlands

Energy Transition in the Netherlands Storylines from regime actors

Master thesis Renewable Energy Management Rick Bosman, October 2012

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Energy Transition in the Netherlands Storylines from regime actors

Cover illustration by Joël de Bruijn

Master thesis Renewable Energy Management Rick Bosman, 26 October 2012

Matrikel-Nr. 3124212 [email protected] Supervisors: Dr. Till Pistorius, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg Prof. Dr. Ir. Jan Rotmans, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam Scientific Supervisor: Dr. Derk Loorbach, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 3

Niets is blijvend behalve verandering Nothing lasts except change - Unknown Rotterdam street artist

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I.

Preface

About four years ago I got interested in energy and set out on an (intellectual) journey guided by the question: why does the transition to a more sustainable energy system proves so difficult? This journey has taken me to Australia, Germany and back to the Netherlands. This research has been inspired by experiences along the way. Especially the difference in looking at energy issues between people I met in Freiburg and at the Clingendael International Energy Programme where I did an internship in autumn 2011 made a lasting impression. These different viewpoints intrigued me and I got the impression they formed part of the challenge. The starting point of this research therefore is, to put it in the words of one of my respondents: ‘There is not one truth, but rather there are lots of truths, because from a different perspective something else is also true.’ Most of my education up to now has had a more positivistic approach, in which there is one truth waiting to be discovered by objective scientists. Therefore, getting my head around such a different, constructivist tradition and overseeing its implications has been an important part of the learning process during this thesis. Also having the opportunity to speak to and learn from numerous energy professionals in the field has been a great experience. One of the implications of taking a constructivist approach is the recognition that I am also guided by certain beliefs on how the world works that are different from other people. These beliefs will have surely affected my research. Therefore, I do not expect that everyone in the energy sector will agree with the findings in this thesis, however, when some of them will at least find the analysis useful in getting some grip on what is going on in the energy domain, my mission has succeeded. This thesis was written at the Dutch Research Institute for Transitions (DRIFT). I am very grateful to my colleagues at DRIFT for the inspiring environment they provided and letting me benefit from the expertise that has been built up in transition research over the last decade. This thesis would not have been possible without all the respondents making time for me in their busy schedules; the passionate guidance of Dr. Till Pistorius and Dr. Derk Loorbach; the valuable lunch discussions with Shivant Jhagroe; the constructive feedback from Prof. Dr. Ir. Jan Rotmans; the support of my family, especially my dad who even helped transcribing an interview; Merijn Bosman, Irene Dekker, Timon Dubbeling, Hendrik Steringa and Gijs Diercks who took the time to comment on different concept versions; and last but not least Nena de Clercq who never got bored of listening to my energy stories, or at least hid it very well. Thanks a lot to all of you.

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II.

Executive Summary

The Dutch energy system is changing. But what exactly is changing, what the drivers for change are, in what direction the change is, or should be heading and at what speed is disputed. The premise of this research is that what changes are observed is dependent on the point of view of the observer. This thesis is part of the academic field of transition studies. Transitions are fundamental changes in society or societal subsystems such as the energy domain. The idea is that such changes can be studied by distinguishing three levels within a system: niche-level, where innovative practices develop; the regime-level that provides stability and continuity; and the landscape level that encompasses long term trends and external shocks to a system. A successful transition is the result of long-term interaction between and within these various levels. Up to now, the transitions field has directed most attention towards the development of innovative practices at the niche-level, as these are seen as the most important drivers for disruptive innovations. The regime level is generally seen as resisting change. However, its exact functioning in an on-going transition challenge has not been studied in detail yet. This research aims to address this gap in the transitions literature by exploring the energy transition from the point of view of regime actors in the Dutch energy domain. In order to map the different understandings actors have of the challenges in the energy system the scientific discipline of argumentative discourse analysis has been used. This approach was developed to systematically identify storylines, the narratives actors use to convey their understanding of the world around them. Because the Netherlands has a functioning energy system, it was assumed that it should be possible to identify a dominant storyline shared by regime actors operating in the energy domain. Furthermore, if a transition is indeed going on in the energy domain, these regime actors should observe significant changes. Insights from discourse theory suggest people will recognize and interpret events and changes differently. This implies that different regime actors will interpret the changes in the energy system differently. This could lead to confusion, insecurity and conflict over the dominant storyline or ‘discursive regime destabilisation’ as this process has been coined. In this research the Dutch energy regime has been defined as the dominant culture, structure and practices within the energy system. It is characterized by a centralized and top-down organized production and distribution system which is predominantly based on fossil-fuels and high levels of energy consumption, and consists of (people working for) energy companies, ministries, NGOs, research institutes, interest groups, intermediaries and energy consumers. The research started with an initial scan of the field based on desk-research and telephone interviews with intermediaries. These intermediaries have been asked who they consider as powerful actors in the Dutch energy domain. The outcome was that Energie-Nederland, the 6

interest group for the Dutch energy sector would form an appropriate starting point for this research. In turn people at strategic positions within Energie-Nederland, several of its member organisations (Delta, Eneco, E.on, Essent, GDF-Suez, GreenChoice and NUON) and other organisations in the direct environment, such as the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation (EL&I) and Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment (I&M), the association for large consumers of energy and water VEMW, the confederation of Netherlands industry and employers VNO-NCW and the research institute ECN, Dutch energy research centre have been interviewed. People at strategic positions within these organizations (e.g. directors or heads of strategy or public affairs departments) have been interviewed anonymously and on personal title. An argumentative discourse analysis has been carried out, aided by qualitative data analysis software (MAXQDA). Storylines formed the main unit of analysis. The dominant storyline and underlying substorylines that were identified from the interviews are summarized in table S1. Table S1 Dominant storyline and its substorylines

Dominant storyline

decarbonization in a European market, while keeping the energy supply secure and affordable.

Substorylines

climate change is main driver for energy transition

sustainability is only one of three pillars of energy policy

the market is the preferred ordering principle for the energy domain

Energy sector should be organized at EU-level

ETS should be leading in reducing CO2

From the interviews discursive regime destabilisation was identified in two ways, as: 1. Tensions within the dominant storyline; and 2. Challenges for the dominant storyline. The tensions within the dominant storyline relate to the market and the role of government in reaching the decarbonisation target and are summarized in table S2. Table S2 Tensions within the dominant storyline

Market

Government

The energy market still needs work to function properly Government should create favourable investment conditions

Dutch merchant mentality can hamper investments in sustainability Government intervention should be minimal, it threatens investment climate

The challenges for the dominant storyline are summarized in table S3 and will be discussed in more detail below. 7

TableS3 Challenges for the dominant storyline

Energiewende in Germany

decentralisation

new players entering the energy system

absence of a clear direction in government policy

Germany’s Energiewende: Most respondents referred to the significant changes that are taking place in Germany’s energy system. They question the direction and swiftness of Germany’s Energiewende and already see these developments affecting the Dutch energy system. Decentralisation: Another challenge to the dominant storyline is decentralized energy production. This development and its disruptive potential is recognized by most respondents, but there are a lot of questions and doubts around its impact. A couple of respondents discuss the possible need for adaptation of the current market model in order to accommodate decentralized energy production. One of the respondents goes even so far as to question the energy market model as it exists at this moment. New players: Connected to the decentralisation trend is of that of new players entering the energy domain. These can be either citizen initiatives in the form of energy co-operations or regime players active in other sectors, such as IKEA and Google getting active in the energy sector. Instable policy: The final challenge is the lack of a secure long-term investment climate because of political instability. On the one hand, absence of clear and effective national or European policy leads to prudence and postponing of investment by some regime actors. On the other hand some respondents observe that if the large utilities will continue to stare at their large coal fired power plants, they will go to the wall, as the new players can adapt to changing circumstances more rapidly. The theoretical implication of this research is that ‘discursive regime destabilisation’ could indeed be observed, but depends heavily on the definition of the regime and the choice of regime actors. Respondents observe that the energy domain is going through fundamental changes at the moment and therefore it is difficult to demarcate the regime clearly. Therefore, it might be necessary to rethink the regime concept in the light of accelerating transitions.

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III.

Contents

I.

Preface.................................................................................................................................................. 5

II.

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................... 6

1.

Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 10 1.1

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Research aim and questions ................................................................................................... 12

Theoretical framework: Energy discourse in transition ............................................................. 14 2.1

Studying transitions................................................................................................................. 14

2.2

Discourse Analysis ................................................................................................................... 18

2.3

Discursive Regime Destabilisation ........................................................................................ 20

Research Method .............................................................................................................................. 23 3.1

Argumentative discourse analysis ........................................................................................ 23

3.2

Research approach ................................................................................................................... 24

Results: Storylines of Dutch energy regime actors ...................................................................... 27 4.1

Dutch energy regime ............................................................................................................... 27

4.2

Dominant energy storyline ..................................................................................................... 28

4.3

Tensions within the dominant storyline ............................................................................... 32

4.4

Discursive challenges for the energy discourse ................................................................... 36

Discussion ......................................................................................................................................... 43 5.1

Discussing an energy transition storyline ............................................................................ 43

5.2

Reflecting on the theoretical framework............................................................................... 47

5.3

Reflecting on the research method ........................................................................................ 51

Conclusion & Outlook ..................................................................................................................... 54 6.1

Outlook ...................................................................................................................................... 56

6.2

Recommendations for further research ................................................................................ 57

Epilogue..................................................................................................................................................... 59 Sources ....................................................................................................................................................... 60 Annex 1: Questionnaire ........................................................................................................................... 65 Annex 2: List of respondents .................................................................................................................. 66 Annex 3: Questions telephone interviews preliminary scan of the field ......................................... 67

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1. Introduction Energy is a popular topic that figures high on the political agenda in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster and on-going public concern about climate change, resource availability, affordability and security, at least in the European Union and its member states. The European Parliament and Council have agreed on targets to increase the share of renewable energy in the total energy supply in 2020 to 20%, to increase energy efficiency and reduce emissions of greenhouse gases with 20% compared to 1990 levels, the so-called 20-20-20 targets (EC, 2009). Also a Roadmap 2050 and a Power Perspective 2030 have been developed to explore possible energy futures (EC, 2011; ECF, 2011). This has led the European Commissioner for Energy Günther Oettinger to state that the EU is going through an energy transition (EC, 2012). The Netherlands was one of the first countries to apply integral Energy Transition policy. The project ‘Energietransitie’, as the policy was called in Dutch, started at the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 2001. The underlying idea of the project was that ‘a fundamental change in the energy system was inevitable and necessary and that a classical policy approach would not work’ (Rotmans, 2011). It was believed that both the then dominant paradigm of neo-liberal market thinking and top-down directive government intervention would not suffice to realise a transition to a sustainable energy system. As of 2007, the transition policy took a key position in Dutch energy policy. However, after a new government took office in 2011, the energy transition policy project was officially abolished (Loo & Loorbach, 2012). Although the formal policy project was stopped, the concept of an ‘energy transition’ did stick as a way to talk about and interpret changes that are on-going in the (Dutch) energy sector. The Dutch energy transition policy project was based on insights from the emerging scientific field of transition research. In the literature a transition is understood as a ‘fundamental change in structure, culture and practices’ (Grin, Rotmans & Schot, 2010:131-132). A transition forms a response to persistent problems modern societies are confronted with. During a transition, which generally takes one to two generations, a societal (sub)system, such as the energy system, adjusts to changing external and internal circumstances. The idea is that transitions come about through the interaction between innovative practices at the micro or niche-level, incremental change induced by actors who operate at the meso- or regime-level and quasi autonomous macro-dynamics at the landscape level. A successful transition is seen as a long-term process of co-evolution between and within these various levels (Grin et al., 2010). The persistent problems that drive a transition are seen as symptoms of unsustainable societies and are similar to what Rittel and Webber (1973) call ‘wicked problems’ (Loorbach & Verbong, 2012). The main characteristic of such problems is that their very nature and conceptualization are not well understood. Loorbach (2007:14) argues:

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‘the diversity of perspectives on what a persistent problem is and what solution is preferred, can be understood when one takes into account that single actors only see parts of the whole society. Their perspective depends on their own history, roles, interests, knowledge, activities and so on but also on their specific place in a system, the level of scale they operate at and the time-horizon they work upon.’ ‘Effective solutions to such [wicked] problems require ongoing, informed deliberation involving competing perspectives. [...] This type of inquiry emphasizes the multi-faceted nature of human action that cannot be reduced to empirical variables but views humans as culturally shaped, communicatively based, socially motivated, and emotionally grounded.’ (Fischer & Gottweis, 2012:6). Such a perspective rejects the positivistic starting point of classical science that meaning can be discovered objectively. Rather it is rooted in the constructivist tradition which assumes that meaning is constructed by humans who experience the world they are interpreting (Crotty, 1998). The scientific discipline of (argumentative) discourse analysis (Hajer, 1995) has been developed to unravel the storylines actors use to convey their interpretation of the world. A discourse can be defined as ‘a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities’ (Hajer, 1995:44). A specific discourse includes various storylines: ‘a generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena. The key function of storylines is that they suggest unity in the bewildering variety of separate discursive component parts of a problem’ (ibid:56). Actors develop and reproduce storylines but actors also derive their positioning in a certain system from storylines. With their storylines actors influence the problem definition and directions in which is looked for solutions, while at the same time storylines demarcate the direction in which actors can look for solutions. According to Hajer (ibid:13), (policy) solutions are the result of a discursive struggle between competing storylines supported by different discourse coalitions. In the energy domain diverse storylines based on differing problem perceptions can be observed. For some the energy transition is mainly about tackling climate change by reducing CO2 emissions (e.g., ECF, 2012), for others it presents the solution to a plethora of problems, including security, environmental pollution, excessive water use and dependency (e.g., Scheer, 1999; Ecofys, 2011). Following Hajer (1995) the outcome of a deliberation is dependent on which storyline prevails in a discursive struggle. A point in case is the different reactions to the nuclear disaster that happened in Fukushima in March 2011. Following the event, the German government almost immediately decided to shut down the seven oldest nuclear power plants and phase out nuclear energy completely by 2022. In the country phasing out nuclear power is generally perceived as an integral part of the ‘Energiewende’ as the German energy transition has been coined (Bosman, 2012a). However, in other EU-countries, such as the United Kingdom 11

and France, nuclear power is still seen (at least by the dominant discourse coalition) as an indispensable part of a low-carbon energy future and, therefore, actively pursued as part of their energy transition (Meulman et al., 2012). It is difficult to explain why the reactions are so different in various countries by looking at Fukushima merely as an external shock to the energy system. Instead the actual societal impact of an event such as Fukushima is the result of a complex interplay of different storylines supported by different discourse coalitions that seek to get their interpretation of the event across to the public and decision makers in particular. From a transitions perspective, it is the regime, defined as ‘systems of dominant culture, structure and practices that are shared by groups of actors’ (Grin et al., 2010:131-132) that dictates the dominant storyline and therefore generally has most power to interpret events like the Fukushima nuclear disaster. It is made up of actors across energy companies, ministries, research institutes, civil society and citizens that share and reproduce the culture, structure and practices. In the transitions literature the regime has often been conceptualized as resisting change. Therefore, in order for fundamental change to take place, regimes need to destabilize or open up. Recent work investigating the role of regimes in changes in the European electricity and natural gas sectors by Vleuten and Högselius (2012) however, shows that regimes have also been a source of change. Thereby they favour incremental change which preserves the overall structure of the regime. This leads Loorbach and Verbong (2012) to conclude that ‘operationalization of the regime concept in the context of the analysis of ongoing transitions calls for developing a more refined understanding of regime structures and regime actors, as well as of their interaction with emerging niches’ (Loorbach & Verbong, 2012:320-321).

1.1 Research aim and questions This exploratory research aims to contribute to closing these gaps in the transitions literature by investigating a transition challenge from the point of view of regime actors. It will focus on the Dutch energy system because the academic field of transition studies has to a significant degree been developed in the Netherlands, largely based on case studies of the Dutch energy sector (see e.g., Kemp, 2010; Loorbach, Brugge, & Taanman, 2008; Loorbach, 2007; Verbong & Geels, 2007) and is therefore well suited for the purpose of this study. Different scholars and actors in the field have come up with differing explanations for the various directions in and paces at which the energy transitions in different countries are taking place (see e.g., Turnheim & Geels, 2012; Geels & Verbong, 2012). However, few acknowledge or make explicit that the meaning of the energy transition concept is often contested. Furthermore, no transition research has so far (to the authors knowledge) explicitly taken a regime perspective on what is happening in the energy domain. By exploring the challenges in the energy domain from the point of view of regime actors, i.e. those actors that are assumed to have most power in reproducing the dominant discourse, a gap in the literature on transitions is addressed. Moreover, it could contribute to a more refined understanding of the regime concept.

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Also outside of the academic realm, energy is a popular topic. Almost everything people do requires energy input, such as transport, lighting and heating the house, using appliances. Also industry uses a large amount of energy for producing the goods in order for people to carry out these activities. The Dutch economy is relatively energy intense both in energy input per unit of GDP and per capita in comparison to other European countries (see e.g., EEA, 2012). Furthermore, fossil fuels form a significant part of its economy: It is home to Royal Dutch Shell, one of the largest oil- and gas companies in the world and to the Groningen natural gas field, the largest field in Europe and tenth largest in the world (Whaley, 2009). Regarding the development of renewable sources of energy the Netherlands is staying behind compared to other European countries. It managed to increase the share of renewable energy in final energy consumption from 2.6% in 2006 to 3.8% in 2010, while the average of EU-27 has increased from 9.0% to 12.4% (Eurostat, 2012). By making explicit the possibility of differing conceptualizations and identifying the regime storylines could result in a better understanding what changes can be expected in the energy domain. Furthermore, by looking into what the energy transition means for different actors involved in the Dutch energy system and not taking its meaning for granted, the debate could be taken a step further. Finally, it could help to identify opportunities to push the energy system in a more sustainable direction. Therefore, the main question underlying this research is: How do regime actors view the Dutch energy system and its future? In order to systematically answer this question it is broken down in the following subquestions: 1. Which actors constitute the Dutch energy regime? 2. What is the dominant storyline regarding the Dutch energy system? 3. What (sub)storylines can be identified from regime actors regarding the future of the Dutch energy system? The thesis is structured as follows: In chapter two the discourse and transition literature will be discussed in more detail, with emphasis on the regime concept and regime destabilisation. Chapter three will described the research method used to answer the research questions. In chapter four the results will be presented and the research questions are answered one by one. Chapter five encompasses the discussion. It will start with providing some discussion points that could form input to improve the storylines identified in chapter four, then the results will be scrutinized in the light of the transitions and discourse theory introduced in chapter two and finally the research method will be commented on. Chapter six contains the conclusions, an outlook regarding the future of the Dutch energy transition discourse and recommendations for further research. In the epilogue the researcher will reflect on the research process.

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2. Theoretical framework: Energy discourse in transition In this chapter the theory that is regarded relevant in order to answer the research questions will be discussed. First the foundations of transition theory and its most recent insights in regime destabilisation are elaborated on. Followed by a description of the theoretical basis of discourse analysis which is needed to understand the research methods which will be outlined in chapter three. This chapter concludes with a synthesis of insights from discourse analysis and regime destabilisation to develop the concept of ‘discursive regime destabilisation’.

2.1 Studying transitions This research investigates the energy transition and assumes that it is possible to understand such a transition in different ways. The academic field of transition research has been developed over the last decade to develop insights in and get some grip on fundamental societal change (Grin et al., 2010). Transition research starts from the notion of persistent problems, which are seen as symptoms of unsustainable societies. Dealing with these persistent problems requires transitions and system innovations towards sustainability. A system innovation thereby refers to transformations within specific subsystems, while a transition transcends individual systems and comprises various system innovations at different scale‐levels and over a longer time periods (Grin et al., 2010). Actors within these systems shape and influence the dynamics of the system they constitute, but because societal systems are complex, they have a functional dynamic of their own which no actor is able to control (Avelino, 2011). Within the transition literature, a distinction is made between understanding transition processes, referred to as transition dynamics and understanding how actors (aim to) influence transition processes. The discipline that investigates the possibility of influencing or steering transition processes is referred to as transition management (Loorbach, 2007). When analysing transition dynamics, different levels in time and functional or geographical aggregation can be distinguished. These have resulted in the ‘multi‐phase’, ‘multi‐level’, and ‘multi‐pattern’ frameworks which are used in transition studies (Avelino, 2011; Grin et al., 2010). These key concepts in transitions literature and their relevance for this particular research will be discussed in more detail below. In order to describe the direction, speed and size of transitions the multi-phase concept was developed. A transition is described through time as an S-shaped curve that goes through four phases: 1. Pre-development: small changes are going on in a system but in the background and are not (yet) visible; 2. Take-off: in this phase structural changes gain momentum, it is the ignition of a transition; 3. Acceleration: structural changes gain speed and become visible 14

4. Stabilization: in this phase a new state of dynamic equilibrium is reached Characterizing these four phases gives the impression of a smooth and clearly delineated process. Quite the opposite is true: transitions are characterized by alternating periods of fast and slow change together forming a strongly non-linear process (Rotmans, Kemp & Asselt, 2001; Rotmans & Loorbach, 2010). One of the difficulties in researching on-going transitions is how to assess whether the changes in a certain system are signs of a transition or just the average dynamics normal to a societal system. And if it is indeed a transition then how to assess in which phase a transition currently is? One of the key questions the multi-phase concept raises in this respect is: Who will not (yet) see the changes in the pre-development phase and for whom do the changes in the acceleration phase become visible? By investigating the changes in the energy domain from the point of view of regime actors, it will be possible to assess whether these actors will see fundamental changes and therefore whether it is possible to speak of an energy transition from their point of view and if so, in which phase they consider the transition to be in. According to the multi-pattern concept transitions can take place following different patterns. A key pattern is to put it bluntly: emerging niches develop and when they grow strong enough they overthrow the existing regime and develop into a new regime (Grin et al, 2010). De Haan & Rotmans (2011) identify three variations on this pattern: 1. Bottom-up pattern: niches develop, cluster and form a niche-regime that challenges the existing regime and eventually takes over and forms a new regime; 2. Top-down pattern: Dramatic exogenous pressure at the landscape level enforce regimechange; 3. Hybrid pattern: Niches develop outside and within the existing regime and together develop into a new regime. This research will investigate whether regime actors observe certain patterns of change in the energy domain and if the patterns they recognize fit the multi-pattern concept. The multi-level perspective introduces the idea that complex systems can be studied by differentiating between the niche-level at which innovative practise are developed, the regimelevel which provides the structure and stability to a system and the landscape level which comprises the long-term trends and exogenous events. Transitions can occur when developments at these three levels align (Geels, 2002; Grin et al., 2010). Most transition scholars have focussed on emerging radical innovations at the niche-level, assuming that novelties developed in niches might eventually make their way into the regime (see e.g., Raven, 2012; Hekkert, Suurs, Negro, Smits, Kuhlmann, 2007). Within transition studies the regime is understood in slightly different ways. Geels and Schot (2010) build on the notion of technological regimes - cognitive routines that direct R&D activities in certain directions (Nelson & Winter, 1982 in: Geels and Schot, 2010) - with insights 15

from neo-institutional theory to conceptualize socio-technical regimes. These contain cognitive, regulative and normative rules. The rules of a socio-technical regime provide stability to a system and can result in technological lock-in. Rotmans and Loorbach (2010) approach transitions as taking place in complex adaptive systems. They put less emphasis on technology as a driver for societal change than Geels and Schot (2010). Rather transitions imply a shift in dominant actors, institutions and practices. They therefore define a regime as ‘systems of dominant culture, structure and practices that are shared by groups of actors’ (Grin et al., 2010:131-132). Culture encompasses shared visions, values and paradigms. Structure involves institutions, economic order and physical infrastructure. Practices are daily routines, rules and behaviour of people within the system. The culture, structure and practices mutually constitute and reinforce each other, which provides stability to the system and resistance to change (Rotmans, 2011). This understanding of a regime will be used throughout this research. In order for transitions to take place regimes need to destabilize or open up under pressure of the niche- and landscape level (Grin et al., 2010; Loorbach & Verbong, 2012). As Rotmans and Loorbach (2010:132) put it: ‘transformative change to regimes can occur through two different mechanisms. On the one hand, pressure from the social surroundings can lead to the discussion of regime structure, culture and practices, while on the other, learning processes concerning alternative options and the forming of new actor networks in niches can produce bottom-up pressures to regimes. Such pressures are taken up by the regime-actors who may take a defensive approach (by discrediting the other actors), a reactive, accommodating approach (of system improvement) or an innovative approach by contributing actively to a transition. They may also do all three things in the course of time. Regimes thus play a crucial, decisive role in transitions.’ Although they play a decisive role in transitions, regime destabilisation processes have not received much attention in the transitions literature so far. (Turnheim & Geels, 2012) have recently started to explore this unbeaten ground by developing a phase-model of destabilisation enactment, inspired by innovation studies, economics, (neo-) institutional, management and organisational theory, see figure 1.

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1) Blindness and denial: External pressures weakly articulated. Industry actors deny performance problems or see them as temporary. Problems are down-played and ‘business as usual’ continues with strong regime commitment. (2) Incremental responses to problems: External pressures become better articulated and linked to performance problems. Industry actors recognize problems, but strategies remain defensive, focusing on tighter controls, incremental innovation strategies, and early diversification. Regime commitment remains strong. (3) Increasing doubts and diversification: Increasing pressures and problems create performance gaps. Industry actors doubt viability of (elements of) the existing regime. Industry actors begin exploring solutions outside the bounds of the existing regime. Diversification and exploration activities signal weakening commitment. (4) Decline and destabilisation: Problems turn into crises which raise the sense of urgency. Industry actors lose faith in the existing regime and implement drastic turnaround strategies. Depending on severity of problems and the ability of industry actors to enact radical change, they can implement two types of change (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985): (4a) Reorientation: Substantial change in some regime elements (technology, knowledge base, regulations) focusing on the development of new means for survival. (4b) Re-creation: Deeper changes to core regime elements (mission, identity, core beliefs), focusing on the development of new hopes for survival around a fundamentally changed industry. (5) Dissolution: If these two types of change fail to address the mounting problems, actors lose faith and abandon the prospects for survival. Industries then try to make the most of decline: avoiding full collapse and ‘milking’ assets. Figure 1 Five stages of decline (Collins, 2009) with the phase-model of destabilisation enactment (adapted from Turnheim and Geels, 2012:4)

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Turnheim and Geels (2012) applied their model to a historical case-study of the British coal industry and, thereby, aim to provide insights for studying ‘the contemporary challenge of climate change and transitions to low-carbon energy systems’ (ibid:1). The authors acknowledge that applying their lessons from a historical case-study of a fully realised transition to contemporary transition challenges is speculative, ‘because a thorough application of the framework would require in-depth studies of the pressures and response strategies in various industries.’ (ibid:13) However, one could argue that the problem of transferring historical lessons to contemporary transition challenges lies deeper than that. Already with analysing a historical case, establishing whether the observed societal changes were a transition is a matter of interpretation of the transition concept. For contemporary transition challenges, this remark is even more relevant, as different actors not only have differing interpretations of the on-going changes but also often have different understandings of what the problem and therefore what the direction to look for solutions is. Taking a discursive approach, as this research does, provides a methodology to deal with such different interpretations. The theoretical foundations of discourse analysis will be discussed in the next paragraph.

2.2 Discourse Analysis According to Rotmans & Loorbach (2010) transitions generally take place in complex systems. Cilliers (2005) explains that it is possible to have more than one description of a complex system: ‘since different descriptions of a complex system decompose the system in different ways, the knowledge gained by any description is always relative to the perspective from which the description was made. This does not imply that any description is as good as any other. It is merely the result of the fact that only a limited number of characteristics of the system can be taken into account by any specific description.’ (ibid:258) This observation is especially relevant in social change processes, as during change the conflicting certainties (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990) of actors emerge - often implicitly - through clashes in problem definition and consecutive goals. In the case of Turnheim & Geels (2012) the authors apparently perceive climate change as the main problem and a transition to low carbon energy systems as the preferred solution. However, as stated before in chapter one, in Germany low carbon emitting nuclear power is broadly perceived as part of the problem. After the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Chancellor Merkel followed the advice of the Ethikkommission1 to 1

a high level committee that was installed after Fukushima to provide recommendations on the future of the German energy system

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exit from nuclear power as soon as possible and pursue renewable energy instead (Ethikkommission, 2012), which has become known as the ‘Energiewende’ (Bosman, 2012b). It is for these reasons that this research puts emphasis on the storylines with which actors give meaning to the world they experience and the assumptions that inform the storylines. Discourse analysis is the academic discipline that deals with systematically unravelling such storylines (Hajer, 1995). Argumentative discourse analysis as proposed by Hajer (1995) has its roots in framing theory. Rein & Schön (1996) explain framing as follows: ‘different observers of a unified world come to view it through incommensurable systems of concepts. One world is seen from different perspectives. [...] Frames can be understood as strong and generic narratives that guide both analysis and action in practical situations. Such narratives are diagnostic/ prescriptive stories that tell, within a given issue terrain, what needs fixing and how it might be fixed. Our narrative frames are the generic story lines that underlie the particular problem-setting stories one finds in any particular policy controversy.’ (ibid: 87 and 89) Furthermore, they argue that differing frames are the main reason for the existence of persistent (policy) problems, the starting point of transition theory. Paradoxically, the ambiguity over the goals and language used often helps in reaching political consensus over such issues (Rein & Schön, 1996). Hajer (1995) adds that: ‘change may (…) take place through the emergence of new story‐lines that re‐order understandings. Finding the appropriate story‐line becomes an important form of agency. (…) The argumentative approach focuses on the level of the discursive interaction and argues that discursive interaction (i.e. language in use) can create new meanings and new identities, i.e. it may alter cognitive patterns and create new cognitions and new positionings. Hence discourse fulfils a key role in processes of political change’. (ibid: 56 and 59) According to Hajer (1995) policy solutions are the result of a discursive struggle. When talking about sustainable development he states that: ‘people may have widely differing perceptions of what environmental politics is about. In this light the present hegemony of the idea of sustainable development in environmental discourse should not be seen as the product of a linear, progressive, and value-free process of convincing actors of the importance of the Green case. It is much more a struggle between various unconventional political coalitions, each made up of such actors as scientists, politicians, activists, or organizations representing such actors, 19

but also having links with specific television channels, journals and newspapers, or even celebrities.’ (ibid:13) The same argument could be made for the energy domain. With their storylines stakeholders influence the problem definition and directions in which is looked for solutions and at the same time storylines can restrain and enable actors to look for solutions in certain directions.

2.3 Discursive Regime Destabilisation In this paragraph the insights from transition theory and discourse analysis will be brought together to develop the concept of discursive regime destabilisation. According to Rotmans & Loorbach (2010) transitions imply a fundamental shift in the ‘systems of dominant culture, structure and practices that are shared by groups of actors’ (Grin et al., 2010:131-132). Discourse is defined as ‘a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities’ (Hajer, 1995:44). It relates closely to the culture concept in transition theory as it gives meaning to the structure and practices in a system and provides coherence in these different elements. In order for transitions to take place, changes in storylines will be necessary. And the other way around: changing circumstances that a transitions implies require changes in storylines to encompass these changes. Fischer and Gottweis (2012:12) argue that: ‘in relatively stable societies, agents – often in the form of discourse coalitions – can manage to bring about change in discursive practices, albeit gradually. But revolutionary situations can give rise to rapid and dramatic changes. Social actors need to be understood both as the products of these preexisting discursive relationships and as the agents of their change.’ Also transition processes are characterized by periods of relative stability alternated with rapid and dramatic changes (Grin et al., 2010), which implies that it should be possible to observe rapid changes of storylines during transitions. By combining insights from discourse analysis and transition studies, it is possible to investigate different perspectives on contemporary transition challenges. Discourse already has its place in Turnheim and Geel’s (2012) phase-model of destabilisation enactment, but there it refers to the legitimacy of an industry in public discourse. They argue, based on a historical case study of British coal that technical and economic factors were crucial in the destabilisation process, mediated by socio-cultural and political factors. However, here it is argued that in order to study on-going transition challenges the focus should be on how these factors are experienced and interpreted by actors and make their way into whose storylines, because their 20

interpretation of what is going on now and expectations about future developments inform decision-making. Internalizing pressure The assumption is that during a transition, the dominant culture, structure and practices, which are reproduced by regime actors through a dominant storyline, comes under pressure either from landscape changes, such as concerns about climate change and the nuclear disaster in Fukushima or from niche-developments, such as local solar energy cooperations. Loorbach and Verbong (2012) argue that: ‘most MLP [multi level perspective] analyses take landscape changes more or less for granted: they are considered as exogenous forces that cannot be influenced by regime (or niche) actors. However, the examples of the major changes in the electricity and gas regimes [see Vleuten and Högselius, same volume] during the last decades demonstrate that regime actors have been actively involved in those changes, even if they failed to control these developments. […] In a more general sense, the concept of the sociotechnical landscape itself has a repository character, in the sense that it generally includes all things external to the regime.’ (ibid:321) Therefore, Verbong and Loorbach (2012) suggest that there is a need for a more refined understanding of such external factors. In this research the notion of external pressures destabilising a regime is put up for discussion. Rather it is argued that in order for a regime actor to react to a pressure, it first has to recognize an event or trend as such. When an event has been recognized as a pressure to the dominant culture, structure or practices, regime actors are actively involved in interpreting and shaping that pressure and, thereby (try to) mitigate its impact. Therefore, in order to actually affect the regime, a pressure first has to be internalized, that means, regime actors have to recognize the pressure as such before they can start to act upon it. The assumption, based on insights from discourse and cultural theory (Cilliers, 2005; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Zuckert, 1991) is that if and how pressures are picked up and interpreted will differ between various (regime) actors. As this process has not been studied so far in the context of transition studies, little is known about its consequences. One of the possibilities is that it will result in discrepancies between regime actor’s storyline(s). If these discrepancies become too large, it could lead to adaptation of the storyline(s) and eventually regime actors could take over (elements of) niche-storylines. Actors could even leave the regime when they lose faith in the regime and its storyline. If a large part of the regime adapts its storyline or loses faith it could lead to “discursive regime destabilisation”2 as this process has been named in this research. 2

Credits for this formulation go to Dr. Derk Loorbach

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Also (Frantzeskaki et al., 2012) identify the regime’s perspective on whether the status quo will hold or not as a condition that influences the governability of transitions. This research will shed light on this process regarding the energy domain in the Netherlands. The research method will be discussed in the next chapter.

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3. Research Method In this chapter the research approach will be discussed including the methodological choices that are made in order to operationalize the research questions introduced in chapter one and theory as discussed in chapter two.

3.1 Argumentative discourse analysis In order to provide insight in the regime perspective on the Dutch energy domain argumentative discourse analysis will be used. According to Hajer (1995) argumentative discourse analysis deals with systematically unravelling perspectives or frames, which are defined as processes of meaning and interpretation that underlie what people do and decide. This approach is chosen as argumentative discourse analysis was developed based on a comparative case study of the different interpretations of sustainable development in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Furthermore, Smith & Kern (2007) argue that the transitions approach comes close to the approach Hajer advocates at the end of his book to further ecological modernization3: ‘The challenge seems to be to think of an organization of ecological modernization as a process that allows for social change to take place democratically and in a way that stimulates the creation of an – at least partially – shared vision of the future [… ] in finding new institutional arrangements in which different discourses (and concerns) can be meaningfully and productively related to one another, in finding ways to correct the prevailing bias towards economization and scientification, and in active intersubjective development of trust, acceptability, and credibility’ (Hajer, 1995:280). Because argumentative discourse analysis was developed (partly) based on the Dutch context and dealing with thematic of sustainable development, it is assumed that it is well suited to investigate the Dutch energy domain in its pursuit of a more sustainable future. The main element of analysis in the argumentative discourse approach are storylines, which are understood as: ‘a generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena. The key function of storylines is that they suggest unity in the bewildering variety of separate discursive component parts of a problem’ (ibid:56). Often discourse analysis is used to study the historical development of specific policies. The argumentative approach is specifically developed for studying contemporary policy challenges. 3

Ecological modernization is the dominant interpretation of sustainability in both countries, according to Hajer

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In this research it is applied to the energy domain and specifically expectations about future developments. Data from interviews carried out between May and August 2012 form the main empirical base, leaving the historical development of the energy discourse for what it is. Other scholars (see e.g., Jong, 2005; Duijvendak, 2011; Smith & Kern, 2007; Loo & Loorbach, 2012), have studied the historical development of the Dutch energy sector and (often implicitly) the accompanying discourse far more encompassing than could have been done over the course of this master thesis. Also, the aim is not to explain the development of certain policies as the argumentative discourse approach is often used for, but rather to ‘map’ storylines currently dominating the energy domain and actors’ expectations regarding the future. Usually a discourse analysis would involve various data sources, including interviews, news articles, companies’ annual reports, policies and regulation. The objective in this research is not to provide a coherent and complete overview of the different storylines in the Dutch energy discourse, but to get an insight in the perspectives and expectations of regime actors regarding the future of the energy domain. Therefore, the only data used for this research are that from interviews with respondents that are active in the Dutch energy sector and preferably those that are closely involved in the energy policy subsystem (Sabatier, 1999).

3.2 Research approach Argumentative discourse analysis prescribes an initial scan of the field as a first research step to get a feel for what is going on in the domain under study (Hajer, 1995). Therefore an analysis of the Dutch energy system and regime was made, of which the results are presented in paragraph 4.1. The goal was to find out which actors are part of the Dutch energy regime. In order to do so, a scan of the Dutch energy system, including desk research and several (telephone) interviews with actors in the field, has been carried out. The respondents were intermediaries such as consultants active in the energy field (see Annex 2). The assumption was that these professionals have a good overview of the field, because they work with a lot of different actors and organisations. Several questions were asked (see Annex 3) to get an insight in which actors these respondents perceive as part of the Dutch energy regime. ‘Regime’ is often understood differently in daily use than in the transitions literature and can have a negative connotation. Therefore, the respondents were asked which actors they regarded as ‘powerful’ in the Dutch energy domain. It is assumed that actors who are perceived as powerful in a certain domain forms an indicator for regime actors. The outcome of this initial scan of the field was that Energie-Nederland, the association representing the Dutch energy sector, would be an appropriate starting point to get into contact with regime actors active in the Dutch energy domain. In chapter four the Dutch energy regime will be described in more detail based on the transitions literature and the initial scan of the field. Step two forms the empirical body of this research effort. Interviews have been conducted with representatives of Energie-Nederland; with several of its members, of which the majority from 24

large utilities, but also with a respondent from GreenChoice, a relatively new and small player that provides only green energy. Then also respondents from organisations in the direct environment of the association were contacted, namely the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment (I&M), the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation (EL&I), the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers, VNO-NCW, the association for large consumers of energy and water, VEMW and ECN, the Dutch energy research centre. Respondents from these organisations work at the interface of energy policy and industry and therefore were assumed to be able to provide valuable insights in the challenges facing the energy sector. Other respondents (see Annex 2 for a complete overview) were contacted by following leads that were provided by respondents themselves, therefore it is assumed that the respondents form (part of) the dominant discourse coalition. Storylines with which these actors convey their understanding of the world around them form the main elements of analysis. In order for respondents to speak as freely as possible they were interviewed on personal title and anonymity was granted in reporting the results. However, in order to come to meaningful conclusions, it is necessary to refer to the organisational context in which a respondent operates. Still it should be stressed that the views provided are those of the respondents and not necessarily that of the organization they work for. This was communicated with respondents prior to the interview. The interview was conducted in a semi-structured manner (Baarda et al., 2000), thereby leaving room to zoom in on certain aspects raised by respondents. The aim was to take stock of respondent’s perspectives on the energy domain and his or her expectations regarding its future. Therefore, the interview questions (see Annex 1) were formulated quite broadly, in order to leave as much room for the respondent’s interpretations as possible. This means for example that respondents were not asked what they think of certain developments the researcher had identified on beforehand, rather respondents were asked what challenges they observe in the energy domain. This is an important distinction as the way questions are asked steer respondents in a certain direction. With this in mind, the interview questions have been formulated carefully in order to get an understanding of the image respondents have of the energy domain, its future and their positioning in it and how they relate to other actors within the energy domain. Also, (follow-up) questions were asked to get an insight in the underlying assumptions respondents have of certain developments in the energy domain and the drivers behind change in their sector. Step three constitutes the actual discourse analysis. The interviews were recorded and the recordings were fully transcribed. With the help of MAXQDA qualitative data analysis software the transcripts have been coded and prepared for analysis. The coding happened in two steps: open coding followed by axial coding (Boeije, 2009). In step four, the findings of step three are interpreted by first reconstructing the dominant storyline that currently guides the energy sector. Afterwards this storyline was reflected upon and tensions within the dominant storyline and discursive elements that pose challenges to this 25

storyline have been identified. Such elements can be recognized by looking for signals of confusion, insecurity, conflict, marginalization of other storylines, and-and and or-or constructions. The aim has been to present quotes from the interviews as complete as possible, to make sure that the context of the quote is clear for readers. A point of concern here is that the original data were in Dutch and needed to be translated into English. Because translating something is always also an interpretation step, effort has been put in to keep as closely to the original meaning (as understood by the author) as possible while also keeping an eye on readability of the text. To make sure the used quotes and their translation aptly capture the intentions respondents had, the final concept version has been checked with respondents and minor changes have been made based on respondents’ reactions to clarify the meaning of certain quotes. For sections for which it has been difficult to adequately translate the original meaning in English, for example when respondents used proverbs, the original Dutch text is provided in footnotes. To conclude this chapter the conceptual model underlying this research is depicted in figure 2.

Figure 2 Conceptual model

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4. Results: Storylines of Dutch energy regime actors In this chapter the storylines of actors in the Dutch energy regime as identified from the interviews are presented. First subquestion one will be answered by describing the Dutch energy system and energy regime in more detail. Then subquestion two will be answered by identifying the dominant storyline that emerges from the interviews with selected regime actors. This is followed by identifying (sub)storylines regarding the future of the Dutch energy domain that lead to tensions within and challenges for the dominant storyline. Thereby, subquestion three will be answered. The citations that most adequately capture the meaning of the different sections or are of particular interest for other reasons are formatted differently from the regular text so that they are easily recognizable.

4.1 Dutch energy regime From a transitions perspective, the energy system is viewed as a complex adaptive societal system. Such systems are in open exchange with their environment and build on an incumbent structure that is optimized to adapt to external changes as well as to internal innovation. It is interconnected with other societal systems such as food production, mobility and construction and embedded within society. Taking into account these considerations the energy system can be defined as ‘all actors and artifacts that together produce the societal function energy’ (Verbong and Loorbach, 2012:9). As stated in paragraph 1.1, the regime is often defined in the transitions literature as the dominant culture, structure and practices within a system (Grin et al., 2010). The regime includes for example the vested interests, consumer habits and regulation that generally work towards upholding the status quo (Grin et al, 2010; Rotmans, 2011; Vleuten & Högselius, 2012). In the energy domain, the status quo is characterized by a centralized and top-down organized production and distribution system which is predominantly based on fossil-fuels and high levels of energy consumption (Loorbach and Verbong, 2012). A regime is constituted by actors who reproduce the dominant culture, structure and practices with their actions. The Dutch energy regime is formed through a complex interplay between people working for energy companies, ministries, NGOs, research institutes, intermediaries and energy consumers. The ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation play an important role as they collect and distribute natural gas and tax revenues which sum up to about €35 billion a year (Algemene Energieraad, 2012). According to the intermediaries that were interviewed at the start of this research, also the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment and the Ministry of the Interior play a role, as they are responsible for climate policy and the built environment respectively. Also energy businesses such as Royal Dutch Shell, GasUnie, GasTerra, the large utilities Essent, NUON, Eneco and grid operators such as TenneT, Alliander and Stedin have an important stake. Furthermore, knowledge institutes such 27

as the Dutch Energy Research Centre (ECN), the Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP) and TU Delft were mentioned. Also interest groups were assigned a prominent role, the most important ones being: On the one hand users of energy represented amongst others by the association for large consumers of energy and water, VEMW. On the other hand there is the energy sector which is often represented by Energie-Nederland. According to the respondent of Energie-Nederland his organisation is ‘the association for the [Dutch] energy sector’. Both users and producers of energy are represented by the confederation of Netherlands industry and employers, VNO-NCW. Hans Alders, the president of Energie-Nederland is also a board member of VNO-NCW. Finally, also environmental NGOs have a role, most prominently Stichting Natuur & Milieu. A selection of fourteen respondents of the organisations mentioned above have been interviewed, the complete list can be found in annex 2. Before continuing with the findings, it is interesting to note that the underlying rationale of the discourse approach as outlined in chapter two was spontaneously brought up by some of the respondents. The respondent from ECN described it most clearly by saying: ‘There is not one truth, but rather there are lots of truths, because from another perspective something else is also true’ and ‘humans are social beings and act according to the organization they’re in. That is what most people do, so then that are one’s truths.’ The last comment leaves less room for agency of individuals operating within a certain structure than discourse theory and especially transition theory do, but in general the remarks adequately capture the underlying ideas of both theories well.

4.2 Dominant energy storyline In this paragraph the dominant storyline and the substorylines underlying the dominant storyline will be discussed, thereby subquestion two will be answered. The dominant storyline that emerges from the interviews could be summarized as follows: decarbonization in a European market, while keeping the energy supply secure and affordable. The substorylines underlying the different elements are discussed one by one below. Decarbonization Reducing CO2-emissions is seen as the main challenge for the energy sector by most respondents, although the respondent from VNO-NCW puts more emphasis on improving energy and resource efficiency as a key competitive concern: ‘resources and energy become scarcer and more expensive, which makes it interesting to develop more efficient techniques.’ Societal and political concern about climate change is seen as the main driver behind the energy transition. Often specific reduction goals were mentioned for the year 2050, e.g., the respondent of Delta states that his company ‘has the ambition to be CO2-neutral by 2050’. In the view of Delta, nuclear power can be part of that mix as well. The respondent of Energie-Nederland formulates it as follows: 28

‘In 2050 we want to realize a CO2-neutral energy supply with as much renewable energy as possible. However, because we estimate that it will not be possible to run on 100% renewable energy in 2050, we should also think about how to involve fossil energy in a CO2-neutral way. That means applying CCS4 to coal and gas fired power plants.’ The substoryline of this section could be summarized as: ‘climate change is the main reason for changing the energy system, therefore the focus should be on CO2-reduction.’ Sustainable, Secure and Affordable The decarbonization goal as discussed in the previous paragraph, is often displayed as conflicting with the other pillars of the ‘golden triangle’ of security, affordability and sustainability of the energy supply. As the respondent of Essent states: ‘the tendency to prioritize renewable energy comes at the expense of security and affordability. […] We should catch up on the renewables goal, but in a way that does not cannibalize the other two.’ Also other respondents state that keeping the energy supply secure and affordable is important and that making the energy supply more sustainable should not go at the expense of the other two. The respondent from VEMW states for example: ‘Often the issue is looked at from only one side, like sustainability is something that can be isolated from the energy discussion. You asked me what the challenges are, well there are three.’ The substoryline discussed in this section could be summarized as: ‘sustainability is only one of three pillars of energy policy and therefore equal attention should be paid to keeping the energy supply secure and affordable.’ Market The market is the preferred ordering principle for the energy sector according to most respondents and should therefore be leading in achieving the decarbonization goals. And as the energy sector is increasingly becoming a European sector, the European level is the preferred scale to set these conditions. As the respondent from VEMW formulates it: ‘we focus strongly on the market, after all we all agreed in Europe to organize our energy supply through the market. We think that that is a good idea, because in a market everyone can play a role in providing solutions for this enormous problem.’

4

Carbon capture and storage

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Essent’s respondent goes a step further: ‘markets provide information about the future. When you can sell your electricity ten years ahead, you can basically look into the future.’ The respondent from VNO-NCW explains that market forces will organize sustainability: ‘businesses see that resources and energy become scarce and therefore markets are developing in those areas internationally. There are actually two things, customers and consumers value sustainability and resources and energy become scarcer and more expensive. Therefore it becomes interesting to develop more efficient technology that uses less resources and energy. ’ The idea is that without government intervention, the market will find the most cost-efficient solution. In this view, the government should not support specific technologies - picking winners - but creating the conditions for the market to work properly. At the same time, energy companies expect that the government plays a(n important) role in providing long-term investment security. At the moment the absence thereof is identified as the main obstacle for investing in sustainable solutions. As the respondent of E.on puts it: ‘we would love to invest in the Netherlands as E.on Benelux, but we have difficulties convincing our German colleagues. They make lists of the most attractive countries to invest in in Europe. Well, the Netherlands does not show up in the top ten. Therefor, they basically look at two things: One is of course profitability, they do want to make some money. But two is stability, how sure can you be that you will get your money back?’ A similar sentiment is displayed by respondents of the other energy companies, the respondent from Essent for example adds that: ’in the end, it should be left to the market, to businesses and entrepreneurs, to choose the technologies they want to pursue.’ The respondent from Nuon puts the ball in the court of the economics ministry: ‘the Dutch EL&I supports the idea of the market very much, taking care that the market can develop its own initiatives, but thereby it is also very dependent on those businesses.’ This apparent paradox between letting the market sort out the most cost-efficient solution and looking at the government for creating a secure and long-term investment climate will be discussed more elaborately in paragraph 4.3. The substoryline that emerges from this section could be summarized as: ‘the market is the preferred ordering principle for the energy domain and should be leading in order to achieve sustainability in a cost-efficient way.’ Europe Most respondents argue that energy, which used to be a largely national sector is increasingly becoming European. Therefore, it should be regulated at this level as well, thereby making use of the comparative advantages of different countries. The respondent of E.on states: ‘there should be much more control from a European perspective, e.g., what happens where? We are a

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pure European player, we are present in many European countries. It is really inefficient when every country would be achieving its goals by itself.’ GDF-Suez’s respondent adds: ‘you have to look where to put wind turbines. Well, there where the wind blows. Where will you put solar? Where the sun shines. Where will you put gas-fired power plants? Where you have enough cooling water, natural gas resources, [and a] gas network. Coal the same: in a harbor, cooling water, possibilities for CCS, offshore. The fragmentation that is still there will hopefully continue to crumble and then we will increasingly move towards more European systems for electricity, for natural gas, for CO2, the ETS5, [and] hydro power.’ The substoryline in this section could be summarized as: ‘as the energy sector (increasingly) is a European sector, it makes most sense to organize it at that level as well.’ European emissions trading scheme (ETS) The ETS is seen as the preferred instrument to get to a more sustainable energy system. According to the respondent of Eneco ‘the ETS is one of the most important drivers for renewable energy.’ The respondent from VEMW adds: ‘the best way to not only incentivize but also provide the possibility to [contribute to a solution] is to internalize environmental costs. An ETS provides a good model for doing so. By giving CO2 a price, by making the right to emit CO2 scarce, everyone will take into account the effects of sustainability when investing, next to the effects on supply security and costs.’ From this perspective, some respondents seem to prefer a single goal for CO2-reduction at the European level to follow-up the current 20-20-20 goals, which also aims for energy efficiency and renewable energy next to CO2-reduction. The substoryline that becomes clear from this section can be summarized as: ‘CO2-emissions need to be reduced and the most effective way to do so is with the European emissions trading scheme.’ In the next two paragraphs subquestion three will be answered by identifying the tensions respondents observe within the dominant storyline (paragraph 4.3) and the challenges for the dominant storyline (paragraph 4.4) regarding the future of the Dutch energy system.

5

European emissions trading scheme

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4.3 Tensions within the dominant storyline Some limitations to or tensions within the dominant storyline could be observed from the interviews. These tensions relate to both the energy market and the role the government should play. They could be identified as storylines in their own right and are discussed below.

Shortcomings of the market One of the tensions mentioned is the discrepancy between functioning of the energy market in theory and practice. The respondent from GreenChoice, which deviates from the dominant storyline on a lot of other points6, seems to support the market as the dominant ordering principle, but comments that the Dutch market is not perfect: ‘The three big [energy suppliers] have 88% of the market, I believe, and then there are a couple of small ones, we have 4% and the Nederlandse Energie Maatschappij will have 4% and then there is a whole fragmented field of small parties. […] Organizing a level playing field between large and small suppliers and making sure that the customer is able to choose between suppliers is a challenge that […] is becoming increasingly important.’ Also VEMW argues that the market does not function properly yet: ‘Our primary focus is […] to make sure that both the Dutch and the European market become accessible. That a European market will develop from 27 national markets. That requires a lot of work. There are a lot of barriers in terms of regulation, access requirements for grids and the like, which makes it difficult for new parties with new solutions to access the market, and thereby have little chance that their solution or idea will contribute to solving the energy issue.’ The storyline that was discussed in this section could be summarized as: ‘the market is the preferred organizing principle for the energy domain, but work is still needed to make sure the energy market functions properly.’ Merchant mentality Another tension respondents observe between the idea of the market as the preferred ordering principle and the goal of a more sustainable energy system is the Dutch merchant mentality. Sustainable alternatives are perceived as expensive and the market as it functions at this moment does not seem to provide enough incentive for developing such solutions. As the respondent of EL&I puts it:

mostly regarding sense of urgency, decentralisation, the role of citizens and preferred policies for sustainability 6

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‘becoming sustainable simply costs money […] classic solar panels, wind turbines, that just costs a lot of money […] and when you start spending a lot of euros just from the idea that it has to be more sustainable regardless of the costs, than you will get stuck. […] in the end, the bill has to be footed and it will end up with you or me. And when citizens see that sustainability will have such a high price, an unnecessary high price, than I think that will only increase societal opposition to sustainability.’ This position is both endorsed and at the same time criticized by the respondent of ECN: ‘we sometimes sort the options [for reaching the 20% renewable energy target for 2020] according to costs, putting a wind turbine on a favourable location and on more expensive locations, solar panels. Then you would end up with very expensive options. That gave the gut feeling that there will not be any public support. You could make a quick calculation, if we start doing this and you would divide the costs amongst households or businesses, that would be very large sums. Let’s get real.’ Only a couple of lines later the same respondent states that: ‘the Netherlands likes to show its merchant side very often, like well it shouldn’t cost too much. And that irritates me as well. At a certain point you just have to say we go in that direction and that will cost a bit more and we just go for it. In the Netherlands often the question is asked can we not do it a little bit cheaper?’ The respondent from EL&I summarizes: ‘of course we would just love to eat our cake and have it. Eating the cake works, at the same time having it not yet.’ 7 The storyline discussed in this section could be summarized as: ‘the Netherlands is characterized by a strong merchant mentality, which hampers investments in sustainability.’ Government intervention – introducing a coal tax Related to the points above, some ambiguity could be observed around the role of the government. As stated in paragraph 4.2 government is on the one hand seen as the institution to create the right conditions to develop a more sustainable energy system, but at the same time intervention from the government is not appreciated. The clearest example, which came up in most of the interviews, is the recent agreement to introduce a natural gas and coal tax8. Or ‘the abolishment of tax exemptions on coal’ as the respondent from GreenChoice put it, which is 7

‘We willen het liefst natuurlijk voor een dubbeltje op de eerste rij zitten. Nou, dat dubbeltje lukt wel, die eerste rij nog niet altijd.’ 8 These taxes formed part of the Spring Agreement, which was reached in a very short period after the governing coalition stepped down on the 23rd of April 2012, in order to carry out austerity measures until new elections would take place.

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quite a discursive distinction in itself. This measure has led to much consternation in the energy sector. The respondent of E.on comments: ‘what frustrates us is that the same MPs that shout that the investing climate should provide long-term stability, now do this. In 2006 we were asked to build that power plant, Brinkhorst9 stood up for it. […] you may think about a coal fired power plant what you want, but this measure will lead to our investment of about two, two and a half billion will be making one billion less profits, at least. It has no effect on CO2, nothing, there will be no gram less CO2 in the air under the ETS […] and the effect on renewable electricity in the Netherlands is negative, because the capacity for large scale [biomass] co-firing is lost. So, we feel betrayed10. For us this is a clear example of changing the rules during the game.’ The respondent from GDF-Suez agrees: ‘It is just not good to do this for the investment climate.’ Interestingly, the respondent from the Ministry of EL&I agrees as well: ‘A stable investment climate is crucial. Everyone always looks at the government and says the Dutch government has had shaky renewable energy policy for years. But the [political] parties that say this are the same that suddenly introduce a coal tax. This time it is on coal, but still it is unreliable policy. That does not help for the investing climate, and that does not look good on the Netherlands.’ The respondent from Energie-Nederland gives an insight in how the decision was reached: ‘the governing coalition steps down, the Spring Agreement was in the making, GroenLinks11 sees an opening and includes a tax on coal and natural gas. […] At first we reacted quite unanimously that it was unfortunate until it became clear that the tax on natural gas would be translated as an increase in energy taxes for consumers, which means that it doesn’t really affect producers. […] With the coal tax it was slightly different, because it is levied on coal, it directly affects those that exploit coal fired power plants in the Netherlands. Then you could see the coalition falling apart. We had internal discussions about it. Companies that had no coal fired power plant said: ‘well it doesn’t really affect us, so we do not really care.’ Some even said: ‘well maybe it even benefits us, because our gas fired power plants are standing idle at the moment’ […] so they thought it would not be so bad to introduce a coal tax.’

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then Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs ‘We voelen ons daardoor wel wat in het pak genaaid’ 11 Left-wing Green party in the Netherlands 10

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Other respondents gave the impression that the natural gas lobby (ab)used sustainability arguments to push for a coal tax in the hope that it will improve the business case for their gas fired power plants. One of them states: ‘the CO2 that comes from a gas fired power plant is also dirty, right? It only emits a bit less, but apparently that is less of a problem. Let’s be honest, those people who wrote that letter12 invested in brand new gas fired power plants that do not run at the moment.’ This explanation fits to an emerging storyline observed by the respondent of Delta: ‘natural gas is being presented as a preferable transition fuel because of the low CO2-content and the possibility for flexible application.’ The emergence of this storyline and its possible implications will be discussed in more detail in chapter five and six. The interesting thing about the introduction of the natural gas and coal tax is that respondents state that it was only possible because the Spring agreement was reached in such a short period of time. The respondent from Nuon makes this point clear: ‘it just happened in an afternoon. It is typically something that would not come from a ministry, because then Hans Alders13 or we could have started a conversation much earlier about how to arrange it.’ Also the respondent from the Ministry of I&M supports this view: ‘90% of policy is made by civil servants, only 10% is politics. Here the political primacy prevailed. And you see that under pressure things can happen very fast. If it upholds that is, because I do not know how those energy companies will exert their influence to get this off the table again. But you can imagine that this would have never made it if it would have gone through a whole policy process from proposal to the Minister and through the parliament.’ The respondent from ECN adds: ‘my analysis is that they only succeeded, because they did it so fast. And that the anti-lobby, those people that have a stake in this not happening, I believe for them this feels a bit like a coup.’ The reactions to introduction of the coal tax give the impression that some respondents wish to separate what they refer to as the market from democratic processes and even put the first above the latter. As the respondent from Essent puts it: ‘you lose your faith in the market when

Dong Energy, Eneco, Shell and Stichting Natuur & Milieu support coal tax: http://corporatenl.eneco.nl/nieuws_en_media/Persberichten/Pages/Kolenbelasting-maaktNederlandse-economie-sterker-en-duurzamer.aspx 13 The chair of Energie-Nederland 12

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there are too much interventions and market-undermining activities.’ The respondent from Nuon connects the two: ‘such a coal tax and the Energiewende14 are examples of enormously capricious policy, that is just not good for the investment climate and for the energy sector as a whole, but they are supported by voters.’ It is difficult to identify a shared (sub)storyline from this section as introduction of the coal tax has led to a precarious situation in the energy sector. The tensions around this topic could be summarized in two contradictory storylines: - ‘Government should create favourable conditions for investments in sustainable solutions’ - ‘Government intervention should be minimal, as it threatens the investment climate’

4.4 Discursive challenges for the energy discourse In this paragraph some points that were mentioned during the interviews but which the respondents had trouble to fit to the dominant storyline will be highlighted. These challenges to the dominant storyline relate to Germany’s Energiewende, the decentralisation trend, political instability and new players becoming active in the energy domain. Germany’s Energiewende A couple of times during the interviews the developments in Germany were mentioned. These developments, often called the Energiewende, seem difficult to rhyme with the dominant Dutch storyline as outlined in paragraph 4.1. The respondent from GDF-Suez for example said: ‘what we didn’t take into account was what happened especially in Germany regarding wind and solar.’ And a bit later in the conversation: ‘I was overwhelmed by what has happened in Germany the last two years, that was above all expectations. So maybe a whole new paradigm is emerging, but I believe chances for that are small. […] With decentralisation you have to think in a completely different way […] you need a whole different constellation to consider what the future will bring. […] Anyway, [Frans Rooijers15] convinced me that centralized production will still have an important role in the Dutch energy market. Although before that all the things happening in Germany made me doubt.’ Also the respondent from Nuon sees himself confronted with the Energiewende: ‘what we now see is that because of the enormous amount of solar and wind combined with integrated markets, interconnection capacity, the Netherlands rather imports than exports. That was quite different a year ago. It means that when cheap solar and wind 14 15

Energy transition in Germany director of CE Delft, a Dutch energy consultancy

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are imported our gas fired power plants are just not ‘in the money’ anymore, so also centralized generation runs less because of sustainability in Germany. Thereby Germany’s policy affects the business case of centralized generation in the Netherlands.’ According to other respondents the Energiewende also influences the public discourse. The respondent from GDF-Suez states: ‘people look at Germany a lot, saying that the Atomausstieg16 and Energiewende will create a lot of economic activity.’ The respondent from VEMW adds: ‘[in Germany] a lot of renewable energy is produced, even more money is being invested. But you can wonder if this is a sustainable way of producing renewable energy. We like to look at this critically and constructively and not just assume that everything is better in Germany because they install a lot of solar systems en build more wind parks.’ The respondent from ECN provides an interesting perspective: ‘[Chancellor] Merkel made some decisions that the energy sector really did not like. But once they are made [in Germany], it is easier for the Dutch government to take similar measures.’ The storyline that emerges from this section could be summarized as follows: ‘Significant changes in the German energy system also affect the Netherlands.’ Decentralisation The clearest challenge which came back in almost all interviews and is difficult to rhyme with the increased Europeanization of the energy sector and the market as preferred ordering principle, is that of decentralisation. The respondent from Energie-Nederland explains: ‘The funny thing is, one hundred years ago we started a process in which all those municipal energy companies were merged, because that was all too much fiddling, not efficient, that had to become much more large-scale. This has resulted in the pursuit of a European energy market for the last 10 - 15 years. In the mean time you see that sustainability leads to all kinds of small local initiatives. Municipal energy companies are springing up like mushrooms, like we are back 100 years ago. The way I see it, that has to do with the time we live in. We live in a kind of post-globalization era in which the great globalization is pretty much done. People really have the feeling they do not have grip on globalization anymore, it makes us insecure. Therefore we are looking for ways to get some grip again, how can we reconnect with each other in local communities? And somehow energy became a dimension of this. People are starting to see that they can cooperate also on energy issues, or do something with the neighborhood, or with the municipality: ‘If we put solar panels on the roof and a

16

Exit from nuclear power

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windmill somewhere together, then we might own our energy supply. And if we do it smartly, it might be even cheaper than purchase power of those weird big energy companies that we do not trust, that are too large and do not actually do the things we want, namely building a coal fired power plant. I think that really plays a role in what is currently happening in the energy supply. And thinking about this is very difficult for people who over the last 15 years grew up in a paradigm of: ‘we have a large-scale energy supply, with large power plants and a large grid which we are going to liberalize, we will make rules on that’ […] So in that sense, the whole market paradigm is up for discussion, I would almost say […] Anyway, we should not close our eyes to the fact that these things could change quite quickly.’ The respondent of E.on shows that this development directly affects his company’s core business in a dramatic way: ‘I believe we realize more than anyone else that centralized electricity production is coming to an end. More than anywhere we realize we have to start doing something else. […] I’m not sure with what we will make our money in the future, will it be installing solar panels? Perhaps, or small scale production? Surely. We clearly have to do something else and that will probably come much sooner than many expect. The margins that have been made on centralized [production], I do not think they will ever come back, also not decentralized, because it will be much more accessible, much more people will be able to get involved. […] This goes for us, but also for Essent and Nuon. They all come from these old utilities, where things just go terribly slow. On top of that, they have become part of not very quick [organizations], in our case Germans, but the Swedes can be just as rigid. RWE is also German and GDF is French, enormous companies that have to change their strategy very quickly17. I’m curious who will survive. I mean when companies start staring at their large scale power plants for too long, they will not make it, but the market will solve that I think.’ The respondent from VNO-NCW adds that: [laggards] will eventually see that they should become more sustainable, or they will lose the battle in the market. So if you don’t go along in making your processes more efficient, look closer at where the resources come from, where the energy comes from and handle this in a sensible way, you will eventually kick the bucket, because others will, and then you really have a problem. It is just that simple.’ Also the respondent from the Ministry of EL&I observes that the large utilities have to react to ongoing decentralisation in the energy system:

17

‘Van die vreselijk grote bedrijven en die moeten dadelijk heel snel gaan schakelen’

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‘The market position of classic companies is changing fundamentally. I believe that when they hold on to their classical strategy, they will eventually go to the wall. And you already see large companies struggling, on the one hand they are the parties with large coal fired power plants which are still important, but they are also the parties that have a very negative image and are competing with all those new players. They are really struggling with their role, you just see that happening.’ He continues with: ‘Keeping a classic energy company alive should never be an end in itself and certainly not for us. What matters is an affordable, reliable and clean energy supply. We do not really care how that is organized. You see incredible changes institutionally and that is only positive. However, we should not have the illusion that we can make it just with consumers with solar panels and a lot of small players. The whole energy transition is a very capital intensive undertaking. Billions have to be invested, also in the Dutch energy supply and to be able to make such investments, scale is needed. So we will still need large players but in a completely different role.’ An interesting side note here is that both the respondent from EL&I and from EnergieNederland repeatedly refer to the large utilities as ‘classic’ or ‘traditional’ energy companies. From a discursive perspective the consequent use of such adjectives implies that these respondents see a new storyline emerging that bases on a different logic than that of the ‘traditional’ energy companies. In chapter five possible building blocks for such a new storyline will be discussed. Most respondents see decentralisation as a trend that can exist next to the drive for Europeanization. As the respondent of the Ministry of EL&I puts it: ‘I do not want to say that the whole system will be turned on its head, because we will still have large power plants and a high-voltage grid. What you actually see is that we used to have a national energy system, we were self-sufficient, from high, middle to low. Now we see a divergence to two systems, on the one hand more and more international, with much more interconnections, even larger power plants, especially for industry, I mean Hoogovens18 will never run on solar panels so to say. And on the other hand we see much more decentralized, small-scale. And those two systems will always be connected, therefore we need an infrastructure to keep everything balanced.’ From this section the following storyline could be summarized: ‘decentralisation has the potential to change the energy system fundamentally’. What its impact will be and how this will affect traditional energy companies exactly is still unclear.

18

A large steel producer in the Netherlands

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Political instability Interesting is that the current political instability seems to lead to prudence at least amongst some players. The respondent from Delta states: ‘we choose those projects of which we think are robust under different scenarios. But it means that you have to be very careful in your decisions. We can handle normal business risks, that is life. Fluctuations in the price of natural gas and coal are normal, but important political changes or the fact that there are no goals for after 2020 makes it difficult to invest. […] that means that you have to be selective and prudent with your business case and for that reason maybe postpone investments or not do them at all.’ The respondent from Essent voices a similar concern: ‘prudence is the behavior it provokes in companies, prudence in investing. […] the cork on which we have made investments in the past, where we float on financially are a couple of large power plants. They have to make money and give us the power to invest in new things, but that is problematic at the moment. And the outlook is just so insecure, we do not know what will happen, that makes it difficult to make plans.’ According to the respondent from GDF-Suez political instability actually reinforces the trend towards decentralisation: ‘do you keep investing in project worth billions of euros, for which the risk, which is always in percentages, can run into tens or even hundreds of million euros? Or do you go for smaller projects, of tens of million euros for which the risks maybe run into the hundred thousands? That is a track we follow at the moment, that we are looking more for decentralized projects19. These remarks seem to confirm the observation by the respondents of E.on and the Ministry of EL&I that large utilities are struggling with their roles. The challenge lies in the fact that they are prudent with developing new strategies at the moment but if they keep staring at their large coal fired power plants, they will eventually go to the wall, according to the respondent of E.on. The storyline in this section could be summarized as: ‘the absence of a clear direction in government policy leads to prudence amongst traditional energy companies.’ New players Connected to the decentralisation trend is the role that new and completely different players are claiming in the energy system. The respondent from Essent observes: ‘Things are really changing, the market is changing, different players. IKEA is building more wind turbines than RWE worldwide, Google more solar panels than a lot of others.

19

which can be both fossil and renewable in the case of GDF-Suez according to the respondent

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There are a lot different new players in the market, then what is still the sector? What connects us?’ The respondent from VEMW states: ‘everyone has their own interests, and the energy sector itself has the biggest stakes, because they have dominated 100% of the energy business up to now, while a lot of new players are lining up. I already mentioned the members of VEMW, say sugar beet producers that suddenly become producers of biogas or industrial enterprises that place wind turbines on their premises. But there are also all kinds of players from outside the industry or energy sector that could play a role. Think about the IT-sector or companies that are very good at marketing products or reaching consumers. Why could companies like Google or Apple not play a role?’ The respondent from EL&I states: ‘I find it interesting to see that if you wanted to speak with the energy sector in the past, one phone call sufficed. Now there are so many players active and that is very good to see, there is a whole new dynamic, all kinds of parties, innovations, very good.’ He goes on by saying: ‘The whole decentralisation is in principle a development that primarily comes from the market. We do not have to do everything from the government. You see that in the market a lot of players, a lot of initiatives originate to stimulate decentralized energy. Cooperations develop, all kinds of small companies spring up like mushrooms, local governments that want something. A lot is happening, not by itself, but indeed without government involvement and that is good in a liberalized market.’ The respondent from Essent, however, sees this quite differently: ‘I think you should look at the fundamentals of the market and the non-market that is developing next to it. […] when you let something play in the market that is bound to completely different rules, you get strange effects that need to be repaired. I rather keep it completely out of the market, that we say we keep everything that is decentralized outside of the market. Then you at least let the market do its work. But you should not start net-metering20 endlessly, using the market when it suits you but not when it does not suit you. It would make it easier when you use simple basic rules, that we say what is in the market and what is not in the market. And it is quite possible that some things are not in the market. Well, then you should not pollute the market with that.’ Apparently as a result of new players getting active in the energy domain disagreement emerges on what ‘the energy market’ actually is. The storyline that emerges from this section is:

20

Salderen

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‘new players are entering the energy system and this is generally a positive development, although it is sometimes unclear what role these players have and how this affects the energy market.’

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5. Discussion In this chapter the results presented in chapter four will be discussed. First, input is provided for a new storyline that addresses the tensions within and challenges for the dominant storyline and therefore could lead to a new storyline that more adequately encompasses the changes respondents observe in the energy system than the current dominant storyline does. Then a comparison is made between the results of this research and the theory as outlined in chapter two. Afterwards the research design, the issues that need to be taken into account when interpreting the results, its shortcomings and ideas for future improvement are discussed.

5.1 Discussing an energy transition storyline As chapter four shows, the storyline that currently dominates the energy sector is increasingly becoming inadequate to encompass the change that respondents observe in the (Dutch) energy sector at the moment. Stopping at just pointing out the difficulties in that storyline feels unsatisfactory. Therefore, in this paragraph some discussion points are identified which could form input for a new storyline that more adequately addresses the changes respondents observe in the energy domain. Problem perception As pointed out in the introduction, transitions can be regarded as wicked problems taking place in complex systems. An important characteristic of wicked problems is that the nature of the problem is unclear and that the problem definition can differ according to the perspective of the observer. One of the remarks of the respondent from Essent points at this: ‘in order to have a meaningful debate [...] it would help to first come to an agreement on what we are actually talking about.’ The main problem the energy transition aims to tackle according to most respondents is climate change. As the respondent of Delta states: ‘the energy transition has of course been initiated because we foresee we will otherwise run into the climate change problem, however, the availability of fossil fuels in relation to geopolitics is also an issue.’ The respondent of EnergieNederland however, observes that there are also other societal problems or needs an energy transition could cater for, such as the (re)communalization a lot of citizens are looking for. An on-going societal dialogue on what the objectives of the energy transition are and which problems it aims to solve could provide helpful in defining the problem and therefore the direction in which to look for solutions.

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Changing market As pointed out at the end of paragraph 4.3, the respondents of Essent and the Ministry of EL&I have different understandings of what the energy market is. In this regard, the respondent from VEMW observes: ‘Both energy and water are special markets, special products, because they require a network infrastructure. Which means that if you have no access to that grid or have to pay too much for access, when there are obstacles, in the end you do not have access to that market.’ At the same time there are a lot of questions concerning the current market design. The market is developed based on logic of centralized energy production. With an increasing share of variable renewables the fossil market logic becomes problematic, because renewable capacity has high up-front investment costs but close to zero running costs, as opposed to conventional power plants that have relatively low upfront investment costs, but higher running costs because of necessary fuel inputs. Open discussion is needed on how to adapt the market in such a way that it continues to work under changing circumstances. Changing roles Another point of discussion that emerges from the interviews is that some actors are struggling with their own but also each other’s roles and that of new players in the energy system. From the interviews one of the main points of concern is the changing role of authorities. The respondent of EL&I states: ‘the role of The Hague21 becomes smaller and the role of Brussels and of local authorities become bigger. The role of The Hague also changes in the sense that we are very busy in the discussion in Brussels and developing the conditions under which local authorities can operate.’ Also reflection on the role of the Ministry of EL&I itself seems appropriate. It looks like the Ministry is experiencing a struggle between protecting current economic interests and facilitating change. About the industry the respondent of EL&I states that: ‘one could say we make it more difficult for companies here regarding CO2 and sustainability, but then they will move somewhere else and you lose jobs.’ The following quote also from the respondent of EL&I underlines this struggle: ‘the traditional energy sector, the members of Energie-Nederland, are not the most innovative companies we have […] Classic parties are of course always inclined to uphold their position as long as possible, but this is also relative. If we look at the renewable energy we have in the Netherlands at the moment it is for 90% by these large classic companies.’

21

Refers to the national government in the Netherlands

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It would be interesting for the Ministry to investigate whether betting on the traditional energy sector to invest in sustainable energy could be part of the explanation of why the development of renewable energy sources goes relatively slow in the Netherlands compared to other European countries. In this regard it is interesting to note is that the respondent from the Ministry of I&M voices his frustration with the position of the Ministry of EL&I but at the same time legitimizes that role: ‘what you can see is that the exchange between people from EL&I and the energy sector is considerable, civil servants that work here22, go there and the other way around. There is quite a shared interest and that is something that also frustrates climate policy […] vested interests are quite vested here.’ However, the respondent continues: ‘it is of course a good Ministry of Economic Affairs, because they really represent the economy.’ With this view, the respondent from the Ministry of I&M legitimizes EL&I’s current positioning. However, one could question whether protecting current economic interests is in the best (economic) interest of the country as a whole. Concerning climate policy the respondent from the Ministry of EL&I stated the following: ‘there is of course the discussion that not all external effects of coal fired, nuclear or gas fired power plants are internalised in the price. Well, that is true, but that’s life at the moment.’ It is interesting that the respondent of the Ministry of EL&I points out a market failure so clearly, but does not seem to see an active role for his Ministry to correct it. It could be part of the explanation for the respondent of I&M to conclude that: ‘the energy transition will not come from [the Ministry of] EL&I.’ The respondent from VEMW includes another interesting point in this respect, namely the role of the regulator: ‘we liberalized the energy supply, introduced competition, privatised part of our energy supply and that is fine, but it postulates powerful control. If you do not organize that control well and make sure control is also executed, it is a matter of time before we get another mess after we saw the banking sector go wrong because of a failing regulator. We could see the same for energy.’ The impression the interviews give is that significant changes in the energy sector are already underway. An open discussion about the role of the authorities, especially that of the Ministry

22

The interview with the respondent from I&M took place at the Ministry of EL&I

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of EL&I and where the country’s future economic interests might lie seems appropriate. It could also include the role other Ministries play in legitimizing the Ministry of EL&I’s current position and the role of the regulator in the Dutch energy sector. Moreover, the roles of the large utilities are discussed. Respondents of large utilities voiced their concerns about the future of their companies under changing circumstances. Some business development units are already actively looking for new ideas which could include value creation in a more decentralized energy supply, energy (efficiency) services or an active role in balancing the grid which will be fed from more distributed energy sources. As the respondent of GDF-Suez puts it: ‘we are not yet involved in distributed energy, smart grids, heating cooling in the Netherlands, but we are investigating it as a result of the difficult times ahead, the margins will simply come under pressure. We have started to look into decentralized solutions and the role GDF-Suez could play in the value chain.’ In the interviews the Dutch energy sector was often positioned in between market and government. As the respondent from E.on puts it: ‘the transition will develop in the market and market players will have to respond, too late, in time, or not in time. There will always be a platform for organisations like VNONCW or Energie-Nederland, because there will always be government intervention, especially in this sector, but also in telecom or railway.’ What is often overlooked in this perspective is the role a lot of citizens could and want to play in solving the problems the energy system is confronted with (see e.g. Hajer, 2011; Schwencke, 2012). As discussed in paragraph 5.3 the respondent of the Ministry of EL&I sees people working together in energy cooperations as market forces. However, as cooperations not necessarily respond to market forces like businesses do, it might be necessary to (re)consider their role in shaping the future energy system and how this relates to the current constellation of market and government. Unexpected coalitions The last point of discussion regarding a new storyline is that a shift in discourse coalitions can be expected or is even actively pursued already. An example of this was discussed in paragraph 4.2, as Dong Energy, Eneco, and Shell cooperated with the environmental NGO Stichting Natuur & Milieu to advocate a coal tax. Also VNO-NCW explains: ‘we cooperate with the environmental movement on a lot of files. 10, 20 years ago the differences were quite clear, often the environmental movement was in favour of sustainability and business against. That used to be the case, but that has changed 46

considerably the last couple of years, I think. Businesses more and more see that sustainability also provides chances, if you do it well. And on the other hand the environmental movement also sees that for sustainability companies are needed as well. That brings these parties together and provides the insight that when you develop common positions it leads to sustainability.’ Also the respondents of GreenChoice and VEMW showed remarkable similarities in storylines where it considers improving market functioning, especially regarding access for new players. Such new discourse coalitions could result in unexpected dynamics and synergies which in turn could lead to creative solutions for existing problems.

5.2 Reflecting on the theoretical framework In this paragraph the theoretical framework is reflected upon. First the results of this research are discussed in the light of the theory behind discourse analysis, followed by a discussion of the concept of discursive regime destabilisation and finally the implications of the findings for transition theory are outlined. Discourse analysis Often discourse analysis, at least the argumentative approach as proposed by Hajer (1995), is applied to study certain policy outcomes. Transition research starts from the premise that societal change does not (only) take place through policy and politics but in wider society. From a transitions perspective, policy development generally happens in regime circles. Argumentative discourse analysis does distinguish dominant or hegemonic storylines from marginalized ones, but these storylines have already made it into policy circles. Therefore, it could be argued that the argumentative discourse analysis tends to overlook the potential for disruptive change from niche-storylines (just like this research does, see Epilogue). This research shows the applicability of an argumentative discourse analysis to wider societal change processes. Combining the discursive approach and the multi-level perspective from transition studies opens up vast new research potential for discourse scholars interested in wider societal change. Discursive regime destabilisation Discursive regime destabilisation has been observed in different ways in this research, most clearly around introduction of the coal tax and interpretation of the energy market. First the discursive regime destabilisation concept is discussed in the light of the ‘phase model of destabilisation enactment’ as presented in figure 1 in chapter two. In doing so, it should be stressed that the destabilisation process as described by this model is based on a successful transition and therefore it is only one of all possible outcomes. From a regime perspective going through all phases of destabilisation enactment is not the preferable course. Another point of concern is that the model was developed to evaluate industry regimes, while the results of this 47

research give an insight in the perspectives of several powerful actors within the energy domain, including the energy industry, but also others. By interpreting the outcomes of the interviews according to the phase-model, it does not mean that the incumbent Dutch energy industry will necessarily go through all the stages and dissolute in the end. This being said a tentative attempt is made to interpret the results of this research according the model. First of all, most of the respondent recognize problems such as climate change but also very tight margins for energy companies and increased competition from new players and technologies entering the market. Next to that, some respondents express that their organizations are exploring solutions outside the bounds of the existing regime, like GDF-Suez looking into decentralised value creation. Respondents do not give the impression that problems have turned into crises (yet), but some comments do hint at the fact that companies are working on radical change of their business strategies. Therefore, based on respondents’ evaluation of the changes in the energy sector, it could be argued that the Dutch energy regime is somewhere between phase 2 and 4, with some hints of energy companies entering phase 4a. The remark by the respondent of E.on that he is unsure which of the large utilities will still exist in 20 years from now, shows that going through all the phases of the model is seen as a real possibility. However, because this possibility is recognized already and is being acted upon, it becomes less likely that this particular company will go through all stages and capitulate to irrelevance or death. In sum, the phase model of destabilisation enactment has value mostly as a warning signal for regime actors that they should not overlook the possibility of their organisation going through all stages. However, as regime actor’s interpretations of events in an on-going transition challenge differ considerably, the model has little explanatory power. Furthermore, it has little predictive power over the future trajectory of an on-going transition, as at any time during a transition an actor could decide to implement significant changes, which can only be established in hind-sight. The concept of discursive regime destabilisation does provide some qualitative insights in possible destabilisation processes. It was observed in this research as a dispute between regime actors involved in coal and natural gas. The consternation around this policy intervention forms an interesting example: one part of the regime, namely that involved with natural gas, frames natural gas as a “friend of renewable energy” or “transition fuel”. In pushing this frame some actors are willing to go so far as to lobby for a tax on coal. From a transitions perspective this is an interesting development as it shakes up long held positions and discourse coalitions. On the other hand, it opens the door to a renewed lock-in in a fuel that is still fossil i.e. it will run out in the end and also emits CO2 , although less than burning coal. The interpretations above refer mostly to the destabilisation of traditional energy companies, which the phase model of destabilisation enactment was adapted to. However, destabilisation 48

in the culture, structure and practices of other regime players could be observed in this research as well. The clearest example is a difference of opinion between the respondent of the Ministry of EL&I and that of a large utility on what actually constitutes the energy market. The respondent of Energie-Nederland goes so far as to question the current energy market structure in the light of an increasing share of variable renewable sources of energy. Adapting the energy market could have far reaching consequences as it is seen as such a fundamental organizing principle of the energy sector. The respondent of Energie-Nederland also observes differences of culture between younger and older people involved in energy discussions within his organization. The respondent of VNO-NCW explains that the practices of his organizations have changed considerably over time, as they increasingly cooperate with the environmental movement in their lobbying efforts. The examples of discursive regime destabilisation that where observed in this research tend towards a kind of multi-level perspective on discursive regime destabilisation: the energy transition concept is broad and therefore easy to agree upon, even if different people have different understandings of the concept. Most respondents agree that there is no fundamental difference of opinion over the long-term goals of an energy transition (80-95% CO2-reduction), however disagreement develops around the actual implementation of this goal. Actual discursive regime destabilisation is observed around more concrete concepts such as the energy market, or government intervention towards achieving the overarching goal, such as the coal tax. A better understanding of the discursive destabilisation process and patterns in discursive regime destabilisation could be gained by repeating this research with the same respondents in one or two years’ time. Reflecting on the discursive regime destabilisation concept, it is also possible that regime actors succeed in recognizing and accommodating pressures timely. After initial destabilisation, this could lead the regime to develop a new and more adequate storyline and reconfigure around it. In this way, dealing with pressures could actually result in a stronger regime. An example could be the ‘natural gas as friend of renewable energy’ storyline that is promoted by some actors in the energy domain at the moment. This could lead to some parts of the regime, such as coal fired power, being replaced for new parts, such as offshore wind or biomass co-firing, leaving the overall structure of the regime largely intact. This process of (part of) a regime successfully dealing with destabilisation could be referred to as ‘regime restabilisation’. Transition theory In this paragraph the implications of the research results for transition theory and its key concepts which were introduced in chapter two will be discussed. The multi-phase concept was developed to describe transitions in time, speed and size and distinguishes four phases: the predevelopment, take-off, acceleration and stabilization phase. One of the challenges in transition studies is to assess in which phase an on-going transition is 49

in. The transitions literature suggests that in the acceleration phase changes become visible at the systems-level. The results of this research show that different regime actors observe that fundamental changes are taking place in the energy domain. Therefore it could be concluded that the energy transition has reached the acceleration phase, which seems to underline the findings of various transition scholars studying the energy sector (cf. Rotmans, 2011; Verbong and Loorbach, 2012). Further research could develop ‘discursive regime destabilisation’ into an indicator to assess in which phase an on-going transition is in. The multi-pattern concept distinguishes three patterns in which transition can take place: through bottom-up pressures, top-down pressures or a hybrid form. The premises of this research and its results pose fundamental challenges to the multi-pattern concept as the existence of ‘exogenous’ pressures is questioned. Rather it is argued, based on insights from discourse theory, that events and developments require interpretation before they are perceived as pressures. Regime-actors are assumed to have most interpretive power in case of such events. Furthermore, the results of this research pose challenges for the regime concept as it is currently used in the transitions literature. In this research the Dutch energy regime has been defined based on the transitions literature as the dominant culture, structure and practices in the Dutch energy domain, characterized by a centralized and top-down organized production and distribution system predominantly based on fossil-fuels and high levels of energy consumption. Taking into account the introduction of the coal tax and its implications in energy regime circles, this demarcation of the energy regime becomes problematic. One could argue that the dispute over the coal tax is a sign of the regime positioning itself in the face of niche-pressures. The problem with this explanation, however is that the observed reactions were not uniform throughout the regime, rather one part of the regime, which is more involved in natural gas seems to abandon another part of the current regime – coal – to incorporate renewable energy in its repositioning efforts. The result seems to be regime internal struggles. These findings questions the view of the regime as a uniform entity that actively resists change. Furthermore, the results show that at least some regime players are actively repositioning themselves towards the changes they observe in the energy system. Van der Vleuten and Högselius (2012) support the finding that regime actors have also been a source of change, but argue that they favour incremental change that leaves the main structure of the regime intact. ‘Regimes and regime actors might exhibit different types of responses vis-à-vis different types of niches (e.g., defensive, accommodating or innovative), which can be located outside, close to or even within the regime’ (Verbong & Loorbach, 2012:320-321). The results of this research support the finding that different regime actors might respond differently to emerging pressures (once they have been recognized as such). Different regime elements are still in place, such as coal fired power plants, network infrastructure, energy markets, but the culture (interpreted as discourse in this research), the ‘glue’ that holds these elements together and provides meaning and coherence to the different elements, seems to be dissolving. Therefore, it becomes increasingly unclear how

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different elements and actors relate to each other and how actors position themselves in the energy domain. Therefore, a thorough revision of the regime concept seems necessary. Another point that was touched upon in the research is the effects the German Energiewende has on the Dutch energy system. Transnational transition dynamics have not been studied indepth so far (see e.g., Vleuten and Högselius, 2012) because systems under study are mostly limited in geographical scope to a single country, just like in this research. This research shows that the transnational transition dynamics also have a discursive component, in other words, the developments in Germany influence the both the public discourse and storylines of regime actors in the Dutch energy domain. The observation by the respondent of ECN that the decisions made by the German government will probably make it easier for the Dutch government to take further measures underlines this result. Further research is necessary to develop a more thorough understanding of the influence of transnational transition dynamics.

5.3 Reflecting on the research method In this paragraph the difficulties encountered throughout this research effort are discussed. These difficulties were both conceptual and practical and relate to the validity and reliability of this research, to the interviews and selection of respondents and to the position of the researcher and the research institute where the research was carried out in the Dutch energy debate. Validity and reliability First of all, some remarks about the validity, reliability of this research need to made. One of the characteristics of exploratory research is that it generally does not provide clear-cut and generalizable conclusions but rather explores venues for further investigation (Boeije, 2010). Possible venues for further research will be discussed at the end of chapter six. Another point of concern is amount of respondents. Because of limited number of respondents that were interviewed, fourteen in total, it is questionable whether it is possible to derive general conclusions for the whole regime. Actually, one of the findings of this research is that it is problematic to clearly demarcate and even speak of the regime, therefore care should be taken not to generalize about the whole regime when explaining the results. Interviews The interviews have been carried out in a semi-structured manner, based on the questions as provided in Annex 1. Some questions, however, needed to be tailored to the respondent’s specific role, e.g., asking the respondent of a Ministry whether his company would still exist in 20 years from now does not make sense. This influences the comparability of the interviews, as asking different questions leads to different answers. One of the ways to deal with this was to keep the presentation of empirical results as descriptive as possible. Thereby, the quotes have been presented as complete as possible, in order for the context of the quote to be clear for readers. A point of concern here is translation of the Dutch data into English. Translating 51

something is always also an interpretation step. Effort has been put in staying as closely to the original meaning (as the researcher understood it) as possible while also keeping an eye on readability of the text. For sections for which it was impossible to grasp the meaning in English, the original Dutch text has been provided in footnotes. Applying a discourse perspective and, in this case, just applying it to interview data means that the outcome is extremely dependent on who was interviewed and even when and in which circumstances. Speaking to a close colleague or even to the same person but two hours later when the respondent would have just read another interesting article or had an interesting appointment with someone, could have influenced the course of the conversation. Interviewing more respondents could have limited this effect. Selection of respondents Another point is the selection of respondents, which is dependent on availability and willingness of people to cooperate. In the end, the respondents (see Annex 2) provide an interesting mix of institutional backgrounds, including small and large businesses, civil servants, interest groups and research institutes. Because Energie-Nederland was the starting point, the focus has been mostly on suppliers of electricity and natural gas, while other areas of the Dutch energy domain remained underrepresented. This is partly made up for by interviewing respondents with a broad view on energy issues, such as the respondents of ECN, of the ministries and different interest groups. However, including more respondents, e.g., from grid operators and the oil, natural gas and heating sectors would have provided a more complete picture. An employee of the environmental NGO Stichting Natuur en Milieu was contacted repeatedly for an interview, but with no result. In order to have an open conversation the interviews were conducted under anonymity. However, to be able to present meaningful results, it was necessary to refer to the organizational context of a respondent. This has been clearly communicated to all respondents, however some respondents hinted at the fact that because their organizational context would be clear, they had to be careful in their wording of certain aspects. This could have been resolved by providing full anonymity, but that would have limited the explanatory power of the results. Furthermore, it was a deliberate choice to investigate the energy domain from a regime perspective. Therefore, the focus has been on regime actors. The first problem here is how to assess who could be considered a regime actor. In this research this distinction was made by asking intermediaries who they considered as ‘powerful’ in the Dutch energy domain. It is questionable whether actors that are perceived as ‘powerful’ are necessarily regime actors. The questions the findings in this research pose for the regime concept require a critical reflection on whether it is possible to identify regime actors in this way. The second problem is whether it is possible to retrieve the dominant storyline from regime actors, when few clearly deviating data are available, as in order for a storyline to be dominant, marginalized storylines have to exist 52

and be known. In this case, it helped that two of the interviews, the one with the respondent of the Ministry of I&M and that of GreenChoice, did deviate clearly at some important points such as sense of urgency and the potential of decentralisation. Also prior knowledge of the researcher on different positions in the energy sector helped to identify the dominant viewpoints. For this reason it would have also been helpful to include more respondents, especially niche-players. On the other hand with this kind of research it is always possible to argue that including more respondents would provide a more complete picture, but as time was limited a line had to be drawn somewhere. Researcher’s position Another point worth discussing is the role that the researcher and the institute at which the research was carried out play in the Dutch energy domain. This research was carried out at the Dutch Research Institute for Transitions (DRIFT). The researchers at DRIFT dismiss the possibility of value- free science (see e.g. Proctor, 1991) and take pride in their action-research approach. The researcher is therefore not seen as an objective observer, but also has a worldview that influences his observations. This has been dealt with to a certain extent by keeping the presentation of the results as descriptive as possible and by letting the respondents check a concept version of the thesis. Also DRIFT’s figurehead Prof. Dr. Ir. Jan Rotmans plays an active role in the Dutch energy discussion. A couple of times over the course of this research, the researcher was confronted during or before the interviews with the active and often critical position Prof. Rotmans publicly takes. Apparently this is not always appreciated by everyone taking part in that discussion. It is difficult to assess what impact this has had on the outcomes of the interviews, but that it somehow influenced the conversations is likely. When this would come up, the researcher did his best to explain that the views of Jan Rotmans do not necessarily coincide with that of other researchers at DRIFT and show that the researcher tries to take a critical stance on all positions including those of Prof. Rotmans. By doing so, the researcher had the impression that all interviews were conducted in a very open atmosphere.

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6. Conclusion & Outlook The aim of the research was to get a more refined understanding of regime functioning in an on-going transition challenge by answering the following question: How do regime actors view the Dutch energy system and its future? In order to systematically answer this question it was broken down in the following subquestions, which will be answered one by one below: 1. Which actors constitute the Dutch energy regime? 2. What is the dominant storyline regarding the Dutch energy system? 3. What (sub)storylines can be identified from regime actors regarding the future of the Dutch energy system? 1. Which actors constitute the Dutch energy regime? The Dutch energy regime has been defined as the dominant culture, structure and practices in the Dutch energy system. It is characterized by a centrally organized production and distribution system predominantly based on fossil-fuels and high levels of energy consumption. The regime is constituted by people working for ministries, businesses, interest groups, NGOs, research institutes and end consumers that together reproduce the dominant culture, structure and practices. Based on a scan of the Dutch energy system including literature review and phone interviews with several intermediaries, it was concluded that powerful actors can be found within Energie-Nederland and its direct institutional environment. This research has included fourteen interviews with respondents from energy companies Delta, Eneco, E.on, Essent, GDF-Suez, GreenChoice and NUON, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation (EL&I) and Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment (I&M), the association for large consumers of energy and water VEMW, the confederation of Netherlands industry and employers VNO-NCW and the research institute ECN, Dutch energy research centre. 2. What is the dominant storyline regarding the Dutch energy system? The main storyline and the underlying substorylines that were identified from the interviewed regime actors are summarized in table 1.

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Table 4 Dominant storyline and its substorylines

Dominant storyline

decarbonization in a European market, while keeping the energy supply secure and affordable.

Substorylines

climate change is main driver for energy transition

sustainability is only one of three pillars of energy policy

the market is the preferred ordering principle for the energy domain

Energy sector should be organized at EU-level

ETS should be leading in reducing CO2

From the interviews some inherent tensions within the dominant storyline were identified. These tensions relate to both the market and the role of government in reaching the decarbonization target. These tensions are summarized in table 2. Table 5 Tensions within the dominant storyline

Market

Government

The energy market still needs work to function properly Government should create favourable investment conditions

Dutch merchant mentality can hamper investments in sustainability Government intervention should be minimal, it threatens investment climate

3. What (sub)storylines can be identified from regime actors regarding the future of the Dutch energy system? From the interviews some discursive elements were identified that pose challenges to the dominant storyline as identified above regarding the future of the Dutch energy system. These challenges are summarized in table 3 and discussed in more detail below. Table 6 Challenges for the dominant storyline

Energiewende in Germany

decentralisation

new players entering the energy system

absence of a clear direction in government policy

Most respondents referred to the significant changes that are taking place in Germany’s energy system. The direction and swiftness of Germany’s Energiewende are questioned by most respondents. Respondents already see some effects of these developments in the Dutch energy system, but the exact future developments in Germany and their effects on the Dutch energy system are uncertain. Another challenge that most respondents had trouble to fit to the dominant storyline is decentralized energy production. This development and its disruptive potential are recognized 55

by most respondents, but there are a lot of questions and doubts around its impact. A couple of respondents discuss the possible need for adaptation of the current market model in order to accommodate decentralized and variable renewable sources of energy. One of the respondents goes even so far as to question the whole market model as it exists at this moment. Connected to the decentralisation trend is that of new players entering the energy domain. These are either citizen initiatives in the form of energy co-operations or (regime) players active in other sectors, such as IKEA and Google that see chances in the energy sector. Another challenge that hampers the energy transition according to the respondents is the lack of a secure long-term investment climate because of political instability. On the one hand, absence of clear and effective national or European policy leads to prudence and postponing of investment by some regime actors, on the other hand some respondents observe that if the large utilities will continue to stare at their large coal fired power plants, they will go to the wall, as the new players can adapt to changing circumstances more rapidly than ‘traditional’ energy companies.

6.1 Outlook This research sheds some light on how the energy transition is understood by regime actors in the Dutch energy system and therefore give insight in possible directions the energy transition could take, however it should be noted that these are not the only directions (this statement will be elaborated on in the Epilogue). The dominant storyline that emerges from the interviews is that climate change is perceived as the main problem that needs to be tackled with an energy transition. Taking this as the problem definition leads to technical solutions such as increasing the share of nuclear power and renewables and developing carbon capture and storage for coal and natural gas fired power plants. However, some of the respondents also see other societal problems an energy transition could cater for, such as people looking for (re)communalization in which decentralized renewable energy could play a role. This finding supports one of the premises of this research that the meaning of the energy transition differs between actors and depends on their perspective and problem definition. New players that are entering the energy domain apparently see opportunities that the “traditional” companies did not see. These new players not only represent niches, as the energy transition literature suggests, but also regime players from other sectors. This leads to ‘discursive regime destabilisation’, signaled by confusion, insecurity and conflict amongst regime actors. An example of confusion is the disagreement over whether new players such as energy co-operations are part of the energy market or should be left out of this market. Insecurity about the future was displayed by some respondents by stating that it is unclear which of the large utilities will still exist in 20 years from now. A clear example of conflict is the introduction of a coal tax, which was supported by regime players that are involved in the 56

natural gas business, but would hurt those regime players that (also) operate coal fired power plants. Regarding the future energy discourse on the one hand one could expect such instances of discursive regime destabilisation to increase when more regime players get involved in renewable energy sources, when other countries, such as Germany, develop radical policy to support this development and when niche-players continue to pressure existing constellations. This could lead to a fundamental shift in the dominant culture, structure and practices in the (Dutch) energy domain. On the other hand, the existing energy regime could reconfigure and restabilize around a new storyline, such as ‘natural gas as friend of renewable energy’. In this case, coal fired power plants could be exchanged for centralized forms of renewable energy, such as offshore wind or biomass (co-firing). Whatever the future brings, it implies the necessity of developing a new storyline that more adequately addresses the tensions within and challenges for the current dominant storyline.

6.2 Recommendations for further research The results of this research imply that the energy transition is heading towards the acceleration phase. During this phase the empowered niche-regimes challenge the existing regime and changes become visible for regime actors. What this research makes clear is that in this phase the regime concept as it is used in the transitions literature becomes problematic. Different regime elements still exist, but the culture (interpreted as discourse in this research) that provides meaning and coherence to these elements is changing. Therefore, it seems necessary to refine or reconceptualize the regime concept. Turnheim & Geels (2012) made a first step in this direction by characterizing an ‘industry-regime’. This research, especially the regime-internal dispute over the coal tax shows that differentiating the regime along the lines of compatibility with changing circumstances could be a promising option. In this case the divide was along the lines of business interests in coal and natural gas, fossil fuels with different characteristics that are more or less compatible with concerns about climate change and more variable energy sources such as wind and solar. Furthermore, it would be worthwhile to assess whether the concept of discursive regime destabilisation could be used as an indicator for the phase a transition is in. In order to be able to identify discursive regime destabilisation as an on-going process, it would be necessary to repeat this research in future. Further distinction could then be made in the different patterns in and drivers for discursive regime destabilisation. In this way, investigating discursive regime de- and restabilisation could become part of the transition monitoring tool-box (cf. Taanman, 2012). Also investigating discursive regime destabilisation around transition challenges in different sectors could yield valuable insights to further develop its theoretical fundaments. Another interesting research suggestion is to investigate regime ‘dropouts’, actors that have been part of the (energy) regime for a long time, but lost faith in the dominant storyline or saw different 57

opportunities because of on-going transition dynamics. Insights from such research could provide a better understanding of how discursive regime destabilisation works and what exactly leads regime actors to lose faith in the dominant storyline. Discursive regime destabilisation also provides interesting research and practical venues for transition management, the discipline that explores and applies possibilities for steering transitions. A better understanding of the destabilisation process could result in developing strategic interventions that make use of the identified weak points in the dominant storyline and thereby speeding up the regime destabilisation process. Other suggestions for further research based on this explorative venture include transnational transition dynamics. By comparing the dominant storylines and discourse coalitions in different countries, such as the Netherlands and Germany, preferably around an emblematic issue such as Fukushima a better understanding of such transnational influences could be gained.

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Epilogue The findings in this research base on an investigation of the energy transition from the perspective of regime actors in the Dutch energy domain. Therefore, it could give the impression that the storylines of respondents are the only one that matter in order to understand transition dynamics, because they form the dominant discourse coalition. However, the opposite is the case. Historical case studies in transition research show that it is likely that innovations with disruptive potential develop out of sight and reach of the regime. Such developments are generally not recognized (timely) by regime actors and therefore such developments probably did not receive (enough) attention in this research. The interested reader is referred to other (transition) research that looks into such potentially disruptive developments in more detail (cf. Schwencke, 2012, Schleicher-Tappeser, 2012; Raven, 2012; Verbong & Geels, 2012). As a matter of fact, this research took a regime perspective because transition research has so far put more emphasis on the innovative power of niches. One could even argue that transition research by its very nature is more interested in change and innovation than in stability. It is probably for this reason that the regime functioning has received less attention in transition studies so far. This research could therefore be seen as an attempt to bridge the gap between frontrunners (that sometimes forget that they are only frontrunners as long as there are people following, otherwise they are just runners) and those parts of a system that are indeed less progressive than some people want them to be, but often more out of caution to protect the good things that have been built up with great effort so far than out of the deliberate intention to stall progress. Of course there are always exceptions such as the industry funded misinformation campaigns aimed to spread doubt on climate science that Oreskes & Conway (2010) and Jan Paul van Soest (2011; 2012) uncovered. However, I (wish to) believe these are indeed exceptions. In order to fruitfully resolve the persistent problems that are facing modern societies, it will be necessary to take note of the different ways in which people experience the world around them – be it regime or niche players - and take this into account for decision making. Transition research and transition management have a lot to offer in this respect. Therefore, I am happy and thankful to have the opportunity to continue my work at the Dutch Research Institute for Transitions (DRIFT) and contribute, at least a little bit, to push society in a more sustainable direction.

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Annex 1: Questionnaire       

What are, according to you, the three most pressing challenges the Dutch energy sector currently faces? How does your organization anticipate on these challenges? How do you inform yourself about the developments in the energy sector? What is the influence of the energy sector on Dutch energy policy? If you could employ a full-time researcher on this topic, which question should he or she investigate? Are there any question(s) you expected that I did not ask? Could you recommend other people to interview regarding my research?

Depending on the organization (some of) the following questions were included:  Which points should Energie Nederland lobby for in the coming five years?  To what extent do you expect Energie-Nederland to actually do so?  What will your organization look like 20 years from now?

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Annex 2: List of respondents Preliminary scan of the Dutch energy system. (Telephone) interviews with: Date 02/05/2012

Respondent Frans van der Loo

14/05/2012

Bram Buijs

24/05/2012

Leonie Meulman

24/05/2012 29/05/2012 07/06/2012

Martine Verweij Ernst Vuyk Walter Ruijgrok

Position Organization Senior staffmember Agentschap NL Energytransition Associate McKinsey & Company Researcher Clingendael International Energy Programme Senior Consultant Squarewise Managing Consultant Ecofys Manager Markets & Energie Nederland Environment

Formal interviews with anonymous respondents from: Date 12/06/2012 08/06/2012 22/06/2012 29/06/2012 05/07/2012 05/07/2012 06/07/2012 29/06/2012 09/07/2012 10/07/2012 11/07/2012 08/08/2012 17/08/2012

Organization Comments E.on Benelux Eneco Response by e-mail GreenChoice Recording quality bad Delta N.V. Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation (EL&I) Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment (I&M) GDF-Suez Energie-Nederland VEMW NUON ECN VNO-NCW Essent

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Annex 3: Questions telephone interviews preliminary scan of the field 1. What is your role in the energy domain? 2. Who would you consider powerful players in the Dutch energy domain? 3. What would you consider the main changes confronting the energy domain at the moment?

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I, Rick Bosman herewith declare that this master thesis titled ‘Energy Transition in the Netherlands: Storylines from regime actors’ has not been submitted elsewhere and is entirely my own work. All materials that have been used in the research are quoted or acknowledged as appropriate.

Rotterdam, 26 October 2012

Signature

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