humans are vulnerable to depression, when the goal is to help the individual who ..... For instance, p
From:
The Handbook ofEvolutionary Psychology Edited by David Buss Jolm Wiley and Sons, Hoboken, NJ, 2005
CHAPTER
32
Evolutionary Psychology and Mental Health RANDOLPH 1\1. NESSE
N EVOLUTJONi\RY PERSPECTIVE revolutionized our understanding of be havior over a generation Jgo, b u t most tnental health clinicians and researchers stil l view evolution as an interesting or even thr�atcning al ternative, instead of recognizing it as an essential basic science for understanding mental di sorders. l'v1any factors explain this lag in incorporating new knowledge, but the n1ost important 1nay be the clinician's pragn1atic focus on finding ways to help people nmv. Evolutionary researchers have not found a new treatment for a single mental disorder, so why should n1ental health clinicians and researchers care about evolutionary psychology (EP)? This chapter attempts to answer that question. The greatest value of an evolutionary approach is not some specific find ing or ne\v therapy, but is in stead the framework it provides for uniting a l l JSPL'cts of a biopsychosocial model. Perhaps equa l ly valuable is the deeper empathy fos tered by an evolutionary perspective on l ifl•'s vicissitudes. An evolutionary per spective does not con1pctc with other theories that try to explain why some people have ment.1l di�orders and others do not. Instead, i L a�ks a fundamental ly d i ffer ent question: Why has natural selection left a l l hun1ans so vulnerable to 1nental d isorders? At first, the question seems senseless. Natural selection shapes mecha n isn1s that \vork, so how can it help us understand why the mind fails? It is also d i fficult to sec how i t is useful to know vvhy we are vulnerable. Who cares why a l l humans are vulnerable t o depression, when the goal i s t o help the individual who is depressed here and now? Surmounting these conceptual hurdles is a challenge that requires time and effort. Researchers and cl inicians w i l l n1ake the effort when they know ·what evolution offers to the understanding of mental disorders.
A
WHAT EVOL U T IO N O F F E RS l'v1any ha\'C contributed to the grmv th of evolutionary psychiatry, but the contri butions are in d iverse sources and not ahvays consistent. Early applications of 903
902
EvoLUTJONIZING TRADIT IONAL. DtsciPLJNES OF PsYCHOLOGY
Szasz, T. S. (1974). Tfu: myth ofmenlnl illness: Foundations ofa theory of persona! conduct (Revised cdi tionr New York: Harper & Row. Tinbergcn, N. (1963). On aims and methods of ethology. Zl'ifschrift fiir Ticrpsychofogic, 20, 410-433. Wakefield,]. C. (1992a). The concept of mental disorder: On the boundary between biological facts and social values. American Psychologist, 47, 373-388. Wakefield, J. C. (1992b). Disorder as harmful dysfunction: A conceptual critique of DSM-III-R's definition of mental disorder. Psychological Rct'icw, 99, 232-247. Wakefield, J. C. (1997). Di01gnosing OSM: Pt. 1. DSM and the concept of m.ental disorder. Bcluwior Research and Thcmpy, 35, 633-650. Wakefield, J. C. (1999a). Disorder as a black box essentiolist concept. journal of Al111ormal Psyclwlogy, lUS, 465-472. Wakefield, J. C. (1999b). Evolutionary versus prototype analyses of the concept of di sorder. jou rnal of Abnormal Psychology, 108, 374-399. Wakefield, J. C. (2000). Spimdrels, vestigia! organs, and such: Reply to Murphy and Woolfolk's "The harmful dysfunction analysis of mental disorder." Philosophy, Psycltinfry, and Psyclwlogy, 7, 253-270. Wakefield, J. C. (2004). The myth of open concepts: Meehl's analysis of construct meaning versus black box essenti illism. Applied and Preventive Psychology, 11, 77-82. Wakefield, J. C., & First, M . (2003). Clarifying the distinction between disorder and non-disorder: Confronting the overdiagnosis ("false positives") problem i n DSM-V. In K. A. Phillips, M . B. First, & H. A. Pincus (Eds.), Advancing DSM: Dilemmas in psychiatric diaguosis. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press. Wakefield, J. C., Pottick, K. ]., & Kirk, S. A. (2002). Should the DSM-lV diagnostic criteria for con duct disorder consider social context? American journal of Psycltiatry, 159, 380-386. Wil liams, G. C. (1966). Adaptation and natural selection. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Willi ams, G. C. (1992). Natural selection: Domains, fn,cls, and challenges. New York: Oxford University Press. Wright, L. (1973). Functions. Philosophicnl Review, 82, 139-168. Wright, L. (1976). Tcleologicnl explanations. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
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EVOLUTIONJZINC TRADITIONAL DISCIPL I NES OF PSYCHOLOGY Table 32.1 Eight Fundamental Contributions
An evolutionary perspective on mental disorders: 1. Asks new questions about why natural selection has left us all vulnerable to mental disorders, questions with six kinds of possible answers, 2. Offers the beginnings of the kind of functional understanding for mental health professions that physiology provides for the rest of medicine, 3. Provides a framework for a deeper and more empathic understanding of individuals, 4. Explains how relationships work, 5. Provides a way to think clearly about development and the ways that early experiences influence later characteristics, 6. Provides a foundation for understanding emotions and their regulation, 7. Provides a foundation for a scientific diagnostic system, 8. Provides a framework for incorporating multiple causal factors that explain why some people get mental disorders while others do not.
ethology to mental disorders (McGuire & Fairbanks, 1977; White, 1 '174) gave rise to mort> specific and comprehensive evolutionary approaches (McCuin· & Troisi, 1998; Pitchford, 2001; Stevens & Price, 1996; Wcncgrat, 1990). Several books cover specific conditions (Baron-Cohen, 1 99�. 1 997; Cilbert, 1 992; Wcnrstanding when , variutions among individuals can result only from diffl'rc•ncf's in gl�IWS, differ ences in environments, and the interactions between thcn1. The proportion of variance volu t i o n a ry' per:--. p cctive on ince:-;t ,n-oicL; ncv. A lllcr it·lm /ourna! td V�-yclnul ry,
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EssL'X, M . , K l ei n , lvl . , E u n s u k , C., & K.>lin, s i l i /_c c h i l d re n to
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Effects on cortisnl and l:wha\·ior. liiolo,\'iulf fl.
Maluspinn, D., Corcoran, C., F a h i m , C., Berman, A . , Harkavy-Fricdman, ]., Yule, 5., et u l . (2002). Pa ternal age and sporadic sch izophrcnia: Evidence for dt:' novo mutations. !l ll lcricnn Jou rna/ of Clin iral Genetics , 1 1 4-, 299-303. Marks, I. M. (1987). Fcnrs, IJ!wbi,IS, nnd rit uals . Nevv York: Oxford University Press. Marks, L M . , & N cs � e , R. M. (1 9lJ.f). Fec t i \·e nn psychi\.-,hh i ng tun, L)( A nw r i c a n P�v'cholog tccll .-\o;�tKi;llion.
P h i l lips,
w,,;,h i ngtun, !)C: :\ nwr ka n P;,yc h i d r i c
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EVOLUTIONlZING TRADITIONAL 0JSCIPLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY
Pomerleau, C. S. ( 1 997). Cofactors for smoking and evol utionary psychobiology. Addiction, 92, 397�408.
Poulton, R., Davies, S., Menzies, R. G., Langley, ] . D., & Silva, P. A. ( 1 998). E\·idence fnr a non ussociat.ive model of the acquisition of a fear of heights. Bchrwio uml Rcscarc/1 and Thcrnpy, 36, 537�544.
Poulton, R., & Menzies, R. G. (2002). Non-associative fe iology 10, 223-240. W;,kdield, J. C. ( "1 092). Dis(lrder ns harmful dysfunction: A conceptuZll critique of DSM-JJI-R's def i n i t i u n of nwnti1l d i snrdt•r. P�yc/wlos ical Review, 99, 2:\2-247. W,1 l ,..o n, P. j . , & A n d rews, P. VV. (2002). Toward a revised evol utionary adaptationist analysis of deprt>SsJon: rlw soci,t l n.1vigation hypothesis. Journal of Affective Disorders, 12, 1-14. WL'iner, H. { ] 'llJ8}. �o tc s on
