literature on good governance reform in the 49 countries classed as low ...
evidence of service delivery in the wake of public administration reform in
Ethiopia.
Cover Sheet
Flying Blind? Evidence for good governance public management reform agendas, implementation and outcomes in low income countries Shaun Goldfinch Nottingham University Business School Nottingham, NG81BB, UK Email:
[email protected] Karl DeRouen, Jr. The University of Alabama Department of Political Science Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 USA Paulina Pospieszna Guelph University Germany
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Title Page Flying Blind? Evidence for good governance public management reform agendas, implementation and outcomes in low income countries Shaun Goldfinch Nottingham University Business School Nottingham, NG81BB, UK Karl DeRouen, Jr. The University of Alabama Department of Political Science Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 USA Paulina Pospieszna Guelph University Germany ABSTRACT While considerable resources and attention has been allocated to recent ‘good governance’ public administration reform in low income and fragile states, there is little evidence as to what degree this agenda has been implemented, nor if it has led to improved services and outcomes for populations. We conduct a review of the large but almost entirely qualitative literature on good governance reform in the 49 countries classed as low income by the United Nations (2010). Our literature search reveals that only a small number of articles actually link good governance public sector reform agenda with implementation. Fewer still assess outcome. We then conductd our own empirical analysis of the relationship between reform agenda (using data from the literature review), implementation, service delivery and outcomes. There is little, if any, empirical evidence for that reform enhancing enhances service delivery.
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Flying Blind? Evidence for good governance public management reform agendas, implementation and outcomes in low income countries
While considerable resources and attention has been allocated to recent ‘good governance’ public administration reform in low income and fragile states, there is little evidence to what degree this agenda has been implemented, nor if it has led to improved services and outcomes for populations. Indeed, in some public management and public administration literature, ‘success’ is simply the degree to which states have introduced, or claimed to introduce, the current package of ‘correct’ public management reforms (cf. Sarker 2006). That is, to some extent reform success is conflated with the adoption of reform agendas and rhetoric. Evidence is often lacking on the implementation of reforms. Evidence is also lacking on improved services or outcomes seen as encouraged through public administration reform and implementation of these reform agendas.
There is a growing literature on the importance of evidence based assessment for public administration, to which this paper seeks to contribute. As Khagram and Thomas (2010) argue, there are two, albeit possibly complimentary, ‘gold standards’ in evidence based assessments. First one based on ‘experimental methods and counterfactuals’ (Khagram and Thomas 2010: S100). Second, ‘a standard that emphasises case studies, comparative methods, and triangulation’ (Khagram and Thomas 2010: S100), which may includes both statistical/quantitative and qualitative methods. The field of study we are engaged in is not conducive to double blind tests and experimental methods, and as such this study sits within the second ‘gold standard’. We also attempt to address a tension between drawing general conclusions on administrative reform to inform policy making generally, particularly at the international agency level, while drawing on the largely qualitative and case-based studies of
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development management. As such, we may sacrifice some contextual richness for the drawing of broad conclusions and general heuristics.
However, in any event, the qualitative literature we discovered is often deficient in addressing our central research questions, even for the often single or few countries addressed. For example, Hope (2001) explores the relationship between the New Public Management (NPM) reform and service delivery in Botswana and Ghana, which in any event are not categorised as LICs. He concludes NPM reform helps service delivery. However, no real evidence is provided beyond a claim of increased macroeconomic performance, with little attempt to link this success to NPM, and with anecdotal evidence at best. Kjaer’s (2004) study of civil service reform in Africa conflates reform success with implementation success, while ignoring service delivery outcomes. Mengesha and Common (2007) attempt to provide evidence of service delivery in the wake of public administration reform in Ethiopia. However, a management fad, Business Process Re-engineering is used to represent NPM, and as such is not a general survey of reform. Success in terms of increased speed of processes and delivery, largely as measured in terms of administrative and regulatory functions is discovered. Broader notions of service delivery such as poverty reduction or other development measures are not considered. In sum, in-depth case studies that address our research questions are lacking in general for developing states, while lack of studies of some LICs is pronounced. As such, the method we use in this study, including the reassembling of varying accounts of reform into broad indicators - albeit one summarised in numbers - is an attempt to provide some synthesis and fill in the gaps, and add perhaps some richness that might otherwise not exist. Our use of multiple sources allows for some triangulation.
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To inform evidence based policy in public administration reform, further conceptual clarification and empirical work is needed. If agendas and implementation are often conflated, reform itself should only be a means to an end, useful if better outcomes are generated for the population at large. As the World Bank notes Civil service reform must be justified to policy makers and the public by their impact on poverty and on the effectiveness of government – either directly in terms of service delivery, or indirectly though their impact on macroeconomic stability or improved economic and social policy formulation and implementation (World Bank 2002: 3).
As such, there are three important issues to address when examining public administration reform: 1. Reform agendas: What is planned or claimed to be done, and what rhetoric on reform exists in policy announcements, statements of intents and speeches and government documents? 2. Reform implementation: To what extent have reforms been put into practice in the field and to what extent they have moved from rhetoric and intent to be reflected in design and action? 3. Outcomes of reform: To what extent have the reforms resulted in improved services or delivered better outcomes? In particular, for low income states we look at performance on a number of development indicators.
To address this lacuna on the relationship between reform agenda, implementation, and outcomes, we conduct a review of the large but almost entirely qualitative literature on good governance reform in the 49 countries classed as low income by the United Nations (2010). We find only a small number of articles link good governance public sector reform agenda with implementation. Fewer still assess outcome. We find enough evidence of ‘good governance’ policy rhetoric to allow us to develop a ‘good governance’ agenda measure. Due to a lack or mixed quality of evidence of implementation in the existing literature 5
however, we derive proxy measures of good governance implementation by drawing on a series of World Bank indicators. Outcomes are assessed by drawing on Millennium Development Goals (MDG) data. We find the link between public sector reform agenda, implementation and improved outcomes is weak at best. Strikingly, for a number of states, data is missing on even such key indicators as poverty. Indeed, a key finding of our study is perhaps the lack of suitable data.
In an environment where the efficacy of aid is increasingly questioned – indeed where aid has been associated with no or negative economic growth, the maintenance of highly oppressive regimes and other aspects of state instability (Doucouliagos and Paldam 2010; Djankov et al 2008; Human Rights Watch 2010), and where development programs themselves are under question - this study raises further cautions regarding spending on programmes of uncertain benefit. It raises cautions to the continued confusion of stated reform agendas by governments perhaps keen to attract foreign aid and loans, to the actual implementation of such agendas. It suggests considerable work is needed to establish further to what extent, if any, public management reform assists development, or if reforms are indeed being carried out for some states.
Public Management Reform Inin Low-Income States
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Public sector reform in low income states has generally reflected developments in the rich North, as least rhetorically. Bureaucratic models of various forms were left by retreating Empires in the post-war era, before being supplanted by New Public Management (NPM) agendas in the 1980s and 1990s, albeit with highly variable evidence of actual implementation and success (Goldfinch 2009; Wallis and Dollery 2001).1
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NPM included the following, situated within the overarching adoption of putative private sector mechanisms:
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New public management in turn began to be supplanted by the so-called ‘Good Governance’ agenda in the late 1990s, particularly as promulgated by international organizations. If NPM was partly a response to failings seen as inherent in the bureaucratic model, to some extent the Good Governance (GG) agenda is an attempt to address some of the problems, or fill some of the gaps, of the NPM agenda (Argyriades 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Doornbos 2003; Roy 2008). Whereas an underpinning strand to NPM sees a minimal state as ideal, an underpinning logic of the Good Governance (GG) agenda is to strengthen the capacity and institutions of the state – a good and effective state rather than simply a smaller one (Goldsmith 1999). NPM and related neoliberal economic restructuring was often associated with building some neoliberal institutions such as the protection of property rights, and as such shares GG’s focus on institution building (Doornbos 2003; Krever 2011). However, where GG departs from NPM is this broader focus on making the state more effective. This may mean increasing its resources, refocusing on the training and merit of civil servants; but also making it more responsive to society, including building transparency, participation and democracy. A key element was a re-found interest in the role of corruption in state performance from international organizations, with a large and growing body of research finding corruption to be a leading cause of under-development (Bose et al, 2008).
The GG agenda as it related to public administration reform could be seen as encompassing several elements, within an overarching focus on building state capacity, as follows: • • • • •
A focus on efficiency and doing ‘more with less’; A move to ‘outputs’, outcomes or results reporting; Decentralised structures with smaller, multiple and often single purpose agencies; Motivation based on financial incentives; Marketization, including contractualism, privatization and customer focus (Goldfinch and Wallis, 2010; Wallis and Dollery, 2001).
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1. A focus on training and developing the expertise and competency of the public service, including increasing merit based recruitment, longer term employment and an emphasis on ethical and values training. To an extent this was a reaffirmation of notions of the civil service as a profession, with the ‘managerialism’ of more simplistic versions NPM being abrogated and language shifting to ‘leadership’. It also meant the apparent jettison of notions of public servants primarily motivated by pecuniary and opportunistic motives, with broader motivations seen as important. 2. A focus on developing anti-corruption mechanisms, including various ostensibly independent anti-corruption agencies, with an array of powers, including investigatory and powers of indictment. Reflecting the renewed international focus on moral probity, particularly from aid donors, various mechanisms were established and pronouncements were made to combat corruption. 3. Policy and administrative participation. Public choice derived models of NPM generally saw civil society groups as vested and/or rent seeking interests seeking to control policy decision making for their own ends. In contrast, GG models saw a key role for civil society in developing and implementing policy. Participation was seen to increase the responsiveness of the government to societal demands, face scrutiny for its actions and so provide an incentive for better performance, and also allow it to draw on the resources and capacity of civil society. Participation was also seen have positive effects on the population itself, developing greater capacity, political engagement, independence and self-reliance. There was also a strong link to the overall democracy agenda underpinning the GG agenda, where a broader notion of participatory democracy and an engaged citizenship was being promulgated. 4. Budgetary transparency and accountability mechanisms. A government that is incompetent and corrupt prefers its actions to be unseen, particularly if it is able to 8
control oil or other resources for the benefits of its members and cronies. As such, a particular focus of aid agencies has been the development of fiscal transparency mechanisms, audit office, ombudsmen, and other apparatus that much of the West takes for granted. Such mechanisms were seen to provide encouragement towards more responsible use of resources, as well as providing support for other controls on lapses of moral probity, as well as methods of sanction. 5. State capacity. If the market and minimal state is the over-arching logic of NPM, building state capacity is a key organising principle of GG. Aspects of GG such as training public servants, corruption and accountability regimes and so on are about building a more effective state. However increasing, and accounting, for physical assets, tax revenue streams and other aspects often taken for granted in developed states, is also a key aspect of state capacity building (Argyriades 2006; Brinkerhoff 2005; Doornbos 2003; Roy 2008).
We use this 5 point schema for coding reform, as below.
Research Design
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Methods This study focuses on the impact of good governance reform on service delivery in LICs. Data was generated by reviewing and coding the extant literature on the subject. This included primary sources such as newspapers and government reports, as well as secondary published sources. We are loosely inspired by the ‘systematic review’ methods used by some policy makers and by some academics in health fields (cf Bigham et al 2011) albeit with considerable adaption and departure, appropriate to the field of study and data sources and their limitations. As such, this study uses what are broadly termed ‘mixed methods’, within
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the ambit of informing evidence based policy (Khagram and Thomas 2010). A team of three was involved in generating and coding documents.
To generate our body of documents, keywords and the names of the 49 LICs, as defined by the United Nations (2010), were entered in a number of seven standard online databases.2 Depending on searching options, which can vary across databases, key terms were searched in titles, topics, abstracts, or in-text. The top ten journals ranked by impact factor by the Web of Science in public administration, and likewise in development, were searched manually. UN and World Bank online archives were searched manually. Leading authorities were asked to nominate important publications, and some documents were also recommended by commentators on earlier versions of this study. Documents produced 1990 and after were included. Studies were examined in English and German, and French in the case of UN documents manually searched. No relevant German studies were discovered.
Initially, 21,683 records were discovered. Records were excluded based on subject areas, title, date published, and prima facie quality. Records were also excluded if they were non-text records, such as video, visual materials. Records were excluded if the database did not offer a full text record. This excluded 20,887 documents. Refereed publication, scholarly dissertations, conference proceedings, publication in a recognised non-academic forum such as a newspaper, ISBN number, or source from a reputable website/institutional (such as the UN or World Bank) database were taken as prima facie evidence of reliability. Studies were excluded if their quality and/or veracity was questionable, such as a number of un-refereed websites and documents from potentially unreliable sources.
2
Databases searched were Proquest, Web of Knowledge, Academic OneFile, Academic Search Premier, JSTOR, WorldCat and Google Scholar. Keywords used included “Public Administration”, “Public Management”, “Civil Service”, “Government Management”, “Public Sector”, “State Sector”, and “Good Governance” in developing countries, and the names of the 49 LICs.
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The abstracts (if they existed, otherwise the full document) of the remaining 796 documents were screened by the research team leader. Records were then excluded if they were not about public sector reform or similar (many, for example, were on broader economic reform), or did not apply to the low income countries in our list, were of inadequate quality, or were duplicates. Studies were excluded if they lacked empirical content with limited used for coding, particularly for a number of opinion and normative/theoretical studies and studies of a highly general nature. This led to 324 documents being further excluded, with 472 remaining. Full documents were uploaded into a database, read in their entirety, and re-evaluated by the same criteria as above, leaving 323 records.
Of note, the UN Public Administration Profiles reports provided 42 results. Because the profiles cover 42 of the 49 countries in our sample, and the reports contain a standard template, the likelihood that certain countries and/or reform traits are over- or underrepresented in our sample is reduced.
Of the 323 studies almost none directly assessed outcomes or service delivery as a function of public sector reform. We discovered no large-n empirical studies that directly applied to our research question. However, the study reviewed a range of publications, including scholarly articles, books, proceedings, policy documents, magazine and newspapers articles, dissertations, as well as reports produced by international organizations, drawing from a range of overlapping and mutually supporting search methods. Our search paid particular attention to studies by international organisations seen as the leading authorities in this area, who have a particular focus and role in development and aid. As such the search provides a reasonably comprehensive survey of the existing literature on public sector reform
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in low income states, although it is possible key documents have been missed.3 Use of multiple sources allowed for triangulation.
Good Governance Agenda Once the body of literature was established, the team coded it for each country in terms of reform agenda and reform implementation for the ‘Good Governance’ agenda outlined above. Category items (professional training, anti-corruption, participation, transparency, and capacity) were coded as 1 if evidence is found in the literature from approximately 2000 to 2008 (Table 1). We then gave a score of High, Medium or Low depending on whether we found 4-5, 3 or 1-2 manifestations of the agenda, respectively. The research team leader independently coded all documents. Other team members independently coded an overlapping group of items so as to cross-check results. Disagreements on coding were settled by consensus. Different years were collapsed into one measure, with the most recent (if deemed reliable) document taken as authoritative in case of divergence. Results were entered into Excel.
After the initial coding process, it was discovered coverage across countries was variable. Some smaller nations had very limited or even no coverage we could discover, even in UN and World Bank documents (e.g., the UN Public Administration Profile Reports cover most countries in the world yet do not contain reports for seven LICs in our study: Haiti, Kiribati, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Togo, and Vanuatu). Coverage that did exist was often full of gaps. In particular, with a few notable exceptions, evidence of implementation was mixed or missing. In some cases, where we did discover evidence of implementation, we found it suggested reform agendas had not been
3
The bibliography is available from the authors.
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implemented – such as Afghanistan. Due to the lack of implementation data in our initial measure, it was not considered suitable for this study and is not presented here.
-Table 1 here
Implementation of the Good Governance Agenda Evidence of reform agenda should not be confused with substantive policy change. As a large body of research suggests, implementation and policy reform is a political or symbolic game where the object of reform can become adopting and adapting the current fashionable language of but where things continue much as before – indeed public management can become a ‘ritual of reform’ where the main battle becomes what to call things, or to appear to adopt the suitable agendas and rhetoric (Goldfinch 2006; Goldfinch and Wallis 2010; March and Olsen 1996). Many policy agendas of course are resisted and fail in the field – and even legislation may never leave the page (Smith et al 2011). These tendencies may only be heightened if there is considerable aid and foreign loans dependent on being seen to play the right game and speak the ‘correct’ language and jargon. As such, to examine public management reform, we need to examine to what extent reforms have been substantive and beyond rhetorical. However, our initial attempt to develop an implementation measure based on extant literature largely failed, as noted. Accordingly, we turned to proxy measures of implementation.
The World Bank provides ‘good governance’ measures of that are useful as proxies for implementation (Kaufmann et al. 2010). As well as showing some actual implementation of policy measures, they give measures of implementation capacity and as such fit well with
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our notion of the good governance agenda having as an overarching logic the notion of state capacity. These measures are: 1. ‘Government effectiveness’ (More-or-less equivalent to item 1 of our ideal type used for coding GG). This is a measure of the quality and competence of government bureaucracy, drawing on a variety of sources. It ‘captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies’. 2. ‘Control of corruption’ (equivalent to our item 2 and 4) ‘captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests’. It includes a variety of accountability, transparency and corruption measures. 3. ‘Voice and accountability’ (equivalent to our item 3). This measures the ability of the people to influence the selection of government policies, media freedom, and political engagement. 4. State capacity is measured by income/capita and ‘regulatory quality’. Other measures such as taxation as %GDP and by education spending as a percentage of GDP might have been suitable, but data is generally lacking for LICs. While income is an admittedly crude measure, and perhaps more an outcome measure, it is widely used in the literature as a proxy for capacity (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003). As such, it at least provides us with some international comparability. Regulatory quality ‘captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and
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regulations that permit and promote private sector development’ and again provides some measure of potential – or capacity – to implement measures, albeit perhaps ones that favour private markets. We have these measures from about 2008 to 2010.
Implementation data are given in Appendix 1 and summarised in Table 2. Scores of Low, Medium, and High are given based on the country’s percentile score for that category. Low score was given for 0-25th percentile, M for 26th to 75th percentile and H for 76th to 100th percentile. The last column contains an Implementation score based on the number of Highs and Lows. For example, a country with two Highs and one Low would have a score of 1. Again the premise is that the higher the state’s implementation measure the greater the probability the good governance agenda (as we have specified it in our ideal type) is actually implemented.
Millennium Development Goals as Outcome Measures Even with implementation of reform agenda, this may not lead to improved outcomes for citizens of a state. Nor should we confuse implementation success with broader reform success in terms of improved outcomes, although there may be a link.
What is a suitable measure of reform outcome success for LICs? We are faced with three constraints: first, the moral hazard of using self-reported success from government agencies in LICs, if indeed these existed; which often they do not. Second, finding measures that have can be used for international comparison, particularly for low income countries. As such, some standard measures are needed, and these need to have reasonable coverage. Third,
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finding measures that have some creditability with the international community and address issues/indicators seen as important.
The United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDG) fit the above conditions. They reflect international consensus (in this case the United Nations) on the immediate and medium term goals of development and have broad and standardised coverage (albeit with considerable gaps), and some creditability as to their source. Accordingly we draw on changes in the MDG index for the period 2000 to 2008 (in most cases), as found in Appendix 2, as our measure of reform outcome success. While the causal link between public sector reform and positive developments outcomes is murky, over-determined, and highly contested, there is a consensus amongst international actors that public sector reform is aimed, and should be judged, on improving these basic service outcomes (World Bank 2002).
Results and Discussion
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Taken together, Tables 1and 2 and Appendices 1 and 2 present a picture of weak to non-
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existent connection between the Good Governance agenda, implementation and change in
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MDGs. Table 2 compares Good Governance Agenda, Good Governance Implementation and MDG outcomes, drawing from and summarising the Appendices and Table 1. Countries that clearly exhibit Good Governance agendas include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Gambia, Madagascar, Malawi, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Uganda, and Tanzania. Looking next at implementation we see that there is little overlap between the countries with strong indicators of Good Governance agendas and our implementation proxies. Adding MDG outcomes to the discussion we find that Tanzania is the only country in the sample with a strong Good Governance agenda, evidence for implementation and considerable improvement in MDG scores. Morgan, Baser and Morin (2010) report similar findings for Tanzania. However,
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again like many studies, there is an underlying assumption that implementation is an end in itself, and that reform success is simply implementation success. No evidence is given of increased service delivery. Returning to our results, Uganda has adopted a Good Governance agenda and has improved MDGs, but has little evidence of implementation. To sum, the Good Governance agenda seems neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for enhanced service delivery, and we find little link between agenda, implementation and outcomes.
Conclusion
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This study shows the link between GG agendas, implementation and improvements in Millennium Development Goals in low income countries, is weak or non-existent. A common problem with literature on public administration in general, but perhaps particularly notable in literature on public administration in LICs, is the elision of stated policy agendas and rhetoric with substantive policy change, something Kauzya and Balogun (2005) also note. Nor it is self-evident that if a reform agenda is implemented, this necessarily leads to better performance. Many reform agendas have strong ideological components and questionable empirical verisimilitude - notably NPM - and debate continues to their success even in developed nations (Goldfinch and Wallis 2010). Molony’s (2009) study of World Bank public administration reform programs also found a mixed impact on governance outcomes, although her study used good governance indicators as outcomes, rather than our implementation proxies, focussed on project spending on aid and public administration, law and justice programs as independent variables, and used a different range of countries.
It is possible however that our findings are a reflection of limitations in our method and in the use of the existing literature of mixed quality and/or coverage in our analysis. Perhaps future in-depth case studies directly addressing our research question would be better
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able to establish the benefits or otherwise of good governance public administration reform in LICs. Indeed, what is concerning is the lack of reliable data on many aspects of public sector and other reform in some LICs, including such basic outcome measures as poverty. More detailed fieldwork is needed on public administration reform and its impacts. Otherwise we continue to fly blind.
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Table 1. Good Governance Agendas in LICs
Malawi
1
L
Maldives
1
Bangladesh
0
1
1
M
Mali
1
Mauritania
1
Benin Bhutan
1
B. Faso Burundi Cambodia C.A.R. Chad
1
1
1 0
1
Djibouti
0
0
E. Guinea 1
Ethiopia
1
1
1
Gambia
1
1
1
Guinea
L
1
L
Myanmar
L
Nepal
1
1
1
M
1
H
Niger
1
1
1
M
L
Rwanda
1
1
L
Samoa
L
Sao Tome.
L
Senegal
O
S. Leone
1
Eritrea
M
1
L
0
1
1
L
Solom. Is.
L
Somalia
1
1
1
1
0
1
M
Mozam.
1
D.R. Congo
M 1
L
1
Comoros
1 1
1
1 1
1
AGEN.
H
1
CAP.
1
0
TRAN.
1
1
PAR.
COR.
EFF.
1
Angola
1
1
Country2
AGEN.
CAP.
TRAN.
PAR.
COR.
EFF.
Country Afghan.
1
0 1
O
1
0
L
1
1
L
M
Sudan
1
1
1
1
H
T.Leste
1
1
1
1
L
G.-Bissau
M
H 1
H
Togo Tuvalu
Haiti
Uganda
1
1
1
1
1
H
Kiribati
Tanzania
1
1
1
1
1
H
1
Laos
1
Lesotho
1
Liberia Madag.
1
1
L
Vanuatu
1
L
Yemen
1
0
1
1
1
L
Zambia
1
1
1
1
1
1
H
19
M M
Note: 1 = evidence of agenda; 0=explicitly no agenda; blank cell no data. L= . 1-2 agenda manifestations; M= 3,H= 4-5.
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Table 2 GG Agenda, Implementation Index and MDG Change Country GG Agenda Afghanistan H Angola L Bangladesh M Benin Bhutan L Burkina Faso L Burundi L Cambodia H C.A.R. L Chad L Comoros L D.R. Congo L Djibouti 0 E. Guinea L Eritrea L Ethiopia M Gambia H Guinea L GuineaBissau Haiti Kiribati Laos L Lesotho L Liberia L Madagascar H
Implementation Index -4 0 0 3 3 1 -1 0 -2 -3 -2 -5 2 -3 -2 0 1 -3 -2 -2 2 -2 3 -2 1
MDG -1 1 0 -2 3 -2 1 0 -4 -4 -1 -2 0 -1 0 -2 1 -3 -1 -3 0 3 0 -5 0
Country GG Agenda Malawi M Maldives M Mali M Mauritania L Mozambique L Myanmar Nepal M Niger M Rwanda M Samoa Sao Tome 0 Senegal L Sierra Leone L Solomon Is. Somalia Sudan H Timor-Leste H Togo Tuvalu Uganda Tanzania Vanuatu Yemen Zambia
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H H M M
Implementation Index -1 4 2 0 2 -4 0 -1 2 5 2 2 -1 1 -4 -4 1 -2 3 1 3 4 0 0
MDG 2 3 -2 0 1 0 1 -4 4 1 2 1 -4 -1 -3 0 0 -1 5 4 4 1 -2 1
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Appendix 1 Implementation of Good Governance Agenda1 Index
V&A v.
V&A5
Reg.qual. v.
Reg. qual.4
M
Corr.v.
Govt. eff.2
4970
Corr.3
Inc./cap. v.
Angola
Govt.eff. v.
Inc./cap.
Country
H
Afghanistan
L
-1.559
L
-1.570
L
-1.782
L
-1.386
-4
-0.920
L
-1.337
M
-1.004
M
-1.142
-1
Bangladesh
M
1580
M
-0.986
M
-0.961
M
-0.786
M
-0.371
0
Benin
M
1510
H
-0.481
M
-0.648
H
-0.360
H
0.308
3 3
Bhutan
H
5300
H
0.395
H
0.837
M
-1.062
M
-0.634
Burkina Faso
M
1170
M
-0.650
M
-0.442
H
-0.129
M
-0.250
1
Burundi
L
390
M
-1.108
L
-1.122
M
-1.153
M
-0.726
-1
Cambodia
M
1850
M
-0.743
L
-1.184
H
-0.367
M
-0.881
0
Cen. Afr. Rep.
L
750
L
-1.411
M
-0.825
M
-1.119
M
-0.983
-2
Chad
M
1230
L
-1.482
L
-1.386
M
-1.084
L
-1.403
-3
Comoros
M
1300
L
-1.797
M
-0.753
L
-1.580
M
-0.294
-2
D. R.
-5
L
300
L
-1.724
L
-1.417
L
-1.616
L
-1.445
Djibouti
Congo
H
2480
M
-0.910
H
-0.260
M
-0.602
M
-1.105
2
Equ.Guinea
H
19350
L
-1.653
L
-1.584
L
-1.306
L
-1.824
-3
L
-1.406
H
-0.333
L
-2.273
L
-2.159
-2
Ethiopia
L
930
H
-0.406
M
-0.715
M
-0.981
M
-1.262
0
Gambia
M
1330
M
-0.658
M
-0.555
H
-0.300
M
-1.051
1
Eritrea
Guinea
L
-1.289
L
-1.227
M
-1.175
L
-1.426
-3
Guinea-Bissau
M
-1.065
L
-1.124
L
-1.187
M
-0.758
-2
Haiti
L
-1.434
L
-1.122
M
-0.825
M
-0.598
-2
Kiribati
H
3350
M
-0.718
H
-0.109
L
-1.258
H
0.733
2
Laos
M
2210
M
-1.031
L
-1.143
M
-1.054
L
-1.710
-2
Lesotho
M
1950
H
-0.260
H
0.143
M
-0.584
H
-0.136
3
Liberia
L
290
M
-1.169
M
-0.557
L
-1.214
M
-0.321
-2
M
-0.637
H
-0.247
M
-0.466
M
-0.621
1
Malawi
L
760
M
-0.520
M
-0.473
M
-0.535
M
-0.217
-1
Maldives
H
5230
H
-0.373
M
-0.688
H
-0.409
H
-0.140
4
Madagascar
23
Mali
M
1190
M
-0.768
M
-0.690
H
-0.429
H
0.152
Mauritania
M
1960
M
-0.904
M
-0.657
M
-0.662
M
-1.011
0
Mozambique
L
880
H
-0.345
M
-0.410
H
-0.323
H
-0.068
2
L
-1.850
L
-1.755
L
-2.308
L
-2.170
-4
Nepal
M
1180
M
-0.951
M
-0.751
M
-0.778
M
-0.575
0
Niger
L
660
M
-0.751
M
-0.655
M
-0.475
M
-0.698
-1
Myanmar
2
Rwanda
M
1060
H
-0.181
H
0.126
H
-0.337
L
-1.285
2
Samoa
H
4270
H
0.022
H
0.104
H
-0.245
H
0.541
5 2
Sao Tome
M
1850
M
-0.684
H
-0.397
M
-0.756
H
0.171
Senegal
M
1790
H
-0.404
M
-0.529
H
-0.262
M
-0.312
2
Sierra Leone
L
790
M
-1.183
M
-0.978
M
-0.762
M
-0.260
-1
Solomon Is.
M
1860
M
-1.003
H
-0.368
L
-1.254
H
0.187
1
L
-2.297
L
-1.734
L
-2.560
L
-1.992
-4 -4
Somalia Sudan
M
2000
Timor-Leste Togo
L
-1.320
L
-1.244
L
-1.246
L
-1.586
M
-1.134
M
-0.986
M
-1.159
H
0.088
1
L
-1.359
M
-1.080
M
-0.834
M
-1.036
-2 3
L
850
H
-0.409
H
-0.175
M
-1.043
H
0.809
Uganda
M
1190
M
-0.629
M
-0.871
H
-0.174
M
-0.486
1
Tanzania
M
1350
H
-0.421
M
-0.418
H
-0.379
H
-0.141
3
Vanuatu
H
4290
H
-0.267
H
0.399
M
-0.711
H
0.581
4
Yemen
H
2340
M
-1.123
M
-1.027
M
-0.601
L
-1.268
0
Zambia
M
1280
M
-0.675
M
-0.506
M
-0.454
M
-0.270
0
Tuvalu
Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
All measures are from 2009. L=low, M=medium, H=high based on sample percentiles: L= 0 to 25th, M=26th to 75th, and H=76th to 100th. V=value. Income/capita is from World Bank (2010). All other measures are from World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, et al. 2010) and are defined as below by this source: Government effectiveness ‘captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies’. Control of corruption ‘captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests’. Regulatory quality ‘captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development’. Voice and accountability ‘captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media’.
24
Appendix 2 Millennium Development Goals Performance and Change for LICs, various years
L
-11
M
M
9.5
H
-24
L
Benin
M
-0.3
M
M
4.8
M
-13
Bhutan
L
9.3
M
25.5
M
6.5
H
-14
B. Faso
H
0
L
24.8
M
7.2
M
-10
Burundi
H
-1.3
H
56
H
25.4
L
Cambodia
M
-2.8
M
1
M
12.9
M
C.A.R.
M
-0.2
L
M
2.3
L
Chad
M
1.7
L
2.8
L
Comoros
M
1.5
L
D.R. Congo
M
0
M
Djibouti
L
20.6
L
2
40
M
5
Net 2007 or 2008 MDG (HL) MDG8, 200008
23.1
M
M
Access Internet 2008 (MDG8)
H
-0.2
0
MDG7, 200008
0.1
M
L
Access sanit.2008 (MDG7)
M
Bang.
H
MDG6, 2000-8
1.5
Child.
