Evolution of Transboundary Politics in the Euphrates-Tigris River System

Global Governance 19 (2013), 279–305

Evolution of Transboundary Politics in the Euphrates-Tigris River System: New Perspectives and Political Challenges Aysegul Kibaroglu and Waltina Scheumann Transboundary water politics in the Euphrates-Tigris river system have evolved with competitive power dynamics and cooperative institutional development. We analyze the evolution of transboundary water relations over four consecutive periods. The first period coincided with nation building in the region, when the riparian states focused on their domestic need for socioeconomic development rather than the formulation of external water policies. The second period saw the advent of competitive transboundary water politics shaped by the initiation of uncoordinated, largescale water development projects. The third period was the most complex, given the link between transboundary water issues and nonriparian security issues. In the fourth period, the role of water bureaucracies in the reorientation of water policies from hostile to cooperative became significant. Even in the midst of the very recent political crisis between Turkey and Syria, partial institutionalization of water cooperation and growing networks of water dialogue at both the governmental and nongovernmental levels should continue to serve as open channels for easing the tensions. KEYWORDS: transboundary water politics, Euphrates-Tigris rivers, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, conflict, cooperation, water bureaucracies.

THE MAIN RIPARIAN STATES OF THE EUPHRATES-TIGRIS RIVER SYSTEM ARE Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.1 Water disputes among them originated with moves in the 1960s by each of them toward large-scale water development projects. The initial aim of the projects was flow regulation designed to end the alteration of flooding and droughts. But ambitions in each country quickly grew to include hydropower generation and sharp increases in the use of river water for drinking and irrigation. Unilateral and uncoordinated water development projects by each party began to stress the river system’s capacity. As the demand for water exceeded supply, water authorities in each country finally began reaching out to their counterparts in the others and they developed rather ad hoc processes of discussion and negotiation. Unfortunately, above the level of the water bureaucrats, political rivalries stemming from conflicting national positions within the Cold War framework prevented any fruitful cooperation from taking root. Turkey’s NATO membership and Syria and Iraq’s ties to the Soviet Union did more

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than inhibit cooperation; they aggravated existing disputes over water and moved them progressively up the agenda of contentious issues until they were near the top for Turkey with each of the others. Ironically, despite similarly dependent relations with the Soviet Union, Iraq and Syria also were at loggerheads over water, as well as other issues implicated in their bitter regional rivalry, and there were moments when water use in the Euphrates river basin propelled the two regimes to the cusp of war. Though frequently marked by harsh rhetoric, Turkish-Iraqi relations were manageable by comparison in part because of complementary economies that induced a significant volume of bilateral trade. With the turning of the millennium, bilateral political relations between Turkey and Syria became conducive to transboundary water dialogue. In this context, contacts were established at governmental and nongovernmental levels, with the focus particularly on water and regional (river basin) development. And a series of protocols were signed to enable further cooperation. Regime change in Iraq created both uncertainties and opportunities. Iraq joined in the trilateral ministerial dialogue on water issues and even signed separate protocols with Turkey and Syria that broadly addressed transboundary water use and management. However, the Iraqi parliament constantly criticized Turkey’s use of water upstream and became vocal over claimed violation of Iraq’s water rights. The recent domestic political unrest in Syria has led to the severing of bilateral political relations with Turkey and the blocking of any further transboundary water cooperation. Against the background of often volatile relations among the three riparians, we consider the evolution of transboundary water politics in the Euphrates-Tigris river system, its competitive power dynamics, and its cooperative institutional development. We begin by describing the physical characteristics of the Euphrates-Tigris river system as the medium of complex interdependencies among the riparian states. We then analyze the evolution of transboundary water politics over four consecutive periods. The first period coincided with nation-building in the region, when the riparian states focused on their domestic need for socioeconomic development rather than the formulation of external water policies. The historical treaties signed at that time defined state borders and general bilateral political relations, and also included some clauses concerning transboundary water uses. The second period, however, saw the advent of competitive transboundary water politics shaped by the initiation of uncoordinated, large-scale water development projects. As the national water development ventures progressed, mismatches between water supply and demand occurred throughout the river basin. The ad hoc technical negotiations were unable to prepare the ground for a comprehensive treaty on equitable and effective transboundary water management. The third period was the most complex, given the link between transboundary water issues and nonriparian security issues. Mutual

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distrust precluded any fruitful outcome. However, this was also the phase when attempts were made to establish a joint mechanism for settling transboundary water disputes. We analyze these mechanisms, which ultimately proved incapable of resolving water and political crises in the region. In the fourth period, the role of water bureaucracies in the reorientation of water policies from hostile to cooperative became significant. In the decades since the disputes over water first began, the state has been the major player in the formulation and implementation of transboundary water policies. The discourse and practices of the state bureaucracies— the water technocrats in the various ministries—and foreign office diplomats of the riparian states have evolved during the prolonged water dispute and this, in turn, has played a significant role in changing the nature of transboundary water relations. In the last section of this article, we therefore consider water relations among the riparians, paying particular attention to the role of water bureaucracies in the reorientation of water policies from hostile to cooperative in the early 2000s. We scrutinize the policy-learning processes of bureaucracies, paying particular attention to the shift from securitized negotiations to a functional approach. We conclude that, even in the midst of the recent political crisis between Turkey and Syria, partial institutionalization of water cooperation and growing networks of water dialogue at both the governmental and nongovernmental levels have continued to serve as open channels for easing the tensions. After all, severe water shortages due to mismanagement, misuse, and prolonged drought conditions can be addressed satisfactorily only at the river basin level, with all the riparians concerned in attendance. Come what may, the dialogue on water should be kept open. The situation strongly suggests the need for joint efforts to assess and coordinate planning and management in order to harmonize basinwide development, in which, in addition to water sector demands (energy, agriculture), in-stream flows, and ecosystem protection should be taken into account.

Rivers of Common Geography and History The two greatest rivers of the Eurasian landscape, the Euphrates and the Tigris, originate in one climatic and topographic zone and end in a quite different one. The basin is characterized by high mountains to the north and west and extensive lowlands in the south and east.2 The catchment areas of both rivers have a subtropical Mediterranean climate with wet winters and dry summers. The rivers are in spate in spring when the snow melts and is augmented by seasonal rainfall, which is at its heaviest between March and May. The summer season is hot and dry, resulting in extensive evaporation and low humidity during the day. Evaporation increases water salinization and water loss in major reservoirs in the three riparian countries.3 Because the water is

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not present where (on farmland) or when (in summer) it is most needed, the riparians have launched large-scale irrigation projects, which have become the main bone of contention in transboundary water politics since the late 1960s. The Euphrates and its tributaries drain an enormous basin of 444,000 km2, of which 33.0 percent lies in Turkey, 19.0 percent in Syria, and 46.0 percent in Iraq while the Tigris and its tributaries drain an area of 387,600 km2, of which 15.0 percent lies in Turkey, 0.3 percent in Syria, 75.0 percent in Iraq, and 9.5 percent in Iran. Both rivers rise in Turkey, scarcely 30 km apart, flow through Syria and Iraq, and join to form the Shatt-al-Arab waterway north of Basra in Iraq before discharging into the Persian Gulf. The Euphrates is a long river (3,000 km), around 41 percent lying in Turkey, 23 percent in Syria, and 36 percent in Iraq. Iraq accounts for most (77 percent) of the Tigris (1,850 km), followed by Turkey (22 percent) and Syria, which has 44 km of the main river channel, forming its border with Turkey (about 36 km) and Iraq (about 8 km).4 The mean annual flow of the Euphrates is 32 km3, of which about 90 percent originates in Turkey and the remaining 10 percent in Syria.5 As for the Tigris, the average total discharge is 52 km3 per year, of which approximately 40 percent comes from Turkey, with Iraq and Iran contributing 51 percent and 9 percent, respectively.6 Iraq derives the majority of its freshwater from the two rivers.7 Although the Euphrates basin is one of seven in Syria, it is strategically the most important because of its existing and potential uses for agricultural and hydropower purposes.8 The Tigris-Euphrates basin is one of twenty-five basins in Turkey, but accounts for nearly a third of the country’s surface water resources and a fifth of its irrigable land. The variation of the flow of these twin rivers from one season and one year to another is extremely high, and severe drought and destructive flooding have been common phenomena for thousands of years. The physical characteristics of the rivers necessitate the coordinated management and use of water resources within and among the states they pass through. They cause interdependencies among the riparian states, which call for a cooperative attitude to ensure more efficient use of the water in the region and the avoidance of serious conflicts. We observe friendly relations among the riparians from the early 1920s until the late 1950s (the first period), when each country’s priority was the establishment of state bureaucracies and all had similar concerns and the same need for socioeconomic development. Throughout that period, planning was done largely on a country-by-country basis. None of the countries engaged in major development projects, which would have resulted in utilization of water by each to the detriment of the others.9 The Euphrates and Tigris linked the communities in the river basin as they had done for thousands of years, and the newly established riparian states had yet to clash over the use of the water.


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At transboundary level, harmonious water relations reigned in the basin under a series of bilateral political treaties. The first legal arrangement among the riparians was an agreement signed by France and Turkey in Ankara on 20 October 1921 with a view toward promoting peace between the two countries. Under Article XII of that treaty concerning the “Distribution and Removal of Waters” it was agreed that “the city of Aleppo may also organize, at its own expense, a water-supply from the Euphrates in Turkish territory in order to meet the requirements of the district.” Article 109 of the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty covers another legal aspect of the issue, stating that, if the fixing of a new frontier results in the river system of one state being dependent on facilities that were established before the war and are now located within the borders of another state, the parties concerned must conclude an agreement that is capable of safeguarding their respective interests and sovereign rights and that, in the absence of an agreement, the dispute will be settled by arbitration.10 One of the most important legal agreements between Iraq and Turkey concerning water resources is the Protocol annexed to their 1946 Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations. This protocol establishes a framework that sets out the two parties’ respective rights and obligations in the Euphrates and Tigris river system. Above all, it emphasizes the urgency of installing flood control works on the rivers and underlines the positive impact that storage facilities sited on Turkish soil would have for both. The parties agreed that, if the most suitable sites were on Turkish territory, the entire cost would be met by Iraq. Permanent observation stations would be built, operated, and maintained by Turkey, with Turkey and Iraq sharing the costs equally. Turkey agreed to inform Iraq of its construction plans and, if it determined that it needed water for irrigation and hydropower purposes, separate negotiations would be held.11 In recognizing rights and obligations for both the upstream and downstream states, it seems peculiarly enlightened and not only for its time since contemporary bilateral water treaties such as the 1987 Protocol between Turkey and Syria and the 1990 Protocol between Syria and Iraq (described in detail in the following related section) seem less balanced in their recognition of upper and lower riparian rights and obligations. During this initial period, the riparian countries were mainly concerned with water supply for urban and rural populations. Bureaucracies with technical expertise were busy with the initial organizational setup and the planning of irrigation systems and dam construction. Transboundary waters were the subject of domestic planning and development exercises and had little to do with the foreign policy agenda. Those involved in transboundary water relations at that time were therefore mainly medium-level technocrats— advisers and professionals who prepared the technical ground for the drafting of the water-related clauses of the treaties, in whose conclusion the riparian diplomats acted as brokers.

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Rivers of Competition In the second period, water relations became competitive due to uncoordinated and unilateral projects carried out in the region. As the riparian states further consolidated their regimes between 1960 and 1980, they paid more attention to socioeconomic development based on water and land resources. Turkey had long been dependent on oil imports. Having been hard hit by the oil crises of the 1970s, the government embarked on a program of indigenous resource development that particularly emphasized hydropower and lignite schemes with the aim of minimizing the national economy’s dependency on imported oil.12 The Syrian economy has traditionally been dominated by agriculture. Exploration for oil did not begin until the early 1980s. Even though oil made a significant contribution to export earnings in the following decades as world oil prices fluctuated, Syria focused on agricultural development with the aim of achieving food self-sufficiency.13 These considerations were reinforced by political goals which, under the ruling Ba’ath Party, placed the emphasis on the development of rural areas and the organization of peasants as a political power base.14 Since 1958, Iraq changed from being mainly an agricultural country exporting wheat, rice, and other crops to an oil-producing, semi-industrial nation forced to import most of its own food. Yet after the Iraqi government nationalized the oil companies in 1972 and began to receive more income from oil, the focus also turned to agricultural production.15 This led to an expansion of irrigated areas, with the aim of achieving food security for the Iraqi people.16 The central water agencies of all the riparian countries designated the rivers for large-scale development projects. In Turkey, the major objective was to irrigate the fertile lands in southeastern Anatolia, which make up onefifth of the country’s irrigable land, using the huge water potential of the Tigris and Euphrates river basin, which accounts for 28.5 percent of the surface water supply.17 In this context, Turkey implemented the Lower Euphrates Project, initially a series of dams designed to increase hydropower generation and expand irrigated agriculture. Subsequently, in the late 1970s, the Lower Euphrates Project evolved into a larger, multisectoral development project, taking in the Tigris waters as well and known as the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP, its Turkish acronym), which included twenty-one large dams, nineteen hydropower plants, and irrigation schemes extending to 1.7 million ha of land. The Euphrates river basin provides 65 percent of surface water supply in Syria and accounts for 27 percent of total land resources. Syria launched the Euphrates Valley Project under the Ba’ath Party. The government set a number of objectives to be met by the project: irrigation of an area as large as 640,000 ha; construction of the large, multipurpose Tabqa or Al-Thawra Dam to generate the electricity needed for urban use and industrial development; and regulation of the flow of the Euphrates to prevent seasonal flooding.18


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The main channels and tributaries of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers account for almost the entire freshwater supply in Iraq, which pioneered and built its first dams in the 1950s: the Euphrates Dam in 1955–1956 to divert water to Lake Al-Habbaniya; and the Samarra Dam on the Tigris, completed in 1954, to protect against previously catastrophic floods. The Ba’ath Party, which came to power under Saddam Hussein’s presidency in 1968, adopted the slogan “food security for the Iraqi people,” which was to be accomplished through the development of irrigation. To that end, the Revolutionary Plan was developed. The Higher Agriculture Council attached to the presidency, the Soil and Land Reclamation Organisation attached to the Ministry of Irrigation, and many other new departments were established to carry out studies, to create designs, and to construct and maintain water projects.19 Owing to the competitive and uncoordinated nature of these water development projects, disagreements over transboundary water uses surfaced in the late 1960s. During this period, transboundary water issues were regarded by each country’s political leadership as falling within the middle range of economic and technical objectives, which could be handled by official technical delegations. Hence, water negotiations were held by technocrats from the riparians’ central water agencies, accompanied by diplomats who advised and monitored the negotiations, particularly when international legal and political aspects were under discussion. The main theme of these technical negotiations was the impact of the construction of the Keban Dam in Turkey and the Tabqa Dam in Syria on Iraq’s historical water use patterns. While Turkey suggested the establishment of a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) to determine the water and irrigation needs of the riparians, Iraq insisted on a guarantee of specific flows and a water-sharing agreement. While Turkey released certain flows during the construction and impounding of the Keban Dam, no final allocation agreement was reached even after numerous technical meetings.20 Those meetings did not achieve the expressed aim of coordinating the water development and use patterns of the three riparians. Consequently, a political crisis occurred in the region in 1975. Turkey began impounding the Keban reservoir at the same time that Syria was completing the construction of the Tabqa Dam—during a period of severe drought. The impounding of the two reservoirs triggered a crisis in the spring. Iraq accused Syria of reducing the river’s flow to intolerable levels while Syria blamed Turkey. The Iraqi government was not satisfied with the Syrian response, and the mounting frustration resulted in mutual threats that brought the parties to the brink of armed hostility. A war over water was averted when, thanks to Saudi Arabia’s mediation, Syria released additional quantities of water to Iraq.21 The main cause of this crisis was the mounting political rivalry and tension between the two Ba’athist regimes. In other words, it was not a water-sharing crisis per se, but rather the beginning of the use of water as a political lever in nonriparian issues.

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Rivers of Discord In the third period, from the 1980s until the late 1990s, political tensions among the parties insinuated themselves into every corner of the relationships and, thus, inevitably water issues moved into the realm of high politics. Bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria had long been strained. Two principal sources of friction were Syria’s extensive logistical support for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a separatist terrorist organization, and Syrian irredentist claims to the province of Hatay in Turkey.22 Despite official denials in Damascus, Syria’s support for subversive activities against Turkey had been widely known and documented since the early 1980s.23 Even though the regional political environment was not conducive to water cooperation in the early 1980s, the growing exploitation of the Euphrates through the construction of the Ataturk Dam in Turkey led to fresh calls for cooperation. Because the issues triggered by water development schemes along the Tigris and Euphrates are so complex and far-reaching, the three riparians had to find ways to structure their discussions. To this end, Iraq took the initiative in the formation of a permanent joint technical body. The first meeting of the Joint Economic Commission between Turkey and Iraq in 1980 led to the establishment in 1983 of the JTC, whose members included participants from all three riparians assigned to lay down methods and procedures that would lead to the definition of a reasonable and adequate quantity of water for each country from both rivers.24 However, the JTC was not able to agree on any substantial resolution even after sixteen meetings. Negotiations were suspended in 1993.25 A careful examination of the records of the negotiations among the riparian states, and their failure, shows that nonwater issues (or, more precisely, the overall pattern of relations among the three countries) played a decisive part in the growth of tension and disputes. The use of transboundary rivers was only one factor in their complex web of relations and interactions.26 The major issues that led to the deadlock in the JTC were related to both the subject and the object of the negotiations: were the Euphrates and the Tigris to be considered a single system, or could the discussions be confined to the Euphrates?27 The wording of the JTC’s ultimate objective—establishing a common terminology—was also problematic: should there be a proposal for the “sharing” of the “international rivers,” or should there be a trilateral regime for determining the “utilization of transboundary watercourses”? Iraq and Syria considered the Euphrates to be an international river and insisted on an immediate sharing agreement under which its waters would be shared on the basis of the needs declared by each country. On the other hand, Turkey regarded the Euphrates and Tigris as forming a single transboundary river basin where the waters should be allocated according to objective needs.28 International customary law on transboundary watercourses has been the point of reference throughout the negotiation process at the JTC meet-


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ings. The principles of equitable and reasonable utilization, of the optimum use of water resources between states, and of the avoidance of transboundary harm to both nature and human usage have been evoked by diplomats representing the three riparians.29 By their nature, principles of customary law do not constitute enforceable rules, nor are they subject to what concepts such as “equity” might mean in concrete situations. In this way, while interpreting the principles of international law concerning equitable utilization, the riparians adopted opposing and rigid positions, with Turkey insisting on its water needs being met, and Syria and Iraq demanding their unilateral shares and respect for their water rights. Turkey’s needs-based approach was expressed in the Three-Stage Plan, put forward by the technocrats of its central water agency.30 According to this, inventory studies of water and land resources throughout the region comprising the territories of the various states would be undertaken and jointly evaluated. On the basis of these studies, the means and measures needed to attain the most reasonable, optimum utilization of resources would be defined. Although founded on principles of scientific rationality, the likely result of the acceptance of Turkey’s proposal as a basis for tripartite negotiations would be to reveal the lesser viability of Syria’s and Iraq’s irrigation expansion plans which would, of course, be unacceptable to them.31 On the other hand, Syria and Iraq insisted on an immediate agreement under which the waters of the Euphrates would be shared on the basis of the water rights claimed by each country. Both countries asserted that, as the annual average flow of the Euphrates River was around 1,000 m3/sec, Turkey should keep only one-third of the flow for itself and allow the remaining two-thirds to be shared by Syria and Iraq.32 The JTC meetings, at which claims and counterclaims concerning the use of the rivers and the nature of customary international water law were voiced, did not make an effective contribution to the settlement of the regional water dispute. The JTC did not provide a platform for delineating the coriparians’ priorities and needs as a basis for addressing regional water problems. In this respect, water use patterns and the riparians’ related legislation and institutional structures never had a chance of being discussed at the JTC meetings. National management and allocation policies were like “black boxes,” and water management practices within the various countries simply could not be debated during those negotiations. Neither did the treaties signed in the late 1980s prove to be useful means of managing the transboundary river system equitably. In 1987 and 1990 two bilateral accords—acknowledged by all the riparian states as being interim agreements—were signed following a number of high-level meetings of top officials in the region. In 1987, the Turkish-Syrian Protocol on Economic Cooperation was the first formal bilateral agreement reached on regional waters, its conclusion made possible by simultaneous negotiations on security matters

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and water.33 Turkish prime minister Turgut Ozal, the decisive political actor at the time, promised a water flow of up to 500 km3 per second, or about 16 km3 per year, at the Turkish-Syrian border, with the intention of reaching an agreement with Syria on security matters.34 At the same time, a Mutual Security Accord was signed, setting out that each state would prevent activities against the other from originating in its territory and that criminals responsible for terrorist activities would be extradited. Ozal believed that the PKK would cease its attacks if Syria stopped supporting it. For a while, it seemed that Ozal’s hopes had been fulfilled, but a dramatic upsurge in fighting between Turkish and PKK forces in 1988/1989 led to renewed Turkish concerns about Syrian support for the PKK.35 On the other hand, the Syrian-Iraqi water accord of 1990 designated Syria’s share of the Euphrates waters as 42 percent and the remaining 58 percent was allocated to Iraq as a fixed annual total percentage.36 However, the existence of these bilateral accords, both relating to only the Euphrates, could not be accepted as evidence of cooperation. Each agreement was bilateral and predominantly concerned with water quantity issues. The riparians could not agree on more comprehensive forms of cooperation that would adopt an integrated approach to the various aspects of water use and needs (quality, quantity, flood protection, preservation of ecosystems, and prevention of accidents) and might potentially facilitate negotiations by linking water management issues. The agreements lacked effective organizational backup, at least in the form of joint monitoring. Most critically, both treaties failed to address fluctuations in flow, meaning that they contained no clauses referring to the periods of drought and flooding that occur frequently in the basin and cause drastic changes in the flow regime that require urgent adjustment to the use of the rivers.37 During that period, water relations among the riparian states were mostly handled at diplomatic level through the exchange of curt diplomatic notes. When diplomacy failed to ease the tensions, meetings were held at the highest level where the driving rationale was the pursuit of Turkey’s, Syria’s, and Iraq’s strategic national objectives. Yet these strategic interests lacked sound and scientific foundations, particularly when they were most needed as water shortages grew and water quality deteriorated. Instead, rhetoric prevailed and all parties stressed the need to achieve food self-sufficiency, food security, or other social and regional development objectives,38 claiming them to be strategic national goals. Consequently, the riparians’ negotiating strategies were incompatible and, not surprisingly, favored national claims.

Rivers for Cooperative Endeavors In the first decade of the 2000s, transboundary water policies evolved from hostile to cooperative. Political will expressed at the highest decisionmaking levels was most decisive in building these cooperative frameworks. However, water bureaucracies also had a role in that change.


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In 1998, Turkish-Syrian relations became tense when Turkey threatened Syria with military measures to prevent Syria from providing ample support to the PKK. War was prevented by the mediation of then Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi. Syria decided not to risk a war and expelled the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan who was subsequently captured in February 1999. This event paved the way for the conclusion of the Turkish-Syrian Ceyhan Security Agreement in October 1998. Shortly after signing, Syria requested the resumption of the JTC meetings to enable the water issue to be considered.39 The Ceyhan Agreement (Adana Accords) marked the beginning of a new era based on more cooperative initiatives of interest to both sides. One of the first initiatives was the 2001 Joint Communiqué between the Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAP RDA) under the Turkish prime minister and the General Organisation for Land Development (GOLD) under the Syrian Ministry of Irrigation.40 The GAP RDA-GOLD cooperation was based on the common understanding of the sustainable utilization of the region’s land and water resources through joint rural development and environmental protection projects, joint training programs, exchanges of experts and technology, and study missions. Syrian and Turkish delegations visited each other’s development project sites. During these contacts, the two sides had opportunities to exchange their experiences of positive and negative impacts of water and land resource development projects going back several decades. Once again, the water issue was relegated to the technical level, as in the 1960s, and left to intergovernmental networks composed of technocrats. However, unlike the technical negotiations in the 1960s, the GAP-GOLD dialogue covered such disparate issues as urban and rural water quality management and rural development (participatory irrigation management and agricultural research). Even though the dialogue between these two leading institutions has not resulted in concrete project implementation or regular exchange programs, it has served as a semiformal consultation mechanism and paved the way for initiatives taken by other government departments and agencies in 2008 and 2009 with the similar objective of solving transboundary water problems within a broader framework of political, economic, and social development.41

High-Level Strategic Cooperation Councils and Water In 2008, the Turkish government embarked on a number of cooperative foreign policy initiatives involving its southern neighbors, Syria and Iraq in particular. The political reasons behind these initiatives can be analyzed at contextual, regional, bilateral, and domestic levels, although that analysis is beyond the scope of this article. However, the political will expressed and sealed at the highest level in Turkey for broader cooperation with its southern neighbors was also reflected in official statements and cooperative trans-

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boundary water development and management initiatives in the Euphrates, Tigris, and Orontes river systems.42 In this context, Turkey and Iraq signed a Joint Political Declaration on the Establishment of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HSCC) on 10 July 2008. The first ministerial meeting of the HSCC, a forum for joint meetings of the Iraqi and Turkish cabinets, was held in Istanbul on 17–18 September 2009. The Turkish foreign minister was accompanied by seven executive members of the cabinet, including the ministers of trade, energy, transport, agriculture, and the environment (water) while the Iraqi minister was accompanied by nine executive cabinet members, the counterparts of the Turkish ministers, and their deputy ministers. According to the strategic partnership agreement between Turkey and Iraq, the HSCC was to meet at least once a year, with the prime ministers of the two countries chairing the meetings. Ministerial meetings, on the other hand, would be held at least three times a year and technical delegations would come together four times a year. Decisions made by the HSCC would be implemented within the framework of an action plan. Barham Salih, Iraq’s former deputy prime minister, called the agreement “the starting point of the Middle East common market” and likened the improving relations between Iraq and Turkey to the relationship between France and Germany in the 1950s.43 On the other front, the first Turkish-Syrian HSCC meeting took place in Damascus on 22–23 December 2009. These cooperative initiatives taken at the highest political level made it possible to resolve prolonged disputes between Turkey and Syria. Thus, under the chairmanship of two ministers, Syria’s minister of irrigation and Turkey’s minister of the environment and forestry, a commission composed of technocrats and diplomats from the two countries met in Ankara on 8 December 2009 to prepare the framework and contents of the series of protocols, Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), on the modalities of development, management, and use of the waters of the Euphrates, the Tigris, and the Orontes rivers. That period of rapprochement showed that, led by politicians at the highest level, the riparians preferred functional cooperation and a benefitsharing approach.44 One productive approach to the development of transboundary waters was to take a regional view of the benefits to be derived from the basin. The Euphrates-Tigris case supports the observation that, when negotiations focused solely on water sharing, upstream and downstream differences were exacerbated, giving greater prominence to water gains and losses. This has regularly required the riparians to see water as more than just a commodity to be divided—a zero-sum, rights-based view— and to develop a positive-sum, integrative approach that ensures the equitable allocation not of the water but of the benefits derived from it. Adding development opportunities in other sectors may enlarge the area of possible


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agreement and make implementation more manageable. Multiresource linkages may offer more opportunities for the generation of creative solutions, allowing for greater economic efficiency through a “basket of benefits.”45 Broadening the scope of the cooperation agenda to take in sectors of socioeconomic development, including water, and simultaneously fostering a situation of regional interdependence were in fact the main aims underlying the establishment of both the Turkish-Syrian and Turkish-Iraqi HSCCs, which were set up to address more than the water predicament in the region. However, the comprehensive and strategic nature of the HSCCs resulted in an innovative approach to transboundary water issues in that the water and diplomatic bureaucracies were empowered to draft and sign a series of protocols addressing problems associated with water development, management, and use. In fact, the Turkish and Syrian authorities managed to convene the second meetings of their HSCC at ministerial and prime ministerial levels in October and December 2010, respectively.46 In addition to issuing a joint statement on bilateral and regional cooperation, they evaluated the progress made in implementing the agreements between the two countries signed in 2009.47 The second meeting of the Turkey-Iraq HSCC was postponed, however, due to the delay in the formation of the Iraqi government in 2010.48 Clearly, this HSCC is going to remain dormant for some time longer, particularly until a solution is found to the political crisis that surfaced as Turkey began to denounce the Syrian government in August 2011 for ill-treating protesters.49 Interestingly, however, even under these unfavorable political conditions, middle-level layers of both bureaucracies remain eager to maintain the contacts that were established under the auspices of the joint cabinet (ministerial) meetings of the HSCC. There are plans to convene international multilateral meetings of appropriate professionals and stakeholders to discuss such issues covered by the bilateral protocols as the protection, efficient utilization, and management of water resources.50

New Water Protocols and New Perspectives on Transboundary Water Issues The Water Protocol Between Turkey and Iraq

At the Turkey-Iraq HSCC meeting, forty-eight MoUs were signed by the two countries on 15 October 2009, one of them concerning water. Even though the river is not referred to by name in the title,51 the text of this MoU explicitly states that it concerns the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. In line with the envisaged functional approach, the MoU was signed by Iraq’s Ministry of Water Resources and Turkey’s Ministry of the Envi-

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ronment and Forestry (MoEF), the government departments responsible for all technical matters relating in particular to water development and management and the protection of water resources. The MoU identified particular issues requiring urgent transboundary cooperation, including assessment of water resources, which are tending to diminish because of increases in water use and climate change; assessment and calibration of existing hydrological measuring stations; modernization of existing irrigation systems; prevention of water losses from domestic water supply systems and provision of safe water; construction of water supply and water treatment facilities in Iraq, with the participation of Turkish companies; development of mechanisms to solve problems arising during the dry period; and joint investigation, planning, and projects for flood protection. The modalities of cooperation are also described in the MoU. The parties agree to transfer knowledge, experience, and technology on water management practices by developing cooperative projects and conducting research and development activities. It is interesting to note that, rather than arguing over only their respective water shares, as happened at past JTC meetings, the Iraqi and Turkish authorities focused on common issues in transboundary water management and use. Those issues are directly related to water development, use, and management practices at national level, which actually have direct impacts on transboundary water policies and practices. The protocol also specifically addresses emerging regional (and global) issues such as the effects of climate change on regional water resources, which had been neglected for decades. Another distinct characteristic of the MoU is that it envisages involving such nongovernmental entities as academic institutions, private firms, and nongovernmental organizations in the activities that it covers. The Orontes: From a Bone of Contention to a Medium of Cooperation

At the first meeting of their HSCC held in Damascus on 23–24 December 2009, Turkey and Syria signed fifty protocols, four of which concerned regional waters (i.e., those of the Euphrates, Tigris, and Orontes). In this context, the parties agreed to build a joint dam where the Orontes River crosses the Turkish-Syrian border.52 They agreed to share the cost of the dam, which is to produce energy for both sides and irrigate 20,000 ha of agricultural land in Turkey and 10,000 ha in Syria.53 The foundation stones were laid in February 2011, with the Turkish and Syrian prime ministers in attendance, just before the unrest broke out in Syria in the spring of 2011. Although the dam will take some years to complete and work may even be stalled by the recent disagreements between Turkey and Syria, the signing of an official protocol on the waters of the Orontes was a breakthrough in Turkish-Syrian hydropolitics and also in wider political relations. For


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decades, Syria did not recognize the Turkish-Syrian political border where the Orontes crosses it, claiming territorial rights to the Turkish province of Hatay (historically, Alexandretta). The signing of the protocol implied the recognition of the border. Also for decades, Turkey called for regulation of the waters of the Orontes River, which often fluctuated, causing severe flooding or drought in downstream Turkish towns and villages. However, Syria never agreed to build water development structures on the border, arguing that the Orontes is a national river. In this respect, the Protocol of December 2009 marks a major change in Syria’s attitude. In fact, it marks the beginning of flourishing cooperation between otherwise hostile riparian states after their agreement to build joint dams on their joint borders.54 Syria’s Emerging Need for Water from the Tigris

Turkey and Syria signed a protocol on the Tigris under which Turkey agreed that Syria could withdraw an annual 1.25 km3 of water, provided that the flow of water is within the average.55 The withdrawals are based on monthly flows and are to be made at appropriate times and places.56 This protocol is further evidence of a change in the positions of the water and diplomatic bureaucracies, particularly in Syria. When the hydropolitical tensions were at their peak in the 1980s, Syria had never agreed to discuss the waters of the Tigris, considering it to be insignificant because of its geographical location in the basin: the Tigris forms the boundary between Turkey and Syria and between Syria and Iraq for about 40 km. At that time, Syria focused almost exclusively on the Euphrates, prioritizing the completion of the Euphrates Valley Project. As Syrian technocrats eventually encountered technical and social difficulties in reclaiming land in the Euphrates Valley, their attention turned to northeastern Syria where it was possible to expand the amount of irrigated land. Issues of Common Concern: Protocols on Water Efficiency, Drought Management, and Quality Remediation

The other two protocols signed by Turkey and Syria cover issues that have only recently come to the agenda of transboundary water negotiations among the technocrats and diplomats concerned.57 In this respect, it is interesting to note that this was the first official agreement concluded by the two countries on the protection of the environment, water quality management, water efficiency, drought management, and flood protection with a view toward addressing the adverse effects of climate change. Unlike the bilateral protocol concluded in 1987 on sharing the waters of the Euphrates, these protocols focused on how the riparian states were to use, manage, protect, and develop the diminishing water resources of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. An analysis of the wording of these two protocols reveals that the water bureaucracies had a chance to open up the countries’ black boxes. On

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the basis of the political will expressed at the highest level of the HSCC, water technocrats have together concentrated on the urgent problems of the acute shortage and deteriorating quality of water resources. Gone are the days when the two countries adopted reserved and rigid positions on their water shares and rights: now they openly discuss new and efficient methods and procedures for managing the supply of and demand for water for agricultural, industrial, and domestic purposes. The protocols cover a range of issues. These include various forms of supply management such as cloud seeding (artificial rain) to increase precipitation, the installation of early flood warning systems and flood protection measures, and agricultural practices with drought-resistant crops. They also include various forms of demand management such as sharing of knowledge and experience about modern irrigation techniques; prevention of water losses in domestic water supply; organization of training programs relating to the operation of dams and the efficient utilization of water resources; sharing of knowledge and technology pertaining to wastewater storage and the reuse of treated wastewater in agriculture and industry; and cooperation on the development of land use techniques to increase the amount of soil and water saved. The general approach and the content of the protocols reveal too that Turkey’s firsthand experience with the European Union’s water policy and approach to water management has been broadly translated into the principles envisioned in the protocols. Therefore, the staff of Turkey’s MoEF58 in particular supported these protocols vigorously because they felt that their implementation would be useful practice for the implementation and extension of the new water legislation in Turkey transposed from the European Union’s water legislation.59 The European Union’s “river basin level” water management approach in the form of its Water Framework Directive of 2000 will not only be applied in Turkey’s national river basins, but also in such transboundary river basins as the Euphrates, Tigris, and Orontes. Moreover, common standards for measuring (gauging) quantities of water and monitoring the quality of transboundary water are among the MoEF’s main objectives in its cooperation with Syria and Iraq. In this context, one of the main aims of the Turkish bureaucracy is to establish environmental quality standards and to implement the polluter-pays and cost-recovery principles at transboundary level, as the relevant MoU stipulates.60

The Ministers’ Network and the JTC Revitalized On 22 March 2007, at the opening of an international conference in Antalya, Turkey, the Turkish minister of the environment and forestry invited the Syrian minister of irrigation and the Iraqi minister of water resources to join him in discussing how to set up a cooperative framework to deal with regional water issues.61 These ministers decided that the periodic meetings of the JTC, which had been held between 1982 and 1992 before being com-


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pletely abandoned, should be resumed. Thus, a series of JTC meetings have been held since, the first in Damascus, Syria, on 7–11 May 2007, which was followed by a tripartite ministerial meeting in Damascus, on 10–11 January 2008, at which it was agreed that training programs on irrigation water management and efficient utilization of water resources would be conducted. At the second JTC meeting held in Istanbul on 23–24 February 2009, officials decided that the next ministerial meeting would be held in Baghdad, opportunities for developing joint projects would be seized, and a JTC bylaw stating its mission and responsibilities would be adopted. On 3 September 2009, both a tripartite ministerial meeting and the third meeting of the JTC took place in Ankara. The three sides decided to cooperate in initiating water training programs and in monitoring and exchanging information on climate change and drought conditions in the three countries. They also agreed to erect new water flow gauging stations and to modernize the existing ones. After talks between the Iraqi foreign minister and the Turkish environment minister, Turkey further agreed to provide 550 m3/sec of water from the Euphrates River during the dry season in the autumn of 2009.62 In March 2008, the Turkish, Iraqi, and Syrian ministers agreed to establish a joint water institute in Turkey, with each riparian appointing fifteen water engineers to conduct studies on water use efficiency and improved water management in the region. The institute was to map water resources in the region and draw up a report on measures that the respective countries should take to ensure effective management of those resources. The engineers from the three countries have been meeting to exchange information and know-how. The first training activity in this context concerned modern irrigation practices in the region and the second focused on dam construction and safety. The group has also developed an interest in studying climate change and its impacts on regional waters. The training institute in Istanbul hosted the third training program for experts in that field.63 The ministers’ initiative in reconvening the JTC has facilitated the drafting of a series of MoUs, putting an official seal on cooperation. Moreover, their network has also led to a series of training programs that have helped water bureaucracies in particular to achieve a certain level of common understanding and discourse.64 Furthermore, the ministerial network has proved to be capable of flexibility and spontaneity in addressing acute water shortages in the region by making swift decisions to adjust flows to meet the needs of downstream riparians.

The Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation: A Network of Academics and Professionals Another significant development in the region is the Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC), which was established in May 2005 by a group of scholars and professionals from the three main riparian countries.65 The

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overall goal of the initiative is to promote cooperation among the three riparians with a view toward achieving technical, social, and economic development in the Euphrates-Tigris region. ETIC’s composition and role are remarkably consistent with the epistemic community’s theory and role in institutional bargaining. An epistemic community is defined as a “network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”66 ETIC’s origins can be traced back to early meetings of scientists from Iraq, Syria, and Turkey as well as the United States in 2004.67 This group of dedicated scholars has been meeting with flexible agendas. At the first stage of these gatherings, the participants shared information on national water policies and raised the significance of water issues in the context of the three riparian countries’ socioeconomic development targets. The members of the group were quick to develop a common understanding of existing conditions, pressing problems, and needs in the region, which led them to decide to turn their expertise and experience to account in ETIC. ETIC is a track-two effort, meaning that it is voluntary, nonofficial, nonbinding, not for profit, and nongovernmental. It is not affiliated with any government, but seeks to contribute positively to efforts, official and unofficial, that will enhance the dialogue, understanding, and collaboration among the riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris system. As a multiriparian initiative, ETIC has been unique in that it looks beyond water rights per se to themes related to environmental protection, development and gender equality, water management, governance, and grassroots participation in a holistic, multistakeholder framework.68 ETIC’s members contend that awareness of socioeconomic development is essential to an understanding of the real dynamics of the region. ETIC’s ultimate objective is defined by the founders as being a situation in which the “quality of life for people in all communities, including rural and urban areas, is improved, and harmony among countries and with nature in the Euphrates-Tigris region is achieved,” so that cooperation on technical, social, and economic development in the Euphrates-Tigris region may be promoted. In line with its vision and overall goal, ETIC prepares and implements joint training and capacity-building programs69 as well as undertaking research projects70 aimed at responding to the common needs and concerns of the people in the region.71 In conducting these activities, ETIC has built partnerships with international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and universities.

Conclusion In this article, we described the evolution and change in transboundary water policies in the Euphrates-Tigris river system with the aid of chronological


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analyses of the changing discourses and practices of the water and diplomatic bureaucracies. We revealed that changes in approach from water rights to water needs, for instance, or more particularly from concentrating solely on sharing the quantity to managing the quality of water can be attributed partly to bureaucratic learning processes. In his seminal work, Charles Hermann argues that foreign policy changes can be placed on a continuum indicating the magnitude of the shift from minor adjustment changes, through both program and goal changes, to fundamental changes in a country’s international orientation.72 In line with Hermann’s definition of major foreign policy changes, the program changes could explain the changes in the foreign policies of the riparian states. They are defined as the changes made in the methods or means by which a problem is addressed. At that level of change, what is done and how it is done change, but the purposes for which it is done remain unchanged.73 Changes are qualitative and involve new instruments of statecraft. Indeed, throughout the evolution of their transboundary water policies, the goal pursued by each riparian has not changed: Turkey has been eager to determine what is needed and how resources should be allocated while Iraq and Syria have adopted the same line of reasoning that a sharing agreement should be concluded on the basis of a declaration of fixed quotas. Yet there has been a change in what is done and how it is done in the region since the early 2000s. The high-level contacts have produced a framework for regional cooperation of which water is an integral component. Issues of mutual concern, such as drought management, efficient management of resources, and the improvement of water quality, have come to the fore during the transboundary water talks. Moreover, new instruments of statecraft (i.e., environmental bureaucracies) and nongovernmental entities (i.e., ETIC) have begun to play key roles in shaping the water cooperation agenda. However, our thorough analyses reveal that the change involving various cooperative initiatives is more closely and intimately related to the change in overall political relations, with decisions being made at the highest level. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the overarching problem of deteriorating political relations in the region may have a counter effect on the development of transboundary water cooperation. As the political will fades, particularly in Turkish-Syrian relations, technocratic and diplomatic bureaucracies are encountering serious difficulties in implementing the protocols because they are closely linked to decisionmaking at the highest level. But it should also be noted that, since the early 2000s, contacts have been made, existing networks have been revitalized, and new ones have been created. Thus, a partial institutionalization of water cooperation had already begun before it was abruptly halted in late 2011 as overarching bilateral political relations worsened. When it has a chance to resume, transboundary water cooperation should start from a variety of perspectives and issues, which may again provide opportunities for regional cooperation.

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In such a context, the array of perspectives and issues should include, among other things, joint initiatives for the collection of reliable data on surface and groundwater resources. In fact, water technocrats drafting the recent protocols have already emphasized this aspect by referring to the issue of the assessment of water resources and the calibration of existing hydrological measurement stations in the bilateral protocols. On the basis of such objective and consistent knowledge of the river system, joint projects could be conducted in such water-related development fields as energy, agriculture, the environment, and health. One basic development objective that has had and continues to have a major influence on rivalries concerning water usage is the expansion of irrigated areas in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.74 While rhetoric suggests that overall growth and especially regional growth of population, for whom food security is required, account for the largest share of total irrigation water use in Syria and in the irrigated areas of the GAP (where cotton is planted on 75 percent to 80 percent of the area cultivated), it is in fact the nonfood crop cotton which, together with irrigated wheat, is largely responsible. Iraqi agriculture, on the other hand, uses about 90 percent of its water to promote the cultivation of irrigated wheat and barley on marginal land with high purchase prices and subsidized agricultural inputs, including water. Where their agricultural development strategies are concerned, the three countries have some unsustainable features in common, although to different degrees: investment in irrigated agriculture and the high demand for water are driven by the low cost of irrigation water; the lack of demand for management practices has contributed to the present low efficiency of water use; and high water consumption has resulted in waterlogged areas and saline soils, the reclamation of which require drainage systems and additional water for leaching. Whatever the political, social, and economic rationale for expanding irrigated agriculture, it must be asked whether irrigation-based economic strategies are sustainable, given the constraints (in resource and funding terms) and the regional implications of the intensification of water resource use. Since all three countries are engaged in water resource development through their involvement in the building of infrastructure (dams), transboundary cooperation should also include methods and means of adequately resolving environmental and social issues during the planning and implementation of these large-scale projects. With the additional adverse effects of the domestic unrest in both Syria and Iraq, further complications can be expected. In this unfavorable atmosphere for dialogue at the governmental level, such track-two initiatives (unofficial, professional networks) as ETIC might be consulted since they provide necessary scientific support for the operationalization of the cooperative agreements in the water and socioeconomic sectors. ETIC might engage a variety of stakeholders such as academics, professionals, and rep-


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resentatives of civil society organizations and business circles as well as the competent authorities of international agencies in the implementation of small-scale, but sustainable cooperative projects relating to various aspects of common concern: water quantity and quality management, health, agricultural development, energy production, infrastructure development, and environmental protection. After all, the track-two initiatives are, by their nature, meant to develop a common understanding of problems and solutions cross-nationally and to help the various governments to reach convergent solutions even in the midst of political crises.75

Notes Aysegul Kibaroglu is professor and faculty member in the International Relations Department at Okan University in Istanbul. She served as the adviser to the president of the Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration from 2001 to 2003. Her areas of research include transboundary water politics, international law, political geography, and Turkish water policy. Her publications include Building a Regime for the Waters of the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin (2002) and Turkey’s Water Policy: National Frameworks and International Cooperation, coedited with Waltina Scheumann (2011). Waltina Scheumann joined the German Development Institute/Department of Environmental Policy and Natural Resources Management in 2007, where she leads research on sustainable dam development in Brazil, China, India, Turkey, Ghana, and Cambodia. Her research covers global water governance, institutional arrangements of natural resource (water-land) regimes, and transboundary water politics. She is the coeditor of Turkey’s Water Policy: National Frameworks and International Cooperation (2011). 1. Iran is also a riparian in that it contributes between 9.7 and 11.2 km3 of water a year to the Tigris through its tributaries in the north and between 20 and 24.8 km3 to the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which unites the Tigris and the Euphrates through the Kharun River. See Food and Agriculture Organization, Water Reports 34, Irrigation in the Middle East Region in Figures, Aquastat Survey (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, 2008). 2. For details of the geographical characteristics of the Euphrates and Tigris river system, see Aysegul Kibaroglu, Building a Regime for the Waters of the Euphrates and Tigris River Basin (London: Kluwer Law International, 2002); see also Aysegul Kibaroglu and Waltina Scheumann, “Euphrates-Tigris River System: Political Rapprochement and Transboundary Water Cooperation,” in Aysegul Kibaroglu, Waltina Scheumann, and Annika Kramer, eds., Turkey’s Water Policy (New York: Springer Verlag, 2011). 3. N. Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East (London: Routledge, 1994). 4. P. Beaumont, “The Euphrates River: An International Problem of Water Resources Development,” Environmental Conservation 5 (1978): 35–43. 5. O. Bilen, “Prospects for Technical Cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin,” in A. K. Biswas, ed., International Waters of the Middle East: From Euphrates-Tigris to Nile (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). See also M. L. Belül, “Hydropolitics of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin” (master’s thesis, Middle East Technical University, 1996), p. 67; John F. Kolars and William A. Mitchell, The

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Euphrates River and Southeast Anatolia Development Project (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991). 6. K. Ubell, “Iraq’s Water Resources,” Nature and Resources 7 (1971): 3–9; C. Gischler, Water Resources in the Arab Middle East and North Africa (Cambridge, UK: Menas Resources Studies, 1979); M. Shahin, “Review and Assessment of Water Resources in the Arab World,” Water International 14 (1989): 206–219. 7. Iraq also has a limited amount of groundwater, but it is a shrinking source because withdrawals far exceed natural discharge rates. See UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Water Assessment Program, “Water Resources in Iraq: Quick Facts” (on file with the authors). See also S. Murthy, “Iraq’s Constitutional Mandate to Justly Distribute Water: The Implications of Federalism, Islam, International Law and Human Rights,” George Washington International Law Review 52 (2011): 752. 8. M. Daoudy, The Water Divide Between Syria, Turkey and Iraq, Negotiation, Security and Power Asymmetry (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2005). 9. Aysegul Kibaroglu and O. Unver, “An Institutional Framework for Facilitating Cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin,” International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice 5 (2000): 312. 10. See Belül, “Hydropolitics of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin.” 11. “The Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations Between Iraq and Turkey, Protocol on Flow Regulation of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and of Their Tributaries,” United Nations, Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Utilisation of International Rivers for Other Purposes than Navigation, UN/Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/12 (1963). 12. International Water Power and Dam Construction 44 (1992):12. 13. A. Richards and J. Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East (Boulder: Westview, 1990). 14. R. Hinnebusch, Peasant and Bureaucracy in Baathist Syria (Boulder: Westview, 1989). 15. K. McLachlan, The South-East Anatolia Project (GAP) and Its Effect on Water Supply and Management in Iraq (London: University of London, 1991). 16. J. A. Allan, Agricultural Sector in Iraq (London: University of London, 1990). 17. In hydrological terms, Turkey has twenty-five large river basins exhibiting a wide variation of average annual precipitation, evaporation, and surface run-off parameters. The Tigris-Euphrates basin is the largest and has great potential for the development of natural resources. See S. Tigrek and Aysegul Kibaroglu, “EuphratesTigris River System: Political Rapprochement and Transboundary Water Cooperation,” in Aysegul Kibaroglu, Waltina Scheumann, and Annika Kramer, eds., Turkey’s Water Policy (New York: Springer Verlag, 2011). 18. H. Meliczek, “Land Settlement in the Euphrates Basin of Syria,” in Land Reform: Land Settlement and Cooperatives (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, 1987). 19. J. A. Allan, Agricultural Sector in Iraq (London: University of London, 1990), pp. 1–2. 20. See Kibaroglu and Unver, “An Institutional Framework for Facilitating Cooperation,” pp. 311–330. 21. See J. Cooley, “The War over Water,” Foreign Policy 54(1984): 3–26; T. Naff and R. Matson, Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984); J. R. Starr and D. C. Stoll, US Foreign Policy on Water Resources in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 1987); J. R. Starr, “Water Wars,” Foreign Policy 82 (Spring


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1991): 17–36; J. Bulloch and A. Darwish, Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East (1993). These authors were among the first to draw attention to the conflicts in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. They assume that the struggle over limited and threatened water resources could sever already fragile ties among regional states and lead to an unprecedented upheaval in the area. Another strand of literature argues that it is not water scarcity that is the defining variable in the conflictive attitudes of the riparians, but second-order resource constraints (L. Ohlsson, “Environment, Scarcity and Conflict: A Study of Malthusian Concerns,” report, Department of Peace and Development Research, Göteborg University, 1999); see, for example, Kibaroglu and Unver, “An Institutional Framework for Facilitating Cooperation,” pp. 311–330; Kibaroglu, Building a Regime for the Waters. 22. Disputes over this province emerged in the 1930s when, following a plebiscite held at the end of the French mandate, Hatay became part of Turkey, although this was disputed by Syria. See M. Kibaroglu and Aysegul Kibaroglu, Global Security Watch Turkey: A Reference Handbook (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 2009). 23. See M. Benli Altunisik and O. Tur, “From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations,” Security Dialogue 37 (2006): 232–234. 24. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Water Issues Between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs 1 (1996): 105. 25. Kibaroglu, Building a Regime for the Waters. 26. The regional context in which water issues may or may not lead to interstate conflict, and the role that nonwater issues played (i.e., territorial claims, support for separatist movements, security issues in general) are analyzed, for example, by N. Beshorner, “Water and Instability in the Middle East,” Adelphi Paper No. 273 (Winter 1992/93) (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies); W. Scheumann, “The Euphrates Issue in Turkish-Syrian Relations,” in H. G. Brauch, P. H. Liotta, S. Marquina, P. F. Rogers, M. El-Sayed Selim, eds., Security and Environment in the Mediterranean: Conceptualising Security and Environmental Conflicts (Berlin: Springer, 2003); F. M. Lorenz and E. J. Erickson, “The Euphrates Triangle: Security Implications of the Southeastern Anatolia Project” (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999). 27. G. Kut, “Burning Waters: The Hydropolitics of the Euphrates and Tigris,” New Perspectives on Turkey 9 (1993): 5. 28. Kibaroglu, Building a Regime for the Waters. 29. Article IV of the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, and Article 5 of the UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses are dedicated to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and participation. In addition, these principles of the Helsinki Rules and the convention enumerate the factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization in Article V and Article 6 of these documents, respectively. See ILA, Report of the Fifty-second Conference Held at Helsinki, 484 et seq. (1966); UN General Assembly Res. 51/229 (21 May 1997) (Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses). 30. For further details on the Three-Stage Plan, see Kibaroglu, Building a Regime for the Waters. 31. P. A. Williams, “Turkey’s Water Diplomacy: A Theoretical Discussion,” in Aysegul Kibaroglu, Waltina Scheumann, and Annika Kramer, eds., Turkey’s Water Policy (New York: Springer Verlag), pp. 197–214. 32. The final communiqués of the sixteen Joint Technical Committee meetings were reviewed with the permission of officials of the State Hydraulic Works and revealed the above arguments (on file with the authors).

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33. For the incentives for cooperation resulting from the linking of intersectoral and intrawater sector issues, see D. G. LeMarquand, International Rivers: The Politics of Cooperation (Vancouver: Westwater Research Center, University of British Columbia, 1977); I. Dombrowsky, “The Role of Intra-water Sector Issue Linkage in the Resolution of Transboundary Water Conflicts,” Water International 35, no. 2 (2010): 132–149. 34. Protocol on Matters Pertaining to Economic Cooperation Between the Republic of Turkey and the Syrian Arab Republic, United Nations Treaty Series 87/12171, 17/7/1987. 35. Scheumann, “The Euphrates Issue.” 36. Law No. 14 of 1990, ratifying the joint minutes concerning the provisional division of the waters of the Euphrates River. See http://ocid.nacse.org/qml/research /tfdd/toTFDDdocs/257ENG.htm (accessed 30 May 2010). 37. M. Schiffler, “International Water Agreements: A Comparative View,” in W. Scheumann and M. Schiffler, eds., Water in the Middle East: Potential for Conflicts and Prospects for Cooperation (New York: Springer, 1998), pp. 31–45. 38. J. Barnes, “Managing the Waters of Ba’th Country: The Politics of Water Scarcity in Syria,” Geopolitics 14 (2009): 510–530; L. M. Harris, “Water and Conflict Geographies of the Southeastern Anatolia Project,” Society and Natural Resources 15 (2002): 743–759; M. Ahmad, “Agricultural Policy Issues and Challenges in Iraq: Short- and Medium-term Options,” in Kamil A. Mahdi, ed., Iraq’s Economic Predicament (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2001). 39. Scheumann, “The Euphrates Issue.” 40. A Joint Communiqué Between the Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry, Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAP) and the Arab Republic of Syria, Ministry of Irrigation, General Organization for Land Development, 23 August 2001, Ankara, Turkey (on file with the authors). 41. R. Durth has argued that the level of political and economic integration may make a difference to the degree of cooperation. In nonintegrated regions, such as that of the Euphrates-Tigris basin states, cooperation would be hampered by differing perceptions of justice and equity while cooperation in integrated regions (e.g., the European Union, North America) would be facilitated by a changing role of governments and the participation of the private sector in river management surpassing the narrow confines of foreign relations. Cross-border information flows are no longer controlled by governments and contacts also exist at the nongovernmental or private sector level (e.g., the Rhine and the Great Lakes). R. Durth, “European Experience in the Solution of Cross-border Environmental Problems,” Intereconomics (March/April 1996): 62–68. 42. The Orontes River (Asi) rises in Lebanon and flows through Syria and Turkey. Turkey is the riparian farthest downstream in the river basin and faces chronic water shortages due to prolonged droughts as well as the devastating impacts of intermittent flooding. Since the early 1960s, Turkey has called for the Orontes to be included in its water negotiations with Syria. For this purpose, Turkey has set up a division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take charge of “regional waters,” including the Euphrates-Tigris river basin and the Orontes. However, Syria continues to refuse to discuss the Orontes, claiming that it is a national river because Hatay (Alexandretta) belongs to Syria even though it became part of Turkey following a plebiscite in the early 1930s. 43. “Iraq, Turkey Want to Integrate Economies, Transform Mideast,” Today’s Zaman, E-Gazette, 18 September 2009, www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_get NewsById.action;jsessionid=0AB3CF80095212C8485703CB890052F3?newsId=187 456.


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44. While water rights and water allocation in a transboundary context are difficult aspects, some authors advocate benefit sharing as a concept, which implies a change from the mere volumetric allocation of water to the allocation of the benefits derived from the use of the river. See C. W. Sadoff and D. Grey, “Beyond the River: The Benefits of Cooperation on International Rivers,” Water Policy 4, no. 5 (2002): 389–403; C. W. Sadoff and D. Grey, “Cooperation on International Rivers: A Continuum for Securing and Sharing Benefits,” Water International 30 (2005): 420–427; A. Klaphake, “Kooperation an internationalen Flüssen aus ökonomischer Sicht: das Konzept des Benefit Sharing,” Discussion Paper No. 6/2005 (Bonn: German Development Institute, 2005); and I. Dombrowsky, “Revisiting the Potential for Benefit Sharing in the Management of Transboundary Rivers,” Water Policy 11, no 2 (2009): 125–149. The prospect of gaining more benefits than in the status quo or through unilateral action encourages states to cooperate with each other in the use of shared rivers. The concept suggests that countries can turn the perceived zero-sum game of water allocation into a positive-sum game (i.e., a win-win situation in which all riparians are better off with cooperation than without it). Rather than conceptualizing water use in quantitative terms, states should conceive of a river as a productive resource and attempt to increase and, ideally, maximize the economic benefits of its use. The notion of benefit sharing in the use of shared rivers is advanced inter alia by Sadoff and Grey, “Beyond the River” (2002), and taken up by A. Kibaroglu, Building a Regime (2002), for the Euphrates-Tigris basin. Similarly, D. Phillips et al. argue in Transboundary Water Cooperation as a Tool for Conflict Prevention and Broader Benefit Sharing (Stockholm: Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006) that benefits can be generated in the economic, environmental, or security arena and that activities in these various spheres may have spillover effects. 45. See A. T. Wolf, “Criteria for Equitable Allocations: The Heart of International Water Conflict,” Natural Resources Forum 23, no. 3 (1999): 30; C. Sadoff and D. Grey, “Cooperation on International Rivers: Continuum for Securing and Sharing Benefits,” Water International 30, no. 4 (2005): 420–427. 46. Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement of the Second Ministerial Meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council Between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Republic of Turkey, 2–3 October 2010, Lattakia,” www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-statement-of-the-second-ministerial-meeting-of-the.en.mfa. 47. “Turkey, Syria Renew Diplomatic Pledges,” Hürriyet Daily News, 21 December, 2010, www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-and-syria-gathered-8220 intergovernmental-cabinet8221-in-ankara-2010-12-21. 48. However, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s two-day official visit to Iraq on 29–31 March 2011 is considered as a milestone and included some follow-up to the forty-eight MoUs on more comprehensive economic integration signed during his visit to Iraq on 15 October 2009. Before flying to Baghdad, Erdogan is reported as saying: “Our aim is to turn the Mesopotamian basin into a joint area of stability and welfare through a wide spectrum of projects, from energy to trade, from health to construction and from water resources to transportation.” “Erdogan Says Turkey to Make Mesopotamia Prosperity Region,” 3 March 2011, http://merryabla64.word press.com/tag/recep-tayyip-erdogan-iraq-visit. 49. See www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey%E2%80%93syria.en.mfa. 50. Nermin Cicek, senior expert, Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs, interviewed by A. Kibaroglu, Ankara, Turkey, 28 October 2011. 51. The Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministry of the Environment and Forestry of the Republic of Turkey and the Ministry of Water Resources of the Republic of Iraq on Water, 15 October 2009 (on file with the authors).

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52. The Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic for the Construction of a Joint Dam on the Orontes River Under the Name “Friendship Dam,” 23 December 2009 (on file with the authors). 53. Although the details of the dam will be set out in the feasibility study, it is expected to be approximately 15 m high and have a water storage capacity of 110 million m3. Of that total, 40 million m3 will be used to prevent flooding and the rest for energy production and irrigation. 54. Arpacay Dam between Turkey and Armenia (formerly part of the Soviet Union) built in 1986, and the Lesotho Highlands Project between South Africa and Lesotho are two examples of such ventures. 55. The Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic on the Establishment of a Pumping Station in the Territories of the Syrian Arab Republic for Water Withdrawal From the Tigris River, 23 December 2009 (on file with the authors). 56. In 2002, Syria and Iraq signed a bilateral agreement on the installation of a Syrian pumping station on the Tigris River for irrigation purposes. The quantity of water drawn annually from the Tigris, when the flow of water is within the average, will be 1.25 billion m3 with a drainage capacity proportional to the projected surface of 150,000 ha. Turkish officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and State Hydraulic Works, personal communication with A. Kibaroglu, Ankara, 10 January 2010. 57. The Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in the Field of Efficient Utilization of Water Resources and Coping with Drought; The Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in the Field of Remediation of Water Quality, 23 December 2009 (on file with the authors). “Joint Statement of the First Meeting of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council Between Syria and Turkey,” 24 December 2009, Syrian Arab News Agency. 58. In June 2011, the MoEF was reorganized and renamed the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs. See www.ormansu.gov.tr. 59. Since the mid-2000s, a number of laws and bylaws have been adopted in Turkey on environmental protection and water quality management in the domestic, agricultural, and industrial sectors. This legal reorientation has been guided basically by the European Union’s water legislation within the framework of the accession process. 60. The Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in the Field of Remediation of Water Quality, 23 December 2009. 61. Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interviewed by A. Kibaroglu, Ankara, 19 April 2011. 62. The three states scheduled the following meeting of the JTC for January 2010 in Baghdad. It was postponed, however, due to parliamentary elections in Iraq and to long delays in the formation of a government in Iraq. The meeting was again postponed because of the unrest in Syria and the election period in Turkey in June 2011. 63. Officials of the State Hydraulic Works, Ministry of the Environment and Forestry, interviewed by A. Kibaroglu, 10 March 2010, Ankara. 64. George Soumi, minister of irrigation, interviewed by A. Kibaroglu, Damascus, Syria, 11 November 2010.


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65. This section is drawn mainly from Aysegul Kibaroglu, “The Role of Epistemic Communities in Offering New Cooperation Frameworks in the EuphratesTigris Rivers System,” Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 2 (2008): 191–195. 66. P. M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization 46 (1992): 13. 67. As a spinoff from a project conducted by the International Center for Peace at the University of Oklahoma, some Iraqi, Syrian, and Turkish participants in the project decided to launch a cooperation initiative in collaboration with the University of Oklahoma and Kent State University. See www.ou.edu/ipc/etic. 68. Summary statement presented at the conclusion of the Twelfth World Water Congress, 26 November 2005, New Delhi; ETIC Newsletter 1, No. 3, ETIC workshop synthesis document, World Water Week, Swedish International Water Institute, Stockholm, 21 August 2006 (on file with the authors). 69. In 2006, the ETIC organized a training program on dam safety in collaboration with the UNESCO for professionals from Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. In March 2009, it arranged a Workshop on Knowledge Technology in Gaziantep, Turkey, for participants from Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. ETIC’s most recent training workshop “Geographical Information Systems and their implementation in natural resources management” was held in Aleppo in January 2010. 70. ETIC has been undertaking a research activity known as “Collaborative Planning and Knowledge Development in the Tigris-Euphrates Region.” The stakeholders in this activity are Iraqi, Syrian, and Turkish university faculty members (on file with the authors). 71. ETIC Newsletter 1, no. 4 (2006) (on file with the authors). 72. Charles Hermann, “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 34 (1990): 3–21. 73. Ibid., p. 5. 74. Domestic and industrial water supply has never played a significant role in terms of volumes extracted from the rivers. 75. In May 2012, ETIC convened the “International Conference on Advancing Cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris Region” in Istanbul, together with Turkey’s Okan University and Germany’s Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law. The conference brought together regional and international scholars and the riparian bureaucracies (water technocrats) who have shown their willingness to preserve and develop relations, which was encouraged by the political will that was initially shown. They in fact perceived water as a technical and vital issue and as a medium of cooperation, a uniting rather than a dividing factor at a time of political difficulties.

Evolution of Transboundary Politics in the Euphrates-Tigris River System

Evolution of Transboundary Politics in the Euphrates-Tigris River System

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