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English for Cambodia?: Aid, Depoliticisation and Inequality
Stephen Clayton
A thesis submitted for the degree of PhD
Department of Sociology
University of Essex
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Abstract This thesis is an ethnographic study of an international aid funded project set up to establish sustainable systems for the teaching and learning of English in Cambodian secondary schools. Unlike other critical studies of ‘development’ projects, this is not a study in the ‘failure’ of ‘development.’ The project is analysed as part of the latest in a series of foreign interventions which have all contained attempts to restructure Cambodian society. The latest intervention, shaped by a range of international ‘development’ organisations, has pursued a neo-liberal restructuring of the public sector as part of the integration of Cambodia’s economy, society and people into global market ‘disciplines.’ English has been central to these processes as the operating language of the organisations, which simultaneously promoted English as the language of ‘development.’ The project was a response to this particular modality of ‘development’ rather than the actual problems of the education sector. Thus, the teaching of English was framed as a technical matter of implementing ‘modern’ pedagogies and materials, effacing wider questions of who benefits from this form of education. Inequalities of income, status and power between the expatriate and Cambodian project participants replicated and naturalised existing and widening global inequalities. Unlike Ferguson’s (1994) ‘anti-politics machine’, the depoliticising effects of this project facilitated the expansion of the private education sector, benefiting specific Cambodian education staff and further undermining an already weak state sector. Whilst project activities created tensions and conflicts at the level of individuals, groups and institutions, these were framed within a neo-liberal modality of development and demonstrated little evidence of resistance to this latest external intervention.
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Contents Abstract.......................................................................................................................................2 Contents......................................................................................................................................3 Figures........................................................................................................................................5 Abbreviations..............................................................................................................................6 Acknowledgements....................................................................................................................9 Introduction...............................................................................................................................11 English spread theories.................................................................................................................................... Foreign aid debates.......................................................................................................................................... Development theory and analysis...................................................................................................................... A methodological note......................................................................................................................................
16 21 27 29
Chapter 1: Historical myths, formations and interventions.....................................................33 Discourse of destruction.................................................................................................................................... 33 A history of foreign intervention....................................................................................................................... 37 Angkorean empire........................................................................................................................................... 39 After Angkor................................................................................................................................................. 41 Thai and Vietnamese expansion..................................................................................................................... 43 French colonialism........................................................................................................................................... 44 Independence to renewed civil war..................................................................................................................... 46 Education under Sihanouk............................................................................................................................. 47 The Lon Nol Regime 1970-1975................................................................................................................... 50 Democratic Kampuchea 1975-79.................................................................................................................... 51 Education in Democratic Kampuchea.............................................................................................................. 52 People’s Republic of Kampuchea/State of Cambodia 1979-1991..................................................................... 54 Transition to the Kingdom of Cambodia.......................................................................................................... 56 Chapter 2: Constructing the Demand for English...................................................................58 Introduction..................................................................................................................................................... 58 Clandestine English classes.............................................................................................................................. 63 The QSA Cambodian English Language Training Project.............................................................................. 65 In the border camps......................................................................................................................................... 72 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia...................................................................................... 78 Chapter 3: English and the restructuring of an aid dependent, market-oriented, clientelist regime.......................................................................................................................................85 Introduction..................................................................................................................................................... 85 Aid and the privileging of English................................................................................................................... 89
4 Cambodia’s ‘theoretical democracy’................................................................................................................... 94 The 1993 election aftermath............................................................................................................................ 96 Divided administration.................................................................................................................................... 97 Continuing conflict........................................................................................................................................... 99 Structural adjustment.................................................................................................................................... 104 The entrenchment of the aid sector.................................................................................................................. 111 Chapter 4: Cambodian education and CAMSET...................................................................117 Introduction.................................................................................................................................................. 117 An Overview of Cambodian Education......................................................................................................... 118 Education sector performance and issues......................................................................................................... 119 The Cambodian Secondary English Teaching (CAMSET) Project................................................................ 127 Cambodian British Centre for Teacher Education (CBC).............................................................................. 131 Cambodian Secondary English Teaching Project (CAMSET) Phase 1.......................................................... 134 Cambodian Secondary English Teaching Project (CAMSET) Phase 2.......................................................... 137 Chapter 5: The Cultural Politics of ELT in Cambodia..........................................................152 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. Communicative Language Teaching............................................................................................................... Changing Classroom Culture......................................................................................................................... Teacher Training Materials........................................................................................................................... Analysis of materials..................................................................................................................................... In the classroom.............................................................................................................................................
152 157 161 165 169 181
Chapter 6: Income, status and inequality...............................................................................192 Introduction.................................................................................................................................................. 192 Income inequalities........................................................................................................................................ 196 Status inequalities......................................................................................................................................... 219 Chapter 7: Aftermath: project outcomes and sustainability...................................................227 Introduction.................................................................................................................................................. 227 CAMSET and project sustainability............................................................................................................ 231 Post-CAMSET trajectories.......................................................................................................................... 243 Afterword.................................................................................................................................252 Appendices..............................................................................................................................258 Other data sources......................................................................................................................................... 276 Bibliography and other documentary sources....................................................................... 279
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Figures Figure 1: Kingdom of Cambodia................................................................................................8 Figure 2: Private school advertising Phnom Penh (author’s photo)........................................61 Figure 3: Advertising private classes, Phnom Penh (author’s photo)..................................... 61 Figure 4: Ratha teaching in-service trainees May 200 (author’s photo)................................ 183 Figure 5: Theany teaching in-service trainees (author’s photo)............................................ 183 Figure 6: Pre-service trainees Takeo RTTC, May 2000 (author’s photo)..............................184 Figure 7: In-service trainees Takeo RTTC, May 2000 (author’s photo)................................184 Figure 8: Margaret, Graham, Vantha and Liesbeth going to rent house in Prey Kabas (author’s photo).......................................................................................................................194 Figure 9: Author’s house Takeo (author’s photo)..................................................................194 Figure 10: Takeo RTTC trainee-trainers, (l-r) Kheang Theany, Chheng Chhin, San Sothearo and Tith Ratha, in old English library May 2000 (author’s photo)........................................213 Figure 11: Training mentor, Sok Chan Mol, gives speech at closing ceremony of on-service training course, Takeo RTTC, June 2000 (author’s photo)................................................... 213 Figure 12: CAMSET trainers graduation ceremony, NETREC, Phnom Penh, February 2001. L-r: Kheang Theany, Douglas Frogett, Sok Chan Mol, Jane Fowles, Tith Ratha, San Sothearo, Chhen Chhin and author (author’s photo).............................................................241 Figure 13: Sothearo in the new English office, Takeo RTTC, December 2002 (author’s photo)......................................................................................................................................242
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Abbreviations ADB
Asian Development Bank
AIDAB
Australian International Development Aid Bureau
ASEAN
Association of South East Asian Nations
BLDP
Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party
CAMSET
Cambodian Secondary English Teachers project
CDRI
Cambodia Development Resource Institute
CELT
Cambodian English Language Training project
CPP
Cambodian People’s Party
DfID
Department for International Development (UK)
DK
Democratic Kampuchea
EDUCAM
Coordinating committee for organisations working in education
EFA
Education For All
FUNCINPEC
National United Front for an Independent, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (English translation)
GDP
gross domestic product
GNP
gross national product
(I)NGO
(international) non-governmental organisation
INSET
In-Service Training
KPNLF
Khmer People’s National Liberation Front
POE
Provincial Office of Education
PRESET
Pre-Service Training
PRK
People’s Republic of Kampuchea
PTTC
Provincial Teacher Training Centre
MoEYS
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport
7 NETREC
National English Teacher Resource Centre (Phnom Penh)
ONSET
On-Service Training
POE
Provincial Office of Education
QSA
Quaker Service Australia
RDRP
Rural Development and Resettlement Project
RGC
Royal Government of Cambodia
RTTC
Regional Teacher Training College
Sida
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SOC
State of Cambodia
SRP
Sam Rainsy Party
TTD
Teacher Training Department
UNDP
United Nations Development Program
UNESCO
United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR
United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF
United Nations International Children’s Fund
UNTAC
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UPPEEP
University of Phnom Penh English and Education Project
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
VSO
Voluntary Service Overseas
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Figure 1: Kingdom of Cambodia
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Acknowledgements It is something of a truism that doctoral theses are supposed to be the work of a sole researcher and writer, but in practice are impossible to complete without the help and support of many individuals and organisations. This thesis is no exception. My main thanks go to my friends and colleagues in Cambodia, who not only made me welcome, but tolerated my seemingly endless questions. In particular, my colleagues in Takeo Regional Teacher Training Centre, Kheang Theany, Chheng Chhin, Tith Ratha, San Sothearo and Sok Chan Mol, the CAMSET project specialists and VSO volunteers. My doctoral research was made possible by a scholarship from the Economic and Social Research Council. An additional research visit was also funded by a grant from the Fuller Fund of the Department of Sociology at the University of Essex. Within the Department of Sociology a number of fellow doctoral candidates have provided support and critical eyes and ears for my work. In particular, I want to thank Lynne Pettinger, Catherine Will, Christy Allen, Fernando De Maio, Damien Short, Jackie Turton, Rhiannon Morgan, Kaoru Aoyama, and Na Jin Nye.. I also need to thank Seb Taylor and Clare Bentall, who at different times provided critical readings of my work and spent many hours discussing the whole idea of development. My examiners, Professor Diane Elson and Professor John Gledhill, also provided critical readings and challenged me to think through many of the ideas in more detail. I would also like to thank my co-supervisor, Dr Yasemin Soysal, for her tough interrogations and incisive comments. The main thanks go to my supervisor, Dr Jane Hindley, for her constant exhortations to ‘think sociologically’, her detailed critical reading of all of my work, and her immense support during the writing of this work, without which I doubt I would have finished. My brother David, and my partner Rachel also deserve thanks for their comments and for putting up with me through all this. It goes without saying that all errors, factual or analytical are mine.
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For Rachel
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Introduction The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. Delusion and disappointment, failures and crimes have been the steady companions of development and they tell a common story: it did not work. (Sachs 1992: 2) Much analysis of ‘development’ takes the form of an analysis of failure – either failure of the idea/l of development or failure in terms of a set of technical development objectives. This thesis sets aside claims of failure or success in favour of what Ferguson (1994: xiv) refers to as the ‘regular effects’ of development interventions. More specifically, using a combination of ethnographic research data and a historical and materialist analysis, I examine the ‘regular effects’ of aid-funded English language teaching in Cambodia as part of a neo-liberal reconstruction of Cambodia’s public sector.
I argue that over the past decade and a half Cambodia has been subject to the latest in a historical series of foreign interventions. What is novel about this latest intervention is that has not come from a single invading or colonising nation, but from an array of non-governmental, bilateral and multilateral agencies organised around particular notions of ‘reconstruction’ and ‘development.’ I show how the discourses, policies and actions of these agencies promoted and constructed English as the language of ‘development’ through an emphasis on how the language provides superior access to international trade and markets, regional and multilateral economic and political organisations and ‘modern’ scientific and technical knowledge than other languages available to Cambodians. As English was also the operational language of these agencies, English and English language teaching (ELT) played central roles as the medium and means for the expansion and entrenchment of the aid sector within Cambodia. I also show how these agencies provided economic incentives, particularly to educated, middle-class Cambodians with English language skills, which restructured local labour markets. Thus, I argue, the choices made by both Cambodian education policy makers and
12 individual Cambodian learners in favour of English, resulting in the very high contemporary demand for ELT, have been structured by this construction of English as the language of ‘development.’
I also contend that this latest foreign intervention has been characterised by a neo-liberal modality of development. One aspect of the post-conflict reconstruction of Cambodia was the transition from a communist single party machine organising a centrally planned economy to a democratic government operating as ‘strategist and manager’ in partnership with the private sector to pursue market-led, export oriented economic growth and increasing integration into regional and international markets. This reconstruction was initially undertaken under the aegis of United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and then later within the framework of an IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programme, which contained a package of financial, budgetary and market reforms aimed at promoting economic growth through the expansion of the private sector and reduction of the public sector. Reform of the public sector also required the depoliticisation and overall reduction in size of the civil service. This would then allow a further commitment in the structural adjustment programme that the newly-formed Royal Government of Cambodia would reduce spending on the army and police in order to reallocate spending towards the social sectors, including education. It was here that the neo-liberal economic agenda came into contradiction with an entrenched political culture underpinned by patron-client relations.
Whilst nominally becoming a democratic state through the UNTAC-sponsored national elections in 1993, Cambodia’s political system remains dominated by shifting alliances within an oligarchic elite, whose members compete for access to the political and economic benefits of power through which they can maintain their networks of patronage that underpin their support. The post-election powersharing agreement between the two main parties resulted in renewed expansion of civil service positions as they sought to reward their client bases. The subsequent political infighting within the fragile coalition government served to weaken many of the political and economic reforms, in
13 particular reform of the national budget. Although the government has consistently committed itself to reducing the size of the military and police and reallocating spending towards the social sectors, financial disbursements to education and health remain at half the level of disbursement to defence and security.
I show how the actions of the donor community have reduced pressure on the government to fulfil its commitment to redistributing the national budget. Levels of aid-funding to the education sector during the 1990s averaged 58 percent of the total education budget, and in 1997 technical assistance expenditure on projects related to the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports was 30 percent higher than total government education expenditure in that year (Godfrey, et al. 2000b: 14). These high levels of aid-funding and the influx of international advisors and consultants has meant that the aid agencies have virtually taken over the financing and management of public sector education in Cambodia. In addition, education staff from top level bureaucrats to ordinary school teachers have sought involvement with aid-funded education projects as a means of supplementing civil service salaries which cannot finance even a basic standard of living. These inadequate salaries mean that teachers, like most civil servants, have to seek out other sources of income, including low-level corruption, as a means of survival.
The Cambodian Secondary English Teachers (CAMSET) project was initially established during the UNTAC era. The CAMSET project was established not as a response to the genuine problems of Cambodian education, such as high rates of illiteracy, inadequate funding, severe under-enrolment, high repetition and drop-out rates, poor quality infrastructure and unsuitable curricula, but as a response to a modality of development in which external forces are viewed as the ‘engine of economic growth.’
14 The overall goal of the project was the establishment of sustainable systems for the teaching and learning of English in Cambodian state secondary schools, systems which were largely successfully established by the final end of the project in 2001. However, the project also produced a number of ‘regular effects’ which I detail in the thesis. As part of the latest wave of foreign intervention, neocolonial relations of social and economic status were established within the project which privileged expatriate staff over Cambodian staff. In the same way, a structure of knowledge was established that devalued the training, skills and experience of Cambodian teachers and trainers and privileged specific forms of pedagogical reform. These reforms, centred around what I argued was an attempted imposition of types of Communicative Language Teaching and learner-centred pedagogy, were not based on an analysis of the realities for Cambodian teachers working within a severely under-funded education system with inadequate salaries, but derived from notions of ‘good’ teaching and learning abstracted from pedagogical theories and practices developed in well-funded and resourced language teaching schools in Western nations.
These materials and methods also represented the medium and means of disciplining trainers, teachers and students into ways of teaching and learning constructed as ‘modern’ and ‘efficient’ in contrast to the ‘traditional’ and ‘ineffective’ methods being used by Cambodian teachers. I expose the contradictions within the materials which lay claim to the empowerment of learners through specific forms of classroom activity and a restructuring of relations between teachers and students, yet can also be seen to contain a highly prescriptive ‘method’ which disciplines the thoughts and actions of both teachers and students. However, the actual use of these materials and methods by Cambodian trainers and students in the classroom, is highly ambiguous and provides no clear evidence that these methods are being used or ‘imposed’ in either the way the material writers intended or the way my textual analysis claims. This leaves ambiguous any claims to the cultural imperialism of ELT at this level.
15 I also show how CAMSET, like most other aid-funded projects operating within Cambodia, was forced to provide various forms of salary supplementation to MoEYS staff, not simply to subsidise their inadequate incomes, but primarily to maintain project activities. This is clearly located in terms of the effective funding of state education by the aid sector and as one of the ways Cambodian education staff enhance their meagre incomes. The role of English is important here as access to projects often relies on the ability to work in English. As well as supplementation, project policies and team members encouraged Cambodian teachers and trainers involved with CAMSET to increase their private sector teaching to provide the extra income needed to keep them in the public sector jobs. Most Cambodian teachers were already working in the private sector as a pragmatic response to the economic realities of their situation. Given the policy statements of project managers and the project policy efforts attempt to establish public-private partnerships and other income-generation activities, the promotion of private sector teaching within the project appears to be in line with the neo-liberal restructuring of the public sector being pursued by the major ‘development’ agencies in Cambodia.
As I describe in the final chapter, with the ending of the project and project supplementary payments those teachers and trainers involved with CAMSET had to rely on other sources of income. The skills, training and experience they gained through involvement with the project have increased their social mobility allowing them to follow various paths. The main one has been their increased involvement in private sector education, which has reduced to a minimum their public sector teaching. An increasing number are moving out of state education into either full-time private sector work. Some have become part of the English-speaking, well-trained, middle-class, who service the aid sector, and others are furthering their own education. Again, English plays a role here as gatekeeper to the aid sector in particular, but also to opportunities for increased private sector work and overseas education.
16 As the above summary shows, this is a detailed and at times complex argument which draws on insights from ethnographic fieldwork, but also attempts to situate these in a broader, sociological framework bringing in a historical and materialist analysis to ask questions about the economic, political and social effects of English and English language teaching as a development intervention. This has drawn on a range of academic disciplines for theoretical and analytical insights, although there appears to this researcher to be a lack of interdisciplinary analyses of contemporary development interventions in ‘transitional’ societies from which to draw on. I set out below the main theoretical and analytical areas I have drawn on as a means of locating my own work.
English spread theories The dominant discourse on English as a global/izing language celebrates the seemingly inevitable rise of English as the global language. This is viewed as resulting from a combination of historical accident, contemporary practical necessity and an assumed innate linguistic superiority of English, so as one writer put it, ‘the world has opted for English, and the world knows what it wants, what will satisfy its needs’ (Hindmarsh 1978: 42). As Alastair Pennycook argues, this portrayal of the rise of English as ‘natural, neutral and beneficial’ fails to ask questions about how English achieved this status and what are the effects of this rise (1994: 9-11). Asking these questions in the case of Cambodia, are central aspects of this thesis. I argue that the rise of English in Cambodia has to be understood as the linguistic element of the latest in a series of foreign interventions, and that access to English and English language teaching have produced ‘regular effects’ such as increasing socioeconomic divisions, restructuring local labour markets and acting as the means and medium for the entrenchment of the aid sector within which relations of a neo-colonial type are established between expatriate and Cambodian personnel. Here, I locate my argument within the main debates on the rise of English.
17 Joshua Fishman and others in the 1960s, analysed the spread of ‘languages of wider communication’1 into ‘developing’ countries (Fishman et al: 1968, Fishman 1972, Kelman 1972, Pool 1972). Adopting a modernisation development paradigm combined with a rational choice approach to (language) policy-making this perspective contends that choices to adopt English (or other ‘international’ languages) in education or other sectors are made by national actors located in particular historical, social, political, economic and demographic configurations. Thus within this paradigm the adoption of English or other ‘language of wider communication’ policies are explained through the assumed functional benefits they provide. English, in particular, is associated with greater access to international trade, ‘modern’ scientific and technological knowledge, the internet, supra-national political and economic institutions, as well as facilitating the integration of linguistically diverse nations and being more economically efficient than developing an indigenous language for use in multiple sectors. Whilst the international context plays a central role in the decisions of national language policy-makers, analysis remains always at the level of ‘decisions made by national actors, with the assumption that those actors have freedom to consider – though not be constrained by – the international context [thus] English language spread is understood to result from decisions made in the non-English-speaking world’ (Clayton, T. 2002: 10-11).
A radical challenge to this perspective is Phillipson’s (1992) Linguistic Imperialism, which draws on structural theories of imperialism and the ideas and language of dependency theory, to argue that the international spread of English has been driven by decisions made in the metropolitan centres of the USA and UK (see also Tollefson 1991, 2000). Phillipson (1992: 136-173, 1994: 10-18, 1997) contends that the spread of English has been actively pursued by the USA and UK since the 1940s
The terms ‘international language’ and ‘language of wider communication’ tend to adhere to Western, or more precisely, former colonial languages (English, French, Spanish, German, and possibly, Arabic). But this term disguises as much as it reveals. It neutralises the political and power content of colonial relations, rendering the languages merely technical objects. In addition, it renders some languages ‘non-international’ or ‘languages of narrower communication’. Yet, in theory, any language can be used to communicate internationally or with an audience wider than its ‘native’ speakers. What is hidden is that some speakers do not have to learn other languages, whilst others, because of prevailing global political economy, have to learn to speak one of these privileged languages. But in the national-functional paradigm, and in other accounts, this is referred to as ‘choice’. 1
18 predominantly in the form of aid-funded provision of English teaching and teacher education programmes through organisations such as the British Council, the Peace Corps and the Ford Foundation. These programmes established and supported English language infrastructures in developing countries, thereby producing ‘English linguistic imperialism [whereby] the dominance of English is asserted and maintained by the establishment and continuous reconstruction of structural and cultural inequalities between English and other languages’ (Phillipson 1992: 47 italics in original). Thus within developing country education systems English teaching and teacher education are allocated more material and other resources, whether from external or internal sources, than other languages, establishing and maintaining structural inequalities. In the cultural sphere, English gains a linguistic hegemony, whereby English becomes the most efficient and effective language to provide access to world markets, scientific and technical knowledge or to facilitate the integration of linguistically diverse nations. Thus, the claimed functional benefits of English are, in reality, the hegemonic effects of English linguistic imperialism.
In this perspective, the hegemony of English is the linguistic aspect of a wider cultural imperialism which serves to support the production and reproduction of unequal relations between ‘Centre’ and the ‘Periphery.’ As part of the wider structural relations of a neo-imperial global economic system English and ELT function to incorporate the Periphery into the ‘modern’ world system through the transfer of institutions, ideals of training and education, and occupational ideologies, and to facilitate the transfer of real and symbolic capital to the Centre.
Little academic analysis of the rise of and demand for English in Cambodia has been published. Thomas Clayton, who was director of the State University of New York Buffalo English Language Training Center in Phnom Penh from 1991 to 1992 and conducted doctoral research on the politics of language in Cambodia during the Vietnamese dominated period 1979-1989, has examined the struggle between the English and French language for dominance in the period since 1989. Framed
19 in terms of the above theoretical debate, Clayton contends that the rise and spread of English in Cambodia results from policy choices at a national level and individual learner choices which favoured English over French, but that ‘international organizations have set the parameters of language choice for Cambodians and, in doing so, are exerting considerable control over the language decisions made in the country’ (Clayton, T. 2002: 21). In doing this he suggests a syncretic theoretical explanation with a weak and revised form of Phillipson’s linguistic imperialism thesis combined with the primacy of choices made by Cambodian policy makers and individuals in a context within which ‘English is both promoted and contested, beneficial and exploitative’ (ibid: 22). Although an interesting contribution to the debate and a useful analysis of the spread of English in Cambodia, Clayton provides no explanation for privileging the choices of policy makers and individuals over the constraining effects of international organisations.
Clayton acknowledges some of the negative effects of the spread of English in Cambodia, in particular its contribution to a form of elite closure: [t]hough economic implications are ambiguous, it seems likely that English language skills mark the divide in a new kind of stratification in Cambodia. On one side stand individuals who control English and who, as a result, have access to virtually all conversations about the country’s political, economic, or development future. One the other side are those who do not speak English and who are thus denied participation. Regardless of real or potential exploitation, however, Cambodians are for the most part embracing English. (ibid: 21) Whilst English has undoubtedly gained in importance in Cambodia, his argument here may be overstated. The national language and the language of the political administration remains Khmer. English is dominant, however, in relations between the government bureaucracy and the various international agencies (multi-lateral, bi-lateral and NGOs), which largely define the ‘development’ agenda. As I show below, foreign languages have regularly played a part in the division between governing elites and the poor majority in Cambodia, and English fits into this same pattern. Whilst he begins to consider possible divisions, Clayton here homogenises all Cambodians who are ‘embracing English.’ This fails to ask what are the effects of this embracing of English.
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In his earlier work on the Vietnamese ‘occupation’ of Cambodia from 1979-1989, Clayton details and analyses how the Vietnamese attempted, through attaching experts to the Ministry of Education and teaching in higher education and producing and implementing curricula and materials to instil a socialist ideology at all levels of education, to fashion an education system which would promote a socialist vision for regional and international relations. He shows how this was largely carried out in Khmer not Vietnamese in a form of what he terms ‘linguistic pragmatism’ as this would have been seen by the occupiers as a more efficient way of transmitting core ideology. He goes on to show how Cambodians involved in education and the government in this period, like subordinate actors in similar situations, betrayed no ideological mystification and perceived clearly this attempted hegemonic project (Clayton, T. 2000: esp. 151-166). In contrast, Clayton does not label the spread of English in Cambodia as an attempt at hegemony, despite noting that the aid agencies of both the US (USAID) and Australian (AusAID) governments establish teaching programmes through which ‘English links with the dissemination of ideologies and thus the intention of returning symbolic capital to nations where English serves as the first language’ (Clayton, T. 2002: 13). However, as I detail below, the various international agencies have attached ‘experts,’ ‘advisors,’ and ‘consultants’ throughout government ministries at national, provincial and district levels, and in the education sector foreign teachers, like myself, have been placed in regional training centres and even individual high schools. Although not driven by a single foreign power, as in the case of French colonialism or Vietnamese occupation, the status and power of these ‘experts’ and their shared definitions of a ‘development’ agenda which emphasises the free market, democratisation and the primacy of the individual, can also be viewed as part of a complex foreign hegemonic enterprise within a neo-liberal framework.
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Foreign aid debates The Development Assistance Committee 2001 tables for the net flow of financial resources to developing countries and multilateral organisations (Development Assistance Committee 2002b) show a total flow of US $190.7 billion. However, $119.5 billion of this represents private flows at market rates, and thus do not qualify as aid in DAC’s terms. For DAC, aid must be an official flow (i.e. from government to government or through a multilateral organisation such as the World Bank), that is intended to promote economic development and welfare, and must have a ‘grant element’ of at least 25 per cent. DAC excludes all military grants, loans and credits from its definition of development assistance (Wood 1986: 12-13; Development Assistance Committee 2002a). Thus, official development assistance in 2001 totalled $68.3 billion (Development Assistance Committee 2002b). This is a tiny figure when compared with other forms of donor government spending, for example, the USA spends around $36 billion annually on defence research and development alone (Stephen 1999:20). This leads some analysts to conclude that overall it is far too small a sum to make a difference to national economies (Lal 1997: 56-57). This disregards the symbolic importance of foreign aid for donor governments, where foreign aid spending symbolises enlightened, benevolent internationalism, and the way aid is continually employed as a political tool. In recipient nations the politics of aid are often crucial to institutional politics. This is particularly the case in countries like Cambodia where foreign aid represents a substantial proportion of government finance.
Debates on foreign aid have often been dominated by attempts to ascribe success or failure to aid at both global and project levels. Right-wing economists have attacked foreign aid for undermining the market forces that would unleash economic development (e.g. Bauer 1981; Lal 1997). The mirrorimage criticism from the left is that aid helps maintain neo-imperialist global inequalities (e.g. Hayter 1971) stifling ‘Third World’ economic development. Post-modern or post-development critics
22 condemn aid as a hand-maiden to the false god of development, because ‘[as] development help, it must first of all destroy what it professes to save – the capacity of a community to shape and maintain its way of life by its own forces’ (Gronemeyer 1996: 66). Assessments of aid programmes or projects have produced similarly divergent conclusions. On one side ‘for every official success, there are at least ten failures. Billions of dollars have been spent on projects and programmes that never achieved their intended objectives’ (Hyden 1976 cited in Riddel 1987: 188). Whilst on the other, ‘[this study concludes that] the majority of aid is successful in terms of its own objectives. Over a wide range of countries and sectors, aid has made positive and valuable contributions’ (Cassen and & Associates 1994: 225).
More recently the focus has shifted to examining how the institutional environment and issues of governance affect the outcomes of aid spending (Brautigam 2000; Godfrey, et al. 2000b; Riddel 1996). Contemporary Cambodia is viewed as a classic case of an aid-dependent country. Aid to Cambodia as a percentage of GDP has been above 10% since 1986, and in 1998 was 14%. In 1998 aid represented 169% of government current expenditure, and for the education sector 130% (Bräutigam 2000, Godfrey et al 2000). This level of aid dependency is said to produce ‘a situation in which a country cannot perform many of the core functions of government, such as operations and maintenance, or the delivery of basic public services, without foreign aid funding or expertise’ (Bräutigam 2000: 2). Within this thesis, I go behind the term ‘dependency’ to ask questions about how the aid sector has become entrenched and what the effects of this are.
Within debates on foreign aid, social categories such as donors and recipients/beneficiaries are often taken to be relatively unproblematic and homogenous social wholes, although the aid dependency literature has begun to open up these categories for analysis. Social agents in each category are assumed to have the same relationship to aid and development in terms of shared meanings, objectives and expected outcomes. The success or failure of official development assistance, as
23 foreign aid is formally titled, is normally assessed by its impact or otherwise on the beneficiaries. As the latter are usually viewed as homogenous and often bounded national, regional or local ‘communities’, analysis of differences in impact across class, gender, ethnic and other social divisions are often neglected. Examination of the impacts on and divisions within the donor category are similarly absent. Little account is taken of social agents who do not fit neatly into either category, but operate (sometimes simultaneously) in both. Thus, although Riddell (1987: 183-263) discusses assessment in detail, he only briefly indicates how tied aid may not benefit some ‘recipients’ and avoids adequate discussion of its benefits to donors. Similarly Kreuger et al (1989: 68-88) whilst acknowledging that donor interests may not be strictly related to recipient needs, still assume that the categories donor and recipient are easily represented by national economies. These categories thus require deconstructing, which is ‘not simply a question of reversing the hierarchy but of demonstrating what is at stake politically in the production and maintenance of that same dichotomy’(Manzo 1991: 9), and, I would add, what is at stake economically.
Political analysis of foreign aid generally focuses on the macro-social level of international aid flows and how donor states employ these to influence recipient states. These macro-level analyses provide little description of how foreign aid influences local politics and economics. Thus, as with much analysis in the field of development, huge and diverse populations are reduced to the status of recipients/beneficiaries with little account taken of social divisions. Also missing are clear analyses of the various agents relations to the structures of aid regimes. Within this thesis, I show how the effects of an entrenched aid sector, in particular how this has restructured local labour markets.
One estimate is that on average 38 per cent of bilateral aid is tied aid, although this varies widely between donor nations (Burnell 1997: 14). The receiving country must spend tied aid on goods or services from the donor country, resources that may actually be cheaper in local or other markets. Tied aid represents a thinly disguised subsidy for donor countries and often comes in forms
24 inappropriate to recipients needs. However, in both donor and recipient countries the costs and benefits of such aid will vary according to socio-economic, ethnic, gender and political relations. Technical and educational development projects often rely on, or come with built-in, donor country ‘experts,’ consultants and equipment, another form of aid tying. Project design and evaluation may often be undertaken by similar ‘experts’, indirectly benefiting the donor country. Few assessments or evaluations of the benefits to these ‘experts’ have been undertaken, despite the rapid expansion in the numbers of ‘development consultants’ over the past two decades (one notable exception is Hancock 1989). Whilst there have been many critical studies of Western ‘experts’ in terms of development power/knowledge (e.g. Cooke and Kothari 2001; Crush 1995; Escobar 1995; Gardner and Lewis 1996; Grillo and Stirrat 1997; Hobart 1993), little has been written about how the high salaries and benefits paid to such ‘experts’ structure their relations with the people they claim to be helping. Reference is made to the ‘high proportion of idealistic, hard-working and committed individuals’ (Hintjens 1999:388) who appear to have ‘good intentions’ (Porter, et al. 1991) within the development profession, but there is little analysis of how their economic rewards and social status appear to create neo-colonial social relations between the professionals and the populations of the countries they work in.
Technical assistance, which currently forms the largest percentage of bilateral aid (Development Assistance Committee 2002b), has other ambiguities. Lipton (1976), Chambers (1983) and the various contributors to Hobart (1993) all provide examples of the inappropriateness of ‘Western’ technical knowledge employed in development contexts. However, there is also a question of the part played by technical aid in a ‘brain drain’ out of developing countries. For example, Africa hosts approximately 100,000 foreign technical experts at an annual cost of around $4 billion, whilst at the same time it is estimated that half of all African professionals are working outside Africa, and unand underemployment is widespread amongst those who remain (Burnell 1997: 89). In Cambodia’s case, as I describe below, this ‘brain drain’ has largely taken place within the country as skilled and
25 experienced personnel, particularly government civil servants, have moved into either the private sector or the aid sector where both their salaries and social status can be much higher.
Riddell (op cit::192-202) has detailed the ambiguity in the evaluation of aid, related to the subjectivity of the questions being asked, an inherent ambiguity in project outcomes and the problems of evaluation instruments. Crewe and Harrison’s (1998) ethnography of aid elaborates the idea that success or failure of aid projects is largely a matter of perspective. Looking at cook stove programmes, they show how the various agents and agencies involved have viewed the cook stoves as a ‘success’ or ‘failure’ depending on their own views of intended and actual programme outcomes. The justification for aid-funded English language teaching (ELT) projects, such as CAMSET, is that as English is the language of international trade, global communications, multilateral economic and political organisations and ‘modern’ scientific knowledge, then improvements in English language teaching must contribute to economic development. However, there is little clear evidence of such a link.
According to a British Council report, UK government funding for ELT projects was based on ‘the contribution they make to the social and economic development of a country, with a focus on the alleviation of poverty [which] must not be just demonstrable but measurable, since without measurement the relationship of value-of-output to cost-of-input cannot be demonstrated’ (British Council 1988: 11). However, a later British Council report into the relationship between ELT aid and educational, social and economic development,
concluded that only narrow educational
objectives (such as an enhanced capability to read, write or speak English) could be measured with any adequacy. Showing any unambiguous causal link between ELT investment and educational, social or economic development was said to be ‘over-optimistic’ (Nuttall 1991:11-14). Despite these difficulties, an implicit faith in the benefits of ELT remains. In the same British Council seminar
26 report that contains Nutall’s article, the then head of educational services at the ODA, referring to Algeria’s ‘ambitious and aggressive ELT programme’, concludes: ‘While nobody could have measured the economic benefits of this policy, it was clearly advantageous to Algeria, just as the learning of English amongst science students as far apart as China and Latin America will have important benefits for those whose studies go to a sufficiently high level to require them to cope with textbooks and research papers written in English.’ (Iredale 1991: 9) Iredale’s conclusion here further indicates the unstated assumptions inherent in much provision of ELT – that it will benefit particular students who study at relatively high levels, who are then presumed to become part of the scientific and technological driving force behind a country’s economic development.
In a short article in a professional ELT journal, Chambers, F. and Erith (1990: 139-40) show that objective justification of aid-based ELT programmes is extremely difficult due to problems inherent in evaluation. The basic rationale for aid-based ELT is that inputs (such as new materials, teacher training programmes) improve the standard of English language teaching in educational institutions, leading to the students using English more effectively in their vocations, which improves a nation’s access to development through science, commerce and industry. Chambers and Erith point out that providing unequivocal evidence for the first link in this chain (i.e. showing that improved student performance is unequivocally related to the input) is difficult enough. Any attempt to show a subsequent correlation between this and the improved use of English in employment would be highly uncertain as cause and effect are distant in both place and time and too open to the influence of external educational, social, political and economic variables. If this link cannot be shown, then the further assumption of improved access to world trade also cannot be shown.
However, Chambers and Erith’s analysis only asks whether the aid-funded ELT inputs can be clearly seen to produce national economic benefits. This does not permit examination of the wider effects of aid-funded ELT, which might allow for a broader perspective on the success or failure of
27 such inputs. The questions then would be who benefits, how have they benefited, how has this affected their socio-economic status and how has this affected institutions, such as those within state education. These questions are central to the analysis of the role of English in Cambodia I set out within this thesis.
Development theory and analysis Since the 1980s the idea/l of development has come under profound critical attack from a loosely defined school of thought Nederveen Pieterse (2000: 175) labels ‘post-development’ (e.g., Sachs 1996, Escobar 1995, Crush 1995, Ferguson 1994, Rahnema and Bawtree 1997, Grillo and Stirrat 1997). Much post-development work is theoretically guided and politically inspired by the poststructuralist writings of Michel Foucault, although Brigg (2002: 422) notes that this is often more the invocation of Foucault’s spirit than the effective application of his theoretical resources. Following Foucault, post-development writers have interrogated discourses of development because, as Escobar (1992: 413-4) contends, these have been a ‘mechanism for the production and management of the Third World […] organising the production of truth about the Third World.’ In this way, his analysis continues, ‘development can best be described as an apparatus that links forms of knowledge about the Third World with the deployment of forms of power and intervention, resulting in the mapping and production of Third World societies’ (1996: 213).
At this point, I do not want to enter into the debate on the relative merits of post-development (but see, Lehmann 1997, Corbridge 1998, Nederveen Pieterse 2000 and Brigg 2002 for critical discussions). However, part of the thesis takes a discursive approach to examine the knowledge produced about Cambodia and Cambodian education and how this has structured development interventions in Cambodia. However, in the main, my work fits more comfortably within a political
28 economy approach to development, although one which takes seriously Norman Long’s (1992) emphasis on social actors, but that their actions have to be understood within economic and political structures that they work within and that they have little chance to mediate or transform.
In his study of a rural development project in Lesotho, Ferguson (1994) points out a radical disjuncture between academic discourses on Lesotho and that produced by the ‘development’ apparatus (specifically the World Bank). For Ferguson, what is important about this difference, is not the truth value of the respective discourses, but what are the effects of the development discourse. In short, these effects are summarised in Ferguson’s idea of the development apparatus ‘an “anti-politics machine,” depoliticizing everything it touches, everywhere whisking political realities out of sight, almost unnoticed, its own pre-eminently political operation of expanding bureaucratic state power’ (ibid: xiv). As I show in the early chapters of this thesis, the dominant discourse of the aid sector in Cambodia presents a ‘people without history’ (Wolf 1982), locating Cambodia’s contemporary ‘development’ problems largely in terms of the destructive effects of the Khmer Rouge period, and in particular, the subsequent lack of adequately skilled and trained professionals to operate the state administration. This has then legitimised a large-scale aid intervention, of both finance and ‘expertise,’ organised around notions of public sector reform and ‘capacity building.’ As I show, this has had the ‘regular effect’ of bolstering the power of the dominant elites who ‘consume’ (synonymous in Khmer with ‘to govern’) the population. At the time Ferguson was researching in Lesotho, state-led development was the dominant paradigm. The end of the Cold War and subsequent global political restructuring, has resulted in a dominant paradigm of neo-liberalism. If the aid sector in Cambodia can be said to be operating as an ‘anti-politics machine’ one of its other main effects, as I show below, is to expand the private sector in education at the expense of the public sector. In the conclusion, I speculate about the long term problems of this expansion.
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A methodological note [A]lthough it may be true that certain important structural changes result from the impact of outside forces (due to encroachment by the market or the state), it is theoretically unsatisfactory to base one’s analysis on the concept of external determination. All forms of external intervention necessarily enter the existing life-worlds of the individuals and social groups affected, and in this way are mediated and transformed by those same actors and structures. Also to the extent that large-scale and ‘remote’ social forces do alter the lifechances and behaviour of individuals, they can only do so through shaping, directly or indirectly, the everyday life experiences and perceptions of the individuals concerned. (Long 1992: 20) This thesis originated in a desire to undertake an ethnographic case study of a typical aid-funded English language teaching ‘development’ project, as a means of examining competing claims about the cultural and socio-economic effects and contradictions of English language teaching (ELT) in ‘developing’ countries. The research was driven by my own experience as an English language teacher in both China and Laos, and shaped by academic ideas such as Norman Long’s call for an ‘actor-oriented sociology of development’ as opposed to structural, institutional or political economy analyses (1992; 2001). My MA dissertation was also a driving force. This analysed ways in which Western ELT teachers working in developing countries reconstructed aid agency discourses, that presented the teaching of English as a relatively simple, smooth and uncontroversial process of the transfer of knowledge from ‘expert’ teachers to receptive ‘beneficiaries,’ in order to come to terms with their own more contradictory and ambiguous experiences. Thus I came to the research equipped with an actor-oriented approach, with the aim of an accessing an aid-funded ELT project to critically examine how institutional and developmental goals are negotiated, interpreted and transformed by different agents occupying different institutional and social positions. I was also immersed in the discursive approaches of the post-development writers, which emphasise how the ‘Third World’ is constructed and reconstructed through the discourses of development agencies and powerful actors. Thus I felt that I could examine how social agents operated within the discursively constructed field of an aid-funded ELT project.
30 As with any research project, the feasibility of the study revolved around gaining access, in this case to a suitable aid-funded ELT project. Problems of access resulted in me eventually taking up a job through the UK agency, Voluntary Service Overseas, as an English language teacher-trainer based in a regional teacher training centre (RTTC) as part of the UK government funded Cambodian Secondary English Teachers (CAMSET) project. I had initially been given permission from the project team and the managing agency (CfBT) to analyse the project as an independent researcher, but the project funder’s, the Department for International Development, Bangkok representative, subsequently turned down my application for access. I then met a project team member at a conference, who suggested I apply for a job as a volunteer on the project, and if I could do the research whilst doing the job that was fine.
Over the fifteen months I spent working in Cambodia, I conducted a largely a standard ethnography using extensive and intensive participant observation and qualitative semi-structured and unstructured interviews (discussions of the strengths and weaknesses of these are widespread, e.g. Denzin and Lincoln 1998; Hammersley 1993; Hammersley and Atkinson 1995; Hertz 1997; Sanger 1966; Scheurich 1997), in addition to the collection of large quantities of documentary sources and library research. My position in the project both allowed me to participate and observe a range of ‘development encounters’ (Escobar 1995), in various formal and informal locations, from classrooms to Ministry meetings, expatriate bars to Cambodian colleagues homes. This provided a wealth of ethnographic data, but my position within the project, and my construction of myself as a ‘well-meaning, committed, participatory’ development worker, limited the degree to which I could effectively reflect on my immersion in this particular social field.
Georgia Kaufmann (1997: 112) in a partial ethnography of ‘developers’ cites Escobar’s (1991) contention that encounters between, say, peasants and development experts is structured by professional and bureaucratic mechanisms anterior to the encounter, and asks how can these people
31 ever hope to interact as equals in a relationship? Put simply they cannot, but that doesn't make the ‘peasants’ powerless as they can draw on local sources of power the field of development encounters is the local and the ‘experts’ enter this field less aware of the rules which govern its operation. In my own work, I rarely felt like this supposed ‘expert’ in a controlling position in a development hierarchy. I often felt that I was the subordinate - there were additionally times when I was kept subordinate – especially as, whilst I learnt enough to deal with basic social conversations, my Khmer never reached a level where I could totally understand a conversation being held in the office or at meetings with the RTTC Director. However, what neither Kaufmann nor Escobar point out is that these encounters are also economically structured, thus, whilst I may have been relatively powerless linguistically, my status as a foreign worker on a recognised aid-funded project, the stark difference between my income and that of my colleagues, and an ambiguous and contradictory position within a complex set of institutional hierarchies (in contrast to my colleagues awareness of their positions within networks of patronage), ultimately left me in the more powerful position.
This thesis may have been very different if the financial and temporal constraints of my research had allowed me to become fluent in Khmer. I may have had better access to ‘everyday acts of resistance’ and ‘hidden transcripts’ (Scott 1990) through the language of my Cambodian colleagues. As I built up a level of trust with colleagues, and as I was also perceived by them to be in a lower position in the project hierarchy then the project team members, there were times when colleagues expressed discontent, cynicism and even anger about the project to me (in English). However, this research goes beyond an examination of these micro-social encounters and struggles to analyse the structural conditions within which they occur.
After returning from Cambodia and undertaking a long process of analysing and interrogating the data opened up larger questions which have led me to reconceptualise the study and also to reevaluate Long’s emphasis on social actors. This reconceptualisation has led me to resituate the
32 ethnography within a historical and materialist analytical framework in a way that brings alive the economic inequalities and realities that shape these encounters. In this regard it appears to me that many of the debates, as they only deal with particular slices of the social world, fail to capture the dramatic socio-economic inequalities that shape the lives of these Cambodian teachers.
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Chapter 1: Historical myths, formations and interventions
Discourse of destruction On one of the first evenings I spent in Takeo, where I spent fifteen months working at the regional teacher training centre, I took a walk by the lake the town sits alongside. Although it was the dry season, water from the lake irrigated adjacent low lying paddy fields, which shimmered with verdant young rice. As I walked between the lake and the fields, images and memories from my early teens in the 1970s of the Vietnam War, news broadcasts of similar fields being strafed or dotted with troops, passed through my mind. Other images, post-1979, of the Khmer Rouge period, the gradual realisation in the West of the horror that had occurred in the three years, eight months and twenty days in which Cambodia was shut off from the outside world.
These images and memories reflect a dominant discourse on Cambodia, which constructs Cambodia as a post-conflict, post-genocide society. Historian of Cambodian education, David Ayres, argues that education in Cambodia since the Khmer Rouge has often been portrayed in terms of what he calls the ‘discourse of destruction.’ This discourse, contained in documents produced by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport and the various international agencies involved in education, views the destruction of the Khmer Rouge period as the primary cause of Cambodia’s current education crisis. This glosses over the failings of the system established under colonialism and the continuation of these under successive post-colonial regimes. Ayres delineates five main themes characterising this discourse of destruction. First, that the Khmer Rouge period saw the total destruction of educational infrastructure and the death of key personnel, including 80 per cent of teachers. Second, that the 1980s saw an impoverished education system re-emerge dominated by socialist economic thought. Third, these legacies left a management system of policy-making and administration with a
34 skills deficit or insufficient ‘institutional capacity’. Fourth, this ‘discourse of destruction’ and lack of capacity provided fertile ground for the justification of substantial quantities of international aid, especially in the form of technical assistance. Finally, it created an atmosphere in which donors were forgiving of mistakes and policy failures (Ayres 2000b). Ayres argues that the discourse is invoked to ‘both revisit Cambodia’s nostalgia for the pre-revolutionary “island of peace”, and to garner support among the international community for involvement in the country’s “rehabilitation and reconstruction”’, suggesting the desirability of some previous state (Ayres 1999: 207). He has also labelled this discourse as ‘The UNTAC Mentality’ (Ayres 2000b) referring to dominant ideas established within the various international agencies operating in ‘rehabilitation and reconstruction’ during the era of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia from 1991-1993.
The persistence of this ‘discourse of destruction’ can be seen in the following extracts from contemporary documents produced by the government and international agencies. Much has been written about the context for Education in Cambodia and it is within this context that any assessment of the system must take place. To briefly summarize, it is fair to say that by 1979 most of the physical infrastructure of the educational system at all levels had been destroyed or seriously damaged and few adults remained with education beyond the primary level. In the last twenty years, extraordinary efforts have been made to rebuild and extend the educational system. (National EFA Assessment Group 1999: 5) Rebuilding the education system destroyed by the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979 is crucial to Cambodia's social and economic development. The main problems addressed in the basic education investment plan are the lack of qualified teachers and budget resources, obsolete curricula and dilapidated infrastructure. (European Union 2000: 7) Pol Pot ruthlessly destroyed the education system and by the end of his reign formal education had ceased. Today, the public school system remains in very bad condition, the quality of teaching is poor and access to basic education very limited. (Save The Children UK 2002: 5) Cambodia's current human resource base has been devastated by almost two decades of war and isolation. There is a dearth of qualified personnel to sustain development efforts, manage public services, and to engage in activities linked with the emergence of a market economy. The limited skill base of the population presents a major constraint to overall economic development, improvement of Cambodia’s competitiveness and equitable access to development benefits. (Asian Development Bank 1999: 13)
35 The first three isolate the Pol Pot/Khmer Rouge period as the starting point, the nadir of destruction, from which the education system is still ‘recovering.’ The ADB quote cites ‘two decades of war and isolation’, which extends the destruction beyond that unleashed during the Khmer Rouge period, and also indicates Cambodia’s isolation from international organisations and aid, both being marked as causal factors in the failure of education. This is then subsequently linked to Cambodia’s inability to sustain development, and in particular to improve the nation’s global competitiveness and access to ‘development benefits,’ due to an inadequately educated populous. Only the first document mentions the twenty years which have elapsed since the Khmer Rouge were ousted by Vietnamese-backed Cambodian forces, and points to the ‘extraordinary efforts’ made since then in rebuilding education. However, within all these documents the central cause of the parlous state of Cambodian education remains the destruction of the Khmer Rouge period. The VSO placement description of my job contained a similar historical picture, with no reference to the education system prior to the Democratic Kampuchea period. During the four year period under the Khmer Rouge, all previous education, health, commercial and transport systems were entirely dismantled. Many of the key personnel died, leaving a huge gap in the workforce of skilled people. The following Vietnamese-supported regime revitalised many of the systems, but followed a rigid authoritarian/communist system. Since the UN-brokered election in 1993, Cambodia has received much attention from donors and development agencies. Development assistance in the form of donations, loans and technical assistance to support initiatives in all sectors of society has been a key feature of the revitalisation of Cambodian society over the past three years. (VSO 1999: 6) There are a number of silences in these examples of the discourse of destruction. No mention is made of education prior to the Khmer Rouge period, nor of the colonial legacy in education, which, as Ayres argues throughout his work, leads to a failure to capture the characteristics and historical continuity of the education crisis in Cambodia. The destruction and devastation of the civil war leading up to 1975 and the US carpet-bombing of Cambodia, the later isolation by Western governments and embargo on ‘development’ aid, the influx of Russian and Vietnamese ‘experts’ and ‘advisors’, historical experiences and events linked to Cambodia’s geo-political location as a Cold War battleground, are absent from these texts, suggesting that they have no relevance or have had
36 no effects. At the same time, these texts homogenise Cambodian society effacing complex divisions of age, class, status, gender, ethnicity and geography. Also absent is the continuity of elite struggles for control of the state machinery and definitions of national ‘development’, which have characterised much of the post-colonial era, and which Ayres contends is central to an understanding of the crisis in Cambodian education (Ayres 2000a).
Historian Michael Vickery argues that a Standard Total View (STV) of the Pol Pot/Khmer Rouge period has become received wisdom in, what he terms, the public consciousness. According to this view, the regime attempted to exterminate all previous regimes’ military and administrative personnel, all intellectuals, meaning all those with post-primary education including teachers, doctors, and technicians, and those who survived only did so through concealing their identities. In addition, in this view, the regime abolished all schooling, medical care, and religion; sought to destroy the family, wipe out minorities, especially the Cham Moslems, pursued policies aimed at deliberately starving the population, and that all the regimes’ policies were perverse and without rational basis (Vickery 1984: 36-7). In challenging this view he explains: There are […] numerous details which controvert the STV, which is not to say that all horror stories are fiction. I am convinced that all the worst atrocities which have been reported occurred at some place at some time, but not as the STV would have it, everywhere all the time. (ibid: 50)
The use of the discourse of destruction in portrayals of Cambodian education establishes certain beliefs about the failings or inadequacies of the Cambodian education system, and the Cambodian people (teachers, students, trainers, administrators) within it. Education personnel are represented as having few relevant skills, being largely untrained and inexperienced, and in the case of teachers, what skills they do possess are devalued as ‘traditional, chalk-and-talk’ methods unsuitable to ‘efficient and modern’ educational practice. To paraphrase Vickery on the Standard Total View, these representations are true in some places, some of the time, but not everywhere all the time. A
37 number of analysts of ‘development,’ mostly inspired by Michel Foucault and Edward Said (for example, {Escobar, 1995 #19}Chambers, R. 1983; Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994; Long 2001; Porter, et al. 1991; Quarles van Ufford 1993{Escobar, 1995 #19}), have shown how the discourses of development institutions construct ‘developing countries’ and their populations in particular ways and establish structures of knowledge about these countries which then serve as the basis for specific ‘development’ interventions. These discursive constructions often represent the population to be ‘developed’ as lacking the necessary knowledge and skills (constructed as ‘modern’) for this process, necessitating the intervention of external ‘development experts’ who are similarly constructed as carriers of the ‘correct’ knowledge and skills. As I show in more detail in following chapters, this pattern is replicated in the discourses of the international agencies working in education in Cambodia. The aim of this chapter is to provide an alterative reading of Cambodian history, which goes behind the discourse of destruction and situates the latest wave of foreign intervention in a longue durée perspective.
A history of foreign intervention A possible alternative reading of Cambodia’s history is as a series of foreign interventions and invasions punctuated by attempts by indigenous elites to control the state apparatus and build an independent Khmer nation, which were characterised by elite political infighting and internal uprisings. These waves of foreign intervention often involved attempts to introduce or impose new ideologies through language and linguistic change. From this perspective, the contemporary ascendance of English is the linguistic element of the latest wave of foreign intervention, which is this time being conducted not by an aggressive or expansionist neighbour, or a colonising power, but by an array of international agencies organised around notions of ‘reconstruction’ and ‘development.’ Moreover, these waves of intervention should not be simplistically viewed as simply imposed on a homogenous population. In this regard, Cambodia’s foundational myth is instructive.
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Cambodia’s foundational myth tells of Kaundinya, an Indian Brahmin, who met and married the dragon princess Soma, whose father drank the water that covered the land he renamed ‘Kambuja’ and presented it to them as a wedding gift. Historians take this to be the kingdom identified in Chinese sources as Funan, probably established by Indian migrants in the Mekong Delta in the first few centuries of the Christian era. However, as Cambodian historian David Chandler points out, Cambodia’s Indianization pre-dates this, and over a period of five hundred years ‘provided Cambodia with a writing system, a pantheon, meters for poetry, a language (Sanskrit) to write it in, a vocabulary of social hierarchies (not the same as a caste system), Buddhism [and Hinduism?], the idea of universal kingship, and new ways of looking at politics, sociology, architecture, iconography, astronomy, and aesthetics’ (Chandler, D. 1996: 12). This Indianization and its linguistic inheritance is the first in a series of foreign interventions that is one way of characterising Cambodia’s history. The two languages of the pre-Angkorean era, Khmer and Sanskrit, demarcated the division between those who grew rice and those who did not. Khmer was the language the ordinary people used to talk to each other and to write about their actions, whereas Sanskrit was the language used by the elite to praise themselves and the gods (ibid: 21-2).
The rest of this chapter sketches these various waves of foreign intervention to historically contextualise this latest wave and to draw out some recurrent themes. Firstly, that the elite responses to these foreign interventions often appear to have been pragmatic. Secondly, the teaching and learning of foreign languages, especially in more recent colonial eras, have largely been the province of elite groups who, through these languages, were closely tied to the officials and administration of these foreign interventions. This occurred within the context of status hierarchies differentiating elites from the Khmer-speaking and largely illiterate majority.
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Angkorean empire To be Cambodian is to be the warrior, the creator and the builder of Angkor Wat. More accurately, to be a Cambodian is to be a descendent of a people that produced architectural masterpieces of the Angkor era which rival the achievements of any of the ancient civilisations. (Bit 1991:3) The sprawling constructions of the temple complex of Angkor Wat symbolise the glory and power of Cambodia’s Angkorean empires, which dominated South East Asia between the 9th and 15th centuries. The central towers of the main temple of Angkor Wat have been a potent symbol of Khmer nationalism, the central motif of all five post-independence flags, and a reference point for political leaders keen to articulate their own national political projects to the perceived power of Angkor. The origins of the empire and its founders are unclear, although a consensus appears to have formed around the role of King Jayavarman II having in some way unified an assortment of different regions and freed Cambodia from the control of Java (Chandler, D. 1996: 35-6). At its peak, the empire covered the whole of contemporary Cambodia, central and southern contemporary Vietnam and large parts of contemporary Laos and Thailand, supported by a rice-based economy, made possible through the establishment and maintenance of a sophisticated irrigation system. The Angkorean social structure whilst not unchanging, was characterised by a clearly stratified hierarchy, with the King at the apex, interconnected through ‘webs of relationships, responsibilities and expectations within which everyone appears to have been entangled’ (ibid: 47).
A central theme of Cambodian historiography is that the legacy of the Angkorean era, aside from the architectural grandeur of the temples, is a rigid social hierarchy and the legitimation of authoritarian notions of leadership and the inferiority of the masses. Several writers point to historical continuity in the organisation of social relations in Cambodia since the Angkorean period. Vickery (1984: 12) contends that although the Angkorean state disappeared ‘the old divisions of society persisted’, whilst Jackson 1989: 5) draws direct parallels between the post-independence hierarchical political culture and the ancient Hinduized kingdoms of South East Asia in which
40 ‘neither equality of opportunity nor equality of attainment represented predominant social values or expected outcomes for the majority of the citizenry.’ Thion (1993: 119) suggests that despite appearing to be a succession of brutal replacements of ruling elites the evolution of modern Cambodian politics is paradoxically ‘a continuous and at times repetitive process.’ Chandler develops this theme of continuity within change in his History of Cambodia pointing to ‘the pervasiveness of patronage and hierarchical terminology in Cambodian thinking, politics and social relations’ (Chandler, D. 1996: 2). Pre-colonial Cambodian social relations of power were characterised by a strong hierarchy, limited social mobility and a network of dyadic patron-client relationships extending down from the king and the monastic order through the graded bureaucracy to the villages and beyond to the landless debt slaves and minorities on the fringes of the state (ibid: 105, Thion 1993: 78).
These hierarchical relations are embedded in the Khmer language, which has no general second person pronoun ‘you’. Instead status relationships, conditioned by age, wealth, political position, religious piety and gender, between the speaker and addressee defines pronoun choice. Cambodian people also use kinship terms as forms of address, for example, a (older) male cyclo driver will be ‘ohm’ (uncle) and a (younger) waitress ‘p’ohn srei’ (younger sister). The terms ‘bong’ (older, senior) and ‘p’ohn’ (younger, junior) are frequently used in everyday conversation indicating the importance of age as a stratifying factor. In addition, women are ranked within the social hierarchy in terms of their fulfilment of a set of often contradictory cultural ideals (walk slowly and softly, be shy and remain protected within the family, be industrious, run the household and control its finances, be both advisor and servant to her husband) which also differ according to marital status (Legerwood n.d.). These ‘traditional’ social relations of power also contained elements of independence. As Vickery points out, ‘traditional’ village and family organisation were weak, villagers did not deal collectively with officials and extended family structures were limited. Thus corporate discipline over the individual, from either village or family, was limited, and once tax or corvée had been paid to the
41 state there was little to constrain the male individual. Thus ‘a paradoxical situation of great anarchic freedom prevailed in a society in which there was no individual freedom at all’ (Vickery 1984: 13).
In the late Angkorean period, when Indravarman III ruled, a Chinese ambassador came to Angkor and one of his party, Chou Ta-Kuan recorded brief details of the ‘customs and peculiarities of this country’ (Chou Ta-Kuan 1993: xix). Chou fails to detail how he communicated with the Khmer, but notes that ‘[f]or long years this country has enjoyed commercial relations with us’ (ibid: xviii) as well as diplomatic connections. Some remarks Chou makes about trade suggest that women may have played a central part in the fact that he and other Chinese visitors could communicate with the Khmer. In Cambodia, it is the women who take charge of trade. For this reason a Chinese, arriving in the country loses no time in getting himself a mate, for he will find her commercial instincts a great asset. (ibid: 43)
The Angkorean empire went into decline after the reign of King Jayavarman VII in the 13th century as neighbouring Vietnam and Thailand grew in power. The royal court began a gradual retreat, hastened by Thai invasions, from the Angkorean capital (around contemporary Siem Reap) downriver to the contemporary capital of Phnom Penh.
After Angkor Chandler points to three important shifts in the centuries following the decline of Angkor up until the period of Vietnamese occupation in the first half of the nineteenth century. The gradual decline of the brahmanical priestly class which had effectively connected landholding, control of slaves, religious practices, education and the throne. These changes loosened the social control of the elites, which may also have been affected by what Chandler claims was a concomitant decline in the popularity of kingship over the period. The other major change he notes, was the increasing
42 influence of the Thais on Cambodian life, the linguistic effect of which was the replacement of Angkorean syntax by its Thai counterpart in the nineteenth century (ibid: 97-8).
This long period of Cambodian history saw a succession of rulers and regional and factional infighting, shifting alliances and power-play between Cambodian elites and those in Vietnam and Thailand, as well as trade links with other Asian and European countries. From the 1620s, the Vietnamese gradually asserted economic and political control over the lower Mekong delta, which was then part of Cambodia. The rise of Vietnamese power split the Cambodian royal family along pro-Thai and pro-Vietnamese lines, and depending on which power supported the incumbent monarch, the rival group would seek support from the other power for his overthrow. The period then saw continuous invasions from Vietnam and Siam punctuated by ruinous civil wars through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (ibid: 95). This factional infighting and pragmatic, shifting alliances with foreign powers was replicated in the second half of the 20th century with equally deleterious effects.
In his history of Cambodian education, Ayres locates the roots of the ‘traditional’ education system in this period. Education took place in the village wat (Buddhist temple or monastery), and involved monks tutoring boys through the reading of sacred texts, teaching the precepts of Buddhism, Cambodian oral and literary traditions and vocational skills, such as carpentry, suitable to their rural lifestyles. Ayres emphasises that this ‘traditional’ education system was central to supporting the existing social structure and maintenance of traditional values (Ayres 2000a: 13). However, it was a limited system of education and the vast majority of the population remained illiterate.
43
Thai and Vietnamese expansion The Vietnamese gradual assertion of control over the lower Mekong delta covered a period of 200 years from the early 17th century. In this period, Vietnamese immigration into the region known to Cambodians even today as ‘lower Cambodia’ or Kampuchea Krom, mean that by the 20th century the now formally annexed region contained 400,000 ethnic Khmer surrounded by 4 million ethnic Vietnamese. This invasion and annexation of Cambodian territory left a ‘legacy of resentment and anti-Vietnamese feeling that fuelled the collapse of Democratic Kampuchea and persisted among many Cambodians into the 1980s and beyond’ (Chandler, D. 1996: 95). During this long period the struggle for control over Cambodia by Siam and Vietnam continued. In 1794 Thai protégé, Prince Eng, was restored to the Cambodian throne, but Thai monarch Rama I felt obliged to reward the Thai official, Baen, who had been governing Cambodia for the previous fifteen years. This ‘reward’ consisted of the two large and wealthy north-western sruk (districts) of Battambang and Mahanokor (containing the ruins of Angkor). These regions remained contested, with Siam giving them back under French pressure in 1907, but retaking them from 1941-46 (ibid: 118). The issue still resonates and in January 2003 rioting in Phnom Penh, which included the burning of Thai businesses and the newly built Thai embassy, were said to have been ignited by remarks rumoured to have been made by a Thai actress concerning the ‘return’ of Angkor to the Thais.
This period of Thai dominance was followed by Vietnamese assertion of control. In 1813, the then Vietnamese emperor ordered 100,000 troops into Phnom Penh beginning a period of attempted subjugation of the Cambodians and to establish a ‘buffer state’ against Thai aggression. Thomas Clayton, in his analysis of language and hegemony in the period, contends that the Vietnamese supported their position with a hegemonic mission civilisatrice (‘civilising mission’), foreshadowing that of French colonialism, which included a variety of cultural and language policies (Clayton, T. 2000:
44 47). In the 1830s, then Emperor Minh Mang appointed General Troung Minh Giang to head this ‘civilising mission’, instructing him: The barbarians have become my children now and you should help them, and teach them our customs […] but the people have no knowledge of [advanced] agriculture […] all these shortcomings stem from the laziness of the Cambodians […] teach them to use oxen, teach them to grow more rice, teach them to raise mulberry trees, pigs and ducks […] As for language, they should be taught to speak Vietnamese. (cited in Chandler, D. 1996: 126) Clayton notes that scholars conclude that this ‘civilising mission’ supported Vietnam’s economic and strategic objectives, for example, that imposing the language and culture on the elite would improve communication between the colonising and ‘buffer state’ or in the case of the peasantry, it would aid agricultural innovation and increase food surpluses for the army and expand tax revenues. As he points out, everyday peasant resistance to this is indicated by the fact that agricultural practices changed little. The Cambodian elite may have pragmatically accepted the language policies, but when the Vietnamese threatened to remove them from power, they staged a rebellion which presaged the withdrawal of the Vietnamese (Clayton, T. 2000: 48).
French colonialism Cambodian independence under King Duang was only a brief interlude during which he began to seek French support in order to play off the Thai against the Vietnamese. The period of French control of Cambodia lasted from the establishment of the protectorate in 1863 through to independence in 1953. The protectorate, established under a treaty with Duang’s heir, Norodom, aimed at protecting Cambodia from the repeated annexations of its two more powerful neighbours in return for timber concessions and mineral exploitation rights. Chandler contends that the French tended to romanticise the Cambodians in comparison to the Vietnamese, whilst simultaneously looking down on them as ‘lazy’ or ‘obedient’ (Chandler, D. 1996: 139). It was possibly this latter view that led the French to put Vietnamese, regarded as the traditional enemy by the Cambodians,
45 into bureaucratic roles in Phnom Penh and as indentured labour in the rubber plantations of Kompong Cham (Clayton, T. 2000: 50).
Despite a ninety-year colonisation, the French colonial powers failed to establish a colonial education system of any substance. Ayres characterises the colonial period as one of neglect which saw half-hearted, rarely completed education policies undermined when their costs of implementation were realised (Ayres 2000a: 30). The colonial power established a limited system of Franco-Cambodian schools in the late nineteenth century, modelled after the French system, with instruction in French and geared toward producing indigenous colonial civil servants. From the 1920s, they pursued a policy of modernizing the wat schools, where boys had traditionally received education from monks, with a similar curriculum to the Franco-Cambodian schools but with instruction in Khmer (Ayres 2000a: 18-45, Clayton, T. 2000: 45-59).
Whilst French was the language of the colonial administration and the language of instruction in some parts of the limited school system established by the colonial power, it remained an elite language and never threatened to replace Khmer as the national language. French colonial officials, likewise, appeared to be less and less interested in learning Khmer. Chandler points out that the résident Bardez, murdered in 1925 by villagers in Kompong Chhnang rebelling against crippling colonial taxation, spoke no Khmer despite having been in service in Cambodia for fifteen years. He then asks: Without knowing the language, how accurate could his assessments be of what ordinary people were thinking? It is as if a great deal of Cambodian life in the colonial period was carried out behind a screen, invisible and inaudible to the French. (Chandler, D. 1996: 158) Clayton argues that the bilingual graduates of the Franco-Cambodian schools would have been able to pierce this screen to begin establishing metropolitan administrative structures in the colony (2000: 51). But this would have been a colonised elite talking to a colonial elite, rather than to ordinary Cambodians. As historian Michael Vickery (1986: 5) points out, these graduates sought positions in
46 the colonial administration as means of amassing personal wealth and the chance to ‘consume’ (synonymous in Khmer with ‘to govern’) the population. The colonised elite, shrewd brokers, were happy to distance themselves from the ‘people of the mud’ (rice growers) and their education and knowledge of the French language facilitated the protection of their elite position and its comforts.
However, among this gradually expanding educated elite, especially after the establishment of the Cambodia’s first high school, Lycée Sisowath, in 1936, came the initial signs of nationalism. Emerging within the lower ranks of the civil service, organised around anti-Vietnamese sentiments and a reawakening of Cambodian cultural and intellectual life, it was not turned against the colonial power until after the Japanese occupation during World War Two (Chandler, D. 1996: 160-5). In 1941, after the usual royal squabbles, the French approved the coronation of Norodom Sihanouk, who was to dominate Cambodian politics for the rest of the century, and who, after the Japanese coup de force in March 1945, declared independence and changed the countries name in French from ‘Cambodge’ to the Khmer pronunciation, ‘Kampuchea’ (ibid: 170).
Independence to renewed civil war Despite the declaration, Cambodia only achieved autonomy within the French Union, full independence following in 1953. King Sihanouk played a leading role in this new nationalist, anticolonial awakening, but his regal status prevented his becoming formally involved in politics. However, after independence, Sihanouk abdicated, designating his father as king, and formed a new party, the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (People’s Socialist Community). Based on an apparently contradictory ideology of Buddhist socialism, which asserted a vague benevolent ruler doctrine, the party attracted players from the left and right of the political spectrum – all keen to get their own chance to ‘consume’ the population. From the 1955 elections through to those of 1966, no non-
47 Sangkum politician was elected to the National Assembly, sealing the former monarch’s monopoly on political power (Ayres 2000a: 34). Sihanouk remained popular whilst the kingdom prospered and his neutralist foreign policy helped him to retain US military and economic aid. However, plots continued to be formed in both Saigon and Bangkok against his leadership, and in the Cold War atmosphere he was labelled pro-communist by the US. This was in part a response to Sihanouk’s own tactical alliances with the left in Cambodia and with communist China. This leftward shift produced an increased tolerance of left-wing teachers in schools, who were subsequently drawn into the Communist Party of Kampuchea, taking students with them (Chandler, D. 1996: 192). In 1963, Sihanouk unilaterally ended all US aid projects as relations between the former king and the US government deteriorated (Vickery 1984: ix). Sihanouk still claimed neutrality for Cambodia but began, as Chandler (1996: 193-7) notes, to attempt to play off the two sides in the expanding Vietnam conflict against each other in a fashion reminiscent of past Cambodian leaders, as well as pursuing a similar political agenda with his domestic opponents.
Education under Sihanouk The Sihanouk era is often seen as a ‘Golden Age’ for Cambodian education. One story I heard from two older Cambodian teachers was that in the 1960s a teacher’s salary could support a family of fifteen. In 1962-3 lower secondary school teachers’ salaries were equivalent to US$100 per month at the official exchange rate, higher than the US$30 equivalent in Thailand, and far higher than the money incomes of Cambodian peasants or factory workers (Vickery 1984: 20). Under Sihanouk’s control in the 1950s and 1960s, education absorbed almost 20% of the national budget, enabling the expansion of secondary and higher education well beyond the rate of population growth, which increased the indigenous elite to fill positions posts previously held by French nationals (Clayton, T. 2000: 65). Ayres argues that this expansion reflects one aspect of the crisis in Cambodian education, which continues today, in that at ‘the highest levels of policy-making, issues of quantitative
48 expansion have almost always been given priority over issues of educational quality’ (Ayres 2000b: 1). Despite external advice, accepted by the Ministry of Education, that educational expansion should be at an affordable pace, Sihanouk pushed for compulsory secondary education and encouraged an unregulated expansion of educational facilities. This included an increase in Khmer public schools (formerly Franco-Cambodian schools) from 1,352 to 1,653 1955 and 1958 (although modernised wat schools only increased by 47), the establishment of the Royal University and rapid expansion of tertiary education in the early 1960s, despite severe fiscal constraints and Sihanouk’s 1963 decision to cancel all US aid (Ayres 2000a: 46-50).
By independence in 1953, French had become the language of instruction at levels beyond elementary school. It remained the language of the state bureaucracy and of elite recruitment through the higher education system until the Democratic Kampuchea regime in 1975. From the late 1940s through to the 1960s, many elite Cambodian students were educated in France, where some were immersed in an intellectual environment which led them to question both colonialism and the nature of the entrenched, hierarchical Khmer social system. This included Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Son Sen and Saloth Sar (later known as Pol Pot) who on their return all became teachers and activists in the clandestine communist movement, eventually becoming the leaders of the Khmer Rouge (Ayres 2000a: 29 & 43, Chandler, D. 1996: 183).
The quantitative expansion of education within Cambodia in the 1950s and 1960s was not matched by an expansion in the capacity of the government, business or industry to absorb these graduates. High school education remained a general liberal arts education with little practical content, due to a lack of curriculum reform, and university students were overwhelmingly taking courses only suitable for careers in the government bureaucracy (Vickery 1984: 18). The expectation amongst these graduates, promoted by Sihanouk’s agenda for the modernisation of Cambodia under his rule, was for potentially lucrative employment within the modern sector of the Cambodian economy, but
49 these expectations were largely unmet. Some of these disgruntled graduates and students still in school and university became involved in anti-Sihanouk political activity, including joining the communists now organising within rural areas, adding to the increasing domestic political turmoil. However, as Vickery (ibid: 23) notes, many also continued an old tradition of becoming clients, hangers-on and servants of the rich, and with the later advent of civil war ‘and the foreign aid and diplomatic community began a new expansion, there were new jobs as interpreters, secretaries, house-servants, drivers, gardeners, guards, etc.’ employment patterns that would be repeated with the expansion of the foreign aid community in the 1990s. Meng Seng Heng, one of the teacher trainers working in the CAMSET project, recalled beginning to study English in private classes in the early 1970s. Although he was studying French at high school, he felt that English would enable him to find work with the Americans who were present in large numbers in Phnom Penh in the early 1970s. In the 1990s, English did provide him with such work, both through involvement with CAMSET and in his private work with both international agencies and foreign companies, such as British American Tobacco (interview 28-12-02).
Under the Sihanouk (1955-70) and the later Lon Nol (1970-75) governments, French was gradually replaced by Khmer as the medium of instruction in secondary education, whilst most higher education remained in French. During the Sihanouk period, English language teaching entered the secondary curriculum as a second foreign language, along with Russian, for students in grade eight for two hours per week. Aid-funded English teaching programmes were also operating at this time. Historian Michael Vickery began his interest in Cambodia as a US aid funded high school English teacher in Kompong Thom and Siem Reap in the early 1960s. This programme came to a halt when Sihanouk ended US aid in 1963 (Vickery 1984: ix). In contemporary Cambodia, many Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MoEYS) staff and officials, like other government officials who had survived the Democratic Kampuchea period, had been educated in French. This included Im Sithy, currently one of the two Secretaries of State for Education. Interestingly, I twice heard him remark,
50 whilst addressing Cambodian and foreign English teachers and trainers at formal events, that although he recognised that English was now the dominant international language, he had not been in favour of the teaching of English due to his own French language education.
The Lon Nol Regime 1970-1975 The ousting of Norodom Sihanouk in the 1970 coup led by General Lon Nol and Prince Sisowath Sirik Matik marked the beginning of over twenty years of open civil war in Cambodia. By this time a fifth of Cambodia’s territory was already controlled by insurgent forces of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, who Sihanouk had mockingly labelled Les Khmer Rouge. The nation was increasingly enmeshed in the Vietnam conflict, one of the major battles of the Cold War. US economic and military intervention included bombings raids on the Cambodia-Vietnam border, ostensibly to disrupt the Viet Minh supply line, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which escalated into carpet bombing of the Cambodian countryside between 1969-73. Historian Ben Kiernan argues these were probably the most important single factor in the rise of Pol Pot (Kiernan 1996: 16). Lon Nol’s leadership was characterised by increasing anti-Vietnamese policies, including imprisoning thousands of ethnic Vietnamese in detention camps, 30,000 extra-judicial arrests and an unknown number of murders, including the massacre of 800 Vietnamese labourers in a settlement across the river from Phnom Penh (Becker 1998: 125). His military campaigns against the communists and North Vietnamese, despite US air support, failed to prevent the increasing control of the country by the Khmer Rouge. In Phnom Penh, the various factions of the military and the elite vied for power and wealth derived mostly from corruption.
During this period, English gained the same status in schools as French as a first foreign language, although by this time education was being severely curtailed due to the destruction and dislocation of civil war and as early as 1972 ninety percent of Cambodia’s schools were closed (Ablin 1991: 26).
51 However, life in the capital retained some semblance of normality as Cambodian émigré Vannary Imam recalls in her memoir of the period, When Elephants Fight. She was educated in French at the Lycée Descartes, which she comments ‘shaped us to be French in thought and foreigners in our own country’ (Imam 2000: 251). However, during the Lon Nol regime she entered the competition for aid-funded ‘Colombo Plan’ scholarships for undergraduate study in Australia. During these tests, she recounts being: […] up against a class of Cambodian students from a particular state school that was unique. Unlike the main stream of other state schools, it was a ‘Khmero-English’ institution where its students had the benefit of English as a medium in most subjects. (ibid: 266). Nonetheless, this was probably the only state school employing English medium teaching, and, like Imam’s own Lycée Descartes, an elite institution. One of my colleagues at Takeo RTTC, Sok Chan Mol, had been a student at this high school in the early 1960s and had been taught in English by teachers from India, the US and France.
Democratic Kampuchea 1975-79 On April 17th, 1975 columns of Khmer Rouge troops entered Phnom Penh ending the Khmer Republic of Lon Nol, who had fled the country on April 1st and beginning the three years, eight months and twenty-eight days of the genocidal Democratic Kampuchea regime. Dominated by the shadowy ângka (organisation), with a leadership including many former school teachers, pursuing an ultra-nationalist revolution which emphasised independence and self-reliance, all borders were sealed, foreign embassies and press agencies expelled, domestic media closed, communications suppressed and the speaking of all foreign languages forbidden. Phnom Penh was abandoned and the population forced into rural areas becoming ‘new people’ to be re-educated by the ‘old people’ (those who had lived under Khmer Rouge rule since before 1975) into the revolution and agricultural production. Agriculture, specifically rice production, was to be the basis of economic
52 reconstruction and a uniquely Cambodian socialism. At the heart of this was the work slogan ‘Nothing is more honourable than growing rice’ (cited in Becker 1998: 229). What resulted was social destruction and violence in which between 1 and 2 million of a population of approximately 7 million were killed or died of overwork and starvation. This violence included political infighting, driven by ideological differences and paranoid struggles for domination, which saw thousands of Cambodians, from anonymous peasants through to Khmer Rouge leaders, arrested, tortured and killed. This infighting played a part in the exile and rebellion of Khmer Rouge cadres, including Hun Sen, Chea Sim and Heng Samrin, who would subsequently form an alliance with the Vietnamese and drive the Khmer Rouge out of power2.
Education in Democratic Kampuchea David Ayres describes education within Democratic Kampuchea as ‘a complex story of an attempt – quite half-heartedly pursued – to rebuild education within the context of an ideological commitment to self-reliance’ (Ayres 1999: 218). The Khmer Rouge began closing schools in areas they controlled in the early 1970s. Ayres describes how this resulted not from the disruption of civil war, but because, as Khieu Samphan asserted ‘“everything was done according to foreign books and foreign standards,” that education in the old regime was “useless” and “failed to serve the needs of the people” or help in building the nation’ (Ayres 2000a: 104). Ayres points out the irony of Samphan and other Khmer Rouge leaders dismissing an education system that had benefited them. However, he also notes that Samphan is pointing to central and continuing aspects of the Cambodian educational crisis: its lack of relevance to the majority of the people’s needs, and the adoption of inappropriate foreign educational models (ibid).
The complexity and viciousness of the infighting is detailed in Ben Kiernan’s (1996) work The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79, in which he also traces the racist agenda of the regime. Vickery’s (1984) text, Cambodia 1975-1982, details the regional and temporal variations in Khmer Rouge factions and their policies and activities. 2
53 During the Democratic Kampuchea period, education was provided on a minimal basis and was either subordinate to or supportive of the political imperative of ‘building socialism’. The 1976 Four Year Plan to Build Socialism in All Fields outlined the primary education policies and objectives, which emphasised basic literacy and numeracy in part-time classes to be run in ‘factories, cooperatives and revolutionary establishments’ in order to ‘serve the goals of the revolution’ (cited in Clayton, T. 1998: 9). According to Ayres, the basic plan specified the teaching of literacy and numeracy only in order ‘to learn technology,’ but that learning technology was a matter of practice, and that ‘learning could only occur swiftly “by cultivating good political consciousness” at the expense of “culture”, to demonstrate the line of the part “is correct”’ (Ayres 1999: 212). The ângka had divided Cambodia into seven main zones and various sub-regions and districts, and provision of education varied significantly between these. According to Vickery’s informants, the Eastern zone saw the best application of the policy, with primary classes operating in the morning, before ‘productive work’, with teachers from the ‘old people’ given regime-produced textbooks to instruct pupils in reading, maths and geography, but the children’s achievements were very low, and after 1978 even this limited provision was halted (Vickery 1984: 172).
Rather than a process of total destruction of education, this period might be better characterised as one of radical failure to construct an alternative to what remained of a colonial education system, already partially destroyed during the civil war, and of subsequent deliberate neglect. The physical buildings of the system not destroyed in the war, were turned over to the army or used as prisons or storehouses, the books and materials abandoned and left to rot, and the teachers, students and administrators subject to the whims of the leaders of whichever zones or districts they were exiled to, as were the majority of the Cambodian population.
54
People’s Republic of Kampuchea/State of Cambodia 1979-1991 The murderous political infighting of the Khmer Rouge and the military conflict with Vietnam from 1977, in part a result of Cambodia being once more enmeshed in the conflicts of rival foreign powers, this time China and the Soviet Union, presaged the downfall of the Democratic Kampuchea regime. Rebel forces form the Eastern Zone, lead by Heng Samrin and Chea Sim, had been fighting the regime since mid-1978, but it was only after Vietnamese forces staged a full-scale invasion in late December combining 150,000 Vietnamese and 15,000 Cambodia troops leading to the fall of Phnom Penh on the 7th January, 1979. The Khmer Rouge leaders had managed to escape to areas on the Thai border, from where they would conduct sporadic raids in a simmering civil war into the late 1990s. The two other opposition factions, the royalist FUNCINPEC led by Prince Norodom Ranariddh and the republican Khmer People’s National Liberation Front were also located in these areas until the peace settlement in 1991. With Vietnamese support a new regime, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was established, with Heng Samrin as President, Chea Sim as interior minister and as foreign minister the twenty-eight year-old Hun Sen, who would become the new dominant figure of Cambodian politics.
The exigencies of Cold War politics led to the refusal of Western nations, under US pressure, to recognise the Heng Samrin government and the UN General Assembly’s bizarre decision in September 1979 to give Cambodia’s seat to the Khmer Rouge representative. A Western aid embargo on the country was established, which allowed humanitarian aid for ‘people in need’ but not ‘development aid’. In contrast, the refugee camps established along the Thai border, accommodating and controlled by opposition forces including the Khmer Rouge, received both emergency and development aid, amounting to more than twice that supplied to Cambodia3 (Mysliwiec 1988: 72-30). William Shawcross’s 1984 book The Quality of Mercy, details the negotiations Between 1982 and 1987 contributions in-kind to the United Nations Border Relief Operation totalled $US95.5 million, whilst those to UN assisted programmes within Cambodia totalled US$39 (Mysliwiec 1988: 154-5). 3
55 around humanitarian and development aid between the various government diplomats, UN agencies, NGOs, the Cambodian government and the Khmer Rouge representatives in the emergency period 1979 to 1981. One of the most interesting aspects is how Hun Sen, a poorly educated, former mid-ranking Khmer Rouge commander, became rapidly adept at playing off these various groups against each other, developing political skills he would employ as Prime Minister in the 1990s in dealing with many of the same organisations and agencies.
The Western embargo continued the isolation of Cambodia from much of the world. However, Vietnamese support combined with the backing of the Soviet Union resulted in the provision of various Vietnamese and Russian ‘experts’ to assist the reconstruction process. The efforts at rebuilding the education system in the People’s Republic of Kampuchea were largely guided by the Vietnamese through advisors placed at Ministry level. In his work on the Vietnamese ‘occupation’ from 1979-1989, Thomas Clayton claims the Vietnamese attempted, through attaching experts to the Ministry of Education and teaching in higher education and producing and implementing curricula and materials to instil a socialist ideology at all levels of education, to fashion an education system which would promote a socialist vision for regional and international relations. He shows how this was largely carried out in Khmer not Vietnamese in a form of what he terms ‘linguistic pragmatism’ (as opposed to ‘linguistic imperialism’) as this would have been seen by the occupiers as a more efficient way of transmitting core ideology. He goes on to argue that Cambodians involved in education and the government in this period, like subordinate actors in similar situations, betrayed no ideological mystification and perceived clearly this attempted hegemonic project (Clayton, T. 2000: esp. 151-166).
In 1984 the teaching of either Vietnamese or Russian as a foreign language was introduced to secondary schools and students were to study one language for two hours per week. Classes were taught by Cambodian teachers who had been trained in Cambodia by Vietnamese or Soviet language
56 professors. The idea being that this would provide a bridge to specific domestic and overseas higher education programmes, which used Vietnamese or Russian as the language of instruction (ibid: 115). When I discussed this period with Cambodian colleagues, they often claimed to have learnt little or no Vietnamese as they were either uninterested or objected on nationalist grounds to learning the language. However, two of my immediate colleagues, Ratha and Pol Mean, had learned Russian in higher education and undertook periods of study in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. They both returned to Cambodia and were assigned to be Russian teachers in secondary schools, but neither ever taught Russian, both becoming default English teachers in their schools.
Transition to the Kingdom of Cambodia With the fall of the Berlin Wall, symbolic end of the Cold War, Cambodia’s geo-political significance waned. Essential economic support disappeared as the Soviet Union collapsed and market-oriented economic policies were spreading though former state-controlled economies, including the policies of ‘Doi Moi’ in Vietnam. All Vietnamese troops were withdrawn from Cambodia by 1989, along with Vietnamese advisors in education and other sectors. Diplomatic negotiations led by the UN, France and Indonesia resulted in meetings between Sihanouk and Hun Sen, now Prime Minister of the PRK, beginning in 1988. This led to the International Conference on Cambodia in July-August 1989 which brought together the four main Cambodian factions, the five permanent members of the Security Council and thirteen other countries to develop a framework peace agreement. In 1990, the four Cambodian factions agreed to the peace process and the establishment of the Supreme National Council to represent Cambodian sovereignty over the transition period. This was followed by the reconvening of the International Conference on Cambodia on October 23rd, 1991 for the signing of the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict (Curtis 1998: 57).
57 After the signing of the Agreements the UN Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to oversee a two-year period of transition which would end with national elections in 1993. This began the latest wave of foreign intervention in Cambodia, but this time not from a single colonising power, but from an array of international organisations, multi-lateral, bilateral and non-governmental, organised around the ‘rehabilitation’, ‘reconstruction’ and ‘development’ of Cambodia. These organisations used English as their primary operational language. In addition the model of ‘development’ being promoted, emphasised a democratic government as ‘strategist and manager’ working in ‘partnership’ with the private sector pursuing market-led, export-oriented growth and an increasing integration into regional and international political and economic institutions, for which English would ‘naturally’ be the language of communication.
58
Chapter 2: Constructing the Demand for English
Introduction One lunchtime in November 2000, I went to the cobblers in the market to have my flip flops repaired. They were there all day, every day, a small group of them working on the floor, squatting on low stools, just inside the main entrance. As I approached one of them called to me, so I sat down in front of him and handed him my flip flops. Without asking anything he started work, sewing the cloth strap back into the rubber sole. As he worked, he asked me a few questions in English. Tentative at first, but as his confidence increased he asked for more details about what I was doing in Takeo. I answered mostly in English, but with some Khmer, as I needed the practice too. He spoke English as well as many of the trainee teachers I was working with and with more confidence than most of them. Seourn, as I later found out was his name, was studying English at a local wat, a Cambodian Buddhist temple or monastery where classes were cheaper than in the local private schools. He had been studying English on and off for two years, depending on his income, and explained that he saw this as a means of gaining a job with more money and status perhaps with a private company or an international organisation as a driver or a guard. His wife also worked in the market, running a shoe stall. I paid him for the repairs and explained where I lived as he wanted to come and visit to practice his English. When I returned to Takeo two years later, Seourn was still working in the market and studying English, but had not yet found a better job.
During my fourteen months in Cambodia, like most foreign workers, I had encounters like this almost every week. I met Cambodians who were studying English in the hope of obtaining better jobs, to help them selling goods or services to foreigners (most often women in the main markets of
59 Phnom Penh where foreign workers and tourists shopped); moto4 drivers, who wanted to communicate with tourists (often state employees in their second or third job); street children in Phnom Penh selling English-language newspapers, who for a little extra on the price of the paper would offer to deliver the paper to your house; students and teachers from schools and colleges or officials from various government ministries studying English for current or future employment prospects; passengers on the bus to Phnom Penh who would tentatively ask questions to practice their English; and from time to time more meaningful conversations, a taxi driver who wanted to ask my opinion of Tony Blair or the young woman in the Russian market in Phnom Penh explaining why she was trying to avoid getting married.
There is little question about the strength of demand for learning English in Cambodia. I worked in Takeo town (the provincial capital of Takeo Province), which had a population of around 37,000 people. The town had four large private schools, two being branches of private schools based in Phnom Penh, which taught English, plus Mandarin Chinese, Japanese and Thai, and computing and business courses. There was also a myriad of small private ‘schools’ or classes teaching English, but also core curricula subjects for secondary school students. Other provincial capitals were similar. In Kompong Cham, large private schools, such as the USA English Center, existed alongside small, single-teacher private classes. In Svey Rieng one of the largest private schools was established by teachers who had trained with the help of a VSO volunteer. In Phnom Penh brightly-coloured street banners and wall posters advertised an endless array of private schools, from the elite and expensive, such as the Australian Centre for Education and the Banana Center, to small private classes run by individual teachers. Even in rural villages, small wooden signs hung on trees advertised private classes secondary school teachers ran in their own homes. Prices in these schools and classes varied, depending on the school, its location and the qualifications, status and reputation of the teachers. Basic English classes in rural areas or small towns would be anything between 100 and 500 riel (or 2 4
Motorcycle taxi, the cheapest and most popular form of public transport in Cambodia.
60 and 12 cents)
5
per student per hour, which was the rough equivalent of a basic rice and pork
breakfast in the roadside cafes found in these towns. Textbook-based courses in private schools were often priced monthly, with the lower grades being around US$56 per month (or 30 hours study) rising to $10 per month for higher levels. This compares to the average civil service salary of around $25 per month or the $45 per month minimum wage in the garment factories that encircle Phnom Penh.
Although taught as a foreign language from the early 1960s, English only began to replace French, the colonial language, as the dominant foreign language in the 1990s. Since 1989, students in state schools have been able to choose to study either English or French between grades 7 to 12 (lower and upper secondary school), but English increasingly attracts more students. In 1996, for example, 40 percent more students registered for the Grade 8 French exam than for the English exam, whereas in 2001, 37,000 students took the Grade 9 English exam, twice the number who took French. In 1995 the Ministry estimated there were 529 English and 1,378 French teachers, by 2000/2001 there were 728 and 331 respectively. By 2000, over 1,000 of the approximately 24,000 students in state and private higher education institutions were studying for a BA in English, while only 250 were taking the French equivalent (Lon 2001, MoEYS 1996: 5, Taylor, G. 1995: 3, Ahrens and Kemmerer 2002: 9).
This high demand for English is embedded in the discourses of Cambodian teachers and trainers, CAMSET project specialists, Ministry staff, VSO programme office staff and volunteers, including myself, and other international agency staff. However, the nature and
At the time I was working in Cambodia the exchange rate of the riel was relatively stable at around US$1 = 3,900 riel. The exchange rate was similar when I returned in 2002. 6 Throughout the text these are US dollars, unless otherwise stated. ‘The US dollar serves all three functions of money in Cambodia: it is widely used as a medium of exchange, a store of wealth and a unit of account. […] Essentially, it is the dollar that serves the function of money in the Cambodian economy.’ (Menon 1998: 6) Over the past four years, the exchange rate has been fairly stable at around 3800 to 3900 riel to the dollar. 5
61
Figure 2: Private school advertising Phnom Penh (author’s photo)
Figure 3: Advertising private classes, Phnom Penh (author’s photo)
62 source of the demand was rarely examined, it appeared so evident and so widespread that it almost unnecessary to question. As one VSO English teacher, discussing other English teaching volunteers’ questioning VSO’s English language teaching work in Cambodia, remarked: [I] didn’t think anybody had ever even questioned or thought that there was any doubt that we should be doing English, [ I ] thought it was a bit naïve and also thought it was quite weird, sort of “Why did you come?” (Philippa interview 10-03-01) In these discourses, English and English language teaching (ELT) was intimately associated with Cambodia’s ‘development’ although what the latter actually referred to was similarly unclear and unstated. One of the project team leaders provided a typical response to being asked about the role of English and ELT in development: I think we all would, all of us I’m sure, all the CAMSET people would subscribe to the view that English does have a role in development. […] But I think we’d all subscribe to the view that yes there are definite hidden benefits, not even hidden, overt benefits. (Lucy RoyalDawson interview 22-02-01) Similarly, an NGO manager describes the demand in hyperbolic terms, but without explaining what needs this demand is fulfilling: “Cambodia's secret weapon is that young Cambodians seem really determined to learn English, which is different than in Thailand and Vietnam. It is a real advantage," said Tony Knowles, Enterprise Development Cambodia. (Cambodia Daily July 23, 2001) For others, the high demand for English simply reflects how English has become the global lingua franca. One writer reports that the Cambodian Secretary of State for Commerce explaining that seventy percent of his own work was conducted in English, simply concluded that ‘English is integrated with the global economy’, whilst an economist with the Cambodian Development Resource Institute contended that ‘Language choice is market driven and the market favours English’ (cited in Clayton, T. 2002: 6).
63 The above statements support Pennycook’s (1994) argument, that the emergence of English as the dominant global language is generally portrayed as ‘natural, neutral and beneficial’ leaving questions of how this status was achieved and what are its effects unanswered. The central question addressed here is how has English achieved its current status in Cambodia? Over the past two decades, it has effectively replaced French as the dominant foreign language, and is now being taught and studied not only amongst the elites, but also by lower class Cambodians like Seourn. Understanding these changes requires examining the contexts within which decisions concerning national language policy were made, but also within which individual Cambodians were deciding to study English. In this chapter, I examine three arenas that were central to the construction of the demand for English and structured these decision making contexts. First, the establishment in the mid-1980s of the Cambodian English Language Training project by the Quaker Service Australia, the first aid-funded English teacher training project in Cambodia. Second, the teaching and learning of English in the refugee camps operating in the Thai-Cambodia border region from the 1970s to 1990s. Third, the period of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, which marked the end of civil war and the beginning of the latest wave of foreign intervention. These three arenas show how different Cambodian social actors, at different times, in different locations perceived economic, social and political incentives for learning English. Prior to this, I briefly describe how some of my colleagues began learning English clandestinely during the 1980s.
Clandestine English classes Many of the teachers and trainers I worked with in Cambodia had begun learning English during the 1980s, when studying certain foreign languages was illegal. These individuals were making language choices under difficult conditions, and their reasons for choosing to learn English demonstrates how they could perceive that things in Cambodia would change in the future.
64
In a document produced under by the Ministry of Education of the State of Cambodia in 1990, the claim was made that English language teaching had begun in 1981 when: […] the School of Language was opened and trains [sic] at secondary level in Russian, Vietnamese, German, Spanish, French and English, and Khmer for foreign students. (Ministry of Education 1990: 15) However, according to academic accounts (Clayton, T. 2002: 5, Ayres 2000a: 142) and conversations I had with Cambodian teachers the teaching of English and French was illegal under the People’s Republic of Kampuchea. Despite this there was a relatively widespread covert system of English teaching and learning operating in Phnom Penh and other urban centres. Three of my Cambodian colleagues who studied in this clandestine way under the PRK reported being able to buy English language textbooks on the black market in Phnom Penh. Ratha, one of the trainers I worked with in Takeo RTTC, described how he attended classes along with ten to fifteen other students held secretly on the second floor of the teacher’s house, so that they were not easily seen. They would tell other people that the class was about another language (usually Russian or Vietnamese) or even a different subject. They also listened to English language radio broadcasts, although the police would confiscate radios if they were being used to listen to English or French broadcasts. The police would threaten to arrest people who spoke foreign languages, especially French and English, to foreigners. People would also keep quiet about any relatives they might have overseas. The suspicion was that if they were learning to speak English or French it was because they were planning to leave Cambodia (this also included Thai and Chinese, and people were not allowed to speak Chinese in public). Ratha said that he started learning English at that time as his cousin could read English books at his relative’s house, so he wanted to do the same. Chhin, another trainer at the RTTC, told me that he started to learn English so he could get information from the radio, especially from the Voice of America broadcasts. Sophal, the national ELT trainer-trainer, explained that in the early 1980s his older brother, who subsequently emigrated to Canada via the border camps, was learning English
65 and he liked the sound of the language, so he started learning too. After his brother emigrated, Sophal also saw English as providing other potential educational and economic opportunities.
Although supposedly illegal under the PRK, even some Ministries were providing language tuition for key staff, including in English, on an unofficial or semi-official basis. Jennifer Ashton, an Australian NGO consultant on a fact-finding mission to Phnom Penh in 1985 described the situation in her report: Apart from private English schools mushrooming around the city, each of the ministries is now conducting classes in various languages, including English, for its cadres. At least one aid worker I spoke to had been approached to conduct after-hours classes for his Ministry. As well it was confirmed that students had already been sent to East Germany and Hungary for English language training. We spoke to the Indian Charge d’Affaires, Mr Malik, who outlined the scholarship scheme that the Indian government had provided for Kampucheans to study English in New Delhi. They employed three teachers for this course which was for fourteen Kampucheans. (cited in Oats 1994: 36) This report was part of initial efforts to establish the first “Western” aid-funded English teaching project in the 1980s by the Quaker Service Australia (QSA).7 A history of the project (Oats 1994) shows how English and the international aid agencies were closely articulated.
The QSA Cambodian English Language Training Project Although during the 1980s the Australian government officially refused to recognise the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, they actively promoted English teaching by funding the Cambodian English Language Training (CELT8). This was the first aid-funded English teacher training project in Cambodia and came at a time when teaching English was officially forbidden and Cambodia was under an aid embargo. Funded by the Australian International Development Aid Bureau9 (AIDAB), At that time named the Quaker Service Council Australia. Initially titled Kampuchean English Language Training, the project name changed in April 1989 when the government announced the country name would change back to Cambodia. 9 In November 1987 the agency had emphasised its changing role by adding International in its title, and in 1995 was renamed the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). 7 8
66 the project was established and managed by Quaker Service Australia (QSA) between 1985 and 1993. A small faith-based international NGO, QSA had been funding a series of small-scale construction projects in Cambodia since 1979, but had no previous involvement in English language teaching or teacher training. An unofficial history of the CELT project, I Could Cry for These People, written by QSA Committee member William Oats, provides a detailed record of the establishment and operation of the project, as well as the thoughts and feelings of the Australian project team members.
The catalyst for the establishment of CELT was the visit of Bill Hayden, then Australian Foreign Minister, to Laos and Vietnam in June and July 1983. His comments on this visit, in the foreword to Oats’ history, encapsulates the view of English as the only effective language for Cambodia’s reconstruction and development. Given his political position, this must also have reflected Australian government policy. In my discussions with officials, it became apparent that one of the most effective ways by which Australia could assist with the process of reconstruction was to help with training in the English language. English, of course, is the international means of communication in the modern commercial and technological world, and it seems to me essential that if the countries of Indo-China, including Cambodia, were successfully to rebuild they needed access to all these skills. (Hayden in Oats 1994: 5) He urged that Australia initiate the teaching of English as an essential first step for Cambodia to take advantage of available international aid (ibid: 31). Hayden presupposed that English was central to the reconstruction of Indo-China, not merely Cambodia, and gatekeeper to the necessary ‘modern’ technology and commercial world. Although technology, scientific knowledge and commercial markets are accessible largely through English, Hayden’s statement contains a number of assumptions repeated in the discourses of international agencies operating in Cambodia in the 1990s. It reflects an external orientation for Cambodian education which, as Ayres (2000a: 187) points out, is highly inappropriate to the needs of the rural majority or at best low on their list of priorities. Cambodia is portrayed as economically and socially homogenous with the access that
67 English provides to these external goods being apparently equally beneficial to all regardless of class, gender, ethnicity, age or geographic location.
Also significant is the explicit link between English and aid. During the 1980s, Cambodia was refused development aid, but allowed humanitarian aid by the UN. This meant that only UN agencies with an emergency relief mandate (UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR) could implement a limited range of projects, whilst the UNDP, WHO, UNESCO and other development focused agencies could not operate there (Mysliwiec 1988: 75). At the time, Cambodia’s bilateral aid came largely from Vietnam, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and was estimated to be around US$100m a year (ibid: 80). The CELT project was a response to the Australian government’s expansion of aid to Indo-China, through AUSTCARE and AIDAB, which provided funding of Aus$399,000 for its initial phase (1985-88) increasing to Aus$2.4m by phase three (1991-3) after which QSA involvement ended and the project became part of formal bilateral assistance. (Oats 1994: 31 & 83). However, as the Australian government having signed up to the ASEAN and USA ban on bilateral aid at government level, this was officially a QSA project even it was wholly funded by AIDAB.
Oats’ discussion of the initial process of establishing the project, which as a QSA Committee member he was closely involved in, reveal similar assumptions to those of Hayden. QSA’s experience in the country led to AIDAB’s request for them to undertake a feasibility study for an English teaching project in Cambodia. A QSA Committee meeting in November 1984 considered the AIDAB request. QSA had previously attempted to define criteria and priorities for projects listed for consideration, which ‘were to be related to the needs of women, to helping disabled people, to improvement in water supplies and to training in agricultural and technical skills’ (ibid: 28) and these were to be started by local groups rather than by governments. As the proposed project was outside these criteria, doubts and unease were expressed within the organisation throughout its involvement, especially regarding QSA’s non-political status. Oats claims the Committee felt that
68 restoration of contact with Western nations was essential for building peace, and further that the ‘teaching of English would not only be the key to open Kampuchean access to Western technology for rebuilding its shattered economy, but it would be a vital contribution to the renewal of an education system which had been almost totally demoralised’ (ibid:31-32). Regarding difficult decisions that had to be made, he argued that QSA members endeavoured to focus on the basic principle that they ‘had agreed to go into Kampuchea, not to tell the Kampucheans how to rebuild their education system, but to listen, to share our experience and to work alongside to find solutions best suited to their needs’ (ibid: 43). However, he also claims that ‘[t]here was no doubt that the Kampuchean government, even if reluctantly, had realised that the resumption of contact with the West would require the resumption of the teaching of English in its schools’ (ibid: 32). The emphasis then, rather than on ‘rebuilding their education system’, was on ‘contact with the West.’
Prior to its establishment, doubts were expressed about both the need for the project and the feasibility of implementation. These were clearly expressed by Mike Call, American Friends Service Committee Cambodian (AFSC) representative, who had been working in Cambodia since 1982. and who QSA consulted for advice on working within Cambodian education. He was concerned that there was neither the necessary level of American Quaker staffing nor adequate capacity within the Ministry of Education to administer and implement new projects (ibid: 30). After talking to Ministry officials, he […] reported a ‘mixed picture’ from his preliminary discussions. He was not sure the Kampucheans wanted ELT. While he conceded that the importance of English was realised for communication and access to technical information, he warned that political considerations could colour decisions on whether it should actually be taught. (ibid: 34) In contrast, Jennifer Ashton, the QSA consultant who conducted the 1985 feasibility study, reported ‘a very positive attitude to ELT’ (ibid). However, she also reported differences between Ministries and no common policy had been developed. Then Vice-Minister of Education, Mr Ek Sam Ol, and other officials, although interested in developing ELT, stressed problems of priorities and favoured
69 a cautious, step-by-step approach. The two sections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs she dealt with, the Australian/Asian Department and the International Organisations Department, also appeared to have divergent policy views on ELT. The former favoured scholarships for government officials to study English in the International Relations Institute in Hanoi, whereas the latter prioritised the re-establishment of national educational resources (ibid: 37-8). This absence of a common policy stance within the government bureaucracy, and the divergent views within the NGO community do not fit easily into theories of language spread. They reflect neither simple ‘choices’ by national policy makers, nor straightforward imposition by external agencies, nor are there clear examples of resistance to English. There is, however, a suggestion that within the governing elite there was a reluctant recognition, if lacking a clear policy direction, that English would become more important for government officials in the future.
In March 1985 QSA accepted the recommendations of Jennifer Ashton’s feasibility study and submitted them to AIDAB. By May, a contract had been signed with AIDAB and Jennifer Ashton was appointed as project officer. The original aims of the project were to set up short-term scholarships of two or three years to initially twelve students to study in Hanoi and ‘the reestablishment of training facilities for English inside Kampuchea was the preferable long-term approach’ (ibid: 40). Oats notes that the short-term aim was a compromise, both with the Cambodian government and with QSA’s political neutrality, to allow them ‘to gain a foothold and begin teaching English’ (ibid: 42). It achieved this, although not immediately. The scholarship students began studying in Hanoi in August 1985, and in 1986 QSA agreed to fund an English language course for seventeen students at the Foreign Language Institute (FLI) in Phnom Penh to be taught by a Cambodian teacher, Yim Dok, who had been trained in Singapore in the early 1970s. Oats comments that the organisation only felt that it was beginning to achieve what it set out to do when QSA placed its first Australian teacher in the University of Phnom Penh in January 1988 (ibid: 51-4).
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QSA’s involvement with CELT lasted until the end of Phase III of the project in July 1993. The objectives of Phase III were strikingly similar to those of the later CAMSET project. The main goal was ‘to contribute to the increase in sustainability of English language capability in Cambodia’ to be achieved through training and retraining secondary teachers of English, the design, production and dissemination of appropriate course materials for training English language teachers, and assisting the Ministry to produce appropriate textbook and other teaching materials for ELT in secondary schools. The project had six components: project management, Ministry staff development and support, English language teacher training, ELT materials production, specialist training in Australia for Ministry staff, and support for course participants (QSA 1991: 2). The rationale for the project again emphasised the importance of English for external contacts and specifically with aid agencies. Without a knowledge of English, Cambodia’s access to the outside world is severely constrained, in regard to communication with external agencies and governments and access to scientific and technical information (most of which is in English). This reinforces Cambodia’s isolation and reduces access to development assistance. […] In the event of a comprehensive settlement for Cambodia under the auspices of the UN, the country is likely to experience increased interest from Western aid donors. To enhance communication with donors, and to increase Cambodian participation in aid related activities, it is essential that students have access to international language training, especially in English. (ibid: 5-8 The first paragraph exemplifies the depoliticisation of aid and development within international agency discourses. ‘Cambodia’s isolation’ resulted from the decision of the UN General Assembly in September 1979 not to recognise the Heng Samrin government and to give Cambodia’s UN seat to the Khmer Rouge representative. This was accompanied by the embargo on aid UN ‘development’ agencies working in Cambodia which effectively reduced ‘access to development assistance’ (for details see Shawcross 1984: 137-8 and Mysliwiec 1988: 72-76). The complex effects of Cambodia’s location as a Cold War battlefield and the effects on different sections of the population, are reduced to constraints resulting from an inadequate ‘knowledge of English’. English becomes the key to accessing the latest wave of foreign intervention in the form of donors and aid. It is also the
71 key to individual Cambodians increasing their participation in ‘aid related activities’, making it clear that these activities are to be conducted in English. What is not mentioned is the reciprocal access to Cambodia which English provides the international aid agencies.
The CELT project, like other ‘development’ projects, was the site of contestations and negotiations between the agencies and actors involved over the meanings, processes and outcomes of the particular ‘development intervention.’ There were parallel contestations during the later CAMSET project, suggesting a continuity of underlying conditions. Initial contestation in CELT centred around the provision of Australian English teachers and the establishment of an ELT programme within Cambodia, neither of which Ministry officials were originally favourable to. Even after these were established, the erratic attendance of government staff due to other duties and cancelling of English classes due to meetings or upcoming holidays left one Australian teacher feeling she ‘was teaching a hobby class’ (ibid: 56). Students were struggling with poor living conditions, family problems, inadequate facilities and heavy workloads, including farming, market selling, translation work and private teaching, to maintain adequate incomes (ibid: 59). The issue of student selection for the university courses established by CELT became ‘a hornet’s nest of problems and misunderstandings’ after QSA staff recommended an additional language test which they would administer and mark (ibid: 58). The expansion of the project into initial and in-service teacher training and textbook development increased unease within QSA about the speed of expansion. This also increased tensions between QSA and AIDAB regarding project priorities. The QSA team viewed AIDAB consultants use of ‘project-style language’ as depersonalising their work and having an excessive focus on process rather than product. The 1992 mid-term review, which was part of the process of CELT becoming integrated into official Australian bilateral aid, was seen by the QSA team as lacking understanding of Cambodian social, political, economic and institutional contexts and how these affected project operations (ibid: 128-142). The result of this was that QSA withdrew
72 and handed over management of the project to a consortium from the University of Canberra and IDP Education Australia Ltd in July 1993.
In the border camps The formation and history of the Thai border refugee camps, some of which operated for over two decades, reflect the complexity of Cambodia’s shifting political alliances and geo-political location as a Cold War battlefield. In this section, I focus on provision of education within the camps, specifically, the teaching of English. Here I examine the context in which the demand for English among Cambodian refugees was created by the fact that it was the medium of communication with international agencies operating in the camps. Another reason is that because between 1992 and 1993 361,462 refugees were repatriated from the camps (Williams 1997: 165), bringing with them whatever education and training they had received, including English language skills. The elites and middle-classes among these refugees gained experience in the camps in dealing with these international agencies, useful skills once they were repatriated for dealing with the entrenched aid regime inside Cambodia in the 1990s.
The destruction and disruption of Cambodia’s escalating civil war and increasing entanglement in the Vietnam war in the late 1960s and early 1970s resulted in the displacement of around half the population and the creation of large refugee movements both inside and outside the country. Those fleeing abroad were in two categories: initially around 34,000, mostly affluent and well-educated, fled to Thailand and were subsequently resettled in a third country, and some 320,000 Cambodian-born Vietnamese, driven by the racism of the Lon Nol regime, went south to Vietnam (Mysliwiec 1988: 95). Under the Democratic Kampuchea regime, a further 150,000 Khmers and Sino-Khmers fled to Vietnam, but only some 26,000 Khmers managed to enter Thailand, although 20,000 of these were resettled in third countries by 1978 (ibid: 95). Up to this point, Cambodian refugees fleeing to
73 Thailand were treated sympathetically by Western nations, perhaps because the majority were welleducated and anti-communist. In the US, Republican Senator Bob Dole and Democrat Representative Stephen Solarz formed a bipartisan arrangement in 1977 to change the refugee laws and enact legislation to allow 15,000 Cambodians into the US without each individual having to prove ‘legitimate’ refugee status (Becker 1998: 386). However, after the Vietnamese-backed ‘liberation’ of Cambodia in 1979, and an increased flow of refugees, attitudes changed dramatically. Thailand, which was now attempting to deal with hundreds of thousands of refugees, closed its border from March to April 1979 and forced some back into Cambodia. In June that year, Thai troops infamously drove around 45,000 refugees back into Cambodia down Prey Vihear mountain which was heavily mined, resulting in an estimated 10,000 deaths (Shawcross 1984: 82-92).
From this point, the Cambodians who had fled to the Thai border were no longer given refugee status, but instead were referred to as ‘displaced persons.’ Overall only around ten percent of the refugees in the Thai border camps were ever given refugee status. (Becker 1998: 448). The camps were often makeshift, sometimes transient, settlements, formally under Thai control and overseen by the United Nations Border Relief Operation (under the UNDP), with the exception of one of the largest camps, Khao I Dang, which was co-managed by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Thai Ministry of the Interior. As most camps were not recognised by the UNHCR, the residents were not eligible for asylum, emigration or other rights guaranteed to refugees under international conventions. The various factions of the anti-Vietnamese military opposition, including the Khmer Rouge, operated openly in the camps and most camps were aligned to one of these groups10. My Khmer teacher, Dara, who had survived the Democratic Kampuchea regime was in the camps from the early 1980s until repatriation in the early 1990s. He spent his time there in political activity campaigning for refugee rights and remained extremely bitter about the refusal of refugee status and accusations of being ‘economic migrants.’ He also expressed These details are from the Thai / Cambodia Border Refugee Camps 1975-1999 Information and Documentation Website available at http://www.websitesrcg.com/border/index.html. 10
74 the view that Western media personnel had used the camp residents for anti-Vietnamese purposes, but had failed to challenge the UN and Western governments which were withholding refugee status.
Sources describing education and specifically English language teaching in the camps are limited. Jeffery Dufresne, who worked in Ampil Camp, part of the collection of camps know as Site 2, and supported the anti-communist Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), provides some detail of the provision of education within the KPNLF controlled camps and the ‘Department of Education’ that was set up and the political importance education held for the KPNLF leadership. Although his work, which was his doctoral thesis, displays a distinct sympathy for the anticommunist resistance and a lack of critical analysis of some of their views and political stances, it contains the voices of people directly involved in education within the camps.
The education provided was initially very basic and mostly consisted of refugees who had experience of teaching, or some useful knowledge, teaching those who possessed neither, with no outside materials in ‘classrooms’ under the trees. The UN were reluctant to provide support for education in the camps as it was felt that this might act as a magnet for those still inside Cambodia. However, Dufresne suggests it was politically important for the KPNLF to get credit for education provision rather than it going to outside forces (Dufresne 1993: 136). He provides a telling quote from an interview with Um Ream, who was in charge of the construction of Nong Samut camp, about concerns behind the drive to provide education: The UN and all the other foreigners believed that all our intellectuals were dead and the only remaining people knew nothing. I wanted to show the international agencies that we did have some resource people left who knew what to do. We could do it by ourselves, organize it by ourselves. We just needed some resources. I wanted to do it, to be directly involved, to build our spirit, and to show our spirit to the outside. (ibid: 139)
75 This suggests the ‘discourse of destruction’ discussed in the previous chapter was the dominant discourse amongst the foreign agencies and personnel working in the camps, a discourse which Cambodians like Um Ream had to struggle against to retain their status and dignity.
According to Dufresne, the quality of education provided in the camps improved gradually as the UN previously wary of imbuing the camps with permanent status through the provision of education, began supplying resources and assistance. He details the establishment during the 1980s of primary and secondary education facilities and a teacher training centre in Ampil Camp. By 1992 Ampil High School had 86 teachers, 1,315 students and was providing a full curriculum (ibid: 256-7). The curriculum duplicated the structure of pre-1970 Cambodian education with one notable exception, the teaching of French was replaced by English. This was difficult as few of the teachers had English skills and there was a need for outside assistance. However, there were important political as well as educational concerns behind this decision. Sonn Nosay, at the time Deputy Director of Education for the KPNLF, explained the pragmatic reasoning behind the curriculum change to Dufresne: We could see that English is the international language. If we were to deal with foreign governments, it would be in English. All the workers from the U.N. and humanitarian organisations speak English, even if they are Thai or Japanese. […] If you can speak directly to the foreigner, without translation, it gives you higher status. They are more willing to deal with you and can see your abilities. […] This is valuable for the future also. In the future, those who can speak English to foreigners, to government, to businessmen, they will have the power. […] For these reasons we have promoted the study of English. (ibid: 165) This underscores that, like my colleagues choosing to study English inside Cambodia during the 1980s, these were knowledgeable and active social agents calculating their future options in relation to the new global order.
Both the UN and the Thai government refused to support the teaching of English in the camps, except for health workers, on the grounds that the camp residents might use this to aid their emigration to third countries, so English ‘became an unofficial portion of the curriculum, and
76 assistance for English education came only quietly from humanitarian organisations’ (ibid: 166). One such organisation was the Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees (COERR), which set up English classes within the context of teacher-training.
Margot Grant, a health educator and activist who worked for eight years in camps at Site 2 and at Ampil for COERR, in her memoir of the period, Bamboo and Barbed Wire, describes how she provided informal English lessons to Cambodian colleagues and other camp residents. She corroborates Dufresne’s descriptions of how, as education facilities improved in the camps, English was taught more widely, often by foreign workers like herself. She also details how her son sent books from Australia to help establish an English library in one of the camps (Grant 2000: 56-7, 8493). In her account, Grant makes little mention of having learnt Khmer and most of the Cambodians that the foreigners dealt with appear to have spoken English, an ability that seems to have been taken for granted. Foreigners speaking Khmer are rarely mentioned and when they are, they appear to be the exception. This was similar in my experience working in Cambodia (and also in China and Laos). The majority of foreigners working for international agencies (including myself) were not able to speak Khmer well enough to work in the language, even those who had spent many years in the country. Those foreigners who had become fluent in Khmer appeared to me to be treated with greater respect by other foreigners and regarded as ‘knowing’ the country better by virtue of their linguistic skills. The same attitude was rarely displayed by foreigners (again, including myself) towards Cambodians who spoke not only Khmer, but perhaps also Chinese or Vietnamese if it was a family language, and perhaps French, Russian, Vietnamese or English as a second, third or even fourth language. As Sonn Nosay’s above remarks suggest, the ability to speak English carried the highest status and Cambodians who could speak English well were taken more seriously by foreigners and regarded as more able than those who could not.
77 Although only a brief analysis of English language teaching in the camps, it highlights how ELT was being requested by Cambodian individuals and organisations in the camps. This suggests that Cambodian policy makers and individuals were choosing to learn English, rather than it being imposed on them, but that this was a highly constrained choice. Camp residents understood that communication with the international agencies working in the camps was in English, but also that this was a result of the international status of English and that the language would be key to future economic and political access to the outside world. Despite some reservations from UN organisations, ELT was supported and promoted on both formal and informal bases by NGOs and also by those UN organisations working in health. Dufresne describes how camp residents with English skills were badly needed in the camp administration, resulting in international workers being routinely requested to run English classes regardless of their own teaching abilities (Dufresne 1993: 252-3). In retrospect, this is ironic considering that some of these same agencies would point to the problems within Cambodian education resulting from the number of poorly or completely untrained and inexperienced teachers.
A demographic report on three border camps also noted that a considerable percentage of the graduates from teacher training programmes that the UN later funded in the camps preferred working in other programmes run by voluntary agencies and international organizations in the camps, as the incentives for this type of work are seen by many as greater. Such incentives include the opportunity to learn other technical skills or to learn foreign languages by working with international personnel. (Lynch 1989: 24) This suggests a ‘brain drain’ away from education in the camps toward the international agencies, a theme also found in the 1990s in Cambodia with the rapid expansion of these agencies inside the country. Despite the reservations about teaching the language, the operations of the international organisations were largely conducted in English, demonstrating the close articulation between the organisations and the language. This is a pattern replicated during the UNTAC period, to which I turn next.
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United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia In this section, I examine how, under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), French continued to lose its association with ‘powerful’ external forces and English became increasingly associated with foreigners and international organisations. During this period, English also became increasingly articulated with the discourses of reconstruction and development, and of democratisation. As UNTAC operations provided increased security and the potential for future stability, aid organisations, mainly operating in English, began to increase their presence in Cambodia heightening the perception of and demand for English as the international language of the new wave of foreigners. The very high salaries and allowances paid to UNTAC personnel created unprecedented earning opportunities, especially for urban-based, middle-class Cambodians. The relatively high salaries paid by UNTAC and the aid agencies to Cambodian staff created a drain of skilled and experienced personnel away from the government bureaucracy, in a way similar to that in the border camps. All these payments worked to restructure local labour markets to service the UNTAC intervention. In addition, there was the (re)establishment of the presence of often highly paid foreign ‘experts’ from the international agencies in positions of power within the state bureaucracy.
The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia was established to secure the implementation of the Paris Peace Accords, which had been signed by the four main Cambodian factions11, the five Permanent Security Council members and twelve other UN members states on the 23rd October, 1991. These Accords committed the four factions to a ceasefire and the termination of external military assistance, the cantonment and disarmament of their military forces (KPNLF) and the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (the Khmer Rouge),
79 and the demobilization of at least 70% of these forces prior to electoral registration and incorporation of the remainder into a new national army post-election, as well as the release of all prisoners of war and civilian political prisoners. The factions were to retain their own territory and administrative powers until after the elections. Non-Cambodian signatories pledged to withdraw any foreign forces remaining in Cambodian territory, cease military assistance, assist in implementing the Accords and recognize the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia (Findlay 1995:11). The most expensive UN peacekeeping operation undertaken at the time, totalling US $1.7 billion12 (United Nations 1996: 481) the main purpose of the two year mission was to restore peace, promote national reconciliation, establish a neutral political environment in preparation for free and fair democratic national elections in 1993. To what extent this unprecedented and complex mission was a success is open to much debate,13 but my interest here is how the UNTAC intervention created unprecedented economic opportunities for literate middle-class Cambodians and restructured local, particularly urban, labour markets. Within this, English was the key to accessing highly remunerative jobs.
UNTAC was a vast operation involving 15,900 military personnel, 3,600 civilian police and 1,020 civilian personnel from over 30 countries structured into seven components – human rights, electoral activities, military, civil administration, civil police, repatriation and rehabilitation (Institute of Policy Studies of Singapore & The United Nations Institute for Training and Research 1995: 4). In addition, the organisation recruited an estimated 7,000 Cambodian staff, including 2,500 interpreters, and around 60,000 temporary electoral staff in preparation for the ballot in May 1993 (United Nations 1995: 182). Whilst many were based in Phnom Penh, UNTAC personnel were also spread throughout the country. Military personnel were based in 270 locations, the civilian police in 21 provincial-level and 200 district-level units, the civil administration had 95 staff in Phnom Penh and 123 in the provinces, and the human rights component had 15 foreign staff in Phnom Penh and Including United Nations Advanced Mission in Cambodia, but not including costs of repatriation (US $97 million) and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced people (Findlay 1995: 33). 13 Examples of this debate can be found in Findlay 1995, IPS/UNITAR 1995, Doyle, et al. 1997, and Heininger 1994. 12
80 21 in the provinces (Institute of Policy Studies of Singapore & The United Nations Institute for Training and Research 1995: 9-25). Also based mainly at district level were over 450 UN Volunteers who were acting as District Electoral Supervisors managing 4000 local registration personnel in fivemember teams canvassing all districts in Cambodia and registering 4.8 million people (Findlay 1995: 54).
The penetration of foreign UNTAC personnel into Cambodia was much deeper than that of the French colonial administration. As Chandler notes, even during the intensification of French economic and political control over Cambodia in the 1920s, the residents based in provincial capitals were submerged in colonial paperwork, and the ‘government’ that the average Cambodian peasant would have encountered was composed of a minority of Cambodians and many Vietnamese (Chandler, D. 1996: 152). During the UNTAC intervention, Cambodians all over the country came into contact with foreign UNTAC personnel most of whom were using English as their medium of communication.
Around the same time as the UNTAC intervention, the gradual lifting of the aid embargo saw official development assistance from Western donors, channelled through international NGOs and multilateral agencies, expand from US$18.5 million in 1988 to US$90.9 million in 1991 (McAndrew 1996: 1). The establishment of UNTAC provided added security, allowing greater access to areas outside Phnom Penh and the other few urban centres where aid agencies had up to now been operating. The expansion of aid agencies was also a response to the Declaration on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, an integral, although not legally binding, part of the Paris Accords. It can also been seen as a belated humanitarian response to apparent needs and as ‘virgin territory for players of the “aid game”’ (Curtis 1998: 72). A fact finding report into Cambodian education undertaken in 1991 listed at least 29 different INGOs involved in education and training projects in different ministries, with six of these involved in formal English teaching, along with
81 three multilaterals and two bilaterals. The same report also noted that the approximate number of international NGOs in Cambodia had gone from 50 in early 1991 to 60 by September that year and was continuing to expand rapidly (Blom and Nooijer 1992: 38-42). All but seven of these INGOs were from English-speaking countries and had English as their working language, the others were probably also working in English.
The official languages of UNTAC were French and English, although the French government, who co-chaired the Paris Conference with Indonesia, wanted a French language and lead military component to UNTAC. This was vetoed by the USA government, which opposed the leader being from a permanent member of the Security Council, and instead Australian Lieutenant-General John M. Sanderson became UNTAC Military Commander (Heininger 1994: 37). Although officially a dual-language operation, English became the dominant medium of communication of the mission. In mission reports and other documents, the French language is notable mainly by its absence. A summary report of the UNTAC debriefing conference held in Singapore in 1994 points out the vital importance of the Mixed Military Working Group Secretariat, the key liaison with the four Cambodian factions and coordinating agency with civilian components, other UN agencies and NGOs. The report notes that ‘the Secretariat issued a considerable volume of correspondence, agendas and other papers, in English and in Khmer, designed to keep UNTAC well ahead of developments’ (IPS/UNITAR 1995: 11). The same report, while analysing the failures of the civilian police component,
whose personnel were drawn from 32 countries, discusses how language
problems negatively affected the police mission. The Civilian Police (CivPol) component was ‘widely perceived as disastrous’ partially due to a lack of command structure, but also as some police spoke neither English nor French, some had no driving licence nor the six years experience UNTAC had specified (Findlay 1995: 144). In making recommendations for future missions, the report notes the need for provision of competent interpreters, and that:
82 [l]anguage should be taken into account in the selection of potential police-contributing countries. If there is an English-speaking mission, junior personnel from non-English speaking countries could have trouble communicating. (ibid: 17-8) This suggests English was the language used by the majority of the UNTAC personnel spread around Cambodia. In addition, as in the border camps English language classes were being provided to Cambodian staff both on a formal basis as part of the training component of the mission and informally by many of the UNTAC personnel.
Belying the discourse of destruction, UNTAC was highly reliant on skilled and experienced local personnel. Although Findlay (1995: 123) suggests there was a critical shortage of Khmer-speakers, translators, typists, and computer programmers and UNTAC failed to properly coordinate provision for their supply, there were still a large number of Cambodian staff, many of them English speakers, who played a vital role in the mission. This included the 2,500 local interpreters, without whom the mission would simply not have functioned as these could not be supplied from any non-local source and the vast majority of the Cambodian population spoke no ‘foreign’ languages. This was foreseen in the envisaged training needs, which stated that ‘[l]anguage training will be essential for local staff, especially for upgrading interpretation techniques,’ although Khmer language training for international staff was only regarded as ‘additional’ to their other training needs (United Nations 1995: 178). As with international agency personnel in the camps, training in Khmer was undervalued and the training of local staff in English given priority.
Grant Curtis, a Canadian who was a senior programme officer for UNTAC’s Rehabilitation and Economic Affairs component and also worked for the UNDP and various INGOs in Cambodia, points out the organisation’s personnel needs and relatively high salaries created a ‘brain drain’ to UNTAC. Although UNTAC’s Khmer staff received monthly salaries lower than the daily mission subsistence allowance (MSA) paid to the international staff, thousands of Cambodian civil
83 servants and teachers left their offices and classrooms to work for UNTAC, resulting in serious curtailment of basic services. (Curtis 1998: 9) Local monthly salaries paid by UNTAC were at least fifteen times the average Cambodian monthly salary a the time, but paled in comparison to the allowances paid to international staff. The daily mission subsistence allowance for UNTAC international staff was US$130, which approached the estimated Cambodian per capita annual income at the time of US$150 (Curtis 1993: 16). In terms of the overall UNTAC budget, local salaries accounted for some US$2 million (or 1% of the total budget), whilst expatriate salaries totalled around US$806 million (ibid: 10 & 16). Curtis explains that there was competition between UNTAC and other international organisations for ‘the limited, but nevertheless surprisingly elastic supply of trained Cambodian labour with multilingual or other employable skills’ which drove up the price of local labour (ibid). As well as severely affecting services during the UNTAC period, he predicted that many of those skilled personnel employed by UNTAC and other external agencies would be unwilling to return to government service if salary levels were not scaled-up to cover at least basic living costs (ibid: 17). During the UNTAC period, a dual economy developed primarily as a result of the high allowances being paid to international staff. Most notably in Phnom Penh land values, rents, costs of services and utilities for foreign workers soared, and the number of bars, restaurants and brothels servicing the foreign contingent similarly increased. British journalist William Shawcross described how government workers with entrepreneurial skills also left their desks to take advantage of this ‘boom’ in the private sector (Shawcross 1994: 15), exacerbating the drain of skilled and experienced personnel out of the government bureaucracy. The dual economy also had other economic effects, which further increased the incentives for anyone versed in English or with entrepreneurial skills to leave their state sector jobs. Inflation reached over 50% in 1992 and the Cambodian currency, the riel, underwent a 70% devaluation in March 1993. The price of rice, the staple food, leapt from 450 riel per kilo in mid-March to 3,000 riel by the 20th, settling down to around 1,900 by mid April. Prices of fish and meat increased by around 80% (Curtis 1993: 15). This seriously eroded the
84 purchasing power of a Cambodian state salary, which in mid-1992 averaged an equivalent of US$3540 per month and was adequate for basic family needs, but by April 1993 averaged only US$8 per month (ibid: 16). State salaries since this period have remained inadequate to cover basic family needs and which structured the lives of teachers in ways I describe in detail in a subsequent chapter.
Here, however, it is important to emphasise that while aid workers’ and agency reports of the time often remark on the lack of capacity within the government administration, they make little comment about how it could have been the intervention of UNTAC and aid agencies that had emptied the ministries of their most skilled and entrepreneurial staff. This ‘brain drain’ and the association of high salaries with working in English either with or for foreign organisations and personnel has a continuing legacy in the contemporary Cambodian labour market. The issue of payments for local staff, as well as the amounts of international aid money spent on technical assistance salaries, and the effects of these remain contentious, if relatively hidden, topics within the ‘aid community’ in Cambodia (see Adams 2002a, 2002b, Godfrey, et al. 2000b). So too are the ways that these deep economic inequalities between foreign workers and Cambodians subtly affects relations between many of them, as Carol Livingston, a writer who worked as a freelance journalist in Cambodia during and after the UNTAC period, describes in her memoir Gecko Tails: A subtle form of imperialism crept into many barang14-Cambodian economic relationships. An employer might balk at paying a maid $100 rather than $60 a month. The same employer might then enrol that same maid in an expensive English course, rather than pay the higher salary and let the maid decide what she could afford for lessons. In many instances the important thing for the barang was to feel they were not being taken advantage of. They were dispensing largesse and retaining control, rather than simply paying an adequate wage. In a country where even backpacking English teachers could afford, and were expected by both ex-pats and Cambodians to have, domestic staff, the old-fashioned colonialist attitudes most barang would have instantly decried still existed, mutated into subtler, end of twentieth-century forms. (Livingston 1996: 42-3)
14
Barang is the Khmer word for generally used to refer to foreigners.
85
Chapter 3: English and the restructuring of an aid dependent, market-oriented, clientelist regime.
Introduction On the second Friday of every month the Education Committee (EDUCAM) meets at the National English Teachers Resource Centre (NETREC) in the Faculty of Pedagogy in Phnom Penh. The committee, established in 1991, is ‘made up of NGOs as well as bilateral and multilateral groups, which have an interest in education in Cambodia […] government officials in education have come as they have time or need and individuals who have an interest in networking around educational issues are also welcome.’15 EDUCAM is led by a four-person steering committee which, whilst I was there, was made up of two international NGO representatives and two Ministry-based, international education consultants. The purpose of the committee and the meetings is to share information between organisations about plans, projects and outcomes of work they are involved in, to discuss topics of relevance, such as the national budget for education, education reform process, textbook and evaluation issues, guest speakers are sometimes invited to provide information about specific topics in the area (for example, David Ayres was invited to present his academic work), and EDUCAM runs occasional workshops to respond to government issues and requests for policy inputs. All of EDUCAM’s business is conducted in English and occasionally French attendees at meetings would request that speakers speak more slowly and clearly as English was not everyone’s first language.
At one of the first EDUCAM meetings I attended in April 2000, there was an interesting presentation by an Italian sociologist researching literacy rates in five rural villages in Kandal 15
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport website http://www.moeys.gov.kh/Educam/educam.htm accessed 03-11-03
86 Province. At the time his results were preliminary, but he was concerned as they appeared to indicate that illiteracy was increasing, and specifically amongst the under fifteen age group. He felt that government policy was not addressing the causes of increasing illiteracy, which were not simply related to educational provision and quality, but were connected to increasing poverty and inequality. The discussion which followed appeared to me, as someone new to Cambodian education and EDUCAM, to reveal a divide between those who favoured working with the government and the Ministry and those who were skeptical of working with the state bureaucracy. The chairperson of the meeting, an international education consultant working as a long-term advisor to the Ministry and head of a large primary education project, wanted to emphasise the preliminary and limited nature of the research. The discussion became slightly heated, as the researcher defended his work’s validity. In the middle of the discussion an NGO worker asked, ‘We have a non-formal literacy programme for seven year-olds. Why aren’t they in school?’ (Fieldnotes 07-04-00). The discussion was concluded by the chair commenting that the Ministry were formulating policies to deal with the issue.
I came away from the meeting wondering about the value of providing English language teaching in a country where literacy rates appeared to be declining. A national survey of functional literacy among Cambodian adults conducted in 2000 by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports in cooperation with UNDP and UNESCO, reported rates of 36.3% completely illiterate, 26.6% semiliterate and 37.1% literate, with the rate of complete illiteracy for women at 45.1% (: vii). Amid all the private schools providing English classes, the CAMSET project establishing English teaching in state schools, a wealth of strategic plans drawn up by teams of aid-funded consultants, these statistics suggested the need for a mass literacy programme, which no one appeared to be promoting.
87 In part, this chapter examines this apparent privileging of English, but it also attempts to deal with the political and institutional complexity within which this is occurring. The following extract from a personal letter, indicates problems I and other expatriate aid workers had in finding out information about these complex systems. As far as work’s concerned, the frustrations have begun to emerge, partly due to the fact that I’ve got past the just sitting and watching – though I may go back to that stage now! To be honest, it’s pretty impossible in this job to do that as the trainee-trainers are expecting me to help them, to ‘tell’ them what to do. I try and do that by asking questions, laying out alternatives, trying to get them to analyse their own situations – and when that fails I tell them what to do!! Also, trying to discover how things work and why some things do or don’t happen is often met with ‘I have no idea’ or ‘I don’t know’. This is despite using all kinds of questioning strategies and informal means. […] I have also been talking to Yogi, a Nepalese guy who works for the local heath authority through WHO. He’s been here for four years and says he still can’t discover how the health management system operates – it does, he knows this, he’s just not sure how. And he’s supposed to work on building management/administrative capacity. (letter to Clare 14-05-00) At times, I may well have appeared to my Cambodian colleagues like a small child constantly asking why. At one level, there was a cultural norm in Cambodia of not asking difficult questions. In a system of patron-client relations asking certain questions, such as why the budget for stationary never reached the RTTC, could have direct and negative economic repercussions or worse. However, due to the privileging of English, we were also all operating within institutional systems characterised by partial knowledge – many aid workers could speak little or Khmer and many Ministry staff spoke little English. Intermeshed with a complex state administration with its own formal and informal rules, an entrenched aid structure had formed in the post-UNTAC period. Comprising an array of international agencies with their own administrative procedures and organisational jargon, they often established parallel or alternative structures to those of the state. The baroque nature of this often fragmented and contradictory regime made it almost impossible to understand even for those Cambodians and expatriates who had worked in it for years and were capable of operating in both Khmer and English.
88 Attempting to unpack and explain this labyrinthine system is a highly complex and difficult task, not least because it raises questions about how to conceptualise, at times shifting, linkages between the government, the state administration and the aid sector, as well as linkages between these and bilateral and multilateral donors. However, this chapter makes a preliminary attempt towards providing an explanation through a description of the bureaucratic, political and economic features of this regime. It points to a range of factors which converged to privilege English, over other potential options such as mass literacy, within the aid agenda.
This chapter also attempts to explain the role of English in the entrenchment of the aid sector in Cambodia. As was shown in the last chapter, during the UNTAC period, ‘development’ was defined as market oriented with English given the key role of providing ‘access to the outside world.’ In this respect, English is an integral part of market-oriented development. The establishment of a dual economy, and the economic premium of English in the labour market created a ‘brain drain’ to the private and aid sectors, restructuring local labour markets.
In the post-UNTAC era, the aid agencies have further expanded, driven by a mandate of administrative reform and ‘capacity building’ with the overall objectives being to ‘develop’ a depoliticised, smaller and technically efficient state administration. However, the newly ‘democratic’ political parties and government remain reliant on networks of patronage, with the state administration being the major network, thus the civil service has expanded by 13 percent since the mid 1990s (Talierco 2003), and together defence and security spending remain at levels twice that of health and education combined. Economic reform and regulation, promoted through IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes, such as that within the forestry sector, have been undermined as senior government officials have profited from continued unregulated operations. Failure to redistribute national spending towards the social sectors and the deterioration of the real value of civil service salaries has maintained the ‘brain drain’. This has resulted in the technocratic
89 imperative of ‘capacity building’ becoming an end in itself, further entrenching the aid sector. In education, the deterioration of the real value of teachers’ pay, as I show in Chapter 6, leads teachers to resort to multiple employment, bribery and corruption. This both undermines the quality and raises the costs of basic education, exacerbating the problems of educational access for the poor, especially the peasants who comprise the majority of the population and whose economic activities may be directed to subsistence rather than income-generation.
Aid and the privileging of English I described in the previous chapter how the demand for English was driven in particular arenas by the operations of international aid agencies, and how during the UNTAC period, this reconstructed local labour markets. During this same period there was an increasing inequality in the allocation of international aid for language education in Cambodia which has favoured English at the expense of both French and Khmer. Phillipson (1992: 47) argues that ‘structural and cultural inequalities [that] ensure the continued allocation of more material resources to English than to other languages and benefit those who are proficient in English’ are central to linguistic imperialism. Aid agencies operating both inside and outside Cambodia in the 1980s and 1990s did little to challenge these ‘structural and cultural inequalities.’ Their promotion of English as the ‘key’ to Cambodia’s future ‘reconstruction and development’ established and maintained the unequal allocation of resources which privileged English. The economic premium attached to English in the labour market, combined with the inadequate state salaries of civil servants, perpetuated the ‘brain drain’ to the private and aid sectors, legitimising further ‘capacity building’ by the aid agencies.
90 Policy documents and reports produced by the growing number of international agencies working in Cambodia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, indicate how English was consistently privileged over both French and Khmer as the operational language for ‘reconstruction and development’.
A 1990 report on the Cambodian education sector by Redd Barna (Save The Children Norway) consultant Elisabetta Galasso, whilst noting that there would be no graduate French and English teachers until the end of the academic year 1992-93, provided an interesting contrast between the state of the two languages in Cambodia: English is very popular among the younger generation, as seen by the growing numbers of private English classes, yet it must be stressed that the working knowledge of English remains generally quite superficial. French is still the language spoken by most part of the country’s intellectuals, officials and administrators who survived the Khmer Rouge time. This situation creates many communication problems and complications in organising seminars and training courses. (Galasso 1990: 29) Galasso pointed out communication problems, but did not explicitly state a policy prescription, though she felt it would be more efficient to have an agreed national second language (ibid). Nor did she recommend any language policies to the agencies coming into Cambodia, for example, that either they train staff in Khmer and/or French or recruit personnel with these skills, leaving English as the default language of operations. A 1989 occasional paper for the East Asian Institute was less reticent to discuss main factor behind the rise in demand for English, the effects of it and to make policy prescriptions. The sharp increase in NGO workers and foreign visitors in the past year has strained the supply of Cambodian interpreters to the limit. Translation capability will be overwhelmed by the requirements of a flood of post-settlement aid workers and officials. The demand for English speakers is great enough at present to be draining some trained Cambodians away from work in their technical areas in favour of translation service. Thus, English language training should be given high priority among the initial areas for future aid. (Muscat 1989: 81-2 my emphasis)
In 1991, UNICEF consultant David Ablin produced a report analysing foreign language needs and policy in the Cambodian state bureaucracy to help define the foreign language needs of the
91 government units UNICEF was working with and design a programme of training based on UNICEF’s resources. Ablin noted that he had initially thought that French could function as a ‘transitional tool [which] could be quickly developed and fulfil many functions while sufficient English skills were being developed’ (Ablin 1991: 6-7). However, he estimated that no more than twenty percent of government staff were capable of professional work in French and he felt there was little enthusiasm for learning French in the ministries. He concluded from this that the provision of French classes would not be worth the drain on aid agency resources. Aside from those areas of work, such as with the Ministry of Health, which remained primarily in French, he argued that once ‘the availability of English training increases substantially, the time and energy spent in learning French will in many cases become a net drain on the functional capabilities of government’ (ibid: 7). He cited a report prepared for the NGO CONCERN, which disapprovingly comments that the French government is offering support to the Ministry of Education to ‘preserve and promote the use of the French language in spite of its questionable value and usefulness to the Cambodian people in the context of South-East Asia’s development trends and the use of English as the commercial language of the region’ (Quinlan 1991 cited in ibid: 7).
Ablin felt that that although twenty percent of government officials could work in French, this was an inadequate number and that it would be more efficient to pursue English language teaching. However, twenty percent seems quite a high figure for foreign language competence among the staff of any organisation. In his description of the origins of the report he states: It was clear that the lack of language skills in the government was interfering with development work in a variety of ways and this impediment would only loom larger as the Cambodian government looked increasingly to Western and English-oriented Asian countries for development assistance. (Ablin 1991: 5) However, like Galasso, he says little about what these communication problems were. Both here in the connection to ‘development work’ and in his use of the Quinlan report’s description of English as the ‘commercial language of the region’, English is given a privileged status. Without a doubt,
92 English is a major language of both the ‘development’ business and international commerce, but alternative possibilities are either not considered or deemed non-viable. The ‘choice’ of English as the ‘language of development’ helped shape the modalities of ‘development’
– primarily the
dominance of the field by international agencies (NGOs, bilateral and multilateral organisations) which operate in English. Alternative, such as pursuing mass functional literacy of the population to enable increased access and participation in all areas of the economy and government, which would have also required training foreign ‘development’ workers to be able to work professionally in Khmer, would have produced an alternative mode of ‘development’ practice.
The claim that English is the ‘commercial language’ of the region also requires questioning. Cambodia has relatively large populations of ethnic Vietnamese and Chinese, both of which are heavily involved in business and trade. The Chinese have been trading with Cambodian since the Angkorean era without the aid of English. The number of Chinese language schools and Cambodian adults learning Chinese appear to have been increasing recently (McNamara 2001: 389), perhaps in response to the ‘failure’ of English to fulfil its role of regional commercial language. But again, whilst not underestimating the widespread use of English in the commercial world, the articulation of English with commerce and business helps shape the modalities of ‘development.’ The emphasis is placed on integration into the increasingly globalised economic system through particular forms of economic activity linked with English (e.g., tourism), or with the English-speaking world (e.g. the garment industry), also facilitated by Cambodia’s comparative advantage of low labour costs. It could be argued, however, that an emphasis on mass literacy may have produced a modality more relevant for and responsive to the needs of the vast majority of the population (about 74% according to Godfrey, et al. 2001: 9) still dependent on agriculture for their living.
In the UNICEF report, Ablin’s primary recommendations are for the training of small groups of Cambodians in each Ministry to act as full-time translators and interpreters which, he argued, would
93 be able to meet ‘many of the needs that international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (IOs/NGOs) now unrealistically suppose may be met by foreign language training of current government staff (Ablin 1991: 2) He further recommends training interpreters to work with the IOs/NGOs, providing support for government language policy development and ‘modernizing’ of Khmer. Interestingly, he makes a strong case against international agencies neglecting their own language policies and language training needs. Increasing the language capacities of the government should not be seen as a solution for the inadequate language capacities of IOs/NGOs. IO/NGO programs without any Khmer speaking professional staff cannot meaningfully claim to be respecting the desires of the Cambodian people. And there is something neo-colonial about going into a government ministry and expecting them to have an English or French speaker to serve one’s needs. (ibid: 115) Development work is notorious for hiding various kinds of value judgements behind a patina of technocratic and technological neutrality. The void of sovereign policy must not be taken as an opportunity to promote technocratic efficiency through the imposition of English. (ibid: 122) The ‘void of sovereign policy’ has meant that Ablin’s policy recommendations do not appear to have been followed. The teaching of English to personnel in ministries has consistently been prioritised over the establishment of effective and sustainable interpreter/translator services either within the state bureaucracy or in the private sector. Nor, I would argue, have the various international agencies working in Cambodia developed their own capacity in Khmer. As a VSO volunteer I was provided by the organisation with five weeks language training prior to starting my work, enough training for everyday ‘survival’ needs, but VSO is one of the very few organisations which have any language component as a compulsory part of personnel training. Recruitment advertisements for jobs with international organisations in the two English language newspapers in Cambodia (Cambodia Daily and Phnom Penh Post), the language requirements for Cambodian and foreign staff reflect continuing structural and cultural inequalities. Cambodian applicants are generally required to have a good or fluent knowledge of both written and spoken English, whereas for foreign staff Khmer is generally ‘useful but not essential.’
94 The potential for Khmer to be the ‘language of development’ appears to have been given little consideration during the early 1990s. As Western languages, and particularly English, are viewed as carriers of ‘modern’ knowledge, non-Western languages are often deemed to require ‘modernization’, defined as ‘the process whereby a language becomes an appropriate medium of communication for modern topics and forms of discourse’ (Cooper 1989: 149). A 1994 World Bank report on Cambodia’s reconstruction needs, whilst noting the significant quantitative achievements in education during the period, still states that: Modernization of the Khmer language has yet to begin, and it may take more than 20 years for the process to be completed. In the meantime, Cambodian higher education will remain dependent on foreign languages. (World Bank 1994: 116) No explanation is provided for the over twenty year timescale, but more importantly the work started under the Vietnamese in ‘modernizing’ Khmer is unrecognised. The same report states that for higher education ‘[a]ccess to learning materials and in general to international knowledge is not available in Khmer [and the use of Khmer] is seriously limited by its inadequacy for conveying many of the concepts of modern knowledge [and] by the lack of textbooks in Khmer for transmitting that knowledge’ (ibid: 116). The subsequent policy recommendations emphasis the need for training foreign language teachers and that education will remain ‘dependent on foreign languages’.
Cambodia’s ‘theoretical democracy’ Whilst working in Cambodia I had a number of conversations with people about Cambodian politics. During one conversation with a group of Cambodia teachers, one of them referred to Cambodia’s ‘theoretical democracy.’ When I asked what he meant by this, he explained that it was democratic in theory, but not in practice. Other teachers pointed to how people above them in the hierarchy exercised power through controlling information and did not like to be asked questions.
95 They all expressed the view that real power in the country was in the hands of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), the party that had emerged from the former communist PRK government, and feared that if the CPP lost an election there would be renewed civil war. They expressed the dangers of speaking out, explaining people who do have been known to disappear. They had a sophisticated analysis of the culture of power in Cambodia from everyday, mundane acts of control through to the corruption of national political power. However, they went on to ask me what could Cambodians do to change this? How can they overturn the corrupt leaders, and not simply replace them with another set? I had no answers and was close to tears as their desire to change the situation and their frustrations and sense of powerlessness were palpable.
Between the 23rd and 28th of May, 1993, despite threats of violence from the Khmer Rouge, which had withdrawn from the election, and political intimidation from other parties, around 90 percent of Cambodia’s registered voters turned out to elect a new government in what the UN declared to be a free and fair ballot. The remarkably high turnout surprised UNTAC officials, Cambodian political leaders and analysts of the country alike. The level of popular participation also contradicts the view expressed by Asian political leaders such as Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yu and Malaysia’s Mahathir bin Muhammed and Western analysts such as Samuel Huntington, that democracy is contradictory to Asian values.16 Many of the teachers and trainers I worked with in Cambodia had been election workers, were proud of their involvement and continued be active in building civil society. The turnout also created a new optimism because, in David Chandler’s words, ‘the vote was a massive statement rejecting politics as usual – the tragedy of Cambodian history’ (Chandler, D. P. 1991:323). However, the immediate aftermath of the elections and subsequent decade of unstable political coalitions and struggles for power, including the 1997 coup de force, indicate that Cambodian ‘politics as usual’ has been maintained with a democratic veneer sufficient to allow international recognition of the government and continued inflows of substantial amounts of foreign aid. 16
Francis Fukayama has provided a concise overview and argument against these perspectives (Fukayama 1998).
96
One aspect of the maintenance of ‘politics as usual’ was continuing power struggles within the unstable political coalition established under the Kingdom of Cambodia. A by-product of this was the renewed expansion of the public administration and the security forces through the patronage of political parties. The expansion of the security forces and failure of the political settlement to create a stable government mitigated against reallocation of the national budget away from the police and army and towards public services despite commitments made to donors. The aid regime established during this period was characterised by a similar lack of coordination and cooperation leading to competition between agencies and an inability to effectively engage with the government on issues such as budget reallocation and public service reform. Amidst all this were severely underpaid, often increasingly poor civil servants, including education staff, pushed toward multiple employment and bribery and corruption as means of meeting basic needs.
The 1993 election aftermath The results of the 1993 election saw defeat for the Cambodian People’s Party. FUNCINPEC, the royalist party led by Sihanouk’s son, Prince Ranariddh, gained 45 percent of the vote compared to 38 percent for the CPP. The Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BDLP) gained 3.8 percent, with the other eighteen parties taking part being almost wiped out. This left 58 seats in the new Constituent Assembly for FUNCINPEC, 51 for the CPP, 10 for the Buddhists and one seat for the fourth party, Moulinka (Shawcross 1994: 23). However, Cambodia’s ‘politics as usual’ quickly returned. The CPP complained of election irregularities in four provinces arguing for required fresh ballots, which UNTAC rejected. On June 3rd, CPP leaders Hun Sen and Chea Sim, went to the palace to ask Sihanouk to assume power to avoid post-election violence. Sihanouk declared a ‘National Government of Cambodia’ with himself as head of state and Hun Sen and Ranariddh as deputy premiers. Ranariddh, UNTAC and most UN members rejected this. Sihanouk withdrew the
97 plan, warning that FUNCIPEC and the CPP would bear responsibility for whatever happened. On June 10th, CPP deputy prime minister, Prince Norodom Chakrapong, and CPP Interior Minister, Sin Song, established an ‘autonomous zone’ in all the provinces east of the Mekong River, which were claimed to have seceded. This display of CPP provincial power, forced FUNCINPEC and Sihanouk into a political accommodation which awarded the CPP with more political power than the electors had given them (Curtis 1998; Roberts 2001; Shawcross 1994: 20-27. After further political wrangling the constitution of the new Kingdom of Cambodia was signed in September 1993. Sihanouk was restored as monarch and head of state, and the Constituent Assembly became the National Assembly, designed to be the main legislative body. In November, the Royal Government of Cambodia was formally established under an unlikely coalition between former enemies Ranariddh and Hun Sen, as ‘first’ and ‘second’ prime minister respectively. Likewise co-ministers led the Defence and Interior ministries and other ministerial portfolios were divided between the two parties.
Divided administration This bifurcation extended beyond the ministerial to the provincial level and had lasting effects on the distribution of political power and the operations of the state bureaucracy and those international agencies working in Cambodia. Each ministry was appointed a vice minister from a party other than the one holding ministerial office, plus two ‘undersecretaries of state’, one from each main party. Likewise at the provincial level, a governor was appointed with a first vice governor from the competing party and two deputy vice governors, one from each main party forming a provincial management ‘team’ (Curtis 1998: 16). Curtis contends that this arrangement ‘further politicized the country’s senior bureaucracy and also encouraged the wholesale politicization of the entire civil service, with a new set of patron-client relationships and even more divided loyalties’ (ibid: 22). CPP politicians and bureaucrats, survivors of the Democratic Kampuchea era, had
98 effectively been running the country since 1979, which meant they were familiar with the challenges of governance and that the party had entrenched power in all levels of the administration. The majority of FUNCINPEC officials (and those of the BDLP) had been exiled in the border camps until the peace settlement, thus had little knowledge or experience in public administration and the local politics of Cambodia (Roberts 2001: 122-3).
Despite government pledges to the World Bank and other donors to reduce the state administration by 20 percent, there was further expansion as hundreds of appointments were made through the patronage of both FUNCINPEC and the BDLP. The CPP did not reduce its own numbers, as they protected both their own political power and the patron-client relationships which underpin the Cambodian political system (Roberts 2001: 129). The CPP effectively retained power due to their intimate knowledge of the administrative system and their ability to veto FUNCINPEC governors through the provincial management ‘team’ arrangement. Curtis quotes Far Eastern Economic Review journalist, Nate Thayer, who summarised the new political arrangements thus: The traditions of real power in Cambodia are rooted in control of the armed forces, security apparatus, state bureaucracy and, importantly, the provincial political structures which control police, armed forces, tax collection, and civil service. These areas remain under the control of the CPP and respond to political loyalties before central authority. (cited in Curtis 1998: 22) However, under this new system those elites, such as the royalists, who had been displaced from their territorial power bases, were provided with renewed access to power and its political and financial rewards.
David Roberts, in his academic analysis of Cambodia’s political transition during the 1990s, argues that whilst the political system can be viewed as having been designed to encourage power struggles, these were nothing new and represented an extension of the conflict in the 1980s between the same groups. Roberts points to a number of consequences of the system: the development agenda was subsumed under ministerial and provincial political struggles; the civil service was not rationalised
99 and the wage bill increased rather than decreased; many civil servants remained unpaid, or were only periodically paid, increasing bureaucratic bribery and corruption; and, the civil administration was grossly inefficient in both costs and labour (Roberts 2001: 129). Legislation was drafted at ministry or Council of Ministers level, with the National Assembly, which had the constitutional power through nine parliamentary commissions to initiate legislation, seemingly acting as a ‘rubber stamp’ with little independence. One of the Assembly members’ first acts was to vote themselves salaries of $650 per month, plus bonuses worth up to $1,000. Other legislation was much slower. By April 1994, only Acts concerning budget and investment laws had been passed, but no legislation on citizenship, the penal code, criminal procedure, immigration, property or the press had been dealt with. Finance Minister, Sam Rainsy, a FUNCINPEC member, declared the new financial laws a ‘revolution’ that would allow the government to centralise financial control and fight corruption. This declaration met with resistance from both business interests and within the government, and Rainsy was relieved of his post in October 1994 and subsequently removed from both FUNCINPEC and the assembly as he continued to criticise the government (Curtis 1998; Roberts 2001; Shawcross 1984: 55-58).
Continuing conflict The 1980s conflict also continued at a military level. In 1994, Khmer Rouge forces still controlled around 10 percent of the country, based around its headquarters in Pailin and Thai border areas, where it conducted both major offensives against government troops as well as random guerrilla attacks throughout the country. Its operations were largely financed through illegal logging and gem extraction around Pailin, Battambang Province, in cooperation with companies connected to the Thai military and estimated by the UN to be worth up to $20 million per month (Shawcross 1994: 48). The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, notoriously corrupt and filled with ‘ghost soldiers’ whose
100 pay was pocketed by officers,17 were too ill-equipped and badly trained to end the continuing civil war in the ‘insecure’ areas, further compromising rural development efforts.
However, Khmer Rouge soldiers were increasingly defecting to the government in response to an amnesty programme and continuing divisions within the party. These defections increased security allowing reconstruction activities in Siem Reap province as Khmer Rouge defectors came under government control whilst still administering the region (Curtis 1998: 34-5). Roberts (2001: 121-49) details how both the CPP and FUNCINPEC manoeuvred to attract defectors to their side of the political divide in the continuing struggle for power. Ranariddh’s inability to wrest power from the CPP, and to grant the rewards of administrative positions promised for party loyalty, undermined his position and further destabilised the already fragile coalition. The defection of Khmer Rouge chief Ieng Sary under the aegis of Hun Sen in August 1996, as well as presaging the final demise of the Khmer Rouge, led to Ranariddh courting anti-CPP Khmer rouge factions with the aim of strengthening his forces and pushing the CPP into concessions. However, on July 5th 1997, the then Second Prime Minister, Hun Sen, appeared on national television to accuse the First Prime Minister, Norodom Ranariddh of illegal acts “dangerous to the nation”. This was the catalyst for two days of fighting between armed forces aligned with Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and Ranariddh’s FUNCINPEC forces, which led to the defeat and temporary exile of the latter, around 100 civilian deaths and up to 60 politically motivated extra-judicial executions (Ayres 2000a: 150, UNHCR 1997)18. This was Hun Sen’s coup de force which saw Ranariddh replaced as first prime minister by Ung Hout, FUNCINPEC Foreign Minister and former Education Minister.
By 1994 the army had 2,000 generals and 10,000 colonels out of an estimated 160,000, which was claimed to be eight or ten times the ideal size of the army (Shawcross 1994: 90-1). 18 Roberts 2001) argues that this fighting was a direct and indirect outcome of the power-building of Cambodian elites since the 1991 settlement, and the struggle over the military and political resources of the Khmer Rouge as it imploded. See also Curtis 1998), who refers to the events as a coup de force, for a broader analysis of the affects of the “coup” on development organisations and projects. 17
101 One immediate external reaction to the coup was the suspension of Cambodia’s entry into the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the UN decision to leave the Cambodia seat empty, both of which Curtis (ibid: 55) argues resulted from US pressure. These actions undermined the legitimacy of the CPP dominated government, which came under further international pressure to allow Rannariddh back into Cambodia to participate in the campaign of the 1998 national election, despite his having been replaced as leader by his own party. Both foreign direct investment and international aid collapsed as a result of the coup. The former, projected at up to $300 million for 1997 was cut by one third, whilst international aid, which represented 40 percent of government revenue, fell by $100 million in 1997 alone. By late 1997 the government faced a budgetary shortfall of $58 million (ibid: 58). Economic growth rates (measured by GDP growth) which had been 7.6% in 1995 and 7.0% in 1996, fell to 1% in both 1997 and 1998 (CDRI 2001: 17). In the education sector, the suspension of aid resulted in the halting of major projects, such as the USAID-funded Cambodian Assistance to Primary Education, which was never resumed, as well as smaller projects and programmes operated through NGOs.
Roberts describes the events of July 1997 as ‘an indigenous solution to Khmer political conflicts, [and] its aftermath appeared to recreate some of the conditions of relative political stability that had preceded Ranariddh’s ill-fated attempt to seize more power’ (Roberts 2001: 168). This relative stability improved security in most regions, providing those international NGO workers who had stayed and their local colleagues a more secure working environment and access to previously ‘insecure’ areas. Roberts further argues that Ranariddh’s defeat led to renewed elite stability as FUNCINPEC, now led by Ung Huot, realigned their coalition with the dominant elite group, the CPP. This reduced their political power, but facilitated their access to previously denied positions of privilege (ibid: 170-3). The then Australian Ambassador, Tony Kevin, argued that this continuation of ‘politics as usual’ reduced power struggles in ministries which had been constraining the
102 operations of development projects (cited in ibid: 179). What was not pointed out, was that this settlement, like the ‘coalition’ could also be described, in less democratic terms, as an oligarchy.
The idea that ‘development’ needs the ‘stability’ provided by strong leadership, in this case the ‘Strongman of Cambodia’ Hun Sen, is a familiar trope within political discourses on nation building. The notion that Cambodia’s ‘development’ requires a ‘strong’ leader indicates the undemocratic nature of this modality of development. This is the discourse that has been constructed around Hun Sen by journalists, politicians, academics and development workers during the 1990s, and one the man applies to himself (see Metha and Metha 1999). As both Curtis (1998: 55-6) and Roberts (2001: 144-5) point out, much of the international media blamed Hun Sen for the coup of July 1997, whilst ignoring Ranariddh’s similarly Machiavellian manoeuvrings prior to the coup. Both Michael Vickery and Tony Kevin, since ending his work as ambassador, have been accused of being apologists for Hun Sen, whilst they in turn condemn other foreign observers as apologists for opposition figures, such as Sam Rainsy. What is missing is a recognition that the UNTAC-sponsored process had created democratic change only at the level of the national elections. The persistent weakness and economic impoverishment of civil society organizations, inadequately nurtured during the transition process and since, has resulted in the continuity of Cambodia’s political culture in which elite groups competed for control over the machinery of state and the political and economic fruits of power needed to maintain their webs of patronage.
The coup was not followed by constitutional change or a complete takeover of power by Hun Sen and the CPP. The remnants of FUNCINPEC, whilst becoming increasingly fractured, established a subordinate role in a renewed coalition partnership with the CPP. (Other potential opposition parties, such as the BDLP and the Khmer Nation Party established by the exiled Sam Rainsy, were similarly disunited. Rainsy’s party was forced into a name change in order to register for the 1998 election, becoming the Sam Rainsy Party.) Under external pressure and from King Sihanouk, a
103 bizarre compromise formulated by Japanese officials was reached to allow Ranariddh to return to Cambodia. This involved being tried in March 1998 in absentia on charges of arms smuggling and plotting to overthrow the government, found guilty and sentenced to 30 years in prison and a $50 million fine. The King then granted Ranariddh a total pardon (International Crisis Group 1998: 8). Ranariddh then returned to attempt to unify FUNCINPEC.
The national elections in July 1998, wholly organised by Cambodians with international observers, with a similar turnout to 1993, resulted in 41% for the CPP, 37% for FUNCINPEC and 14% for the Sam Rainsy Party. The opposition parties refused to recognise the results, claiming voting irregularities and voter intimidation, although international observers declared the poll itself ‘free and fair’ and disputed the allocation of National Assembly Seats (Roberts 2001: 182-3). A new crisis emerged, accompanied by demonstrations and violence in Phnom Penh, which some claim was largely manipulated by opposition forces (ibid: 193-4 and Grainger and Christine 1998). A new elite settlement was established by November, in which Ranariddh was named heads of the National Assembly, FUNCINPEC became the junior partner in a renewed coalition with the CPP but without bifurcated administration, and an unelected upper-chamber, the Senate, was created. Roberts (2001: 197-200) argues that the latter, whilst flawed, settled the underlying and superficial tensions amongst the Cambodian elite through lessening competition for politically powerful and privileged positions and patronage that accompanies them. This new settlement left out the Sam Rainsy Party, which maintained its opposition although subsequently accepted seats in the Senate.
The struggle for control of the state continued after the most recent national election in July 2003. Whilst the CPP gained the most National Assembly seats in this election, it failed to win the necessary two thirds majority to take overall control. FUNCINPEC and the Sam Rainsy Party then formed the Alliance of Democrats to attempt to form a new coalition and oust Hun Sen from the Premiership. As of January 2004, a new government had not been formed, and the Alliance of
104 Democrats was proposing a tripartite system where each party would appoint a deputy prime minister to the Council of Ministers and that each political party must control one-third of the positions in provincial, municipal and district governments, as well as posts in the military, police and diplomatic service (Vong 2004). The failure to reach a settlement has stalled the reform process, as the National Assembly is not sitting, and indicates that the oligarchic nature of Cambodian politics will continue as the political elites compete to ‘consume’ the population.
Structural adjustment Even within the state-controlled economy of People’s Republic of Kampuchea from 1979-1989, there was a significant private sector in family-based agriculture and agricultural processing, smallscale manufacturing, repair work and , much of the retail trade. From 1985, the private sector was explicitly recognised, public-private sector joint ventures were established, some price controls were lifted, followed in 1987 by trade reforms allowing private sector exports, which also produced unrecorded border trade estimated to be equivalent to official trade (Kannan 1997: 9-10). These reforms were accelerated and expanded after the withdrawal external support from the Soviet Union in 1989, so that by the 1991 signing of the Paris Peace Accords, ‘the economy had already moved considerably along the road to market-oriented reforms, privatisation and the erosion of statecontrol on much of the economic activities’ (ibid: 10). These market-oriented economic reforms were similar in form to those being introduced in other nominally communist nations in Asia, such as China, Vietnam and Laos, from the early 1980s. However, after the establishment of the Royal Government of Cambodia in 1993, an agreement between the government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank introduced a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), integrating Cambodia into the post-Cold War economic restructuring policies of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’.
105 In a Cambodian Development Resource Institute (CDRI) working paper, K. P. Kannan notes the: SAP basically addresses issues in macro economic management with clear targets for reducing the budget deficit, for monetary and financial reforms, liberalisation of external trade and investment for public sector reform. Its long term objectives of economic growth are anchored in the development of the private sector and in restricting the role of the public sector. A limited role for the public sector is recognised in the sphere of economic infrastructure but in practical terms is no more than rehabilitation. Kannan goes on to state that the SAP policies were simply a continuation of the on-going market reform process. However, the emphasis on financial reforms, freeing of external trade and reduction and restriction of the public sector suggests a more clearly neo-liberal agenda. John Williamson, senior fellow at the Institute for International Economics, coined the term ‘Washington Consensus’ to describe the basic package of policy advice from the Washington-based institutions to Latin American countries in the late 1980s and which were subsequently applied by these institutions to most ‘developing’ countries. The package is summarised in ten propositions: • •
Fiscal discipline A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health care, primary education, and infrastructure • Tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base) • Interest rate liberalization • A competitive exchange rate • Trade liberalization • Liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment • Privatization • Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit) • Secure property rights (Williamson 2000: 252).
Williamson points specifically to the second proposition and the absence of recommendations of monetarist, supply-side economic policies, slashing government expenditure or a minimalist state, to argue the Washington Consensus was not, as many critics have stated, synonymous with neoliberalism. However, he also notes that the least progress has been achieved in the redirection of public expenditure (ibid: 253). Although Williamson may be correct in asserting that his distillation
106 of policy areas does not amount to a strictly defined neo-liberal agenda, the overall flavour of financial, trade and investment liberalisation and privatization and deregulation, reduces the role of the state to that envisaged within neo-liberalism, as the regulator and guarantor of financial stability. The emphasis on external trade as the primary means of wealth creation and, presumably through the redistribution of government spending and ‘trickle-down’, poverty reduction, also appears to match the neo-liberal paradigm. In addition, as former World Bank economist, Ravi Kanbur, points out, during the actual implementation of the policies over the 1990s, the representatives of the Washington Institutions ‘saw the main task as storming the citadel of statist development strategies’ which led to a purist (and neo-liberal) stance both in ideology and in application (Kanbur 1999: 2-3).
In Cambodia’s case, prior to the establishment of the SAP the government had committed itself to reconstructing state-market relations under its National Programme to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia adopted in March 1994, which committed the government to work as ‘a strategist and manager of development […] working with the private sector as a full partner in the rehabilitation and development of the country’ and recognising that ‘capacity-building is a major undertaking that can only be realised in full cooperation with private investors and the international community’ (Kingdom of Cambodia 1994 cited in Curtis 1998: 61). Williamson would no doubt argue that these commitments and the SAP policies would not have resulted in a neo-liberal minimalist state. However, as Kannan points out in his analysis of the implementation of the first Cambodian SAP between 1994-1996, cuts in social sector spending are characteristic of structural adjustment and in Cambodia: this was the case when a set of stabilisation measures were introduced in 1992. And this continues to be the case during the period of implementation of a SAP. […] the continuing constraints – political and economic – and the specific programme of SAP make it difficult for concerted action of a long-term nature for substantial investment and development of social sectors such as health and education. […] Therefore the connection between an SAP and market-based economic reform is not so much in the lack of recognition for the state to play a role in social development as in the outcome of such a strategy which results in the relatively low priority in government expenditure. (Kannan 1997: 24-5, my italics).
107 The nature of the Cambodian political system has additionally meant that, despite the SAP, there has been no substantial reduction in defence and security spending which would allow the redistribution of the national budget toward the social sectors. Whilst the government has made commitments toward budgetary reform and regularly announces budgetary allocations for education have been increased, actual financial disbursements never meet these commitments. Thus, during the 1990s, defence and security spending averaged twice that of education and health combined (CDRI 2003: 15).
The structural adjustment measures, in line with other aid driven reforms, assumed that part of what was required was more effective governance. As Ferguson points out in his study of Lesotho [...] the "development" planners regarded the paralyzing bureaucracy of the government apparatus in Lesotho, with all its "inefficiency" as some sort of mistake - the result of poor planning, perhaps, or of a bad organizational chart, or perhaps lack of education. Thanks to the "development" problematic and its principle of "governmentality," the central bureaucracy in Maseru was never understood as a political fact, as a mode of exercise of a form of power. Government was seen as a machine for delivering services; but never as a way of "governing" people, a device through which certain classes and interests control the behaviour and choices of others. (Ferguson 1994: 76) A brief example from the Cambodian forestry sector, indicates how the international agencies similarly fail to see Cambodian ‘governance’ as part of the machinery enabling the ruling elites to continue to ‘consume’ the Cambodian population.
One aspect of the reform process was the regulation of forestry aimed at creating a sustainable forestry sector, which would protect these valuable natural resources and the rights of the people (often ethnic minorities) living within forestry concessions and produce a government revenue stream. IMF support for Cambodian forestry was suspended in 1997 in protest at continued and anarchic illegal logging, and a new process of reform began in 1998 under a $30 million Structural Adjustment Credit agreement with the World Bank. This set out conditions for forestry sector management for the government to qualify for the release of the second tranche of $15 million,
108 which was released in December 2003. According to Mike Davis of Global Witness, the environmental group which worked as the official independent monitor of the Cambodian forestry sector until their contract was terminated by the government in April 2003 after the group reported police violence against peaceful demonstrators, the government have not met key conditions of the loan and the World Bank is allowing subversion of the reforms (Davis 2004). The timber concessionaries failed to produce management plans and environmental impact assessments on time and, after the deadline for submission of these had been extended by one year, when they finally did the quality was poor and it was noted that some concessionaires had simply copied sections of others papers. Whilst some conditions have been met, Davis argues, others: have been disregarded, as part of what appears to be a deliberate government strategy to facilitate logging outside the reformed regulatory framework. […] That the conditions have not been met is testament to the determination of senior officials within the Government to thwart reforms which might diminish their own profit from illegal logging. That the World Bank has pronounced this acceptable, indicates a lack of will to do nothing to encourage future governments to take forestry sector reform seriously. (ibid) The World Bank’s response, in a press release, is that the government have met all the conditions except for two non-forestry conditions which have been waived. The Bank also notes that whilst Cambodia’s ‘forest sector has many problems: illegal logging continues, and corruption and weak governance are having a negative impact […] important progress has been made [and the] Bank has agreed to remain engaged, even though progress is slow, difficult, and frustrating (World Bank 2003). But the problem here would appear not to be weak governance, but strong elites pursuing the economic rewards of forestry exploitation, and a lack of democratic accountability.
A similar undermining of reforms can be seen in education. The central argument of David Ayres work on the history of Cambodian education is that Cambodia’s experience exemplifies the idea of educational crisis that emerged in the 1960s. In Cambodia’s case, the crisis was a ‘product of the disparity between the education system and the economic, political and cultural environments that it had been intended to serve’ and tensions inherent in ‘pursuing development (and one of its
109 symptoms, modernity) in a manner at odds with tradition and the cultural underpinnings of the state’ (Ayres 2000a: 3). He argues these tensions have played out in the various post-colonial political regimes in Cambodia in very similar ways. On one side, Cambodia’s different leaders have viewed education as a vital institution for the creation of good citizens and the realisation of their vision for Cambodia’s future. On the other, these same leaders have used education as a means of capturing and bolstering their personal power and that of the political regime they lead. Thus formal education has served a dual role of ‘making Cambodia look modern and at the same time sustaining the tenets of the traditional polity, where leadership is associated with power and where the nature of the state is perceived to be a function of that power’ (ibid). Thus unstructured educational expansion is symptomatic of the way Cambodian leaders have used education as a means of legitimating their own political power. It also serves to undermine the reform process being advocated by the international agencies and their many advisors.
Ayres provides many examples of this. In 1996, the government decided to expand primary education from five to six years. This expansion had been advised by an Asian Development Bank consultation team, but the recommendation had been for a gradual approach leaving adequate time for the development of new curriculum frameworks, textbooks and staff training programmes, and proposed a date of 2000 for implementation, advice which was ignored (ibid: 179-80). Second Prime Minister Hun Sen’s programme of primary school construction which preceded the 1998 election, undertaken without the involvement of the Ministry or needs analysis, and with the aim of securing greater legitimacy,19 with a total cost of $30 million, which did not come from the education budget (Ayres 1997: 259-60, Ayres 2000a: 180-1, Bray 1998: 6). One external advisor summarised the effects of this, whilst leaving silent the political causes:
Bray collected data from 77 schools for his study in primary education financing. 31 schools reported receiving buildings from politicians during the mid-1990s, with 25 of these naming Hun Sen specifically. ‘During 1995-97 the CPP is said to have constructed over 1,800 primary school buildings, with particular activity in the latter part of the period, costing about US$36 million’ (Bray 1998: 6). 19
110 The impact of substantial investment in school building has been disappointing. Enrolment rates have not improved significantly if at all. […] The targetting criteria for school building programmes, especially to address equity issues, remains unclear. (MoEYS 1999: 7)
A further example was that in the mid-1990s, when graduates of Cambodian universities were told they would no longer be granted automatic recruitment into the civil service, which was in-line with the government’s 1994 commitment to the IMF to reduce the size of the civil service. After a student representative at the Royal University of Phnom Penh 1995 graduation ceremony had expressed the students’ concerns, both Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen (who were joint Prime Ministers), over-ruled Ministry of Education protests and suggested compromises, and decreed that the graduates would spend a year at the Faculty of Pedagogy to be trained as upper secondary teachers. This ‘policy’ remains in place and was later rationalised by the Council of Ministers as being necessary to ensure political and social stability (Ayres 2000a: 175-8).
111
The entrenchment of the aid sector
112
A fable: The Old Testament and the New By Clarence Wagstaff "Next!" the In-Country Director shouted. He turned the blue file folder on his desk sideways so he could read the name on the label. "Let's see. Mr - 'Sirik', is it?" A young Cambodian man jumped up from the long wooden bench in the hallway outside. All the other Cambodian applicants shifted along the bench, moving one seat closer to the door of the InCountry Director's office. Mr Sirik paused in front of the In-Country Director's desk and made a polite sompeah. "Yes, yes, do sit down Mr Sirik," said the In-Country Director. "I have rather a lot of applications to review today." He opened the blue file. "You do understand, don't you, that I don't make the final decision on funding? All I can do is review your application for completeness before we forward it to headquarters." Mr Sirik smiled. "Good. Let's see what we have here on your program. Your affirmative action plan seems to be in good order. Here's your office non-smoking policy, good, yes, and your mandatory recycling program. The free day-care center for single mothers - yes, here we are - and I see you've already agreed to recognize the employees' union should they ever form one. But I don't - where's your HIV/AIDS non-discrimination policy?" "The pink form," said Mr Sirik. "Just there, clipped between the abortion rights resolution and the anti-landmine manifesto." "Ah, yes," said the In-Country Director. "There it is. Now let me just review my checklist. Ecology awareness program?" "Here," said Mr Sirik. "Signed copies of the endangered species and wetlands preservation petitions?" "These two stapled together." "And your anti-logging statement. . ." "That's included as part of the ecology awareness program," said Mr Sirik. The In-Country Director sighed. "Our funding procedures are quite clear on this point Mr Sirik. We do need a separate anti-logging statement, in triplicate, countersigned by a Global Witness member, before we can fund you." He rummaged in his desk. "Here, fill one out - just change the names at the top and photocopy it." "I'm very sorry," said Mr Sirik. "I'll work on it overnight and bring it back to you first thing in the morning."
113
As Wagstaff’s only slightly tongue-in-cheek piece indicates, the entrenchment of the aid sector is such that they effectively control what projects are implemented and the minute details of implementation. It also indicates how most levels of accountability are external to Cambodia, under terms set through international agreements with little or no democratic accountability to the Cambodian population. In this section, I map out how the process of aid sector expansion and entrenchment from the early 1990s, and particularly post-UNTAC.
Since the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in October 1991, there has been an influx of international organisations and agencies overall ODA to Cambodia in 2000 was US$398.5 million (US$30.4 per capita), or 12.5% of GDP, up from 3.7% in 1990 (UNDP 2002: 205). Brautigam 2000: 11) contends that ODA at above 10% of GDP is ‘a marker of possible aid dependency.’ An increasing percentage of ODA in Cambodia (57% in 1998) is in the form of technical assistance. Technical assistance is not easy to define, but it generally focuses on either providing personnel with specific skills not available locally or bringing in personnel to train local staff in the required skills. Another characteristic is that salary costs are often the largest single item in the budget (Godfrey, et al. 2000b: 12). Technical assistance for education in 1997 totalled over US$35 million or 130% of government current education expenditure (ibid: 14-16). The Co-operation Committee for Cambodia, a membership organisation for the exchange of information between NGOs operating in Cambodia, list on their website20 78 international NGOs as full members and 7 as associate members in 2001. Only 11 local NGOs are listed as full members and 1 as an associate.
Curtis describes the Cambodian aid market in the first half of the 1990s as characterised by a donordriven policy environment, a lack of inter-agency cooperation, an absence of aid coordination within and between sectors resulting in duplication and unnecessary competition between agencies and a 20
http://www.bigpond.com.kh/users/ccc/member2001.htm accessed 01-11-03
114 concentration of aid in Phnom Penh to the neglect of rural areas (see Curtis 1998: 71-109 for detailed discussion). A Cambodian Development Resource Institute report on emergency and development assistance to Cambodia from 1992-1995 prepared for the NGO Forum commented that: Donors need to examine how their aid disbursements may adversely affect local ability to manage assistance. In the rush to repatriate people from the Thai-Cambodian border and to jump-start rehabilitation efforts, the participation of the government bureaucracy was largely ignored. In effect a parallel structure was created with NGOs, multilateral agencies, and consultants performing many of the task normally assumed by government personnel. The urgency of donors to implement high-cost emergency programmes was, ironically, in conflict with the slow process of rebuilding societal institutions needed to manage aid effectively. (McAndrew 1996: x) Many of the aid agencies in this period were circumventing the state bureaucracy, either from the belief, shaped by the discourse of destruction, that there were no established institutional structures and a dearth of trained and capable administrators or that those put in place under the State of Cambodia were illegitimate or ineffective due to their association with the Communist PRK period. This situation continued in the post-UNTAC period, after the Kingdom of Cambodia was established, with a patchwork of aid agency interventions and donors showing ‘a marked lack of interest in either coordination or being coordinated’ (Curtis 1998: 74). That this continued into the late 1990s was made clear to me in my first meeting with Lucy Royal-Dawson prior to my going to Cambodia. Lucy described one of the problems that CAMSET faced resulted from competition between agencies. The larger agencies have more money and so can pay higher per diems. At one point, CAMSET lost all their school inspectors to UNESCO, which had offered them $15 per day to run some training courses. As this was at a time when the inspectors were supposed to be working in the schools, it totally undermined CAMSET and Ministry objectives (fieldnotes 24-0699).
115 During much of the 1990s, donor and project activity was either unconnected to government departments or undertaken through project implementation units, parallel structures to which capable, senior government staff would be assigned further undermining the ability of ministries to formulate and implement policy. As Curtis points out […] in development terms, this knee-jerk tendency to disregard everything pre-UNTAC resulted in the rejection of much of the hard-won experience of the 1980s, including the resourcefulness and dedication to nation-building (or rebuilding), training and capacitybuilding efforts, as well as rural development models piloted with the support of international NGOs. Such disregard allowed donors and other “purveyors of aid” – as well as FUNCINPEC – to ignore existing (that is, SOC government) mechanisms in favour of direct and often self-styled delivery of programs and services. (Curtis 1998: 73) Curtis argues that UNTAC having been externally imposed and driven, lacked a clear mandate to build the capacity of the existing state bureaucracy, and its assumed political neutrality led to the undermining of the existing administration. This, combined with post-election political uncertainties and continuing conflict within the coalition, led to an uncritical acceptance of huge quantities of foreign technical assistance (ibid: 89-90) of which the CAMSET project was a small part.
Despite the recognised problems of these modes of implementation, this was still an issue at the end of the 1990s. A Cambodian Development Resource Institute survey of fifty technical assistance projects found that whilst all bilateral funded projects were implemented through normal government structures, almost half of international NGO projects were either implemented through a local NGO or directly by project staff, and more than a quarter of multilateral projects established implementation units within government ministries (Godfrey, et al. 2000b: 38). The same survey also noted that only seven percent of chief technical assistants on bilateral or multilateral projects were able to work in Khmer, while for NGOs this figure was seventy-five percent, partly due to the employment of Cambodian nationals in these positions (ibid: 33). A SIDA report on the aid sector from 1996, points out the silencing effects of the domination of English within the aid sector.
116 NGO meetings are normally conducted in English without Khmer translation, cultivating a dominance of Western voices and points of view. The Khmer workshop held in July 1995 poignantly illustrates that in a familiar setting Cambodian members of local and foreign NGOs are able to express themselves clearly and forcefully. The task of strengthening civil society in Cambodia demands that local and foreign NGOs devote greater attention to the task of developing genuine partnerships and coordinated advocacy strategies. (McAndrew 1996: 25) That this continues can be seen in my opening discussion of the meetings of EDUCAM. However, the following story shows how a two-language system operates, with English remaining the privileged language by virtue of its attachment to the aid sector.
In my first week working in Takeo I was invited to attend the meeting for Coordination of Donor Support to Primary Education in Takeo Province. The meeting was attended by around twenty Cambodian education staff and NGO workers and six foreigners working in education. The Australian chief technical assistant of a large education project based in Takeo chaired the meeting, which was held in English. The Director of the Provincial Office of Education gave the opening speech in English and his deputy translated it into Khmer. The deputy also provided translations into English for those Cambodian participants who could not address the meeting in English. Only one of the foreigners present spoke Khmer well enough to address the meeting in Khmer, which he did providing a very brief translation into English afterwards. After the meeting, the chair of the meeting offered me a lift to Phnom Penh in his project-supplied vehicle. He had been working in Cambodia for around ten years, was well respected and regarded as an expert on the Cambodian education system. Arriving in the outskirts of Phnom Penh he asked where I wanted to be dropped off, and then gave his driver directions in rather poor French. I provided some final directions and thanked the driver in Khmer. I had been in Cambodia for about five weeks.
117
Chapter 4: Cambodian education and CAMSET
Introduction On my return to the UK after a year working as part of CAMSET, I began analysing and interrogating the various sources of data I had gathered. I also contacted the project funders, the Department for International Development (DfID), to request further documents that had not been available prior to the end of the project, in particular project evaluation and assessment reports. The first reaction from an official at DfID was that these were not publicly available and may even be covered by the Thirty Year Rule, which seemed ridiculous. A process of negotiation and appeals through DfID and the project management agency, the Centre for British Teachers, over a period of eighteen months resulted in no documents being supplied to me and regular invocations of ‘issues of confidentiality’, which were not elaborated upon. The lack of access to the mundane documents of a publicly-funded education development project further demonstrates a lack of transparency and accountability.
This chapter provides an outline of the establishment and history of the Cambodian Secondary English Teachers (CAMSET) project. This provides the background detail for subsequent chapters on the role and effects of English and English language teaching in Cambodia. Due to the lack of access to project documents, some of the details of the project are not available, in particular details of the financial aspects of the project. I also show where how CAMSET in part continued work that the earlier QSA CELT project had been doing. However, to begin the chapter, I detail the serious issues faced within Cambodian education, to show that CAMSET, like other aid-funded English teaching, was not established to address these, but was a response to the imperatives of an externally-oriented model of development.
118
An Overview of Cambodian Education Since 1996-97, the Cambodian state education system has been organised into 12 grades, six primary, three lower secondary and three upper secondary. Primary education begins at age 6, lower secondary at age 12 and upper secondary aged 15. Students should graduate from Grade 12 at age 17.21 However, due to the high repetition rates that are characteristic of the system, the ages of students may vary markedly within classes. In schools with available teachers, English language teaching begins in Grade 7 at age 12. CAMSET produced materials for teachers and students in lower and upper secondary schools and training English teachers to work at lower secondary level. Students can study at higher education for up to five years depending on the type of course and institution. Higher education includes 18 primary teacher-training colleges (PTTCs), 6 regional teacher-training colleges (RTTCs), which train lower secondary (grade 7 – 9) teachers in two-year teacher training programmes. Entrance to PTTCs and RTTCs is by national exam, and entrants should have completed 12 years of education (or nine years in remote areas). At the national level, the Faculty of Pedagogy in Phnom Penh provides a one-year, post-graduate programme to train upper secondary (grade 10-12) teachers. CAMSET’s teacher training programme was based in the six RTTCs, and included both pre-service and in-service teacher training.
Education is viewed by the Cambodian government and the array of international agencies working in the country as key to the ‘development’ of the nation. As such, since the signing of the Peace Agreements in 1991, the sector has seen large investments of foreign aid. According to figures on the Ministry website, total education spending between 1994 and 1999 was over $420 million, $176.9 million of this came from the government, whilst $243.8 million (or 58%) came from ‘development partners.’22 The above mentioned reports states that for ‘the EFA [Education For All] period (1990 to 2000), total investment in basic education by IOs and NGOs amount to about US$116,413,719’ A diagrammatic representation of the system is reproduced in Appendix 2 MoEYS website: Education Sector Annual Spending available dev_partner_profile/dev_partner_pro.htm accessed 03-11-03. 21 22
at
http://www.moeys.gov.kh
/
119 (op. cit.: 15). Despite these high levels of spending, the sector continues to face serious problems, the most notable being: − − − − −
low enrolment rates at all levels one of the highest drop out rates in the world both of these worse for girls and the poor chronic under-funding (less than 10% govt expenditure, 2.9% GNP) lack of capacity in terms of infrastructure, trained personnel, teaching materials and equipment − unsuitable curricula (Clayton, S. 2001: 7-9)
Education sector performance and issues Enrolment, Repetition and Drop Out Rates Lower secondary enrolment 1997-8 was 229, 000 down 7% from 1994-5 (246,000), a 30% fall from the 1986-7 peak enrolment of 327,000. In rural areas only 4.7% of those aged 12-14 in the poorest rural per capita quintile were enrolled in lower secondary school, and even in the richest rural per capita quintile only 24.5%. Drop out rates for lower secondary school in 1996-7 were 37.6%, one of the highest in the world.23 In 1998-9 student flow rates for Grade 9 indicated promotion, repetition and drop out rates of 41%, 20.9% and 38.1% respectively. For female students the equivalents were 41.5%, 15.2% and 43.3%. For Grade 12 all students the figures are 72.3%, 9.0% and 18.8% and for female students only 74.2%, 6.3% and 19.4%.24 Economic Inequity Despite high growth rates from the early 1990s, 1997 estimates show 36.1% of the population or about 4 million Cambodians were below the poverty line25, with about 90% of the poor living in rural areas (Asian Development Bank 1999: 3). According to a 1998 United Nations report, between UN Working Group on Poverty and Education 1998 Towards the 21st Century: National Strategy Education For All draft, UNESCO Phnom Penh 24 MoEYS Planning Department 1999 Education Statistics and Indicators 2000/01 final draft 25 Using a consumption-based poverty line defined as adequate income to buy a daily 2,100-calorie food basket plus an allowance for non-food expenditure (ADB op cit). 23
120 1994 and 1997 the rural-urban poverty gap widened and the poverty severity index worsened from 83% to 89% (cited in Clayton, S. 2001: 8), suggesting that inequality in access to education between urban and rural regions of Cambodia may also be worsening. Economic inequity continues to affect those Cambodia students who are enrolled in school. Educational expenditures, both formal and informal, such as (illegal) school fees, uniforms, transportation, equipment, school maintenance, private schooling, food, and ‘gifts’ to the teacher, all increase the cost of schooling for families. It is difficult to estimate the total costs of schooling to families, but research by UNICEF consultant, Mark Bray, estimated an annual cost to parents of a Grade 6 student in 1998 at over 450,000 riel per annum or around $116 (Bray 1998: 11). GDP per capita in 1998 was $247. He also estimates that government expenditure only accounted for 13% of resources invested in primary education, with the rest coming from parents and the wider community, making the system effectively private education (ibid: 23).
Gender Inequity The figures on enrolment, repetition and drop out rates indicate distinct gender inequalities, which reflect the overall situation for girls in Cambodian education. An NGO produced report on gender and development in Cambodia succinctly summarised the overall situation for female students and teachers. Girls are under-represented at all levels of formal education in Cambodia, and both supply and demand constraints on their participation have been identified in recent research. The decision to enrol students in school is taken at the level of the household and community, where geographic, economic and other factors are mediated by perceptions of gender roles and the benefits of education. The institutional environment surrounding formal education is far from gender-neutral itself. The extent to which gender constraints are recognised and addressed in the provision of schooling plays a significant role in determining access to and participation in education. [...] Gross and net (excluding over-age) enrolment rates are lower for girls at every level and are overall very low at secondary level. At primary level, 88.3 percent gross and 77.8 percent net for all children, and 81.2 percent gross and 72.4 percent net for girls. By lower secondary, the enrolment rates drop to 23.7 percent gross and 16.3 percent net for both sexes, and 16.8
121 percent gross and 12.4 percent net for girls. For upper secondary, the figures stand at only 8.1 percent gross and 6.8 percent net for all children, and 5.7 percent gross and 5.0 percent net for girls. [...]Women are also under-represented in school staff. The proportion of female teachers declines the further up the educational system and the more remote the area. (Gorman, et al. 1999b: 14-5)
The report identified a range of interrelated factors that affect girls’ access to and participation in formal education, the most significant reason being given by parents was cost, both direct and opportunity costs, with the latter being larger for girls due to their higher share of domestic and productive labour. Parental perceptions of education as more important for boys, that boys are more intelligent and that boys are expected to be the main income earners, all have a negative affect on girls’ access to education. Parents believe that the economic return to boys' education are higher than for girls, although data from the 1997 Socio-Economic Survey of Cambodia suggest that the economic returns to girls' education are currently higher with each level of education than for boys (MoEYS 1998: 9, Gorman, et al. 1999b: 16).
Education funding and salaries The education sector has a history of chronic under-funding. In 1994, the government declared a target of 15% of the national budget for education by 2000. McNamara (1999: 75) points out, in reality the budget share throughout the 1990s remained at or below 10%. Since then the government regularly claims to have reached the 15% mark and announced at budget allocation for education of 18.2% in 2002, but as the NGO community note, the actual disbursement of funds falls far short of the allocations every year (NGO Forum 2002). In comparison, defence spending was estimated to be as high as 60% of the national budget in 1996 (Burdon 2001). It is likely that the level of defence spending reflected the directly political needs within the government, particularly the CPP, to maintain the support of the military and police. Since then defence spending has been reduced, but a
122 recent Cambodian Development Resource Institute report indicates that over the 1990s, total defence and security averaged twice that of education and health combined and still retains the largest share of the national budget (CDRI 2003: 15). Teachers salaries, like those of other government workers, have been inadequate since 1980s. During the 1990s, teachers salaries averaged around $20 to $25 per month, which, according to my colleagues, was approximately 1012% of an average family living costs in provincial towns. I discuss the effects of these inadequate salaries in more detail in Chapter 6, and how these affected the project operations. The most important effects are that teachers have to find alternative sources of income, which may come from other work or from corruption within the school system. This in turn leads to reduced attendance and commitment. Combined with curriculum and timetabling issues, which mitigate against the completion of the curriculum within assigned teaching hours, teachers run ‘private’ classes that students have to attend in order to cover the materials required to pass the exams to pass into the next grade. Capacity Issues There are a range of issues which international agencies working in Cambodia group under the notion of a lack of capacity. Whilst in part expressing the genuine needs of the education sector, to a degree the ‘lack of capacity’ analysis is overplayed as a result of the dominance of the ‘discourse of destruction’. International agency reports on the sector tend to begin with comments such as ‘the death of as many as 75 per cent of school teachers’ (McNamara 1999a: 67), ‘Cambodia’s current human resource base has been devastated by almost two decades of war and isolation, including the destruction of the education system in the 1970s’ (Asian Development Bank 2000: 1) and ‘[w]e need funds, infrastructure and technical assistance’ (Tol Lah, Minister of Education introduction to National EFA Assessment Group 1999: x). These then frame such reports within the discourse, and possibly underplay the efforts and achievements that have been made by the sector as a whole and by the many dedicated Cambodian staff working within education. A lack of capacity is seen across
123 a range of matters, such as the physical structures of schools, the managerial and financial capabilities of school heads, education administrators and other ministry staff, the classroom abilities of teachers, the training of teachers and the printing and distribution of textbooks and other materials. Curriculum Issues The widespread view within aid agencies and amongst academic analysts is that curricula in Cambodian education do not provide students with the required skills and knowledge for later employment, either in the private sector or in the state sector. Education development policies implemented through the Royal Government of Cambodia and international organisations26 since the early 1990s, aimed at overcoming these problems, have been framed in terms of technical sector development, focusing on infrastructural investment, strategic planning, capacity building through teacher training, and the creating of “appropriate but modern” methodologies, textbooks and curricula. A report produced by an Asian Development Bank consultant for the Ministry on the effects of the past decade of education development in Cambodia characterised the approach as ‘narrow, technically focused project assistance’ and points out that ‘the overall development impact has been disappointing [and] few if any of the original education sector targets set in 1995/96 will be met by 2000, despite significant spending levels’ (MoEYS 2000b: Annex 8).
Vin McNamara, an academic and education consultant who has been working in Cambodia since the early 1990s, points out that despite the constitutional provision, in Article 68, of ‘free primary and secondary education to all citizens in public schools […] for at least 9 years’27, no legislation to this effect had been presented to the National Assembly. Since 1979, the education system has been
In 2000 this included 74 INGOs, 10 bilaterals, including AusAid, CIDA, DfID, GTZ, JICA, USAID, and a range of multilaterals and UN organsiations, EU, WB, ADB, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNESCO and ILO. 27 The Constitution is available on the Council of Ministers website at http://www.cambodia.gov.kh 26
124 shaped by sub-decrees approved through the Council of Ministers (McNamara 1999a: 69). ‘It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that national leader initiatives are driven by political motives, uninformed by the technical considerations underlying the effectiveness of the institutions of a modern state’ (McNamara 1999b: 101).
The commitment to nine years of basic education reflects a central aim of the World Declaration on Education for All which emerged from the UNESCO-sponsored 1990 Jomtien Conference, which the Cambodian government committed themselves to in 1991 (National EFA Assessment Group 1999: 9-10). However, as the government pamphlet notes ‘[d]ue to budgetary constraints there is little hope of ensuring equal opportunity for every child to receive a 9-year basic education in the very near future’ (op. cit.: 17).
One priority area has been primary education, but enrolment rates have shown little improvement. In school year 1996/97 the national gross enrolment ratio28 for primary was 94.5% (86.4% for girls), which declined to 89.7% (83.9%) by 1998/99. The net enrolment ratio29 over the same time went from 84.7% (78.4%) to 78.3% (74.1). Over the same period, in urban areas both gross and net enrolment ratios increased, overall and for female students, with net enrolment increasing from 80.5% (74.8%) to 84.6% (81.0%). In rural and remote areas gross and net enrolment declined overall and for female students, with net enrolment in rural areas falling from 93.0% (86.0%) to 82.6% (77.8%) and from 51.8% (48.1%) to 45.5% (42.1%) in remote areas (all figures from National EFA Assessment Group 1999: 37-8). Repetition rates for Grade 1 of primary averaged around 40% over this period, overall and for female students, whilst drop out rates increased slightly from 7.3% (8.5% for girls) to 10.7% (12.2%). By Grade 6 repetition rates are low, in 1997/98 they were 3.8% (2.3%), the population of official age for that level. This can be over 100% due to repetition or enrolment over over- or underaged students. 29 Net enrolment ratio is the number of students enrolled in a level of education who are of official school age for that level as a percentage of the population of official school age for that level.
125 but drop out rates remain high at 14.2% (17.2%), with regional differences similar to those for enrolment (ibid: 42-44). Thus, those students who reach lower secondary education, the point at which foreign language teaching begins, represent a minority and reflect marked gender and regional inequalities.
Reports assessing the impact of education ‘development’ policies and advocating further policy prescriptions tend to have a narrow technical focus that locates the problems and potential solutions within the sector itself, paying little attention to external political and economic conditions. The 1999 Education for All in Cambodia assessment report is one example. The report points to a range of factors behind high drop out and repetition rates, including poor school infrastructure and shortage of classrooms, inadequate education and training of teachers, inefficient school administration, low community and parental participation and poor implementation of the school timetable. The report notes that families withdraw children from schools, both seasonally and sometimes completely, to contribute to family labour, and that these practices are increasing with the deepening of poverty. However, there is no wider analysis of the effects of increasing poverty or resource inequalities on access to schooling nor are there policy prescriptions dealing with these issues (ibid: 42-3). Beyond the oft-repeated calls for the government to reform the budget to reduce spending on the military and police and increase education spending, the policy recommendations centre on improving the quality of schools, teacher, administrators, managers and systems – all of which provide scope for further and enhanced aid-funded technical assistance. The Ministry website (www.moeys.gov.kh) hosts a range of documents, all in English as is the whole site, such as the RGC/UNICEF Masterplan for Education, the Priority Action Plan (PAP) and the Education Strategic Plan. The latter exemplifies the technicist nature of the educational reforms being proposed in Cambodia. The Broad Policy Priorities 2000-200530 focus on ‘institutional development and capacity building’ measures, focused on financial and management reforms of the sector http://www.moeys.gov.kh/education_reform_in_cambodia/education_strategic_plan/broad_policy_ priorities.htm (accessed 04-11-03) 30
126 including budgetary reform to increase and make transparent government education spending. In the section dealing with responsiveness of the plan to cross-cutting issues, the issues listed are accountability, transparency, public service reform, gender, ethnic minorities, disabled learners, HIV/AIDS, participatory approaches, the private sector, and the environment. No mention is made of the effects of increasing poverty, income and resource inequality on educational access.
Alternative views are voiced, although less often. Kurt Brandenburg of the NGO Kampuchea Action for Primary Education produced a detailed analysis of the factors affecting repetition rate. The reports conclusions suggest that the nature of aid-funded technical assistance in education may actually have been exacerbating the problems. [I]t was found that attendance mediates the effects of a number of other important variables commonly associated with repetition. These include levels of parental education, family income, minority/majority language, and urban/rural residence to name but a few. Students with the best attendance were found to come from households with more highly educated parents and higher incomes. When this finding was considered with another discovery that technically assisted schools are better managed and have higher repetition rates, a startling picture begins to emerge. This refers to the very strong possibility that past technical assistance has been most benefiting the children with a lower risk of repeating. High risk children who appear to have lower attendance rates and come from poorer families are not in school enough to benefit from traditional quality inputs such as teacher training, teaching aids, or library services and thus apparently continue to repeat in more disproportionate numbers than their better off counterparts. Unassisted schools on the other hand were found to have weaker evaluation practices, poorer management, and higher promotion rates. But more of these promoted students in unassisted schools failed externally administered achievement tests than was true in assisted schools. Thus, technical assistance seems to have exacerbated the differences between high and low risk groups. These findings make a strong argument for diversifying technical assistance to include more than the traditional approaches for improving school quality. This suggests the need for a major initiative to aid high risk children through nontraditional approaches which target out-of-school factors. (Brandenberg 2000: Executive summary)
Given the high rates of illiteracy in Cambodia a national literacy program would be an essential part of education policy, however, less than 2% of the totally illiterate adult population is currently being served by either government-sponsored classes or NGO and donor supported literacy programs. Government-sponsored programmes, which cost $12 per student, claim to produce functional
127 literacy in 55% of students, with a 45% success rate for NGO programmes at an estimated per student cost of $23 (MoEYS 2000a). As Paulo Freire (1970) and others have emphasised, literacy is a basic need, not just as it provides skills needed for employment, but because of the role of literacy in social and political transformations. It would seem that given the political roots of the problems in Cambodian education, and other aspects of Cambodian society, a mass literacy programme would be a means of genuine empowerment for the still marginalised majority.
The Cambodian Secondary English Teaching (CAMSET) Project The CAMSET project is another example of the institutional complexity discussed in the previous chapter. The CAMSET project had three stages: an initial “pilot” phase, the Cambodian British Centre for Teacher Education (CBC) and the project itself in two phases, CAMSET 1 and CAMSET 2. All three stages were funded by the British government through the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which under the new Labour Government in 1997 became the separate Department for International Development (DfID). Whilst ODA/DfID provided the funding, all three stages were managed by the Centre for British Teachers (CfBT), which also supplied expatriate staff, referred to either as project ‘specialists’ or ‘advisors’. Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO), a British development charity working through volunteers, also provided ELT volunteers who worked on all three stages of the project with funding largely from DfID. The three stages had differing degrees of integration within the Ministry, although building the capacity of Ministry staff was the focus of all three stages.
CfBT (the organisation now only uses the acronym), was founded in 1965 and has since employed 5,000 British teachers working outside of the UK particularly in Malaysia, Oman and Brunei. George Taylor, CAMSET 2 team leader, explained that CfBT was a beneficiary of the British government’s policy of opening the process of tendering for development projects in the early 1990s, which had
128 broken the British Council monopoly on such work and facilitated a ‘huge expansion’ for CfBT (interview 17-03-01). Since that period CfBT’s work has diversified, shown by their current description as ‘a leading independent provider of education and training services both in the UK and internationally’ (CfBT 2002: n.p.), and their turnover has increased from approximately £5 million in 1991/92 to £70 million in 2001/02 (ibid: 16). The organisation works on a ‘not-for-profit’ basis, thus [a]ll surpluses are reinvested in education to support initiatives that promote the company’s values and complement its operational work. Although a not-for-profit organisation and a registered charity. CfBT values commercial disciplines as a means of ensuring efficient service delivery. (ibid: 16) CfBT Chief Executive, Neil Macintosh, a former chief executive of Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) which supplied volunteers to the CAMSET project, describes the belief within the company that ‘there are serious deficiencies in monopolistic state-controlled provision of education and that a more liberal approach enabling participation from a range of education providers, would be of value […] the challenge for CfBT is how the twin objectives of liberalising provision and maintaining public service ideals can be realised’ (ibid: 5). These statements indicate how the neo-liberal agenda is increasingly becoming part of the non-governmental sector. These discourses construct all ‘efficient’ provision of services as stemming from organisations subject to ‘market disciplines’ which can enable a more ‘direct relationship between teachers and learners/parents [which] can free teachers from regulatory burdens, improve accountability to parents and be more cost effective’ (ibid). Education is portrayed as an individual rather than a public good, and the ‘implementation of sound policies is critically dependent on delivery systems which work’ (ibid: 6). Absent from these are discussion of political or democratic accountability (replaced by ‘corporate accountability’), despite the fact that the funding for much of CfBT’s work, both internationally and overseas, comes from UK taxpayers.
129 CfBT has clear parallels with the organisation which took over from QSA at the end of the CELT project in 1993. IDP Education Australia, an independent not-for-profit organisation owned by thirty-seven Australian universities, illustrates the close ties between ELT, the aid organisations, and the blurring of boundaries between public and private sector organisations. Their Cambodian website provides a brief history of the organisation. International Development Programme Education Australia was established by the Australian Universities in 1969 to represent Australian education overseas and to provide a mechanism for both the universities and the Australian Government to channel education and training aid to developing countries in Southeast Asia. IDP is still owned by the universities in Australia, but is now independent of the Australian Government and operates internationally. IDP now operates in around 35 countries, including in Europe, North and South America and in Africa. IDP established its office in Cambodia in 1992.31 IDP Education Australia established the Australian Centre for Education (ACE) in Phnom Penh in 1992, as a profit-making ELT organisation which now has an additional centre in Siem Reap and employs around 50 expatriate and 50 Cambodian teachers. Its website lists the company’s clients as including AusAID, UN agencies, such as UNDP and UNESCO, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, Embassies, NGOs, major hotels and private companies in Phnom Penh and the provinces of Cambodia.32 In 1999 ACE reported revenues of US$1.6 million from its English teaching work in Cambodia (Clayton, T. 2002: 12) much of which, given its client base, presumably derived from international aid. The total budget for the four years of the University of Canberra/IDP managed project was Aus$4.1 million (Coyne, Geoffery 1999: 144), a percentage of which would have been repatriated in the form of salaries and other costs, e.g. for the production of the product design document, which was wholly undertaken in Australia for no clear reasons, and the six weeks of study in Australia for graduates who would become university teachers (King 1997: 9). In the same fashion, some of the costs of CAMSET such as advisors salaries and the overseas study period for Cambodian teachers would have been repatriated to the UK.
31 32
http://www.idpcambodia.org/index.html accessed 06-08-03 http://www.idpcambodia.org/ace/features.html accessed 06-08-03
130 The other foreign organisation involved with CAMSET was Voluntary Service Overseas. Founded in 1958 by Alec Dickson, VSO by sending unskilled, pre-university students to do voluntary service (mostly in education) for one year (Edwards 1983: 4), and now described itself as ‘an international development charity that works through volunteers [committed to] long-term development goals and long-term partnerships and focus[ed] on sustainable development’ (VSO 2003b). Since 1958, VSO has sent approximately 29,000 volunteers to work in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Eastern Europe, and normally has around 1,500 volunteers in over 40 different countries. The organisation is funded through a mixture of DfID grants and charitable donations. In 1996/97, VSO’s total budget was £26 million of which £19.8 came from DfID and £6.2 million from charitable donations (Clayton, S. 1998: 30) by 2003 these figured were £23.8 and £31.8 (VSO 2003a: n.p.) indicating a shift in core funding away from DfID toward private and corporate donations. It currently costs approximately £15,000 per year for VSO to recruit, train and equip each volunteer. However, part of the costs of the volunteer, most often the monthly salary (at local rates) and accommodation, are often covered by the host government or organisation. This differs widely from country to country, but the organisation views this as important to ‘partnership’ between VSO and the hosts. Although it has broadened out form its original base, 80% of VSO’s work is still in education and ‘ELT activity constitutes approximately 25% of VSO’s overseas activity’ (VSO 1997: 11).
VSO’s discourse, the ‘public face’ of the organisation, suggests a different set of underlying values from those of CfBT, as shown on their web page titled ‘What is VSO?’ Ours is a very individual "people to people" approach to development. Instead of sending food or money, we send women and men from a wide range of professions who want the chance to make a real difference in the fight against poverty. These volunteers work in partnership with colleagues and communities to share skills and learning and jointly achieve change.[…] VSO also works to address the structural inequalities and barriers that prevent people from exercising their rights. We use our experience and our supporter networks to work for changes in policy and practice - rich and poor countries - that reduce disadvantage. (VSO 2003b)
131 Phrases such as ‘fight against poverty’, ‘structural inequalities’, ‘people exercising their rights’ ‘achieve change’ and ‘reduce disadvantage’, reflect apparently more political discourses than the commercial discourses produced in CfBT documents. A similarity between the two organisations’ discourses is possibly reflected in the claim VSO makes to a ‘individual “people-to-people” approach to development”.
I am not suggesting that the discourses these organisations produce accurately represent the ‘reality’ of the work they do or of the organisations as a whole. Organisations produce textual discourses for various purposes, for example, staff recruitment, proposing projects, seeking funding, public awareness, advertising, media relations, etc., with differing ‘rules of formation’ (Foucault 1972:38) which mask or efface organisational tensions and conflicts. However, these discursive differences between CfBT and VSO may reflect aspects in the actual practices (or practical ideology?) of the organisations which might partially explain the tensions and conflicts between the CAMSET ‘advisors’ and VSO volunteers that persisted throughout the life of the project. Even though in CAMSET 2, four out of the five expatriate ‘advisors’ had previously been VSO volunteers in other countries, and one had been a VSO programme officer in Cambodia, the tensions and conflicts persisted.
Cambodian British Centre for Teacher Education (CBC) The 1991 signing of the Paris Peace Accords and the formation of UNTAC appears to have been a key year for assessing Cambodia’s need for English and English language teaching. Two major consultancies were undertaken by UNICEF (Ablin 1991) and Australian Catholic Relief 1991), both of which fed into the design of CAMSET. The ODA also commissioned a consultancy in late 1991 that established the Cambodian-British Centre for Teacher Education (CBC) to provide ‘emergency
132 assistance in the field of English teaching’ and operated from September 1992 to August 1994 (ODA 1997: 3.1.3) Why this was classified as ‘emergency assistance’ is not clear, although it is suggestive of the ‘discourse of destruction.’ CBC main aims were to provide English teacher-training courses and workshops (focusing on retraining teachers of other subjects), access for Cambodian teachers to resources and self-study facilities and to provide support to VSO and other NGOs involved in English teaching. According to the CAMSET 2 project proposal document, sustainability was not considered to be an appropriate goal of the project due to its ‘experimental’ nature, and because the UK government did not recognise the State of Cambodia. This meant that CBC was established outside Ministry premises and systems, which both ODA and project director, Harvey Smith, argued further limited its sustainability (ODA 1997; Smith 1996: 151).
During this initial phase, two project teacher training ‘advisors’ developed training materials and worked with three VSO volunteers in running in-service teacher training (INSET) courses. These were run in three RTTCs (Kandal, Battambang and Takeo) and were aimed at lower secondary school teachers trained in other subjects who were already teaching English. By this time, QSA were already running the B.Ed. (TEFL) course, as well as ‘recyclage’ courses aimed at retraining teachers, and at least three of the Cambodian trainers who were involved in CAMSET had been on ‘recyclage’ courses. Despite the already apparent demand for ELT and its introduction at secondary level in 1989, these was the only available training courses for lower secondary teachers as there was no established RTTC pre-service English teacher training course. The courses and materials developed during this initial period were further revised and developed for INSET courses and formed the basis of the PRESET courses established within the Ministry under CAMSET 1 and 2 (Smith 1996: 154). Tensions were already apparent between project team and volunteers, with the development and running of these courses the apparent source. Lucy Royal-Dawson, then VSO programme officer, described the situation for the volunteers as: […] they were given the materials: “This is what you are going to teach and you’re gonna teach on this day” It was incredibly prescriptive. That was a source of tension, because there
133 was no autonomy, no flexibility for them to develop any materials or to be involved in developing material for anybody else, because at that stage there weren’t any trainers (interview 22-02-01). In the next chapter, I examine in more detail the prescriptive and doctrinaire content of these materials and methods.
Teachers attending these in-service training courses were selected through an entrance test set and carried out by expatriate staff with no involvement from MoEYS except to provide permission for the teachers to attend the test and, for those who passed, the course. At this point, as there was little Ministry involvement, selection was on the basis of passing this test, regardless of the teachers’ qualifications, previous training or official Ministry status, i.e. primary teacher, lower secondary teacher or upper secondary teacher. The in-service courses were run in three blocks of ten weeks over the period of a year, with the teachers (now ‘trainees’) being paid a $2 per diem from project funding. Returning to their schools after each block they were expected to ‘implement’ the new methods and techniques which reflected a ‘communicative’ and ‘learner centred’ approach to language teaching. In Chapter 5, I examine how these materials formed part of a hegemonic attempt to change the perceived ‘culture’ of learning and teaching in Cambodia. Although the outcomes of this attempt are complex and uncertain, there was a degree of resistance to the methods being promoted. Kao Sophal, the first Cambodian national ELT trainer-trainer and a trainee on an inservice course in 1993 at Battambang RTTC, recalled that a few trainees dropped out of the course because the new methods failed to address their own concerns about grammar and they felt the level of the classes was too low. Sophal was asked to be a counterpart to the VSO trainer for the following in-service course, and the same problems arose (interview 27-12-02). The position of the volunteers and the reaction of some of the trainees suggests that there was little discussion about the course structure, content or learning outcomes. Project activities at this point also parallel descriptions of the Cambodian aid market of the early to mid-1990s from the last two chapters,
134 driven by the technical imperatives of the agencies, circumventing the ‘inefficient’ government bureaucracy and with a minimum of local participation.
The second main ‘output’ of this phase of the project was the English language teaching resource centre housed in the CBC building. The centre aimed to provide resources, beyond simply textbooks, for English language teaching and learning at a national level, which could be accessed by Cambodian English teachers as well as expatriate English teachers. Behind the decision to establish a resource centre was the perception that a lack of resources in education and English teaching in Cambodia was a major constraint on language learning (see Ablin 1991: 2, Australian Catholic Relief 1991: passim). Initially funded directly by the project and located in the CBC building, under CAMSET 1 it was ‘handed over’ to the Ministry and became the National English Teaching Resource Centre (NETREC) at the Faculty of Pedagogy. However, the fact that a CAMSET ‘advisor’ was based in NETREC, later to be replaced by a VSO volunteer, and that the CAMSET supplied its running costs, opens to question to what extent the management of the centre was ‘handed over’. From 1997 NETREC became self-funding, which led to conflicts between the NETREC staff and volunteer and the management of the Faculty of Pedagogy over issues of staffing and finances, which I describe in Chapter 5.
Cambodian Secondary English Teaching Project (CAMSET) Phase 1 The first full phase of the project, CAMSET 1, ran from September 1994 until August 1997 with the overall aim of establishing a sustainable national English teaching programme for secondary education. According to Harvey Smith, team leader of CAMSET 1, it was envisaged as a much wider and more ambitious project than CBC and was ‘established directly under the auspices of the Ministry for Education, Youth and Sport and under the guidance of a steering committee chaired by the Secretary of State, HE Kea Sahan’ (Smith 1996: 151). Smith further explains that following the
135 1993 elections, the UK government had recognised the new Royal Government of Cambodia. Thus integration of project and Ministry systems was seen as a positive and achievable move that would increase the participation of Cambodian education staff, along with local ownership and potential sustainability of proposed project outcomes. George Taylor, who was given responsibility for the policy of increasing integration, recalled: having lots of arguments with people [in the project team]. We ran courses that were completely outside the Ministry cycle. We called them different things, ran them at different times of the year, our cycle was completely different from the Ministry’s and I remember having discussions with people who simply couldn’t understand it, this is people working on the project. I remember some people saying, “We can’t let the Ministry do that! They can’t do that!” No, I mean, this was the mentality of some of the people. There were some people at that time, and I think since indeed who were constitutionally uninterested in doing things that way. (interview 17-03-01) George’s experiences working within projects, not just CAMSET, had made him highly critical of the project approach to development work mostly because of the way projects tended to circumvent government systems.
The objectives of CAMSET 1 were to build capacity within the Ministry toward the overall aim of establishing a sustainable system of English teaching in secondary schools. The eight main project components show how this had broadened out from the teacher-training and resource centre focus of CBC, these were: 1. A system for data gathering and analysis to inform policy making with three trained Cambodian English supervisors in three Ministry departments to operate the system. 2. A team of Cambodian teachers and supervisors trained to develop a national English curriculum and provisional syllabuses for all six grades of secondary school based on existing curricula for other subjects, primary curricula, the QSA-produced Cambodian English Course and their own knowledge. 3. A system to provide training and in-service support of English teachers and a pool of trained staff to operate the system initially in the Ministry and two or three provinces. 4. A national in-service teacher training system for lower secondary level supervised by a trained supervisor Teacher Training Department of the Ministry and organised and delivered by Cambodian trainers at RTTCs.
136 5. The design of a national pre-service training programme undertaken by Cambodian trainers and supervisors. 6. The expansion of the supply of basic teaching materials, though training of teachers in materials development during in-service courses, and the development of the National English Teaching Resource Centre (NETREC). 7. The design and evaluation of lower secondary English textbooks and teachers guides though the training of a team of Cambodian staff of textbook writers. (this component was added in January 1996 in response to pressure from the Ministry.) 8. Establishment of procedures for regulating private classes offering secondary-equivalent ELT. (adapted from Smith 1996: 152-55)
The project team for CAMSET 2 consisted of five expatriate ‘specialists’ who were responsible for the different components. Instead of being based in the CBC building, which was increasingly used for commercial ELT courses run by CfBT, the team members were to be based in the relevant parts of the Ministry according to their components. The integration of the project into the Ministry, also met resistance from senior Ministry staff, which continued through the lifetime of the project. One indicator of this was the contestations and negotiations over where the team members would be based. Lucy Royal-Dawson described this in some detail. […] the Director of PRD33 definitely felt that CAMSET was “that room down there where those people sit and they’re not really part of PRD”. So, from what she was saying, how she was saying it and how she was referring to people, which I was quite surprised by, because I always thought it was more integrated. In their defence, it’s really difficult to work in a different way when people have got used to how other projects and other donors work.[…] For example, at the Faculty, we fought tooth and nail not to be allocated to the “CAMSET room,” the “French room,” the “JICA34 room,” the “UNICEF/UNESCO/ PASEC35 rooms” blah, blah, blah. Um, but that was a perception and an attitude on the part of the Director over there – you couldn’t budge! And in a way he’s right. If he’s got all these foreigners, you actually want to keep them contained. You don’t want them spreading out too much and potentially tainting or … you know, maybe not even something negative, just messing about with his staff. Because our argument was, you know, “Look, we are TA to your staff, so it would make more sense to work with your staff.” He’d say, “Oh no, no they smoke” or “Oh no, no it’s too noisy” And “Oh no, no there’s not enough room” and on and on. At the end of the day it was a political decision. “Keep you over there. We’ll get money out of you for that room, plus we know where you are.” (interview 22-02-01)
Pedagogical Research Department, MoEYS – the location for the textbook ‘specialist’. Japan International Cooperation Agency 35 Support Programme for Primary Education in Cambodia (EU). 33 34
137 This was a pattern replicated in the RTTCs in relations between the volunteers, the English teachertrainers and the rest of the RTTC staff.
Cambodian Secondary English Teaching Project (CAMSET) Phase 2 Phase two of CAMSET was initially set to run from September 1997 to August 2000. However, the July coup de force brought many government ministries to a halt, including MoEYS. The political nature and effects of the events of July 1997 rarely appear in the project documents I have access to. One example is the report of a consultancy for the production of the baseline study for CAMSET 2 written in November 1997. The author writes that the ‘issue of communication between the various offices of the MoEYS seems to be a problematical one, and takes place within a complex and difficult bureaucratic environment’ (Luxon 1997: 11). This was written three months after the coup, yet ascribes difficulties in communication between political rivals in the Ministry as a matter of mere bureaucratic complexity. The July events affected project activities so that ‘[s]ignificant progress was not possible until the formation of the new government in December 1998’ (CAMSET 2000). This led to the extension of some project components so that CAMSET 2 did not finally end until August 2001. 3.3.8 The focus of the project – building on the start made by CAMSET – is essentially on sustainability. For this reason training is almost entirely in-country, in order to develop models which are appropriate and within local capacity. The project will aim only to establish systems and programmes for which the Ministry can take full budgetary responsibility before the end of the project. (ODA 1997: Project Rationale 3.3.8) CAMSET 2 aimed ‘to establish sustainable systems for improving the quality of English teaching and learning in secondary schools’ and ‘build on the foundation’ of phase I with ‘outputs […] largely [to] be achieved by MoEYS staff working alongside five specialists provided by the project’ and the ‘systems developed […] will influence and are expected to serve as a model for improving quality in the teaching of other subjects’ (ODA 1997: Summary and Recommendation 1.1-1.4). In overall outcomes were listed as follows:
138 Over three years (September 1997 to August 2000) the project will: strengthen the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport’s (MoEYS) supervision system for secondary education; develop a provincial supervisor system to support and monitor English teaching; develop a coordinated English teacher training system; complete the production and distribution of textbooks for English for all secondary grades; develop a testing and evaluation system for English which will provide evidence of impact on student learning. (ibid: 1.2)
In addition, the project team were also to assist the Ministry in producing a baseline study of teaching and learning English in secondary schools and funding would be provided for a programme of English training for key Ministry officials. The five project specialists were to include the team leader, who would be responsible for project management and the development of Ministry supervisory capacity, and four specialists in respectively ELT supervision and evaluation, management of English teacher training, training of ELT teacher trainers and ELT textbook development. In addition, at least one specialist needed to have experience in educational financing and budgeting. The specialists would be located within the appropriate department or section of the Ministry, indicating a concern to promote a sense of ownership on the part of the Ministry. But the specialist were also viewed as operating as a team: The order of duties has no significance and it is not to indicate priorities. Project outputs are closely related and it is not possible to assign responsibility for many of the activities to one specific post: there will need to be close collaboration between team members. (ibid: Indicative Job Descriptions 1.1)
This emphasis on teamwork effaces the real relations of power within the project and masks who is ultimately responsible.
While the project emphasises notions of ownership and participation through Ministry involvement with the design process, integration within Ministry departments and the participation of Ministry
139 personnel, the language of the following paragraph from the Terms of Reference, suggests a different type of relationship. 10.1 The principal input to the project on the Cambodian side will be personnel. The supervisors, teacher trainers, materials developers and so on will be MoEYS staff assigned to the project. In addition, senior staff of the Ministry will serve on the steering committee and staff in appropriate departments, provincial directors and teacher training centres will be associated with the project. (ibid: Technical Annex 10.1) The various MoEYS staff will be “assigned” to the project, senior Ministry staff will “serve” on the steering committee, and other Ministry staff will be “associated” with the project. Absent here are words indicating the level of control or management on the part of the Ministry. The “project” although ideally integrated within the Ministry, remains set apart, an institution of its own. In other paragraphs these relationships are less clear: Project out puts will largely be achieved by MoEYS staff working alongside five specialists provided by the project. The latter will assist with the development of sustainable systems… (ibid: Summary and Recommendations 1.3)
The image of MoEYS staff working alongside the specialists is ambiguous, perhaps it is an unequal relationship, perhaps not. But the next sentence sees the specialists as assistants to the MoEYS staff, a presumable inferior position.
The section, ‘Indicative Job Descriptions’ contains similar ambiguities. The team leader will in ‘close cooperation with the Steering Committee chairperson and other senior officials of MoEYS, be responsible for the management of the project within Cambodia’. The indicative descriptions for the other four specialists all begin ‘In collaboration with other team members’ followed with a series of specific duties or tasks of which most begin with ‘assist’ or ‘advise’ the Ministry or more often a Ministry Department. Only the team leader is specified in this document as having a management role, although one is the ‘Specialist in Management of Teacher Training’.
140 The final sections of this chapter discuss some of the main ‘outputs’ of the CAMSET project over the ten years that it was operating, showing how it continued work done by the QSA project, but also providing further examples of how it was not a response to the serious problems of Cambodian education. Resource centres The establishment of the resource centre reflects the pedagogical style of ELT the project intended to introduce to Cambodia and, more broadly, the nature of educational development envisaged. The centre contained a range of materials for teachers to use in planning lessons, UK and USA produced ELT textbooks, and self-access materials for students, including audio and video resources. Important pedagogical, cultural and socio-economic assumptions lay behind the provision of these resources and the centre itself. The most obvious, and which have been explored widely in the literature36 , relate to the privileging of “Western” knowledge, cultural values of learning and development, and that these “modern” materials will be applicable and effective in Cambodian classrooms for Cambodian teachers and students. Something not discussed in the ELT literature is the relationship between the pedagogic and socio-economic assumptions. A resource centre assumes that teachers have available time to access these resources, and find them valuable in the process of lesson planning. Related to this is the idea that teachers generally plan lessons, in the sense of not relying solely on a ready-made textbook, but draw from an appropriate textbook which they supplement with additional materials from other sources or which they have produced themselves. Again, this makes assumptions about the amount of time Cambodian teachers have available for lesson planning, and that they have been (or will be) trained in such techniques. Aside from the training assumption, what is not taken into account here is the socio-economic situation of the majority of Cambodian teachers. The idea that the teachers could spend time accessing and
For example Alptekin and Alptekin 1984; Canagarajah 1999; Copley 1995; Ellis 1996; Holliday 1994; Kumaravadivelu 1993; Lewis and McCook 2002; Littlewood 2000; Liu 1998; Nunan 1989; Pennycook 1989; Podromou 1988; Seedhouse 1996; Swan 1985; Thompson 1996; Tollefson 1991. See also Chapter 5. 36
141 developing teaching materials from those held in the resource centre, most of which reflected methodologies and cultures unfamiliar to them, assumes an amount of free time the socio-economic situation of the teachers did not allow. As is detailed in the chapter on money, teachers’ state incomes are meagre, averaging less than US $20 per month. As I detail in the chapter, these inadequate incomes result in teachers spending much of their time earning income from sources other than their state teaching. Many teachers earned extra income from private teaching, which the resource centre could also have been useful for. Female teachers’ participation in private teaching and their ability to access resource centres are further constrained by gender and cultural differences. Female teachers, who represent only 27% of secondary school teachers, have greater responsibility for domestic labour (as do female students, which contributes to low female enrolment rates), reinforced and exacerbated through cultural norms which limit a woman’s movement outside the home, especially after dark (Gorman, et al. 1999a: 15-19, Copley 1995: np).
The setting up of a resource centre by CBC was not a novel idea. Both the above mentioned consultancy reports advised the creation of some type of central resource centre in Phnom Penh, the QSA CELT project had English language libraries for teachers and students in both RUPP and the QSA offices. VSO volunteers were involved in establishing English language resource centres/libraries in Kompong Chhnang and Svay Rieng. The British Council have resource centres in the majority of countries in which they operate, other ELT organisations, such as CfBT, have established them as part of aid-funded ELT projects. As well as the perceived need for resources for teachers and learners, these centres reflect an educational culture which emphasizes (and values) learner autonomy and the ability of teachers to adapt and supplement materials within the curriculum. Although Cambodian educational culture did not reflect similar values, with emphasis placed on the teacher as the source of knowledge and learning being a matter of unreflectively absorbing this knowledge, the desire to change these educational values lies behind the development of resource centres and remained important throughout the life of the project. During CAMSET 1,
142 the CBC resource centre was moved to the Faculty of Pedagogy to become NETREC, and the establishment of “mini-NETRECs” in the six RTTCs was discussed but never realised. Later, under CAMSET 2 each RTTC was provided with US $5000 to purchase resources and equipment (CAMSET 2 letter dated 17-02-00), which contributed to the establishment of informal “English Departments.”
A review of teacher resource centres37 as a strategy for teacher development in the developing world points out that the expansion of such centres in the UK in the 1960s came at a time when there was relatively low central control over schools and the curriculum, and there success was associated with teacher autonomy, professional development and participatory learning and an underlying philosophy of decentralisation. These successes lead to the exportation of the model to both “developed” ands “developing” nations. However, the educational context on most “developing” countries reflected central, hierarchical control over the education process and teachers are not autonomous professionals exploring participatory teaching and learning (Fairhurst and Knamiller 1999: 54-65). Overall, the report raises serious doubts about the teacher resource centre strategy as a means of improving the quality of teaching and learning as either material development centres, drop in centres or as libraries of reference materials. It further notes that the sustainability of such centres, both financially and in terms of the evolution of ideas, is dependent on external resources and international donors (Knamiller 1999: 172). The reports suggestions for increasing the contribution of such centres to improving education quality focus on issues such as further training (for centre staff and for teachers), increased autonomy, enthusiastic school heads and realistic expectations of what these centres could achieve (ibid: 25-6). The effect of teachers’ socio-economic conditions was only hinted at in a brief paragraph. Only exceptional teachers, anywhere in the world, are creative enough and can spend enough time to produce resources for their own classrooms. It is nice, but totally impractical, to think that most teachers will develop their own aids. This is particularly the case in developing This review (Knamiller 1999) was a DfID-funded assessment of the effectiveness of teacher resource centres as a strategy to improve the quality of education in developing countries. It did not focus specifically on English teaching, although at least one of its case studies had an ELT focus. 37
143 countries where teachers are poorly paid and family responsibilities very demanding, and materials for the construction of teaching aids are scarce. (ibid: 166) So, not only would it take an exceptional teacher to benefit from the resource centre, but it would also require exceptional socio-economic conditions.
In this way, resource centres can be seen as part of the inappropriate exportation of technology and ‘expertise’ which fails to examine or take into account local conditions and expertise (see Chambers, R. 1983; Hobart 1993). However, whether they are appropriate or not is only part of the story. At a local level there may be differing levels of support for such centres and many teachers, trainers and students view them as valuable sources of English ‘knowledge.’ As I show in subsequent chapters, these centres also have other uses and effects, as sources of localised power and as sites of development encounters, such as those in Takeo RTTC, which go beyond questions of the appropriateness of ‘Western’ knowledge.
Staff retention There are some interesting parallels concerning issues of sustainability between CAMSET and the previous QSA-managed CELT project. The definition of sustainability and how sustainable the project had been was disputed between the QSA team and the 1992 Mid-Term Review Team. The main criticism of the Review Team was that the project had not pursued sustainability through training Cambodian counterparts to take over the training of teachers once the QSA team withdrew. However, the QSA team pointed to the lack of any trained or experienced Cambodian teachers of English to take over the B. Ed. (TEFL) course, and Mark Deasey, the QSA Field Coordinator, labelled the Review Team’s expectations ‘pure fantasy’ (Oats 1994: 117). The 1992 review resulted in QSA withdrawing from management of the project in July 1993. The University of Canberra/IDP team that took over only focused on the B. Ed. course, which they intended to be make
144 sustainability through ‘localisation’ of staffing and integration into the University of Phnom Penh. This phase of the project was renamed the University of Cambodia English and Education Project (UPPEEP), and was based in the Foreign Language Centre of the University.
Roger King, a Review Team member who became the Administrative Director of UPPEEP38, argued that the localisation of teaching staff was complete by the start of year two of this new phase of the project (King 1997: 12). These local staff were selected graduates from the B. Ed. course, four in June 1993 and ten in June 1994, who had then undergone six weeks further training in Australia. Thus the ‘localised’ staff went directly from their own training to lecturing on the same course with little or no experience of working in Cambodian high schools or of teaching English in the state sector, an issue of quality that King does not address. In order to retain these staff whose language skills, as King notes, were in great demand from international agencies, the project had to provide salary supplements without which there would be ‘little chance that any of these new graduates […] would take up the lecturing positions’ (ibid: 14). These supplements were substantial, although they declined over the life of the project, as can be seen in the following table:
Annual Cost of University of Phnom Penh English and Education Project Salary Supplementation 1993-97 (US$)
Year
Number of Lecturers
1993/94
4
1994/95
14
1995/96
20
Annual Type of Project Supplement Supplementation per Lecturer $3 per hour/35 hour week for 10 $4,620 months $3 per hour/35 hour week for 10 $4,620 months $250 per month/10 $2,500 months
Number of Students
Annual Cost per Student (notional)
220
$84
256
$253
290
$172
King was also Senior Manager, Consultancy Services for IDP Education Australia, which later established the ACE school, and had been Team Leader of an earlier study on ELT provision in Cambodia (Australian Catholic Relief 1991). 38
145
1996/97
20
$175 per month/10 months
$1,750
330
$106
(Source: Coyne, Geoffery 1999: 147, Table 7.1)
Coyne, who was project Team Leader and had taught English in Phnom Penh high schools in 196970 under Australian government funding, points out three main reasons for reduced levels of supplementation. First, the decreasing need for Cambodian staff to spend time preparing, consulting with advisors or trialing and evaluating the new curriculum. Second, the project team had assisted them to identify appropriate alternative income sources and, third, that the lecturers had to provide more of their own income as it was clear that the Ministry could not provide similar levels of supplement after the project ended (Coyne, Geoffery 1999: 147). The project team were aware of the negative effects of these payments on the sustainability of project outcomes, however, as with CAMSET, such supplementation was necessary in order for Cambodian staff to be retained during the life of the project. In this way, the payments ‘sustained’ the project during its own lifetime. For longer term sustainability, the project introduced measures to meet recurrent costs of the B. Ed. programme. One of these was student fees. Recurrent costs were estimated to be Aus$36,000 per annum, which in 1995/96 was about Aus$124 per student. The project introduced a pilot, voluntary student contribution of Aus$55 per semester per students, which was lowered to Aus$27 in 1996/97, along with charging students for textbooks and personal copies of other course materials (ibid: 148). A second measure was the identification and management of appropriate alternative sources of income for the Cambodian lecturers. These included teaching English in other faculties of the university, to the Cambodian staff of UN organisations, technical courses to commercial organisations and interpretation and translations work. The project team also helped the lecturers establish their own private English courses within the Foreign Language Centre on a profit sharing basis with the Centre. By October 1996, the lecturers were earning an average US$100 per month from these alternative sources, on top of their state salaries, project supplements and their own
146 private teaching (ibid: 149). These measures meant the local staff were retained in their positions so that by the end of the project in June 1997, there were 28 trained Cambodian lecturers officially attached to the Department of English at the Foreign Languages Centre, including four who had gained Masters degrees through scholarships for overseas training (ibid: 150).
In her analysis of the sustainability of UPPEEP, Denham, the project’s Academic Director, notes that the two main purposes were ‘to train English teachers for Cambodian high schools and establish a university department staffed entirely by Cambodians capable of providing the training’ (Denham 1997: 131). She points out that the second had been achieved within the life of the project through the use of salary supplements without which the Cambodian staff would have had to seek additional employment. However, the first purpose of training high school teachers had been less successful and that […] few of those successfully completing the course have become school teachers. The salary and conditions of teachers are considerably worse than they can command by working for the private sector or for international agencies. (ibid: 132) She goes on to point out that all of the graduates are in jobs that require English, whether in the private, non-governmental or state sectors, but filling such positions with trained personnel was not the purpose of the project.
Denham’s analysis of the sustainability of the UPEEP project begins with a summary of the assumption underlying ‘sustainable development’: Education and training programs funded through development assistance are based on a number of implicit assumptions commonly shared by donor and recipient. Crucial in the aid process is the assumption that the donor’s ways of doing things are in some respects better than the recipient’s. Without this assumption, there would be little point in either requesting or offering the assistance. Another assumption underlying education and training assistance is that in the course of the education aid program the recipient will obtain the knowledge and skills being transferred and absorb, at least to some extent, the donor’s behaviour. Equally important is the corollary that the donor’s skills and knowledge are relevant and transferable across cultures. The donor may also assume that once the skills and knowledge have been transferred and the aid package has ceased, the recipient will maintain the new patterns of behaviour. This is the ultimate goal of an aid program and when it is achieved, the aid is called
147 ‘sustainable development.’ Each of these assumptions is at very least arguable. (Denham 1997: 129-30) Despite being ‘arguable’, she uses these assumptions as a framework for analysing the sustainability of the UPPEEP project. She argues that due to large-scale immigration Australia has spent considerable amounts on research into the most successful methods and techniques for teaching and learning languages and the development of materials. Thus, whilst recognising the unequal power relations between donor and recipient, she points out that it was not without logic for Cambodia to request assistance for ELT from Australia. However, this begs the further question of how appropriate and applicable the methods and materials developed in Australia are to the educational context of Cambodia. The sustainability of the materials and methods depends on how the appropriate and applicable they are for the Cambodian trainers, teachers and students who use them. Denham deals with these questions at the cultural level, arguing that the project adopted a ‘culturally neutral’ approach in which methods and techniques were demonstrated as a means of providing possible options rather than imposing specific practices. It was then left to the individual teacher or student as to whether they would use these options (ibid: 132-3). Denham elaborates on this by arguing that elements of Western language teaching practice are not possible to implement in Cambodia, such as learner autonomy, as traditionally students and parents expect teachers to assume responsibility for students’ learning. Whilst the B. Ed. (TEFL) students were familiarised with what the project staff considered to be the benefits of learner-autonomy and learner-centred classrooms, she contends that: Once they enter the workforce as teachers in private schools, they have little opportunity to use these approaches to language learning, except if they become part of the small minority who obtain employment as lecturers in the B. Ed. (TEFL) course. In many of the private schools, the larger the number of pupils in the class, the greater the teacher’s income. Staff are paid according to the number of the pupils enrolled in their class. This way of managing the language programs militates against learner autonomy and accepts that students do not view learning as an active process. (ibid: 133)
148 Interestingly, she only talks about private schools, despite the fact that the project aimed to trained teachers for the state sector. Denham also reveals here that, despite the claims to simply providing ‘options’, the final sentence implies that students should be autonomous and active learners.
Retraining teachers The aim of the original QSA CELT project had been to produce trained English teachers for Cambodian secondary schools, and the B. Ed. (TEFL) programme had been a central part of this. During the UPPEEP phase of the project a tracer study of the 129 graduates from 1993-1996 was conducted. Thirty of the graduates had gone on to be lecturers on the programme (with two later resigning) and eight lecture in other higher education programmes, whilst only twenty-three had become high school teachers and five had become full-time teachers in private schools. Of the rest, thirty were working in government ministries, NGOs or UN organisations, eight in journalism, translating and interpreting and librarianship and twenty-five had gone into private study, private business or overseas (ibid: 155). Overall, less than one quarter of the graduates went on to work in state education. In an earlier seminar paper, Coyne had argued that the reason for this was because the Ministry has not insisted graduates teach in state schools, but merely offered them positions and this lack of government planning undermines the potential impact of the project (Coyne, Geoff 1996: 161). He points out that ‘Cambodia has changed from a command economy to a market driven economy’ (ibid), and so students should be prepared to pay fees for higher education. However, this same market-driven economy means that the Ministry cannot place graduate according to a plan, but must necessarily leave this to market mechanisms. These mechanisms tend to favour the international agencies and private sector where salaries and other payments are much higher than the state sector. This includes the B. Ed. (TEFL) programme itself whilst the salary supplements were being paid by foreign donors. Coyne was concerned that ‘the commitment of lecturers to the programme is uncertain … [i]t may be that some will leave the program when the
149 salary supplement is further reduced and eventually withdrawn’ (ibid: 161-2). One member of the QSA team reflecting on her experience wondered how ‘an ostensibly simple teacher training program has been turned into the second most desirable course for the elite in the entire country’ (Oats 1994: 125). This elite status and the accompanying fees that can be charged have kept the programme in operation and qualified staff in place, as have the private courses that still operate within the Foreign Language Centre. However, although details are not kept, according to Ministry staff I spoke to the programme now produces few teachers for state schools.
Another component of the CELT project were the in-service teacher training or ‘recyclage’ courses established for secondary teachers in Phnom Penh and some provinces who were already teaching English. Although the Review Team regarded this component as a noteworthy achievement of CELT, they advised that it should be taken over by another organisation on the grounds of ‘improved cost effectiveness.’ They also felt that Cambodian teachers who had been through this course were then competent to train other teachers on similar courses. (Oats 1994: 138-9). QSA team members who had been involved in the ‘recyclage’ courses were unhappy with the Review’s implied criticisms of their professional competence, but also saw this as a waste of resources. Oats records one commenting: It would be educational stupidity to take Recyclage away from QSA teachers, who have their own personal experience of teaching Recyclage, as well as QSA’s corporate experience in this area and to give it to new teachers inexperienced in Recyclage in Cambodia. (ibid: 139) The ‘recyclage’ courses were not continued into the next phase of the project, but were taken up by the pilot phase of CAMSET, which ran in-service courses in three blocks of ten weeks that under CAMSET 2 became one year in-service courses. Whilst the QSA courses provided input for the later CAMSET courses the trainers involved were either ex-patriot CBC/CAMSET project staff or VSO volunteers, none of whom had worked on the QSA courses. However, some of the Cambodian teachers did take part in both courses, including some who went on to be teacher trainers, inspectors and trainer trainers with CAMSET.
150
Textbooks The QSA team also worked with the Ministry’s Textbook Committee to design and produce an ELT textbook for secondary schools, the Cambodia English Course, which was to be accompanied by a teacher’s manual. The book was produced in draft by senior Ministry official, Suon Champu, and later re-written in Australia and in Cambodia by textbook consultants. Printing by a Phnom Penh print shop was arranged and camera ready copy was produced, but production problems and unavailability of Ministers until after the May 1993 elections meant that final Ministry approval was not obtained until July 1993. At this point, ‘AIDAB without warning arbitrarily ordered all work to cease on the textbook’ (ibid: 85). Oats provides no explanation of this suspension, but the one textbook for Grade 6 beginners of English was completed as an additional consultancy to the UPPEEP project, though it barely rates a mention in Denham’s edited collection on the project (see King 1997: 11). The textbook was finally produced in February 1994, but distribution problems continued. Although originally planned as a series for all six grades of secondary school English, only the first book was produced and without a teacher’s guide. However, according to one informant, it was used in some schools without a teacher’s guide and was often divided into three parts to be use in grades six to eight (George interview 17-03-02). Pirate copies of the book were also still available in markets during my time in Cambodia and it was sometimes advertised on the boards of small private schools. The book was not used in the early stages of CAMSET and, according to George Taylor, the design of the original in-service training courses ‘bore not relation to the […] book, it didn’t actually teach them to use the […] book, [… but] bits of Headway and bits of other things’ (interview 17-03-02). It was used as a reference during the redesign of the English syllabus under CAMSET 1, but neither the Cambodian English Course nor any of the Ministry staff involved in its production appear to have been involved in the design and production of English for Cambodia.
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In the following chapters, I will examine the workings of CAMSET in more detail as means of illuminating my overall argument concerning the role and effects of English and aid-funded English language teaching in Cambodia.
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Chapter 5: The Cultural Politics of ELT in Cambodia
Introduction
Following the Takeo RTTC graduation ceremony in August 2000 there was a party for staff and students held outside the main administration building with lots of food and beer supplied and dancing led by the art and culture teacher. During the party some of my students explained that three students in other subjects had been failed and so would not graduate, and many of the other students felt this was very unfair and they were angry. As the party continued, some of the male second year students turned over tables, ripped up some of the new gardens, destroying small sugarpalms, and had got into scuffles with some of the teaching staff. At some point, the police were called and then there was a tense and sullen stand-off between the students and the staff, but no resolution of the issues.
Cambodian students are often described by both Cambodians and expatriates as ‘passive’. However, this minor protest was not unusual. Thomas Clayton describes student protests in higher education against the use of French as the language of instruction which culminated in students at the Institute of Technology of Cambodia in May 1995 disrupting classes for three weeks, burning tires and effigies (Clayton 2002: 3). Vin McNamara, a education consultant working in Cambodia, in analysing the 1994 reform of university entrance exams, which reduced the rate of entry to universities and corrupt payments for unqualified entry, suggest that the nature and high costs of the reforms has two driving forces. The first is the need of severely underpaid education staff to extract extra income form the state, whilst the second may be the desire of the government not to return to the situation of higher education overfilled with potentially disruptive students. David Ayres discusses student
153 involvement in political protests against both the Sihanouk and Lon Nol regimes and the links students had with left-wing and communist teachers, but also student involvement in anticommunist protests. However, he tends to dismiss the students’ activities, arguing that the majority ‘were reacting to the imperatives of their teachers or the imperatives of education ministry officials’ (Ayres 2000a: 57).
Aid agency discourses construct students as passive receivers and regurgitators of slabs of knowledge, made even more passive and disengaged through the effects of ‘traditional’ teaching methodologies and authoritarian teachers. These student-teacher relations are said to be derived from Cambodian ‘tradition.’ Education and teachers are seen in as central to the reproduction of ‘traditional’ social relations of power. Primary socialisation within the family emphasises that children should not act independently, ask questions, think or analyse for themselves or challenge the authority figures and to respect those older and above them in the hierarchy (O'Leary and Meas 2001: 60). Within education these norms and values are reinforced through the student-teacher relationship. Writing about the chbab, Khmer traditional normative poems, Chandler comments: According to the chbab, these authority figures convey material to be memorized. There is nothing to discuss. The teacher’s relation to his student, like so many relationships in Cambodian society, is lopsided. The teacher, like a parent, bestows, transmits, and commands. The student, like the child, receives, accepts, and obeys. Nothing changes in the transmission process, except perhaps the ignorance of the student; knowledge is passed on from student to student over generations, and this involves little or no “progress” (Chandler 1996: 90) These social relations of power, rooted in the Angkorean era and transmitted through the ‘traditional’ education system are viewed as structuring contemporary Cambodian classroom relations and practice. David Ayres, an academic characterises contemporary classroom practice thus: Instead of learning to consider options, make decisions, and solve problems, Cambodia's students are encouraged to memorize slabs of often useless information. A successful student is one who can then regurgitate the slabs in an examination. The roots of this dominant culture of instruction are deep-seated. In the first instance, they
154 are a direct reflection of the educational practices of pre-revolutionary and colonial times. Beyond that, the culture of instruction is a remnant of the precolonial era, when Cambodia's monks were also the nation's only teachers. It is a culture based on precolonial interpersonal relations, with the teaching process underscoring the teacher's authoritarian stance towards the student. Put simply, teachers talked and students listened. (Ayres 1999a) In a similar fashion, the discourses of the myriad international agencies which have flooded into Cambodia since the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991, portray Cambodian classrooms as dominated by authoritarian teachers uncritically transmitting information to passive students. One early example, a 1991 consultant’s report on education for the international NGO Redd Barna, noted that the ‘Cambodian teaching methodology gives little scope for students’ self learning: the teachers frequently dictate the lesson and the students are meant to memorize’ (Galasso 1990: 20). An early proposal for the CAMSET project describes how ‘[s]tudents read from the blackboard, copy and listen to the teacher […] the typical lesson is highly teacher-centred’ (Kennett 1992: 2e), and an account of an Australian aid-funded higher education project remarks that in ‘the classroom, teachers and active and students are passive’ (Coyne 1997: 31).
These characterisations of the Cambodian classroom are not wholly inaccurate, however, I suggest that they fail to provide a clear understanding of what happens in Cambodian classrooms, either ‘traditional’ or contemporary. A recent evaluation report on a World Bank funded primary education quality improvement project pointed out that: [s]urprisingly, amongst the welter of professional literature on education in Cambodia available to researchers, there are comparatively few studies based on close observation and investigation at school level. (Geeves, et al. 2002: iii) Even that report, which evaluates the effects of a project that in part aimed to promote ‘pupilcentred teaching’ the measure of teacher quality is whether or not they are teaching through ‘childcentred’ methods. What is not considered is that supposedly ‘traditional’ methods, easily labelled and dismissed as ‘chalk-and-talk’ or ‘rote-learning’, may actually be effective methods of teaching given the constraints the teachers work within. Ironically, the VSO volunteers who worked on that
155 project went through the same Khmer language training as myself in Phnom Penh, which was highly teacher-controlled, involved elements of rote-learning, listening and repeating the teachers’ stock phrases, and we all had nothing but praise for the teacher and the effectiveness of his teaching.
This chapter discusses the hegemonic model of teaching being introduced through the operations of aid-funded projects, using the example of the CAMSET teacher training materials. These materials represent one example of a hegemonic model centred on notions of ‘learner centred learning’ widely in use in a variety of aid-funded education projects in Cambodia. This model largely ignored the previous training and experience of Cambodian teachers, as I discussed earlier often constructed as untrained and inexperienced, but also fails to engage with the real constraints faced by these teachers in their work – particularly constraints of time and finance. The CAMSET variation of this hegemonic model, as contained in the teacher training materials, was a particularly authoritarian and doctrinaire version despite claiming to be aimed to ‘empower’ students within the classroom. It established sets of binary opposition in which privileged Western derived educational knowledge and practice was privileged over Cambodian educational knowledge and practice. These materials and the virtual imposition of this particular method goes to the heart of the undemocratic nature of this mode of development intervention. These were designed, produced and initially implemented largely without consultation with Cambodia education staff and at the whim of expatriate staff on the basis of minimal research into Cambodian education and the lives of Cambodian teachers and students.
Pennycook argues that ELT ‘beliefs, practices and materials […] represent particular understandings of language, communication, learning, education and so on [which are] not merely random views, but rather are very much part of a broad range of discursive and cultural practices that emanate from the “West” […] connected in a complex reciprocal relationship to the expansion of English and other forms of culture and knowledge’ (Pennycook 1994: 178). In analysing the materials, I
156 draw out contradictions in these texts, by which I mean, where the texts undermine their own claims to openness through a reading which highlights the authoritarianism embedded in the texts. This is not to claim that the texts are somehow wrong or that other methods or approaches would provide more effective teacher training - there is little clear evidence that any ELT ‘method’ is more effective then any other (Ablin 1991: 39, Pennycook 1989: 612).
The training texts, and other project documents, establish a hierarchical binary of modern/traditional in which ‘modern’ pedagogies are contrasted to the ‘traditional’ pedagogies said to dominate Cambodian education. These ‘modern’ pedagogies, according to project documents, produce more efficient and effective learning and teaching, which provides the rationale for their use. In particular, the claim is made that these methods ‘empower’ learners to take part in more meaningful communicative language learning activities in the classroom. I problematise these claims showing how the view of ‘empowerment’ being proposed is limited to a proposed shift of power within the classroom from teacher to students, who it is then claimed are more in control of and responsible for their own learning. Although this is the claim made for the ‘learner-centred’ and ‘communicative’ materials and methods produced by the project, I show how these materials can also be read (and therefore implemented) as increasing the power of the teacher over the students, specifically through an increased role for the teacher in setting the aims and objectives of the lesson and through increased surveillance of students and students’ work. I then examine at how the use of these materials in classrooms produced ambiguous and highly contingent readings by both trainers and trainee-teachers. A combination of the ambiguity of the materials, the different understanding and interpretations of the trainers and trainees and existing educational norms produce complex and unclear outcomes which reflect the contingent nature of classroom interactions rather than some abstract notion of the imposition of cultural values and norms embedded in educational/ELT materials.
157 Prior to examining the materials themselves, I discuss the pedagogical theories and practices they claim to be based in. The first is communicative language teaching (CLT).
Communicative Language Teaching Although often referred to by practitioners as a ‘method,’ communicative language teaching is not a unified body of educational and linguistic knowledge and teaching and learning techniques and procedures. There are disagreements within the ELT profession about what is meant by CLT and ‘communicative language use’ (e.g. Seedhouse 1996, Thompson 1996, Lewis and McCook 2002) and whether it actually occurs in ELT classrooms (e.g. Kumaravadivelu 1993). However, as the following quotes show, there is a degree of agreement about the characteristics of CLT. Communicative language teaching makes use of real-life situations that necessitate communication. The teacher sets up a situation that students are likely to encounter in real life. Unlike the audiolingual method of language teaching, which relies on repetition and drills, the communicative approach can leave students in suspense as to the outcome of a class exercise, which will vary according to their reactions and responses. The real-life simulations change from day to day. Students' motivation to learn comes from their desire to communicate in meaningful ways about meaningful topics. (Galloway 1993) […] a communicative classroom seeks to promote interpretation, expression and negotiation of meaning. This means learners ought to be active, not just reactive, in class. They should be encouraged to ask for information, seek clarification, express an opinion, agree and/or disagree with peers and teachers. More importantly they should be guided to go beyond memorized patterns and monitored repetitions in order to initiate and participate in meaningful interaction. (Kumaravadivelu 1993: 12) At the more abstract end there is general agreement that CLT involves an emphasis on communicating by means of the foreign language […]; at the practical classroom end, CLT is strongly associated with a number of particular activity types, such as problem-solving and pair work. (Thompson 1996: 9) Common to all versions of Communicative Language Teaching, however, is a theory of language teaching that starts from a communicative model of language and language use, and that seeks to translate this into a design for an instructional system, for materials, for teacher and learner roles and behaviours, and for classroom activities and techniques. (Richards and Rogers 1986: 69)
158 There is an emphasis on ‘real-life’ situations and language, which the teacher should attempt to provide or replicate in the classroom. This assumes the learners will be using the language in their ‘real lives.’ The assumption derives from the situation of learners of English in English speaking environments. The majority of Cambodian school students and their teachers would be unlikely to be English in their everyday lives, thus the emphasis on oral communication is misplaced. There is also the assumption that the teacher can provide this ‘reality’ in terms of both linguistic content and context. This may be possible where the teacher is a well-trained, linguistically aware, competent user of the English in an English speaking environment, but is far more difficult in Cambodia where some or all of these are not the case. There is a further emphasis on variety in the language classroom, variety of tasks, texts and activities. Together with the meaningfulness of ‘real-life’ situations and language, these are viewed as creating an inherently motivating situation for the learner. This assumes the teacher is capable of providing those meaningful materials and topics either by using appropriate textbooks or by gathering and adapting their own materials. A further assumption, and one directly relevant to most Cambodian teachers, is that the teacher has the time and finances for these. As I indicated previously, Cambodian teachers work on inadequate incomes in a severely under-funded state education system and thus have to spend their non-classroom hours earning money outside state education.
CLT contains a focus on learner-centred learning in which the learner is characterised as motivated, active and participatory. The above quote from Kumaravadivelu tends toward the ‘strong’ version of CLT in which language is not just practiced through communication, but is actively learnt (Howatt 1984: 279 cited in Richards and Rogers 1986: 66). The learner is an active participant in the lesson, takes responsibility for their own learning and is questioning, critical, able to openly express their opinions to both other students and with the teacher. This assumes that the learner is familiar with this approach to learning, that it is something they have encountered outside the language classroom, perhaps throughout their education and within wider society. It also assumes an equality
159 of power between the teacher and learner which allows the learner to openly negotiate with, question and disagree with the teacher. Thus classrooms are seen as spaces for discussion and contestation – whether this happens in practice is open to question. However, what this fails to deal with are the radical differences in teacher-student relations in different societies.
CLT is often contrasted with some other ‘method’ (in this case audiolingualism) which is portrayed as inferior and characterised as mechanical, repetitive, and reliant on memorization or rote learning. As Pennycook points out, part of the orthodoxy of ELT contends: that there has been a series of teaching methods over the years, each being succeeded by a better one until we reach the present. Here we find (a) the best method (or approach) to date, (b) a proliferation of new and exciting methods from which to choose, and (c) the promise of even better things to come. (Pennycook 1989: 597-8) This view of CLT as the ‘best method’ in a continuing stream of progressive teaching methods, is rarely questioned. What has been challenged is the cultural appropriateness of CLT, especially in Asian countries. Many practitioners’ argue that CLT requires cultural adaptation (for examples see Ellis 1996, Lewis and McCook 2002, Holliday 1994). One result of this has been a move toward producing ‘culturally appropriate’ textbooks, like the English for Cambodia series, and a variety of suggestions for the adaptation of methods or ways of applying methods in different settings that may be regarded as more ‘culturally appropriate’ or ‘culturally sensitive’. The questions or problems they generally deal with is how to improve the quality and efficiency of English teaching through taking into account cultural factors. This focus on notions of culture, a seriously problematic term and often one often reified by ELT professionals, tends to gloss over issues of power. Adrian Holliday, whose text Appropriate Methodology and Social Context is often cited in discussions of culture and ELT, in looking at the design and implementation of ‘appropriate methodologies’ argues that:: [r]ather than the destructive notion of cultural imperialism I prefer the market place analogy, where parties are all equal and there is a tremendous potential for industry. Also, this analogy helps reduce the ‘us’ and ‘them’ problem. Market places are essentially cosmopolitan societies, where people come from afar to buy and sell; and ‘afar’ might be anything from a village down the valley to a distant land. Yet, within the intimacy of dealing, outsiders and insiders of
160 all sorts of different types might begin to lose their foreignness and become just people with different types of personalities. (Holliday 1994: 7) Holliday appears to miss the irony of his rather naïve analogy – that the global ‘melting pot’ he views the ‘cosmopolitan society’ of the market to be, marks both himself and his argument as located in a specific culture and, I would contend, class. His wish for transcendence so that all become ‘just people with different types of personalities’ parallels the neo-classical economic arguments of Milton Friedman (1980), in which the ‘invisible hand’ of the market is also ‘blind’ to the class, gender, ethnicity, age and nationality of the participants. And, like Friedman’s economics, it ignores the empirical realities of structural inequalties. The essential individualism contained in his description is a common feature of work in the ELT profession, clearly marking its own cultural roots in certain aspects of Western philosophy. However, other writers on methods, and on CLT are much clearer about issues of power.
Proponents of CLT argue that the tasks and activities in CLT are intended to increase the learner’s control over the learning process and shift the balance of power in the classroom away from the teacher. This shift and some of the issues surrounding it are neatly summarised by one proponent. Drills and the like vest power in the teacher, while communicative tasks such as role plays, problem-solving tasks and simulations give much more control to the learner. There is little doubt that the types of communicative tasks which have been developed for second and foreign language learning are intended to change the balance of power in the learner’s direction. (Whether, in fact, these intentions are realised is another matter.) Authority power and control have become major issues with the rise of communicative language teaching. When we ask learners to communicate in a language over which they have only partial control, we are asking them to take risks, which many of them may feel unhappy about. For many older learners who have learned other second languages in classrooms where traditional approaches prevailed, the fact that they are asked to extemporise in a language over which they have only rudimentary control is extremely threatening. (Nunan 1989: 86) Although these intentions might not be realised, they are there as an integral, and potentially radical, aspect of CLT. For Nunan, the central problem in effecting this shift is the resistance of ‘traditional’ (and usually older!) learners, based in their fear of change and the threatening nature of risk taking in the classroom.
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The contrast of ‘modern’ CLT with ‘traditional approaches’ is one found widely in ELT texts, to the extent that, at least until recently, CLT represented the dominant ideology of English language teaching. As I show in the following sections, the materials and methods produced within CAMSET employed this same contrast as part of an attempt to impose language teaching methods broadly defined as CLT.
Changing Classroom Culture At the heart of the methodological changes promoted by CAMSET were two perceived aspects of Cambodia teaching and learning, which required changing. The first was that Cambodian teachers employed teacher-centred methods, which required changing to methods promoting studentcentred learning. Secondly, Cambodian teachers were supposedly teaching through ‘grammartranslation,’ which needed to be changed to methods based on Communicative Language Teaching. These changes were initially proposed in the trial phase of the project based on the analysis of Cambodian English language classrooms by expatriate project staff. No details of this analysis are available. An extract from the original in-service training programme proposal, written by CBC/CAMSET 1 teacher training advisor, Psyche Kennett, summarises the perceptions and proposed changes. Very little learning to speak English takes place. Students read from the blackboard, copy and listen to the teacher. Time is not managed so that the maximum number of students have the opportunity to speak and there is no real pairwork or groupwork (i.e. with all the students in the class working simultaneously). The typical lesson is highly teacher-centred. Teachers need an approach and a variety of classroom techniques that will ensure that real, communicative learning takes place. (Kennett 1995: np, emphasis in original) This defines ‘real’ learning as students speaking, to each other, not just the teacher, in pairs or groups, thus ‘real’ learning is learning to communicate orally in English. Cambodian teachers’ current practice is dismissed without discussion in the sentence: ‘The typical lesson is highly teacher-
162 centred,’ with the implication being that ‘teacher-centred’ teaching is not ‘real’ teaching. There is a strongly expressed desire to change the culture of Cambodian (language) education, both in terms of methods and techniques and in terms of the relationship between teachers and students.
The same document provides brief, but indicative, descriptions of the approaches that this in-service course will train Cambodian teachers to implement in their classrooms. Although brief summaries, these contain a number of claims and assumptions about cultures of teaching and learning which continued through the life of the project and are found in the final versions of the teacher training materials I analyse below. These also contain characterisations of Cambodian classroom activity and teacher student relations that the new methods seek to change. 2.3
Communicative Approach
The methodology is based on teaching structural/lexical syllabuses, communicatively. On this course “communicative approach” is not narrowly defined, as it often is, as a way of teaching English by using integrated functional-notional-skills based syllabuses where grammar is not taught discretely. Rather it is defined in its wider sense, as meaningful interaction in the classroom where students learn to communicate in situations relevant to their needs, be it through grammar, vocabulary, functions or the four skills. 2.4
Learner Centred Lessons
The methodology is based on a learner centred approach. Trainees are encouraged to change their perception of the roles of teachers and learners and to realise that learning is more important than teaching. Students have rights and dignity; real learning takes place in the classroom; mistakes are positive signs of real learning; students can achieve a great deal more than is traditionally accepted by Cambodian teachers; it is the teacher’s job to facilitate the students in talking, not to do all the talking; learning takes place in a variety of work arrangements and the traditional plenary set-up is only effective in certain stages of the lesson; decentralised classrooms encourage independence; students should be encouraged to be independent of the teacher (because they are on their own in the real world); students should acquire self and peer study habits and share rather than compete in the learning process. (Kennett op cit.: np) The approaches being introduced are described as ‘meaningful’, and students learn to ‘communicate in situations relevant to their needs’ providing ‘real learning.’ This ‘real learning’ includes making of mistakes, which is something teachers need to facilitate - presumably to avoid ‘unreal’ or ‘false’ learning. A key claim here is that ‘learning is more important than teaching.’ This rationalises a shift
163 in emphasis in the classroom from teachers to students, which, although this implies a shift in relations of power between the two, is viewed in the materials as a simple matter to be achieved through the use of specific classroom techniques. The passage on the ‘rights and dignity’ of students and that teachers need to recognise that ‘students can achieve a great deal more than is “traditionally” accepted by Cambodian teachers,’ reflect the view of Cambodian education as authoritarian and dominated by teachers discussed earlier. Teachers should be ‘facilitating’ students to become more independent, because independence from the teacher and learning alone or in cooperation with peers more accurately reflects the position of students in the ‘real world.’ This ‘real world’ appears to be one in which the independent, empowered individual is prime. All of these claims carry implicit characterisations of ‘traditional’ Cambodian teaching as opposite to these new methods, and thus not ‘real’ language learning. Cambodian teachers, and especially English teachers, at that time were said to be largely untrained, making what this ‘traditional’ teaching style was unclear.
The linguistic structures in the summaries provide no space for discussion, contradicting the supposed philosophy of the methods being promoted and the whole in-service course itself. The present simple tense is widely used (‘Students have rights,’ mistakes are positive’) and sometimes accompanied with the modal verb ‘should’ (‘students should acquire’). One use of this tense is to talk about things that are always true or that are scientific fact. The modal verb ‘should’ is used to express something we want to happen, but also contains a sense of obligation. In the course aims, emphasis is placed on the trainee teachers ‘working in groups discussing and differing openly […] thinking and questioning issues in education [and becoming] more independent.’ However, the language of the summaries leaves no room for discussion or questioning of the approaches. I show below, in the analysis of the teacher training materials, the continuity of this lack of openness.
164 The prescriptive nature of the texts and their implementation was a source of tension and contestation throughout the life of the project, which reflected an attempt at an imposition of a ‘Western method.’ By this I mean a culture of teaching and learning that claimed to originate in European humanist ideals and was developed through the work of European and North American applied linguist and ELT practitioners. At the time the project began, Communicative Language Teaching and learner-centred approaches were the dominant ideology of English language teaching in the UK and Europe. However, the approach was not the only one to be recommended or used at this time in Cambodia. In Ablin’s (1991: 37) analysis of ELT provision in Cambodia, he describes two international NGOs which had ‘set up large English-teaching programs whose curriculum is closely based on […] the audiolingual [method]’. He also details the limitations of communicative approaches specific to Cambodia; the fact that CLT over-emphasises speaking skills which may not be what students require; that it is a time-consuming approach; that it requires students to move around and move the furniture which Cambodian students may be reluctant to do and requires a strong, self-confident teacher to persuade them; that it contains an over-emphasis on fluency and ‘native-speaker’ skills; that it is highly demanding on teachers time and takes considerable preparation; that it is often difficult to use in large classes, and; that it neglects grammar. For these reasons, Ablin recommended that methods or approaches suitable for the needs and situation of both the learners and the teachers should be chosen (ibid: 38-9).
Despite Ablin’s concerns and recommendations, communicative and learner-centred approaches were widely promoted over other possible approaches not only by CAMSET, but also by QSA in their training courses and the textbook they produced. An NGO planning study report for ELT in Cambodia (Australian Catholic Relief 1991) recommended these approaches and the World Bank similarly saw a need for ‘modern, child-centered teaching methods’ throughout education (World Bank 1994: 115).39 These reports and projects thus accepted the dominant ideology of Western ELT This report also noted that foreign language programmes accounted for ‘over half the total NGO outlays in higher education’ (op cit.: 122). 39
165 that these approaches allow greater learner autonomy and participation in the learning process, and were regarded as ‘modern’ and ‘progressive’. Pennycook (1989) has pointed out that this view of CLT misrepresents transformations in language teaching over centuries as some linear progression of increasingly ‘scientific’ and ‘efficient’ practices. Arguments for inductive grammar teaching appeared in the 4th century, for following ‘natural learning’ in the 15th, for ‘learning by doing’ and learner-centeredness, the use of games, ‘real’ examples, variety in lessons, dialogues, role play, pair and group work and communication were all recommended by 17th century language practitioner Comenius (ibid: 599-600). Although a historical misreading, the view of CLT as ‘modern’ and ‘scientific’ is widely accepted within the profession and was accepted within the texts and practices of those agencies involved in ELT in Cambodia.
Teacher Training Materials The CAMSET teacher training programme comprised a set of courses designed and developed over the lifetime of the project. The courses for in-service and pre-service teacher training differed slightly, due to time constraints, but they involved all or part of the six main components: 1. Language Upgrading – (English for Cambodia textbooks)
161 hours
2. Methodology
240
3. Introduction to Learning and Teaching (ILT)
44
4. Pronunciation & Language Awareness
36
5. Visual Aids
30
6. Study Skills
22
The final pre-service curriculum allocated a total of 1098 classroom hours to complete the courses, including time for revision and assessment, although as in other parts of the education system that number of hours was never available. Here I analyse the two core courses which aimed train teachers into a particular culture of education – Methodology (240 hours) and Introduction to
166 Learning and Teaching (ILT) (44 hours) – for what Pennycook (op cit:: 178-9) refers to as the ‘beliefs, practices and materials […] represent particular understandings of language, communication, learning, education and so on.’ The Language Upgrading course acted as a way for the trainers to demonstrate the ‘methods’ contained in the two core courses. As Robert Shrubshall, CAMSET’s textbook specialist, described it: […] the idea of the textbook was to reinforce the communicative teaching methodology that CAMSET was propagating. And the textbook is designed to help teachers implement that in their classrooms. So that, to me, to turn the teaching methodology around from a rather autocratic teaching methodology in the classroom, which reflects, of course, the nature of the society, to a more democratic, participatory activity in the classroom. Well, I think that is actually a revolutionary thing. (interview Robert 27-02-1)
There are two important themes I point to in the materials. First, that what these courses are claiming to promote is openness toward what is possible in the classroom, and in relations between trainer and trainee, teacher and student. Second, a perception of an existing classroom culture which is the opposite of this openness and emphasises ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and the teacher as the source of knowledge.
The opening unit of Methodology begins with a reading passage which establishes the binary opposition Communicative Approach/Grammar Translation that is reinforced throughout the text and in the units of ILT, which consistently privileges the former over the latter. In Cambodia, we are learning how to use a teaching methodology called the “Communicative Approach.” In the past, you probably learned English through the “Grammar Translation” method. The “Grammar Translation” method has been very popular in Cambodia, but many other parts of the world no longer use it. Most people want to learn a language so that they can communicate easily with other speakers of that language. The “Grammar Translation” method teaches a lot about how a language works, but not so much about how to use it. The “Communicative Approach” does not concentrate on grammar, it aims to teach people many different things about a language so that they can easily communicate with other people and can use the new language with confidence. (Methodology U1) References to the past (‘In the past’, ‘has been very popular’, ‘no longer use it’) imply a ‘new, modern, progressive method’ replacing the ‘old’, that other parts of the world have already adopted.
167 The reason for learning a language is not longer merely to know how it works, but to ‘communicate easily,’ with other people of the world, and with ‘confidence’. This new method achieves this through teaching ‘many different things’ rather than just how the language works. The Communicative Approach is said to promote confident communication through the use of a variety of techniques and materials, whereas Grammar Translation only teaches how the language works through and because of a fixed methodology.
The introduction to ILT reflects the values of both CLT and the learner-centred approach. AIM OF ILT ILT stands for Introduction to Learning and Teaching. The aim of ILT is to get the trainees to discuss topics related to learning and teaching. They can discuss in English or in Khmer. Trainers can explain difficult words or ideas in Khmer, and also discuss with the trainees in Khmer if necessary. Often, there aren’t any right or wrong answers for the tasks. Different trainees will have different ideas and opinions. The aim of the tasks is to make the trainees think about teaching and learning, and to share and discuss their ideas with their colleagues. ILT sessions are not (directly) English Language improvement sessions (although the trainees will probably learn new vocabulary in the sessions). The main aim is to get trainees to think and discuss - and if they disagree with each other, that can be a good thing. We want them to get away from the idea that there is always one right answer to questions about teaching and learning. (ILT U1) The emphasis is on the trainee-teachers discussing topics, rather than on being lectured, with trainers as facilitators and classroom managers providing occasional explanations. There are no ‘right and wrong answers’, instead ideas, opinions, thinking, sharing, discussion, and even disagreeing are all seen as ‘good’ things which promote learning. The final sentence makes clear what ‘we’ (although who this collective is remains unclear) ‘want them to get away from’ is the view currently held that ‘there is always one right answer.’
The sense of openness that learner-centred and CLT approaches claim to value can, as I show below, also be read as the exact opposite – a highly prescriptive view of classroom activities and
168 teacher-student relations. At times the materials imply that anything that can be interpreted as teacher-centred is ‘wrong.’ The materials themselves also contain contradictions. One example is the ‘brainstorm’ technique. This covers various ways of eliciting the ideas, thoughts, views and feelings of the trainee teachers, which are then written on the board by the trainers or sometimes the trainees. The training texts usually include an instruction for the trainer to produce a poster to be used after the brainstorm containing the answers that the material writers anticipate the trainees will give. In my classroom observations, the trainees normally requested time to copy the ‘answers’ from the posters into their notebooks. The trainees may have been interpreting what was written on these posters as the ‘right’ answers as they come from the teacher. And in a sense they are the ‘right’ answers; the material writers had already anticipated them – they knew what they wanted to the trainees to think during the brainstorm. These contradictions appear inescapable as project team members wanted to promote a specific ‘method’ in the belief that this would improve the teaching and learning of English, as well as provide a model which could be adapted to other subject areas.
The second important theme is the characterising of existing practices in Cambodian classrooms. As well as the rejection of Grammar Translation, there is the move away from the idea of a clear ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in teaching and learning. This reflects a widely held perception about the teaching of English and education generally in Cambodia (and other Asian societies40) that it consists of classrooms filled with passive students (‘empty vessels) copying down everything the teacher (‘holder of knowledge’) says or writes on the board. Whilst there may be some validity in this view of Cambodian classrooms, it is not backed up by clear research evidence from the classroom.
40
Littlewood’s (2000) research into Asian and European students’ attitudes towards learning does not back up these preconceptions about Asian students, which he argues require challenging from within the profession.
169
Analysis of materials
Here I analyse selected materials from ILT and Methodology, not to claim they misinterpret CLT/learner-centred teaching or that they would not produce effective teachers (although both these may be debated). Instead, I highlight contradictions in the texts, and how the texts attempt to discipline trainers’ and trainees’ actions and thoughts. The texts make claims to be promoting a methodology and classroom culture that values openness, discussion, dialogue and participation, but this is contradicted by the prescriptive nature of the content. There is little space within the texts for disagreement – no alternative methods are either suggested or provided. However, as I show with excerpts from classroom observations, contradictions within the texts allow spaces for interpretation, for trainers and trainees to reinterpret the methods and practices in their own ‘culturally appropriate’ terms.
‘Good’ and ‘bad’ teachers The texts contain a series of binary oppositions, which contain implicit characterisations of Cambodian teachers (i.e. ‘bad’ teachers), but also set out prescriptive models for ‘good’ teachers. One example is in ILT Session 3, ‘What makes a good teacher?’, in which the trainees have to find adjectives in their dictionaries to describe good and bad teachers. The trainer is instructed to: 4. Make sure that the list includes the following:
170 A Good teacher
A Bad Teacher
organised patient interesting tolerant gentle kind motivating efficient punctual funny
disorganised impatient boring intolerant angry unmotivating late demotivating inefficient
(ILT Session 3) Although the trainees may have found other adjectives, the trainer is clearly instructed which adjectives need to be included and which are ‘good’ and ‘bad.’ The ‘bad’ ones are perhaps easy to agree with, but how essential is it to be ‘funny,’ ‘kind’ or ‘gentle’ as a teacher? But in a ‘method’ laying claim to openness and exploration on the part of the learners, why do these characteristics have to be spelled out?
In the session’s final task, the trainees ‘write a list of statements using should to describe what a teacher should do and should be’ - further reinforcing the characteristics of a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ teacher, a distinction the trainer is encouraged to make clear throughout the session. The modal verb ‘should’ is used again in the next session ‘A Good Teacher Is A Good Listener’ to prescribe teachers actions and responses. After the trainees have marked a series of statements concerning listening either ‘agree’ or ‘disagree,’ the trainer is advised to give this feedback: •
The relevance of all this for the classroom is that the teacher should allow enough time for the students to speak without being interrupted. • The teacher should show her/ his students that (s)he is listening properly and values them by commenting on/ responding to what they say. (ILT Session 4) The trainer is then instructed to put the trainees into small groups to discuss the following: "Is it important for a teacher to be a good listener. If so, why?"
171 This question appears to have already been answered by the trainers’ previous feedback – it is important because of the reasons the trainer has stated. A dictation is suggested as a final activity and concludes: Careful listening demonstrates that the listener values the speaker as a human being. It is very important that students feel that the teacher is interested in them. For this reason, a good teacher will listen carefully to her/his students and respond to them appropriately. (ILT Session 4) The implication here is that Cambodian teachers do not treat their students as human beings, a theme that is continued in Session 12, which I examine below. The dictation contains no space for discussion, but a set of prescriptions of what a ‘good’ teacher should be. On making mistakes ELT specialist and academic, Michael Swan (1985: 74) argues that Communicative Language Teaching ‘over-generalises valid but limited insights until they become meaningless’. An example of this from the materials comes in the attitude teachers and students should adopt toward errors. In CLT fluency of communication, usually spoken, is emphasised over accuracy, as part of the idea that students should be ‘exploring’ and ‘playing’ with language. In this process making mistakes is seen as not only inevitable, but should be welcomed as a sign of learning and progress. So, in ILT Session 5 the trainer is instructed: 5. To conclude, try to dispel fears about speaking English by saying and/or dictating: • Everyone makes mistakes when they speak another language. • It is better to be able to communicate in English than to know perfect grammar but not be able to talk to anyone. • We can learn from our mistakes. • Practice makes perfect. • If you don’t make mistakes, you don’t improve. • It is better to make mistakes now than when you are in the classroom. Cooler: Ask the trainees to give you sentences starting “I feel more confident now about speaking English because I …” Feedback: Encourage answers such as: ... because I know it's OK to make mistakes.
172 ... because I know I will learn to speak better if I make mistakes. ... because I know that communicating is more important than using perfect grammar.
This takes the valid insight that mistakes are an integral aspect of learning to the meaningless extreme of ‘If you don’t make mistakes, you don’t improve’! The dictation and the answers to be ‘encouraged’ provide no space for discussion. Nor is there space to point out that it is not making mistakes that (possibly) aids learning, but being aware of errors and correcting them or having someone, such as a teacher, to correct or help correct them. The issue is discussed in more detail in Methodology Unit 16 Parts 2 and 3 (and reinforced in Unit 1 of Study Skills), which provide explanation and which types of mistakes teachers should correct. But the principle remains the same, as a dictation in Part 2 proclaims – ‘All students make mistakes. That is how we learn.’
The contradiction here is that it encourages teachers to be dismissive of the genuine and valid concerns of learners about making errors. Whilst they are encouraged to develop their own errorcorrection skills, concerns about errors, especially spoken errors, are misplaced. (As I write this, I can hear my own voice, like that of many other ELT teachers, telling student after student ‘don’t worry about making mistakes’. But my response failed to address their concerns.) In Cambodia, value is placed upon accurate speech as Karen Fisher-Nguyen points out in her analysis of Khmer proverbs. Chumpuap choeng kang bat baoe kampuap moat bang brak. If you misstep, you can retrace your steps, but if you are careless with words, it will cost you dearly. Antat chea ati kanlang bang troap thuan phang pipruah antat. The power of the tongue is unlimited; if you lose all it is also because of your tongue. Being able to speak correctly in all situations is highly valued and is often compared to other items of value, as in these two proverbs: Monuh yok samdey damrey yok phluk.
173
Man has speech, the elephant has tusks. Sauv bang brak muoy thang kom aoey bang peak. It’s better to lose money, than to waste words. (Fisher-Nguyen 1994: 103) Like Asian languages, Khmer has a variety of forms of address and vocabulary which mark differences in social rank and kinship. The correct usage of these forms is a sign of politeness and respect, important social values. Without wanting to oversimplify complex cultural codes, I would suggest that the concerns of my Cambodian colleagues and students about their mistakes in English did not reflect some abstract desire for ‘perfect’ grammar, but were rooted in their own sociocultural values. Despite the emphasis on openness and discussion claimed for these methods, the approach to mistakes indicates a closed and fixed attitude, not allowing the exploration of these values and the importance of accurate language use to Cambodian trainers, teachers and students.
How Do You Learn? The lack of openness is also present in various parts of the materials dealing with learning styles. The aims for ILT Sessions 7 and 8 are to get students to reflect on how they learnt as a means of increasing their awareness of different learning styles and that they can learn from each other and by themselves without a teacher. These units attempt to avoid prescribing the idea that some ways or learning are ‘better’ than others, but aim to encourage reflection and discussion on learning styles. The suggested feedback in Session 8 summarises the ideas. There are no 'correct' answers as to the best way to learn English. All of the learning methods described above are useful in some way, but none of them are rules which must always be followed. For example, it is not necessary for a learner to 'write down the translation of every new word or phrase', but this technique can sometimes be helpful to remind learners of the meanings of vocabulary items which they find particularly confusing.
174 However, an earlier note in the session implies that some learning styles are not valid at least for learning English. NOTE: Learning a prayer is very often “learning by heart without understanding”. People who say prayers in a church or in a temple often say them “like a parrot” without understanding. Sometimes the prayers are even in a foreign language (Sanskrit, Pali, Latin, etc). Some students learn to repeat English sentences or passages like this, without understanding, but this is not really learning English. In Unit 9 of Methodology the ‘practice of new language mechanically’ through drills is described as ‘useful for every level of student,’ so the idea of simple repetition is not the issue. The key difference here is the idea of ‘understanding’. The note assumes that for most Cambodian students ‘learning by heart’ means an absence of understanding. Whilst ‘learning by heart’ is included in a list of possible learning styles in the sessions, the note marks it as ‘not really learning English.’ Those styles which reflect the values of CLT, such as ‘speaking as much as possible in class’ or ‘forgetting about grammar and listening to what people say instead’ are not marked in the same fashion. Similarly, ‘learning by heart’ is not included in the ILT Unit 9 activity ‘Ranking different learning activities’ nor the Study Skills units on learning styles, although drilling is included as a form of Auditory Learning. This portrayal of ‘learning by heart’ is characteristic of a negative attitude toward memorisation within the ELT profession. One writer discussing this in connection with Chinese students makes the following telling remarks: That Western teachers respond to memorization by Chinese students with such derision and scorn is, I venture to suggest, not a mark of advanced scientific thinking, but the response of persons raised in a society used to the instant obsolescence of words. Perhaps Westerners need to reflect carefully on this matter and ask why there is apparently nothing worth memorizing in Western society today. (Sampson 1984: 29 cited in Pennycook 1994: 163) Whilst I might take issue with Sampson’s stereotyping of Western society, the claim that memorisation is a part of an inefficient, unscientific and ‘traditional’ learning ‘method’ is one often heard from ELT practitioners, despite their often professed eclecticism. And in the CAMSET materials it is negatively associated with the ‘traditional Grammar Translation’ which is to be replaced with ‘modern CLT’.
175 Motivation The theme of motivation appears throughout the teacher training materials. A ‘good’ teacher is characterised as ‘motivating’ (ILT S3) and motivation is described as a ‘key’ to discipline (ILT S16), CLT and learner-centred activities are ‘motivating’ rather than ‘boring’ (Methodology U6 S1), and testing activities are said to ‘motivate weak students’ (Methodology U20 S2). The sections on motivation demonstrate how these materials and methods attempt to discipline the thoughts and actions of trainers, teachers and students.
ILT Session 11: Motivation – Making Students Confident deals how the teacher can motivate students and why this is important for learning English. This session contains specific prescriptions for teacher/teaching styles and the classroom environment, which are said to enhance learner motivation. Assuming that trainees are unaware of its meaning, there is a gap-fill exercise to help the trainees understand the word motivation. This describes motivation as the ‘key to learning English successfully’ and without it students ‘will probably find it difficult to learn the language.’ Whilst ‘teachers cannot force students to want to learn English’ there are many things they ‘can do to help motivate their students’ and things they do that might make them ‘demotivated’. Thus, motivation becomes the central task/duty of the teacher.
Trainers are then instructed to put trainees into groups to think of ways teachers can motivate their students. This section has a series of ‘suggested answers’ for the trainees to come up with, which are then reinforced through the following handout.
176 Box 1: ILT Session 11 Handout A GOOD LEARNING ENVIRONMENT Try to make your classroom a good place to learn. This is not easy in Cambodia. The school buildings are old and often need repairing. Most schools don't have electricity so there are no lights or fans. Usually there are many students in each class so there isn't much space. You can't change this, but there are some things you can do to make your classroom a better place to learn. Here are some ideas: •
Be enthusiastic
•
Be confident (or pretend to be confident.
Teachers have to be actors
sometimes.) •
Make sure you look at every student in the class
•
Remember to smile
•
Learn the names of your students. Show interest in them, and be patient with them when they make mistakes.
•
Praise your students regularly
•
Use gestures and facial expressions to help your students understand
•
Use lots of drawings and pictures to make your lessons interesting
•
Reduce teacher talking time (TTT), increase student talking time (STT)
•
Ask questions (elicit) often, give explanations (tell) less often
•
Allow enough time for students to listen and think before they speak
•
Listen carefully to your students and respond to what they say
•
Encourage your students to work in pairs and small groups
•
Encourage cooperation not competition
•
Move around the class. Monitor carefully and help weaker students.
•
Encourage your students to ask questions
•
Don't forget your sense of humour
•
Respect your students. Don't forget that they are human beings too.
•
Be fair. Don't have favourites.
•
Teach the whole class, not just the stronger students.
•
Most importantly, don't forget to enjoy yourself.
177 That the imperative form, usually denoting orders, is used here is a marker of a lack of openness and potential for discussion or even disagreement with this view of the learning environment. The detailed list of instructions of how the teacher can promote motivation appears to contradict the view that access to well-paid work and ‘modern’ knowledge are sufficient motivation for learning English. The ‘ideas’ describe in minute detail how the teacher should teach - ‘use lots of drawings,’ ‘ask questions,’ ‘teach the whole class’ - but also how they should move – ‘use gestures and facial expressions,’ ‘move around the class’ – how they should feel - ‘be enthusiastic,’ ‘be confident’ – and how they should behave – ‘remember to smile’, ‘don’t forget to enjoy yourself’. Noticeably absent is something my colleagues and students referred to regularly - being knowledgeable about the subject.
The list also again includes the ‘idea’ to remember that students ‘are human beings too’ insinuating that this is something ‘traditional’ Cambodian teachers do not remember. This theme is continue in Session 12: Treating Students As Human Beings, which aims to explore ‘non-directly educational’ needs of students and the pastoral role of teachers. In part, this attempts to address some of the issues which contribute to the low enrolment and high drop out and repetition rates in Cambodian education, and allows the trainees to bring in and discuss their own experiences and consider possible ways to deal with students problems, a useful and necessary part of any teacher-training programme. However, the implication that Cambodian teachers are not aware of these problems is difficult to reconcile with the fact that the majority of Cambodian teachers, especially those outside urban areas, live in similar conditions to the majority of their students and face the same problems and issues with their own children. It also suggests that teachers should be extending their control over students’ lives beyond the classroom.
This disciplining of teachers and students is shown again in Session 16: Students’ Responsibility and Classroom Management. The session aims to heighten trainees awareness of how to ‘involve their students in classroom management’ and ‘motivate their students by giving them greater
178 responsibility and involvement in their own learning’. There is a discussion activity on who is responsible for various classroom jobs (taking the register, choosing materials, preparing visual aids, maintaining discipline, forming groups, keeping a class notice board, etc.) the teacher, the students or both. This is slightly incongruous as Cambodian students, even in secondary schools, are generally responsible for most of the non-teaching activities. The session includes a detailed reading passage on classroom management. The reading text reveals a level of disciplining which stands in contradiction to claims within these texts about increasing students’ motivation through giving them more responsibility for their own learning. The passage stresses that the teacher must remember that it is ‘important to create a productive environment,’ which can be done through ‘a well thought-out plan of classroom management’ or students become ‘discouraged and bored.’ The passage emphasizes what the teacher should do, how the teacher needs to plan, manage and control students and student activities in order to produce a ‘good learning environment. Students’ taking responsibility is only mentioned in the final point in the passage – and it is only in reference to ‘nonlinguistic jobs’ not responsibility for their own learning.
The passages stress that the teacher must be in control to improve student motivation and the key to this is discipline. In a truly Foucauldian moment, the text declares: To teachers “discipline” usually means “punishment”: making students do their homework again, not allowing students to do something they enjoy, etc. However, teachers should remember that ‘prevention’ is better than ‘cure’. The key to discipline is to prevent problems by creating an atmosphere full of cooperation and motivation. Think of discipline in a positive way: discipline is creating order. (ILT S16) As well as the implicit suggestion that Cambodian teachers normally impose order upon their classrooms through ‘discipline’ as ‘punishment,’ the passage clearly defines the teachers’ main duty – to create order. Order can be achieved though the teacher being organised and planning the lesson and classroom management in detail. Order and management are choices, the teacher should ‘impose new routines with new classes.’ The teacher is told to arrive in class first in order to prepare the classroom, and then stand by the door ‘so that you can have individual contact with the students
179 as they come in.’ This is culturally and practically difficult for Cambodian teachers, as the norm is for students to be in the classroom before the teacher arrives, to show respect for the teacher by standing up when they enter. Also, in Cambodian schools classrooms belong to students, with teachers moving between them. Finally the text recommends the teacher to teach students ‘how to move’ through the use of ‘signals’ which indicate when to move or when to talk and not talk, and to make sure that the students are ‘working as soon as they sit down’ ensuring all the available time is efficiently employed in learning. The passage concludes by instructing the teacher to teach students ‘how to move into different activities and teach them signals which will tell them when to move, when to stop talking, etc.’ which will help to get students ‘working as soon as they sit down’ ensuring all the available time is efficiently employed in learning. And for communicating with the teacher, the teacher can ‘train them how to attract your attention, e.g. insist they raise their hands and ignore them if they shout out.’
Although this reading of the materials and methods produced by CAMSET indicates, as I have argued, an attempt to impose a particular culture of teaching and learning, such a textual analysis is limited as it says nothing of how these texts are used by the various participants in the project. In the final sections I use fieldwork data to show how this attempt was neither a ‘success’ nor a ‘failure’, but produced a variety of reactions not easily classified within terms such as adoption, adaptation and resistance.
Asking questions Asking questions is an integral aspect of the training materials, central to my own training and the way I work as an ELT teacher and trainer. As I noted in the introduction to Chapter 3, asking questions in Cambodia was seen as a problem, particularly if these questions challenged the hierarchical social relations of power. This cultural norm of avoiding asking questions appeared to
180 be widespread in education. A few months into my time at Takeo RTTC, Chan Mol said to me, ‘You’ve been here some time now, what do you think you have learned about Cambodia?’ (fieldnotes 23-05-00). I replied that the most obvious thing I had learned was that there were problems involved in asking questions. She nodded in agreement, and I explained that I came from a background where questions are expected. I asked her when she asked questions, and she replied only when she felt she could not do something or when she had contradictory ideas in her mind. Talking to Chhin, one of the trainee trainers, about a lesson, he commented that ‘If [students] ask many questions, it’s difficult to explain’ (fieldnotes 06-05-00), somewhat undermining my training hope that he would encourage more questions in his classes! A Cambodian programme officer from Save The Children, Theng Chhor Virith, explained to me that in the 'traditional' system students have to ‘listen, listen, listen’ to the teacher as the teacher is the one who has learned before and who knows - ask questions would be doubting someone who is older and more knowledgeable. He also explained that in his field of rural development when doing Participatory Rural Appraisal, getting neak kraw (those without) to talk when the neak mean (those with) were around was impossible. He believed it was not just a matter of education but of wealth. The poorer would feel looked down upon by the wealthy, if they were to ask questions (fieldnotes 07-12-00).
One way I used questions was as a means of getting the trainers to examine their own work and practices – instead of telling them what they could do, my idea was that I could ask questions that would suggest possibilities. But as I noted in a letter to a friend, it seemed ‘pretty impossible to do that as the trainee-trainers are expecting me to help them, to ‘tell’ them what to do, which I try to do by asking questions, laying out alternatives, trying to get them to analyse their own situations – and when that fails I tell them what to do!’ (personnel communication 14-05-00). This can be seen from the discussion Thearo and I had about how to arrange a lot of new books and other resources we had bought for the English Library. Thearo kept chipping in with his, ‘I have no idea’ which has become his standard answer to questions which require decisions. At one point, slightly later in the morning, he was
181 organising the books for the ‘trainers only’ shelves. He asked me how he should arrange them. So I replied that there were different ways to do it. You could do it in sections (methodology, classroom activities, teacher resource books, theory, etc.). Alternatively, just put them all alphabetically by author or title. Then he asked me, ‘But how do I decide?’ I said that he should choose the method, and asked him which he thought would best suit them and would be easiest to find books when they needed them. But then he replied, ‘How would you decide?’ I told him that that was not important and that he needed to think about it, and to make the decision. He still asked me to tell him, but I declined, and left him to it. He did make a decision (to have sections) and came back to me later to ask about which books should go in which sections. I then spent some time explaining the idea of each section, and giving examples, and then showing him books and asking him to say which section they belonged to. Eventually he began to work for himself. Looking at the sections later he had done a pretty good job, though there were some odd choices, which I need to ask him about. (fieldnotes 0610-00) Whilst my frustration is obvious, Thearo was doubtless feeling the same. The discipline of my training was leading me away from giving an answer, and into making suggestions or asking questions. Likewise, Thearo’s training led him to expect clear answers and explanations from someone he regarded as his kru. This is an example of what Taylor (2001: 133) describes as the ‘contradictory discourse of authority at the heart of the development encounter.’ My attempt to ‘empower’ Thearo through asking questions rather than giving him the answers he wants, paradoxically underlines my own power in being able to authorise ‘other’ empowerment.
In the classroom The next two section are detailed descriptions of the training materials being used by Cambodian trainers working with trainee English teachers at Takeo RTTC. These are not meant to be exhaustive, but merely indicative examples of the complex ways in which these materials were interpreted within Cambodian classrooms. Whether these methods and materials ‘succeeded’ or ‘failed’ to produce particular ‘learning outcomes’ – or an imposition of a specific culture of teaching and learning – is far from clear in these examples. The trainers seem to be using the materials in a way that indicates to the students that there are ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ answers, which may reflect a reading of the materials which matches a cultural background which constructs knowledge as a set
182 of fixed answers. There are indications that the trainees want to open the discussion of the answers, but when this discussion appears to be going away from what the trainer perceives to be the ‘right’ answer (e.g. when trainees want to argue that not all teaching in Cambodian schools is teachercentred) the trainer cuts off discussion by stating an ‘answer.’ I present these, with the added limitation that they are descriptions I produced and thus are filtered through my own cultural biases, as a means of problematising ideas of English and ELT as cultural imperialism.
183
Figure 4: Ratha teaching in-service trainees May 200 (author’s photo)
Figure 5: Theany teaching in-service trainees (author’s photo)
184
Figure 6: Pre-service trainees Takeo RTTC, May 2000 (author’s photo).
Figure 7: In-service trainees Takeo RTTC, May 2000 (author’s photo).
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Thearo PRESET ILT S13 Learner and Teacher Expectations (Observation notes 20-12-00) The aim of this session is to have the trainees discuss Cambodian learner and teacher expectations and how these may affect teaching and learning. Thearo began by asking the trainees to discuss in pairs the statements ‘like father like son’ and ‘like teacher like student.’ Then he asked for some interpretations from the class. After eliciting some answers, Thearo told the trainees his own interpretation of the second statement: All activity, when we teach or outside, the students imitate. So we must behave well in the class, so the students do the same.41 I noted here that: Thearo is confident, even confident enough to allow space for students to answer by remaining silent. Elicits good answers, nominates – does he encourage? As a trainer, I felt that Thearo was working in a way that reflected my own interpretation of how the training materials should be used and how a trainer should work. I would run the activity in a similar fashion, eliciting trainees’ answers and providing my own interpretation. Is there any difference in an educational culture which emphasises the teacher as the source of knowledge? Would the trainees take Thearo’s answers to be somehow definitive?
The next part of the session involved group discussion of the following four questions which Thearo dictated and then wrote on the board. 1. 2. 3. 4.
Is there only one way to teach English? What method is used by most teachers in Cambodia? What method do we use on this course? Are they the same or different?
A learner-centred activity like this should produce a discussion with conclusions drawn by the learners with the trainer in the role of guide, advisor or consultant. However, these can produce All the quotes in this section are from verbatim observation notes and thus reflect the language as the trainers and students use it. 41
186 simple answers (a. no, b. grammar-translation, c. communicative, d. different), potentially limiting the discussion. As the trainees discussed the questions, I moved around the groups observing and listening to their conversations, which were mostly conducted in English. I was concerned that the trainees were merely regurgitating phrases such as ‘student-centred’, ‘teacher-centred’ or ‘grammartranslation’ without any discussion their meaning or how they translated into classroom practice. Thearo’s feedback to the first question appeared to confirm this: T: Is there only one way to teach English? S1: No. T: Very good. Any different answers? S2: I think there are two ways: teacher-centred and student-centred. T: Does that mean we can’t use a variety of methods? S2: No. However, he also encouraged broader answers. For example, one student commented that he felt that ‘young students can’t do student-centred as they are too young to share ideas.’ Another confident and quite fluent trainee tried to argue that there was a lot of student-centred teaching in Cambodian primary schools. In response, Thearo pointed to the word ‘most’ in question b) and asked if teacher-centred teaching was the general situation in Cambodia, and most of the trainees agreed it was. Another trainee then commented that from grade one to grade nine teaching was teacher-centred, to which Thearo replied, ‘Good.’ This was followed by a trainee suggesting that a mixture of teaching styles was being practiced in Cambodian schools. Thearo’s reaction to this was to underline the phrase ‘most teachers’ on the board. In reply, another trainee commented that ‘in the countryside most teachers teach teacher-centred,’ which ended this part of the discussion. The trainees appeared to want to suggest, based on their own experiences, that not all Cambodian teachers were teacher-centred teachers. Thearo, however, seemed unwilling to allow an open discussion of the trainees experiences as students. A compromise of sorts is suggested in the final trainee comment, with largely urban trainees and trainer agreeing that this was the situation in the countryside.
187 In feedback for the third question, Thearo encouraged some description of what the ‘Communicative Method’ involved. This elicited the following: S1: Everyday the students talk more than the teacher. The teacher just gives students advice and they have to work in groups to share their ideas. T: Very good. S2: Make students walk around and help each other, sometimes work in groups or pairs and sometimes play games. After telling the students that this is learner-centred teaching, Thearo then went on to elicit some differences. T: Now tell me, what the name of teacher-centred method? Ss: Teacher-centred? T: Teacher-centred, yes, or what else can we say? (Writes ‘Grammar Translation Method’ on board.) And this one, what is it called? Ss: Student-centred. T: Or what do we say? (Writes ‘Communicative Method’ on board.) Are they the same or different? How different are they? In response to these final questions, one trainee described his own experience of learning English at school. The students have no chance to ask each other and when they don’t understand they rarely ask, only for translation. And when they go home, they just say what the teacher said. This may well have been part of that student’s experience and of many other Cambodian students. But a question that struck me was, if this was the case how did these students, who were mostly quite ‘communicative’ and were not afraid to give their own views, become such active, participatory and communicative language learners? Was this student stating what he thought Thearo (and me, as the observer) wanted to hear?
Thearo then commented further on the two ‘methods’: If you teach the Grammar Translation Method it is the old way for your students. […] For Grammar Translation Method the students just follow the teacher. For Communicative Method, students can express opinions and do activities in the class to improve their knowledge […] the students learn by doing.
188 I only observed the first half of Thearo’s class, so did not observe the trainees’ discussion of the differences between the ‘Grammar-Translation Method’ and ‘Communicative Method,’ or discussion of Cambodian teachers’ expectations. It appeared to me in the first part of the class that Thearo was attempting to get the trainees to work out the ‘right’ answers to the questions. Some of the trainees wanted to contradict these ‘answers’ with their own experiences and ideas. Although he encouraged some open discussion, he attempted, through the use of praise, emphasis and summarising with his own opinion, to push the trainees to conclude that Cambodian classrooms are teacher-centred, ‘Grammar Translation’ environments.
Ratha INSET ILT S13 Task 3 (Observation notes 15-12-00) Ratha began the session by reading out the list of twelve learner expectations, which the trainees read with him, mostly silently. Then he told the class: Now look at these statements. Agree or not? All the statements are not right or wrong. You work individually first. The trainees began looking at the statements, although it appeared to me that they were actually working in pairs. Ratha then asked them to discuss the statements in groups and to ‘share ideas.’ As they did this, he went from group to group monitoring their work. After some time, he asked the class to ‘discuss together’. He read out each statement and asked the whole class ‘agree or disagree?’ followed by asking individual students to explain why they agreed or disagreed. He controlled this discussion through praise or his own opinions. For example, with statement one, ‘I want the teacher to translate everything’ after asking for the class opinion, he stated: So, you don’t want the teacher to translate everything. You think it is a waste of time. Whilst most students had agreed, some had not, but their opinions were not explored. In response to statement three, ‘I’ll ask if I don’t understand’ a trainee responded with:
189 If I afraid to ask the teacher, I couldn’t understand about a word that I don’t know. This interesting response was not followed up with discussion, Ratha simply reacted by saying ‘Good’ and moving on to the next statement. In feedback, Ratha explained that he felt that as the trainees had discussed these statements in groups, they did not need to discuss them further.
Some statements provoked stronger reactions and disagreement between Ratha and some trainees. Statement six, ‘I want the teacher to read aloud so that I can repeat – that’s how I learn to speak’ produced agreement from most trainees with responses such as: S: Because when the teacher speaks I can get the pronunciation or stress. S: Because I want to know about pronunciation. S: Sometimes I want the teacher to read aloud the important word all the students don’t understand. The trainer instructions for this activity say that the trainer should ‘[r]eassure them that there are no right or wrong answers, and that it is their opinions that matter,’ but it is not that simple. The learner-centred, ‘Communicative Method’ being promoted devalues reading aloud, either by teacher or students, which Ratha is aware from his training. In response to the trainees statements, he gave an explanation in Khmer about the importance of teachers not reading aloud all the time. Then, speaking in English, he asked the trainees to agree that the teacher should only read aloud new words, not whole text, which produced half-hearted agreement from the class.
Statement eight, ‘I want the teacher to correct me every time I make a mistake’ produced a similar effect. S: I want teacher to correct me every time because the teacher’s correction saves time. S: Because teacher’s have good ideas for weak students. In response to the trainees responses, Ratha asked them: When you speak with your friend outside, do you want the teacher correct you every time?
190 This brought a mixed response, some trainees agreeing some not, but one, Sopheap, replied that: I think that if I have teacher to correct me every time I am very lucky, because the teacher not near me every time. Outside the class I want my friend to correct me every time. The trainees responses demonstrate their concerns with accuracy and having their mistakes corrected, in order to learn from the corrections. This does not contradict the ‘we learn from our mistakes’ ethos of the materials, although the desire to be corrected ‘every time’ may do. Ratha’s response dealt with the issue in a different way: But we know already when teacher gets students to practice, if teacher corrects all the time, students won’t speak as will lose confidence. In doing this, Ratha as the trainer is providing a ‘correct’ answer, which he reinforces by repeating the explanation in Khmer. This ended the discussion of statement eight. Statement nine, “It doesn’t matter if I make mistakes, because I can learn from them,” brought general agreement and no discussion, possibly because it would have merely repeated what had already been discussed.
Most trainees said they disagreed with statement ten (‘I only want to learn grammar rules’) with some providing the following explanations: S: I disagree because in English there are four skills, the first I can learn vocabulary, pronunciation, for easy to speak. So I can learn grammar rule, four skill, pronunciation and vocabulary. S: Disagree because when I know only grammar rule, I cannot communicate with each other especially foreigner. Statement eleven (‘I want to learn things on my own – not just learn by heart’) produced general agreement: I’m agree, because I do things on my own I can learn form my mistakes. If I learn by heart, I can’t remember for a long time. Although one trainee disagreed, which produced a discussion in Khmer between him and Ratha which ended with the trainee saying in English:
191 Sometime I agree, sometime I’m not agree. Example, if we learn about grammar we can do things on our own. Some new words we can learn by heart. Whilst the majority of the in-service trainees said they did not want to only study grammar or simply learn by heart, their requests in their private classes were different. These same trainees were paying Ratha to teach them privately in the evenings. In the private classes, Ratha explained, the trainees requested to be taught through ‘Grammar Translation,’ a request he fulfilled. Did the trainee’s responses in class reflect their actual beliefs or were they providing what they saw as the ‘right’ answers? As Ratha commented at the end of the class: Thank you for your different ideas because no right or wrong.
Conclusion Tomlinson (1991: 56) points out that audience responses to texts are too complex and active to support ideas of simple cultural manipulation, such as the ones sometimes claimed for English and ELT, nor can these responses provide a clear refutation of the possibility of cultural imperialism. In a sense this chapter represents what Tomlinson refers to as a thinking out of the problem. However, what these materials and methods were part of was the construction of local ‘expertise’ based on Western knowledge. One example of this is Chan Mol who was employed by the EQIP project as a trainer in ‘pupil centred methods’ on the basis of her training and experience with the learnercentred approaches of CAMSET. In a similar way, the other teachers and trainers involved with CAMSET benefited financially in their private teaching from both association with this aid-funded project and the hegemonic methods being promoted. In the next two chapters I look at the economic benefits to the teachers in more detail.
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Chapter 6: Income, status and inequality
Introduction During in-country training, VSO volunteers have a ‘placement visit’ to meet employers and colleagues, see the town or village and arrange accommodation. Thus, in late February 2000, I travelled down to Takeo in the white, VSO Range Rover with three other volunteers, Liesbeth, Margaret and Lynne, who were going to work on the World Bank funded Education Quality Improvement Project (EQIP), Graham Lang, our VSO programme officer, and Chea Vantha, the VSO programme assistant. We arrived first in the small district town of Prey Kabas, where Liesbeth would be based. After a brief meeting at the District Office of Education, we set out to look for a house for Liesbeth. The local education officials had suggested a couple of houses to Vantha, one they referred to as the ‘UNTAC house’ as it had previously been rented to UN. We visited the recommended houses, neither of which were suitable. We then drove around town stopping at houses that either appeared to be for rent or looked suitable, whether they were occupied or not. Vantha would explain to the owners that we were from an ‘ângka’42 (organisation) looking to rent accommodation, which usually produced interest as rents charged to foreign organisation personnel were much higher than those paid by Cambodians.
After some time we came to a two-storey wooden house which, Vantha thought we might be able to rent. There was a family already living in it, which didn’t appear to be a problem. Vantha talked to the owner’s daughter who explained that we should return when her father came back. On returning, we discovered that the owner was the former Director of the District Office of Education, now retired. He appeared a little wary at first, but relaxed after some discussion with 42
This word was also used to refer to the revolutionary organisation of the Khmer rouge regime.
193 Vantha and Graham. We then all went inside to inspect the top floor of the house. Liesbeth felt she would be happy renting the top floor, although she was concerned about where the family would live. With Vantha translating, the owner explained that this was not a problem as they had plenty of room. The owner and his wife, plus their daughter and her children (her husband worked in Phnom Penh), and an elderly relative, were left with the downstairs, which was made up of three small rooms. The owner agreed to make changes, including removing the linoleum that covered the wooden floor and installing a small bathroom and kitchen on the top floor. The rent was set at US$150 per month, a rental agreement drawn up and two months rent paid in advance so the alterations could be made.
In Takeo the next day we managed to find houses for both Margaret and myself. Mine was a large wooden stilted house rented for US$200 per month. No alterations were needed as it had been rented to foreigners on and off since the UNTAC period. The only changes that were made were the removal of the linoleum flooring and of the occupants – the owner’s son, daughter-in-law and their baby who were living in the house. They moved next door with the owner and his wife. Margaret found a similarly large house, for the same rent, which was being let by a former deputy provincial governor who was working in another province. My colleague, Chan Mol, helped her to find this house, and possibility benefited, as other volunteers told us that it was customary to give a payment to the person who introduced the tenants. The next day Lynne and Vantha travelled by motorbike to Kirivong, where they found accommodation for her on the top floor of a two-storey house, once again moving the family downstairs.
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Figure 8: Margaret, Graham, Vantha and Liesbeth going to rent house in Prey Kabas (author’s photo).
Figure 9: Author’s house Takeo (author’s photo)
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These stories of house-hunting demonstrate how the status and economic power of foreigners and foreign ‘development’ organisations can restructure even the domestic arrangements of ordinary Cambodians. These aspects of the effects of the operations of ‘development’ organisations are largely absent from the wealth of documents produced by the international agencies operating in the aid sector, as well as academic studies of development discourses and encounters. These documents focus on the monitoring, assessment and evaluation of narrowly specified project technical objectives, e.g. with CAMSET, the number of teachers, trainers, and inspectors having passed through training, the production of teacher-training and textbook materials, or the establishment of a system for monitoring teaching quality (the project log-frame, in Appendix 3, lists these in detail). The wider social, economic and political effects of this influx of foreign agencies and personnel organised around ‘reconstruction and development’ remains both under-reported and undertheorised. This chapter is a partial analysis of this phenomenon taking the CAMSET project (particularly CAMSET 2) as a representative example.
This chapter describes and analyses the wide inequalities in incomes between Cambodian civil servants and expatriate personnel working in ‘development’ projects and the concomitant inequalities in status and power. These inequalities of income, status and power replicated and naturalised within Cambodia existing and widening global inequalities.
Civil service salaries are widely recognised as insufficient to meet basic needs, resulting in civil servants pursuing other income sources, which severely limits the functioning of the public sector, including education. Donors and international agencies point to the failure of the government to ‘reform’ the civil service and ‘efficiently’ reallocate the national budget as the reason for these inadequate salaries. This ‘inefficient’ allocation fails to consider the political realities of a governing party highly dependent on the support of the military and police, and a political culture underpinned
196 by patron-client relations. Deeming the causes technical rather than political, ‘development’ agencies are pushed into supplementing the salaries of government staff involved in projects in order to sustain project activities. These supplementary payments provide economic security to the small percentage of government staff working with projects, and reduce the limited pressure on the government to restructure national budget allocations away from spending on the military and police and toward education, health and rural development.
Income inequalities Cambodian education staff Cambodian teachers, like all state employees, earn salaries which fail to cover basic household needs and provide no economic security. In rural areas, education staff receive between $15 and $20 per month, and in urban areas and in higher education, between $20 and $25 per month. Average household size is 5.2 (5.5 in urban and 5.1 in rural areas - MoP 2000b: n.p), and government estimates of average monthly household expenditures are $264.6 in Phnom Penh, $119 in other urban areas and $74.7 in rural areas (NIS 2001: n.p.) From conversations with colleagues, students, education officials and aid workers, I estimated the average-sized Cambodian family requires between $150 and $200 per month for to cover basic needs. State salaries thus represent only around ten per cent of the required household income. In addition, government staff regularly receive their salaries months late. After the serious wet season floods in September 2000, for example, salary payments were delayed for three months. A government announcement that the money was being diverted to flood relief was greeted with quiet scepticism amongst my colleagues.
The inadequate salaries of civil servants, particularly teachers, is widely commented on in agency and consultants reports. Galasso (1990:6) referred to them as a structural constraint hampering the
197 effectiveness of government policies, a World Bank report (1994: 114) pointed to underpayment as a source of teacher (and administrator) absenteeism and corruption, and a CAMSET report stated that the low salaries and economic status of teachers resulted in low motivation, scant lesson preparation, poor performance and corruption (Taylor, G. 1995: 2). NGO statements to the annual World Bank-organised Consultative Group meetings, where the Cambodian government presents its policies and plans to donors who then pledge aid monies, regularly call for increased salaries and incentives for education staff in order to improve education quality (see NGO Forum 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002).
Despite this widespread awareness of the negative effects of low salaries in the education sector, and the occasional increase, such as the $8 per month rise in 1994 (when inflation was around 25%), salaries and other remunerations remain derisory, although personnel costs remain at almost 70 percent of the recurrent budget in 2000/01 (MoEYS 2002: 105). The lives of education staff are clearly structured by the need to pursue these additional income sources, which, in turn, affects the operation of the whole education system. I detail below the various ways teachers supplement their salaries, which is followed by a discussion of those parts of the education reform process aimed at reducing the need for education staff to pursue additional sources of income. I then examine how CAMSET, like other aid-funded projects, found it necessary to supplement education staff salaries in order to sustain project operations. Education staff additional income sources Most of the teachers in Cambodia are poor and they find it difficult to live if they depend on their salary. For life they always do another job besides work as a teacher. Some are farmers, moto-taxi drivers and some teachers are businessmen, etc. If they don't have other jobs they will hardly live. Because of low standard of living, some teachers have done something strange to earn money to support their family such as forcing the students to learn in private class to collect money from them, some teachers take bribes from the students who fail the examination, although they know it is not a good action. Others force their students to buy his43 copies, another one his wife sells something in the school for instance candy, breakfast...etc. Do you know what will happen to the students if they don't or they buy 43
Only 37% of primary and 27% secondary teachers are female (Gorman, Pon & Kheng 1999:15).
198 something from others besides his goods? The students will get refused high marks or get sent out the classroom. (Excerpt from pre-service trainee-teacher’s essay 'On being a teacher in Cambodia' 22-01-01.) Cambodian teachers and trainers, like many government staff, engage in a variety of incomegenerating activities to supplement their inadequate salaries. Those detailed here were openly reported by teachers and trainers and as the above excerpt shows, were included in trainee-teachers’ written work. Although these activities had negative effects on the education system, neither the Ministry nor any of the consultants and NGOs working in the education sector has undertaken a systematic analysis of these activities. In this informal analysis, I categorise the activities into six areas. Overtime and invigilation payments Teachers and other education staff gained extra income from working overtime, although the allocation of overtime depended on maintaining good connections. Heads of schools and colleges and the Directors of Provincial or District Offices of Education played key roles in the assignment of overtime, which meant that good relations with these officials had to be maintained. In addition, overtime payments were normally only made once or twice a year, with a ten percent deduction for ‘administrative fees’ which, I was informed, meant the pockets of these same Heads and Directors. Those administrative staff not working as teachers, although they were normally qualified teachers, could also benefit due to the endemic shortage of classroom teachers. Thus, staff in district or provincial offices of education would arrange with the head of the local school to teach, for example, four classes of Khmer literature, which would be paid at overtime rates. The head would arrange things so that these classes could be taught altogether, and in return would receive a percentage of the overtime payment.
199 High school and college teachers also received supplementary payments for invigilating exams, such as the teacher training centre entrance exams or the grade nine and grade twelve national exams. These payments were substantial, my colleagues received between 160,000 riel ($40) and 300,000 riel ($76) depending on the level of the exam and the invigilator status. McNamara (1999b: 110) quotes figures for 1996-97 of up to $120. Again this was not automatic, but at the discretion of school and college directors. Colleagues explained that teachers avoided asking questions about financial matters as they might not be assigned invigilation work. This emerged after I had asked why traineeteachers had to pay for classroom items, such as chalk, when there was a Ministry budget line for RTTC recurrent costs. After suggesting discussing this with the RTTC director, my colleagues explained that they would not discuss financial matters with the RTTC or POE directors, as this would risk not being assigned invigilation. The above supplementary income sources discussed are largely legal, the ones I discuss now are either semi-legal or illegal. However, these need to be understood within the framework of the effective private funding of state education discussed in the previous chapter. In his study of this private funding, Bray (1998: 14) notes a pragmatic acceptance of these payments amongst most parents, who are in similar economic situations to teachers, rather than any bitterness. A Phnom Penh Post journalist reports an unnamed education official explaining about extra payments to teachers, ‘[i]f we didn't agree, the teachers would not teach, and when the teachers don't teach what would happen to Cambodian students?’ (Chea 1999: np). Classroom Payments In an essay, one in-service trainee was very open about a common form of payment charged by teachers at secondary and tertiary levels: In the monthly and semester test I collected money from students, 200 or 300 riel for each. The students were collected all subjects. By doing this some students' parents were angry, some criticized. […] They didn’t know about teachers difficulty. (Excerpt from in-service trainee essay ‘On being a teacher in Cambodia’ 25-02-01)
200 Trainers, teachers and students talked quite openly about types of classroom payments to teachers, many of which match those noted by Bray (1998) at primary level. Students would have to pay a small amount of money for normal classes, Bray refers to it as a ‘gift’ to the teacher, usually between 100 and 500 riel ($1 = 3,900 riel) per day. Some teachers, especially in primary schools, brought small snacks into the classroom, which the students would have to buy. Related to that, within school grounds or by the schools gates, there would be small stalls selling drinks and snacks, and perhaps also basic stationary. These were normally owned by teachers’ families, who paid rent to the school. Students were encouraged to buy snacks and drinks from the stalls owned by their teacher’s family. If they didn’t, their grades would suffer. According newspaper reports, primary teachers in Phnom Penh who did this were disciplined by the authorities (Chea 1999), but unofficial user fees still widely reported to be in place (Vong 2001). Bribes This usually concerned students bribing their teacher for better grades, either during the year or more often, in exams when teachers were bribed to ignore the cheating. The government had resorted to placing armed guards around schools during the national exams as exam cheating had become such a problem. Soldiers with AK47s surrounded schools to prevent friends and family ‘helping’ with the exams. (People still gathered around the schools in spite of this and some cheating continued.) However, it probably failed to stop the bribes that students paid to teachers to ignore them cheating in the exam room. Multiple employment Around 35% of all Cambodian workers hold multiple jobs or engage in multiple income-earning activities (MoP 2000a: iv). Wages and salaries make up only a small percentage of total household incomes as only 15% of all workers in Cambodia aged 15 years and over are paid employees (MoP 2000a: v). For many teachers and trainers, across a range of subjects and levels, private teaching is
201 their main secondary income source. This is partly driven by inadequate incomes, but also results from insufficient teaching hours to cover the curriculum, due to a range of factors including official and unofficial holidays, labour duties, ‘meetings’, teachers invigilating exams, double-shift schools, teachers working elsewhere, and flooding. Thus, many teachers run private classes after the end of state teaching hours, in the same classrooms, with the same students. If students want to pass the national exams, they have to attend private classes in order to cover the whole curriculum. However, as some trainee-teachers explained, teachers also pressurised students to attending private classes through the manipulation of grades – those not attending the paying classes would find their grades falling.
Income from other private teaching depends on student and parent perceptions of the teacher’s status and abilities. These perceptions were central as students normally paid per class so could easily move to a different private class. Colleagues also explained that they had to keep up these private classes to maintain their reputations. Thus, despite receiving substantial ‘overtime’ payments from CAMSET (see below), most trainers continued teaching privately. Chan Mol, the training mentor at Takeo RTTC whose reputation was founded on over a decade of private teaching, was earning between $150 to $250 per month by teaching around 20 to 25 hours privately per week. Traineetrainers Theany and Chhin earned less, between $80 and $150 per month, as they ran fewer classes and were less well known. Meng Seng Heng, the training mentor at Kandal RTTC, was earning up to $1000 per month, as he had secured a good reputation teaching business English to the staff of private companies in Phnom Penh, such as British American Tobacco and Pochentong Airport (interview 28-12-02). The trainee-teachers at Takeo RTTC also taught privately, mostly in local private schools where they were paid around thirty percent of the students’ fees.
I get $20 per month so I need to do extra work. [I]n the rainy season, I plough, rake soil, transplant rice, tend my oxen, and in dry season I plant jujube, water melon, pumpkin to support my family. But the big officials have easy lives [and] corrupt, [they] have four or five villas, some have five or six wives. I'm fed up government do like this. I have not time to
202 improve my knowledge or write some books. Sometimes I prepare the lesson, sometimes not. (Excerpt from in-service trainee teacher, essay ‘On being a teacher in Cambodia’ 25-02-01)
Like about eighty percent of the Cambodian population, many teachers and their families are involved in farming, perhaps growing rice or raising small livestock for family consumption or sale. Female family members would normally be responsible for selling any products in the local market. The rice planting and harvesting seasons have a higher level of absenteeism among education staff and students.
Some teachers ran small businesses, for example, one of the RTTC staff supplied building materials. He also did building work and employed other RTTC staff. We employed him and two other RTTC staff to renovate the English library using money from the project (see Chapter 6). We paid them 100,000 riel (around $25) in total for a week’s work.
Many male teachers, in both urban and rural areas, worked as a motorcycle taxi, or moto, drivers. These are the main form of cheap transport in Cambodia and the capital needed to buy a moto would be a family generated or borrowed from wealthier members of the extended family. Although particularly prevalent in Phnom Penh, three of the in-service trainee teachers at the RTTC informed me they worked part-time as moto drivers. Project supplementary payments In the introduction to their study of 50 technical assistance in projects in Cambodia, Godfrey et al:11), argue that the level of external assistance - $404 million in 1998, equivalent to 14% of GDP, 226% of tax revenue or 169% of government current expenditure - marks Cambodia as aiddependent. This, they claim, has two serious effects. Firstly, a high proportion of Cambodia’s besteducated people work for or are counterparts in donor agencies or international NGOs, which has
203 raised the price of educated labour. Secondly, due to the failure of government to collect revenue and reallocate spending, donor agencies and international NGOs have virtually taken over funding of the education, health and social sectors. This take over of funding and the supplementation of civil servants’ salaries, eases pressure on the government to improve revenue collections, reallocate budgets and raise state salaries (ibid: 1). In their survey, 38% of chief technical assistants viewed inadequate government salaries as an obstacle to more effective capacity development, and 85% of technical assistance projects were paying some form of salary supplements (ibid: 47, 40). Agencies and NGOs disagreed on whether it was better to pay direct salary supplements or to provide supplementary payments on the basis of work done or to cover expenses. Types and levels of payments varied markedly across projects and between Ministries. A higher proportion of NGO projects than other projects paid supplements and these were paid at higher rates than multilateral agencies. The highest average rates of supplementation were in the education and health sectors (ibid: 41-3).
In the education sector, the types and levels of payments varied widely. Probably the most widespread was the per diem (daily allowance) paid to teachers and other education staff attending training courses or workshops. There were official Ministry rates for such payments, which depended upon distance travelled and Ministry status. Some organisations paid per diems at Ministry rates, others set their own rates. The teachers attending the CAMSET 2 in-service training courses at the RTTCs received a per diem of $2, half from the Ministry and half from the project (payment of the Ministry half to the in-service teachers at Takeo RTTC was severely delayed). The Education Quality Improvement Project, also operating in Takeo, paid primary teachers a $2 per diem to attend bi-monthly training sessions in core schools and $1 to attend training in their own schools up to three times a month (Geeves, et al. 2002: 32), and employed Chan Mol as a trainer at $10 per session. I analyse CAMSET supplementary payments and their effects on the project below.
204 Supplementary payments to Cambodian personnel from donors and projects were controversial and, at times, the source of heated debate within the aid community. A 1995 Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) report evaluating their support to Cambodia was highly critical of such payments. Paying of salary supplements and other honoraria to government counterparts […] goes very much further than taking on responsibility for local costs. […] The widespread practice of paying salary supplements is not conducive to sound capacity-building, and also fosters relationships between donor and recipient analogous to those that prevailed in colonial times. (Bernander et al 1995 cited in Curtis 1998: 101) The report recommended joint action among donors to remedy the situation possibly through establishing a central fund ‘to provide payments to selected civil servants, according to preset criteria […] over a transitional period’ (ibid), a recommendation that appears not to have been acted upon. In Godfrey et al’s report some four years later the same issues problems with supplementation were pointed out, and the ambivalent attitudes towards these payments within projects (Godfrey, et al. 2000b: 41). This report suggested paying straight salary supplements, as opposed to various alternatives, such as product-related payments or payments to attend training, as it is clearer and more efficient (ibid: 43). More interestingly, the authors quote the comments of a number of chief technical assistants, which emphasise the necessity of such payments as ‘in practice Cambodian projects do not work without supplementation, given the extremely low salary scale for government staff’ (cited in ibid: 41). Whilst supplementary payments for Cambodian staff were widely discussed, as I discuss below, the subject of salaries and other payments to expatriate staff was much less open to discussion.
Education reform policies There appears to be general agreement within the aid community and the government that improvements in the education sector, especially in terms of the quality of education, are reliant on
205 an increased budget share for the sector, which would allow improved salaries and incentive payments for staff. A series of education reform policies have been devised through technical assistance programmes since the establishment of the Royal Government of Cambodia in 1993, however, as was discussed in Chapter 3, these have not resulted in substantial improvements in education financing nor the incomes of education staff. Vin McNamara points out the failure of reforms was in part due ‘to the diverse range of advisors, often foreign and from various backgrounds, who draft the policy statements which are then announced by government leaders as their own policies, often without realising the ramifications’ (McNamara 1999b: 108).
The latest round of reforms were begun under an Asian Development Bank (ADB) technical assistance programme, initially under the Secondary Education Investment Plan (SEIP) to develop a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) for education, which developed a series of initiatives including the Priority Action Programme (PAP), the Education Strategic Plan (ESP) and the Education Sector Support Programme (ESSP). In addition to acronyms,44 this extended programme of technical assistance has produced a series of reports, surveys, evaluations, position papers, strategic plans, and consultancy papers aimed at developing a coordinated strategy for the sector and the various agencies working in it. Many of these are available on the Ministry’s website, but only available in English.
Whilst I was conducting a small piece of research on VSO Cambodia’s future directions for secondary education (Clayton, S. 2001), I read and discussed many of these documents with ADB consultants and Ministry personnel. I received the impression that much of this work was being carried out in English, driven by the consultants who then, as McNamara points out, drafted policy statements and speeches for Ministry leaders. This provides these consultants with direct control over the formulation, if not implementation, of government policy. This also structures their 44
Lucy Royal-Dawson produced a slightly tongue-in-cheek list of these acronyms for EDUCAM see Appendix 7.
206 relations with the Ministry staff they work with, an example of this came from the initial stages of the research work for VSO.
At the start of the work, I arranged a meeting with a Ministry senior Project Management and Monitoring Unit (PMMU) manager in the Planning Department. On arriving at his office, I was told to wait as he was busy. Then he came in accompanied by a senior ABD consultant. The Consultant walked up to me and said enthusiastically, “You here to see me?” I replied that I was here to talk to the Manager, whose office we then went into and discussed the work. He had some useful ideas about possible future volunteer placements, but felt that I needed to get a clear overview of the sector, so suggested that we go to the Ministry documentation centre and Education Management Information System office. As we were leaving, we met the Consultant, sitting at a desk by the door. I felt that I ought to give him a brief explanation of what I was there for, but this was his chance to take over. After listening briefly, he told the Manager that he would go and get the necessary documents for me to read and disappeared out the door. As we waited, the Manager described problems they had experienced since the PMMU came under the Planning Department. He argued that the PMMU worked in the interests of the whole of Cambodian education, whereas the Planning Department was more interested in working for MoEYS and itself. He described the way they had to work as akin to finding your way through the Phnom Penh traffic, with endless traffic intruding from the left without looking, and having to weave around and in amongst all these different and slightly anarchic vehicles that crowd the streets. He also felt that it caused problems with donors, as they want things done quickly, but having to pass everything through the Planning Department has slowed things considerably. The Consultant returned with a pile of documents and spent an hour briefing me, whilst the Manager stood by, reduced to a pedestrian.
The reform plans contained a number of policies aimed at reducing informal payments made by parents from 50 percent of school funding to 18 percent, which would be achieved through
207 increases in teachers salaries and incentive payments, as well as in school operating budgets. The 2001 Priority Action Plan (PAP) for education included a projected 50% rise in teachers salaries by 2005, and significant increases in school operating budgets. It also included incentive payments to improve teacher performance and efficiency of staff deployment. For example, classroom teachers would be paid an extra $5 per month, as an incentive to those teachers who had taken non-teaching positions to return to the classroom. Teachers willing to work in remote areas would receive an extra $10, as would those who teach multi-grade or multi-level classes (Clayton, S. 2001: 11-13). In 2002, the government also outlawed start-of-year fees that were levied by schools on all parents. By the end of 2002, the salary for a teacher with a B.A. or B.Ed. had risen to 170,000 riels per month (about $42), for lower secondary teachers, 110,000 ($27) and for primary teachers, 100,000 ($25).
It is not clear yet to what effect these financial reforms have had on school enrolments. However, it appears doubtful that these increases and incentives will have a major effect, especially in urban and semi-urban areas, and there is an underlying assumption that these relate to individual incomes. As both absolute amounts and as a percentage of total household income, however, these amounts are small. As detailed above, teachers in urban areas, and even some in rural areas, have opportunities to earn substantially more than these payments – 50 percent of $25 to $30 is not sufficient to allow them to give up these extra sources of income or meet basic household needs. Similarly, given the potential for earning much larger amounts in urban areas, teachers would be unlikely to move to rural areas, or even be located in rural areas after graduation, for only $10. Additionally, they would be moving away from the support of the whole family, for which a $10 bonus and a 50 percent rise in insufficient compensation. Administrative staff in schools and colleges may well have taken those positions because of the time it allows to work outside education, thus a $5 bonus seems equally insufficient.
208 These types of incentive payments have been attempted before. An ADB 1994 report bemoans the lack of improvements in staff performance and the failure of MoEYS staff to abandon their second or third jobs after the introduction of a 20,000 riels (approximately $8 in 1994 prices) per month salary supplement for teachers (ADB 1994: 81 cited in Ayres 1997: 247). At the time this represented a rise of around forty percent, but given that salaries were so low and that inflation was 41 percent in 1993 and 17.8 percent in 1994 (CDRI 2001: 17), even a forty percent pay rise would have made little difference to the household income of teachers.
The Priority Action Plan also included increased disbursement of funds to schools through district budget management centres, with the aim of increasing local control over funding to improve overall spending efficiency and, possibly, reduce loss of funds through corruption. This aspect of the reforms faced serious problems, as there was resistance from parts of the Ministry and government bureaucracy, especially at provincial level, which had previously controlled the process. During my field trip in December 2002, my former programme officer, now a consultant, Graham Lang, informed me that only about 5 percent of the funds allocated for that year’s PAP had so far been disbursed, which had led to a drive to get the funds disbursed. A Ministry official (who requested this conversation be anonymous), was rather skeptical about the PAP funds. O: We do not get PAP. PAP is to support learning, to support teaching activity. In reality, only in words, on paper, and then NGO will receive report, stupid report on paper from the Director – “We spent $2000 on this, $1000 on that, $500 on cement for my house!” (laughs) Stupid! S: So you haven’t seen any PAP money then? O: I have heard, but I haven’t seen. Every time I have heard, “PAP, PAP is coming”, but where is PAP? What does PAP look like? Another official, similarly anonymous here, told me that they were receiving $3 from PAP funds to attend ‘technical meetings’ (staff meetings aimed at improving teaching quality) at the RTTC, which should be around three hours long. As they were all busy teaching privately, which paid much better than $1 per hour, the ‘technical group leader’ simply filed reports describing the meetings that never happened so they could still receive the payments.
209
Financial reforms aimed at improving teachers’ incomes were heavily constrained, not only due to limited resources overall, but also by the apparent reluctance of the government to reallocate the national budget in reality rather than simply on paper. Projects were less constrained, and CAMSET paid various forms of supplement to the education staff involved with the project in order to maintain project activities.
CAMSET supplementary payments CAMSET employed various forms of supplementation, which changed over time, but which were essential to sustaining project activities. They were also an controversial issue within the project and the source of tension. CAMSET 1 advisor, Kath Copley, in her analysis of the planning workshops for CAMSET 2, remarked that this issue ‘evokes strong feelings of resentment on both the donor and recipient sides’ (Copley 1998: 91). Lucy Royal-Dawson, in correcting my use of the term salary supplements, explained that: […] in CAMSET 1 counterparts were paid […] a real salary supplement each month they got dollars in an envelope. I’m not really sure, maybe seventy or a hundred dollars. They all got it. When CAMSET 2 started, no one got it, blanket policy, no more. And the reason was sustainability, it was a big theme with CAMSET 2 […] Anyway, we spent ages and ages navel gazing on this, trying to work out how we can justify paying people to do some things, just to be realistic because people working on twenty dollar a month salaries are not going to be able to do the stuff in the Ministry that they need to do, they’re going to have to go out and earn money. (interview 22-02-01) As Lucy explains, at the end of CAMSET 1 the donors, DfID, had decided that salary supplements were unsustainable, and there were to be no supplements under CAMSET 2. However, the cessation of supplements resulted in those Ministry staff working with CAMSET going back to their other sources of income, limiting the time they could work with the project. To work around this, Lucy explained, the project team devised a range of payment forms - overtime payments based on Ministry rates, mentoring payments, payment by product, a ‘lost earnings allowance’ - a process she
210 described as ‘incredibly messy, very, very complicated and involved, highly unsatisfactory and emotionally charged, really one of the most difficult issue we’ve had to deal with’ (interview 22-021). She also expressed surprise when I explained that my colleagues still referred to their ‘overtime’ payments as salary supplements. Regardless of their title, these payments enabled Ministry staff to spend the majority of their working hours on tasks aimed at achieving project objectives, in turn allowing the project to achieve its overall goals within the allotted timeframe.
Stuart Lawson, the VSO volunteer working at National English Teacher Resource Centre (NETREC) from 1998 to 2000 detailed the effects of the ending of supplementary payments to NETREC staff in a 1999 discussion document. Under CAMSET 1, Prach Chan Sokha, the NETREC manager who Stuart was supposed to be training and mentoring, had received a supplement of $150 per month. Under CAMSET 2, he only received his $17 Ministry salary, which resulted in him reducing his hours at NETREC from 7 per day to 3. Ironically, Sokha was now working five mornings per week with the CAMSET 2 textbook team and receiving a ‘payment by product’ of $100 per month (Lawson 1998: n.p.). At this stage, NETREC was supposed to be generating its own income, from photocopying, cassette copying, membership fees and internet and email charges, sufficient to cover staff costs. However, as Stuart commented Sokha was being expected, […] to continue his previous role AND raise money. In short, he is being expected to do double the amount of work in about half the time. As he said to me, “I used to sit here and plan how to replace old displays, how to develop new initiatives, look for new books in catalogues. Now all I think about is how to get money for toner, paper, spare parts, for the photocopier, [how to] replace the cassette copier.” (ibid) Aware that financial support would come from neither the project nor the Ministry, Sokha and Stuart worked toward making NETREC self-funding. As well as the above mentioned sources, they increasingly targeted foreign NGOs and organisations, encouraging them to rent out NETREC’s spare rooms for meetings and workshops. However, the cyber café became the main income generator of the centre, especially after they were given permission to operate commercial computer
211 training courses. By this stage, NETREC’s status was becoming unclear, and was generating conflicts with the Director of the Faculty of Pedagogy, Thor Sar, over finance and staffing issues. Stuart described this as ‘one of those problem areas where we need to find a balance between the public body’s need for staff development and NETREC’s need to be commercially successful’ (Lawson and Prach 1999: n.p.). The lack of government funding for education was pushing the centre into effectively becoming a private sector enterprise in a similar way to teachers becoming increasingly involved in private teaching. Whilst project objectives centred on the establishment of sustainable systems within state education, the advocacy by those involved in the project of increasing private sector activities to make up for short falls in government funding, which Stuart and Sokha supported in order to keep the centre operating, facilitated the increasing commercialisation of state education.
During their one year on-the-job training under CAMSET 2, the RTTC-based trainee-trainers and training-mentors were paid ‘overtime’ by the project for work over the fourteen hours covered by their state salaries up to forty hours per week. For this the trainee-trainers would receive an extra $217 and the training-mentor $270 per month. The monitoring and administrations of these ‘overtime’ payments produced tensions and unintended effects, which I discuss below and in the next chapter. During their earlier ten-month training period in Phnom Penh, the trainee-trainers had received supplementary payments of $178 per month to cover accommodation and food, from which they saved between $500 and $700. During the summer vacation during on-the-job training, all the trainee-trainers (21 in 6 RTTCs) undertook an eight week training course in the Regional English Language Centre in Singapore. CAMSET funded supplementary payments of Singaporean $40 per day, plus a travel allowance of US $120 and the Ministry paid them US $160 to cover passports and visas. My colleagues reported saving around US $700 from these payments, which they believed was the average figure for the 21 trainee-trainers. At the end of on-the-job training,
212 when the ‘overtime’ payments ended, the trainers reduced the time they worked at the RTTC to the minimum necessary.
213
Figure 10: Takeo RTTC trainee-trainers, (l-r) Kheang Theany, Chheng Chhin, San Sothearo and Tith Ratha, in old English library May 2000 (author’s photo)
Figure 11: Training mentor, Sok Chan Mol, gives speech at closing ceremony of on-service training course, Takeo RTTC, June 2000 (author’s photo)
214 Supplementary payments lessened the economic pressures felt by Cambodian education staff involved in aid-funded projects like CAMSET. However, these staff were well aware that such payments were temporary, hence they would maintain their private classes even whilst receiving supplements. Sok Chan Mol, for example, whilst being paid ‘overtime’ by CAMSET to maintain a forty hour week at the RTTC, was also teaching around twenty hours per week privately. When the ‘overtime’ payments stopped, at the end of on-the-job training, the trainers increased their private hours and reduced the time spent at the RTTC. Meng Seng Heng, training mentor at Kandal RTTC was teaching 13 state hours per week and 25 privately in late 2002 (interview 28-12-02). At Kompong Cham RTTC, Tum Sisopheareth was teaching 24 hours per week to cover the classes of trainers who work doing outside work, and teaching up to 30 hours per week privately (interview 21-12-02). Kandal trainer, Hong Huong, explained that his private teaching allowed him to maintain his commitment to training provincial teachers at the RTTC, work he viewed as important for Cambodian education (interview 19-12-02), a view which was repeated by Ouk Khamdy, the training mentor at Kompong Cham RTTC (interview 21-12-02). My colleague, Theany, when describing her and her colleagues private teaching commented, ‘If we don’t do like this, how can we survive our life?’ (interview 25-11-00).
Whilst many of the trainers had been teaching privately prior to their involvement with CAMSET, their involvement with the project increased their opportunities for private teaching and the fees they could command. Before training with CAMSET, they had no official status as English teachers or teacher trainers, and although it took a long time for the Ministry to officially recognise the CAMSET trainers, they received Ministry certificates in a graduation ceremony in February 2001. This official status added to the status of having been trained in an aid-funded project with ‘native English speaker’ trainers and having had overseas training, information the trainers included in their posters advertising classes. This professional status enhanced their economic status, as Sisopheareth
215 pointed out to me, quite proudly, that ‘I am a teacher trainer, so I get a special salary from private classes’ (interview 21-12-02).
The project also supported and assisted the trainers in their private work. One example was the financial support, for per diems, staff costs, room rental, etc., of over $4,500 paid to Chan Mol to run courses for local secondary teachers and other education staff during the time the trainee-trainers were in Singapore. This support had a long-term policy aim of establishing sustainable incomegeneration activities in the RTTCs, which never really came to fruition. CAMSET training and education finance advisor, Mike Delens, drafted a document outlining the proposed policy. He noted the inadequacy of salaries, limited government budgets and the movement towards a sectorwide approach in which the government and donors would fund agreed priorities, but also a further shift: […] toward greater involvement of the private sector in education. This affects not only completely private enterprises, but also involves the entry of the state into the private market-place, in areas which it is competent, for example language training and teacher training. It is possible to foresee a future, even in developing countries, in which the role of the Government is to regulate and set standards for the education system. The role of the private sector will be to supply educational goods (textbooks, classroom materials, furniture, etc.) and educational services (examinations, training, inspection, etc.) to the standard required by Government. (Delens n.d.: 2-3 italics in original) This indicates a vision of the future for education in Cambodia within the project parallel to that of CfBT, with a dominant role for the private sector, and the state fulfilling the role of regulator – along the lines of the role of the state suggested by Milton Freidman. It also assumes that the problems faced within the education system are merely a matter of a lack of capacity and bureaucratic inefficiency – the ‘dead hand’ of government – which can be solved through the efficiencies of the private sector. But if the education system, which still only serves a minority of the population, cannot currently be adequately funded through a national budget heavily subsidised by donors, where would the extra finance that would be required for the profits to motivate the
216 ‘invisible hand’ of the private sector be found? What would be the effects on such public-private partnerships of a political culture underpinned by patron-client relationships?
CAMSET volunteers and team members In comparison to the Cambodian teachers and trainers involved with the project, the expatriate volunteers and CAMSET team members (all from the UK) had very high incomes. As a volunteer, I received a monthly salary from the project45 of $300 plus $50 for utility bills. In addition, VSO paid my rent of $200 per month. VSO also paid the insurance costs, that covered all my medical bills and included emergency medical evacuation. In the UK, I had received a pre-departure grant of approximately £450 and on my return after one year (flights paid by VSO), I received a £877 resettlement grant and a £500 ISA to cover missed pension payments. Whilst in country, all professional expenses, e.g. work related travel to Phnom Penh, was covered either by the project or by VSO. I also had a small Honda moped, which I had on permanent ‘loan’ from another volunteer, for which I could claim a petrol allowance. In terms of salaries and payments, not including insurance, flights and expenses, this is approximately $812 per month or around thirty times the state salaries of my Cambodian colleagues.
The details of my income and additional benefits are easy to reveal. Finding out what the expatriate team members received is more difficult. This partly results from salaries and other allowances not being public information unlike other parts of project finance. It also resulted from an English cultural norm which makes it ‘bad taste’ to ask someone about their salary, a product perhaps of the UK class system. Being English and of lower status in the project hierarchy, I avoided asking the project specialists about their salaries for fear of offending them. However, there are other sources of information concerning equivalent salaries. 45
For the first six months my salary was paid by the project, but during the extension period this was paid by VSO.
217
The 1991 Australian Catholic Relief consultant’s report contained a draft proposal for a project very similar to CAMSET, which suggested ‘personnel fees/accommodation/allowances’ of $8333 per month for the team leader and $6667 per month for project advisors, all of who would be ‘international’. The proposal envisaged local personnel, such as a project coordinator, teachertrainers, curriculum and materials development staff, would be Ministry employees paid government salaries. However, the proposal included paying local salaries for a clerical assistant and a driver of US$30 per month (Australian Catholic Relief 1991: Annex 9, Table 2). These were probably higher than the salaries paid to the expatriate staff of CAMSET, although the term ‘allowance’ in the proposed budget does not indicate whether this includes expenses such as accommodation, flights, health insurance and so on. One of the CAMSET team indicated that their salaries alone were between US$3000 and US$4500 per month – or approximately one hundred to one hundred and fifty times the monthly salary of a Cambodian teacher. In addition, they would have had all the usual extra ‘allowances’ and benefits, including the use of a project vehicle and accommodation costs. Technical assistance programme salaries Godfrey et al’s (2000a: 53-4) study of 50 technical assistance projects in Cambodia highlights a distinct lack of transparency regarding costs on the part of projects. Information on foreigners’ salaries was deemed ‘confidential’ or where provided it only included payments made to expatriates in Cambodia and not those made in their home countries. The authors underline the contradiction of donors demanding transparency from the Cambodian government, yet failing to honour these demands themselves. From the limited data they received, the authors summarised unit personnel costs as follows:
Table ?: Unit personnel costs: averages for two types of projects (US $ p.a.)
218 Category of staff
Projects executed by NGOs or UNV
Projects executed by multilaterals, bilaterals, companies or government
International experts International consultants Local experts Local consultants
43,800 …. 6,588 ….
127,381 159,775 15,690 24,250
Note: Unit personnel costs include not only salary, but also other costs accrued in employing someone, such as air fares, costs of shipping personnel effects, allowances (education, housing, etc), health insurance, superannuation, and so on. In the case of non-NGO projects, in particular, they may also include some quite hefty overheads. (Source: Godfrey, et al. 2000b: 54, Table 5.1)
The large differences between the costs of ‘international’ and ‘local’ personnel are not unusual. Organisations claim that ‘international’ personnel remunerations are set at levels which allow them to return home with no loss of living standard and are commensurate with the ‘market rate’, which appears to be a function of salaries paid by the large multilaterals such as the World Bank, the ADB and the various arms of the UN. Godfrey et al point to several Cambodians who have lived and were educated abroad are working as international experts on aid projects as evidence that ‘criterion for inclusion in the “international” category is market forces’ (ibid: 54). However, the huge differences between ‘international’ and ‘local’ ‘experts’ and ‘consultants’ seem more difficult to explain through market forces. There have been various analyses of the failings of ‘development experts’ (e.g. Chambers, R. 1983; Crush 1995; Ferguson 1994; Hobart 1993) which largely focus on knowledge, but little has been written about these socio-economic inequalities and why local ‘experts’ in developing countries are paid much less and, partially as a result, often have lower status.
In Cambodia the level of salaries and benefits paid to expatriate personnel appears not to be open for discussion. In August 2002 Brad Adams, a human rights lawyer in Cambodia between 1993 and 1998, published two opinion pieces in the English-language Phnom Penh Post, a paper read widely within the expatriate community, criticising the level of payments to international ‘experts’ working on technical assistance programmes in Cambodia (Adams 2002a, 2002b). Adams pointed to the increasing share of technical assistance in total aid to Cambodia, from 19% in 1992 to 57% in 1998,
219 and some ironies of this. One example he gives is the failure to take up a suggestion made by UNTAC to pay Cambodian judges a decent salary, which could assist in making them accountable for corruption and aid the overall judicial reform process. He estimates the cost of this as $1.2 million per year or less than half of one percent of the total donors spend on technical assistance in Cambodia. That this has not happened, he argues, is because ‘this would have involved paying Cambodians instead of foreigners, a bizarre taboo among donors’ (Adams 2002a). Whilst his articles contained detailed figures (many from Godfrey et al 2000b), it was also a polemic as his closing sentence, a reworking of the old joke about the army, shows: Join the aid community. Travel to exotic, distant lands. Meet exciting, unusual people. And make a killing. (Adams 2002a) Despite the detail and the polemics there were only two responses, both letters, published in the Phnom Penh Post: one from the external relations director of the ADB quibbling with the details of payments and the other in support of Adams from a Cambodian living in Washington. A Post journalist I talked to in December 2002, said that the only other response has been from someone who did not like Adams and was unprintable. This lack of response from the ‘aid community’ suggests either that levels of remuneration is a settled subject or perhaps that justifications cannot be provided.
Status inequalities There is a funny story that happens to young teachers who want a wife. When they go to her parents, they ask, 'What is your job?' 'I am a teacher' replies the teacher.' 'I don't want a sonin-law whose job is a teacher,' answer her parents, 'because your salary is too low to bring up my daughter.' This is the real life of teacher in Cambodia. (Excerpt from pre-service trainee teacher’s essay 'On being a teacher in Cambodia' 22-01-01.) In the past, Cambodian teachers had high social status, in part because of their role as the bearers and transmitters of knowledge. Indicators of this high status remain, for example, the term of
220 address for a teacher in Khmer is kru, a derivative of the Sanskrit guru, marking the monastic roots of education. David Ayres points out that in addition to benefiting from the status accorded to monks, after independence teachers were vested with the authority of the state through transmission of the new values of ‘modern’ Cambodia (Ayres 2000a: 41). Students were careful to keep their heads below the teachers’ (a sign of respect within Cambodian Buddhism), and always stood up when a teacher entered the classroom. This high status is also captured in a Khmer saying my colleague, Chheng Chhin, often used when student-centred learning was being discussed: ‘Knowledge without a teacher is like a flower without a smell’. Ayres mentions the following Khmer phrase as indicative of the reverence parents gave to teachers. I give to you my whole child. Teach him everything you know. You set the rules. Whatever you do is up to you. I need only the skin and bones. (Ayres 1997: 107) There was also an economic dimension to this high social status. In the 1960s, teachers incomes were relatively high; the story that I was often told was that in those times a teacher could support a family of fifteen.
In contemporary Cambodia, as student’s comments about marriage indicate, teachers’ declining economic status has been accompanied by a decline in their social status. This was probably exacerbated by some of the activities teachers were pushed into to earn extra income. If students were hiring their own teachers as a moto driver, for example, this combined potentially contradictory economic and social relationships. The student would still address the teacher as kru, but would be paying them for a service. Similarly, although students and parents may understand the economic pressures on teachers, the manipulation of grades and taking of bribes contradicts the social and cultural norm of the honest and moral teacher as a role model for students.
Those education staff involved with CAMSET (as with other aid-funded projects) had some protection from the loss of economic status. During the life of the project, the supplementary
221 payments were, at times, substantial, in particular those paid during on-the-job training in CMASET II. More importantly, the training and skills acquired from their involvement with CAMSET has increased both their value in the private education market and their ability to access other forms of employment, especially with international organisations, and opportunities for further study. It needs to be stressed that these staff worked extremely hard during their involvement with CAMSET, not just in their state jobs and project work, but, as was shown by the hours noted above, in their private work, which was often their main source of family income. At times when they were not receiving supplementary payments, they remained highly committed to working in state education for derisory salaries, when many could have moved full-time into private teaching or possibly found other work. When I discussed this with colleagues, there gave a range of reasons, some related to the residual social status of being a kru and being in a government job, some with being involved in the project and possibilities for further training, but they also felt very strongly about the importance of education, not just for the individual, but for the nation. The irony is that the training, skills and status they gained through involvement with the project has resulted in many of them leaving the state education sector.
Whilst involvement with the project helped maintain their economic status, and to some degree social status, Cambodian education staff had lower de facto status than ‘international’ staff within the project, even those who were in a higher position within the Ministry hierarchy. This was exemplified during some early meetings I attended as part of my induction into the project. One of the first was with Dr. Nath Bunroeun, the Director of the Teacher Training Department of MoEYS, held in his office, in which CAMSET teacher-training advisor Jane Fowles and national trainertrainer, Kao Sophal (acting as interpreter), were introducing me as the new Takeo RTTC volunteer. The Director was making a small introductory speech in Khmer, which Sophal was translating, which Jane interrupted to discuss the situation with Meng Seng Heng at Kandal RTTC. The Director broke into English to discuss this, and then returned to his welcoming speech, in Khmer,
222 in which he stated his hope that I would be highly professional and that I might also stay and marry a good Cambodian woman. Later, as we walked back from the meeting, Jane commented about ‘the amazing turnaround in Bunreoun’ who when he had begun the job the previous year had, in her words, ‘been bolshie and difficult to work with’ (fieldnotes 27-02-00).
A few days later, there was a meeting of the volunteers and the teacher-training team. Jane was away, so the meeting was being chaired by Sophal, who had previously been introduced as part of my ‘line management team’ (fieldnotes 27-02-02), and attended by volunteers from three RTTCs. Despite Sophal being both the chair and above volunteers in both project and Ministry hierarchies, and having been involved with CAMSET since 1993, much longer than anyone present, the volunteers talked over him, largely ignored the agenda he had prepared and, it appeared to me, used the meeting as an opportunity to vent frustrations with the CAMSET team. During the meeting, Sophal commented that some CAMSET team members would benefit from ‘learning the Ministry way of doing things’ (fieldnotes 004-03-00).
Even when the status of Cambodian staff was emphasised as being equal to or above that of foreign counterparts, there were often contradictions. My own placement description, which Jane explained had been specifically written by her to clarify these relationships, states unambiguously that ‘the volunteer will be accountable to the Teacher Trainer of the English Department of Takeo RTTC’, which was Sok Chan Mol, who had been trained within CAMSET 1 (VSO 1999: 9). It also stressed that the volunteer was to ‘assist the teacher trainer’ to implement the one-year on-the-job training of the new teacher trainers, and made clear that: [i]t is very important that the position and standing of the established teacher trainer should not be undermined. For this reason, the volunteer should be ready to act in such a way that everyone at the college and at the provincial education office realises that it is the teacher trainer who is responsible for the ELT training at the RTTC, not the outside “expert”. (ibid: 10)
223 By the time I came to Takeo RTTC, Chan Mol had been a qualified teacher for over thirty years, had survived the Khmer Rouge period, taught at primary and secondary both maths and English, been trained with CAMSET on an in-service course, selected to counterpart two volunteers, undertaken six months training in the UK and one-year on-the-job in Phnom Penh, attended training and workshops in the USA and Japan, and had been running in-service courses at Takeo RTTC since 1997. I had one four week certificate in teaching English and seven years experience of teaching and training in five different countries, and had been in Cambodia for four weeks. My job had come up because Tim Phal Mean, Chan Mol’s colleague in Takeo, had left to become a provincial inspector, and CAMSET had decided that Chan Mol would benefit from the assistance of a volunteer. My impression was that Chan Mol could have mentored the new trainers by herself, as she was highly trained and experienced, and in conversation one day she told me that she actually preferred to work alone and that CAMSET had never asked whether she wanted another volunteer (fieldnotes 08-08-00).
Whilst the placement description clearly defined my position as assistant to Chan Mol, other factors made this less clear. The trainee-trainers appeared to perceive me as their de facto ‘boss’ rather than Chan Mol. Thearo’s explanation of this clearly linked me to the project and a monitoring role: T: Because I thought that you come here, um, to work in the Takeo RTTC, to be a representative of CAMSET, so maybe everything happened you can report to CAMSET. S: Mm, that’s interesting, I never thought of it like that. You see I was told not to be the boss, very specifically by CAMSET, I was told do not be the boss, Chan Mol is the boss. T: And as I told you one day, you are the eyes of CAMSET. (interview 06-03-01) In contrast, Chhin and Ratha emphasised my experience, qualifications, status and my being foreign. R: You work not only Cambodia, you work in China or different place. So when we work with you, you can help me and give us some advice like our expert, so we regard you as a leader too and share our experience. (interview 27-02-01) C: Because I think that you are foreigner, you know, you have lot of experience in English and you used to work in many different countries in the world and you are a high graduate if compared with us. (interview 10-02-01)
224 However, the trainee-trainers were aware of Chan Mol’s position as their mentor, so deferred to her over most matters, and she represented all of them in discussions with the RTTC Director or the Director of Studies. Chan Mol would also use my status in negotiating with those above her in the hierarchy. On the way to request the use of car one day, Chan Mol told me that I should request it from the POE Deputy Director as I had ‘salty lips’. She explained that this is a Khmer expression used to describe someone who had the status or respect to request something from a person of higher rank. Chan Mol felt that my position as a foreigner attached to a foreign development project, an ângka, meant that I had the required status (fieldnotes 19-06-00).
Although my placement description envisaged my job to be as assistant to Chan Mol, there were other responsibilities, not set out in project documents, which contradicted this position. A central one related to the teacher training methods and materials. Under CAMSET 1 a set of lesson structures referred to as PP (presentation, practice) and PRS (practice, revision, skill) were developed and implemented and Chan Mol had been trained using these. Later, but particularly under CAMSET 2, these were rejected as they did not match the newly developed teacher training materials. Jane made clear to me in our early meetings that part of my job was to make sure that these were not being used, and that more ‘standard’ lesson planning approaches were used. Jane was aware that Chan Mol might not be happy about this change, as it contradicted her own training, but that I was to make sure the trainee-trainers understood the situation (fieldnotes 30-03-00). This contradicted the placement description’s concerns about the volunteer not being seen as the outside ‘expert’ and led to serious tensions between Chan Mol and myself. I was focused on what I thought was a simple methodological change, without realising how my actions undermined Chan Mol’s status as the trained and experienced English teacher-trainer.
There was also the perception among many Cambodian staff involved with CAMSET that it was easier for volunteers to discuss financial matters with the project than Cambodians. Volunteers
225 foreign status would allow trainers and mentors at the RTTCs to use volunteers as brokers between them and the project, especially concerning financial matters. Whenever there were problems with the ‘overtime’ payments, the trainers would ask me to intercede on their behalf with Jane, who was in immediate control of the payments, which I normally agreed to do. The volunteers in the other RTTCS also acted as brokers in this way. Philippa Thomas, in Kompong Cham, and Nick Wilson, in Prey Veng, both argued the ‘overtime’ payments had largely resulted from the volunteers pointing out to the project team how much extra work was involved, in terms of lesson planning, observation and feedback, for the mentors and trainee-trainers (interviews 10-03-01 and 19-03-01). The regular meetings between the CAMSET team and the volunteers provided an institutional space for the volunteers to discuss such matter and exert pressure on the project team, but the volunteers’ colleagues and counterparts, such as Chan Mol, were not invited to these meetings to put their own case.
Some Cambodian staff also felt that many of the expatriate staff felt that the per diems and salary supplements were creating a dependency or that Cambodian staff were simply pursuing income rather than training (see also Harvey Smith, CAMSET 1 team leaders, in the next chapter). Chan Mol regularly complained about this attitude, and Phal Mean described how he felt insulted when one project team member had openly stated at workshop that it was felt that some people were only there for the per diem (fieldnotes 01-11-00).
During a discussion with one of my Cambodian colleagues about salaries, I mentioned what I estimated the project team members salaries to be and that I the level of my own salary. I was surprised to find that my colleague was unaware of the salary levels of the project team and other ‘international’ workers, although this reflects the lack of transparency within the aid sector. My colleague remained very polite commenting that whilst my salary seemed a reasonable level, those of the project team were far too high and questioned the value for money they provided.
226
227
Chapter 7: Aftermath: project outcomes and sustainability
Introduction
Kao Sophal, counterpart to CAMSET 2 teacher training advisor and national English trainer-trainer, began learning English privately in Battambang in 1983 when he was sixteen. At that time, he recalled, ‘learning was very tough […] only the ones who had good motivation could learn well’ (interview 27-12-02). His teachers were officials from the Provincial Office of Education, who had the power to run private classes despite the restrictions of the time. As he needed money to finance his own learning, he opened his own private English class in 1984, which became ‘quite popular at that time without any methodology’ (ibid) to the envy of his own teachers. The police would sometimes come and sit at the back of his class as he taught, but, he said, they were more concerned about the political content of the lesson than the language itself.
Due to government restrictions on student numbers at the time, Sophal did not enter upper secondary school, but instead passed the test for the Regional Teacher Training College in 1984. He was rather disappointed as he had not really wanted to be a teacher and had taken the test simply to provide another option if he failed to enter upper secondary school. Nonetheless, he completed a two-year maths and biology lower teacher training course, whilst at the same time maintaining his private English classes (he subsequently studied the upper secondary curriculum part-time graduating in 1993).
By the late 1980s, he was teaching English in a lower secondary school in Battambang, and in 1990 was selected for a QSA ‘recyclage’ course in Phnom Penh. This was where he was first exposed to
228 Communicative Language Teaching and student-centred learning, although he described the courses as theoretical, from which he gained an awareness rather than the ability to apply the methods. He described his own methods at that time as ‘chalk and talk […], but I was serious about getting students to work things out […] and not much speaking, only teacher-student communication, no pairwork or groupwork’ (ibid).
In July 1993, he passed a CBC selection test and undertook an in-service course run by VSO volunteer Maggie Hunter at Battambang RTTC. Although, he had not wanted to be a teacher, he saw this as a good opportunity for promotion and to develop his language skills in order to fulfil his ambition to escape from teaching in rural areas. This time the exposure to new teaching methods was less theoretical, as he explained, ‘first of all we found it quite difficult to cope with the new environment of learning and teaching […] most of us were shocked from the beginning […] because we were in the habit of grammar learning and teacher talking time’ (ibid). Despite the shock, he felt the methods were ‘just new things brought in and we had to adapt and learn […] and the Communicative Approach really helps the students’ (ibid). His performance on the course led to his being selected by Maggie as her counterpart for the next course and subsequently to selection for training as a teacher-trainer. This included six months in the UK followed by one year on-the-job training in Phnom Penh RTTC, after which in 1996 he returned to Battambang RTTC to begin running in-service courses and mentoring the two new provincial English inspectors. He also opened his own private school.
After a year working at the RTTC, Sophal was chosen to be trained as a national trainer-trainer and counterpart to the teacher training advisor for the upcoming CAMSET 2. In his words, ‘Harvey Smith wanted me to come and work in the Ministry level because he could see my capacity as well as my confidence and commitment to work’ (ibid). Harvey persuaded the Ministry to allow Sophal to transfer from the RTTC to the Faculty of Pedagogy and the project provided some financial
229 assistance for his move. There was a lack of support within the Faculty for his position there (specifically for his ideas to develop income generating activities), and no official position of national trainer, so he subsequently transferred to the Teacher Training Department. Sophal also began teaching privately in Phnom Penh, eventually opening the first private English teacher training courses at $400 per student, based on the CAMSET in-service courses. He ran during evenings and weekends whilst continuing to work full-time running training courses and developing training materials for the Ministry and CAMSET.
On returning to Cambodia in 2002, over a year after the completion of CAMSET 2, I found Sophal proudly operating his own medium-sized private school, the Institute of Cambodian Education, for which CAMSET 2 had provided $2000 of financial support. He had taken extended leave from the Ministry, because his position as national trainer had never been officially recognised and he had been given work translating documents for Ministers and Directors, something he did not want to do. His school, which employed five foreign teachers (with the British and Australian teachers being paid $10 per hour compared to $4 per hour for the Philippino teacher) as well as teachers trained by CAMSET, was slowly becoming successful running both general English and BA equivalent courses. He was not planning to return to work at the Ministry, although he was keen to explain his ambition to establish a public-private partnership with the Ministry to train teacher-trainers, teachers and other Ministry staff. However, because of his knowledge of the way the Ministry worked, he was not very confident this would happen.
Sophal epitomised the remarkable flexibility, capacity to adapt and resourcefulness of many Cambodians, especially those who had survived the Democratic Kampuchea period. Like Sophal, many of the teachers I worked with and met had developed their entrepreneurial skills through their private classes and other work, prior to involvement with aid agency ‘capacity building’ projects, a fact that was rarely remarked upon within the discourses of these same agencies.
230
Sustainable development or project sustainability? After the initial phase of the project under CBC, both DfID and CfBT regarded sustainability of project outcomes as vital. The overall objective of CAMSET 2 was ‘to design and implement sustainable systems that led to continued improvement in the quality of teaching and learning for English in secondary schools’ (ODA 1997: n.p.). The main focus of this chapter is an examination of these systems since the end of the project to make some assessment of their sustainability. This first requires some discussion of the definitions of ‘sustainable’ and ‘sustainability’ within development thinking and practice and clarification of
their usage and meaning within the
CAMSET project.
In their original formulation, the concepts sustainable development and sustainability were primarily concerned with the environmental effects of human (economic) action and the reformulation of policy and practice to alleviate these effects and ensure future environmental and social viability. A useful differentiation between the two terms is made by O’Riordan (1988 cited in Dresner 2002: 645), who sees sustainability as primarily concerned with the environment and sustainable development as prioritising development. Over time the terms have been co-opted and institutionalised by the NGOs and international agencies working in ‘development.’ Development interventions now contain policies aimed at producing ‘sustainability’ and practitioners and academics build careers around the pursuit of ‘sustainable development.’ However, there has been a profound shift in the meaning of the terms: Sometimes a project is described as “sustainable” on the grounds simply of its survival beyond the phase of external support, but neither this nor its “success” measured by limited project goals, necessarily implies true sustainability. (Sharp 1995: 310) Thus, sustainability and sustainable development often refer to the continuation of narrowly defined project objectives, beyond the life of the project itself. (In some cases, for example, Fowler 2000, it
231 even appears to be about how the ‘development’ organisation can sustain itself.) Whilst retaining the idea of formulating and implementing policy in order to produce lasting change, the emphasis has shifted away from the wider effects of development interventions (or ‘development’ as a whole) contained in the original usage. Under this new formulation, political questions inherent to the reorganisation of economic and social relations required in pursuit of ‘sustainability’ are absent. The ‘keys’ to sustainability are located in institutional capacity building, and local participation and ownership - terms also subject to wide debates over their definition, possibility, and achievement and often the failure of sustainability is said to result from the failure of development interventions, and especially projects, to instil these effectively. Recipient governments can be said to “own” an aid activity when they believe that it empowers and serves their interests. This is crucial to the success of an aid activity, because unless the recipients truly believe in the reform or the project, it is unlikely that they will put any effort into making it work. […] It also makes it possible that the project or reform will be sustained (Kanbur, et al. 1999: 25-6). As I show below, it was this more recent reworking of ‘project sustainability’, which emphasised the ‘ownership’ and ‘participation’ of the Ministry and its staff, that was seen as the key to sustaining the outputs of the CAMSET project.
CAMSET and project sustainability Project outcomes and purpose are largely defined in terms of systems in place, which links project success strongly to sustainability. The project goal reflects the fact that the long term benefit will be in the increased access of Cambodians and of Cambodia to economic development through employment and regional fora. Through the development of a supervisor system, higher quality teacher training and production of textbooks, the project is intended to influence teaching and learning, leding to both greater competence in English and to greater communicative and social skills deriving from the learner-centred methodology applied in English teaching. As with most education projects, it will not be feasible to evaluate the impact of this on socio-economic development until some time after the end of the project. (ODA 1997: para 3.4.2)
Whilst the ‘pilot’ phase of the project was ‘not designed to be sustainable’ (ODA 1997: para. 3.1.3), sustainability became central in both CAMSET 1 and 2. According to project documents and
232 participants, the key to achieving sustainability of project outcomes was through the integration of project activities within all levels of the Ministry. Integration would be achieved through the increased participation of Ministry personnel in project design and management process which would engender an increased sense of local ownership. This can be seen in the following claims made in a CfBT document describing the achievements of CAMSET 1: We successfully helped the Ministry establish a Steering Committee at the beginning of the project, which has been very effective in guiding and monitoring project activities, as well as helping to promote ownership by Ministry staff of the project’s activities. The extent to which ownership has been developed is one of the outcomes of which we feel most proud. The fact that the Ministry played a very active part in the design of CAMSET 2 is evidence of the extent to which they understood what CAMSET 1 was achieving and what the Ministry still needed to do to ensure it could develop a sustainable national programme. (CfBT 1997: n.p.) Leaving aside the rather paternalistic language, especially in the final sentence, the emphasis on integration, participation and ownership, marginalised the under-funding of education and the economic realities faced by severely underpaid education staff involved with the project. As I show below, these financial and economic constraints meant the key staff trained within the project, who it was assumed would maintain the systems of teaching and learning English, either left their Ministry positions or increased their outside work once project support ended.
An academic analysis of the CAMSET 2 project design workshop by project team member, Kath Copley, exemplifies how project members identified the key issues for project sustainability as ‘participation’ and ‘ownership’, thus marginalising the important effects of inadequate salaries. According to Copley, the design process for CAMSET 1 was dominated by expatriate project staff with only three or four Cambodians participating (Copley 1998: 86). In contrast, for CAMSET 2, ‘[a] ll the key stakeholders associated with the education system were involved in the project design process’ and it was to be managed through ‘a steering committee, under the chairmanship of a senior officer of the Ministry, with representation from all the key departments which have a stake in the project’ (ODA 1997: para. 3.3.3). In Copley’s discursive analysis of the CAMSET 2 design
233 process, she points out the imbalances of power embedded in the ‘talk and text’ of this process. One example comes in the donor agency rules, spelled out by the team leader during the design workshop, which state that the project ‘must be a partnership’ – but, as she notes, this is anomalous given that ‘partnership’ normally signals equity, but the modal ‘must’ generally signals coercion (ibid: 89). Copley points out how such discursive anomalies reveal the unconscious ideological stances that potentially undermine concepts such as ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’. However, she also views these ideals of ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ as central because: [c]hange will only be realised when all the participants in the development process have the access to the necessary skills and language to become empowered. (ibid: 94) This assumes that some participants in the process (‘the Cambodians’) are initially un- or disempowered, a situation that can be improved through (‘the project’) providing ‘the necessary skills and language’. Thus, Copley centres power in language and linguistic skills, viewing these as vital for the effective or ‘authentic’ development which would, in turn, be sustainable.
Another text she analyses is the following exchange between the project team leder (A) and a Ministry official (B). A
There will be no salary supplements as in the [Project 246].
B
The success of the training course depends on the trainers. If they get no salary support, they won’t be able to do it.
A
We have to expect the trainers to teach for a shorter period, unless the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport is able to pay a proper salary to its people. We are not setting the policy.
B
[Unintelligible]
A
There will be an opportunity to discuss this at the appraisal.
B
If [A] does not believe me he just try to do the training course. It will fail.
A
Salary supplements conflict with sustainability. This is their concern. It will be very difficult to complete the criterion of “completed project” “fully sustainable” if there are salary supplements. We should put off this discussion until then.
Project 2 here refers to CAMSET 1 – Copley never formally identifies the project she is talking about, and refers to the three phases of CBC/CAMSET as Project 1, Project 2 and Project 3. 46
234
(ibid: 92) Copley then provides a detailed critical discourse analysis of the exchange, summarising that Speaker A controls the conversations as he is ‘using his first language and has a number of skills at his command’ and because ‘he is ultimately in a position of authority and can therefore control the turns’ (ibid: 93). Whilst this discussion reveals the paradoxes and power imbalances of the ‘participatory’ design process, it fails to take seriously the point Speaker B was making. Without supplementary payments, the material conditions of the education staff would mean they would have to be working elsewhere, thereby undermining ‘the success of the training course’.
As I discussed in Chapter 5, the ending of salary supplements resulted in project activities being halted or disrupted, leading to the resumption of payments under different labels such as ‘overtime’ or ‘payment for specific activities.’ Speaker B’s point, that the training course would fail, was based on experience and intimate knowledge of the situation of education staff. Copley’s discussion about the power of Speaker A residing in his linguistic advantages and position in the project fails to examine the wider context of the conversation. Speaker A points out that the policy of ending supplements was a donor decision (‘We are not setting the policy.’), made within the framework of project ‘sustainability’. The reinstatement of payments, in apparent contradictory of the ‘sustainability’ criterion, suggests that either the Cambodian participants in the project had more power than Copley attributes to them and/or that project activities could not be sustained without such payments. However, such temporary payments could not resolve the long-term problem of inadequate salaries and the under funding of education. It was these issues of education financing which undermined the long-term sustainability of the systems established by CAMSET. The ‘access to the necessary skills and language’ which Copley refers to ‘empowered’ many of the Cambodian staff through increasing their access to work in the private sector and with international agencies or in returning to higher education.
235
The marginalisation of the economic situation of education staff can also be seen a discussion of CAMSET project sustainability given by CAMSET 1 team leader Harvey Smith at a seminar a year in 1996. Smith framed his assessment using his own definition: ‘Project sustainability’ can be defined as the ability to sustain the impact of the project after the aid funding has ceased. This can be seen in terms of product, what the project sets up which will continue after the aid funding stops, such as the systems or structures which are in place, the staff trained to operate the systems, and the resources, especially financial, which are available. It can also be seen in terms of a process, developing a commitment to sustaining the change which the project initiates, by those who implement the activities, by managementlevel staff and at the political (policy-making) level. (Smith 1996: 151, italics in original) Using this distinction between product and process, Smith briefly examines where each of the eight project components (see Chapter 3) were in terms of sustainability a year prior to the end of CAMSET 1. Although clearly noting the need for a financial commitment to sustain the systems and structures produced under aid funding, he appears to assume that these systems have been established within the budget available to the Ministry, thus allowing the Ministry to simply take over the financial commitment. However, he also makes several references to the need for Ministry staff to continue to access ‘other sources of income […] if they are to be fully committed to their work’ (ibid: 154), which suggests an awareness that at least some of the systems and structures established by the project cannot be financed within the Ministry budget. The notion of commitment is central to the second part of his definition, and is referred to throughout the text. Although he indicates that for some Ministry staff commitment is partly dependent on external income sources, he emphasises that ‘the CAMSET team has ensured that what is developed builds on existing systems or structures and is developed by Cambodians rather than Britons, so there is a sense of ownership and commitment to change at all levels (ibid: 155). As I show below, whilst throughout the text Smith indicates the need for financial commitment from the Ministry to sustain the systems and structures developed though project activities, although also indicating serious doubts that such commitments will be forthcoming, he concludes by stating that sustainability is
236 being undermined as project supplementary payments are generating a ‘culture of dependency’ amongst Ministry staff.
One component he assesses is the development of a policy framework through the establishment of a system for gathering and analysing data, which included training three English supervisors in three Ministry departments to operate this system. One outcome of this system was a Survey of ELT in Secondary Schools (MoEYS 1996), which contributed to the development of a Master Plan for teaching English and the baseline study for CAMSET 2. He states that the ‘sense of ownership’ here is at the level of the supervisors, who have built up the necessary contacts and established their status at provincial, university and school levels. Sustainability for this component, he notes, also requires recurrent budget costs from the general education budget, and although there was a policy commitment ‘we do not know yet whether this will include a financial commitment’ (ibid: 152). However, this apparently doubtful financial commitment would appear essential to maintain these supervisors in their posts or to train replacements.
In discussing the production of a national English curriculum for grades 7 to 12, he points to ‘a strong sense of ownership’ which should aid sustainability (ibid) deriving from the participation of Cambodian staff in producing the curriculum. But he notes that whilst: [t]his component was not expected to establish a system for perpetual evaluation, revision, retrialling and so on, […] a pool of trained people are now available to operate such a system if a later project were to establish one – and if the Ministry were to identify a current budget source. (ibid: 152) However, regardless of the need to review and revise the curriculum, this also relies on the continued training and payment of teachers who are then able to effectively apply the methods and techniques in the curriculum.
237 Further financial concerns are raised in his discussion of the establishment of a supervision system for the training and in-service support of English teachers within the Ministry and provinces. Smith points out the problems stemming from a lack of Ministry agreement on the structure of such a system and over the status and grade of ‘teacher trainer’. He notes the ‘financial implications, as there will need to be posts at a suitable grade and a recurrent budget for whatever system is eventually agreed’ (ibid: 153). Ministry supervisors were already: in posts which are seen as bearing a certain status and responsibility; […] the teacher trainers, although confident of their professional ability, are demotivated by their lack of [Ministry] status. They are also concerned that their time for and access to activities which will provide sufficient income to keep a family will be restricted in the Regional Teacher Training Centres, something which the team is currently working on. (ibid: 153) The question of establishing official Ministry status and pay-scales for teacher trainers, and for other staff trained through CAMSET such as the national trainer, Kao Sophal, were never resolved during CAMSET 2. Regardless of Ministry ‘ownership’ of the ELT teacher training system developed by the project, this appeared, at least in part, to be a question of the reluctance of the Ministry to create new pay-scales for these posts. There was already a pay-scale for those teachers working in teacher training centres related to their status as lower or upper secondary teachers. Creating a new grade of ‘teacher-trainer’ would presumably have meant regarding all these staff, with subsequent budgetary implications.
In both the above and in his assessment of the national in-service teacher training system for lower secondary at RTTC level faced similar issues, he points to the need for the Cambodian teacher trainers to retain their access to ‘other sources of income’ in order to maintain their commitment to their work within state education. Assisting with these activities is something he notes the project ‘team is currently working on.’ As I discussed in Chapter 6, this was summarised in the policy initiative drafted by Mike Delens aimed at formalising and expanding trainers’ participation in private sector education as part of a nascent public-private partnership with the Ministry. The main aim seemed to be, as with the case of the National English Teachers Resource Centre, that the
238 trainers would take the led in developing income-generating activities enabling RTTCs to become partly self-financing. This also suggests the project team viewed the possibility of the government increasing the education share of the national budget as highly unlikely.
Ironically, Smith briefly notes that the component to establish procedures for regulating privatesector secondary-equivalent ELT, was unlikely to be continued as the Ministry had yet to establish an inspection system for state sector schools.
In his conclusion, Smith again refers to the work the project team have been undertaking ‘with their Cambodian colleagues to try to open up possibilities for personal income generation using new skills they have gained from the project [which] involves being prepared to take risks and having some basic business skills’ (ibid: 155). That many of the Cambodians involved with CAMSET had been successfully generating personal income from their own private teaching, even setting up private schools, prior to their involvement gains no recognition in Smith’s paper. He goes on to note that as ‘in the near future the Ministry is unlikely to have adequate resources [and] there has been resistance in the Ministry to the concept of its activities being self financing […] some activities will therefore run at a lower level of quality than the staff are capable of providing and some may not run at all’ (ibid: 156). The lack of Ministry resources is given here as a simple fact, with the only alternative envisaged being self-financing presumably through private sector activities. Discussions of government ‘ownership’ through a political commitment to the redistribution of the national budget are noticeably absent. This may be result from Smith, as a representative of the project, not wanting to appear to be critical of the government the project is in ‘partnership’ with, but it could also be related to the views expressed in Delens’ paper indicating a more dominant role for the private sector in education.
239 However, in his final paragraph, Smith locates what he appears to view as potentially more threatening to project sustainability than a lack of government financing of education. While professional and political commitment will generally have been achieved, doubts must remain about the personal commitment of anyone who sees themselves as financially disadvantaged by continuing with activities initiated by the project. Unfortunately a culture developed where per diems are no longer seen as temporary assistance while one is in training, but as a permanent right, and the incentive to look for supplementary income elsewhere has diminished. This culture of dependency is counter-productive and counter-developmental and, as long as it persists, will make all aid projects less effective than they might otherwise be. (Smith 1996: 156) Given that Cambodian education was largely being funded through aid money transmitted through projects and that donors failed to persuade or pressurise the government into the reallocating and disbursing an adequate proportion of the national budget towards education throughout the 1990s, it is unsurprising that education staff saw supplementary payments from projects as a ‘right’ – these had effectively become their salaries. That they would be ‘financially disadvantaged by continuing with activities initiated by the project’ was not a matter ‘personal commitment’ but reflected the harsh economic realities of their situation. Their inadequate state salaries left them with no choice but to find ‘supplementary income elsewhere’ and thus limiting the time they could commit to project initiated activities. The use of ‘dependency’ here, as in other ‘development industry’ discourses (see Brautigam 2000; Godfrey, et al. 2000b), parallels the use of the term ‘welfare dependency’ that supposedly prevented the poor and unemployed from participating in the ‘benefits’ of the newly liberalised economies in Western nations during the 1980s. It also contains an ironic depoliticisation of the ‘dependency’ school of development analysis. Instead of examining the structural causes of poverty and ‘underdevelopment’, this use of ‘dependency’ simply blames the individual victims for not being ‘flexible’ or ‘entrepreneurial’ enough to suit new market ‘disciplines.’ This ignores the fact that most Ministry staff involved with the project were already using their entrepreneurial skills in establishing private classes and other external sources of income, and many of them had been doing this before their involvement with the project.
240 Both the donor, DfID, and the project team were acutely aware of the under-funding of the education sector, thus CAMSET 2 aimed ‘only to establish long-term activities within the Ministry which [could] be covered by the Ministry’s budget’ (ibid: para. 11.5). Ministry staff had been paid salary supplements during CAMSET 1 to cover loss of other income sources and enable them to work full-time on these long-term activities, particularly teacher training and inspection. However, DfID viewed these payments as a threat to project sustainability. In the CAMSET 2 proposal, it was made clear that salary supplements would be replaced by payments for specific activities, such as the production of the textbook or per diems and travel expenses for ‘training programmes which are established specifically for project purposes’ (ibid: Annex B, para 1.4). In addition, the proposal stated that ‘it must be assumed that MoEYS staff are only available for 15-20 hours per week and that they must be allowed sufficient time to undertake their own income generating activities’ (ibid: para. 11.3). This assumes that 15-20 hours per week is sufficient for staff to maintain the quality of the activities they were involved in, both during CAMSET 2 and after the project ended. In the case of teacher trainers, this is difficult as they spent most of those hours in the classroom, leaving little time for the lesson preparation and self-study required by the student-centred methods they were now expected to employ. Teaching and teacher-training materials and methods produced within the project had implicitly assumed a high level of teacher preparation, as well as the ability of the teachers and trainers to continue their own professional development through self-study. During training with the project, this was made possible through the use of supplementary payments and per diems. Once these payments had ended, teachers and trainers had to increase their private teaching, leaving little time for the preparation and self-study required to sustain the quality of their work.
241
Figure 12: CAMSET trainers graduation ceremony, NETREC, Phnom Penh, February 2001. L-r: Kheang Theany, Douglas Frogett, Sok Chan Mol, Jane Fowles, Tith Ratha, San Sothearo, Chhen Chhin and author (author’s photo).
242 Figure 13: Sothearo in the new English office, Takeo RTTC, December 2002 (author’s photo).
243
Post-CAMSET trajectories When I returned to Cambodia in December 2002, Hong Huong, trainer at Kandal RTTC and husband of my former colleague, Kheang Theany, came to pick me up. We took a taxi back to their house through the anarchic traffic of Phnom Penh and, through the fuzz of my jet-lag, Huong started filling me in on how life had been since I saw them last. All teachers had received pay increases, but it was still far from enough to allow him to only work in the RTTC. He had become a teacher and shareholder in Sophal’s school, ICE, and apologised because he would have to go and teach there straight after we arrived at his house. He and Theany had just had their first child, a girl, and were living along with Theany’s mother on the top floor of a three story house owned by Theany’s uncle near Kampuchea Krom Boulevard. This consisted of one small room, plus a kitchen and outside toilet and shower. On arriving the greeting was as warm and welcoming as ever, and I was soon seated with a cool glass of water and some fresh fruit as Theany, looking tired, rocked her seven-week old daughter in a bamboo crib hung from the ceiling. Theany was on maternity leave from her Masters degree in education at the Royal Academy of Cambodia, an institution of higher education established by the Council of Ministers outside the control of MoEYS. She was still receiving her government salary whilst studying and was planning to work at the Academy after completing her dissertation on the effectiveness of English teaching in secondary schools. In the meantime, Huong was teaching around forty hours per week or more and they were saving money to build a house on some land they had bought on the outskirts of Phnom Penh.
That Theany had stopped working at the RTTC was not a surprise to me, when we had worked together she had regularly expressed a desire to find another job or to return to study for a Masters. Like the majority of the Cambodian education staff who had been involved with CAMSET, she was intelligent, resourceful, highly capable and had ambitions for the future of herself and her family. She was also neither prepared nor able to continue to survive on her Ministry salary and whatever
244 she could earn teaching privately. None of this made her any different to the majority of Cambodian education staff nor to the many expatriate personnel working in the sector. In this final section, I map out the trajectories of the Cambodian and expatriate staff who were involved with CAMSET. That this is limited is an inevitable aspect of the restrictions of time and finance inherent in doctoral research. However, during my research trip in December 2002, I talked to staff and observed classes at four of the six RTTCS and one secondary school, visited NETREC, TTD, the MoEYS Planning Department and Document Centre, conducted interviews with five Ministry officials and had informal discussions with expatriate education staff.
In August 2001, after almost ten years of operations, CAMSET ended. The project had successfully produced the various outputs detailed in the logical frameworks (see Appendices 3 and 3a), thereby establishing good quality systems for the teaching and learning of English in Cambodian secondary schools. The main achievements included the development of a national curriculum for English teaching and the syllabi to accompany this; a national ELT baseline study; textbooks, teachers guides, listening cassettes and supplementary materials for English teaching for all six grades of secondary school; approximately 550 trained English lower secondary English teachers by July 2001; a total of 40 trained English teacher-trainers, with 31 still working in the 6 RTTCs, and others in the inspection team; a full set of materials for two-year pre-service or one year in-service ELT teacher training courses; a trained national ELT trainer-trainer, plus materials for training teacher-trainers; 75 provincial secondary education inspectors across 8 subjects in 10 provinces trained in classroom observation and feedback, data collection and reporting and some financial management skills and two national English inspectors also trained in exam preparation and item banking, and; the establishment and financial security of the National English Teachers Resource Centre (NETREC). In achieving these outputs, the project also contributed to the development of a range education support systems in the Ministry, the training and capacity building of a range of Ministry staff, and English teaching to over 360 Ministerial staff (CAMSET 2000; CfBT 1997; ODA 1997). Within the
245 terms of the project logframe, the views of the donor organisation, project management agency and the Ministry, CAMSET was highly successful.
When I discussed the sustainability of CAMSET outputs with George Taylor, he was more critical and pointed to a failure to contribute effectively at the policy level, but also pointed to a more complex view of capacity building. However, his focus remained technocratic, in that he explained that his experience of working in education projects in Malaysia, Indonesia and Cambodia had influenced his view that the key to sustaining development interventions was at the level of the development of systems and policy management across the whole sector. [O]ne of our first objectives on the project was to increase the ability of various groups to contribute to making Ministry policy, and I think we failed in that. And it’s only by contributing to Ministry mechanisms, Ministry policy and strategies and programmes that we can say that things will continue, be sustainable. […] But actually it involves system development, management development, skills enhancement, and also a regulatory framework, actually writing what the regulations are, and without those things, you can develop people’s individual capacity in the sense that you give them some training, but it remains latent. It is only when the mechanisms and the regulations and the management change to make use of those individual skills that a sustainable capacity is released. (interview 17-03-01) This was about seven months after George had left CAMSET and he was working as part of a UNICEF education consultancy developing a sector wide approach (SWAp) under the Education Sector Support Programme.
Lucy-Royal Dawson, who had taken over from George as CAMSET 2 team leader, focused on the retention of trained staff after the end of the project within her discussion. She felt that, with the exception of the textbook team which was created as a temporary measure, the majority of the staff trained through CAMSET would remain in their posts, but whether the quality and effectiveness of their work would be sustained ‘very much depends on money’ (interview 22-02-01), both in terms of overall budget support and staff salaries. However, she also felt that ‘if people do leave the Ministry then it’s actually good for Cambodia […] their skills are going out there somewhere, and you’ve got
246 to get to that certain point where there’s that threshold of trained people’ (ibid). Although slightly different in focus, both former team leaders viewed the sustainability of CAMSET outcomes to be closely tied to the training and retention of skilled personnel, although only Lucy specifically mentioned finance and salaries. But sustaining certain aspects of the project, such as teacher training or school inspections, relies on the retention of those staff with the specific skills and knowledge of both systems and the content of the work – staff with other skills and knowledge cannot simply be transferred into these posts.
Despite Lucy’s optimism, by December 2002 many of the education staff involved with CAMSET had left their Ministry posts, either permanently or on long-term secondment, or they were much more heavily involved in private sector work resulting in them minimising the time spent in their state sector jobs. The motivations behind this were varied, and not purely economic, although inadequate state salaries were mentioned as a partial influence by most of the staff I talked to. I managed to talk directly to or get information (confirmed by two sources) about 45 teacher-trainers, inspectors and other Ministry staff who had been trained through CAMSET to work in posts other than classroom teaching. There were four main post-project trajectories: 15 staff remained in post, but had substantially increased their private sector work; 4 had left to work wholly in private sector education; 11 had left to work in the aid sector; and 3 had left to undertake further education, one overseas. There was little evidence of promotion within the Ministry and only one person had moved to another department. Five of the 45 had left the Ministry to unknown destinations, and there were no cases of staff moving out of the Ministry into non-educational work in the private sector. Some of those who were working outside the Ministry may be on extended leave and may return to their posts in the future, assuming they do not find other employment opportunities. However, the skills and experience they gained through involvement with the project, in particular the English skills, appear to have increased their social mobility.
247 This is not an exhaustive survey, and as far as I am aware, no survey has been done by either the Ministry or by DfID to examine what has happened to those staff who worked on the project. DfID have, as yet, undertaken no follow-up study to examine the effects of the CAMSET project, although the original proposal noted that ‘[a]s with most education projects, it will not be feasible to evaluate the impact of this on socio-economic development until some time after the end of the project’ (ODA 1997: para 3.4.2).
The post-project trajectories of the teacher-trainers working at the RTTCs provides an overview of the variety of motivations for the staff who left their Ministry posts, as well as details of how those who remained were increasingly relying on private sector teaching to sustain their Ministry work. The RTTCs now only run pre-service training courses, as the Ministry has not provided funding to maintain the system of in-service training. However, staff losses and the increasing time those who remain spend in private teaching inevitably reduced the quality (and in some cases quantity) of the pre-service training being provided. Many of the teacher trainers who remained in their RTTC posts had been given an added incentive to remain. In 2001 the US Embassy had provided funds trainers to undertake a bridging course to gain a BA in English at the Royal University of Phnom Penh, which they would graduate from in summer 2003. Those trainers I talked to who were taking this course were all hoping to go on to post-graduate study.
When I returned to Takeo RTTC, only one of the five trainers was still working as a trainer. Chan Mol had become ill toward the end of on-the-job training and been off work for the last couple of months I was at the RTTC. The illness continued and she returned to work at the RTTC sporadically, although she maintained some private classes. During my 2002 visit, Chan Mol was still not teaching at the RTTC, although we spent some time chatting. She was not looking for another job, and would remain at the RTTC as the English librarian. Early in 2003 I heard from Theany that Chan Mol had gone to the USA, but no one was sure whether this was for study, work or to join
248 relatives, nor did they know when or if she would return. Theany had transferred to Kandal RTTC and then gone on to post-graduate study, which she had wanted to do for some time for both personal reasons and to find a job outside teacher training. Ratha had planned to transfer to Phnom Penh after finishing on-the-job training, partly because he found it to be a more open place where he felt he could express his opinions more easily than in Takeo. He also said he wanted to look for a job with an NGO as he felt it would be both interesting and provide a good income. If teachers’ salaries were higher he would probably stay in state education, but there had been so many rumours about an increase in salaries and no real increase that he could not see a time when this would happen (interview 26-02-01). Ratha transferred to a secondary school in Phnom Penh, in order to be able to spend more time teaching privately, and in 2002 began working as a local project officer with CARE Australia in girls education in the remote Ratanakiri Province in the north-east of Cambodia. No one could tell me if he had resigned from his government job or whether he was on a leave of absence, and I was unable to contact him by phone.
Chhin had told me that he would remain at the RTTC as he enjoyed teaching, although he was interested in working for a human rights organisation (interview 10-02-01). When I returned he was working for the Cambodian Centre for Human rights monitoring political and election violations and was about to visit Kompong Speu to interview the wife of an opposition party activist who had recently been murdered. His salary was $200 per month plus $150 per month expenses. He had arranged a Ministry leave of absence and continued working for the human rights organisation up to the elections in July 2003. Only Thearo remained at the RTTC, teaching two classes of pre-service trainees in all the subjects except Language Upgrading, which was being partially covered by two trainers from other subject areas. The second year pre-service trainees were not having Language Upgrading classes. He was also teaching various private courses outside his long hours at the RTTC. Thearo was quite phlegmatic about the situation, although he was still looking for alternative opportunities. Like other English teacher trainers remaining at the six RTTCs, he was attending a
249 bridging course for a BA in English during the summer vacations (interview 12-12-02). Thearo later gained a scholarship to study for a Masters degree at the Royal University of Phnom Penh and left the RTTC in September 2003. Former trainer and Takeo Provincial Inspector, Phal Mean, was already looking for another job before the end of the project. In May 2001 he became a Senior Project Officer with CARE on a girls education project in Koh Kong Province. He worked for CARE for just over a year, and in 2002 gained a scholarship to study for a MA in Australia and started a year preparatory course in Phnom Penh in October and left for Australia a year later.
As CAMSET had not established a system of trainer training to replace RTTC trainers, English teacher training in Takeo was being carried out by non-qualified teachers. During my visit, Kung Po, the RTTC Director, talked at some length about the problems he had retaining staff members, and not just the English trainers. In his view, this was due to poor salaries and trained staff being able to gain better incomes outside the RTTC (fieldnotes 15-12-02). In order to cover some of the English teacher-training classes, Ul Run, a graduate of the RTTC who had been a trainee whilst I was working there, was transferred from his secondary school to work at the RTTC. Ul Run was also teaching private classes, and every weekend travelling the two hours to Phnom Penh to study for a BA in English at a private university. The unavailability of trainers also meant that the English Library, which had been re-equipped and improved through a $5000 grant from CAMSET 2, was effectively closed.
The situation in the other RTTCs was similar. At Kandal, the trainers all remained in post, although Channan was in the Philippines on a six month IT training course. The other trainers had taken up his classes, and were all only in the RTTC when they had classes to teach. The rest of the time was given over to private work. Huong emphasised that it was this private work that enabled them to stay in their state jobs (interview 19-12-02). However, Meng Seng Heng felt less committed to the Ministry mainly because they had failed to provide him with his promotion and official status,
250 despite having fulfilled all their requirements, which left him feeling unmotivated and discouraged (28-12-02).
By the end of 2002, Phnom Penh RTTC has lost two trainers, Chhun Sovanne and Som Sophara, who had both been involved with CAMSET since being selected for a 1994-95 in-service training course. Yem Touch, one of the remaining trainers, explained that they had both transferred to high schools at this allowed them to spend more time teaching privately. Som Sophara had subsequently begun working for an NGO. The four remaining trainers were running four pre-service classes and covering English classes for students of other subjects. They were also all teaching English privately and attending the BA bridging course.
Of the trainers at Kompong Cham RTTC, Ouk Kamdy was not working as a trainer as he had become a Deputy Director, although he was still teaching English privately, and Ly Phyrith was working outside and his teaching was being covered by the other trainers. Tum Sisopheareth was covering much of this work, teaching twenty four hours per week on the pre-service courses, plus teaching privately for three hours per day. She estimated her income to average around $200 per month. She was doing the bridging course and had gained a scholarship to study for six months in Singapore as part of a post-graduate diploma in applied linguistics, which she was hoping to take up after once her son was a year old Another trainer, Te Lay, was working part-time in Phnom Penh for the Cambodia Women’s Advice Centre, and only teaching 10 hours per week at the RTTC.
There were similar patterns for other CAMSET-trained Ministry staff. Meas Kadul, who had been part of the teacher training team, had become a project manager for UNDP in Prey Veng, and an inspector from Battambang was doing the same job in Stung Treng. The textbook team had all moved out of Ministry posts, either into the private sector or into aid sector work. NETREC
251 manager, Sokha, was spending the majority of his time teaching English and computer courses privately. One of the two national English inspectors, Prak Polla, was in Singapore doing a Masters degree in English.
The post-project trajectories of the expatriate staff were remarkably similar to those of the Cambodian staff (with the obvious exception of remaining in Ministry posts). Most remain within the education sector in some ways, either with aid agencies, the private sector or in further study. CAMSET 1 team leder, Harvey Smith, remained with CfBT and is currently working in Rwanda as a consultant coordinator, which includes working on the DfID-funded Education Sector Support Programme – parallel to the work George Taylor is doing in Cambodia. CAMSET 1 advisor, Psyche Kennett, became team leder of the DfID-funded, CfBT-managed English Language Teacher Training Project in Vietnam, modelled on very similar lines to CAMSET. Kath Copley went on to teach and conduct doctoral research in language and development at the University of Technology in Sydney. Lucy Royal-Dawson returned to the UK to work for a private sector examinations board, although is planning to return to overseas work. Jane Fowles returned to the UK to work in higher education and Robert Shrubshall is teaching English at the Asian University of Science and Technology. Only one volunteer moved into the NGO sector, Philippa who went on to work for the Disability Action Council in Cambodia as a trainer and advisor, before returning to the UK to do post-graduate study in education and development. The others all moved into either private sector teaching or post-graduate study outside Cambodia.
These staff represented some of the key Ministry personnel trained through CAMSET and expected to remain in their posts to sustain the systems producing good quality learning and teaching of English in Cambodian secondary schools. Given the high demand for English teaching and the plethora of international agencies working in English, the training they received and skills they
252 developed through the project were highly ‘marketable’, thus increasing their social mobility. Whilst they expressed various motivations for leaving Ministry posts, the underlying factor was economic – without salaries reflecting their skills and abilities and providing them with a decent living standard, economic pressures pushed them into increased private sector teaching or out of their Ministry positions altogether. Although it could be argued that CAMSET failed to establish systems to replace these staff, thus undermining sustainability, replacement staff would have faced the same pressures and their training would have increased their social mobility.
Afterword
In January 1999 university and secondary teachers in Phnom Penh, with the support of students and parents, began an indefinite strike in pursuit of improved pay. The strike lasted about a month, spreading to many provinces, but produced no effective rise in salaries as the government protested that the national budget could not finance a teachers pay rise. However, in the run up to the 1998 election the Prime Minister, Hun Sen, officially one of the world’s lowest paid governments leaders, had spent $30million of his own money building primary schools. No one asked or explained where this money had come from (Ayres 2000b: 2) In the press, Deputy Prime Minister, Sar Kheng, pledged to ensure salaries and overtime would be paid on time, and that the question of teachers’ pay would be considered once administrative reforms aimed at eliminating wastage and corruption within the state bureaucracy were realized (Samreath 1999: n.p.). These reforms would help achieve a reallocation of the national budget to reduce spending on the police and military and increase health and education spending, commitments the government had made after the 1993 UNorganised democratic elections. Despite these pledges, teachers’ salaries and education budgetary disbursements remain inadequate.
253 In January 2000, the Cambodian Independent Teachers Association, the first officially recognised public sector union in Cambodia, called for a nationwide teachers strike to from the 1st of February to demand an increase in salaries from an average of $20 per month to $100. This time few teachers came out on strike. The Association’s President, Rong Chhun, told journalists that teachers were being intimidated by police and other government officials. The government again stated that budgetary restrictions would not allow a pay increase, but held out the possibility of a ten percent increase in the future, which the Association leadership condemned as inadequate (Vong 2001: n.p.).
The VSO Programme Office in Phnom Penh issued a memo the week before the start of the 2001 strike. The memo ‘reminded’ all volunteers working in education ‘to be careful at this time to avoid participation in strike activities and not to get into political discussions with teachers relating to the pay dispute [as the] ramifications for both yourself, and the rest of the VSO programme, could be very severe if any of us were seen to be engaging in any political activities whatsoever (VSO Cambodia memo 24-01-01). The memo explained that volunteers could choose whether to go to work or not, depending on how they felt about the situation, but they should not be seen to be indulging in political activity. On the first day of the strike, I told my colleagues I had to go to Phnom Penh and took the two-hour bus journey up to the capital. On the journey, I noticed a few posters indicating support for the strike in rural areas. In Phnom Penh, the Faculty of Pedagogy and some secondary schools were closed and at lunchtime there was a small demonstration outside the Faculty. Far fewer teachers took part in this strike than the previous one resulting in even less success.
The causes of the strikes, the reaction of the state and the position of VSO summarises the central points within my thesis. The protests of Cambodia teachers, who cannot live on their meagre salaries, are either ignored or repressed by a unresponsive and largely unaccountable government
254 dominated by self-serving elites, whilst a ‘neutral’ aid sector blithely ignores the political and economic realities within which it works in pursuit of the technocratic end of ‘capacity building.’
English and English language teaching have been at the heart of the maintenance of this system. As I have discussed throughout the thesis, the economic premium placed upon English through the specific model of development being promoted by the international agencies in Cambodia has facilitated a ‘brain drain’ from the state sector into the private and aid sectors. This is a response to deep social inequalities, the serious under-funding of education and inadequate state salaries, and driven by individual and household survival. The ‘democratisation’ of the Cambodian state is too limited to effectively change a political culture within which elites compete for power in order to ‘consume’ the population, and has not produced any substantial redistribution of national budgets towards the social sectors. The ‘brain drain’, a regular effect of these economic and political realities, legitimates the aid sectors’ technocratic obsession with ‘capacity building’, further entrenching the sector in Cambodia.
Scholars who have analysed the impact of structural adjustment policies and programmes have emphasised the disproportionate affects of public sector cutbacks, especially on women and the poor (see Afshar and Dennis 1992; Elson 1995; Elson and Nilufer 2000; Simon 1997). What I have pointed to within this thesis is the privatisation of the public sector from within driven by the particular configuration of political, economic and institutional conditions described above. The way this thesis has evolved, from an initial interest in aid-funded ELT to this focus on these larger process, suggest further research on other cases of transitional societies may be worth pursuing. To conclude I would like to speculate on the possible continuing effects of this privatisation from within.
255 The CAMSET project was a small part of aid-funded public sector education reforms in Cambodia that have established a regime which favours continuing private sector expansion to replace a ‘failing’ state sector. The continuing infighting amongst the political elite, who at the end of 2003 had still not managed to establish a new national government on the basis of the July 2003 election results, leaves reform of the social sectors largely under the control of international agencies, whose work continues to be framed by an agenda of neo-liberal reconstruction. At the 5th World Trade Organisation (WTO) Ministerial Conference in held in Cancún in September 2003, Cambodia and Nepal became the first least developed nations to sign agreements for entry to the WTO. An Oxfam report quotes Cambodia’s chief negotiator’s view of the conditionalities of these agreements. "This is a package of concessions and commitments that goes far beyond what is commensurate with the level of development of an LDC like Cambodia. Nonetheless, we do accept the challenges, because we see the benefits of joining the world trading system". H.E. Mr. Cham Prasidh, Minister of Commerce and Chief Negotiator for Cambodia, July 22nd 2003 on the adoption of Cambodia’s accession package. (Oxfam International 2003: 1) These conditions include immediately halting the use of affordable generic versions of new medicines, even thought the Doha declaration allows other least developed nations until 2016 to implement this agreement, and limiting tariff peaks on agriculture to less than half those of the US and Canada, and a quarter those of the EU (ibid). Cambodia’s entry into the WTO will also mean that it will come under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, which aims to reduce all barriers to trade in services, such as education, and the removal of government ‘barriers’ to international competition. Under this Agreement, international education providers could compete for access to Cambodian state education.
I would argue that whether the private sector can provide more effective, efficient education than the public sector is not really the question here. Currently in Cambodia, only a minority of the population enters education beyond the initial primary years, with the main barrier to enrolment being financial resulting from parental poverty and the unofficial charges in place due to the severe under-funding of the education sector. If the education system cannot currently be adequately
256 funded through a national budget heavily subsidised by donors to allow access for the poor majority of Cambodians, where would the extra finance to produce profits as incentives for the private sector be found? The teaching of English in Cambodia provides a potential example of what could happen if the private sector comes to dominate the whole of public sector education. Despite projects such as CAMSET, English teaching is still predominantly undertaken within the private sector. Although this means that those ordinary Cambodians, like my cobbler friend Seourn, with enough disposable income can access classes, those without the necessary income cannot. It also means that within cities and some urban areas, good quality English teaching (and other education) is being provided through the private sector to an expanding urban middle class, whilst rural and remote regions have either no access or only access to poorer quality teaching. The overall outcome, which could be the future for the whole of Cambodian public sector education, is a system which reflects and reproduces existing socio-economic inequalities.
257
258
Appendices
Appendix 1: Cambodia Economic and Social Indicators
GDP growth per capita (1999 constant prices) Population below poverty line (%)
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
6.7 302
5.5 300
3.7 281
1.8 247
5.0 256
-
-
36.1
-
-
Population with access to safe drinking water (%) Population with access to sanitation (%)
1988-91 36 14
Life expectancy at birth female male Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births)
1990-97 30 19 53.4 58.6 51.4
1990/2 123 900
1996/8 89 473
Primary school enrolment – net (%)
78.3 74.1
girls (%) Lower secondary school enrolment – net (%)
14.2 11.1
girls (%) Literacy (%) Sources: Asian Development Bank 1999; Clayton, S. 2001
66
67
259 Appendix 2: Cambodian education system
260
Appendix 3 : CAMSET II logical framework and project header sheet Narrative GOAL: More Cambodians become competent to benefit from higher levels of employment, higher education, training and research, and from regional economic and political developments
Objectively Verifiable Indicators
Means of Verification
Goal to Supergoal: From 2000, 30% of secondary school leavers competent in English to a basic communicative level and able to take up educational, business and regional opportunities
School-leaving test results Reports from employers, colleges, ASEAN and other organisations
PURPOSE: Sustainable systems implemented that lead to continued improvement in quality of teaching and learning for English in secondary schools
OUTPUTS: 1 Ministry Supervision unit strengthened
2 ELT supervision system implemented at provincial level
Assumptions
Security and political situation allows for continued educational development, investment by nonCambodian companies and admission to international organisations
Purpose to Goal: Systems for controlling quality through coordination of training, materials development, testing and evaluation of learning and for delivering support to teachers in schools are in place, with MoEYS budget support, by EoP By school-year 2000/01 60% of secondary schools have English teachers and appropriate teaching materials
MoEYS reports Steering Committee reports Supervisors’ Reports Provincial Directors’ reports
Government continues to be commited to the role of English Current patterns of schooling are maintained or improved and English teachers are not reassigned Exam system selects on the basis of educational achievement Outputs to Purpose:
1 .1 Structure for Head of Unit to contribute to Ministry policy-making in place by mid-i 998 1 .2 Unit competent to monitor educational quality nationally by mid-1999 1 .3 Head of Unit managing and training supervisors by EOP 1 .4 Standard procedures for national supervisors ready in draft by mid-1998 and fully implemented by mid-1999 1 .5 Two ELT supervisors functioning effectively as part of supervisor team by EOP
MoEYS and Project reports
2.1 Twenty seven ELT supervisors functioning effectively at post by EOP 2.2 Supervisor training system established by EOP 2.3 Procedures for ipformation flow between SuperVision Unit and provincial supervisors (and vice versa) effective by EOP 2.4 50% of English teachers implementing appropriate methodology by EOP
MoEYS, Provincial Directorate, Supervisors’ and Project reports
MoEYS implements policy to develop provincial supervisor system
Evaluation reports
MoEYS able to retain trained and motivated supervisors at provincial level
Evaluation reports
MoEYS continues policy of developing the Supervision Unit and clarifies status and grading of supervisors MoEYS able to retain trained and motivated supervisors at national level
261 3 Coordinated system of pre-, in- and on-service English teacher training established
4 English textbooks and teachers’ materials for all secondary grades produced and distributed and evaluation/revision system established
5 Evaluation system for ELT established providing evidence of impact on student learning
6 Language upgrading programme in place for key staff of MoEYS and other ministries
3.1 Plans for future teacher training based on forecasts of needs by mid-1998 and a programme based on such plans implemented from mid1999-02-22 3.2 By EOP 4 RTTCs with 6 English teacher trainers each providing Lsec Preset and Lsec and Usec INSET, and 2 RTTCs with 3 trainers each providing Lsec INSET 3.3 Effective system of coordination between teacher training, supervisors, NETREC, textbook development and exams in place by mid-1998 3.5 System of coordination and support bewteen RTTCs, NETREC, Fac. Ped. And provincial supervisors in place by EOP 4.1 ELT textbooks, teacher’s guides and cassettes for all secondary grades, based on MoEYS syllabuses, written, trialled, printed and distributed by EOP 4.2 Use by schools of textbooks for 4 secondary grades fully evaluated by EOP 4.3 System of revising books every 5 years established by EOP 4.4 Textbooks and other learning materials produced by project are gender neutral
MoEYS and Project reports
5.1 Baseline data available by 1 2/97 System implemented by supervisors by EOP for collecting data to give information on quality 5.2 ELT Supervisor (identified by mid-i 998) responsible for establishing item bank in coordination with new Exams Unit by mid-i 999 5.3 By mid-1999, team of testing specialists drawn from supervisors, trainers and textbook writers competent to provide items for bank and to train teachers in testing procedures 5.4 Programme for training teachers to write tests based on syllabuses and textbooks introduced from mid-i 998 6.1 Work-related English upgrading courses provided to 300 key government officials by EOP 6.2 Feasibility of developing a sus’!aFnable programme investigated by mid-i 998 and recommendations, if accepted, fully implemented by EOP
Baseline and subsequent reports; supervisors’reports
MoEYS policy for exam reform remains in line with current agreement with AusAID
End-of-course results; Project reports
Sustainable ESP programme is shown to be feasible
Evaluation reports
MoEYS policy on PRESET and INSET at secondary level does not change PRESET for Upper Secondary continues to be supplied through the university system MoEYS clarifies status and grading of teacher trainers and trainer trainers MoEYS able to retain trained and motivated teacher trainers
MoEYS supervisors’ and Project reports Gender audit of materials produced by project
MoEYS policy remains in line with Textbook Master Plan and ADB MoU
262
Narrative
Objectively Verifiable Indicators
Means of Verification
Assumptions
263 ACTIVITIES:
INPUTS:
1 .1 Develop structure for Supervision Unit to report and to contribute to Ministry decision-making 1 .2 Contribute to the establishment of clear status for supervisors 1 .3 Provide training for Head of Unit in managing and training supervisors and back-up training for deputy 1 .4 Establish procedures and provide equipment for monitoring educational quality and train unit staff to use 1 .5 Develop action plans for supervisors and provide training in their application 1 .6 Provide on-the-job training to 2 ELT supervisors
(a) MoEYS:
2.1 Propose role and duties of provincial ELT supervisor for official approval and contribute to the establishment of clear status for provincial supervisors 2.2 Develop provincial ELT supervisor training system (initial and on-the-job) involving Supervision Unit, Teacher Training Dept and Fac.Ped., leading to qualified status, and deliver training programme to 30 trainees 2.3 Establish procedures for information flow on ELT issues between Ministry, Directors of Education, RTTCs, headteachers and teachers 2.4 Establish on-/in-service support role for ELT supervisors which will help trained and untrained English teachers to implement appropriate methodology
8 textbook writers/illustrators
3.1 Develop forecasting procedures and planning system based on forecasts 3.2 Develop coordination system linking teacher training with supervision, NETREC, Fac.Ped., textbook development and examinations 3.3 Contribute to the establishment of clear status for teacher trainers and trainer trainers 3.4 Develop trainer training capacity within Teacher Training Dept and Fac.Ped., including provision of refresher/upgrading training to existing teacher trainers 3.5 Provide on-the-job training for 5 RTTC trainers (returning from UK training 7/97) 3.6 Provide training leading to qualified teacher trainer status for 20 teacher trainers responsible for LSec and USec INSET and LSec PRESET 3.7 Develop PRESET course for LSec and
4 senior staff as members of Project Steering Committee 5 counterparts to work with UK-appointed staff
Activities to Outputs Steering Committee reports; Project reports; ODA monitoring reports
All programmes are covered by MoEYS recurrent budget by EoP
30 designated provincial ELT supervisors 20 designated ELT teacher trainers
office space within appropriate MoEYS departments and training centres training facilities within FacPed and RTTCs recurrent budget for appropriate activities from 1/2000 (b) ODA: 5 specialist staff, including team leader project management and administration training for ELT supervisors, teacher trainers and other designated staff materials and equipment, including vehicles, for the above funding for textbook development, printing and distribution regional study tours/short courses English training for designated staff of MoEYS and other ministries
Framework of Textbook Master Plan and MoEYS/ADB Textbook Project
264
265
Appendix 3a: CAMSET Graduation Strategy logframe Hierarchy of Objectives
Indicators of Achievement
Means of Verification
Assumptions
Improved policy development and implementation and resource management lead to improved teaching and learning outcomes. Eg. from 2000, at least 30% of secondary school leavers competent in English to a basic communicative level and able to take up further education and employment opportunities
MoEYS reports
Security and political situation allows for continued educational and economic development.
Systems for assuring quality through coordination of effective training, materials development and dissemination and support to teachers in schools are in place, with MoEYS budget support, by January 2001.
MoEYS reports and policy documents
Evidence by eop that systems for data collection and information flow on quality and financial concerns contribute to a) policy development and dissemination and b) more effective use of resources, so better linking all levels of the education system. Effective coordination between 4 key MoEYS Departments and 24 provinces evident by eop.
CANEP reports
Goal Education system better able to contribute to human resource development in Cambodia.
School-leaving test results
Purpose Sustainable systems implemented that lead to continued improvement in the management of education and the quality of teaching and learning (particularly of English) in secondary schools
By school year 2000/0 1 60% of secondary schools have trained English teachers and all schools have sufficient teaching materials for Grades 7, 8, 9 and 10.
Steering Committee reports Inspectors’ reports Provincial Directors’ reports
Project reports
Current patterns of schooling, educational management, training and materials development are maintained or improved Staff loss (trained teachers, teacher trainers, inspectors and textbook developers) remains low. MoEYS continues to maintain adequate budgetary support Exam system selects on the basis of educational achievement Transparency and accountability at least maintained Data collection and information flow continues to contribute to more informed policy and decision making
266 Output 1 Inspection system operating effectively at provincial level
Key activities - Output 1: supporting MoEYS to: manage PI training; plan, establish, manage and monitor PIOs; facilitate collaboration between Finance Department and POEs on budgeting for PI activities; establish and maintain systems for improved horizontal and vertical information flow; assist TTD and FoP to recruit suitable candidates for new cohort of PIs and to agree sensible staffing arrangements for the PI course; evaluate and revise previous P1 training course and assist FoP to deliver course; develop P1 course training materials and provide training to trainers; explore FM options and incorporate into training secondary English teachers.
Department of Finance (DoF) receive provincial inspector (P1) workplans and budgets from 28 inspectors in 10 provinces by September 2000. 28 PIs in Provincial Inspection Offices (PIOs) operating (with agreed workplans and RGC budgets) in 10 provinces by January 2001 45 PIs complete training at Faculty of Pedagogy (FoP) by March 2001, fake up posts in April 200() and receive in-service training and support to eop. PI course and trainer capacity strengthened and sensible staffing policy agreed by cop 75 PIs in PIOs operating (with agreed workplans and RGC budgets) in all provinces by cop Inspection handbook in regular and appropriate use by 28 PIs by September 2000 and by all PIs by cop. Information flow on quality issues in 10 provinces by December 2000 and in all provinces by cop Options for financial monitoring (FM) procedures and training explored and formally agreed by December 2000. FM training for 28 PIs provided via in-service, incorporated into FoP PI course and provided to trainee PIs as required by March 2001.
PI workplans and budgets DoF documentation Secondary Education Inspection Office (SEIO) and FoP visit reports SEIO and FoP monitoring visit reports FoP graduation, MoEYS postings and PlO staffing lists Course programme and related documentation PI reports to General Education Department (GED) and responses to Provincial Offices of Education (POEs) from GED. Project reports
Provincial Offices of Education (POEs) continue to be supportive of PI role Quality assurance system develops in MoEYS with participation from relevant departments. MoEYS and Ministry of Economy and Finance (MoEF) maintain or improve current level of cooperation. PIs remain in post and continue to operate effectively FoP PI trainers have capacity for further training and course revision Sensible PI course staffing arrangements in place
267 Output 3 English textbooks and teachers’ materials for all secondary grades produced and distributed and evaluation/revision system established.
Grade 10 textbook, teacher guide and cassette based on MoEYS syllabus written and trialled, produced and distributed by September 2000 Grades 11 and 12 textbooks, teacher guides and cassettes based on MoEYS syllabus written and trialled, ready for production and distribution by February 2001.
Key activities - Output 3: Support MoEYS to: Coordinate textbook development process with Master Plan and MoEYS/ADB Basic Education Textbook Project, including orientation and distribution Provide gender awareness and sensitivity training to teams of writers and artists Complete draft, trial and prepare for printing and distribution materials for grades 11 & 12 Establish materials evaluation system and implement for 4 grades Assist TTD with textbook orientation programme Develop system of regular evaluation, including screening for gender neutral content and revision of books over 5-year cycle that can be achieved within MoEYS recurrent budget.
Teaching and leaimng materials are evaluated for gender awareness and sensitivity on an ongoing basis Use by schools of textbooks forGrades7,8,9and 10 evaluated by February 2001. Materials evaluation and revision system (procedures, budget and staffing) established by February 2001.
MoEYS (Publishing and Distribution House) reports Student textbooks, teacher’s guides and listening cassettes for Grades 10, 11 and 12 Gender audit report SEIO, PI and POE reports Evaluation and revision guidelines Project reports
MoEYS policy remains in line with Textbook Master Plan and ADB MoU Satisfactory action by MOEYS and MOEF continues to be taken to resolve budget allocation and staff status issues Materials are widely and effectively used in schools MoEYS foreign language policy maintained Materials distribution takes place in line with MoEYS rolling dissemination policy ie. Grade 11 in school year 2001-2 and Grade 12 in 2002-3
268
Appendix 4: CAMSET II: Organisational and institutional overview
DfID UK Project funders
DfID Bangkok Project monitoring and evaluation
MoEYS Phnom Penh Project partner Faculty of Pedagogy NETREC 1 volunteer NETREC manager
CfBT UK Project managers
CfBT Phnom Penh Project team support
Teacher Training Department TT specialist National trainer-trainer
Pedagogical Research Department Textbook specialist Assistant in language education Textbook writer Teacher’s guide writer Illustrator
Provincial Offices of Education Volunteers in 3 POEs
VSO UK Volunteer provider
VSO Phnom Penh Volunteer support
6 Regional Teacher Training Centres Volunteers in 5 RTTCs Trained EFL teacher-trainers Trainee EFL teacher-trainers Lower and Upper Secondary Schools Volunteers in some schools Project trained English teachers in some schools
Secondary Education Inspection Office Supervision and evaluation specialist National English Inspectors
Project team leader
269
270 Appendix 5: Cast of Characters: CAMSET II team George Taylor
Team leader
Lucy Royal Dawson
Supervision and evaluation specialist (Team leader 08-00 to 08-01)
Robert Shrubshall
Textbook specialist
Jane Fowles
Teacher training specialist
Mike Delens
Specialist in management of English teacher training
Douglass Frogatt
Assistant specialist in language training
MoEYS Teacher Training Department Dr Nath Bunreoun
Head of TTD
Kao Sophal
National English trainer-trainer
Meas Kadul
Deputy Head Planning and Research Department
Chan Solin
Takeo Regional Teacher Training Centre Kong Po
RTTC Director
Sok Chan Mol
English teacher trainer
Chheng Chhin
Trainee English teacher trainer
Tith Ratha
Trainee English teacher trainer
Kheang Theany
Trainee English teacher trainer
San Sothearo
Trainee English teacher trainer
Stephen Clayton
CAMSET II/VSO ELT trainer
271
CAMSET II/VSO ELT volunteers Philippa Thomas
Kompong Cham RTTC
Nick Wilson
Prey Veng RTTC
Cathy Crawford
Battambang RTTC
Florence Lawson
Obeykom (Phnom Penh) RTTC
Stuart Lawson
NETREC
Other RTTC teacher trainers Kandal RTTC
Meng Seng Heng Hong Huong Nin Channan Horth Han
Kompong Cham
Ouk Khmady Ly Pirith Tum Sisopheareth Te Lay Ly Kheng
Phnom Penh
Chhun Sovanne Som Sophara Im Prohas Sor Sokunthea Yem Touch Srey Soksaphat
Prey Veng
Hin Havy Ly Sothin Hin Sokhom Choth Sophan
Battambang
Nuom Rada Phiev Khay Seng Sacha Seng Sophearea Hong Hoklim Chea Phanet
VSO Programme Office
272 Graham Lang
Programme officer
Chea Vantha
Programme Assistant
273
Appendix 6: Average Daily Earnings of Workers, 1997–2002
1997 Pre-Jul 12,250 9,675 7,050 4,155 -
2000 Aug 9,511 8,068 6,611 4,186 2,250 4,443 8,500 11,044
Daily earnings (riels) 2001 Feb May Aug 8,200 9,568 9,057 7,300 7,058 7,189 6,400 7,386 6,670 3,900 2,670 2,686 2,600 2,600 2,683 4,100 3,613 4,500 8,300 7,500 9,165 10,000 12,050 10,559
2002 Feb 9,450 8,137 6,062 3,350 3,543 3,916 7,772 14,327
Change from last year (%) 2001 2001 Nov Feb May -25.4 15.2 -2.0 -27.5 11.5 -5.4 -12.3 -5.3 -9.1 12.9 -14.1 58.5 1.0 36.3 40.5 -13.5 -4.5 43.0 21.0 -6.4 17.0 2.8 43.3 -0.6
Nov Nov May Cyclo drivers 8,398 6,262 9,375 Porters 6,893 5,000 6,675 Small vegetable sellers 5,813 5,096 6,712 Scavengers 3,006 3,393 4,231 Waitresses* 2,335 2,358 3,652 Rice-field workers 4,184 3,618 5,167 Garment workers 7,410 8,968 8,775 Motorcycle-taxi drivers 9,522 9,791 11,978 Unskilled construction 8,220 5,970 7,500 8,261 5,625 4,841 7,025 6,912 -18.9 -6.3 workers Skilled construction workers 14,891 14,517 11,200 10,306 12,375 9,866 11,530 13,850 -32.0 2.9 Notes: Surveys on the revenue of waitresses, rice-field workers, garment workers, unskilled workers, motorcycle taxi drivers and construction workers began in February 2000; * Waitresses earnings do not include meals and accommodation provided by shop owners. Source: CDRI.
-16.3 34.4
274
Appendix 7: EDUCAM’s Very Rough Guide to Recent Abbreviations in Education This is an informal attempt to clarify some of the recent developments in the education sector by focusing on the proliferation of abbreviations. Pease correct, if incorrect, complete, if incomplete and contribute to further. In September 1999, a new programme started called the SEIP Secondary Education Investment Programme, an ADB Asian Development Bank funded programme originally oriented towards Secondary Education. Its inception and development afforded the opportunity to review the education sector more generally using a SWAp Sector Wide Approach. Out of this were born a number of working groups: PPG the Policy and Planning Group, a group of senior Ministry members responsible for overseeing the review process; IRD the Institutional Reform and Development Task Force SME the Sector Monitoring and Evaluation Task Force and the ESFP the Education Sector Financial Planning Task Force. One result of the SEIP was the agreement of the ADB to fund a PPTA Project Preparation Technical Assistance to develop a sector assistance package, to be funded by the ABD. Sometime in early 2000 (not sure of the exact date), the WB World Bank and the IMF the International Monetary Fund negotiated the SAC Structural Adjustment Credit matrix with the RGC Royal Government of Cambodia. One condition of the SAC was the implementation of the PAP Priority Action Programme, one method of securing finances in a decentralised manner from the MoEF Ministry of Economy and Finance to line Ministries, one of which is the MoEYS Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport. In MoEF, the BSEC Budget Strategy and Management Centre oversees the PAPs in the line Ministries and processes requests (such as from MoEYS) and makes decisions about releasing funds. In order to administer and monitor PAP finances in MoEYS, new offices called BMC Budget Management Centres were opened at either national, provincial or district level according to need. Other relevant abbreviations are as follows: PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan of RGC SEDP Social Economic Development Plan of RGC NPAR National Program for Administrative Reform ESSP Education Sector Strategic Plan ESDP Education Sector Development Plan, scheduled early 2001 with Bank and donor support EPSFF Education Policy Strategic and Financing Framework (aims at implementing EFA by 2010) EFA Education For All, a UNESCO initiative. (produced by Lucy Royal-Dawson for EDUCAM 17-11-00)
274
275
Appendix 8: VSO placement description, ELT trainer Takeo RTTC, excerpt 2. Details about the job How the job fits into the organisation structure (level, line management, colleagues, etc.) Structure of the education system and Line Management The Minister for Education / | \ CAMSET - The Teacher Training - VSO Department | The Provincial Education Office | The Regional Teacher Training Centre | The English Department at the RTTC | The VSO Volunteer The volunteer will be accountable to : ⇒
The Teacher Trainer of the English Department of Takeo RTTC;
⇒
The MoEYS VSO Co-ordinator at the Teacher Training Department in Phnom Penh;
⇒
The CAMSET Trainer Training Advisor at the Faculty of Pedagogy in Phnom Penh.
On a day to day basis, the volunteer will be expected to liaise about professional matters with the EFL teacher trainer in the English Department. It will be her responsibility to keep the RTTC Director informed of the volunteer’s work and responsibilities. The volunteer should not expect to liaise directly with the Provincial Education Office which is a matter for the Director of the RTTC. If problems arise, or the volunteer feels s/he needs the chance to speak to someone outside the direct line of management, s/he should refer to the MoEYS (Ministry of Education, Youth & Sport) VSO Co-ordinator (currently Mr Meas Kadul) and the CAMSET (Cambodian Secondary English Project) Trainer Training Advisor (currently Ms Jane Fowles) with regard to professional issues, and to the VSO Programme Director for other matters. Description of Posts These posts have been designed in order to provide short-term support to the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport for its national programme of EFL teacher and trainer training. Each post is based at a regional teacher training centre and involves the volunteer working alongside, and under the guidance of, the teacher trainers responsible for the local implementation of the national EFL programmes. In-service courses have been up and running for some time. A pilot pre-service course has just finished in Phnom Penh and a second is taking place at Phnom Penh RTTC. Further courses will be run at five regional teacher training centres including Takeo from March 2000. These training centres will also be responsible for running 3-month intensive English language upgrading courses for serving, untrained teachers of English from April 2000. ELT provision in Cambodia is fairly new (the first training courses for teachers of English were completed in 1994) and most of the teacher trainers involved in training teachers have only recently completed their own training. The one EFL teacher trainer at Takeo RTTC ran her first in-service course from March to December 1998. It will be the volunteer’s responsibility to assist the teacher trainer at Takeo RTTC to implement the year's on-the-job national training programme for 4 new teacher trainers. This is a difficult and a delicate task as it requires leadership and guidance, but in a somewhat disguised form. The new teacher trainers have the ability and many of the skills they need to do the job well. At this stage, what they need to gain most is confidence in what they can do, as well as a realistic understanding of what they can’t do yet. They would also benefit from having someone at hand who can gently remind them of things they have forgotten, assist them to find the answers to problems they don’t know how to solve, and generally guide them in a nonauthoritarian way. It is very important that the position and standing of the established teacher trainer should not be undermined. For this reason, the volunteer should be ready to act in such a way that everyone at the college and at the provincial education office realises that it is the teacher trainer who is responsible for the ELT training at the RTTC, not the outside “expert”. At the same time, the new trainers will need help in improving their language skills and in broadening and deepening their knowledge of methodology and study skills, as well as of management and administrative practices. The volunteer will need to assume a subtle role: of guiding, and yet not appearing to guide; of supporting, and yet not being tempted to do things for and instead of the trainers; of judging when to step in to provide firm support, and when to stand back and let the trainers get on and make their own mistakes. It is not an easy job, but it is a very rewarding one. By contributing to the professional development of new teacher trainers, the volunteer will thereby be ensuring that EFL teachers will be well taught for many years to come.
275
276
Other data sources Interviews – electronically recorded 22-08-01
Ursula Head, VSO ELT teacher, Kratie High School – interviewed in VSO Phnom Penh office
25-11-00
Kheang Theany, English teacher-trainer, Takeo RTTC – interviewed my house, Takeo
10-02-01
Chheng Chhin, English teacher-trainer, Takeo RTTC – interviewed his house, Takeo
13-02-01
Tim Phal Mean, English inspector, Takeo Provincial Office of Education interviewed my house, Takeo
22-02-01
Lucy Royal-Dawson, CAMSET II inspection advisor/team leader – interviewed her office, Phnom Penh
26-02-01
Tith Ratha, English teacher-trainer, Takeo RTTC - interviewed my house, Takeo
27-02-01
Robert Shrubshall, CAMSET I/II textbook advisor
06-03-01
San Sothearo, English teacher-trainer, Takeo RTTC - interviewed my house, Takeo
10-03-01
Philippa Thomas, CAMSET II/VSO ELT trainer, Kompong Cham RTTC – interviewed her house, Phnom Penh
17-03-01
George Taylor, CAMSET I advisor, CAMSET II team leader – interviewed his house, Phnom Penh
19-03-01
Nick Wilson, CAMSET II/VSO ELT trainer, Prey Veng RTTC – interviewed in VSO Phnom Penh office
19-06-01
Jane Fowles, CAMSET II advisor – interviewed her house, UK
19-12-02
Hong Huong, English teacher-trainer, Kandal RTTC – interviewed my hotel room, Phnom Penh
12-12-02
San Sothearo, English teacher-trainer, Takeo RTTC – interviewed in his office
20-12-02
Te Lay, English teacher-trainer, Kompong Cham RTTC – interviewed in his office
21-12-02
Tim Sisopeareth, English teacher-trainer, Kompong Cham RTTC – interviewed in her office
21-12-02
Ouk Khamdy, English teacher-trainer, Kompong Cham RTTC – interviewed in his office
276
277 27-12-02
Kao Sophal, National English trainer-trainer, MoEYS – interviewed at his private school in Phnom Penh
28-12-02
Meng Seng Heng, English teacher-trainer, Kandal RTTC – interviewed in NETREC, Phnom Penh
Interviews – written notes 10-08-00
Graham Lang, VSO Cambodia programme officer – interviewed in his office Phnom Penh
21-08-00
Seng Kan, Manager, Programme Management and Monitoring Unit, MoEYS – interviewed in his office
21-08-00
Mike Ratcliffe, Education consultant, Phnom Penh, interviewed in his office, Phnom Penh
28-08-00
Kao Sophal, National English trainer-trainer, MoEYS– interviewed in his office
30-08-00
Liz Webber, VSO ELT teacher-trainer, Kompong Chhnang POE – interviewed in her house, Kompong Chnnang
25-10-00
Nath Bun Roeun, Director of TTD, MoEYS – interviewed in his office
25-10-00
Lucy Royal-Dawson, CAMSET II inspection advisor/team leader – interviewed her office, Phnom Penh
26-10-00
Jane Fowles, CAMSET II advisor – interviewed in her office, Phnom Penh
27-10-00
Lor Chor Vanna, National inspector of English, Secondary English Inspection Office, MoEYS – interviewed in his office
04-12-00
Alison Lane, VSO ELT teacher-trainer, Kompong Speu POE – interviewed in her house, Kompong Speu
11-02-01
Estelle Day, VSO ELT teacher-trainer, Svey Rieng POE – interviewed in Le Jardin café, Phnom Penh
277
278
Newspapers Phnom Penh Post – online subscription between March 2001 and 2002 available at http://www.phnompenhpost.com/ Cambodia Daily The Guardian
Websites (regularly consulted) Accord journal – http://www.c-r.org/accord/index.htm?accser/series.htm Cambodia Development Resource Institute - http://www.cdri.org.kh/ Cambodian
Recent
History
and
Contemporary
Society
An
Introductory
Course
-
http://www.seasite.niu.edu/khmer/Ledgerwood/Contents.htm Council of Ministers - http://www.camnet.com.kh/ocm/ MoEYS – http://www.moeys.gov.kh Thai-Cambodia Border Refugee Camps – http://www.websitesrcg.com/border/index.html
Archives accessed Cambodian Development Resource Institute library, Phnom Penh Cambodia Cooperation Committee resource centre, Phnom Penh MoEYS Documentation Centre, Phnom Penh National English Teachers Resource Centre library, Phnom Penh
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Bibliography and other documentary sources Thai / Cambodia Border Refugee Camps 1975-1999 Information and Documentation Website Available at: http://www.websitesrcg.com/border/index.html Accessed on 24-10-02 Ablin, D. A. 1991 Foreign Language Policy in the Cambodian Government: Questions of Sovereignty, Manpower Training and Development Assistance UNICEF 24 December 1991 Adams, B. 2002a 'Time to put the brakes on the gravy train' Phnom Penh Post Phnom Penh 11/18 August 30 - September 12 — 2002b 'What 'technical assistance' means' Phnom Penh Post Phnom Penh 11/18 August 30 September 12 Afshar, H. and Dennis, C. 1992 Women and Adjustment in the Third World, London: Macmillan. Ahrens, L. and Kemmerer, F. 2002 'Higher Education Development', Cambodian Development Review 6(1): 8-11. Alptekin, C. and Alptekin, M. 1984 'The question of culture: EFL teaching in non-Englishspeaking countries', English Language Teaching Journal 38(1): 14-20. Asian Development Bank 1999 Country Assistance Plan 2000-2002 Asian Development Bank December 1999 — 2000 Technical Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia for Preparing the Education Sector Development Program Asian Development Bank June 2000 Australian Catholic Relief 1991 Report of the Planning Study for English Language Training in Cambodia: Draft ACR Ayres, D. 1999 'The Khmer Rouge and education: beyond the discourse of destruction', History of Education 28(2): 205-218. — 2000a Anatomy of a Crisis: Education, Development and the State in Cambodia 1953-1998, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. — 2000b 'Presentation: The Educational Crisis in Cambodia: Yesterday And Tomorrow' EDUCAM Phnom Penh Bauer, P. T. 1981 Equality, the Third World and Economic Delusion, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Becker, E. 1998 When The War Was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution, New York: Public Affairs. Bit, S. 1991 The Warrior Heritage: A Psychological Perspective of Cambodian Trauma, El Cerrito: Seanglim Bit.
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