Explaining Elections in Singapore: One-Party Dominance and Valence Politics Supplementary Appendices Steven Oliver⇤ Kai Ostwald† 11 August 2017
Abstract This set of supplementary appendices describes the data and coding of variables used in the manuscript entitled, “Explaining Elections in Singapore: One-Party Dominance and Valence Politics”. The manuscript and appendices are both works in progress and will be updated to include additional information and analysis as necessary. A finalized set of appendices will be made available with publication of the manuscript.
⇤ †
Assistant Professor, Yale-NUS College,
[email protected] Assistant Professor, University of British Columbia,
[email protected]
Appendices A Di↵erence in Party Credibility A.1 Potential Concerns . . . . . . A.1.1 Post-Treatment Bias . A.1.2 Pro-Government Bias . A.2 Additional Analysis . . . . . . A.2.1 Data and Methods . . A.2.2 Results . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
B Experienced Electoral Candidates B.1 Experienced Electoral Candidates in Singapore . B.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.3 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.3.1 PAP and Opposition Incumbents . . . . B.3.2 PAP and Opposition Challenger Quality
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
3 3 3 5 7 7 10
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
14 14 16 16 16 17
C Territorially Encompassing Infrastructure C.1 Party and State at the Grassroots . . . . . . . . . . . C.1.1 The People’s Association . . . . . . . . . . . . C.1.2 The PAP Community Foundation . . . . . . . C.1.3 Residual Sources of PAP Support . . . . . . . C.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C.2.1 People’s Association Grassroots Organizations C.2.2 PCF Kindergartens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C.2.3 Residual Sources of PAP Support . . . . . . . C.3 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C.3.1 People’s Association GRO Density . . . . . . C.3.2 PCF Kindergarten Share . . . . . . . . . . . . C.3.3 Previous PAP Vote Share . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
19 19 20 21 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26
. . . . . . .
29 29 30 31 31 33 33 33
D Cross-Cutting Constituencies D.1 Administrative Reporting Practices . . . . . . . D.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D.2.1 Population Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . D.2.2 URA Administrative Boundaries . . . . D.2.3 WorldPop Population Distribution Data D.2.4 Electoral Division Boundaries . . . . . . D.3 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
. . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
D.3.1 Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D.3.2 Cross-Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E Electoral System E.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E.2 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E.2.1 District Magnitude . . . . . . E.2.2 Relative Representation Index E.2.3 New SMC and GRC . . . . .
. . . . .
F Di↵erence in Policy Positions F.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F.2 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F.2.1 Policy Domains . . . . . . . . . F.2.2 Positions within Policy Domains F.2.3 Di↵erence in Policy Positions .
2
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
34 34
. . . . .
43 43 43 43 44 44
. . . . .
45 45 49 49 50 52
A
Di↵erence in Party Credibility
In Appendix A, we explain, evaluate, and address two potential concerns regarding the data we use to generate Di↵erence in Party Credibility. First, we explain and evaluate these concerns. Second, we address both of these concerns by conducting additional analyses using data on party credibility from an alternative source.
A.1
Potential Concerns
We identify two potential concerns: The first is with respect to post-treatment bias resulting from the use of data collected through post-election surveys. The second is with respect to the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), its relationship with the PAPdominated government, and the reliability of data collected through IPS surveys. A.1.1
Post-Treatment Bias
The first concern stems from the use of data collected through post-election surveys. We argue that voters’ comparative assessments of party credibility influence vote choice and subsequent election outcomes. In order to test for this relationship across more than one election, we must use data on assessments of party credibility collected through multiple waves of IPS surveys as, to our knowledge, there have been no alternative e↵orts to systematically collect this data across multiple elections. The need to rely on data collected through post-election surveys, however, complicates the test of our argument due to the threat of post-treatment bias. We possess data on assessments of party credibility reported after elections have been held
3
and election outcomes become common knowledge. Yet election outcomes almost certainly influence subsequent assessments of party credibility reported by survey respondents. The threat posed by post-treatment bias is thus straightforward: If we use Di↵erence in Party Credibility to predict PAP Vote Share with data on assessments reported after election outcomes become common knowledge, then we cannot rule out the alternative explanation that respondents are simply reporting assessments that ex post reflect election outcomes rather than assessments that ex ante influenced their vote choice and thereby shaped election outcomes. Post-treatment bias is a valid concern. Consequently, we use data on assessments of party credibility collected from the preceding survey waves to generate Di↵erence in Party Credibility. For example, we use the di↵erence in percentage of respondents to the post-GE 2006 wave of the survey who either agree or strongly agree that the PAP is a credible party and the percentage that either agree or strongly agree that a given opposition party is a credible party to generate values for Di↵erence in Party Credibility for contests in GE 2011. Similarly, we use the di↵erence in assessments collected in the post-GE 2011 wave of the survey to generate values for GE 2015. While this strategy allows us to rule out the threat of post-treatment bias, it raises a number of additional issues. First, a number of newly formed opposition parties contested seats in GE 2011 and 2015. For example, the RP formed in 2008 and first contested seats in GE 2011. Similarly, the SGF and PPP formed in 2014 and 2015, respectively, and first contested seats in GE 2015. As these parties did not contest seats in the previous election, the survey enumerators did not ask respondents to assess their credibility in the previous survey waves. Second, two long-established
4
opposition parties—the SPP and NSP—contested seats in GE 2006 under the label of the SDA rather than their own party labels. Consequently, the survey enumerators did not ask respondents in the post-GE 2006 wave to assess whether the SPP or NSP were credible parties, but rather whether the SDA was a credible party. We address the resulting issue of missing values for Di↵erence in Party Credibility as follows: First we assign newly formed parties the value of the least credible party from the previous round of the survey. As new opposition parties have not contested elections and have no established reputation among Singaporean voters, we argue it is reasonable to assume that voters perceive these parties as among the least credible within the opposition camp. Second, we assign values for the credibility of the SDA to the opposition parties that participated in the SDA coalition in GE 2006. A.1.2
Pro-Government Bias
The second concern stems from the relationship between IPS and the government of Singapore. Specifically, some observers raise general concerns about the reliability of data collected through IPS surveys given the nature of IPS as a ‘quasi-government institution’. We thus feel it is important to carefully evaluate whether this relationship should disqualify the use of data collected through IPS surveys. We argue that even if we adopt a critical perspective on IPS as an institution established to serve the needs of the government, it does not necessarily follow that data collected through IPS surveys is unreliable or provides a biased reflection of public opinion. The context in which IPS was established and the function which it was intended to serve is relevant.
5
IPS was established at the behest of the PAP government in the aftermath of negative electoral shocks in the early 1980s: In 1981, the PAP saw its first postIndependence loss of a seat in Parliament to the WP during a by-election in Anson SMC. GE 1984 saw the loss of an additional seat to the SDP and a sharp decline in PAP vote share from GE 1980. Although the PAP ultimately received 64.8% of votes cast, leaders saw the decline in support as indicative of a worrisome trend. In the aftermath of GE 1984, the PAP held an election post-mortem to identify specific reasons for the decline in popular support and to identify steps to arrest this trend. The subsequent report concluded that a series of unpopular policy proposals unveiled during the election year and the failure of existing input institutions—the network of party and state grassroots organizations—to provide the government with reliable information about the discontent around these policies were the proximate reasons for the decline in PAP support. Underlying this conclusion was also a recognition that a growing desire existed in society for greater input into the policy-making process and that existing input institutions were not up to this task. The response of the government was to establish a range of new input institutions designed to invite and channel input from outside of the government into the public policy-making process: IPS was one of these new institutions.1 Established in 1988 under the patronage of the Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong as a private company with the status of an “Institution of Public Character” rather than as a state-funded statutory board, IPS was intended to conduct policy relevant research focused on domestic issues, and provide a forum for individuals outside of government 1
Other institutions created to channel input into public policy-making include the Feedback Unit (FBU) established in 1985 and organized under the Ministry of National Development.
6
to express views on public policy, a forum within which they might, according to Goh, “disagree agreeably” (Henson 1988, 18). The overarching point that we make is that while IPS was indeed established by the government and has maintained a close relationship ever since, it was never intended to function as a ‘mouthpiece’ for the government. Rather, IPS was established in part to circumvent existing party and state institutions that failed to provide the government with reliable information on public opinion. Although this does not allow us to rule out the possibility of pro-government bias in IPS surveys, it suggests that the government itself had a clear interest in establishing IPS in order to provide unbiased, reliable information.
A.2
Additional Analysis
We recognize that readers may not be entirely satisfied. Consequently, we conduct an additional analysis using data on assessments of opposition party credibility from an alternative source—a single-shot, pre-election survey conducted by the independent and non-partisan Malaysia-based Merdeka Center for Opinion Research—in order to address both concerns. First, we describe the data and methods. Second, we present our results. A.2.1
Data and Methods
We use data collected by the Merdeka Center for Opinion Research as part of a preelection survey conducted in the weeks before GE 2011. The Merdeka Center is a private, non-partisan opinion research firm based in Selangor, Malaysia. We know of 7
no connection between the Merdeka Center and the government of Singapore. Moreover, scholars researching political attitudes in Singapore have enlisted the technical assistance of the Merdeka Center to conduct surveys in Singapore (e.g. Welsh 2016). The Merdeka Center (2011) polled 611 Singaporeans ages 18 and above using random stratified sampling based on electoral division, ethnic, and age groups. The Merdeka Center conducted the survey through telephone interviews carried out between 11 April 2011 and 5 May 2011 and included questions in their survey regarding the credibility of opposition parties. Specifically, survey enumerators asked the following question: Do you think the opposition in your area is credible? Figure A.1 shows the survey results. The percentages of respondents who assess the opposition in their area to be credible is uniformly lower than the percentage who assess the opposition to be credible in IPS surveys. Nevertheless, the rank order of opposition parties according to credibility is essentially the same: Respondents assess the WP to be the most credible while new opposition parties that never contested elections before GE 2011 such as the RP are assessed as the least credible. Although the survey did not ask respondents to assess PAP credibility, the data collected on assessments of opposition party credibility nevertheless allows us to test for the e↵ect of variation in opposition party credibility in the context of GE 2011. Moreover, it allows us to rule out both post-treatment bias and concerns related to pro-government bias resulting from the use of data collected through IPS surveys.
8
1.0
Figure A.1: Opposition Party Credibility from Merdeka Center Survey
0.6 0.4 0.0
0.2
Percentage Response
0.8
Credible Don’t Know Not Credible No Response
WP
SDP
NSP
SDA
RP
SPP
Opposition Party
Note: Figure A.1 based on estimates of Opposition Party Credibility reported by Merdeka Center (2011).
9
A.2.2
Results
We replicate the basic model that we use to produce our main results in the manuscript with data on assessments of opposition party credibility collected through the Merdeka Center’s survey. We present these results in Table A.1. Model 1 presents our baseline regression in which we regress PAP Vote Share on Opposition Party Credibility. Models 2 through 5 successively include covariates to account for the three dimensions of party strength. Model 6 includes covariates to account for electoral system e↵ects. For all models, we calculate coefficient standard errors using robust standard errors and include opposition party fixed e↵ects.2 Models 1 through 6 again show consistent support for our argument. The estimated coefficient on Opposition Party Credibility is in the anticipated direction and significant in all models. The addition of covariates does not overturn these results although the magnitude of the e↵ect begins to vary noticeably and the adjusted Rsquared declines with their inclusion in Models 5 and 6. We thus use the results from Model 4 to estimate the predicted e↵ect of Opposition Party Credibility. Figure A.2 illustrates the predicted e↵ect of Opposition Party Credibility on PAP Vote Share based upon results presented in Model 4 of Table A.1.3 According to model estimates, the predicted e↵ect of a one standard deviation increase in Opposition Party Credibility translates into a 4.69% decrease in PAP Vote Share. The predicted e↵ect of a change in Opposition Party Credibility from its minimum to its 2
Models also omit both Opposition Incumbent and PAP Challenger as all opposition incumbents vacated their previous seats to challenge incumbent PAP MPs during GE 2011. 3 We estimate the predicted e↵ect of Model 4 rather than Model 6 as the addition of covariates in Models 5 and 6 yields no corresponding improvement in goodness of fit statistics.
10
Table A.1: Opposition Party Credibility and PAP Vote Share PAP Vote Share (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
1.068⇤⇤⇤ (0.224)
1.321⇤⇤⇤ (0.214)
0.795⇤⇤⇤ (0.191)
0.870⇤⇤⇤ (0.158)
1.280⇤⇤⇤ (0.255)
1.507⇤⇤⇤ (0.293)
PAP Incumbent
0.132⇤⇤⇤ (0.039)
0.008 (0.049)
0.022 (0.048)
0.014 (0.051)
0.067 (0.084)
Opposition Challenger Quality
0.088⇤⇤ (0.040)
0.104⇤⇤⇤ (0.038)
0.074⇤ (0.041)
0.156⇤⇤⇤ (0.039)
0.172⇤⇤⇤ (0.052)
PA-GRO Density
0.015 (0.011)
0.009 (0.010)
0.025⇤⇤ (0.012)
0.001 (0.017)
PCF Kindergarten Share
0.069⇤ (0.037)
0.069⇤ (0.039)
0.097⇤⇤ (0.046)
0.039 (0.045)
Previous PAP Vote Share
0.046 (0.062)
0.033 (0.046)
0.117⇤ (0.063)
0.107 (0.097)
Opposition Stronghold
0.172⇤⇤⇤ (0.055)
0.175⇤⇤⇤ (0.055)
0.131⇤⇤⇤ (0.048)
0.148⇤ (0.075)
Percent Malay
0.007 (0.130)
0.245 (0.235)
0.147 (0.251)
Percent Indian
1.070⇤⇤⇤ (0.376)
0.276 (0.606)
0.590 (0.698)
Percent Other
1.196 (0.901)
2.507⇤⇤ (1.114)
2.847⇤⇤⇤ (1.058)
Percent High-Middle Income
0.595⇤⇤ (0.235)
0.710⇤⇤ (0.287)
Percent HDB
0.270⇤⇤ (0.120)
0.144 (0.150)
Percent Born Pre-Independence
0.341⇤⇤ (0.161)
0.479⇤⇤ (0.240)
Opposition Party Credibility
District Magnitude
0.008 (0.006)
Deviation from Electoral Quotient
0.165⇤⇤ (0.075)
New GRC
0.012 (0.021)
New SMC
0.027 (0.037)
Constant
Opposition Party Fixed E↵ects Observations R2 Adjusted R2
0.904⇤⇤⇤ (0.054)
0.921⇤⇤⇤ (0.042)
0.715⇤⇤⇤ (0.095)
0.727⇤⇤⇤ (0.082)
1.111⇤⇤⇤ (0.186)
1.253⇤⇤⇤ (0.189)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
26 0.473 0.342
26 0.717 0.607
26 0.847 0.727
26 0.884 0.735
26 0.915 0.734
26 0.945 0.654
Note: Models estimated with robust standard errors; ⇤ p
