Ethnicity and Conflict Generation in Ethiopia: Some Problems and ...

Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 24, 3, Sept.2006

Ethnicity and Conflict Generation in Ethiopia: Some Problems and Prospects of Ethno-Regional Federalism J. Abbink

Conflict studies are a burgeoning new field of academic research, reflecting the persistence of communal disputes and violent confrontations in the postmodern world. Indeed, in the social sciences, notably political science, sociology and social anthropology, the interest in disputes, violence, and war and their attempted mediation or resolution has perhaps never been greater. Theoretical advances are being made in the understanding of the interlocking factors of ideology, cultural representation, social inequality and material interests that generate conflict (see Brass 1997; Horowitz 1985, 2001; Tilly 2003; Broch-Due 2005). Although the policy impact of conflict studies as an academic field is limited, largely due to the non-receptivity of policy circles and the power struggles preventing their implementation, the relevance of the general insights attained is obvious. These insights relate to ‘resource competition’, persistent inequalities in socio-political systems, patterns of humiliation and abuse of minorities, and the politicisation of religion. In the past decade or so, students of the Horn of Africa, and of Ethiopia in particular, could not escape this new trend of conflict studies. Political, communal and ethnic tensions are rampant as Ethiopia struggles to develop a post-imperial society that has to deal with diversity, deep-seated political conflict, and entrenched inequality inherited from the past. The post-2005 election crisis in the country1 has made it clear again that violence or the threat thereof remains an important idiom of politics and of group relations. To many, this is something of a puzzle after the advent of a new government in 1991 under the aegis of the rural insurgent movement Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) that ended the long civil war, promising a solution to the ‘national question’ in Ethiopia and a defusion of ethnic and regional tensions. The TPLF fought an ethno-regional liberation war from 1975 to 1991. In 1990, it broadened into the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (or EPRDF, a coalition of parallel parties to represent other parts of Ethiopia), and later enlarged its programme nationwide with the ambition of creating a renewed, ‘revolutionary-democratic’ state, with more rights to be accorded to neglected minorities and language groups, and aiming for a decentralised, ethno-linguistically-based federation instead of an enforced unitary state. This was held in due course to solve the ‘national question’, that is, the ISSN 0258-9001 print / ISSN 1469-9397 online/06/030389-25 DOI: 10.1080/02589000600976729

© 2006 Journal of Contemporary African Studies

390 Journal of Contemporary African Studies

inequalities in power, cultural prestige and resources between the various ethno-linguistic groups.2 I will not repeat the history of this ‘experiment’ in ethnic politics over the last 15 years, as numerous studies have been, and still are, devoted to it (for a comprehensive analysis placed in the wider African context, see Alemante 2003). Today the model is in trouble and seems to stagger. In 2005–2006, there is unrest in the Ogaden, parts of Oromiya, Amhara, Gambela, and in urban areas. Whatever happens after more than 1.5 years of post-election crisis and repression of domestic protests, the EPRDF regime in power will have the difficult, if not impossible, task of regaining legitimacy and credibility among Ethiopians of various ethnic and other backgrounds. Even the usually mild if not indifferent ‘international community’ had second thoughts about the policies of the current regime after the campaign of repression started in early November 2005 (Lyons 2006). The apparent stability of the past 15 years has proved to be shaky. In contrast to, for instance, donor-country policy-makers limited by their diplomatic agendas, many academic observers had the opportunity to take a more serious look at the historical antecedents, the nature of the insurgent movement turned government (also in Eritrea), and the new political dispensation and for years have issued cautions about the changes (Merera 2000; Nord 1999; Ottaway 1995; Tronvoll 2001; Pausewang, Tronvoll and Aalen 2003). In Ethiopia, the question as to whether the current regime has offered a successful solution to ethnic tensions and conflicts, as compared to the previous Ethio-Marxist dictatorship of Mengistu Haile-Mariam (until 1991) or even to the imperial state of former emperor Haile Sellassie I (before 1974), is still relevant. But the answer is mixed. Certainly there is no large-scale civil war at present between the government and ethno-regional mass movements, as under the Mengistu regime. But these movements were as much about political repression, lack of inclusive democracy, and contesting economic marginalisation of peripheral regions as about ethnicity or ethno-linguistic rights per se. In the present contribution we contend that the post-1991 regime in Ethiopia, despite its promise and claims to bring solutions, has been less successful than expected in managing ethnic tensions in the country, and has basically only ‘decentralised’ the problems by defining the sources of conflict to be on the local and not national level. The federal state is all-powerful, retaining political control and financial-economic resources at the centre, but declines responsibility for the emergence, or even production, of local conflicts between ethnic communities on the regional or local levels, of which there have been dozens since the early 1990s. Thus, while large ethno-regional liberation movements no longer exist in Ethiopia as they did in the 1970s and 1980s, or have only a modest following (such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) among Oromo, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) among Ogaden Somalis or the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF) among Afar), ‘ethnic’ struggles between com-

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munities are quite frequent, and have led to a localisation of conflicts away from challenging the central state, and to an ‘essentialisation’ of ethno-cultural or linguistic differences, which then came to (re)define local group relations. As Clapham has said (2004:53): “This redefinition of Ethiopia along ethnic lines has created conflicts of its own, especially over the demarcation of the territories of the different federal units”. There are no conclusive signs yet that the EPRDF regime is succeeding in finding a durable solution to this conflict dynamics. And in public and scientific debate, despite the rhetoric and the human rights reports on ‘ethnic conflicts’ in Ethiopia and the occasional case studies, no one has made an inventory of those local-level conflicts and tried to make sense of the patterns, if any. But to do so and compare the situation with that of the pre-1991 period is highly relevant, because Ethiopia’s new political system was claimed to bring internal peace by defusing ethnicity and ethno-regional tensions as a source of armed rebellion. This paper is an attempt to inventorise and explore local/ethnic confrontations not on the basis of an ideological parti pris or of a critique of the legal doctrine of ‘self-determination’, but on that of the facts of conflict and its victims. Based on the record of incidents (see Appendix 1) and on alleged causes of the conflict – many of which were extensively reported upon in the (inter)national press and some of which were looked at in more detail by the author through site visits and interviews – one can draw the cautious conclusion that there is a pattern of local conflicts not decreasing according to plan, but continuing and in many cases deteriorating. This happened in conjunction with the undermining of traditional mediation mechanisms, made invalid because of wider political-economic factors and not compensated for by an effective extension of state judicial mechanisms under the new 1994 constitution. While space limitations do not permit an indication of what social scientists like to call the ‘underlying causes’ of all the conflict cases mentioned, recurring factors are the disagreements about the possession of or use rights to land, water sources, jobs in local administration, cultural policies and prestige (feelings of inter-group superiority and inferiority), licences for investment and settlement, and language policy in education and administration, but most of all the inability of the current administrative and government agencies to install a predictable and encompassing framework of mediation and procedures for negotiated solutions for dispute on the basis of issues instead of identities. Disagreements are now often seen through a screen of ‘ethnic’ interests and ambitions, whether justified or not, and this clouds people’s judgements. This fact is in part related to the codification of ethnic identity in the legal system of the country without the effective mediation structures yet being in place. The Ethiopian Constitution of 19953 and the way law and governance in Ethiopia are pursued in practice stimulate ‘boundary thinking’ between groups and contribute only marginally to a reduction of the ethnic or regional disputes over time. The noteworthy traits of contemporary conflicts are their reduction in scale – in specific locations, dispersed, or in a sense, ‘democratised’ – and their non-state directed nature. Few conflicts are inspired by a new, inclusive national vision of


state reform; most are essentially reactive, parochial and conservative in nature. Exceptions are perhaps those movements striving for regional autonomy or secession, such as the OLF and ONLF or some small groups in the Gambela region, but even there the political ideology is in flux. To deal with ethnicised conflict and to reduce ‘ethnic clashes’ in Ethiopia, there probably has to be some constitutional revision and a reordering of the current regional state boundaries in the country to produce workable, balanced units where territory, ecology and regional identity are the building blocks, and not primarily ethnicity or language. However, pessimists intimate that it may already be too late for that, because among the generation coming to maturity since 1991, new identities have been formed and are being ‘internalised’ – in the Bourdieuan sense – by local people.4 Such identities have become structuring practices of daily life, derived from the external domain (national politics and administration, as defined in the constitution and additional laws). The issue of land and access to land is currently playing a major role in this Ethiopian conflict dynamic. Land is the most important resource, and historically it had major existential and identity aspects for people. For the populations living on it, land – despite its open borders and the fluidity of property rights and claims – was invested with symbolic meaning and was the basis of their social and cultural existence. These perceptions not only linger on today, as defining some of the heritage of groups, but also have tended to develop into a basis for exclusive identity formation, as can be seen from the numerous territorial and small-scale border conflicts between groups that have come to style themselves discursively in ethnic terms.

Ethnicity in Ethiopia’s Post-1991 Legal and Political Framework The new post-1991 state narrative was that there was no state narrative: Ethiopia was to be seen as a loose collection of peoples/nations/nationalities (essentially the Stalinist definition), units that are to be identified primarily with their own language, body of historical mythology, or culture, and not with the state or with ‘Ethiopian identity’. This was the ideology of the TPLF. Federalism was introduced, admittedly as an experiment; as Ethiopia’s prime minister said. But it is not yet fully developed. Some contradictions as to the delineation of units and the powers of federal versus regional authorities are not resolved. Major opposition figures, such as Professor Beyene Pet’ros, a United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) party politician from the south, are of the opinion that federalism in Ethiopia is “non-existent”,5 because regional autonomy is not respected, all major budgetary decisions are made in the federal capital, and the federal government can interfere (also militarily) at will in the regions. Ethiopia today is often said to follow ‘ethnic politics’: divide-and-rule of the country’s many ethnic/national groups for the benefit of rule by a minority (largely from the northern Tigray region), but that is probably an inaccurate de-


scription in view of the new (1995) constitutional framework that aimed at equity between groups and enhancing their opportunities. In addition, the agenda of federalisation and the granting of ethno-linguistic and regional rights reflecting the inherent diversity of the population has broad support in the country. But most, though not all, groups also want to maintain and build an overarching national Ethiopian state framework. What can be said is that the current Ethiopian regime led by the EPRDF, that emanated from the ethno-regional movement TPLF, has not foreseen the drawbacks of a system based on ethno-linguistically defined regions and a strict ‘ethnicisation’ policy. For example, the staffing of local administration has taken on a divisive dynamic of its own, whereby aspiring elites from the regions have used the new dispensation, with its rights to ethnic claim-making, for their own benefits and power manoeuvring. So, in practice, an ‘ethnic’ policy was often pursued, and has led to new perceptions of inequality and elite rule on lower levels in the political system. Four ingredients define the Ethiopian socio-political system and provide the setting for conflict along ethnic lines. (a) There is the fact of the historical heritage of ethno-linguistic and regional diversity of groups, and the question of failed socio-political inclusion under previous regimes (the empire and the Derg). In day-to-day life and local conditions, rural people (80 per cent of the total) identify themselves to a large extent in terms of their ethno-linguistic and regional way of life, which provides their sustenance and social cohesion. Connections with other groups and wider Ethiopian society are not denied or shunned, but the content of ‘Ethiopian identity’ is often nominal, especially for smaller minorities with a rural way of life. The state is often seen as an adversary and as an extractive agent which gave only little in return. As long as this phenomenon of dual identity is not recognised, tensions will remain, even under the best of circumstances. Ethno-linguistic and ethno-regional diversity is a fact that will not go away. In urban areas this problematic partly dissolves due to long-standing social intermingling, but there is an objective need to give cultural and political recognition to local/ethnic identities and ways of life in relation to the reality of an overarching Ethiopian state and of the transgroup economic connections that exist. I want to emphasise that the fact of ethno-linguistic diversity in itself is of course not a factor that generates violent conflict, but minority elite action often mobilises on this basis, and the formalisation of ethnic identity, by nature fluid and manipulable, leads to entrenching it as an ideology with primordialist traits. (b) In 1992 the new Ethiopian government led by the EPRDF/TPLF introduced a new regional map of Ethiopia which proposed 14 killils (killil is an Amharic word meaning ‘reserve’, ‘fenced territory’, or ‘area that inhibits the view’). The borders were largely ethno-linguistic and were determined by ideology, not geographic and economic-ecological common sense. The entities called nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia had to have, as much as pos-


sible, their own region. A compromise map followed. Not all the ca.75 nations, nationalities and people have their own region or state. Some new reg io n al states h av e no clear ethnic majority population (Benishangul-Gumuz, the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS), the chartered city states Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa), some are anomalies: Harari (a small ruling minority of some 11 000 amidst c.120 000 non-Harari’s) and Gambela (a small state of c.200 000 people). Furthermore, all states, including those with one big majority (Somali, Oromiya, Tigray, Amhara and Afar) have significant ethno-linguistic minorities ranging from 5 to 15 per cent of their total population. There are inherent problems with this new regional division. The problem of ethnic diversity and governance on the basis of ethnicity is not solved therewith, only decentred and moved towards the lower levels of administration. The risk of discrimination of ethno-linguistic minorities by the dominant majority in a Regional State is real, and might lead to a new ethnic ranking system. In practice, this is already the case in several of these regions. Also, the place of the ethnically mixed urban populations in the towns and cities across these regions, and which are often Amharic-speaking, is inherently problematic and has not yielded a solution to date. For some populations, being declared out of place of or the ‘wrong’ language group is not an acceptable option in any state order. (c) The 1995 Ethiopian federal constitution contains the puzzling and controversial Article 39.1, which stipulates the right of secession from the federation of any of the sovereignty-bearing units. What these units are is a bit unclear in the constitution itself, as the text both identifies the regional states as well as the ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ of Ethiopia as sovereign units. (Later on, the concept of ‘minority nationalities’ is also used in the text). From a constitutional law point of view, this clause is highly unusual and contested, and it will not do to counter that Ethiopian reality is very specific and needs it. One might say that with putting the unconditional right to secession in the 1995 constitution, the drafters adopted the most extreme version of the right to self-determination, which is known as the ‘nationalist principle’ (Buchanan 1991:46), thus bypassing alternatives. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi gave the rationale for this in a 1995 interview.6 Asked about the possible Pandora’s box effect of clause 39.1 he said: “There is no way the secession could take place one fine morning simply because the right is embodied in the Constitution. As a matter of fact, the secession clause was put into the Constitution in order to avoid such an eventuality”. This is a nice example of dialectical thinking, but questionable. What he is saying is that by keeping the door open for disgruntled groups to walk out, they would be inclined to stay and give it a try, as the federal government would do, to keep them in. But many observers noted that in practice it is unlikely that a proposed secession procedure would be possible.


The constitution, as we saw, confirmed the new regions and on paper gave them far-reaching administrative autonomy, but in practice an informal control or brake system was in place. The role of the federal government was formally increased again in 2003 when the House of Peoples’ Representatives adopted a proclamation on federal government intervention in regions.7 It gave the federal government the power to intervene in the regions in case of a serious deterioration in the security situation. This was necessitated by the frequency and intractability of local, ethnicised conflicts. In the last three years, this bill was often resorted to, but has not led to successful solution of the conflicts because government forces lack cultural sensitivity and mediation and negotiation skills. (d) The fourth element in the new politic dynamics since 1991 is the principle of state ownership of land. In the cities, a land-lease system was introduced, but in the countryside all land is property of the state and therefore, as people say, of no one. This also includes the lands that are customarily used and distributed by the pastoral people and the indigenous minorities in the south. It can be used by the local people, but, if need be, confiscated, used and redistributed at will by the regional authorities and the federal government. It is basically up for grabs, and an issue of perpetual contestation. It is also politically used: periodic redistributions can be directed against political opponents. This situation invalidates customary tenure and land-use regimes of the local people, and thus produces a major bottleneck in rural development, flouting the recognition of rights to livelihood of the various ethnic groups in the country. In addition, its problematic effects as to productiveness and ecology are usually underestimated.8 Hence, because no one can legitimately claim durable community or customary rights over it any more, the relevance of the fact that land is state property is that it becomes a resource to be fiercely contested by local ethnic groups.

The Claim-Making Game in Ethiopia: Opportunism and Identity Politics There are some definite advantages to the ethno-political dispensation in Ethiopia which has existed since 1991: minority groups have acquired visibility and can have their grievances and demands heard. They can use their languages for educational purposes, and educated members of their community function in the administrations and political institutions, even up to the parliament (House of People’s Representatives). This fact is no mean achievement. Under the Derg this process of recognition had already started, as evident in the literacy programmes in more than a dozen languages and the work of the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities (ISEN) and its political role in mobilising minority representatives. The current regime has by its reforms started a process of political reform to modify perceived past hegemonist and authoritarian policies –


reforms which may in principle do justice to the de facto federalism that the country knew for a long time (Fontrier 1999). The policy also brought more recognition and even pride to various neglected or disadvantaged communities. After ethnic/ethno-linguistic identity was accorded an organising role in the determination of boundaries and policies, the new political dispensation (Clapham 2002) was quickly used as a means to make claims to resources on the national (state) level and the local level (especially land and government funding). This started with intricate negotiations and ethnic positioning strategies of ethnic elites or spokesmen to get advantages at the expense of other groups. Ethnic revivalism in these years after the 1991 take-over was remarkable and had a primarily strategic component (see Markakis 1998 for the example of the Gurage). Often violent action was also a part of this. Land and borders became the prime foci of contestation. Land had become an increasingly scarce resource due to soil erosion and population growth.9 Often this contestation was backed up with an explicit reference to cultural and language differences as well as sentiments of being historically disadvantaged. As Tilly (2003:238) has said, violence “emerges from the ebb and flow of collective claim-making and struggles for power”. We should interpret this as happening predominantly on the local level: it is here that perceptions of power, of competition between groups, and of the ‘relevance’ of language and ethno-cultural differences are first articulated and become easily manipulated by ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ with ambitions in the wider regional or national arenas. The role of ‘ethnic middlemen’ is vital.

Land and Culture in Conflict: Some Cases The majority of conflicts in rural Ethiopia (see Appendix 1 for a documented listing of conflict cases) emerged from disputes on land and on boundaries of districts (woredas) and zones between the newly defined ethnic or linguistic groups (in Amharic: behéresebotch). As access to land and related resources such as water holes, forest areas and pasture is under pressure for virtually all groups, the advantage to be gained from declaring oneself a member of a group that has legal identity and can claim rights is obvious. This strategy is used to make individual claims under collective guise. Unlike what happened in the past, any dispute on land or land use between individuals or households now becomes a collective, community issue, and pits communities against each other: this is the logic that must inevitably be pursued, and in terms of which the rights can be obtained. There is no legal structure that adjudicates between individuals or families when the legal identities of people are corporate, even if the issues that gave rise to the dispute are small-scale and individual. This is the essential difference between the EPRDF era and the imperial or Derg era, when regional grievances were formulated and given expression in wider collective insurgent movements formed on a regional basis, for example, in Bale and Gojjam in the 1960s, or in Tigray, Somali and Oromo regions in the 1970s.


The majority of conflicts now dubbed ‘ethnic’ in Ethiopia are about boundaries between territorialised ethnic groups. Fights about identity are being waged in order to establish the borders of districts and zones, and the ‘identity’ professed by local people is the deciding element. The government often claims that groups clashed ‘spontaneously’, as in the tragic Guji-Gedeo conflict of 1998-99,10 but this obfuscates the generative dynamics of conflict behaviour in rural settings. A common answer to recurring boundary problems in Southern Ethiopia has been the separation of units, that is, ‘secession’ in miniature form. In the Southern Regional State we have seen a notable proliferation of units (Aseffa 2005:238): the Region started out in 1993 with nine zones, but has now 13 zones, with an additional eight ‘special woredas’ for specific ethnic groups (such as Alaba, Dirashe, Konso, Burji), often established after recurring conflicts. More intractable, however, are the conflicts that are about power and access to scarce resources in a shared arena, such as the three cases below.

Suri, Dizi and Me’en Conflicts in the Maji Area In southwest Ethiopia, near the Sudan border, the Dizi sedentary peasants are locked in a long-standing conflict with the Suri agro-pastoralists, which is partly about resources and partly about different cultural values, worldviews and life styles (Abbink 1993, 2002). Both speak different languages, and have quite different forms of social organisation, the Dizi being a more hierarchical chiefdom society, the Suri a segmentary, clan-based, egalitarian society. Suri are in a squeeze due to expansion into their territories of the agro-pastoralist, well-armed Nyangatom and Toposa people in the south and west (from Sudan), and who run the Suri toward the Dizi mountains. Numerous clashes have occurred, and they predate the policy of ethno-regional federalism. In 1994 a Suri woreda was instituted, that is, administratively separating them from the woredas where Dizi lived, and giving them a kind of self-governance, though under tutelage of the ruling party and with co-opted young leaders. One local Dizi chief at the time expressed scepticism (in an interview in 1993): “Yes, now we have a new government who brought us the behéreseb thing. We don’t know yet what it means. This matter has not ripened yet. But we have to live in this land together, not separately”. For him, the ethnicity discourse was not by definition a liberation or an improvement: he made it dependent on the government’s success in addressing the outstanding security and economic issues. Indeed, the political recognition of ethnicity has not led to an end of the conflicts. Suri often clashed with Dizi farmers, also killed women and children, and usually acted with impunity. Reverse attacks of Dizi on Suri were rare, because the Dizi are not armed and cannot fight back. As highlanders they are under close control of state administration established in the villages and, in addition, they are a more fragmented society. The Suri lowlands – bordering Sudan – are difficult and uncontrollable terrain for government people and soldiers. While the two groups already had a long history of tense relations in imperial times, the number of victims has never been as large as in the last 15 years. Obviously, the entry of automatic weapons, since before


1991, and possessed in significant numbers by the Suri, has increased the death toll. Suri youngsters have also tended to develop a ‘gun cult’, and regularly killed Dizi and others in the neighbouring highlands without a demonstrable material reason except peer-group pressure and ‘prestige building’. The ubiquitous presence of guns is a complicating factor in many so-called ethnic clashes in southern Ethiopia. Suri are also in frequent violent conflict with the Anywaa people in the gold-panning areas in the Dima region of the Gambela State, and occasionally clash with the Me’en people, living to the northwest of the Suri. In a major confrontation a few years ago between Me’en and Suri, close to 50 people were killed and some 5000 head of cattle stolen. The government interfered but made things worse, arresting and shooting the wrong people, and later, local Me’en spokesmen said in disdain: “This government acts like a bull: with a lot of force, but without brains”. Coercive force was always the predominant means to maintain order and push through their politics. In the last 10 years, the EPRDF administration has not succeeded in controlling armed conflict or in instigating successful, durable mediation, although this was on their agenda. Disturbing is that after 1991, with increased government presence, the traditional mediation mechanisms, in this region done via culturally accepted negotiation procedures taking several days,11 have also lost impact because of their devaluation in the state judicial system, changes in local power relations in and between the ethnic groups, and due to conflicts becoming more multidimensional, that is, not only ‘resource competition’ or a clash of prestige, but also youth rebellion and disproportionate armament of lowlanders (see Abbink 2000 for illustrations). Efforts of newly trained and appointed young Suri, Me’en and Dizi administrators and cadres, working on the zonal or regional level since the mid-1990s, have enhanced communication somewhat, but have not translated into an improvement of the local situation, because the underlying problems of land use, water, cattle rustling and transhumance routes have not gone away, and because internal changes in social and political organisation are more far-reaching than anticipated.

Oromo: Non-Oromo Relations in Wollega Wollega in western Ethiopia has been a traditional area of settlement of Oromo since the 17th century. Oromo are at least 35 per cent of the total Ethiopian population, and a large majority in Wollega. They are mixed farmers, petty traders, and keep livestock. Since the late 19th century, but in many places as recently as the 1970s and 1980s, immigrant settlers from the north (Amhara, Tigrayans, Gurage and others) arrived. Many of them intermarried and mixed with the local Oromo. The first northerners originally came in the wake of the conquest of the area by Emperor Menilik II in the late 19th century, and some became big landlords, dispossessing or competing with local Oromo and other groups. The more recent migrants are mostly resettled drought victims from the northern Gondar, Tigray and Wollo regions. Most of the newcomers became regular farmers or civil servants, traders, teachers, and so on. In the Derg time (1975) the imperial


land-tenure system was abolished, with all non-Oromo landlords dispossessed and land (as state property) given in use to the local farmers. This meant the end of the ‘ethno-class’ system of northern ‘Amhara’ landlords and Oromo tenant peasants. In the early 1990s, after the proclamation of the new regions on the basis of ethnicity, the relations between Oromo and non-Oromo deteriorated, with an ethno-nationalist discourse emerging among Oromo, inspired by cadres of the Oromo Liberation Movement (OLF), then still in the government, and also by those of the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organisation (OPDO), a part of the current governing EPRDF coalition. This discourse was grafted on a history of tensions between the ‘established’ and the ‘newcomers’ (see Assefa Tolera 1997) but much aggravated by political manipulation by new elites and a new ethno-linguistic ideology. An appeal is also made to a controversial clause in the Oromiya Region Constitution.12 The discourse led to serious clashes across Ethiopia (see Appendix 1, cases of 1991, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2005), among others in the Hararghe region and in Wollega. Oromo farmers began to contest the very presence of Amhara and other farmers, accusing them of land usurpation and damage to the environment. Evictions, killings, property destruction and burning of houses followed repeatedly in several places. These clashes are still seen today: the most recent one occurred in the wake of the post-2005 election turmoil in Gida-Kiramu woreda in Wollega, where a few thousand ‘Amhara’ farmers, supposedly Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) opposition party adherents, were chased out – allegedly under the auspices of the OPDO party people and condoned by local police and militia – and forced to take refuge elsewhere. The majority of them were allowed to return after intervention by officials from the Region, but in fact, there is a regular threat of population displacement of non-Oromo people from the area – mostly ordinary traders and small-scale farmers – as has been evident in some other parts of Oromiya as well. Local Oromo phrase the conflict in terms of access, use and possession of the land and the natural resources (for example, forest), which they tend to see as rightfully theirs. From a political point of view, the most problematic element here is the tacit and sometimes open support that government-affiliated authorities and cadres (political activists of the ruling party) reportedly gave to this discourse of dispossession based on ‘primordial’ criteria of ethnic origin, language and indigenous status. This is then justified in terms of ideas of ethnic self-determination.

Nuer: Anywaa Conflict in Gambela The most serious ethnic conflict today may be that between Nuer and Anywaa in the small western Gambela regional state, which has a population of some 200 000 people.13 In the past three years, hundreds of people have been killed in an


appalling manner, thousands wounded and displaced, and insecurity is still rampant. State security forces have been shown to be incapable of preventing or solving the conflict, and at times are accused to have fanned it actively by choosing sides.14 In addition, this conflict is a longstanding and recurring one, with no durable solution in sight as long as the political set-up of the region is not changed. Points of contestation are who holds power in the regional administration, and who has the right over what land in the region. Despite its large surface area, there is resource competition between the five ethnic groups in the region and the large contingent of highlanders who immigrated to the area in the course of the past 50 years (and who form ca.25 per cent of the population). The Nuer and Anywaa (respectively, 40 and 28 per cent of the total population) fight over representation in the regional state government, over federal funds, over privileges and land for agriculture (Anywaa) or pasture (Nuer). The two major groups dominate the local arena of politics and are locked in violent rivalry. The basic claim of the Anywaa is that they are the original inhabitants of the area and that most of the Nuer are newcomers from the Sudan, who should not dominate and occupy Anywaa lands along the Baro River. There is a historical basis in fact for this claim, because in the past decades many Nuer refugees came to Gambela to escape the Sudan civil war. The Nuer were also the masters of the region in the Derg era, when Ethiopia supported the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) which had an important operational base in Gambela. Under the EPRDF, political authority was given to the Anywaa but now is shifting back to the Nuer, apparently under government tutelage. 15 This conflict has other historical antecedents, because in the 19th century the Nuer gradually pushed Anywaa east into Ethiopia. Remarkably, the 25 per cent northerners now living in Gambela are excluded from local politics. This is a logical result of the fact that the political administration of the state under the current federal order should be based on local ethnicities allegedly indigenous to the area. The result so far has been a toll of several thousand people killed, thousands wounded, tens of thousands of displaced, huge loss of property, and deep insecurity. The ethnic group-identity of Nuer and Anywaa has been deeply essentialised. A remarkable feature of this conflict is the incompetence of the authorities and the security forces to handle it and restore durable peace. At some points, for example, in the 2004 violence, the security forces were accused of taking sides and assaulting uninvolved Anywaa people, a fact for which the federal government later formally apologised.16 But up to 2006 no effective mediation was achieved and no perpetrators brought to justice. However, a commission of inquiry report pointed a finger at the insurgents, but also to some members of the security forces. The conflicts have abated, but the area is in deadlock and remains unstable due to the inherently problematic political structure in the Gambela Region grafted upon socio-political tensions between two groups.17


Problems of Accommodating Local Diversity in the Federal Order As noted above, federal rule held important promises upon its introduction in 1991, among them a respect for local languages and cultures, training and staffing of local authorities with local people who spoke the relevant languages and were sensitive to the culture, and more access to regional and state institutions by members of smaller ethnic minority or disadvantaged groups. The new political formula met the critiques on perceived past hegemonies and cultural domination of outsiders, and sought an innovative and politically expedient formula for recasting Ethiopian state identity. However, the process of federalisation and decentralisation had to be in line with the ideology of ‘democratic-centralist federalism’ as formulated by the dominant party, EPRDF. During the preparation of the new political system, for example, during the National Conference of 1991, a top-down formula was applied in which it was already decided that ethno-linguistic identities would have to find organisational expression and form the basis of the system. There was little consultation on the local needs and future plans with grassroots movements or local authorities, including women’s groups, civic groups, traditional leaders and elders, with the latter two categories being seen as relics of the past. One result was that traditional conflict resolution mechanisms – basically, structures of debate for reconciliation and compensation for wrongdoing, grounded in the recognition of diversity and the inevitability of disputes – were neglected by government authorities, because all resolution of conflict had to conform to government expectations and procedures (see Abbink 2000b). A combination of the two was found to be too complicated and too cumbersome due to their ritual form and time-consuming aspects. Still, as local ethnic groups identify with their tradition and see limited use in codified and federal laws for specific local problems, the relevance of customary procedures is still there and appeal to it would enhance the acceptance of settlements reached. Also the ritual of conflict negotiation itself – its social setting and the discourse performance by those involved – has a function, beyond its judicial outcomes. A word needs to be said on mediation efforts, which can be presumed to be part of government efforts to defuse violent conflicts. In many cases, government agents did try to restore normalcy, but were unable to restructure the pattern of interaction between the groups in their particular setting. The usual scenario of government action after conflict was roughly as follows: (i) after the violent clashes, police or troops were sent in to stop the violence and seek out perpetrators; (ii) the parties were called for a meeting and given warnings; (iii) an appeal to community elders was made to mediate, hand over perpetrators and conclude agreements under government supervision; (iv) the dead were buried, the displaced either returned or migrated to other areas, houses were rebuilt and so on; (v) no compensation for life or damage was arranged by the state legal institutions, although it sometimes occurred between local protagonists. In some cases


(for example, Gambela) a commission of inquiry was installed to make a report with recommendations, and simultaneously an effort was made at containment with troop or police presence; (vi) sporadically, perpetrators were arrested or prosecuted, the conflict ebbed away or was subdued, while elders continued to work and restore day-to-day relations. Root causes were not addressed because the means to tackle them were lacking (see below). Overall, few of these conflicts ever saw a final solution. There is perhaps only one case where some kind of solution for ethnic conflict, administrative control and the disputes about political representation was reached with an appeal to the new federal rules: that of the Berta and the Gumuz people in the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state. Initially, after the conflict between the two came to a head, the groups just walked out of the regional assembly and refused negotiations. But eventually mediation began. The tensions between the three main population blocks – Gumuz (24 per cent of the population), Berta (27 per cent) and ‘highlanders’ (35–40 per cent)18 – was provisionally resolved by proportional power-sharing and the acceptance of the validity of Amharic (as lingua franca) as the official language of regional administration to be known by office-holders, after matters were submitted to the Constitutional Inquiry Commission of the House of the Federation. This initiated a legally-argued compromise procedure, although a final resolution has not yet been reached. For example, the political position and the rights of the 35 per cent ‘non-indigenous’ population (Oromo, Amhara, Gurage, etc.) were not definitively established.19 A major condition conducive to this (provisional) solution may have been simply the ‘balance’ between the population blocks, necessitating a kind of consociational compromise. In addition, compared to Eastern Wollega or Gambela, the controversies over the history of group relations in the region were less acute. 20 This case, therefore, offered a way out because of the de-emphasising and flexible use of ethnicity and language choice.

Conclusion Ethnicity as Political Artefact: Between the Quest for ‘Belonging’ and the Quest for Economic Security The ‘Ethiopian nation’ as an imagined, unified community à la Anderson (1983) is in deep crisis since the overthrow of the centralising monarchy of Emperor Haile Sellassie I in 1974, and is perhaps fading away. The ‘ethnic narrative’ as state ideology has not proven to be a workable, long-term alternative. But recognition of ethnic differences and the value of cultural traditions is not a charged issue in itself and can generate new commitments to the political order that facilitates this (in contrast to the imperial order and the Derg era). A prescriptive policy of ethnic identity on the micro-political level, however, tends to lead people to conceptualise local conflict in essentialist terms, rooting it in the presumed ethno-linguistic differences. Perhaps this was an unintended effect of the ethno-federal model as proposed, but is nonetheless quite real.


While the evidence to state that the current political dispensation ‘produces’ conflict along ethnic lines is inconclusive, it can be said that it does not effectively work to discourage or defuse it. Compared to the previous political orders, ethnic-styled conflicts are not less frequent in federal Ethiopia (see Appendix 1), although they are quite divergent in kind. After 14 years of experimenting with this new ethnic-based federal order, one would have expected a stabilisation of ethnic-styled conflicts and local border disputes. But this was hardly the case. Most of the conflicts keep recurring, and that means they seem to be politically or socially reproduced due to problematic assumptions in the political set-up. Their ‘root causes’ are not tackled and may lead to renewed confrontation later. Addressing these root causes would require more funds, development efforts, peace education and the creation of pan-group leadership. The three cases we discussed are prime examples of such cyclical conflict, exhibiting a familiar pattern, seen in most cases listed in the Appendix. They revolved around material interests, such as land, disputed borders, natural resources, political power, and access to state resources (funds, jobs, investments), the securing of which can enhance the existential and economic security of people. In addition, there were ideological, immaterial factors involved. Perceived cultural-historical differences, ethnic ranking, perceptions of disadvantages and grievances are there, and are resuscitated under the leadership of aspiring local ethnic elites (often teachers, young community leaders, and non-peasant formal-educated persons). They engage people in symbolic discourses of belonging, in- and exclusion, and feelings of inferiority or superiority as to cultural and religious traditions, and the formal political arena allows them to pursue their interests forcefully subverting the national as a whole. Thus, the ‘creative ambiguity’ in ethnic or linguistic identification is gone, as ethnic group boundaries harden into primary identities.21 Anthropological research of the last two decades has, however, demonstrated time and again that ethnicity is a part-identity, marked by discursive flexibility and selective use. There is no autonomous primordial logic in ‘ethnic’ group relations that emanates in conflict (Bayart 2005). A political system might work better if it recognised these aspects. Indications are also that the current federal system of contested units, of ambiguous division of power and of economic non-transparency, stimulates opportunism and abuse. To summarise, the evidence so far (see Appendix 1) shows a transformation of ethnic conflicts in rural Ethiopia into new shapes, not a clear reduction. The idea back in 1991–1992 was that ethnic conflicts would be transitory, “a release of pent-up tensions”, but this proved incorrect. Reportedly, federal police/army forces even let some conflicts rage without interfering decisively because of this perception of their being suppressed ‘traditional’ or ‘age-old’ rivalries. Some of the conflicts indeed are connected to long-term tensions – though not only between ethnic groups but also groups with a different mode of subsistence economy, regardless of language or ethnicity – about diminishing resources in the


face of unrelenting population growth. While the post-1991 political model also held out promises to solve these, this has not happened. The Ethiopian Constitution of 1995 is akin to a myth of conflict resolution, but it does not work as such. Lack, or erosion, of accepted and agreed-upon conflict mediation mechanisms allows a run-away effect in these ethnic-styled conflicts. It is striking that in many areas of tension and conflict, even the most marginal ones, the federal government has now placed special armed units, called fet’no derash, or rapid reaction forces, to contain the outbreaks of violence in those areas. This may perhaps be needed in view of the security problems, but a similar investment in local judicial structures, confidence/trust-building measures, and mediation mechanisms would also be helpful. This is why perhaps the time has come to adjust the Ethiopian experiment with ethnic or ‘multi-nation’ federalism, and: •

make revisions in the constitution as to the rights of the ethno-regions, the ‘right to secession’, and the definition of sovereignty, not to be vested primarily in the nations, nationalities and peoples but into a more civic conception, reflecting the wide territorial dispersal of virtually all larger ethnic groups throughout the country. Regional autonomy must be a concrete possibility, but citizenship is better defined in a nationwide, neutral sense rather than on an ethno-linguistic basis. The definition of a ‘nationality’ in the constitution (article 39.5) is difficult and has a doubtful ideological origin. Part of the effort to refine the constitutional clauses could be a fundamental strengthening of the judicial status and role of the ‘House of the Federation’, now a quite marginal chamber with unused potential;

•

reform the dogma of state ownership of all land and formulate forms of more shared, communal or associated property rights or ownership (based partly on traditional forms of ownership), register land in the name of the users/owners, and give legal security to cultivators and pastoral land users;22

•

allow new institutions of conflict mediation, partly based on traditional socio-political mechanisms used by elders, religious leaders, ritual experts and on territorial, customary law. In this respect, a start seems to have been made by the Ethiopian Ministry of Justice in January 2006 with a plan for ‘alternative dispute resolving mechanisms’.23 The current role of the House of the Federation, while it has contributed to alleviating some tensions (for example in Benishangul-Gumuz State, see above), is clearly insufficient.

•

re-arrange the boundaries of zones and regions (killils) into smaller scale, manageable units based on territorial-geographic criteria and that might connect instead of divide ethno-linguistic/ethno-regional identities in a shared arena. It should not be forgotten that to a large extent, ‘ethnicity’ is a political artefact. Ethnic identity, while a positive socio-cultural and psychological ‘resource’, should be depoliticised and formally disconnected from power politics.


The Ethiopian model of regional governance so far has emphasised the ultimate containment of conflicts by force and repressive action, aimed at ‘restoring order’ by all means. This may work in cases of spiralling conflict about long-contested resources. But the order established is inherently unstable and superficial, and based on a political ideology that now shows dissonance with developments on the ground. The generative mechanisms of conflict and exclusionism are not tackled. For this, a more serious involvement of educated local authorities and accepted leaders, constitutional law enforcement, and the building of new negotiating structures to be used by non-state mediators are needed, even if this means a loss of authority for the federal government. A political structure that encourages actors to play upon local identity conflicts is in need of reform. A creative refurbishing of the federal idea at the basis of the Ethiopian post-1991 state can provide a start. Acknowledgements The original version of this paper was presented at the 2nd International Conference on Wars and Violent Conflicts in Africa, Centro de Estudos Africanos, ISCTE, University of Lisbon, Portugal, December 15–16, 2005. I am grateful to the participants for their critical remarks. Also my sincere thanks to the JCAS referees for comments on an earlier version of this paper. Notes 1. This crisis has generated enormous controversy within Ethiopia and with the donor-country community, and also led to a huge amount of media and internet responses. One example: M. Odenheimer, “A dream defiled – the betrayal of Ethiopia’s democracy”, Washington Post, December 18, 2005 (p.B04). 2. For some recent studies among many see: Assefa 2005 and Van der Beken 2004. 3. For the complete text, see: www.civicwebs.com/cwvlib/constitutions/ethiopia/constitution_1994.htm. 4. For the Bourdieu view, see his influential 1977 book, p. 72, 80–81, and passim. The effect of ethnicising conflict, whether intended or not, has been significant and potentially disastrous, changing the fabric and mentality of Ethiopian society. The intangible emotional dimensions of this cannot be evoked in an academic paper but are better expressed in novels, poetry, music and popular songs. Anybody who, for instance, heard the (evocative, non-political) song “Eske Meche”, by Ethiopian singer Gigi Shibabaw on her album And Itiopia (1998), knows what I mean. 5. “Beyene cites non-existence of federalism in Ethiopia”, The Reporter, January 28, 2004. 6. With the Kenyan newspaper The Standard, March 26, 1995. 7. See: The Reporter (Addis Ababa), October 16, 2003. 8. A recent example (2005) is the new policy towards national parks in southern Ethiopia (Mago Park, Omo Park and Nech’ Sar Park), to be run as commercial tourist ventures by the African Parks Foundation, based in The Netherlands. Under this project, now in progress, the federal government urges local peoples to move out of the park and limits hunting and pasture use, with the danger of ignoring age-old use rights, and negatively affecting the economic and social livelihoods of the ethnic groups concerned. The people will probably be moved out by force, as has happened before in the Nech’ Sar Park with Guji and Koore people. Thus, the state’s officially stated respect for the languages, cultures and ways of life of the nations, nationalities and peoples appears conditional, and can be infringed upon when politically expedient. (See: www.danadeclaration.org/text%20website/omotakeover.pdf). 9. See Sahlu Haile 2004. Also the interview with expert Sahlu Haile, online at www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=38905


10. For instance, in 1998, after the deadly confrontation between the Guji and Gedeo, the then government spokeswoman Selome Taddesse said the Guji and Gedeo ‘tribes’ in the Oromiya region “had clashed spontaneously” (Government statement, August 19, 1998). What happened was that the local Gedeo party-affiliated cadres and militia had unilaterally claimed land from the Guji for the Gedeo zone (in the Hagere-Mariam area). Armed confrontation then followed and escalated into mass killings. The Gedeo are productive coffee farmers, the Guji are agro-pastoralists with large cattle herds, but both peoples have notable cultural similarities, for example, the age-grade system. 11. They had a transcendental element, via the killing of sacrificial animals and a common meal between the protagonists. 12. Article 8 of this constitution reads: “Sovereign power in the region resides in the people of the Oromo nation”. This would seem to prejudice the rights of non-Oromo living in the region (often for many generations) and is in contradiction with their rights as defined in the federal constitution. See the discussion in Van der Beken 2004:75ff. 13. For some antecedents to conflict there, see Young 1999. 14. Ethiopian state security forces and militias show themselves to be quite unprofessional, their often irresponsible and violent dealings with civilians and opposition forces fueling more protest. 15. Small indigenous minorities such as Komo, Oppo and Majangir play no political role. 16. See the IRIN news message “Ethiopia: parliament votes for independent probe into violence in Gambella”, March 30, 2004. 17. On June 11, 2005 there was an ambush on a bus near Gambela in which 30 people were killed. 18. The rest of the population (10–14 per cent) was made up of the indigenous groups Komo, Mao and Shinasha. 19. See Baylis 2004 for more details and an analysis of the formal legal aspects. 20. The Benishangul-Gumuz State compromise scenario, however, could in principle also be followed in the case of Gambela State but was not tried. 21. For a fascinating account of the social uses of ‘ambiguity’, see Levine 1985. 22. It is encouraging that the current government is slowly moving in this direction, by accepting a system of land registration and of land transferral to offspring, thus giving farmers title. There are also efforts to deal with women’s rights to land. 23. See: “Ministry to launch Alternative Dispute Resolving methods nationwide”, news message of the Ethiopian News Agency (ENA), January 3, 2006 (available online on January 12, 2006 at: www.ena.gov.et/default.asp?CatId=11&NewsId=191996).

References Abbink, J. 1993. “Ethnic Conflict in the ‘Tribal Zone’: The Dizi and Suri in Southern Ethiopia”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 31,4:675–83. ______ 2000a. “New Configurations of Ethiopian Ethnicity: The Challenge of the South”, Northeast African Studies, 5,1:59–81 (New Series 1998). ______ 2000b. “Violence and the Crisis of Conciliation: Suri, Dizi and the State in Southwest Ethiopia”, Africa, 70,4:527–50. ______ 2002. “Paradoxes of Power and Culture in an Old Periphery: Surma, 1974–98”. In Donham, D. et al (eds.) Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After. Oxford: James Currey; Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press; Athens, OH: Ohio University Press: 155–72. Alemante, G. 2003. “Ethnic Federalism: Its Promise and Pitfalls for Africa”, Yale Journal of International Law, 28:51–107.


Anderson, B. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Assefa, F. 2005. “Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia. A Comparative Study”. Ph.D. dissertation. Faculty of Law, University of Utrecht. Assefa, T. 1997. Ethnic Integration and Conflict: The Case of Indigenous Oromo and Amhara Settlers in Aaro Addis Alem, Kiramu Area, Northeastern Wälläga. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press. Bayart, J-F. 2005. The Illusion of Cultural Identity. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Baylis, E. 2004. “Beyond Rights: Legal Process and Ethnic Conflicts”, Michigan Journal of International Law, 25:530–602. Bourdieu, P. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brass, P. 1997. Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Broch-Due, V. (ed.) 2005. Violence and Belonging: The Quest for Identity in Post-Colonial Africa. London and New York: Routledge. Buchanan, A. 1995. “Federalism, Secession, and the Morality of Inclusion”, Arizona Law Review, 37,1:53–63. Clapham, C. 2002. “Controlling Space in Ethiopia”. In Donham, D. et al (eds.) Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After. Oxford: James Currey; Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press; Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press: 9–30. ______ 2004. “Ethiopian and the Challenge of Diversity”, Africa Insight, 34,1:50–5. Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO). 2001. The Harm Done by Ethnic and Religious Conflict. Special Report 38. Addis Ababa: EHRCO. Fontrier, M. 1999. “L’ethno-fédéralisme: retour à un État ancien”. In Rouaud, A. (ed.) Les Orientalistes sont des Aventuriers: Guirlande offerte à Joseph Tubiana par ses élèves et ses amis. Saint-Maur: Éditions SÉPIA: 215–20. Horowitz, D. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. ______ 2001. The Deadly Ethnic Riot. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press. Levine, D. 1985. The Flight from Ambiguity: Essays in Social and Cultural Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lyons, T. 2006. “Ethiopia: The Beginnings of a Transition?” In Africa Notes, 25. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Markakis, J. 1998. “The Politics of Identity: The Case of the Gurage”. In Mohammed Salih, M. and Markakis, J. (eds.) Ethnicity and the State in Eastern Africa. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet: 127–46. Merera, G. 2000. “Authoritarian Populism and Democratisation in Ethiopia”. In Prah, K. and Ahmed, A. (eds.) Africa in Transformation, Vol. 2. Addis Ababa: Organisation for Social Sciences Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA): 179–91.


Nord, A. 1999. Politische Partizipation in einer blockierten Demokratie: Das Beispiel Äthiopiens. Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde. Ottaway, M. 1995. “The Ethiopian Transition: Democratization or New Authoritarianism?”, Northeast African Studies, 2,3:67–84. Pausewang, S., Tronvoll, K. and Aalen, L. (eds.) 2002. Ethiopia Since the Derg: A Decade of Democratic Pretension and Performance. London and New York: Zed. Sahlu, H. 2004. “Population, Development and Environment in Ethiopia”, ECSP Report, 10:43–51. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center. Tilly, C. 2003. The Politics of Collective Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tronvoll, K. 2001. “Voting, Violence and Violation: Peasant Voices on the Flawed Elections in Hadiya, Southern Ethiopia”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 39,4:697–716. Van der Beken, C. 2005. Een Nieuw Model van Staatsopbouw in Afrika: Een Analyse van de Ethiopische Federale Staatstructuur. Ghent: University of Ghent, Faculty of Law (Non-Western Law Working Paper). Young, J. 1999. “Along Ethiopia’s Western Frontier: Gambella and Benishangul in Transition”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 37,2:321–46. Appendix 1: List of violent conflicts between Ethiopian ethnic groups, 1991–2005 Note: this list is not complete but sums up the main incidents. Information is taken from public sources such as Ethiopian newspapers, human rights reports (Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO)) and yearly US State Department reports on human rights, and from interviews. Sources are indicated in the appendix notes. Largely left out here were human rights abuses, religious conflicts, and several direct clashes between government security forces and local ethnic and language groups.1 Year

Groups in conflict

Place

No. of people killed and wounded

Other damage

19912

Oromo – Amharic-speakers

Dire Dawa city

c.30 killed

Property destroyed and confiscated

19913

Oromo and descendants of Northerners (Amhara, Gurage, a.o.)

Arba Gugu (Arsi)

154 killed; unknown Cattle and property number abused and theft, destruction of churches and houses, mutilated hundreds of people displaced

19914

Issa – Oromo

Dire Dawa area

Several dozen killed

Unknown

Oromo – non-Oromo

Arsi Negele

c. 60 people killed, 50-60 wounded

Houses, grain stores, and property destroyed; cattle stolen, churches looted

1992

5


19926

Amhara – Oromo – Argobba

Villages in the Kemise area, Wollo

Several dozen people Land and houses killed, a few hundred confiscated, property displaced looted

19927

Amhara/northerners, Oromo, and state security forces

Woter, Bedeno

c. 150 people killed

19928

Amhara – Oromo

Mugi town, Wollega c. 200 killed

Unknown

19929

Amhara – Oromo

Genji town

7 Amhara killed

Unknown

199410

Wolayta – Gamo

Their border

1 person killed, serveral wounded

Unknown

199411

Somali – highlanders/Amharicspeakers

Various places in the Several dozen Somali Region 5

Unknown

1995 and 199612

Oromo (supported by OPDO party cadres) – Yem

Sokoru area; Jimma zone

Several people wounded

Property damaged, people attacked and beaten up

199513

Oromo vs. northerners/ Dera, Arsi region ‘Amhara’

3 killed, dozens wounded

Problems on the states and boundaries of the woreda

199614

Oromo vs. Amhara and Arsi-Negele area other northerners

Unknown

Intimidation, expulsion threats

199815

Gedeo –Guji-Oromo

Hundreds (perhaps up to 3000) killed

Property looted and destroyed, houses burnt, livestock theft; c. 10 000 people displaced

199916

Wolayta – government Soddo, Wolayta security forces – Gamo

10 people killed, hundreds wounded by security forces

School property, textbooks, houses and shops destroyed

1991–200417

Suri – Dizi

Maji area (SNNPRS)18

Hundreds killed and wounded in an ongoing, low-intensity conflict situation

Livestock theft, looting of property (clothes, money, grain, guns, etc), destruction of houses

1992–200419

Suri – Anywaa

Dima area (SNNPRS-Gambela border)

Over 200 killed in numerous clashes

Property stolen (alluvial gold dust, cattle, rifles)

200020

Oromo – non-Oromo

Gida-Kiramu, Eastern Wollega

c. 100 killed

Property looted and confiscated, people chased out

2000–200521

Afar – Issa

Eastern Ethiopia

Dozens killed since 2000

Cattle and camels raided; property & houses destroyed

200022

Suri – ‘Me’en’

Maji area

c. 50 killed

Livestock theft (several thousand cattle)

Hagere Mariam area

Unknown


200123

Oromo – northerners (‘Amhara’)

Gimbi area and Bure Dozens killed area, East Wollega

Property, land, and all other possessions confiscated without compensation; 12 000 people displaced

200124

Berta – Gumuz – resettlers and state security forces

Benishangui-Gumuz c. 10 killed Region

Unknown

200125

Borana (Oromo) – Garri (Somali)

Their border (Moyale c. 60 killed, over 200 Livestock theft, area) wounded property destroyed

200126

Wolayta – Sidama

Bilate river area on Sidama – Wolayta border

c. 17 people killed

200127

Gidole – Zaisse

Southern Region

Several people killed Destruction of granaries and houses

2001, 200228

Zayse – Dirashe

North Omo zone

4 people killed, 3 wounded, c. 100 displaced

Property looted and destroyed, cattle and money stolen

200229

Karrayu Oromo – Afar Fentale area

56 killed in two clashes

Unknown

200230

Burji – Koore (Amarro) Amarro area (SNNPRS)

c. 100 killed, hundreds wounded

Property looted, houses burned down

200231

Shekacho and Majangir Tepi area (SNNPRS) At least 500 killed vs. state security forces, and vs. Manja and Sheka

Property destroyed and burned, more than 5000 people displaced

200232

Amhara-Afar

Northwest Shewa

31 (Afar women) killed

Unknown

200233

Nuer – Anywaa

Gambela

60 killed, 41 wounded

8780 displaced, dozens of houses burned down

200334

Nuer – Anywaa – security forces

Gambela

c. 350–450 killed

Property, cars, houses destroyed

200335

Oromo – Somali

Meisso, Hararghe region

18 killed, 21 wounded

Over 200 houses burned down, 34 camels stolen

200336

Suri – Anywaa

c. 21 killed Near Dima, on border of Surma woreda and Gambela region

Property robbed

200437

Nuer – Anywaa – highlanders

Gambela town

c. 200–300 killed

Houses burnt, property looted

200438

Ogaden Somali and Majerteer Somali

Wardar area

c. 54 killed

Unknown

200539

Oromo – non-Oromo (Amhara Gurage, and others)

Gida-Kiramu, Wollega

Unknown

c. 2000 people chased out, property and houses looted and confiscated

Property destroyed, 3500 people displaced


200540

Anywaa – highlanders – security forces

Gambela area

c. 30 killed

Cars and property destroyed

200541

Afar – Oromo

Bati, Jile

8–10 killed

Property destroyed

Oromo – Somali

Oromiya-Somali Region border

73 killed

Dozens wounded, 10 000s displaced

Guji – Boran

Finch’ewa-Yabelo area

100–150 people killed

c. 23 000 people displaced, property looted and destroyed, cattle stolen

2005

42

200643

Appendix Notes 1. An example was the bloody clash in May 2002 between Sidama and state security forces in Looqe (near Awasa), where the latter killed at least 25 demonstrators who were contesting changes in the status of the southern capital Awasa. In the city, a second demonstration was also quelled with force (Addis Tribune, May 31, 2002; Ethiopian Human Rights Council, Human Rights Abuse in Awassa and its Environs, Special Report 51, June 7, 2002). 2. Interview with three refugee eyewitnesses, Addis Ababa, 1994. 3. See for instance: Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religious or Belief. Report submitted by Mr A. d’Almeida Ribeiro, Special Rapporteur appointed in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1986/20 of March 10, 1986, UN Economic and Social Council (report E/CN.4/1993/62, January 6, 1993), section 29. Also: Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), The Human Rights Situation in Ethiopia, First Report (December 12, 1991); Id., Third Report (July 16, 1992). 4. Human Rights Watch, World Report (1992) available online at www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/AFW-02.htm, under `Ethiopia’. 5. EHRCO, The Human Rights Situation in Ethiopia, Third Report (July 16, 1992). 6. Informants in Addis Ababa 1998; fieldwork interviews 1998. 7. See Amnesty International, Annual Report 1993. See also the report Ethiopia: Status of Amharas, in the University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, available online at www.asylumlaw.org/docs/ethiopia/ins93_amharas.pdf. (accessed 28 December 2005). 8. Perpetrators of these killings (alleged members of the OLF) were sentenced only in February 2004 by an Ethiopian court. See the official Ethiopian News Agency’s (ENA) news message, “Court sentences two convicts to death by hanging”, Addis Ababa, February 19, 2004. 9. See Addis Zemen newspaper of May 2, 1992. In many of the conflicts between Amhara-speakers and Oromo, the OLF was allegedly involved. 10. Etiop (Amharic weekly), November 2, 1994. 11. Täzzabi (Amharic weekly), May 31, 1994. 12. Express (Amharic weekly), October 20, 1995; also T’obbia (Amharic weekly) February 29, 1996. 13. Habesha (Amharic weekly), October 12, 1995. 14. T’omar (Amharic weekly), October 2, 1996; Andinnet October 12, 1996. 15. Amnesty International, Annual Report 1999, Ethiopia, available online at www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar99/afr25.htm. 16. Efoyta (Amharic magazine), December 1999–January 2000 issue (Ethiopian date: Hidar-Tahsas 1992); Ethiopian Human Rights Council, Human Rights Violations in North Omo, 27th Special Report (December 13, 1999). 17. Ethiopian Human Rights Council, Ethnic Conflict in Bench-Maji Zone, 66th Special Report (October 15, 2003), and informants from Maji in Addis Ababa; fieldwork interviews. 18. SNNPRS = Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State, with about 45 ethno-linguistic groups. Its capital is Awasa.


19. US State Department (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor), Ethiopia: Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 2003, Washington, DC, February 25, 2004, available online at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27727.htm); informants from Maji in Addis Ababa. 20. See Ethiopian Human Rights Council, Serious Destructions Resulting from Ethnic Governance, Special Report 34, Addis Ababa, September 21, 2000. See also its Special Report 38, The Harm Done by Ethnic and Religious Conflict (23 February 2001). 21. For example, IRIN news messages “Ethiopia: tribal clashes in east”, April 24, 2002; and “Ethiopia: ethnic clashes worsening effects of drought”, July 29, 2002; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Afar Region and Shinille Zone under heavy rains but pockets of vulnerability remain: Assessment Mission Report”, (August 19–September 3, 2003), p.3, and numerous other UN and IRIN reports. The Afar-Issa conflict is longstanding and is more clearly concerned with resource competition in a shrinking natural arena (pasture, land, water resources). 22. Interviews in Addis Ababa with Maji travellers, 2001. 23. T’obbia (Amharic weekly) Vol. 8, No. 8, February 25, 2001. See also The Reporter (Addis Ababa), February 5, 2001. 24. Interviews Addis Ababa, 2002. See also Human Rights Watch, World Report 2002, section Ethiopia, available online at http://hrw.org/wr2k2/africa5.html. 25. IRIN news message, “Ethiopia: scores dead in tribal clashes”, December 11, 2001, available online at www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=17563&SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa&SelectCountry=ETHIOPIA); see also Kassa, G. 2001. “The Garri and Boran conflict in Southern Ethiopia”. Paper for the OSSREA Second Annual Workshop on Conflict in the Horn: Prevention and Resolution June 8–9, Addis Ababa, available online at www.ossrea.net/announcements/getachew.pdf, accessed 10 December 2005; Dagim Wonch’if (Amharic weekly), October 23, 2001; and Goh (Amharic weekly), December 22, 2001. 26. EHRCO report of September 2, 2002; article in The Reporter, September 4, 2002. 27. Ma’ibel (Amharic weekly), October 20, 2001. 28. See Mäbräq (Amharic weekly), November 22, 2001; US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, Ethiopia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 20 02 , Wa s hi ng t o n, DC, March 3 1 , 2 0 0 3 , av ailab le o n lin e at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18203.htm. See also Ethiopian Human Rights Council, 18th Regular Report, August 2002, section `Ethnic conflict’. 29. See IRIN news message, “40 killed in tribal fighting”, January 8, 2003, available online at www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=31625. 30. 30. Interviews Addis Ababa, 2002. 31. See US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, Ethiopia: Count r y Re po r t s o n Human Righ ts Pra ctices, 20 0 3 , av ailab le on lin e at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27727.htm. See also, BBC news message, “EU wants Ethiopian ‘atrocity’ inquiry”, July 16, 2002. 32. Here the Amhara regional state militia was alleged to be the perpetrator: see The Afar Forum’s commentary at www.tisjd.net/corbeta.htm, accessed April 25, 2005. Also, US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, Ethiopia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2002, as cited in note 31. 33. See IRIN news message, “Ethiopia: Over 60 Reported Dead in Tribal Clashes”, October 3, 2002; also IRIN news message, “Ethiopia: violence on the increase in Gambella Region”, January 24, 2003; and US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Ethiopia: Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 2002, as cited in note 38. Also: “Armed conflicts report, Ethiopia-Gambella (2002 – first combat deaths), Update: January 2006” at http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-EthiopiaGambella.htm. 34. Human Rights Watch, Targeting the Anuak: Human Rights Violations and Crimes against Humanity in Ethiopia’s Gambella Region, New York, HRW, 17,3, March 2005. 35. IRIN News (UN), “Ethiopia: ethnic violence leaves 18 dead in the east”, message of February 6, 2004. Also, Ethiopian Human Rights Council, An Ethnic Conflict Flared Up in West


36. 37.

38.

39.

40. 41. 42. 43.

Hararghe Zone, 71st Special Report, December 30, 2003. Another conflict in the Oromiya region (between the Gura and Dawa ‘tribes’) was mentioned in the US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Ethiopia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2003, section 5, available online at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27727.htm. See: US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Ethiopia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2003 as cited in note 35. See Genocide Watch and Survivors’ Rights International, “Today is the Day of Killing Anuaks”: Crimes Against Humanity, Acts of Genocide and Ongoing Atrocities Against the Anuak People of Southwestern Ethiopia. A Genocide Watch and Survivors’ Rights International Field Report (February 25, 2004, available online at http://genocidewatch.org/Today%20is%20the%20Day%20of20Killing%20Anuaks.htm). Also: Associated Press report, “Ethiopian police arrest 37 people for allegedly instigating tribal clashes that left nearly 200 dead”, March 5, 2004. US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Ethiopia: Country Re p or t s o n Hu ma n Ri g hts Practices, 20 0 4 , section 5 , av ailab le o n lin e at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41603.htm. See US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Ethiopia: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005 (March 2006) available online at www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rsd/rsddocview.html?tbl=RSDCOI&id=4418218511&count =4. The incident was first reported in an Amharic news message, “Kä-2000 bälay yäQinijjit Dägafiwoch Täsaddädu” (=“More than 2000 CUD supporters were made refugees”), available online at www.mahder.com/index.php?name=amharic (accessed October 21, 2005, taken off the site since). See also: Hadar (Amharic weekly), October 20, 2005. Associated Press news message, “Rebels kill over 30 in South-Western Ethiopia”, October 31, 2005. See T’omar (Amharic weekly), March 9, 2005. M. Plaut, “Ethnic clashes in Ethiopia kill 73, displace 80 000: right group”. AFP news message, August 24, 2005. See Ethiopia: “thousands displaced in clashes over land in the south”, IRIN news message, J un e 19 , 20 06 , availab le on lin e at: w w w .irinn ew s.org/report.asp?ReportID=54024&SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa (accessed June 25, 2006). An earlier message in The Daily Monitor of July 19, 2005 also hinted at this conflict (“Ethnic conflict between Gabras and Gujis which erupted in April 2005 in the Oromia region of borena zone continues in the area, UN agency said on Monday”). Also: A. Henshaw, “Ethiopian fears after land battle”, BBC news message, June 30, 2006. Henshaw speaks of 90 000 people displaced, available online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/5133060.stm (accessed July 2, 2006).