Ethnicity, inclusion and post-conflict reconstruction ...

Ethnicity, inclusion and post-conflict reconstruction: the Kenyan case Dr. Sirkku Hellsten Counsellor (Governance), Embassy of Finland, Nairobi Docent, Social and Moral Philosophy, University of Helsinki [email protected] Past and present injustices, and in general the quest for justice, are often seen to be the main causes for violent clashes and conflict. Thus, the restoration of justice is seen must be the most important goal in post-conflict reconstruction. However, the current policy approaches, social movements and theoretical models for conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction tend to look at justice from technical point of view, as a rapid institutional and/or legal fix to overcome war and violence in order to establish 'peace' and to guarantee 'security'. Consequently, the wider concept of 'social justice' is often replaced with the concepts of 'law and order'. Restoration of sustainable peace with justice, however, does not merely mean establishment of the rule of law or other institutional procedures of justice. Instead, during post-conflict reconstruction the concept of justice has much wider moral and social dimensions that need to be taken into account if the goal is to find a normative framework for ‘justice’ that can offer a way to lasting social harmony. This means the concept of justice needs to be considered in relation to local social ethics, traditional and international values, ethnic relations, to the grievances of people, and in general to the issue of public trust. This paper presents an ethical analysis of the concept of 'justice' in a post-conflict context in relation to the values of equality, impartiality and inclusion. The author discusses particularly the relationship between the principle of impartiality and social cohesion in Kenya in the post 2007 elections context by examining the problems that the ‘traditional’ social contract approach is facing in dealing with historical and ethnic injustices in developmental issues. The author argues that the social contract approach tends to deal the power 'on the top' often ignores communitarian, feminist and capability ethics observations that have pointed out the problems in the contractarian claims for impartiality and required for more comprehensive understanding of inclusiveness and impartiality that aims for more equal distribution of power and resources in order to realize human capabilities. The overall aim of the paper is to bring theory and practice together and, on the one hand, map out the main ethical dilemmas involved in '(re)constructing' or 'restoring' peace with justice in a conflict ridden society with fragile state. On the other hand, it attempts to give an overall view of the problems of justice that lead Kenya to its current crisis and find guidelines towards sustainable reconstruction of peace by inclusive power sharing and impartial resource distribution.

Introduction After December 2007 flawed general elections 1 , Kenya has gone through a traumatic experience characterized by the post electoral violence following the disputed presidential elections. The consequence of the violence has seen the loss of over thousand lives, displacement of over at least three hundred thousand people and destruction of livelihoods of millions of Kenyans and wanton destruction of property and infrastructure, worth of billions of dollars. The anarchy and heavy handed attempts to control it has led into further abuse of human rights and further diminished trust and confidence in the political leadership and state security agents in an already fragile state. The tensions and wave of violence ruptured the social fabric that had held the nation together so far 2 - particularly the ethnic relations become explosive when neighbors turned against each other - into enemies. The president 3 who was swiftly sworn in power again was no longer seen as a legitimate sovereign, and the social contract that had hold the nation together was seen broken by both - the political elites as well as their supporters. People’s lack of trust to leadership and to state institutions particularly in the justice and governance sectors made people from different ethnic backgrounds 4 to turn into sub-national political and communal solutions - instead of relying on institutional processes to deal with the situation that they saw not only as violent and insecure but also profoundly unjust. Simultaneously the distrust between various ethnic communities deepened further. For two months the country was on the precipice and was only saved from tipping over by committed national and international mediation efforts led by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. 5 (see Amani Forum 2008, Human Rights Watch 2008) After the tense negotiations a grand coalition government was formed. This government includes both the former ruling party (Party of National Unity, PNY) as well as the former opposition (Orange Democratic Movement, ODM). The former was a coalition of parties who supported the re-election of president Mwai Kibaki, and the latter turned after a widely expected win into being a loser in the elections. The claims for rigging and stolen elections never went away, and despite the seeming reconciliation between the different parties – and particularly the political elites representing these different parties, the situation across the country has remained tense. The collaboration between the different stakeholders at the political level has turned out to be difficult, and at grass roots distrust between the different communities – as well as the distrust to the leaders – remains strong. The coalition government was formed in order to bring peace and stability by bringing some ‘justice’ to the election results that were seen as ‘stolen’ by one ethnic group from all the others. However, the lack of public trust, the sense of injustice and ethnically unfair treatment in Kenya goes much deeper than the last elections. The people of Kenya are now, have been for years, and once again were demanding during the last elections – for a new ‘social contract’ that deals with the past injustices and disparities; a contract that is more inclusive and impartial and does not centralize power to one person, and to one ethnic group the person in the highest office represent.

All in all, the people in Kenya have called for justice and have hoped for a new social contract to bring it about – but the existing institutional structures and political system, brought together with ethnic imbalance and tensions, have efficiently prevented any new government from succeeding to deliver what the people are striving for. Therefore, Kenyan situation shows how important it is to understand the various theoretical and practical aspects of the concept of 'justice' in a post-conflict context. Particularly when we think of a social cohesion, nation building and state formation in terms of democratic system based on the idea of ‘social contract’ between the people that are to be governed under central political authority. These stakeholders may have very different understanding of the concept of ‘justice’ and its dimensions. Some may see the 'new contract' with new ethnic balances as justice (some win and some lose), others may ask for the kind of justice the new government is striving for; and in the latter case, there might be various understanding what the right direction, processes and values are to be realized. Since the political parties are based more on ethnic ties than ideological agenda's, finding a shared view becomes even more difficult. After all, for the social contract to be just, it needs to be based on shared – and implemented - values of equality and impartiality in a manner that can realize all human potential equally. As Nussbaum and Sen have pointed out, the problem in liberal contractarian thinking is that the contract itself is often seen as the ultimate value in itself, rather than as a starting point and means to other values and goals to be realized in a democratic society, such as the realization of human capabilities. The ‘original position’ presented by John Ralws as a starting point in which all those part of making the social contract are in equal position to choose shared principles of justice is misguiding. People make rational choices according to the evaluation of their own situation and their own benefits in that situation. Bringing about any social contract in practice presumes that the social, political and economic context is well understood, and that any power sharing deals are accompanied with institutional, constitutional and distributional reforms. (on human capability approach and criticism of Rawls see for example Nussbaum 1992, 1993, Sen 1985, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1999) When we think about making a social contract to work in real life, it is essential to realize that the concept of justice reaches both directions - to the past and to the future. Thus, when justice is discussed in a pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict situations, we have to understand whether we are referring to a backward- or forward looking concept of justice, or the combination of both. The former is dealing with corrective elements: thus, it focuses on retribution and 'correcting the past and existing wrongs' in forms compensation, and in general, it is concerned with accountability and punishment for offenses committed, and thus, the issue of amnesty is related. It can also demand for redistribution of resources. (For example Robert Nozick 1938). The latter examines how to find impartial processes and arrangements can bring about social justice in the future. It focuses particularly on realizing the rule of law as well as the egalitarian distribution of public resources, including the public offices. (John Rawls 1971, 1993 for example) In order to reach national unity, gain public trust, and to maintain sustainable peace it is important to include both dimensions into reconstruction and reconciliation: correcting the past injustices – as well as looking forward in building more inclusive and equal society in the future. (See also Hellsten 1998: 815-817)

If the historical grievances are not properly dealt with the power deals reached at the top (in a manner of speaking behind ‘the veil of ignorance’ – of the citizenry at large), between the political elites, are not considered legitimate and taking the concerns and needs of the whole citizenry into account. Various power-sharing deals tend to force the ordinary citizens to ‘live with’ whatever 'their leaders' (and often also including the international community) agree among themselves, rather than really take into account the concern and expectations of the people or peoples. 6 In order to take into account individual citizens’ (or various groups of citizens) demands for inclusion, empowerment and true social equality as well as fairness in distribution of power and resources, more attention should be paid in theory as well as in political practice to the capability, communitarian and feminist approaches that all emphasize the social embeddedness and historical setting of any ‘social contract’ that is meant to bring about strong state with good governance and respect for human rights. Social contract and post-conflict concept of justice In order to understand Kenyan situation, it is useful to take a look at the wider theoretical and empirical backround in post-conflict reconciliation. Since existing injustices and the quest for justice are usually seen to be the main causes for violent clashes, it is often claimed that the creation or restoration of justice must be the most important goal of post-conflict reconstruction. However, the current policy approaches, social movements and theoretical models and practical solutions for conflict resolution tend to look at justice from merely technical point of view, as a rapid fix to overcome war and violence. This relates the notion of ‘peace’ to ‘security’ and replaces the concept of ‘justice’ with the concepts of ‘law and order’. Creation or restoration of justice, however, does not merely mean establishment of the rule of law, but it has wider moral dimensions as well as social elements and distributional issues. Therefore, the concept of justice and the normative framework justice offers to lasting social harmony needs to be considered in relation to local social ethics, values and to the public ethics requirement of impartiality and the realization of human capabilities within a particular social context. In many other cases the attempts to reconstruct peace and harmony by top down social contracts have resulted in an unstable and weak states, which, for their part, have collapsed again. Kenya is at the moment a fragile state, people of which are waiting to see if the new power sharing deal can work and and whether the coalition government will succeed in strengthening the state and its institutions while providing more equal distribution of public resources to all. In order to build national unity, it is also crucial for the government to be able to deal with past injustices but with a focus on forward looking goals in more inclusive and impartial distribution of power and resources. Thus, it is useful to analyze the Kenyam situatiation in the social contract framework. Hobbesian social contract and 'libertarian communitarism'

In Kenya the post-elections aggressions, violence and destruction appeared to be ethnically based, and some news broadcast even used the world ‘genocide’ to describe the situation. However, the root cause for the violent explosion in Kenya is more complex than mere issues of identity or ethnicity as such. It has its roots in persistent past injustices, long-terms socio-economic disparities and historically bad governance that has created very unequal society which has no public trust neither to the impartiality of the state institutions nor to those who are holding the highest offices. In fact, Kenyan society has been deeply divided into a class society in which the political elites hold the power as well as vast fortunes, while the people in the grass roots often survive below the poverty line. The emerging middle class focuses more on business and improvement of their own quality of life than on changing the system to be more accountable and equitable to all. Violence after elections is not as such a unique phenomenon in Kenya. Since the establishment of a multi-party system in 1991 Kenya has witnessed violent conflicts during election times. As noted earlier this violence is linked to long-standing grievances and the failures of governance that run deeper than mere electoral politics. Kenya has a history of extensive corruption and systemic abuse of office by public officials that has resulted in a situation in which encouraging statistic about economic growth co-exist with depressing figures of poverty (approximately a half of the population lives on less than two USD a day). Political contexts have become all the more charged because of what is at stake: those who achieve political power benefit from widespread abuses of office, irregular acquisition and theft of land, the corrupt misuse of public resources and politically motivated manipulation of ethnicity and, in general, the culture of impunity. All these forms of bad governance occur at the expense of groups who are out of and outside of power at the particular moment. Besides political manipulation of ethnicity and negative campaigning based on ethnicity rather than issues 7 , the socio-economic disparities add up to the tensions between the different groups increasing distrust in the governments, which remains partisan and self-interested, but maintain power with the support of its own kin. The result is what could be called 'mock-democracy' where apparently democratic processes and institutions produce undemocratic and unequal power structures. In Kenya the violence is often blamed on multipartism, but if we look at the Kenyan political scenery we see that the country has now multiplying party politics with its over 200 registered parties which divide themselves like cells - not due to ideological but rather personal and communal/ethnic disputes. 8 This situation in Kenya could be described as ‘libertarian communitarism’, that is, a mixture of African communitarian cultural traditions with the new Western individualistic politico-economic framework. In ‘libertarian communitarianism’ rational self-interest of classical liberalism is set in the context of communitarian traditional solidarity in a manner that could be seen as expanding Hobbesian social contract framework from individuals to social collectives (communities, groups based on shared interests) who do not trust each other, but need to agree on some central authority in order to move away from the state of nature and continuous war of everyone against everyone. 9 In this collective context, however, the authority that in the individualistic Hobbesian terms should be granted to the independent sovereign is now kept by a particular (ethnic, tribal, regional, religious, etc.) group/community.

As the communitarian critique of liberalism have noted, subjects of social contract thinking are not autonomous individuals but tied to their circumstances and social contexts (see for example Walzer 1983, MacIntyre 1984). In Africa, and in this instance, in Kenya, this is evident. The political reasoning is self-interested libertarianism that aims for the maximum and immediate personal benefits, but it is set in the communitarian or rather communalist social context in which traditional solidarity makes its demands to the immediate community of any individual, in any position. Due to the embeddedness of sovereign as well as its subjects, the legitimacy of the state tends to remain minimal and superficial. As long as the conflicts and inequality, greed and grievances, between the various groups and communities are not solved, sovereign can only rule by authoritarian means while simultaneously remaining (at least partly) a hostage to its own supporters. This means sovereign – and the state can never be fully impartial and non-partisan in distribution of the resources and powers. This leads to a vicious cycle of biased distribution of power and resources with persistent disparities. Vice versa, the voters remain dependent on 'the good will' of their leaders. Since sovereign is not impartial, the citizens need to guarantee their share by voting 'one of their own in power', even if they may realize he or she might not be 'the best choice for all'. Thus, conflicts are in-build in political authority. In an individualist context of Hobbesian model of social contact, individuals may overcome conflicts and constant war by surrendering some of their ‘unlimited natural rights’ under political control of the neutral sovereign. In the collectivist context of ‘libertarian communitarism’ individuals, including the sovereign cannot be considered as neutral. This means that since also the sovereign’s authority is seen - almost inherently - to be partial/partisan, it is more difficult to find an agreement on acceptable rulers. Thus, there is either quick rotation of power or the power is hold on by force and with 'dirty hands' tactics. 10 In such setting contractual agreement remains weak. Since it is the different (interdependent) groups - rather than autonomous individual citizens - that are represented in the government, the result is on an overwhelming pressure on whoever has the political authority. The ones in power tend to use all means available to guarantee continuity of the benefits to their supporting groups, rather than focus on national development and the public good for all - in the long run. Simultaneously the groups outside and without power are in constant ‘ethnic opposition’, just waiting for their chance to take over the power and turn the tables around. Again we see 'mockdemocracy at work'. Democratic processes provide the stage for the theater, but the real battles are fought and agreed on behind the scenes. People participation is used manipulatively - they are used to fight the real battles on the ground when political support is needed, or there has been need to show once might in front of the others, as the Kenyan situation has shown us once again. Simultaneously the political leaders and elites make their own deals with each other in a manner that will personally benefit them all most in any given circumstances. 11 This neo-Machiavellian realism in Kenyan - but also more widely elsewhere in African - post-colonial politics creates a vicious cycle of unjust and biased distribution that maintains fierce (often tribal/ethnic/regional) competition between the groups and political manipulation of ethnicity, which, for their part, accumulates

greed of the leaders and grievances of the ordinary citizens. Since the ‘central government’ tends to always be biased towards ‘its own’, distributional inequality and constant rivalry on public resources further fuels ethnic conflicts, clashes and other aggressions between the different groups. It also marginalizes the weaker groups and regions. Leaders for their part learn to believe they are above any ethical or moral demands – and in general the rule of law – when their actions are judged by the citizenry. They are often forgiven to strive for their personal profit if they meaintain at least some biased, solidarity towards their supporters – not matter how limited this may be. All in all, this allows 'Dirty Hands' politics that is the core of political realism and justifies the use even of unethical means to political gains. In practice the result tends to be a culture of impunity and leaders learn to ‘get a way with murder’ without having to take public responsibility, because their supporters from the same ethnic background think that this is the only way to protect their collective interest – since if there is a power shift, the new leaders would be forced to use the same means to guarantee their own support Prisoner’s dilemma in a collective context Liberal contractarian thinking relies on 'game theory' that is based on the assumption that everybody will always try to maximize his or her own good and benefits. This type of reasoning its complexity is easily in ‘liberal communitarianism’ in postcolonial Africa. When further analyzing Kenyan situation, the framework of Prisoner’s Dilemma comes useful. As Charles Khamala (2007) notes, a typical African context self-interested rationality is set in a collective context and this creates a different type of prisoner's dilemma scenario 12 . Individuals who act rationally to advance their own self-interest will together sacrifice individual autonomy for the greater good of their restricted communities. In Kenya each individual voter experiences a vicarious kinship relation with their elected members of parliament, and one tends to elect a clansman or relative to articulate or represent tribal or group interest at national forums. No competent candidate from a smaller tribe, community or clan is likely to emerge victorious, unless coalitions between the smaller tribes are made. The merits of the candidates' political ideology, agenda or programme remain of secondary interest at best and downright irrelevant at worst. This creates a political context in which ideologies or planning for comprehensive national political agenda becomes futile. While the ethnic/tribal criteria used to select the individual's best interests appear irrational from the perspective of Western individualistic voting theory, in the African electoral context a voter from a large tribe or clan lives well by not asking how his or her vote will provide the maximum impact to him(her)self but rather calculating how the tribal, group or collective interest might best be achieved by a tribalized leader. Voting patterns thus usually reflect candidates chosen from big tribes or regions who are considered more likely to advance the parochial rather than abstract, wider national interest. 13 Political coalitions are formed on the same principle, by bringing together tribes that cannot manage to get enough loyalty votes within their own ethnic support base, but need other smaller tribes to expand their scope of ethnic support. As a result, formal development polices are likely to be subordinated to demands of the

patronage politics of rewarding relatives or members of their own ethnic community with public resources in order to entrench, perpetuate and reproduce cultural patterns of historical injustices. (Khamala 2007, 9) Individual politicians may care almost exclusively for their own benefits, interests and power, but they can do this only when maintaining enough supportive from their communities. Inter-dependency has been created: people have to rely heavily even on the crooked leaders in order to guarantee some resources in the already biased distribution system. Making fully independent and autonomous decisions by either party becomes next to impossible. The result is a double hostage situation, in which also leaders remain dependent on their ethnic support and the electorate is left with very few serious choices. While all try to maximize their benefits, the end result is never the optimal one. 14 Anti-reform agenda In Kenya ‘The winner takes it all’ political system and the outdated constitution provide the executive absolute power and full control of public institutions including Parliament. While everyone recognizes the flaws of this system, the change is hard to come by and the reforms are usually done in piecemeal amendments. For example after 2002 elections which radical reflected political change after the times of former authoritarian presidents of Moi and Kenyatta, the new constitution was promised within 100 days. Five years later there is still no new constitution. After December 2007 post-election anarchy, the new power deal required amendment to constitution to created the post of Prime Minister and two deputies in order to pave way for the coalition government. The new constitution is now promised within a year, but the process has hardly started yet. Once the coalition government was formed and those yarning for power got their position, no one seems to be hurry to move ahead with any more radical changes. The fact that the constitutional amendment does not clearly define the mandates and the relationship between president, vice-president and prime minister, seem to be minor protocol inconvenience and embarrassment. Also ‘the first pass the post’ election is recipe for tension particularly in ethnically mixed areas. It tends to set ethnic groups against each other and political agendas become irrelevant. While Kenyans clearly wanted the change 15 , the legislation and the institutional set up forces the nation to remain divided along ethnic and socioeconomic lines. Therefore, the situation is difficult to cure within the existing legal and institutional framework that has been gradually (re) constructed by the selfish leaders to guarantee them absolute, sovereign power. Since ‘the opportunity often makes the thief’ the new leaders who might have during their 'opposition times' called for new constitution, more strict legislation and its more effective implementation, tend to forget these demands once in power. Even political agreement signed before the elections do not hold after it becomes clear who has de facto power. Thomas Hobbes’ observation that ‘Covenants without swords are but words’ fits in the Kenyan situation, Memorandums of Understanding of new power sharing deals agreed by all parties before the elections have been broken soon after the elections. Thus, political coalitions tend to be short-lived. This happened just when Mwai Kibaki was brought to power under National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in 2002 elections against the

former president Moi's long time ruling party KANU. The main split between the then coalition partners was due to Kibaki's side ignoring the Memorandum of Understanding that was signed during the campaigning. That MoU promised new constitution that would share executive powers; and Raila Odinga would be then appointed as the Prime Minister ruling 'together with' Kibaki - thus, giving the often rivaling ethnic groups Gikuyu and Lou and the rest more equal power shares. After the dispute on new constitution that would have given a chance to realize this power sharing plan, Kibaki and his inner circle disregarded the promises he had given to the other coalition members (and through them to their ethnic communities) and favored his own central Kenya region instead. This angered the rest of the nation and alienated the other ethnic groups increasing the already built up ethnic tensions and distrust. 16

At the moment the new grand coalition government formed after the post 2007 election crisis is really bloated (from 222 MPs now 94 altogether is in the government). This extravagance grandness of the coalition government is rationalized (though not really justified) with the demand of 'all inclusiveness'. Nevertheless, those who did not make it to the government are fiercely complaining to have been shortchanged and claim that their respective communities are sidelined in the process. However, if the government was really able to perform impartially, the number of ministries and whether all communities are presented with the same numbers would not be the issue - but rather how whoever occupies the office can deliver equally and adequately to all. Simultaneously this ‘all inclusiveness’ of the grand coalition government comes with grand expense. The grand coaltion cabinet is the largest ever in Kenya's history and will cost taxpayers a significant amount of money. 17 The real problem is then, that all the sub-national loyalties and the lack of shared visions and values preclude forward-looking solutions for impartial social justice that promotes public good and national unity. Instead, a nation remains divided with its people set up in competitive positions. There is no public trust in partisan and selfinterested governments or in inefficient state structures with often (ethnically and/or regionally) biased (re)distribution of resources, corruption, waste of public funds, and unequal service delivery. All in all, individualistic greed of the political elites and collectivistic grievances of the ordinary citizenry maintain distrust across the nation and focuses on past injustices rather than really working together for a shared agenda that could unite the nation and to strengthen the state. 18 How to find national agenda and shared values in the context of libertarian communitarism? The top-down power-sharing deals have detached peace-making and reconstruction processes from those involved in the conflict at the grass-root level. If the focus is merely on the political elites and not on the people whose lives were most affected by the hostilities, peace and harmony may be difficult to maintain. In Kenya after violence broke out, the first concerns was to enforce law and order even with very rough means by the security forces. In the meantime the outlawed militia and other similar outlawed organizations have gained foothold in dealing with grievances of their own ethnic communities. Since there is no public trust in political

or security institutions parallel systems develop and further weaken the authority of the state or government. The second action was to look for reconciliation by finding ‘ethnic balance’ by forming the new coalition government. However, as noted before, the political elites ended up disputed among themselves who deserves a place in government and on what basis, rather aggravating than calming the tensions. These quick fixes have not worked, when the real issues are in solving the long-term politico-economic disparities and other historical grievances, that is, in political and social justice. Thus, the legitimacy of the new coalition government remains weak; people are starting to see more and more clearly that the political elites do not seriously work for the unity of the nation with true concern for its people – or the truth, but for their own personal benefits. (On Kenyan post-election violence and it causes see Amani Forum, 2008) In Kenya the members of various communities in conflict demand for 'justice' in its various forms. However, the idea that justice promotes impartiality is not easily understood. Communitarian traditionalism sees that tolerating pluralist values, multiculturalism and ethnic heterogeneity in the form of peaceful co-existence and cooperation means not only full inclusiveness but also compensation of those who have been neglected, marginalized and whose rights violated in the past. While it is important to bring violence to an end and to establish order and security, both at a community and state level, it is as important to deal with the causes of the conflict. In Kenya the causes were in past injustices and thus, the solution for reconciliation have to include an element of ‘righting the wrongs’. The idea of impartiality in this context - particularly when it comes from ‘top-down’ - is seen as an other mockery of democracy that now asks people to accept an abstract principles of impartiality and leave their past behind as well as to encourage them to ingore their ethnic and communal identity - and social injustices and victimization that this very identity might have brought on them. This idea creates discontent when people expect injustice done to them to be acknowledged and admitted; maybe to be apologized and compensated. By people social justice in this situation is not seen as attempt to reach something as abstract as 'impartiality', but rather they see it as 'the quest for the truth'. 19 Thus, now in Kenya there are various civil society networks and movement like ‘Kenyans for Truth, Justice and Peace’ working just on this understanding of justice. Different organisations are investigating different types of violations and collecting the data to bring the Truth out in their reports. Also the African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities and the Kenyan mediation team recommended setting up various Commissions to deal with the issues of justice. Two of these commissions: Independent Review Commission (IREC) and Commision of Inquiry on Post-Election violence (CIPEV) are already working, while the Bill that is to set up The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) is still to be debated in the Parliament. IREC's mandate is to identify weaknesses in the electoral legislation and processes as well as to examine more generally what went wrong in the 2007 elections. CIPEV is investigating the post-election violence; its scope and circumstances, root causes. It also has been trying to identify those accountable for instigating and financing violence. IREC and CIPEV have had public hearings and have collected number of information and material. They are to will come up with

recommendations that should be implemented within the overall legislative, institutional and political reforms in order to avoid similar conflicts in the future. The fear of all is now, that these reports and recommendations of the commissions, like so many before, will not be taken seriously and will end up collecting dust on the shelves of the public offices. The work of all these commissions have also brought up into debate the question of amnesty. Should all those found guilty in any offences to be made accountable for their deeds. How would the already inefficient and corrupt courts deal with this situation? How can you punish the youth hired by politicians to cause havoc, intimitation and to engage in violence the same manner you should impose penalty on the politicians behind the plans; those who have manipulated the ethnic tensions for their own advantage or interests and have financed of the destruction. If people will learn the truth, will and should they forgive? How can the victims be compensated? By seeing the sculptrits punished or by amends from the Government. While finding out the truth about the past injustices is important, focusing merely on backwardlooking concept of justice can also be problematic if sustainable peace and coexistence is to be achieved. In Kenya, historically biased and unequal distribution of resources and consequent socio-economic disparities (and particularly the injustices related to the ownership and allocation of land) are obvious, but now it is next to impossible to undo all the earlier wrongs in a manner that does not punish also the innocent. Neither will it be easy to find a way to settle the demands of collective and community rights against those of individuals, particularly in the land ownership. Internally displaced people are of particular concern in this context. Therefore, hand in hand with finding out 'the truth', has to come a plan for forward looking distributive justice and the rule of law that will treat the citizenry impartially and equally. While there should not be universal amnesty of the wrong doers, even impunity for corruption and the organization of political violence will be are easier to deal with once there are shared values and a united concept of how 'Justice' should work in the future. The problem with backward looking concept of justice is particularly evident in the communitarian context. It is important to be aware of our communal ties and their role in the wider social and political context and in relation to the causes - as well as also solutions to the conflict. At the same time, we should also be aware that the communitarian emphasis on group rights and cultural rights tends to create moral justification that allows suppression of individual rights either in the name of the common good or in the name of cultural identity. It also creates loop-holes in new constitutions and legislative arrangements that legalize violations of individual rights in the future. 20 In Kenya individuals tend to be more loyal to their ethnic and other close communities than to the government or state as an institution. It is difficult to get people to be committed to even newly constructed political order, if they continue to identify themselves through their communities and national unity and identity as selfgoverning members of a democratic society, is only secondary. 21 The challenge is to find a national agenda and shared values that will take the people forward together.

In Kenyan discussion on ‘majimboism’, i.e., the Kenyan form of federalism, based on regional self-governance, ethnicity and ethnic discrimination become central. Decentralization of government was understood to lead into ethnic divisions, in which different ethnic groups would get certain parts of the country to govern. In other words the federalism was soon to be ethnically based, rather than mere decentralization of decision-power and the use of public resources. Collective rights tend to take over individual rights and thus, the tensions continue. Feminist critique and gender in post-conflict reconstruction

The top down social contract approach also tends to ignore social context and grassroot concerns. In addition to this, it also easily disregards gender inequality. Women have theoretically as well as in practice been marginalized in political life, and violations of women’s rights are often ignored or belittled. 22 In Kenya this is also the case, and in general women are the one that suffer the most in and from conflicts. This happens even during the times that the conflicts were not yet fullblown violence, but appeared in the form of disparities and structural injustice. In libertarian communitarist context, women do not have a serious place in political scenery. They can and are used in political games, but in the end they tend to remain in the loosing end. Women are in double jepardy; their rights are often violated due to their gender and due to their ethnicity, political opinion, or social status. (See for example Zuckerman and Greenberg 2004). The paradox is that in introducing gender equality as a part of the pack of peace agreement, women’s situation in society may in fact deteriorate rather than improve. Women’s rights might be ‘justifiable’ suppressed in the name of the common good of their own community, or traditional values. The attempts to introduce or support gender-mainstreaming might even lead into (violent) resistance by traditional societies (and this resistance might include women with traditional view on their own gender-based role). In Kenya the role of women tends to be undermined with the ethnic concerns – while there is now more women in parliament than before 23 , the leadership is still firmly in the hands of men. Women are also used by the ethnically based political parties – to do 'the dirty job' or collect the ethnic and maybe also some female support, though many women still do no vote for women. If you want the job you need to be loyal – not to 'your sisters', but to your masters in the political gameplans. Rebels often find their careers gone. The leaders with their own personal interest sometime may present an argument that in a post-conflict situation ‘justice’ has to be introduced step by step; by keeping the gender dimension for a later date, after national-level violence is reduced and national unity is achieved. This creates a yielding duty to gender equality. Impartiality and justice, however, cannot be introduced in a partial fashion. If the reconstruction of the society is to be based on justice, all types of structural violence should be taken into account. Failing to do so prevent comprehensive reform and building for forward looking concept and practice of justice. Women’s rights should not be based on demands that ask ‘gender equality’ to wait until other types, more pressing and somehow more important aspects of justice are realized. In practice in many places this has led into a situation in which all other constitutional rights and freedoms come first and gender equality yielding for ‘religious freedom’, ‘freedom of negotiation’,

‘freedom of association’, ‘freedom of expression’ and/or ethnic inclusion. This means that the realization of all these rights and freedoms requires that the promotion of women’s equal rights can be set aside – if their promotion would offend religious minorities, cultural traditions, etc. Women’s rights and gender equality then has to thus, yield in front of other ‘human rights’ – and to wait for a more suitable and less explosive time to be introduced to the post-conflict society. This cannot provide for inclusion of the disadvantaged, full impartiality and respect for the rule of law in general. We need to focus on the human potential and human capabilities that are to be realized – even, and particularly, in the situation in which some groups appear less advantaged than others. 24 (Keating and Knight 2004, Nakaya 2004, 145). If we paid more attention to the struggles of women, and to the feminist critique pointing out this, we could learn learn that the concept of justice post-conflict societies are striving for has much wider scope that is often recognized. Justice means admitting as well as correcting structural injustices – whether these social, cultural, ethnic, institutional, or political. Feminist approaches to peace note that the traditional social contract thinking focuses on ‘negative peace’, that is, the absence of violence and warfare, while, as Betty Reardon (1996) describes, the feminist conception of peace and security focuses more on ‘positive peace’. ‘Positive peace’ is a concept presented originally by Johan Galtung (1975) means an absence of structural violence, which is much more than merely a laying down of arms. Structural violence involves exploitation, penetration of the autonomy of those at the bottom of society, fragmentation and marginalization. The way in which power relations – including gender – are configured at the end of any conflict will affect post-conflict reconstruction and the likelihood of sustainable peace, impartiality and participation in making and realising really inclusive social contract. 25 In Kenya, the quest for ‘positive peace’ would mean that we need to understand how and why certain communities (ethnic, women, religious, etc.) have been marginalized, and to whose advantage. In other words, it actually explains 'the Truth' in the quest for justice. However, it also insist that we recognize that this marginalization is in reality not based on certain characteristics of certain communities or individual, or due a lack some other characteristics that is used to claim that they do not have ‘leadership qualities’, but rather that there has been a plot to keep the power among particular individuals and their communities (as long as these support directly their individual leaders). As women have been prevented from their share of leadership and power on the excuse of their ‘gender based character', that is claimed to be less rational, less autonomous, less decisive – some ethnic communities are similarly set outside the power, by similar rationalizations. Like gender, ethnicity is not one’s chosen attribute and should not be used as a basis for any inequalities. However, in Kenyan power games both are ruthlessly manipulated for political purposes. In many sense this shows that nothing has learnt since the colonial rule that was basing power on racial differences. Now the same structural injustices are locally, ethnically based. If we do not recognize the problems in gender equality pointed out by the feminists, we may never acknowledge other structural injustices that keep power sharing biased and democracy only illusionary. Power games are usually about individuls’ selfish ambitions - and those who know how to play them know also how to keep others away from power: almost as a natural order of things. In some sense, libertarian communitarism has integrated in itself the negative sides of both individualistic

libertarism as well as collectivist communitarism. Self-interest appears to be the main driving force, and communities are used and manipulated by individual leaders to maintain power. Conclusion I have argued that in Kenya, as well as elsewhere in post-colonial Africa, when new social contracts are made as a remedy for social unrest and conflict, it is essential we need to understand the various aspects of the concept of justice they embrace. The expectations of the people who may have very different understanding of what is meant by ‘justice’ promised by the politicians. If African countries have not learnt from their colonial past in relations to the issues of impartiality, equality and continue supress their own, sustainable peace is difficult to reach. The focus has to be in working on structural inequalities and on 'positive peace', this requires both institutional reforms and new attitudes and commitment to public ethics as well as fight against corruption. In order to overcome the existing structural injustices and in order to give people ownership in reconstructing impartial framework for justice, there is a need to pay more attention to the bottom-up approach to peace-building that can foster a climate of interrelated understanding between the ethnic, cultural and religious divides from which violence has stemmed in the past. This can reduce the tendency to identify ‘the evil other’, which shaped the consciousness of many communities and nations, and has damage peaceful coexistence. In other words, instead of falling into communitarian nationalism and further fragmentation of society, the bottom-up approach dealing with structural injustice could build on cultural traditions, existing networks, and the participation of the communities, parties interested in promoting peace, work to establish new relationships to promote reconciliation and understanding within and between communities in order to realize human potential and capabilities equally and for all. Bibliography: Addison, T. and Murshed, S.M. (2001). From Conflict to Reconstruction: Reviving the Social Contract. UNU/WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2001/48. Addison, T. and Murshed, S.M.(2003). Explaining Violent Conflict: Going Beyond Greed versus Grievance. UNU/WIDER Special Issue on Conflict, Journal of International Development, 15: 391-396. Afshar, H. and Eade, D. (eds.)(2004). Development, Women and War. Feminist Perspectives. A Development in Practice Reader. Oxford: Information Press, Oxfam. Ahluwalia, P. (2001). Politics and Post-Colonial Theory. African Inflections. Routledge, London and New York, 2001.

Amani Forum (2008). Regional Parliamentarians Fact-Finding Mission to Kenya on the Post-Election Violence. The Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace/Amani, Nairobi. Barry, B. (1999). ‘Statism and nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique’ in Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer (eds.) Global Justice, Nomos XLI. New York University Press, new York and London. Bellamy, A. (2004). ‘Ethics and Intervention: the Humanitarian Exception and the Problem of Abuse in the Case of Iraq’, Journal of Peace Studies, 41:2, 2004: 131-147. Belliotti, R. (1995) ‘Are all Modern Wars Morally Wrong?’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 26:2, Fall 1995: 17-31. Burton, J. (1993) Conflict: Resolution and Prevention. London: St. Martins Press. Coady, C.A.J. (1991). ‘Politics and the Problem of Dirty Hands’ in P.Singer (ed.) A Companion to Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. Eade, D. (2004) ‘Part Two: Introduction: Peace and reconstruction. Agency and agencies’ in H. Afshar, and D. Eade (eds.). Development, Women and War. Feminist Perspectives. A Development in Practice Reader. Oxford: Information Press, Oxfam. Elworthy, S. (2004) ‘The Prevention and Resolution of Conflict using Non-violent methods’, in P. Direct (ed.) Unarmed Heroes: The Courage to go Beyond Violence, forest Road: Clairview. Galtung, J. (1995). Peace: Research, Education, Action. Oslo: Pandora Press. Gourevitch, C. (2003). ‘We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families’: Stories from Rwanda. Oxford: Picador. Hagg, G, and Kabwanja, P. (2007). ‘Identity and Peace: Reconfiguring Conflict Resolution in Africa’, in African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Special Issue on Identity and Cultural Diversity in Africa, Vol. 7, No. 2: 9-35. Hampshire, S. (1978). ‘Morality and Pessimism’ in S. Hampshire (ed.) Public and Private Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hellsten, S. (2004). ‘Human rights in Africa: from Communitarian Values to Utilitarian Practice’, Human Rights Review, Vol. 5:2, January-March 2004: 61-85. Human Rights Watch (2008). Ballots to Bullets. Organized Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance. Nairobi. International Crisis Group (ICG) (2008). Kenya in Crisis. Africa Report no. 137, 21.2.2008, Nairobi. Ivision, D. (2002). Postcolonial Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jones, Charles (1999).’Patriotism, Morality and Global Justice’ in Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer (eds.) Global Justice, Nomos XLI. New York University Press, new York and London. Kagan, R. (2002). ‘Multilateralism, American Style’, The Washington Post, September 13, 2002. Keating, T. and Knight, A. (eds.)(2001). Building Sustainable Peace. Tokyo: United Nations University Press and Alberta, Canada: Alberta Press. Kiai, Maina (2008). 'Crisis in Kenya: What lessons for Democracy?' Keynote Address at The World Movement for Democracy 5th Assembly with theme 'Making Democracy Work: From Principles to Performance', Kiev, Ukraine, 6-9.4.2008. MacMahan, J. (2001) ‘War and Peace’ in J. Sterba (ed.) Morality in Practice, 6th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Thompson Learning. Miller, David (1997). On nationality. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Moghadam, Valentine (1994)(ed.). Women and National Identity. Women and Politics in Muslim Societies. UNU/WIDER by Zed Books, London and Oxford University Press, Karachi. Moller Okin, Susan (1999). Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Princeton University Press, Princeton. Murshed, S.M. (2002). Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment: An Introduction’, Journal of Peace Research, 39:4: 387-393. Nhema, A. (2004)(ed.). The Quest for Peace in Africa. Transformations, Democracy and Pubic Policy. Addis Ababa: OSSREA, International Books. Nkrumah, K (1970). Consciencism, Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization and Development with Particular Reference to the African Revolution, London: Panaf Books. Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Basic Books, New York. Nussbaum, Martha (1987). Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on political distribution. WIDER Working Paper 31, Helsinki: UNU/WIDER. Nussbaum, Martha (1992). "Human Functioning and Social Justice. In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism", Political Theory, Vol. 20 No. 2: 202 - 246. Nussbaum, Martha (1993). "Non-Relative virtues: An Aristotelian Approach" in the Quality of Life (eds. Nussbaum & Sen). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Nyerere, J. (1967). Freedom and Unity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Potter, A. (2004). The Rule of Law as the Measure of Peace? Responsive policy for reconstructing Justice and the Rule of law in Post-conflict and transitional

Environments. A paper presented at UNU-WIDER Conference: Making Peace Work, June 4-5, 2004, Helsinki, Finland. Reardon, B. (1996). ‘Women’s visions of Peace: Images of Global Security’ in J. Turpin and L.A.Lorentzen (eds.)The Gendered new World Order: Militarism, Development and the Environment. London and New York: Routledge. Roche, D. (2004). ‘Foreword’ in T. Keating and A. Knight (eds.)(2001). Building Sustainable Peace. Tokyo: United Nations University Press and Alberta, Canada: Alberta Press. Sen, Amartya (1985). Commodities and Capabilities, Amsterdam: North-Holland. Sen, Amartya (1990). "Justice: Means versus Freedoms”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol 19, No 2: 11 - 121. Sen, Amartya (1992). Inequality Reexamined. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Sen Amartya (1993). "Capability and Well-Being" in the Quality of Life (eds. Nussbaum and Sen). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Sen, Amartya (1999). Development as Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Skjeie, H. (1998). ‘Quatas, Parity, and the Discursive Dangers of Difference’ in J. Klause and C. Meyer (eds.) Has Liberalism Failed Women? New York: Palgrave. Sterba, J. (2001). ‘Reconciling Pacifist and Just War Theories’ in J. Sterba (ed.) Morality in Practice, 6th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Thompson Learning. Walzer, Michael (1983). Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books. Walzer, Michael (1980). The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1980): 209-25 Yannis, A. (2003). ‘State Collapse and its Implication for Peace-Building and Reconstruction’ in J. Milliken (ed.) State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction. Oxford: Blackwell. Zuckenman, Elaine and Greenberg, Marchia (2004). ‘The Gender Dimension of PostConflict Reconstruction: An Analytical Framework for Policymakers’, Gender and Development, Oxfam Journal, vol. 12:No.3, 2004.

1

Few dispute that the election was fraudulent. European Union, Commonwealth, Kenyan elections monitors and other observers reported many anomalities and irregularities: unusually high voter turn out, lack of access to voting centers, names missing from the registers, questionable voting hours, party agents disappeared, and the Electoral Commission of Kenya showing signs of manipulating the results. 2 Kenya gained its independe 1964 from the British colonial rule.

3

President Mwai Kibaki was re-elected in the December 2007 general elections, but few dispute that particularly the presidential the election was fraudulent. European Union, Commonwealth, Kenyan elections monitors and other observers reported many anomalities and irregularities: unusually high voter turn out, lack of access to voting centers, names missing from the registers, questionable voting hours, party agents disappeared, and the Electoral Commission of Kenya showing signs of manipulating the results. 4 The largest group is Gikuyu, with 21 percent of the population, followed by Luo with 15 percent, Luhya (14 percent), Kalenjin (11 percent), Kamba (11 percent), Kisii (6 percent), and Meru (6 percent). Smaller groups include the Embu, Maasai, Mijikenda, Samburu, Somali, Taita, Teso, Turkana, and others. About one percent of the population consists of Europeans, Asians, and Arabs. 5 After the violence that followed the announcement of the results of the presidential elections, African Union eminent persons panel led by former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan was invited to mediate between the former ruling party/coalition PNU and the opposition of ODM. Political power sharing agreement was reached between Kibaki and Odinga on 28.2.2008 that made room for the creation of Prime Minister's and two Deputy Prime Ministers' Positions. The bloated coalition government of 42 ministers and 52 assistant ministers (out of 212 MPs) was sworn in 17.4. 6 After the 2007 election crisis, even after the peace deal was finally agreed on, divisions between the political elites remain and both sides - or rather particular ethnic communities - claim to be shortchanged within their political coalitions and by their own leaders. The debates are still tangled around the questions of who is in and who is left out. In Kenya, after the historical signing of the national accord between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga in February 2008, the stalemate on agreeing on how to share the ministerial portfolios was immediate. Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) and Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) found it hard to share political power and cabinet posts equally. While the Kofi Annan mediation process suggested 50-50% power deal, no one is willing to give up already ‘gained’ positions or to settle with cabinet posts that are considered to be less prestige and with smaller budgets. Instead of focusing on the distributional issues and social justice that could heal, unite and reconcile the country, the different sides continued to argue about individual cabinet positions on the basis that the new cabinet would have to reflect ethnic, regional, gender and other group related balance. 7 During the 2007 Election campaigning, negative ethnicity and hate speech played significant role. There was, for example, text message campaign against ODM Raila Odinga in which people were warned not to vote him since he comes from Luo tribe, is uncircumcised and thus, does not have the leadership 'qualities'/is not fit to lead the nation. 8 And since the political parties are not based on ideologies, but rather used as vehicles for one’s own ambitions, individuals leap from one party to another easily. The choice of one’s party is based on individual’s evaluation on what he or she can personally gain from different networks of power and reciprocal favors. Since politics is personalized, the supporters have to follow their candidate to his or her new party. In Kenya political parties are for sale, for trade, and for exchange. They are coming up like mushrooms. We could talk now about ‘multiplying party politics’ rather than multiparty politics, since there are over two hundred registered political parties in Kenya. Many of the original parties having split (due to personal rather than ideological differences) and reformed like cells - with almost the same names with very little difference in their political views as such: for example Ford (Forum for Restoration of Democracy) has divided into Ford-Kenya, Ford-Asili, Ford-People. Similarly there is NARC and Narc-K, ODM and ODM-K, etc. 9

On Hobbesian original Social Contract framework, see Hobbes 1996. On theoretical critique and practical problems of individualism in the African post-colonial context see for example Hellsten 2004, Ivison 2002. 11 Dirty Hands concept in governance mean acceptance of the use of means that might be considered otherwise unethical, when needed to reach certain political goals. More on Dirty Hands in political ethics - and the conflict between idealistic and realistic political ethics, see Winston 1994. 10

12

Prisoner's dilemma is in the area of game theory and describes a situation where local optimization leads to the worst possible outcome globally: Two prisoners are questioned separately about a crime they committed. Each may give evidence against the other or may say nothing. If both say nothing, they get a minor reprimand and go free because of lack of evidence. If one gives evidence and the other says nothing, the first goes free and the second is severely punished. If both give evidence, both are severely punished. The overall (globally) best strategy is for both to say nothing. However not knowing

(or trusting) what the other will do, each prisoner's (locally) best strategy is to give evidence, which is the worst possible outcome. 13 Since there is an exception to every rule, it is interesting to compare Kenyan and Tanzanian situation. While in Kenya the candidates for rulers have been from the bigger ethnic groups, in Tanzania - after the socialist experience the opposite has been the practice. The presidential candidates have been elected from the smaller tribes, in order for them to be forced to think for the national good and in order not to give them a chance to be too much under pressure from their own ethnic supporters. Tanzanian experience, in fact, gives an interesting example also to Kenya on how to balance the powers in multiethnic communities. 14 Libertarian framework in inherently realistic in its nature, while traditional communitarian framework is more idealistic, looking for the perfect community - whether in history or in hypothetical context, like Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa (1968) ideology. In the libertarian communitarian scheme, things appear to be turned around. Communitarian solidarity, however biased, is the reality and the ideal is the profit maximization. Those who cannot make a win in political position are seen to be somewhat less rational. Communitarian solidarity mixed of with individualist self-interest has created powerful social and ethnic networks also in Kenyan politics. When cooperation between these networks fails, the result is open conflict, as the post-election crisis has regrettably shown. This is because these networks further enforce ‘libertarian communitarianism’ by aiming towards personal benefits and limited communal advantage rather than the common good of all citizens. Simultaneously, the power and political future of the leaders and others competing for public offices now depends on the support of these networks. 15 The demand for change was evident when people voted old decision-makers out. 70% of the MPs were changed. 16 Hobbes in Leviathan (1651: chapter 17) ‘Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a Commonwealth’ explains why and how individuals join together in civil states (or commonwealths in his terms): For the laws of nature, as justice, equality, modesty, mercy, and in sum, doing to others as we would have done to, of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants, without the swords, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. 17 at least Kshs. 352 billion a year (about EU 3.52 billion). The 2007/2008 budget envisaged 34 ministries at a cost of Kshs. 299.6 billion (an average of Kshs. 8.8 billion per ministry). Forty cabinet ministers and assistant ministers would therefore cost Kshs. 1.06 billion which amounts to about USD 2.5 million per year in salaries alone. The cost of a prime minister, two deputy prime ministers and forty permanent secretaries would escalate the wage bill further. 18 While this article focuses on the Kenyan situation, it is evident that similar politico-economic context libertarian communitarianism can be found elsewhere in Africa. Various African scholars and political activists from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana have noted that they have recognized similar tendencies in their countries after discussions with the author. 19 On impartiality as the basis of social contract see Burton 1993, Gourevitch 2000, Rawls 1971, 1993. Walzer 1980. 20 In many newly independent post-colonial countries the constitutions contain both individual and collective rights thus, leaving room for the leaders to use the law to justify the violation of individual rights in the name of national security or in the name of cultural rights. See Hellsten 2004. 21 On the post-colonial critique of the Western liberal approach and on African concept of ‘communalist’ democracy see for instance Ahluwalia 2001, Nkrumah 1970, Nyerere 1967 22 Violence against women is not just a by product of war, but often a deliberate military strategy, with women particularly targeted in ethnic cleaning campaigns, as occurred in current genocides in Bosnia and in Rwanda, for example. 23 In 2007 elections 15 women got elected and 5 nominated to the parliament of 222 MPS, in 2002 elections only 10 got elected and nominated. 24 On the metaphor of ‘yielding duty of equality’ see for instance Skjeie 1998. 25 Many of the countries experiencing actual or latent conflicts have never experienced ‘development’ in the sense of social justice, Democratic Republic of Congo being a prime example of such situation. Societies in these countries cannot return to ‘democracy’ with the help of a social contract, because democratic institutions need to be grounded in local realities and in order to be fully participatory must evolve over time and cannot be merely set from above. However, external agencies involved in peacemaking and reconstruction tend to focus not on local capacities but on their own interventions (what can they do to prevent conflict and enhance development as they see it). In many cases these agencies

do not appreciate the impact that the role of gender relations has on ‘the ability of traumatized, poor, and ill-educated populations to play their full role in the post-conflict reconstruction’.