Exploring Mindset Agency Theory Maurice Yolles,
[email protected] Gerhard Fink,
[email protected] Working Paper of the Organisational Coherence and Trajectory (OCT) Project http://www.octresearch.net 19 December 2013 Abstract This paper develops a socio-cognitive theory of the normative personality of a plural agency like for instance an organisation or a political system. The personality is represented through formative cognitive traits that arise from the Sagiv-Schwartz cultural values study. To establish the traits the principles of Maruyama’s meta-theory of mindscapes are examined and related to Mindset Agency Theory. A Maruyama “mindscape” can be understood as a construct from which coherent sets of behavioural mind-sets can emerge. A specific set of goals, demands and behaviours would be typical for a social-cognitive system that is ruled by a single mindscape. However, pure mindscapes are extremes, and will likely be rarely observed to rule a single agency. In any self-referential, self-regulating, self-organising and pro-active social system different modes of thought (or paradigms) are prevalent and can be related to different mindscapes. As highlighted by Bandura, such interaction between prevalent forces can be modelled with cybernetic approaches, which can explain the internal dynamics of a system. This research creates a generic model that has the potential to distinguish between different types of personalities within the same framework and can illustrate the sources of the internal cultural dynamics of a system. Keywords: Agency theory, cultural dynamics, efficacy, mindscapes, mindsets, normative personality, social intelligence, traits. 1. Introduction Our purpose in this paper is to develop a dynamic model of personality that can represent some of the complex conceptualisations of Bandura, Jung and Piaget. To do so it will create a basis that links trait/type theories by developing on the little known mindscape theory, and link to other cognitive theories of personality. Boje (2004) has shown that Maruyama-mindscapes are a constrained set of personality mindset types that can be assigned to a personality (or in the context of a social, to a “normative personality”). Boje intuited that Maruyama's mindscapes could be explained through three Foucaultian trait dimensions - knowledge, ethics and power - which could operate as a trait basis for mindscape modes. The lack of an empirical basis for Boje’s traits has led us to employ an alternative trait basis that arises from the extensive empirical work on cultural values undertaken by Shalom Schwartz (1994). The result is the creation of what we call Sagiv-Schwartz (2007) Mindset types. We then elaborate on this through the development of agency theory within which we discuss the role of cultural and social environments with respect to the internal and external dynamics of social systems. A culturally based sociocognitive agency meta-model is introduced that sits on “living systems” theory. The agency is adaptive, has a normative personality, and an epistemic state determined by its formative traits, the function of which is control. These traits can take bi-polar epistemic values called enantiomers. These, combined together, at the extremes give 8 different cognitive types that 1
define the space of personality type mindsets. The personality type is influenced by the culture that the agency is bound to. The traits can be used to explain the what, why and how of dynamic agency behaviour in complex situations. Initially we briefly explore the set of theories that are relevant to our approach in order to develop Mindset theory. Beyond this we shall develop dynamic Mindset Agency Theory that encompasses a personality within its social and cultural environments. It is a trait theory, where the traits take on special control functions that ultimately orientate the personality towards a potential set of “typical patterns of behaviour”. Next, we discuss the immanent cultural dynamics of social systems and finally we illustrate paradigm ‘cycles’ from stable state through system thrift and tensions into crises, which finally may either lead to transformation of a system, or the decay of a system, or to a revival of the ‘old paradigm’ through a ‘more of the same’ type of strategy. 2. Personality, Traits and Mindsets The characteristics that determine the nature of personality can be represented by a variety of theories. Mindscape theory is used together with Sagiv-Schwarz (2007) theory to create a new Mindset Theory which can represent personality types. Sagiv-Schwartz theory is a consequence of an important empirical study of epistemic cultural values. Mindscape theory is little recognised for reasons that include its lack of generative transparency, but as we shall show, it has greater cognitive utility than more traditional trait or type approaches. We shall also show that mindscape modes can be transparently generated from combinations of bipolar traits that arise from Sagiv-Schwartz theory. The function of such traits is explained through Jung’s (1923) approach to a theory of personality, where traits can be inferred as having some virtual nature, and can take one of a pair of bi-polar epistemic values. These bipolar values have an interactive relationship, and act as auxiliaries to each other, thereby creating what may be referred to as an auxiliary process. A trait is usually seen as a distinguishing feature, characteristic or quality of a personality style. It creates a predisposition for a personality to respond in a particular way to a broad range of situations (Allport, 1961). Traits arise from an interconnection between personality and situation (Chapman et al., 2000), resulting for instance in the interaction model of personality3 (Stevens and Rodin, 2001). Traits are also described as enduring patterns of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and oneself that are exhibited in a wide range of social and personal contexts. They constitute habitual patterns of thought, emotion and stable clusters of behaviour. They are therefore better seen as constructs that reflect different sets of values and attitudes. There may be a whole variety of traits, but we can also identify super-traits (Bandura, 1999) or global traits (Van Egeren, 2009) which play a formative role in the development of personality. These formative traits are constituted as self-regulatory propensities or styles that affect how individuals characteristically pursue their goals (Van Egeren, 2009). In this paper when we refer to traits, we shall mean formative traits. These operate as continuous variables which together define a personality space, and are subject to small degrees of continuous variation. Traits may take scalar values that for Eysenck (1957) determine personality type. As an illustration, the Five Factor Method (FFM1 or the Big Five) is an empirically based classificatory trait approach where the traits take on single pole and bi-polar values (Cattel, 1945; Goldberg, 1993; Costa & McCrae 1992). Normally, types are assignments of condition that can be associated with a set of characteristics or properties. There are theories that explore types, though mostly the traits are 2
inferred as existing virtually, and unspecified. Thus, as with Jung’s theory on which it sits, in Myers-Briggs Type Inventory (MBTI; see Myers, 2000) traits may be deemed to be inferable with some unrecognised virtual existence. That traits may have a virtual nature does not mean that they do not take on some implicit form of necessary but unidentified control function (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). There is some confusion in the literature in the way that types are defined. Some authors (e.g. Eysenck, 1957) find that simple distinguishing marks may qualify single traits as types, while Myers-Briggs when referring to types means meta-types, i.e. a determinable collection of types (Myers, 2000). Following Eysenck, types can be defined through a trait that can characterize a system. If more than a single trait is needed to characterize a system, then types may occur as some form of composite of several traits with certain distinguishing marks. Thus for instance consider the case of the extreme poles of bi-polar traits. The number of types (z) to be generated from bi-polar traits depends on the number of traits (n) that constitute a system: z = 2n. In a case where three states of a trait (e.g. the extremes and a range in the middle) constitute a system, then z = 3n. We have already referred to MBTI as a “personality type” approach with virtual traits, and which operates as a classificatory system that was created from Jung’s (1923) bi-polar temperament personality theory. From 4 bipolar virtual traits, a system of 16 personality types was created by Myers-Briggs (Myers & McCaulley, 1985; Myers, McCaulley, Quenk & Hammer, 1998). While personality traits create a potential for the generation of descriptive clusters of behaviour, many consider them to represent the ultimate causes of patterns of behaviour. However, if such a view is to be sustainable, then additional theory is needed that ties traits theories to more dynamic theories like: (a) Piaget’s (1950) concepts of child development and Bandura’s (2006) psychology of the human agency that would allow traits to take a role that is significantly beyond their use as classification systems; and (b) Piaget’s ideas of intelligent behaviour and Bandura’s interest in efficacy and performance that establish ideas of change in behaviour through learning that existing trait theories are unable to currently represent. It may be possible for trait theory to embrace such concepts by seeing them as enduring patterns of cognitive schemata that arise from such phenomena as perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and oneself, i.e., they condition decision making processes in some way. Action then emerges from the major processes of cognition, motivation, effectiveness recognition, and selection of available patterns of behaviour. Action is also affected by efficacy which is an agency’s capability to create performance, while in contrast self-efficacy is the belief that one has in their capability. 3. Personality Theory, Pathologies and Personality Disorder Personality indicators have become important because of the belief that they provide a way of connecting the demands of given social and task environments with potential individual behaviour, performance and misbehaviour (Bandura, 1999a). Connecting mind with decisionmaking or overt behaviour is conceptually axiomatic. Given appropriate theory and a proper understanding of the pragmatic utility of a theory, through personality evaluations the anticipation of orientations towards particular forms (or patterns) of behaviour for either individuals or groups is feasible. We have referred to Jung’s development of a model of personality temperament undertaken in the 1920s. In this, personality differences that naturally occur are constituted as temperament types. Ryckman (2004) notes that Jung’s theory models personality as a 3
dynamic and organised set of characteristics possessed by a person that uniquely influences his or her cognitions, motivations, and behaviours in various situations. By cognitions are meant the capacity for information processing through an individual's set of psychological “functions” and/or their related conceptual connections, and by behaviour is meant the actions or reactions of cognitive individuals in relation to what they perceive within their environment. The behaviour may be conscious-unconscious, overt-covert, or voluntaryinvoluntary. Temperament theorists (like Myers et al., 1998) who refer to behaviour in this context are often interested in decision making behaviour that connect with the mental function (e.g. of judging), which leads to overt behaviour. Here, seemingly random variation in individual behaviours is seen as orderly and consistent due to distinctions in the ways they prefer to use their mental functions (like perception and judgment). Other theoretical approaches like those of trait theorists (Heinström, 2003) or cognitive theorists (Baron, 1982) often tend to be concerned directly with overt behaviour where mental functions (like judgment) are not part of their consideration. In developing his explicatory framework for personality, Jung (1923) articulates a number of propositions: (i) past experience and expectations about the future influence behaviour and personality; (ii) individuals are capable of constant and creative development; and (iii) personality is an open system, which is receptive to inputs and exchanges. He considers behaviour to be a sub-system of personality, which can change as a result of inputs from and interactions with the external environment of the individual. Thus, the influence of others can have a significant impact on an individual’s behaviour, implicitly thereby recognising the role of changing context. Jung also established a basis for the development of a cognitive theory of personality. It became the entry point for a number of other theoretical and empirical examinations of personality, most of which centre on personality differences between individuals. They include the MBTI and its close relative Socionics (Müller et al., 1998), the latter linking Jung’s conceptualisations with those of Freud and Kepinski (Müller, Malsch & SchulzSchaeffer, 1998). More empirical approaches include the Five Factor Method 1 (Cattel, 1945), often referred to as FFM or the Big Five. There is a main distinction in the approaches adopted by MBTI and FFM: the former is a typology of personality preference patterns (Cody, 1996), and the latter is a trait approach that indicates a personality framework of indicative variables. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive, since the states that traits variables adopt can be represented as types (Eysenck, 1957). Support for the possibility of creating theory that links personality indicators with behaviour has not always been as strong as it is now. Social psychologists (e.g., Mischel, 1968) argue that behaviour is not stable but varies with context, a proposition which has been to some extent evidenced (Krupat, 2006). Theorists in the 1960s and 1970s suggested that predicting behaviour by personality tests was impossible; an explanation for this by some behavioural theorists was that personality is a perceived construct that people impose on others in order to maintain an illusion of consistency in the world. However, by the 1980s, it was realised that while predicting single instances of behaviour may be unreliable, patterns of behaviour could be identified from an aggregate of a large numbers of observations. More generally, patterns are generically defined as an abstraction from a concrete form that keeps recurring in specific, non-arbitrary contexts. It is this very nature that enables a predictive capacity, even when it comes to their interaction with personal and situational variables. Another realisation has also developed: that where it is possible to associate personalities with stable preferences, a consistent connection to behaviour can be discerned (de Oliveira et al., 2008; Hyldegård, 4
2009). A theory of personality functioning reflects the personal narratives that individuals construct over the course of their lives (McAdams, 1996 & 2001; Tomkins, 1979). It should contain not only a theory of persons but (at least implicitly) a theory of personality assessment through the identification and provision of a set of personality indicators. By this is meant a set of beliefs about the internal psychological structures and overt behavioural tendencies that must be measured in an assessment of personality and the procedures that are required to measure them. Personality theory and personality assessment are intertwined and manifested as the likelihood for behaviour through the use of personality indicators. When personality has pathological conditions that result in problematic behaviour considered to constitute disorders, then assessment often refers to problem diagnosis and treatment. There is a divide between modern socio-cognitive approaches to personality assessment and trait and types approaches, even though they can in principle be related (Eysenck, 1957; Van Egeren, 2009). Our interest here is human agency theory, which can be modelled as systems that have “the cognitive capacities of intention, forethought and the ability to react and to reflect, and from these capacities come the agentic perspective through which adaptation and change in human development occurs. To be an agent is to influence intentionally one's functioning and life circumstances, and personal influence is part of the causal structure. Agential systems are seen to be self-organizing, proactive, self-regulating, and self-reflecting, and they are participative in creating their own behaviour and contributors to their life circumstances” (Yolles, Fink & Dauber, 2011: 637). Modelling personality is consistent with modelling human agency. Human agency is complex, and modelling its effective functionality requires theoretical pluralism (Bandura, 2008). However, the very plurality of personality theories (or more generally schemas) that coexist (Carver, 2005) creates an uncertain fragmented paradigmatic horizon. This is unintegrated, with unrelated theories that are competitive and together demonstrate an undeveloped theoretical understanding of the nature of personality (e.g., Sharpley, 2006). For instance, Bandura’s (1999, p. 229) socio-cognitive theory is a dynamic self-schema of personality that sees the individual as an autonomous system that interacts dynamically with its social environments. In contrast the trait schemas of personality like FFM tend to be devoid of contextual connection, and have a static rather than dynamic nature (Bandura, 1986). However, such explanations do not go far enough in exploring some of the distinction between different personality theories, and in due course we shall elaborate on this approach using notions from Maruyama. Good theory can often highlight pathologies which, in the context of personality, generate what are normally referred as disorders that have psychological explanations (Markus, 1977; Larsen & Buss, 2010). When it comes to understanding and diagnosing personality disorder, good theory is essential to diagnose and treat the pathologies. Where the plurality of autonomous personality theories demonstrates an incoherent collective platform, it is to be expected that any given diagnosis and treatment of personality disorder might be questioned, if not problematic or even harmful to subjects. So recognition that there is confusion in treating personality disorder is also recognition that the platform of current theory is incapable of consistently recommending proper diagnosis. This is explicitly recognised for instance by NGTM (2009) when citing the UK department of Health in 2003. It is noted that the confusion that surrounds an understanding of the nature of personality disorder impacts on our ability to care for people. 5
This confusion will undoubtedly offer semantic conflicts that arise with terminological inconsistency across the theory horizon, realising that separate theories can be associated with distinct paradigms when they maintain linguistic distinction (Yolles, 1999). Thus, according to Carver (2005: 320): “There is potential for confusion in comparing…[theories of personality] across literatures, due to differences in use of terms.….”. Boeree (2006) supports this by saying that the field of personality gives us a plurality of theories rather than a science of personality, resulting in a confusing complexity of non-relatable terms. This is illustrated by Carver (2005) with respect to the term control, when he notes that: Eisenberg (2002) uses the terms self-regulation and regulation to refer specifically to the effortful control of emotions, while elsewhere self-regulation is used to refer to the goal-directed management of behaviour (Carver & Scheier, 1981 & 1998). Also, while Eisenberg (2002) uses the term control to refer specifically to inhibition without implication of the nature of the restraint, personality and social psychologists have used the term control in a wide variety of other ways (Skinner, 1996). Another illustration comes with the term type. When Jung introduced his temperament theory in the 1920s, it was considered that personality states occurred in dichotomously opposite and interactive pairs that he called enantiodromia. MBTI is a development from this where the enantodromia are either dimensions that are external to the personality or psychological functions that are internal to it. These combine in certain ways to generate personality patterns called types (Pittenger, 1993). This is different from the types referred to by Eysenck (1957) which are more like Jung’s enantiomedria, and which constitute the state of a trait. In biology the term trait has associated with it a phenotype - this being the state of a trait (e.g., the trait eye colour has the phenotypes blue and green), and reminiscent of Jung’s use of enantiomedria or Eysenck’s use of type. Goldberg (1993) has used biological terminology to refer to phenotypic personality traits in considering FFM. However, the term pheno implies a biological origin (nature) rather than a learned one (nurture) – something which raises significant questions about the nature of personality (Maruyama, 2001). Even if this were a legitimate word to use, a phenotype is the state of a trait, again rather like Jung’s enantiodromia and Eysenck’s type. To be consistent with Jung’s original term enantiodromia, we prefer to use the term enantiomer2 which does not entertain the conceptual baggage that Jung assigned to his term, but has a common Greek origin. Enantiomers are constituted as a paired dichotomy “state possibilities” that a discrete personality trait may take that will result in a “personality condition.” The pairing process in principle enables the traits to take values, the variation of which come from a continuum, but for which under some conditions possibly only a limited number of discrete identifiable values can be adopted. In this paper we adopt the following terminology. Enantiomers are dichotomously opposite paired virtual “epistemic dimensions” that dynamically interact, and through that interaction create an orientation within distinct parts of an agency that contribute to its overall agency orientation. This is reminiscent of Jung’s theory of personality, and Sorokin’s (1962) theory of culture. These enantiomers come in pairs and one or the other can be taken as values selected by bipolar trait variables. The values adopted are seen to be the dominant values of the dichotomous pair (called a pole). However, where one or other of the enantiomers does not dominate, the trait may take a balanced value. Combinations of personality traits form meta-types, though we shall follow the terminology of MBTI here and refer to them as personality or cognitive types. 4. Human Agency and Socio-Cognitive Theories of Personality
6
Social cognitive theory takes personality as a complex system (Bandura, 1999 & 1999a; Cervone et al., 2004). Socio-cognitive variables develop through socio-cultural experiences. They distinguish between cognitive capacities that contribute to personality functioning, including skills, competencies, knowledge structures that have been sedimented from the real life situations that have been experienced, self-reflective processes that enable people to develop beliefs about themselves within social contexts, and self-regulatory processes where people formulate goals, standards and motivations toward identifiable outcomes (Bandura, 1986, 1999; Williams, 1992). Personality assessment differentiates between personality structures and behavioural orientations. Internal structures are assessed through an examination of a system of interacting psychological mechanisms (rather than a set of independent variables as in trait approaches) while the dispositions are connected with contextual variety. In social-cognitive theory, assessments capture not only current psychological tendencies, but also personal determinants of action that contribute to development over the course of time. Evaluations are made of individual differences as well of the psychological attributes that contribute to personal identity. Ways in which the structures of personality come into play are illustrated as individuals interact with the settings and challenges that make up their day-to-day lives. Social-cognitive personality assessment seeks to explore individual personality coherence, and assessments explore the cognitive structures that are used to interpret events, and not only to self-reflect and self-regulate, but also to cases of change through self-organisation. Personality assessment often seeks psychological change, when it attempts to identify psychological qualities that where appropriate can be modified or developed. Bandura’s (1986) socio-cognitive theory arises through his considerations of social learning, and he recognised that socio-cognitive processes were influenced by memory and emotions, and they are interactive with environmental influences. Behaviour is also seen to be guided by cognitive processes like the Jungian enantiomer of thinking and judging that develop about the world and other people. Scott Murray et al. (2005) notes that Bandura began from a behaviourist base to develop a theory of self that explored the complex psychological and subjective reality of individuals as it impacts on goals and expectations and points towards individual strategies. These were seen to be used to satisfy expectations and accomplish meaningful subjective goals, and to induce the affective representation of a problem. It can be seen as a theory of individual differences (Bandura, 1999). In contrast, Piaget (1950) developed a theory of human commonalities that has been successful in exploring sensorimotor, logical, and thinking skills, while not having shown to be equally useful for analysing individual differences in adult performance (Scott Murray et al., 2005). It has also been subject to further development (Labouvie-Vief, 1992; Blanchard-Fields & Norris, 1994), particularly in respect of integrative attribution reasoning (e.g., relating to dispositional and situational components). His theory is principally concerned with how a child abstracts and internalizes certain features of behaviour, as opposed for instance to Vygotsky’s (1978) theory of how the child is able to internalize social and cultural aspects of behaviour. According to Wertsch (1979), Piaget posited formal operations of knowledge that necessarily arise in interaction with the world, which he referred to as operative intelligence. This is concerned with the representation and manipulation of transformational aspects of reality, and it frames how the world is understood. It is the active part of intelligence that involves all actions, including anticipation, following or recovering the transformations of objects of attention. Operative intelligence operates through processes of assimilation and accommodation (Demetriou et al., 1998). Assimilations assumes that new information is integrated into existing mental 7
schemes, while accommodation refers to the active transformation of mental schemes when the specifics of an object of attention are to be taken into account (Sternberg, 1996). Piaget also coined the term figurative intelligence, which is the “static” part of intelligence that represents (in mind) meaning that arises from the operative aspects of intelligence. The states that intervene between transformations cannot exist independently from their interconnected transformations, and so the two are integrally interconnected. Bandura (1999) did not show much interest in traits or their causes, and argues that they cannot tell one much about the determinants and regulative structures governing the behaviours that constitute a particular cluster. Instead, his interest lies in “perceived selfefficacy2” (concerned with beliefs about ones capabilities to produce designated levels of performance that exercise influence over events that affect life). Self-efficacy beliefs arise from how people feel, think, motivate themselves and behave, where beliefs produce these diverse effects through the major processes of cognition, motivation, effectiveness and selection. So, rather than a trait theory, Bandura produces a process theory in which one can envisage that the traits condition the processes in some invisible way. In contrast, type theory refers to the variable states that may develop within a set of traits (Eysenck, 1957). It is possible to summarize relationships between socio-cognitive, trait, enantiomer and type tendencies in the predominant species of theories, as shown in Table 1. Support for the distinctions in Table 1 might be read into Cervone et al. (2001), who notes that a sociocognitive approach yields a theory of personality assessment that differs significantly from the trait-dispositional assessment strategy that has so far predominated in the field. Table 1 also highlights the realization that the different species of theory exist across a fragmented horizon of meanings, since they rarely link. Having said this, connecting of the species of theories is not unknown, as illustrated by Eysenck (1957) who created a trait theory in which trait variables were able to adopt type states, and by Van Egeren (2009) who explored how socio-cognitive theories may be expressed in terms of traits.
Characteristics Theoretical Approach
Socio-cognitive Multiple-causative cognitions
Trait Defines a framework for personality
Variables
Continuous variables that may have states Quantitative and qualitative inquiries Susceptible to complex explanations
Continuous variables
Data collection tendencies Analytical tendencies
Quantitative inventories Often uses simple classification approaches
Type Usually described in terms of paired opposite states called enantiomers. Discrete variable states of a trait. Quantitative and qualitative inventories Often uses relational approaches generating complex classifications.
Table 1: Overview of Major Tendencies in Personality Theories
5. Maruyama’s Mindscape Theory Maruyama developed his socio-cognitive personality type theory through a schema of epistemological meta-types, which he called mindscapes theory. It is attitudinal rather than temperament oriented, since it arises not from emotional factors, but rather from cultural knowledge. It belongs to a relational universe and its schema permits personal determinants to 8
operate dynamically within causal structures. Meta-types are combinations of epistemic values (which we call enantiomers) which are constituted as elements of human culture, material objects, or human practice (Maruyama, 1988). Mindscape analysis, Maruyama claims, is particularly suitable for complex and multifaceted environments, and can be used to explore the interrelations among seemingly unrelated aspects of human activities. While Mindscape theory is represented as an epistemological typology, its purpose and use lie in interrelating seemingly separate aspects of human activities. While Mindscape modes are numerous and vary from individual to individual, they cumulate into at least four common and stable types that may be partly innate and partly learned. While singular agencies (individuals) may be said to have empirical personality, plural agencies have a collective cognitive ability that is normative (Thompson & Fine, 1999), and as such a normative personality - a principle also supported by, for instance, Bridges (1992), Kets de Vries (1991) and Yolles (2006), and already embedded in Mindscape theory. Hence, Mindscape theory can apply to social personality and individual personality contexts. Within respect to the social personality of the plural agency "one of the [personality] types becomes powerful for historical or political reasons, and utilizes, ignores or suppresses individuals of other types" (Maruyama, 2002: 167; cited by Boje, 2004). Following Maruyama (1988; 2001; 2008) and Boje (2004), four types of mindscapes always exist in any culture, though their percentage distribution varies across cultures 3. In Mindscape theory the personality of an agency is described in terms of epistemic cognitive meta-types (rather than the individual cognitive characteristics), and therefore really constitutes a meta-theory (offering meaning able to respond to both theory-doctrine and problem based issues). While in its current form it identifies four basic epistemic personality types of mindscape (Maruyama, 1988 and 2008), Maruyama (1974) originally referred only to three (Independent, Hierarchical and Mutualists), but later settled on four mindscape types, which are driven by different and partly overlapping value perceptions and attitudes. However, it is important to note that in different Maruyama publications we find slightly different versions. For illustration, here we refer to Maruyama (1988 and 2001) epistemic values for each of the four mindscape types as follows: H (Hierarchical/Bureaucrat): Maruyama (1988 and 2001): hierarchical, homogenist (conventionalist), classification (neat categories), universalist, sequential, competitive, zero-sum, oppositional, extension, one truth; Plus in Maruyama (1988): eternal, unity by similarity, tension; Plus in Maruyama (2001): optimalist, ethics to dominate the weak, ingroup, self-stereotyping, group bounded, prone to collectivism. I (Independent/Prince): Maruyama (1988 and 2001): independent, heterogenistic (unconventionalist), randomising (embraces uncertainty), individualistic, uniqueness, negative-sum, separation, caprice, subjectivity; Plus in Maruyama (1988): isolationist, temporary, no order, identity, specialization, indifference; Plus in Maruyama (2001): self-sufficiency, poverty self-inflicted, prone to individualism. S (Social/Reformer): Maruyama (1988 and 2001): heterogenistic (non-conventionalist), mutualist, interactive, patternmaintaining, simultaneous, cooperative, positive-sum (mutual aid through individual difference so all gain in interaction), absorption, stability, polyocularity; Plus in Maruyama (1988): contextual, relation, convertability, job rotation, continuity; Plus in Maruyama (2001): cause-effect, harmonious patterning, interactions are non-hierarchical, self-contained universe. G (Generative/Revolutionary): Maruyama (1988 and 2001): heterogenistic, interactive, pattern-generating, mutualizing, 9
simultaneous, cogenerative, positive-sum, polyocularity, diversity, relational emergence. Plus in Maruyama (1988): contextualizing, mututal gain by diversity, relating, convertablitity, job rotation, absorption, flow, development; Plus in Maruyama (2001): liberational, unfolding, evolution, non-hierarchical.
It is important to note, and a reflection of the ‘mutualists’ Mindscape types from the earlier publication (Maruyama, 1974), that there is significant overlap between constructs constituting S (Social/Reformer) and G (Generative/Revolutionary): heterogenistic, interactive, mutualizing, relating, simultaneous, positive-sum, poly-ocularity, absorption, contextual, non-hierarchical, job rotation. Available data on cross-cultural migrants indicate that some aspects of mindscapes are formative in childhood and become irreversible at the age of around ten, approximately corresponding to the child’s formative years. An agency with one mindscape mode may "learn" to "understand" by some intellectual process a figurative structure that is conceptualized in other mindscapes, but the results of such attempts are likely to be highly distorted or psychologically artificial. This becomes clear, e.g., when an agency is a human activity group that holds a particular paradigm in science (Kuhn, 1970). Gammack (2002), in his discussion of Mindscape theory, notes Maruyama’s rejection of the common simple-minded typologies in favour of a “relationology” that goes further than temperamental classifications of individual qualities. Rather it specifies an epistemological basis from which result communicative and behavioural styles. Cultures are seen to be epistemologically heterogeneous, and a number of canonical mindscape modes exist that are each represented within them in some proportion. These epistemological modes are seen to be prior to, and transcendent of, nationality and culture (Maruyama, 1988; 2001). Indeed, as indicated by Maruyama (1974) these epistemological types are directly related to personality characteristics and cultural backgrounds. There is an interesting feature of the four mindscape modes identified by Maruyama (1988), which is that the I and H types are obverse “two sides of the same coin”, as are S and G types. However, according to Maruyama, this obverse nature is non-linear, so that it cannot be said that I and H types or S and G types are polar opposites of each other. An epistemic description of each of these mindscapes has been proposed by Dockens (2004) (adapted from Maruyama, 1980) as shown in Table 2. Here the epistemic categories cover, for Dockens, a typology of knowledge that constitutes the basis of the mindscape types. Tung (1995) notes that for Maruyama (1993), the epistemological structures that are mindscapes refer to the way in which people process and interpret information, and this is therefore part of cognitive processing (e.g., Galavan, 2005). The four epistemic meta-types identified by Maruyama constitute proprietary cognitive types which differentiate agencies on the basis of logical processes and the way in which they analyse and synthesize information. These four epistemological types and their mixtures are claimed to account for nearly two-thirds of all peoples in the world (Maruyama, 1993). Mindscape cognitive types were perceived by Maruyama (1988) to be quite different from the Jungian psychological (enantiomer) typologies. They provide a link between seemingly separate activities such as decision process, criteria of beauty, and choice of science theories. They do not line up on a single scale, nor do they fit in a two-by-two table. Rather, 10
Maruyama considered, they are more like the four corners of a tetrahedron. Mindscape theory is not a classificational typology (like that of Myers, 2000) since its purpose and use “lie in interrelating seemingly separate aspects of human activities such as organizational structure, policy formulation, decision process, architectural design, criteria of beauty, choice of theories, cosmology, etc” (Maruyama, 1988:2). Maruyama assumed that it has a relational basis. Epistemic Categories Universal View
Mindscape Types Independent Social The most probable Equilibrium by state is random means of mutual distribution of corrections, or events with cycles due to independent mutual balancing. probability. Structures Structures decay maintained Information decays Loss of and gets lost, information can Blueprint must be counteracted contain more by means of information than redundancy or by finished product. means of Embryo must feedback devices. contain more information than adult.
Information
The more specified, the more information. Past and future inferable from present probabilistically or deterministically.
Perception
Rank-ordering, classifying and categorizing into neat scheme. Find regularity.
Isolating, Each is unique and unrelated to others.
Logic
Deductive, axiomatic. Mutually exclusive categories. Permanence of substance and identity. Competition, Zero-sum. If not homogeneous, then conflict. Let the "strongest" dominate homogenistically. Majority rule (dominated by quantity).
Each question has its answer unrelated to others.
Generative Generated new patterns by means of mutual interaction, Structures grow, Heterogeneity, differentiation, symbiotisation and further heterogenisation increase. Complex patterns can be generated by means of simple rules of interaction. The amount of information needed to describe the generated pattern may be greater than the amount of information to describe the rules of interaction. Thus the amount of information can increase. Contextual: Look Contextual: Look for new for meaning in interactions and new context. Look for patterns. Therefore mutual balance, meanings change and new seeks stability. meanings arise. Simultaneous understanding of mutual relations. No sequential priority. Logical values cannot be ordered.
Isolationism, Zerosum or negativesum. Virtue of selfsufficiency.
Symbiosis: Static harmony. Avoid disturbance. Restore previous harmony.
Ethics
Hierarchy Casual chains. Hierarchy of categories, supercategories. "Oneness" with the universe. Processes are repeatable if conditions are the same
Symbiotisation: evolving harmony. Positive sum. Regard differences as beneficial. Incorporate new endogenous.
Table 2: Description of Mindscape Types (Dockens, 2004) Mindscape theory arises from Maruyama’s (1963) realisation that personality involves causative processes and goals, from which is deviated. Since these deviations occur in an agency’s interaction with its environment, the deviation may be either counteracted or amplified. Maruyama referred to cycles of deviation-counteraction and deviationamplification (Boje, 2004). Deviation-counteraction seeks to control deviations, while deviation-amplification enhances them and adds to the existing heterogeneity. The selection of one form of cybernetic control or another is influenced by an agency’s cognitive type mindscapes and the interests of the agencies. It seems that after 1980 Maruyama finally settled on 4 dominant types of mindscape, though originally he had worked with three mindscape types (Maruyama 1974) which he then 11
extended to five in Maruyama (1977). In developing these mindscapes empirically he used two forms of measuring instrument, a questionnaire, and a pictograph (Maruyama, 2001). In 1976, he had found that his work converged with that of Harvey (1966), who had been giving psychological tests to university students over several decades, and as a result had identified four frequent epistemological types. Harvey referred to these as Types 1-4. The Harvey types are described as follows:
Type 1: high absolutism and closeness of beliefs; high evaluativeness; high positive dependence on representatives of institutional authority; high identification with social roles and status positions; high conventionality; high ethnocentrism. Type 2: deep feelings of uncertainty; distrust of authority, rejection of the more socially approved guidelines to action accompanied by lack of alternative referents; psychological vacuum; rebellion against social prescriptions; avoidance of dependency on God, tradition. Type 3: manipulating of people through dependency upon them; fairly high skills in effecting desired outcomes in his world through the techniques of having others do it for him; autonomous internal standards, especially in the social sphere; some positive ties to the prevailing social norms. Type 4: high perceived self-worth despite momentary frustrations and deviation from the normative; highly differentiated and integrated cognitive structure; flexible, creative and relative in thought and action; internal standards that are independent of external criteria, in some cases coinciding with social definitions and in others not. In order to relate his mindscape types to Harvey’s systems, Maruyama has used a technique that we shall call epistemic mapping. In this, a description of two entities that need to be related for comparison are formulated in terms of a set of keywords which are then related to each other to determine the degree of commensurability. Incommensurability would mean that there are some contradictions in the relationships. With this conversion, Maruyama (2008: 84) notes that the reader can recognize that: Maruyama's types H, I and G are almost identical with Harvey's Types 1, 2 and 4 respectively, while Maruyama's type S is quite different from Harvey's Type 3. Thus, Maruyama had found that Harvey had one dimension that was different from his own set. This leads us to the conclusion that a broader latent framework exists that has explanatory power beyond Maruyama and Harvey. As we will show below, such a broader framework was suggested by Boje (2004). Boje paves the way to a three bi-polar dimension framework, which in a further step can be empirically related to Sagiv and Schwartz (2007). Mindscape theory argues that a social system develops a preference for one personality meta-type (mode) over another for historical or political reasons, and ignores or suppresses individuals of other modes (Maruyama, 2002: 167). This perception is in obvious contrast to Jung (1923), Schwartz (1990) and to Tamis-LeMonda et al (2007) who rather refer to an auxiliary function of alternate poles of a trait, while Maruyama settles on the ‘opposing view’ perception of alternate poles. Using mindscape theory provides a broad and potentially dynamic capacity to describe agency orientation, and it can thereby generate explanations about situations in which they were involved, or expectations about their potential behaviour in anticipated 12
situations. Because of that property of mindscapes, Boje (2004) was interested in creating a generative trait basis for the mindscape types. So he created a trait basis that arises from three of Foucault’s (1972) traits: knowledge, ethics and power, each with a pair of enantiomers. These may be described as follows: (1) Knowledge: Boje (2004) refers to an agency’s will to historically constituted and informationally scripted patterns of knowledge, so that an actor is part of a knowledge script system and responds to and generates informational consequences. Boje also distinguishes between the bi-polar meta-types within the context of a will to knowledge, and these correspond to Transaction scripts and Transformation scripts respectively. Transactional scripting involves simple repetition and sameness that reflects on status quo, while transformation scripting is about embracing uniqueness and change in a system through emergence and deviation, and reflects on the possibilities that emerge through autonomy. It involves Maruyama’s notion of the dialectic of deviationcounteracting and deviation-amplifying in the scripts. This knowledge scripting is part of secondary socialization (e.g., by providing them with socially acceptable values). Through this, agents internalise the scripts, as well as the character type expected for agents in their environment. This script internalisation is constituted as a means of formation, and enables an agent to be influenced by knowledge based information that relates to its social environment. As we shall see, stabilising transaction scripts may be related to the ‘embeddedness’ dimension of Sagiv & Schwartz (2007) and transformation scripts to intellectual autonomy. (2) Ethics: Boje (2004) considers regulation within the context of Foucautlian ethics which (unlike the normal definition of ethics) is connected with the relationships we have with ourselves and the mutual ways in which agents are both controlled by others and control by self. Control by a generalised other within a socio-cultural context and is hence polyocular and perhaps more social harmony oriented, while achievement is more connected with mono-ocularity self-interest and control by self. As such the bi-polar enantiomers that permit this trait to create an orientation are mono-ocularity (one view) and polyocularity (many-views). (3) Power: Boje (2004) notes that agents are not free to say just anything when or where they wish, and certain types of knowledge are forbidden in some social environments. This appears to be connected with a realisation of the nature of the constraints and a technical ability to engage with the environment and to establish anticipations and controls. This presupposes the existence of a hierarchical structure that both anticipates and facilitates behaviour. The enantiomer options that Boje assigns to this trait is an orientation to power as may be related to hierarchy, and service and may be related to egalitarianism. Through the use of Foucaultian propositions Boje (2004) formulated a generative trait basis for mindscapes. However, while this is able to construct mindscape types, these, so far, arise from qualitative postulates with no empirical connection. As an alternative we turn to a promising approach, developed and effectuated by Schwartz (1999, 2004) and Sagiv-Schwartz (2007) on cultural values. 6. Creating Mindset types from the Sagiv-Schwartz Trait Basis Following an interest in characterising societal culture, Schwartz (1999, 2004) undertook an extensive study (60,000 respondents) to explore the dimensionality of cultural orientations. It derived cultural orientations from a priori theorizing (unlike previous approaches such as: 13
Hofstede, 1980, 2001; House, Javidan, Hanges& Dorfman, 2002; Inglehart & Baker, 2000) rather than post hoc examination of data. In respect of the measuring instrument Schwartz used for this, it designated a set of a priori value items to serve as markers for each orientation. These items were all tested for cross-cultural equivalence of meaning. The items were demonstrated to cover the range of values recognized cross-culturally, to help ensure a relative comprehensiveness of cultural value dimensions. In addition, it specified how the cultural orientations are organized into a coherent system of related dimensions and verified this organization, rather than assuming that orthogonal dimensions best capture cultural reality. Finally, it brought empirical evidence that the order of national cultures on each of the orientations is robust across different types of samples from many countries around the world. Sagiv & Schwartz (2007) identified three bipolar dimensions of culture that represent alternate resolutions to each of three challenges that confront all societies. In the context of the agency, these bipolar dimensions constitute enantiomer pairs that, like Boje’s Foucaultian conceptions, can be assigned to some originating trait. These paired enantiomers are: (embeddedness, autonomy), (hierarchy, egalitarianism) and (mastery, harmony). An emphasis on the cultural orientation at one polar enantiomer typically accompanies a de-emphasis on the polar orientation with which it interacts. Since these enantiomer pairs can be assigned to traits, we require trait names which we shall posit here, summarise in Table 3, and explain further later in this paper: (1) Cognitive Trait Enantiomers Embedded cultures are consistent with a collectivistic view, where meaning in life can be found largely through social relationships, identifying with the group, participating in a shared way of life, and the adoption of shared goals. Values like social order, respect for tradition, security, and wisdom are important. There tends to be a conservative attitude in that support is provided for the status quo and restraining actions against inclinations towards the possible disruption of in-group solidarity or the traditional order. Autonomy cultures are consistent with an individualistic view, where meaning is found in the uniqueness of the individual that is encouraged to express internal attributes (preferences, traits, feelings, motives). Two classes of cultural autonomy arise: Intellectual and Affective Autonomy. Intellectual autonomy presumes that individuals are encouraged to pursue their own ideas and intellectual directions independently (important values: curiosity, broadmindedness, creativity), while in affective autonomy individuals are encouraged to pursue affectively positive experience for themselves. The values are: exciting life, enjoying live, varied life, pleasure, and self-indulgence. At this point it is important to note that there are some reasons why affective autonomy is kept separately from intellectual autonomy. The affective dimension seemingly is also closely related to mastery of the figurative trait. (2) Figurative Trait Enantiomers Mastery promotes the view that active self-assertion is needed in order to master, direct, and change the natural and social environment to attain group or personal goals (values: ambition, success, daring, competence). Mastery organizations tend to be dynamic, competitive, and oriented to achievement and success, and are likely to develop and use technology to manipulate and change the environment to achieve goals. Harmony promotes the view that the world should be accepted as it is, with attempts to understand and appreciate rather than to change, direct, or exploit. There is an emphasis on fitting harmoniously into the environment (values: unity with nature, protecting the environment, world at peace). In harmony organisations, there is an expectation that they will 14
fit into the surrounding social and natural world. Leaders that adopt this type try to understand the social and environmental implications of organizational actions, and seek non-exploitative ways to work toward their goals. (3) Operative Trait Enantiomers Hierarchy supports the ascription of roles for individuals to ensure responsible, productive behaviour. Unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources are seen to be legitimate (values: social power, authority, humility, wealth). The hierarchical distribution of roles is taken for granted and to comply with the obligations and rules attached to their roles. Egalitarianism promotes the view that people recognize one another as moral equals who share basic interests. There is an internalisation of a commitment towards cooperation, and to feelings of concern for everyone's welfare. There is an expectation that people will act for the benefit of others as a matter of choice (values: equality, social justice, responsibility, honesty). These traits and their enantiomer characteristics are summarised in Table 4 together with a listing of keywords that are relevant to the types. Setting the cultural level Sagiv-Schwartz enantiomers in a trait space thereby enables the generation of what we shall call a set of Sagiv-Schwartz Mindset types (Table 5), since as explained earlier, while they come from a similar frame of reference to that of Maruyama, their epistemology arises differently. For the formation of Sagiv-Schwartz Mindset types we shall use the Schwartz (1994) set of values and formation of value dimensions (Table 3). Using the same epistemic mapping technique as adopted by Maruyama to compare his mindscapes with Harvey, we compared the Maruyama constructs with those derived from Sagiv and Schwartz (2007). For SagivSchwartz Mindset types, we have found better comparability with the Maruyama mindscape types when, from the Schwartz value inventory, we closely relate ‘affective autonomy’ to ‘mastery’ and form a composite epistemic bi-polar trait (Mastery & Affective Autonomy vs. Harmony). Traits Cognitive
Dimensions/Poles Intellectual Autonomy Embeddedness
Figurative
Mastery & Affective Autonomy Harmony
Operative
Hierarchy Egalitarianism
Values/Items [broad-mindedness, freedom, creativity, curious] [polite, obedient, forgiving, respect tradition, self discipline, moderate, social order, family security, protect my public image, national security, honor elders, reciprocation of favors]. [successful, ambitious, independent, influential, social recognition, choosing own goals, daring, capable] [exciting life, varied life, pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgent] [accept my portion in life, world at peace, protect environment, unity with nature, world of beauty] [authority, wealth, social power; humble] [loyal, equality, responsible, honest, social justice, helpful]
Table 3: Sagiv and Schwartz (2007) Bi-Polar Traits (modified with respect to affective autonomy). When comparing the values and attitudes of the Maruyama mindscape types with the Sagiv & Schwartz value dimensions in an epistemological mapping, we easily find values/items of the Schwartz universe which fit part of the respective Maruyama mindscape types as shown below. The H type (hierarchical bureaucrat) contains numerous items which are similar or can be 15
related to notions of embeddedness and hierarchy of the Schwartz system: hierarchical, homogenist (conventionalist), classification (neat categories), universalist, sequential, competitive, one truth, eternal, unity by similarity, ethics to dominate the weak, in-group, self-stereotyping, group bounded, prone to collectivism. The I type (independent prince) contains numerous items which are similar or can be related to notions of intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy and mastery of the Schwartz system: independent, heterogenistic, unconventionalist, individualistic, uniqueness, separation, caprice, subjectivity, isolationist, temporary, no order, identity, specialization, indifference, poverty self-inflicted, prone to individualism. As a reflection of the ‘mutualists mindscape types’ mentioned previously and arising from Maruyama (1974), we find similarities to the notions egalitarianism and harmony of the Schwartz system: heterogenistic, interactive, mutualizing, relating, simultaneous, positivesum, poly-ocularity, absorption, contextual, non-hierarchical. The consequent differentiation between the G type and the S type apparently is influenced by a slightly stronger orientation towards intellectual autonomy of the G type and towards embeddedness of the S type. Considering the Schwartz value universe (Figure 1) which was produced with the Co-Plot4 technique of Raveh (2000), we find that Maruyama intuitively discovered that neighbouring ‘value fields’, i.e. combinations of positively correlated values, form the basis of emergent behavioural types. In terms of the Schwartz value universe: ‘hierarchists’ have a preference for hierarchy and embeddeness, ‘individualists’ have a preference for autonomy and mastery, and ‘mutualists’ have a preference for egalitarianism and harmony. Now, we should note that such an intuitive epistemological comparison is not the ultimate method. It would be much better to combine the Schwartz questionnaire, available from Shalom Schwartz 5 with the Maruyama/Boje questionnaire (Boje, 2004), to apply them simultaneously to the same sample and to analyse the quantitative data with appropriate techniques. Nevertheless, the route suggested by Boje (2004) can be further pursued and a more differentiated system of 8 types derived with Sagiv-Schwartz (2007) traits. To do this we initially formulate a labelling code as shown in Table 4. These arise from epistemic crosscomparison deriving from the traits poles (the enantiomers), and permit choices to be made for labels from the options available.
Harmony Egalitarianism Embeddedness Intellectual Autonomy Hierarchy Affective Autonomy
Mastery
Figure 1: Schwartz’s Value Universe (Schwartz, 2008) 16
Label Individualism Synergism Populism Collectivism Hierarchical Egalitarian Collectivist Hierarchist (Mindscape) Independent Prince (Mindscape) Mutualist (Mindscape) Achievement Hierarchist (Mindscape) Generativist (Mindscape)
Origin in Sagiv & Schwartz (2007) Intellectual Autonomy, Mastery & Affective Autonomy Intellectual Autonomy and Harmony Embeddedness, Mastery& Affective Autonomy Embeddedness and Harmony Hierarchy Egalitarianism Harmony and Embeddedness Embeddedness and Hierarchy Intellectual Autonomy, Mastery & Affective Autonomy Egalitarianism and Harmony Hierarchy, Mastery & Affective Autonomy Intellectual Autonomy and Egalitarianism
Table 4: Generative Origin of the Labels Used in Mindset and Mindscape Theory As a result we can formulate the Mindset types against the enantiomers and their epistemic values as shown in Table 5. It should be noted that the type numbers do not imply trait importance, but simply offer a counting aid. These types are extremes of the Mindset Space, as illustrated in Figure 2. Four of these eight Mindset types correspond to the four Maryuama mindscape types. With this it is possible to fill the gap indicated by Boje (2004) and identify the four additional Mindset types he sought, and which constitute the Mindset Space in Figure 2. Graphically, the relations between these eight Mindset cognitive types can be illustrated by the Mindset Space of Figure 2. As can be seen from this, four pairs of Mindset types emerge that are in diametric contrast. However, the 8 types can be multiplied since balances between the types can also develop, which is something that we shall return to in due course. Further analysis is possible beyond the contrasting and opposing Mindset types composed of sets of opposite enantiomers poles as shown in Table 6. At a later stage, we may also look at variation, where two enantiomers are the same and only one is varied. In the Sagiv-Schwartz value universe six options arise (Table 9). We begin with Harmony and move clockwise around the Schwartz value universe (Figure 1). We also show variations, where two central pairs of constructs are kept constant. In the Sagiv-Schwartz universe these pairs are located next to each other, because these constructs are correlated to each other. It may be noted that the Mindset types in Table 3 are classified according to Individualism/Collectivism. This is determined by the cognitive trait, i.e. as according to the enantiomers Intellectual Autonomy/Embeddedness. As we shall explain in due course, this is because the cognitive trait is a trait value attractor for the personality under normal conditions.
17
Mindset type 1: HI Hierarchical Individualism
2: EI Egalitarian Individualism Maruyama: I (Independent Prince) 3: HS Hierarchical Synergism 4: ES Egalitarian Synergism Maruyama: G (Generative Revolutionary) 5: HP Hierarchical Populism Maruyama: H (Hierarchical Bureaucrat) 6: EP Egalitarian Populism
7: HC Hierarchical Collectivism
Enantiomer Intellectual Autonomy Mastery & Affective Autonomy Hierarchy Intellectual Autonomy Mastery & Affective Autonomy Egalitarianism
Epistemic Value [broad-mindedness, freedom, creativity, curious] [successful, ambitious, independent, influential, social recognition, choosing own goals, daring] [exciting life, varied life, pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgent] [authority, wealth, social power] [broad-mindedness, freedom, creativity, curious] [successful, ambitious, independent, influential, social recognition, choosing own goals, daring] [exciting life, varied life, pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgent] [loyal, equality, responsible, honest, social justice, helpful]
Intellectual Autonomy Harmony
[broad-mindedness, freedom, creativity, curious] [accept my portion in life, world at peace, protect environment, unity with nature, world of beauty] [authority, wealth, social power] [broad-mindedness, freedom, creativity, curious] [accept my portion in life, world at peace, protect environment, unity with nature, world of beauty] [loyal, equality, responsible, honest, social justice, helpful]
Hierarchy Intellectual Autonomy Harmony Egalitarianism Embeddedness
Mastery & Affective Autonomy Hierarchy Embeddedness
Mastery & Affective Autonomy Egalitarianism Embeddedness
Harmony
8: EC Egalitarian Collectivism Maruyama: S (Social Reformer)
Hierarchy Embeddedness
Harmony Egalitarianism
[polite, obedient, forgiving, respect tradition, self-discipline, moderate, social order, family security, protect my public image, national security, honour elders, reciprocation of favours] [successful, ambitious, independent, influential, social recognition, choosing own goals, daring] [exciting life, varied life, pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgent] [authority, wealth, social power] [polite, obedient, forgiving, respect tradition, self-discipline, moderate, social order, family security, protect my public image, national security, honour elders, reciprocation of favours]. [successful, ambitious, independent, influential, social recognition, choosing own goals, daring] [exciting life, varied life, pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgent] [loyal, equality, responsible, honest, social justice, helpful] [polite, obedient, forgiving, respect tradition, self-discipline, moderate, social order, family security, protect my public image, national security, honour elders, reciprocation of favours]. [accept my portion in life, world at peace, protect environment, unity with nature, world of beauty] [authority, wealth, social power] [polite, obedient, forgiving, respect tradition, self-discipline, moderate, social order, family security, protect my public image, national security, honour elders, reciprocation of favours]. [accept my portion in life, world at peace, protect environment, unity with nature, world of beauty] [loyal, equality, responsible, honest, social justice, helpful]
Table 5: Mindset types derived from Sagiv and Schwartz (2007) Bi-Polar Traits with reference to Maruyama (1988, 2001) Mindscapes
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1
Hierarchy
(3) HS
(7) HC
Operative trait
(5) HP
(8) EC
Egalitarianism
0
Harmony
(4) ES 1
Cognitive trait
Embeddedness
(1) HI
Intellectual Autonomy
Figurative trait
(6) EP
(2) EI
Mastery+Affective 1 Autonomy
Figure 2: Mindset Space with Eight Mindset types
Now, one remaining open issue is whether the number of types is appropriate to characterize variety within and between social systems? Apparently, any number of types could be created from any number of traits. Once, in an interview Geert Hofstede said to one of the authors: “Values - you can have as many as you want. The issue is, whether you have a sufficiently large number for differentiation, and a sufficiently small number to be remembered by the audience.” The number of traits quickly increases when several states of a trait are considered to be type forming. In Figure 2 we illustrate 8 types which emerge from the alternate poles of 3 traits: 8=23. In a case where three states of a trait (e.g. the extremes and a range in the middle) constitute a system, then z=3n. E.g. one could assume that the upper and lower third of a trait represent the two poles of a trait, and the middle third represents a balanced attitude. In that case we would end up with 27 possible types: 27=3 3. Our preference is to not only refer to the number of traits with respect to differentiation and memorizing, but to take it that a meta-model of normative personality could provide an appropriate theory from which the number and contents of traits can be derived. This metatheory enables mindset theory to represent a dynamic nature of personality and hence turning personality theory with its characterising traits into a theory of agency.
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Pole 1 - Individualism Type Mastery Individualism Enantiomers Intellectual Autonomy 1: HI Mastery & Affective Hierarchical Autonomy Individualism Hierarchy Intellectual Autonomy 2: EI Mastery & Affective Egalitarian Autonomy Individualism [Mindscape: I] Egalitarianism Harmony Individualism => Synergism Intellectual Autonomy 3: HS Hierarchic Synergism Harmony
4: ES Egalitarian Synergism [Mindscape: G]
Pole 2 - Collectivism Type Harmony Collectivism Enantiomers Embeddedness 8: EC Harmony Egalitarian Collectivism [Mindscape: S] Egalitarianism Embeddedness 7: HC Harmony Hierarchical Collectivism Hierarchy Mastery Collectivism => Populism Embeddedness 6: EP Egalitarian Populism Mastery & Affective Autonomy Egalitarianism Embeddedness 5: HP Hierarchical Populism Mastery & Affective [Mindscape: H] Autonomy Hierarchy
Hierarchy Intellectual Autonomy Harmony Egalitarianism
Table 6: Four Contrasting Pairs of Mindsets and relation to the Four Maruyama's Mindscapes 7. The Psychological Agency Given that we have a Mindset theory, our interest wanders towards generic modelling of the agency (Bandura, 2006), which has the cognitive capacities of intention, forethought and the ability to react and to reflect. From these capacities the agency-perspective arises through which adaptation and change in human development occurs. To be an agency is to influence intentionally one’s functioning and life circumstances. Personal influence is part of a causal structure. Agential systems are seen to be proactive, self-organizing, self-regulating, and selfreflecting. They are participative in creating their own behaviour and contribute to their life circumstances. An agency has cognitive functions that are represented through its personality. The theoretical fragmentation of competing theories in the field of personality theory (psychodynamic, trait, and humanistic theories) in essence promotes a fragmented view of the personality (Mayer, 2005). L’Abate (2005: 5), too, notes “considerable fragmentation among theories and models of personality socialization, developmental, social, and adult psychology, as well as personal relationships [what] makes it necessary to develop a theory that will attempt to integrate these specializations in a consistent framework” and, in particular, theoretical vacancy in the field of personality socialization. One of the pegs of such fragmentation lies in the lack of relational theory. As part of this, in reference to psychopathic personalities, he argues that there is a need to “view psychopathology from the ‘outside’ or ‘among and between individuals’ rather than just ‘inside’ the individual” (L’Abate, 2005: 8). In other words, there must be environmental aspects to a personality, and these need to consider personality in relation to intimate others, like family. Relational theory can contribute to this, he believes, by embracing relational and developmental attributes of personality. When referring to “relational” L’Abate means the nature of intimate relations between and among intimate others that can be seen as functions of individual characteristics in transactions (e.g. environments, other generations, etc.). A coherent theory also needs to include considerations of functionalities and dysfunctionalities, as well as reproducible ways to prevent and treat dysfunction (L’Abate, 2005: 7). 20
Therefore, a single structural framework for the personality as identified by L’Abate is also needed for the agency. Like Mayer (1995), we shall adopt a systemic framework, but here cybernetic principles will be important, and we will focus on “living system theory” (Yolles, 2006). It is not new that personality can be represented as a system (Pervin, 1990; Mayer, 2005), but representing it as a “living system” is new. Such an approach can respond to the needs of complexity and uncertainty, and embed features of adaptation and autonomous selforganization that are important to Bandura (2006). In this part of the paper we model adaptable agencies with a personality from which potentials for patterns of behaviour arise that may be perturbed by their pathologies. Such agencies may be individual or plural. The plural agency is a social collective that is culturally based, and operates through a collective mind that derives from its members’ adherence to its cultural norms (Yolles, 2009). It is cohesive through these cultural norms. Its membership together creates collective cognitive and existential processes that can respond to a potentially changing environment. The agency operates through traits that within the normative personality assemble into mindsets and determine its orientation from which likely patterns of behaviour can emerge. Mindset Theory is based on a system of traits that operate as controls (that is, to establish an influence6 over its immediate environment) within a “living system” generic (or meta) model, i.e. a model that defines the generic components of a conceptual model, process, or system from which through further particular specification, models can be generated. This will be formulated as an agency having traits (one of its generic components), the values of which define Mindset types. The approach creates a potential for dynamic analysis of the agency and its personality in relation to other external agencies, as well as allowing inquiry into its pathologies and dysfunction. Such a generic model will be useful for understanding the nested levels of investigations from top down approach (e.g., society, organizations, teams, individuals), and from a bottom-up approach (e.g., from individual personalities, through normative organisational personality, to socio- and economic-political personality at society level). 8. Modelling Agency and its Normative Personality The agency generic model we shall develop has conceptual characteristics that define a living systems model, as a derivative from Yolles, Fink & Dauber (2009). It arises from the system theory of Schwarz (2001). It has also been shown to arise through a configurative combination of disparate conceptual ideas that exist in organisational theory (Dauber, Fink & Yolles, 2012). The theory may be seen as a cross-disciplinary paradigm that: (1) centres on Schwarz’s (1997) “living system” theory of adaptive organisation; (2) incorporates Habermas’s (1971; 1987) theories of knowledge and communication; (3) addresses Bandura’s (2006) agency theory of human development; (4) incorporates aspects of Piaget’s (1950) theory of personality development; and (5) delivers a trait theory of normative personality that has embedded within it strong anticipation (Dubois, 2000; Rosen, 1985) as one of its features. Strong anticipation occurs as a consequence of the very structural nature of an agency, thereby creating a potential for the expectation of patterns of agency behaviour. In our agency theory, this role is determined by traits and Mindsets (Yolles & Fink, 2013). It also embraces dynamic aspects that explain issues of complexity, chaos, morphogenesis and metamorphosis (Yolles, Fink, Dauber & Sawagvudcharee, 2014).
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In Figure 3 we offer a generic social viable system model of a super-system (of three systems) which can be identified as “living” if the system interconnections satisfy the properties of autopoiesis (Maturana and Verala, 1973 & 1980) and autogenesis (Schwarz, 1997). It is a broadly viable system that develops strategies as part of its social “living” processes that enables it to develop policies, the consequence of which include responses to ideas of sustainability where they are of significance to the agency. The cognitive system offers an important directive for the living supersystem since it is here that identity constructs occur that act as a referent field of influence for the rest of the supersystem. Seeing these systems in terms of fields of influence, the cognitive system operates as a field attractor for the supersystem as a whole. Autopoiesis is constituted simply as a network of processes that enables cognitive system activity to become manifested operatively (Schwarz, 1997), and this is conditioned by autogenesis – a network of principles (that may be seen as second or higher order processes) that is guiding autopoiesis. The conceptual system maintains conceptual entities that act as a formative reference for the figurative system in which conceptual entities are manifested through autogenesis as structured schematic entities, which create a strategic potential for the supersystem. The operative system operates through structured operative entities, manifested by autopoiesis from the figurative system, and from which together with stimuli from its operative environment it undertakes its operative functions. Feedback between each of the systems enables the supersystem as a whole to learn.
Autopoiesis & manifestation of taskrelated behaviour
Autogenesis & network of thematic principles sensitive to context Cognitive System
Figurative System
Operative System
Conceptual identification Cognitive interest
Figurative elaboration Figurative purposes
Structural execution Operative intention
Autopoiesis & regeneration of network of operative processes through evaluated operative experience
Autogenesis & regeneration of conceptual identification through evaluated experience
Figure 3: Generic Representation of a “Living” Social Viable System Autogenesis facilitates an ability to create, organise, and prioritise according to some cognitive interest associated with self-identification that permeates the cognitive system for a given operative context. Autopoiesis facilitates an ability to connect elaborated figurative schemas to a set of possible operative actions that conform to these schemas under the given context. Responses may be fed back to the figurative and cognitive system so as to amplify or supress particular figurative schemas or conceptual identifications. Considering autogenesis as a conduit through which a network of transformative processes are active, then it is a generator of the strategic (or figurative schema) laws through which the agency operates.
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Similarly, an autopoietic conduit is a generator for operative laws and relationships (Schwarz, 1997). While Figure 3 is a representation of the core concept of a living system, it may be used to provide a model of a cybernetic agency, as shown in Figure 4. Here, the terms autopoiesis and autogenesis have been replaced by Piagetian intelligences. For Piaget (cited in Elkind, 1976: 56), intelligence is something that creates an internal connective orientation within an agency (or its personality) towards its environment. This orientation is connected to the capacity of the agency to adapt (Piaget, 1963, pp. 3-4, cited in Plucker, 2012). The Piagetian (1977) intelligences include operative intelligence which frames how the world is understood and where understanding is unsuccessful operative intelligence changes. There is another attribute of Figure 3 that should be discussed at least briefly here. It is that the living system operates through control processes, and these may be envisaged to occur locally to each of the three systems. These controllers are generic and even if they are distributed and implicit, they may be presented in terms of a single system control function that we shall refer to as a trait. These traits may coalesce into patterns that when they apply to personality, they are referred to as Personality Mindset types, as presented in Table 6. Under other contexts than personality, they may refer to some other attribute of the supersystem.
Cultural (figurative) intelligence
Cultural System Cultural Epistemic patterns (of knowledge), identity. Cognitive identification
Agency operative intelligence
Personality System Figurative schemas (goals, ideology, ethics, self-schema). Figurative elaboration
Agency Operative System Structure and imperatives for decisions Operative intention
Agency operative intelligence feedback
Cultural (figurative) intelligence feedback
Figure 4: Generic Model for a Living System Agency
The antecedents of this model can be found in Yolles & Fink (2014 & 2014a & 2014b) where the links between the Maruyama mindscape types and the new Sagiv-Schwartz Mindset types are more closely inspected. Following Yolles, Fink & Dauber (2011), autopoiesis is a concept that is quite similar in nature to that originally introduced by Piaget (1963 & 1977) in the study of child learning and behaviour - called operative intelligence, and autogenesis is directly related to figurative intelligence. It should be noted that Figure 4, like figure 3, is a recursive model (2006) that can be applied to any context that satisfies “living system” criteria, that is where autopoietic and autogenetic networks can be explained to operate for an appropriate supersystem.
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The generic model constitutes a psychosocial framework for the “collective mind” of an agency that constitutes its normative personality (Davis, 2000). The term normative personality is not new, being usually used within the context of the ambient normative social influences that exist during the formation and moulding of personalities (Mroczek & Little, 2006). Our interest lies in recognising that the norms in a plural agency arise from a stable collective. These norms act as a basis from which a unitary cognitive structure coalesces such that a collective mind can be inferred, and from which an emergent normative personality arises. To explain this further, consider that stable plural agencies develop a common dominant culture within which shared beliefs develop in relation to the capacity of the collective power to produce desired outcomes. Cultural anchors are created that are represented within the paradigm that the agency carries and which makes it durable. This enables the development of formal and informal norms for patterns of behaviour, modes of conduct and expression, forms of thought, attitudes and values that are more or less adhered to by its membership. When the norms refer to formal behaviours, then where the members of the collective contravene them, they are deemed to be engaging in illegitimate behaviour which, if discovered, may result in formal retribution - the severity of which is determined from the agency’s ideological and ethical positioning. This develops with the rise of collective cognitive processes that start with information inputs and through decision processes result in orientation to action. It does this with a sense of the collective mind and self. It is a short step to recognise that the collective mind is associated with normative personality. Where a normative personality is deemed to exist, it does not necessarily mean that individual members of the collective will conform to all aspects of the normative processes: they may only do so “more or less.” Figure 5 is an agency generic model (also called a meta-model) in that adopts a set of generic conceptual characteristics of living systems (Yolles, 2006). It comes from Schwarz’s (2001) “Living System Theory” that describes the dynamics of more or less complex entities defined as sets of several (at least two) interacting parts. His starting point consists of identifying three inseparable primal categories present in all systems: objects, relations and wholes. These three types of initial ingredients are on equal footing. In his meta-model he argues that he has an extension of the mechanist paradigm where objects have a privileged ontological status. In his new paradigm of ultimate "reality" (that which exists), there are two complementary, inseparable and irreducible aspects: objects and relations. Figure 5 is bedded on recursive (Yolles, 2006) principles of systemic hierarchy: where systems are structured as a hierarchically nested set of recursively embedded systems, one within another creating more complexity in the modelling process (Williams and Imam, 2006). Thus, complex “bottom-up” interpersonal interrelationships can be modelled through a complex multiplicity of reasons that often are taken as a principle of emergence “causing” higher order systemic forms in which complexity becomes reduced to an invisible horizon of meanings. Under normal circumstances, through legitimization of selected patterns of action top-down influences can constrain the nature of the interactions at the bottom level. Such constraints through legitimization may be ineffective in post-normal situations (those experiencing uncertainty such that they may be at the edge of stability), especially if they lead to crisis (Dempster, 1999; Tognetti, 1999). Thus, the modelling approach can represent networks of processes at the individual and small group level, as well as their impact on the higher level social influence networks of processes and vice versa (Yolles, 2006). The generic model of Figure 5 represents a durable plural agency that embraced development through its cybernetic processes, with a culture, a normative personality, an operative 24
capacity, and an environment. The agency operates through intelligences, adapts to changing situations, and creates and implements its own policies. It enables specific relationships to be introduced within and across systemic domains, as necessary and according to the logical processes that may be proposed within socio/economic/political situations. Cultural orientation attracts agency behaviour towards cultural norms.
Cultural Environment Paradigm. Collective unconscious, Identity, cultural self-reference. Cultural orientation trait: (sensate/ideational)
Cultural (figurative) intelligence Behavioural intelligence
P1,1
Agency Personality P2,1
Figurative intelligence
Social Environment
Agency Operative intelligence
P3,1
Agency Operative System Structures that create Cognitive system Figurative System operational Attitudes, emotion Figurative information as schemas Operative System performance as &conceptual information (e.g. goals) that include appreciative Operative information &investment efficient and effective (e.g. goal imperatives). information, feelings & decision structures facilitating decision and directed action under Cognitive self-reference. imperatives. policy making behaviour. structural facilitation/ Cognitive orientation trait: Cognitive self-regulation. Cognitive self-organisation. constraint. Figurative orientation trait: Knowledge Disposition Operative orientation trait. Agency selfSelf-relational ethics organisation Operative Intelligence Social orientation adjustment imperatives Figurative Intelligence trait P4,2 adjustment imperatives P4,1
Operative Intelligence
P3,2 P2,2 P1,2
Impulses for cultural adjustment
Imperative for operative intelligence adjustment
Note:Pi,j (where pathology type i=1,4 and order j=1,2) refers to type-pathologies that can arise through both intelligence limitation and impeded efficacy
Figure 5: A Relational “Living System” meta-model of an Agency in Interaction with its Environments
The Formative Traits Figure 5 indicates that there are five formative traits in any agency, one of which defines its cultural orientation, 3 of which define its normative personality (the cognitive, figurative, operative orientations), and the last of which defines its social orientation which emerges through interaction with the social environment. The normative personality traits have been discussed at length in Yolles & Fink (2013). As indicated by Yolles et al. (2011) and Fink et al (2012), in the context of organizational culture research, traits are bi-polar value dimensions that typify agency and establish a basis for strong anticipation. It is through these bi-polar traits that agency and indeed personality orientation preferences can be indicated in the respective domains - for the forward linkages (i.e. action oriented processes) or feedback linkages (i.e. information collection, adaptation and learning processes). As a result, given understanding of the five traits that an agency has, strong anticipation can be manifested thereby creating behavioural expectations (as illustration, see Yolles & Fink, 2013a). 25
Strong anticipation also arises in the normative personality through its set of formative traits which function as personality control variables (Van Egeren, 2009), where the values/states that they adopt refer to personality types (Eysenck, 1957), and where the type values of a personality derive from the epistemic values that its traits have adopted. The trait theory that emerges is based on and reflective of emotional-motivational systems that are able to increase adaptation to classes of stimuli associated with positive and negative reinforcement (Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky, 2005: 314, cited in Van Egeren, 2009). For Davis (2000) durable personality traits are usually tightly bound to qualities of emotions, but they may also be defined in terms of preconscious mental dispositions that affect the reflective processes and influence the different categories of cognitive and animated behaviour. They also provide the regulatory patterns that create agency stability. For Fleishman, Constanza & Marshall-Mies (1999) traits are also related to performance. In corporate theory the traits have generic characteristics that are domain dependent, and may be seen as normative personality variables that regulate the importance attributed to different classes of information. They are indicative of personality styles that arise from personality types. Types have a special role in personality theory. They are deemed to be responsible for the patterns of behaviour that a personality generates, and since behaviour is closely related to cognitive structure which it facilitates and constrains, so traits are also connected with personality structure. Patterns of behaviour are generically defined as an abstraction from a concrete form that keeps recurring in specific, non-arbitrary contexts. It is this very nature that enables an agency’s behaviour to be strongly anticipated, even when it comes to their interaction with personal and situational variables. Where it is possible to associate personalities with stable type preferences, a consistent connection to behaviour can be discerned (de Oliveira et al., 2008; Hyldegård, 2009), and this includes the likelihood of determining economic behaviour, even under conditions of uncertainty. Piagetian and Non-Piagetian Intelligences The conceptual model of Figure 3 has special transitive functions that cut across distinct ontological systems through an autogenetic7 (or figurative) conduit through which the laws are generated that guide the agency operatively, and an autopoietic8 (or operative) conduit through which operative relationships are generated (Schwarz, 1997). These generations are facilitated through the conduits by a number of transitive intelligences. These are all based on the Piagetian intelligence concept (Yolles et al., 2011), include cultural intelligence, and are connected with social/behavioural and emotional intelligence. Piagetian intelligences may be seen as a network of relational processes involving the manifestation of a definable set of components between given domains of the living system that: (i) through interactions and transformations, continuously regenerate, realize and adapt the relations that produce them; and (ii) constitute its socio-cognitive nature as a concrete unity. It has already been said that for Piaget (cited in Elkind, 1976: 56) intelligence is something that within the personality creates a connective orientation of an agency towards its environment, what generates the capacity of adaptation. The Piagetian (1977) intelligences include operative intelligence which frames how the world is understood and, where understanding is unsuccessful, operative intelligence changes. Operative intelligence is concerned with the representation and manipulation of the transformational aspects of reality, and involves all actions that are undertaken so as to anticipate, follow or recover the operative transformations. It also refers to highly integrated 26
and generalised sets of actions that are adaptive in nature (Schoenfeld, 1986). It can thus be thought of as the effective capacity to create a cycle of activity that manifests schemas operatively. There are two forms of operative intelligence illustrated in Figure 5: one is connected with the agency as a whole, and the other with its normative personality, and both have similar functions. Personality operative intelligence manifests strategic schemas from the figurative system to the operative system. Agency operative intelligence manifests agency schemas from the personality as a whole to the agency operative system. While both personality and agency operative intelligences are constituted as a network of self-producing processes, in the agency they involve bureaucracy - this being responsible for the implementation of policy that arises from the normative personality. Thus, agency operative intelligence develops capabilities of how to design a bureaucracy and to define bureaucratic structures and rules. Figurative intelligence is a form of autogenesis (Schwarz, 1997; Yolles, Fink & Dauber, 2011) that provides core relational explanations of reality as a reflection of patterns of knowledge. It manifests knowledge as information about states of reality, which it delivers to the figurative system to enable perception, drawing, mental imagery, language and imitation (Montangero & Maurice-Naville, 1997; Piaget, 1950; Piaget & Inhelder 1969). There are two forms of figurative intelligence indicated in Figure 5: cultural (figurative) intelligence and personality figurative intelligence. Cultural (figurative) intelligence is used when knowledge is manifested from agency culture to the cognitive system in the personality as conceptual information. Through figurative intelligence within the personality, this information is then again manifested as a variety of strategic forms of schema like goals, ideology, ethics, and self-scripts the latter of which project strategic expectations into operative structure and behaviour. There is another form of intelligence in Figure 5, but this is not Piagetian in nature. It is behavioural intelligence which is connected with how policy that has been developed in the personality is implemented. It occurs as a “structural coupling” that represents a simple interaction between two (or more) “living systems” (i.e., a behavioural system and its environment of other behavioural systems) and which maintains a past and future relationship between the agency operative system and that of interactive others. Consistent with a need identified by L’Abate (2005), an agency not to be isolated, but rather interactive with an environment that may include other agencies, as illustrated in Figure 5. It functions through behavioural intelligence, as represented through its overt actions (Ang, Van Dyne, Koh, Ng, Templer, Tay & Chandrasekar, 2007: 6). Such behavioural intelligence may also be considered to embrace attributes of social intelligence (Baron-Cohen, 1999). Kihlstrom & Cantor (2000) in discussing the development of social intelligence, refer to Greenspan’s (1979) suggestion that it should emphasize social and practical intelligence, and consists of three components: social sensitivity (reflected in role-taking and social inference); social insight (including social comprehension, psychological insight, and moral judgment); and social communication (subsuming referential communication and social problem solving). These three components, and especially social sensitivity, constitute a part of behavioural intelligence, and as such construct a “structural coupling” (Maturana and Varela, 1987) between social operative systems and their social environment. This occurs when there is an epistemic relationship between the social operative systems of two or more coupled “living system”, thereby creating an interactive connection between their past, present and future histories.
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9. Agency Temperaments and Attitudes Even though collectives are composed of individuals, resulting in a supposition that normative and individual personalities operate in a similar way, there are distinctions between the singular and the plural agency (Yolles, 2009a). The substantive difference is that while individuals may adhere to organisational norms, organisations operate through collective norms that develop from their coherent cultures. Unlike that of the individual, organisational personality processes are often both observable and measurable. While the individual’s temperament, emotional feelings and emotional arousal will undoubtedly impact on the functioning of the organisation as a whole, normative emotional attributes (in the collective) will have a more profound influence on its overall functioning and coherence. While emotions/feelings occur in the singular personality, they may also develop a normative dimensionality in a plural agency. In both cases emotions also can affect agency performance, but the nature of this performance is quite different when the agency is either an individual or a collective. In discussing this, however, it must be made clear how one can differentiate between emotions and feelings, and there does seem to be some confusion between these terms. For us a useful distinction between the two comes from Hansen & Christensen (2005:1426), who tell us that: “...neuro-psychologists, brain researchers and other behavioural scientists have strongly emphasised the importance of emotional response (Damasio, 2000; Le Doux, 1998). In this research, a distinction has emerged between feelings and emotions.…. Basically, emotions are thought of as very primitive, extremely fast, unconscious mechanisms controlling the individual responses to a wide variety of situations ranging from serious threats (for instance from an approaching car) to trivial decision making tasks (for instance choosing a coffee brand in the supermarket) (Heath, 2001; Franzen & Bouwman, 2001). Feelings, on the contrary, are those conscious and cognitive perceptions we use to describe our more primitive non-cognitive emotional control of what we do. We may talk about feelings of sadness, jealousy or happiness etc. Such feelings are much more detailed in nature than emotions and they can be described verbally in more or less precise terms by the individual experiencing such feelings”
The idea that organisations have collective or normative feelings is not new (Albrow, 1997; Elfenbein, 2007). Albrow (1997) argues that adequate organizational narrative needs to transcend the emotion/rationality divide. Elfenbein (2007) explains how the emotion process begins with a focal individual who is exposed to an eliciting stimulus, registers the stimulus for its meaning, and experiences a feeling state and physiological changes, with downstream consequences for attitudes, behaviours, and cognitions, as well as facial expressions and other emotionally expressive cues. These downstream consequences can result in externally visible behaviours and cues that become eliciting stimuli for interaction partners. For each stage of the emotion process there are distinct emotion regulation processes, that incorporate individual differences and group norms and that can become automatic with practice. Elfenbein (2007:1) draws on the notion of emotional contagion for which: "Research has found that emotions - both upbeat [emotions that for us result in such feelings] like enthusiasm and joy, and negative [emotions that for us result in such feelings] like sadness, fear and anger - are easily passed from person to person, often without either party's realizing it. Emotional contagion occurs in a matter of milliseconds (Hatfield et al, 1994; Hatfield, & Rapson, 2004)…If you're the receiver, you may not know what exactly happened, just that you feel differently after the encounter than you did before."
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Some yet empirically unsupported theory has also appeared that might have the potential to explain how normative emotional states might arise in the collective. Deindividualisation theory arises from Le Bon’s crowd theory (see Reicher, 2001), which proposes that the psychological mechanisms of anonymity, suggestibility and contagion transform an assembly into a psychological crowd (Postmes & Spears, 1998). However, while normative contagion theory may be linked to the creation of the emotional norms, there is a need to develop more theory to underpin this notion. Thus, Mazhar (2011) recognises that emotion and culture are very closely linked through the formation of a “social mind” that according to Cooley (1962) is a unity, not of agreement but in organisation through the interactive influences that arise between parts of the social system that creates some whole. In particular Cooley notes that “everything that I say or think is influenced by what others have said or thought, and, in one way or another, sends out an influence of its own in turn” (Cooley, 1962: 4). For Jenkins (2004:63) this social mind is relatable to the internalisation of Mead’s (1934) generalised other in the development of an individual’s personality and the rejection of any sharp divide between individual and social psychology (since for Mead it is through social interaction that consciousness arises). Bolender (2010:3) therefore recognises this notion of the social mind as a relational cognition which can be expressed in terms of cooperation. Such relational cognition is not only connected with attitudes and rational thought, but also with emotion enabling the idea of emotional climate (de Rivera, 1992; Tran, 1998; Ozcelik, Langton & Aldrich, 2008) to develop. The argument for this is that the social mind operates through cognitive scaffolding (Sterelny 2004; Caporael, 1997; Wilson 2005) that has developed into Hutchins’ (2010, 445) notion of enculturated cognition – that is ecological assemblies of human cognition that make pervasive use of cultural products that are typically assembled as on-going cultural practices, arising as behaviours that are part of processes of interaction. Where emotion is the cultural product enhanced by interaction, emotional climate results. The idea of the social mind can now be extended by recognising that a durable group with a dominant culture has the capability of collective cognitive processes (Clark, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Theiner, Allen & Goldston, 2010), a pre-required conceptualisation for the existence of a normative/collective personality. For Gordon (1989: 115) emotional climate is the patterns of meanings embodied in symbols through which people communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward emotions. More generally Fernández-Dols, Carrera, De Mendoza, & Oceja, (2007) define it as being constituted as an emotional atmosphere that provides emotion accessibility caused by the priming of specific categories of emotion linked to culturallybased emotional conventions. De Rivera (1992) indicates that emotional climate emerges because emotions have structures which may be specified in precise ways, this constituting a structural theory of emotions. Emotions are therefore always in a society - though the notion of ‘society’ may here may be reduced to only be two people, and may even be reduced to one person and an imaginary other. Tran (1998) is interested in how an emotional climate arises, evolves and is maintained, and notes that emotionality and rational thought coexist in organisational settings, and that while individuals have emotions, collectively these individual emotions create an emotional climate, which in turn will affect individual emotions. For de Rivera (1992: 7), emotional climate contributes to such facets as political unity and cultural identity, and emotional structural theory (de Rivera, 1977; de Rivera & Grinkis, 1986) shows how emotions may be conceived as various sorts of attractions and repulsions between people which transform their bodies and perceptions. Illustrations are provided of different types of climates. For instance a climate of fear comes about in certain 29
political or economic circumstances, isolates people from one another, is not conducive to cooperative activity, and encourages insecurity in relation to an authority. In contrast, a climate of security might arise. Both might be measured through an instrument that evaluates how people in a given collective maintain relationships of trust of each other and of authority. Climates of stability or instability may also exist, and measuring norms for anxiety, agression or synergy might also suffice as a measures. Yet other climates and their measures that de Rivera considers are those of confidence, satisfaction, hostility, solidarity, and hope. Ozcelik, Langton & Aldrich (2008) consider that emotional climate can be positive or negative, drawing on the relational systems framework of Kahn (1998) which sees organizations as ongoing systems of work relations among employees who have varying emotional attachments to each other. Kahn proposed that relational systems can be functional or dysfunctional depending how members of a collective are emotionally bound to others “through experiences of feeling themselves joined, seen and felt, known, and not alone in the context of their work lives” (Kahn, 1998: 41). These relational systems routinely shape the interactions among organizational members and have a substantial impact on the way that organizations operate and perform. Ozcelik, Langton & Aldrich (2008) argue that organizational leaders may influence the relational systems in their organization by establishing and enacting norms for how organizational members should interact with each other. We are following Bates, Goodnight and Fite (2008: 485), who tell us that emotion and temperament can be separated for the sake of theoretical analysis, but they correspond in so many ways that it is clear that they are part of the same whole. Emotions are generally seen as states of mind that are often associated with longer lasting mood. Temperament can also be seen as a hypothetical construct describing individual differences in reactivity and selfregulation (Rothbart & Bates, 2006), and such reactivity may be negative or positive. Temperament may also be seen as the pattern of responses in a given type of incentive condition across many occasions (Bates, Goodnight & Fite. 2008). Temperament and attitudes should be seen as independent and interactive, and both should be seen as cultural knowledge based belief potentials that have been manifested as cognitive belief states in a personality that are orientated towards some object of attention. The cultural elements from which emotions arise may be referred to as “emotional culture” that define the criteria of emotional competence and determines the self-regulation of emotions and exposure to emotional episodes (Gordon 1989). Temperament interacts with emotional activation or arousal (Hirschman & Stern (1999), citing Mehrabian and Russell, 1974) resulting excitement or calm. Emotional arousal is a relatively important area of study, in particular because of its perceived connection with memory in the singular agency. Thus for instance for Christianson (1992), perceptual, attentional, and elaborative cognitive processing - triggered by an emotionally arousing experience - can produce memory enhancements of details related to the emotion laden stimulus. The cost of this is less elaboration and consolidation of memory for the peripheral details. Positive temperament valence appears to enhance information processing ability (Isen, 1987) and reduce cognitive elaboration (Batra & Stayman, 1990), and the development of emotional arousal is connected with the processes through which information is encoded (Sharot & Phelps, 2004; Ochsner, 2000). When temperament and emotional arousal interact, the result is emotional feelings like tranquillity, delight, melancholy or panic. Hirschman & Stern (1999) propose a model that represents this relationship. It is adapted from Holbrook and Batra (1987) with antecedence in 30
Russell (1980), and relates temperament with arousal. An adapted form of the model, represented in Figure 6, distinguishes between four classes of emotional feeling, making it easier to discuss theoretically the role of emotional feeling in an agent than when having to deal with innumerable different feelings. We refer to these feeling classifications as: containment, stimulation, passive, and dysthymic. These can be seen as classes of feeling tendencies, developed through experiences of degrees of emotional arousal. Temperament of positive valence Containment feelings Contentment Tranquillity Serenity Placidity
Stimulation feelings Exuberance Delight Ecstasy Elation
Low emotional arousal
High emotional arousal
Passive feelings Hopelessness Dread Lethargy
Dysthymicfeelings Anger Hostility Panic Paranoia
Neutral arousal => rational thinking Zero valence => emotional balance
Temperament of negative valence
Figure 6: Classes of emotional feeling tendencies (containment, stimulation, passiveness, dysthymic) arising with the continuously variable variables of temperament valence and emotional activation/arousal (adapted from Hirschman & Stern, 1999: 8) Hirschman & Stern (1999) note that an agency’s willingness to take emotional risks is dependent upon the temperament valence that they have at the time. Thus, durable positive valence in temperament, as believed by an agency, will likely result in the agency taking more emotional risks, and those who believe themselves to be in substantively dysthymic will make choices aimed at reducing emotional risks. Temperament interacts directly with attitudes, contributing to cognitive responses (e.g., attitude formation and recall) and behaviours. Thus Kahn & Isen (1993: 257) have found that temperament with positive valence improves an agent’s expectations about the likely outcome of anticipated neutral or positive experiences or events, and prompts it to engage in more elaboration and thinking about neutral things in which they are interested. 10. Efficacy The autopoietic conduit is also used by the agency (Figure 5) in order to become efficacious in the generation of operative performance. In the plural agency when referring to the normative beliefs that an agency has about its efficacy, the term collective efficacy is often 31
used. Lindsley, Brass & Thomas (1995) citing Guzzo, Yost, Campbell, & Shea (1993: 9) note that efficacy is a task specific potency that is meant to refer to a shared belief about general effectiveness across multiple tasks encountered by groups in complex environments. In this paper we shall not distinguish between the efficacy of the individual and the plural agency, since relative meanings will depend on the plural or singular context. Efficacy is normally taken as the capability an agency has to organize and implement a series of actions to produce given attainments or performances (Bandura, 1977, 1986; Wood & Bandura, 1989). This capability is influenced by the capacity of operative intelligence to generate coherence, and (as noted by Bandura, 2005: 316) an agency’s interactive, coordinative, and synergistic dynamics. This is because efficacy is a general measure of the effectiveness of operative intelligence in manifesting information into its operative system. As a result, in/efficacy can affect all of an agency’s strategic processes like goal setting, choice of activity, amount of effort that will be expended, analytic strategies, and persistence of coping behaviour (Bandura, 1977; Wood & Bandura, 1989; cited in Lindsley, Brass & Thomas (1995: 647). It may be noted that efficacy should be seen as a different measure than the more traditional measure of psychometric intelligence, since efficacy is specific to the capacity of operative intelligence to effectively complete its function, while psychometric intelligence tests responded to some general (and perhaps ad hoc) ideas about the nature of intelligence (Lautrey, 2002). We would point to the fact that Bandura’s use of the term efficacy is really ‘operative efficacy’, allowing us to also introduce a new term ‘figurative efficacy’ that uses the autogenetic conduit. This latter would be concerned with the relationship between cognitive conceptualisation and the figurative mental schemas that result. However, a discussion about figurative efficacy is beyond the scope of this paper. When referring to efficacy in the remainder of this paper we shall mean operative efficacy. Following Huh (2011: 2), efficacy tends to be seen in terms of some subjective (i.e., an agency’s beliefs in itself), rather than being seen objectively as some universally observable degree of agency performance, though both uses are possible. Thus for instance Lindsley, Brass & Thomas (1995) see it as a collective belief by a plural agency that it can successfully perform a specific task. Bandura’s use of the term efficacy tends to be a subjective one, which arises from his notion of self-efficacy. So it is taken as being associated with an agency’s belief about the capability of self, therefore making efficacy an instrument that has a cultural and emotional imperative. However, it is also feasible to adopt a more strategic management approach with a more objective view that arises from an intuitive constructed set of indices that relate specifiable goals to measures of outcome performance. This approach can be problematic in complex and uncertain situations since there may not be an exclusive linear mapping between goals and performance. This is why the use of subjective measures has become more dominant. In this respect Lindsley, Brass & Thomas (1995) are interested in the way in which efficacy changes under emotional stimulation, and produce a theory that examines the relationship between efficacy and performance, where performance affects an agency’s belief in its efficacy (or capability) which in turn affects performance. This leads to reciprocal causation with "deviation-amplifying" and “deviation-correcting” spirals of performance, which amplify upwardly or correct downwardly the relationship between efficacy and performance. There is another way of expressing changes in the relationship between efficacy and performance. Efficacy is a reflection of an agency’s capabilities to produce designated (or more properly formulated as ‘desired’) levels of performance in social environments. 32
Inefficacy emerges when a given a level of capability is not sufficient to achieve desired results, i.e., relatively poor performance develops. In contrast, when efficacy is enhanced there is an improved relationship between a given level of capability and performance. Efficacy may be seen to be a capability measure of operative intelligence. Thus, the efficacious connection between capability and performance is directly connected by the operative intelligence processes that manifest an operative structured view of the world, just as it offers feedback into figurative intelligence. Positive emotions arise when efficacy is high, strong negative emotions may arise when inefficacy is experienced and figurative intelligence is not capable of providing alternate images of reality, i.e. there is little ability to offer adapted strategic views. Efficacy is shaped by experience, encouragement and affective state (Bandura, 1986, 1997; Goddard, Hoy & Hoy, 2004). There are two forms of experience: mastery (or enactive), and vicarious. The former occurs where the past experiences of an agency indicate that it can contribute to building up efficacy in similar contexts in the future; the latter refers to learning by observing the high level performance of other agencies. Encouragement occurs through verbal persuasion and is a specific performance feedback from intimate others. Affective state refers to the level of emotional state (e.g., anxiety or excitement) connected with some behaviour that involve performance. The latter is consistent with the view by Adeyemo (2007) that emotive imperatives condition efficacy, which can in turn be related to emotional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), which also uses the operative conduit. It may be argued that emotional intelligence and efficacy are interrelated. While efficacy is unable to improve cognitive capabilities and cognitive resources, it can prevent a situation where bad emotions impede the best use of resources and capabilities. Inefficacy in the function of the intelligences may not only result in the stimulation of emotional/feeling conditions and a diminution of performance. In more sever conditions of inefficacy, contexts can be misrepresented. This not only results in agency disorder, but also impact on the imperatives that orientate traits, and hence result in an agency shift in orientation against its natural contextual tendency. For illustration of a “measure of efficacy”, we refer to Goddard, Hoy & Hoy (2000) who examined school teaching. In their context, ‘agency’ refers to the intentional pursuit of a course of action, in this case with respect to educational goals. Thus one school may be working to raise student achievement scores, while another to increase the rate and quality of parental involvement. In purposive actions agencies strive to meet their goals and thus reflect intentionality. These goals can be assessed, and attempts can be made to see if they are reflected in the agential policy implementations. As a result, Goddard, Hoy & Hoy (2000) created a measuring instrument that asked teaching staff whether: (a) teachers in this school are well-prepared to teach the subjects they are assigned to teach; (b) teachers here don’t have the skills needed to produce meaningful student learning; (c) the opportunities in this community help ensure that these students will learn; (d) the lack of instructional materials and supplies in this school makes teaching very difficult. Additional questions were deemed necessary to provide a validity check on the efficacy measure which followed the proposition that teacher efficacy of the plural agency would be positively related to individual teacher efficacy and trust in colleagues, and negatively related to sense of powerlessness and degree of conflict. As a result the emotional dimension of the respondents was assessed by asking them whether there was: a sense of teacher powerlessness; an individual teacher efficacy measure; and a measure of teacher trust in colleagues.
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Efficacy is reduced with the development of pathologies Pi,j in Figure 5, where (i,j) are such that they indicate type i=1,4 and order j=1,2. These pathologies can result in agency dysfunction. 11. Controls in the Generic Model The model of Figure 5 has two types of control: lateral and transitive. Lateral controls are taken up by the traits. The epistemic values of these traits determine what is important locally to the agency. The normative personality and social orientation traits are influenced by the dominant cultural trait orientation. Culture determines what is acceptable in a society. It is on this basis that our leaders are appointed, our laws are created, and our rules are imposed and policed. So, cultural orientation creates an influence that forms a predisposition for normative personality and social orientations. However, where there is a significant cultural minority that does not conform to the dominant epistemology (usually occurring when a culture has moved towards instability), it means that the laws (which are longer term social regulators) and rules (the result of shorter term political regulators) may not be as embracing or enforceable as in culturally stable situations. We underline the fact that in plural agencies cultural control processes are normative. This demands the realisation that ultimately it is the individual who decides how to behave. The goals and interests of an individual are the ultimate determinants of action and behaviours. Even where there are strong controls, for instance formulated by laws within the agency, we find deviations with respect to behaviour and the policing of those laws. In plural agencies like nation states such deviations range from tax avoidance to murder or even genocide. Culture is responsible for the formulation of an agency potential from which laws and rules arise. This potential is socially delivered to the normative personality of an agency through a process of self-creation, using cultural figurative intelligence to manifest cultural information, ideologies, ethics, goals and other forms of strategic attributes of the agency that in due course influences the way in which policy is created and implemented. This is so because it allows self-generation and self-organisation. Transitive controls operate across the systems shown in Figure 5. They function through operative and figurative intelligences, each working with feed-forward processes, and capacities for negative (deviation-counteraction) feedback and positive (deviationamplification) feedback. These transitive controls manifest information across the agency, and enable personal self-reference (identity) and self-regulation. When the information is inadequate for the needs of the system, uncertainty is introduced that leads to a change dynamic. This can lead to adjustments in self-reference, self-regulation and create conditions for self-organisation. Figure 5 embraces the idea that a living system is embedded into a cultural environment and interacts with a social environment, a notion extended by reflecting on the recognition that there are consequential influences and interactions with these environments. Central to the understanding of Figure 5 are two principal features: (1) the ‘living system’ is an agency equipped with a necessary and sufficient set of intelligences having the capacity to create and pursue its own goals and develop its own levels of performance; and (2) it may self-organize and respond to a changing environment through adaptation (Bandura, 2006). The figurative system in Figure 5 operates as a strategic agency which is formulated within its ideological and ethical frame. As such it also has “strategic” figurative and operative 34
intelligences represented by P2,1 and P2,2, and P3,1 and P3,2. The nature of these intelligences is due to their sensitivity to contexts that arise from the meanings of the systemic domains, and since different components of the model have different meanings, so they are distinct from other figurative and operate intelligences in other parts of the model. 12. The Dynamic Nature of the Cultural Trait The term trait as used here refers to the preferential variables of an agency that are formative in defining its functional nature. The traits are dichotomous, and may take one of two bi-polar qualitative values (called enantiomers) which orientate the agency in the way that it processes information and develops, and which ultimately creates a penchant towards particular forms of decision and policy making and behaviour. For Van Egeren (2009) and Davis (2000), such traits operate as fundamental control and characterising function. There are 5 traits: combinations of the enantiomers of 3 normative personality traits create personality types; and combinations of the 5 traits create agency types. The traits arise from core epistemic properties of the agency that commonly exist within it. An agency’s capability to create performance is taken as a function of its capacity to process information efficaciously. The traits establish regulatory processes that enable the emergence of stable patterns of behaviour. Different traits therefore have different control functions and hence necessarily reflect different definitive characteristics (Yolles, 2009; Yolles & Fink, 2009; Yolles, Fink & Dauber, 2011). Personality interacts with its environment, and because of this we need also to consider influences that impinge from the environment on the agency. We distinguish two environmental traits of the personality: agency cultural and social orientation. Agency cultural orientation controls what is culturally legitimate in the agency, while social orientation controls how the agency reacts to the perceived needs of what it identifies as its environment, including others. In the cultural and operative environment of the agency, cultural and social orientation act as attractors of ‘appropriate behaviour.’ Cultural orientation is core to the agency, and its very nature draws on the dynamic theory of Sorokin (1937-42). This begins with the realisation that culture may be seen as being constituted through the shared norms, values, beliefs and assumptions, and the behaviour and artefacts that express these orientations - including symbols, rituals, stories, and language; norms and understanding about the nature and identity of the social entity, the way work is done, the value and possibility of changing or innovating, relations between lower and higher ranks, the nature of the environment (Yolles, 2006; Williams et al, 1993). All durable societies have a culture. This is explained by Schaller, Conway & Crandall (2008) when they refer to Sumner’s realization that culture results from “the frequent repetition of petty acts” (Sumner, 1906: 3) that result in what he calls folkways. They further note that these cultural folkways “are not creations of human purpose and wit” but are instead “products of natural forces which men unconsciously set in operation” (Sumner, 1906: 4) and which develop through fundamental psychological processes that govern the thoughts and actions of individuals. Culturally based social groups (socio-cultures) are not static entities that are just shaped simply in reaction to external forces. As Kemp (1997) explains, the reason is that sociocultures are dynamic systems, constantly in a state of change generated by the properties within the system. In other words human cultures do not ‘change’, but are rather always in a 35
‘state of change’. They form historically not as discrete entities, but through continuous development. Thus, cultures can be defined less for what they are now, and more for where they are coming from and where they are going. This is not unique to human socio-cultures since many non-human societies also culturally adapt, both in technology and social organization (Rensch, 1972). However, what seems to be unique about human society is that it has developed the capacity to take cultural adaptations and convert them into an evolutionary process. Human cultures evolve, rather than just adapt to circumstances. Here evolution is a distinct dynamic process, and is what Gell-Mann (1994) describes as a complex adaptive system: that is “a system [that] acquires information about its environment and its own interaction with that environment, identifying regularities in that information, condensing those regularities into a kind of ‘schema’ or model, and acting in the real world on the basis of that schema. In each case, there are various competing schemata, and the results of the action in the real world is feedback to influence the competition among those schemata” (Gell-Mann, 1994: 17). This constitutes both a learning process for the system through feedback, and the generation of its own capacity to change over time - hence creating its dynamic. A socio-culture is not isolated from its environment, which acts to impose ‘natural’ selection on schemata that limit which schemata might be successful. An explanation for change in the complex socio-cultural system has been given by Sorokin (1937-42) through his Principle of Immanent Change. This tells how cultures change not just as a response to the external needs of human society, but through something that occurs within the process itself. This principle states that a durable social system changes by virtue of its own forces and properties, and it cannot help changing even if all external conditions are constant. A socio-cultural system satisfying this principle generates consequences which are “not the results of the external factors to the system, but the consequences of the existence of the system and of its activities. As such, they must be imputed to it, regardless of whether they are good or bad, desirable or not, intended or not by the system. One of the specific forms of this immanent generation of consequences is an incessant change of the system itself, this being due to its existence and activity” (Sorokin, 1937-1942: Vol, 4, 600-1). For Sorokin (1937-42) all social systems, whether they be the family, the State, universities, schools, churches, or any other, are reflections of complex systems of meanings (Gibson, 2000). Sorokin created a theory of socio-cultural change that explains how, through the domination of one of two cultural conditions, different patterns of cultural based behaviour can develop. The two cultural conditions identified are referred to as sensate and ideational types (Yolles, Frieden and Kemp, 2008). While these constitute dominant cultural orientations, culture is always multi-dimensional and pluralistic. These types are paired, exist together within a given frame of reference, and form an interactive couple. In a cultural frame of reference they are constituted as opposing and interactive sensate and ideational forces. Kemp (1997) explains that in a culture in which the sensate type dominates, meanings are only taken from the senses, this resulting in a predominantly utilitarian and materialistic society. Ideational culture relates to the supersensory, to the creation of ideas, and the highlighting of the humanitarian or spiritual. In an Ideational culture the creation of ideas may predominate, and people with a predominantly ideational mind-set generate possibilities through the pursuit and maturation of a variety of ideas. Communication is also important within socio-cultural settings and the way in which it operates through narrative. In this context, Gibson (2000) notes that Ideational culture centres 36
on metanarrative, while sensate culture centres on Visualism 9 - in which metanarratives 10 collapse and fragment into antenarratives 11 leading to a society without integrated thought or judgment. Empiricism will dominate over theoretical concepts. Cultural dynamics arise because these cultural conditions maintain an interactive virtual couple between the two types. Jung12 uses the term enantiodromia 13 to represent this, giving a principle in which the superabundance of a force will inevitably produce its opposite. He in particular used it to explore the dichotomous relationship between the unconscious and conscious mind, the former acting against the wishes of the latter (Jung, 1971). All agency traits have the same immanent dynamics as does the cultural trait. One of the two bi-polar enantiomers is in ascendency, while the other is in decline. With respect to culture, when Ideational mentalities interpret the world, they are harmony and idea-centred and tend to embrace the creation of ideas (Kemp, 1997). However, idea creators often tend to be unable to apply their ideas and may lack the practical capabilities or material governing controls necessary to manifest the ideas as behavioural aspects of the system. Agencies with a predominantly Ideational mind-set generate possibilities through the pursuit and maturation of a variety of ideas, with little emphasis on how to use them materially. Thus, they create variety, but they cannot harness and apply it. Zetterberg (1997), referring to Sorokin, illustrates how Western culture has oscillated between stable Sensate and Ideational dominant types. An Ideational culture in 600 B.C. changed to a Sensate culture at the height of the Roman Empire, which in turn became Ideational in the Middle-Ages, after which it became Senate again in more modern times. Western Sensate culture is currently in decline (Sorokin, 1937-42, Vol, 4: 312) and moving again towards its Ideational state. When a cultural system moves from its dominant stable (Ideational, Sensate or Idealist) state it moves towards culturally instability so that dominant values and beliefs are lost across a culture, and the social develops a “disorderly stage” (in reference to Confucius: Sorokin, 1937-42, Vol, 4: 365; Sorokin, 1937-42: Vol,4: 725). This results in the greater likelihood of social disruption and conflict. Such dynamic conditions are well explained in theory on the dynamics of complex adaptive systems (Yolles, Fink, Iles & Sawagvudcharee, 2013; Manmuang, Yolles & Talabgaew, 2012,), though this is beyond the scope of this current paper. It is worth noting that there are certain particular properties of Sensate and Ideational society that have implications for the orientation of agencies. Sorokin (1937-42: Vol, 1:217) notes that “in the beginning of an [ideational] up-swing of culture, [culture] is virile and stern, is marked by a collective state of mind and discipline…is a culture of volition and strong determination to achieve an ideal…. The decline of the culture or a great cultural period is stamped by…sensate mentality, and individualism.” More, “sociocultural rhythms such as individualism and collectivism, centralization and decentralization, integration and differentiation” (Sorokin, 1937-42, Vol,4: 360) affect social processes such that “pulsations of war and peace, stable and critical periods, revolution and reaction, autocracy and democracy, individualism and collectivism, classicism and romanticism, idealism and materialism, convention and anarchy, growth and decay, integration and disintegration, have been going on without end” (Sorokin, 1937-42, Vol. 1: 89). 13. Traits, Enantiomers and Agency Types Trait orientations 37
We have explained that agency traits take on formative control functions for an agency. They adopt epistemic values that impacts on the nature of their control under given contexts. They also determine the choice of bi-polar values that the traits may adopt. Earlier in this paper we introduced Mindset Theory, and showed that it had more facility than Mindscape Theory (Maruyama 1974, 1988). Mindset Theory developed 8 (=23) cognitive types from 3 personality traits, expandable from Figure 5 to 32 (=25) cognitive types from 5 traits. The 5 agency traits include 2 that are external to the personality (cultural and social) and 3 of which are internal to it (cognitive, figurative and operative). These traits and their enantiomers will be shown in Table 9. As will be shown below from the theoretical base developed, these traits can now be more thoroughly defined, adapting from Yolles and Fink (2011; 2013). The trait orientations arise from the enantiomers that belong to each trait, which for the normative personality were explained earlier. Here we extend this to include the other cultural and social orientation traits, and provide additional enantiomer information where appropriate, and these are described in some detail below. The relationship between the traits is important, and rather like Lewin’s (1951) or Rummel’s (1975) field theories, if one thinks of the traits as vectors in a human force field, then the epistemic values that they adopt are influenced by a force field established by the cultural trait – where the culture enantiomer then operates as a field attractor for the other traits. In fact Lewin, and others after him including Rummel have each developed a field theory of psychological behaviour. In this, Lewin adopted the term aufforderungscharakter or valence, where a positive valence implies a degree of attraction. This term has also been used by Hirschman & Stern (1999) in the exploration of emotions, where the intensity of an emotional orientation, just like traits, may have a valence that is positive, neutral or negative. The cultural trait will have positive valence for the personality and social orientation trait, unless pathologies intervene when such valence may perhaps become neutral or even negative. At his stage, it is appropriate to identify the nature of the traits we have been referring to: Cultural Trait This trait maintains three forms of knowledge: identification, elaborating and executor knowledge (Yolles, 2006) that can each be manifested into the personality system as information. The enantiomers of this trait have been explored at some length in Yolles et al (2008) and arise from the work of Sorokin (1937-1942), and are summarized in Sorokin (1962). As already indicated, the two type orientations are Sensate and Ideational, Sensate epistemic attributes include: appreciating the nature of the needs and ends that are to be satisfied in respect of a given object of attention, the degree of strength in pursuit of those needs, and the methods of satisfaction. The means of satisfaction occur not through adaptation or modification of human beings, but through the exploitation of the external world. It is thus practically orientated, with emphasis on human external needs. With reality as perceived from senses, its operative nature is highlighted in that it views reality through what can be measured and observed rather than reasoned. Ideational cultural orientation epistemic attributes include: appreciating the conceptual and internal nature of an object of attention, and creating fulfilment or realization through self-imposed minimization or elimination of most physical needs. These views are also considered as important for achieving harmony in a society. Reality is understood through what can be envisaged and reasoned, i.e. a perceived conception. In cases where culture is moving towards instability,
38
the ascendency of one type over the other may vary according to the means by which a particular group or regime is able to come to power and maintain it. Cognitive Trait This trait arises from cognitive and social psychology (Van Liere & Dunlap, 1981; Menary, 2009), is existentially connected with cognitive self-reference (Hannah et al, 2010), and maintains a relationship with cognitive intention (Freeman, 2008). It might involve the effective realising of potential recognising social and political structures and the associated constraints imposed on the agency. The variable may be seen to take enantiomers that give the agency an autonomy orientation when an agency will follow less the guidance of its host culture, but might react more autonomously to the lessons drawn from (or opportunities offered by) environmental impulses; the other enantiomer of the variable might be embeddedness orientation (Sagiv and Schwartz, 2007). Autonomy refers to bounded entities that should find meaning in their own uniqueness and who are encouraged to express their internal attributes (preferences, traits, feelings and motives). Embeddedness emphasizes the maintenance of the status quo and restraining actions or inclinations that might disrupt ingroup solidarity or the traditional order. The trait is affected by attitudes, and emotive imperatives that may orientate the agency towards cognitive coherence or dissonance. It also has impact on perspectives that are associated with strategies, ideology and ethics/ morality. In addition, it creates imperatives for the control of the patterns of behaviour through intention. The development of inefficacy can lead to lack of coherence and a demonstration of collective cognitive dissonance, and this can act as a driver for cognitive state/dispositional 14 dysfunctions (Endler & Summerfield, 1995: 255). This can also be connected with patterns of information that arise from conceptual and cultural knowledge. Figurative Trait This trait has both cognitive and evaluative aspects, is influenced by attitudes and reflection, and connects with cognitive purpose and processes of cognitive self-regulation. As a trait variable it takes enantiomers that define a harmony orientation and mastery with affective autonomy orientation (Sagiv and Schwartz, 2007). Mastery is monistic in nature and encourages active self-assertion to attain group or personal goals and to master, direct and change the natural and social environment (values: ambition, success, daring, competence). Affective autonomy occurs when individuals are encouraged to pursue affectively positive experience for themselves, and take on values of excitement, enjoyment, variation, pleasure, and self-indulgence. Harmony is pluralistic in nature, and tries to understand and appreciate rather than to direct or exploit. We could further relate this to appreciations driving goal formulation as a process that derives from data collection and involving the careful weighing of arguments as opposed to spontaneous decisions following from the spontaneous desires of the decision makers. This trait maintains an interconnected set of more or less tacit standards which order and value experience, determines the way an agency sees and values different situations, and how instrumental judgements are made and action is taken. The trait facilitates how an agency as a decision maker observes and interprets reality, and establishes decision imperatives about it. As such the trait regulates the appreciations and resulting goals of the organisation with respect to its intended operations, the potential for social interaction, and the ethical positioning that may occur as a response to opportunities provided or indicated by the social environment. Efficacy in this trait in relation to the operative orientation trait can lead to self-principled agencies with aesthetical, intuitive or ethical/ideological positioning. It can provide preferred ideological images that may facilitate action. It orientates the agency towards a view of stages of historical development, with respect to interaction with the external environment. In-efficacy can lead to corrupt and sociopathic organisations (Yolles, 2009), or more broadly agency misconduct (Greve et al., 2010). Operative Trait 39
This trait provides the ability of an agency to be able to durably maintain a separate operative existence while coping with unpredictable futures. As a trait variable it is able to take one of two enantiomers. These are hierarchy and egalitarianism. Hierarchy relies on hierarchical systems of ascribed roles to ensure productive behaviour (Sagiv and Schwartz 2007, 179). Through hierarchy, people are socialized to take the hierarchical distribution of roles for granted and to comply with the obligations and rules attached to their roles. In hierarchical cultures, organizations are more likely to construct a chain of authority in which all are assigned well-defined roles. Members are expected to comply with role-obligations and to put the interests of the organization before their own. Hierarchy defines the unequal distribution of power, roles and resources as legitimate (values: social power, authority, humility, wealth). In contrast egalitarianism seeks to induce people to recognize one another as moral equals who share basic interests as human beings. People are socialized to internalize a commitment to co-operate and to feel concern for everyone’s welfare. They are expected to act for others’ benefit as a matter of choice (values: equality, social justice, responsibility, honesty). Egalitarian organizations are built on co-operative negotiation among employees and management (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2007, 180). Hierarchy is also consistent with the formulation of strong control measures to accrue funds that might develop through the supposition that austerity measures are needed that must be directed to easily objectively controlled parts of a system through processes of mass taxation, while egalitarianism would rather challenge this by pointing to the unequal distribution of income, tax collection should be put in effect according to resources and capacity to pay. Challenges from the social system may require flexibility in the application of these rules. This trait can represent a durable and distinct personality orientation that is able to cope with unpredictable futures. It structures appreciative information enabling adaptation, and enables the personality to facilitate responses to its social environment and predefine its behavioural penchant towards its operations. Agency efficacy in relation to the social orientation trait may contribute to the realising of its full social orientation potential, to engage with the environmental predictions that it controls, and adjust its own operative processes. In contrast, in-efficacy may result in an agency inadequacy that can impact on its operative intelligence or the recognition of agency adjustment imperatives. This may occur through self-regulation and either the subordination to hierarchy or liberation away from power and bureaucratic regulations allowing normative rule obedience to be defined at a sub-agency level. The distinction between hierarchy and egalitarianism is also reflected in considerations about information power. This is constituted as the disciplining function of information, and its control through, among other things, socialization and division of labour (Boje, 2004). Social Trait This trait, with the enantiomers ‘Dramatising’ and ‘Patterning’, directs action, interaction, and reaction that (re)constitutes the social environment in terms of (desired, welcome, undesired, not welcome) activities, and it determines the orientation that an agency has towards its environment. There is some connection between Dramatising and Sensate, while Patterning is connected with Ideational (Park, 2005: 16; Wolf and Grollman, 1982; Matthews, 1977). In a stable sensate culture the sensate trait may orientate the agency towards Dramatising (individual relationships, sequential, communication, contracts, individualist, ideocentric), while in an Ideational culture it assumes a Patterning orientation (configurations, relational pattern, balance, collectivist, allocentric, humane orientation), and in a stable Idealist culture it assumes a balanced Dramatising-Patterning type orientation. Adopting the enantiomers Dramatising versus Patterning for modelling social relations of an agency requires that social orientation must be seen arising from innate symbolic behaviour which creates a potential for actual behaviour. The agency’s figurative schemas (which constitute a formalized strategic map) point towards an object (or situation) of interest. The 40
object of interest has been internalised as a strategic (figurative) schema, and social orientation then responds to this schema as a cognitive projection that acts as a substitute for the object. This implies that social orientation has its roots in the normative personality and it responds more to its own proprietary schemas than those from others in the social environment. The related theory arises from studies of children at symbolic play (Shotwell et al., 1980; Park, 2005: 4) under the influence of culture (Lillard, 2002). It may be noted that the Dramatising capacity of Dramatisers was tested by Park (2005) with scripts. 'Dramatising' is a valid construct, since the dramatic (Sensate valued) performance of Dramatisers was significantly more successful than those of Patterners. Any agency develops its own schema (or self-schema) as part of the figurative system. This will include ideology, ethics and goals, and can serve as a self-script for a Dramatising appearance in a given social context. If in a specific social context the figurative self-schema is appropriate then self-script Dramatising will turn out as effective, and it will contribute to success. The social orientation trait is ultimately responsible for the way in which policy will be implemented. It is also reflective of Jung’s (1971) notions of Extraversion - with its focus on the external world and participatory activities and actions within it (and reflective of Sensate culture), and Introversion - with its focus on the inner world of ideas and experiences, reflecting on thoughts, memories and feelings (and reflective of Ideational culture). As such there is a connection between Extraverted/Introverted personalities and Sensate/Ideational cultural orientation, with implied implicit connections to Dramatising/Patterning social orientation respectively (Richardson, 1996:120; Yolles, 2009a). Thus, the direct connections are between Extrovert, Sensate and Dramatising, and between Introvert, Ideational and Patterning. 14. The Auxiliary Function and Outcomes of the Enantiomers In any dynamic bipolar system interactions exist between the polar opposites resulting in a process of unfolding events and change, which Zhang (2009 & 2011) has referred to as YinYang bipolar relativity within his “string theory” of change. In an agency with traits having such bipolar relativity, the traits adopt enantiomer values that are the result of dichotomous interaction between the bipolar enantiomers. We refer to this very interaction as an auxiliary process where each enantiomer pole is auxiliary to the other. The result of this auxiliary process is that qualitative outcome values arise that may be represent polar value dominance, or a continuity of variation that is constituted as a balance between the two. When referring to a balance, we mean an agency with a ‘balanced trait.’ This does not mean that each individual personality that is active within the agency should have exactly the same values and attitudes. Rather, by the term ‘balanced traits’ we refer to mix of values that come from the degrees of ascendency of each the alternate poles of a given trait, influenced by an interactive and auxiliary process that occurs through the interaction of traits. Thus, in the personality the cognitive trait is influenced by the figurative trait, just as the figurative trait is influenced by the operative trait. We shall refer to the enantiomer ascendency to agency dominance of trait values as the trait Outcome values that constitute for an agency its driver towards situational responses. An agency is viable if it is able to survive in different social contexts by mobilizing the most appropriate attributes of its values, beliefs and resulting attitudes that emerge from the alternate poles. Such a harnessing is not always possible since the values of an agency may deny this, which explains why instead of an agency maintaining its viability, it may decline and terminate. In understanding this, it would be appropriate to more carefully examine responses to two questions: (1) what are the natures and functions of each of the paired 41
enantiomer orientations, and (2) what is the function of the auxiliary interaction between the enantiomers? These attributes can be explored across all five enantiomer pairs. Considering the cultural trait, the Sensate and Ideational enantiomers that are responsible for cultural orientation each have their individual attributes. The main attributes of Sensate culture are material or this-worldly, and it fosters the capability of individual survival here and now! Sensate agencies are good at satisfying their own needs and desires by whatever means available. There is strong action orientation with not much regard of consequences for others. That can include reckless action and exploitation of resources. Ideationality is otherworldly. Its main attributes are that it secures future survival through the creation and development of concepts and understandings that emerge as ideas and schemas of thought as reflections of changing situations. When the culture trait finds an enantiomer balance, it develops what Sorokin calls an Idealistic (or Integral or Integrative) culture, in which the Sensate and Ideational enantiomers are congruently blended in a mutually enriching partnership. The enantiomers are creating a cultural Outcome for the agency. Where an Idealistic culture takes dominance, the nature of the Outcome is that Ideationality fosters the creation of ideas about opportunities of satisfaction of needs and desires, and Sensate offers ways and means to implement ideas and is also indicative of what operationally does not work. Ideationality then fosters the development of insights what the long term effects of current practices might be and might offer new ideas to avoid undesired long term side effects. In that sense, Ideationality attracts harmony orientation. With respect to Intellectual Autonomy and Embeddedness we can give the following answers: A major benefit of Intellectual Autonomy is its capacity to foster creativity. Intellectual Autonomy is a precondition for innovation, i.e. to generate ideas that go beyond existing limits. Limits are set by knowledge and practices. Thus, intellectual autonomous agencies go beyond the limits of the cultures into which they are embedded and set impulses for operative, strategic and cultural change. Ideational values and attitudes foster the creative capacities of intellectual autonomy. Without intellectual autonomy the agency would be limited in its creative and adaptive capabilities. A major attribute of Embededness is wisdom and knowledge storing, i.e. to keep the memories of knowledge. Embeddedness secures coherence of a social whole (of an agency) through referring to traditions, common interest, keeping the common body of knowledge alive and creating awareness of available resources. Through awareness about available resources, Embeddedness contributes to creating clarity about feasible strategies which can be pursued with the available resources. Through Embeddedness excellent ideas created by intellectual autonomy can come to fruitions. If Embeddedness is too strong, it may suppress new ideas and even prevent new ideas to emerge. If Intellectual Autonomy is too strong, permanently creating new ideas and attempts to implement them may exhaust available resources and could lead to the demise of the agency. Mastery and Affective Autonomy form the alternate pole to Harmony. The main benefit of Mastery is the strong achievement orientation of agents. Everyone does his/her best to deliver desired performance. Strategies towards active self-assertion are promoted in order to master, direct, and change the natural and social environment and to attain group or personal goals. Affective Autonomy is granting that those who achieve high efficacy also can enjoy the benefits of their efforts. These two facets of the enantiomer constitute an important element 42
of individualism. Harmony regulates the attitudes towards human and natural resources. It is directing agency strategies towards a positive attitude to the social and natural world, trying to appreciate and accept rather than to change, direct, or exploit. Harmony is also perceived as one constituting element of collectivism. These enantiomers operate as a lateral or transitive auxiliary function on each other by enabling the generation of accessible Ideational and Sensate responses to a changing environment, and this is needed for cognitive or operative survival. This interconnection can be illustrated. In a predominantly Ideational culture humane values and strength of character may be important, while in a predominantly Sensate culture desire and enjoyableness may be. An Idealistic balance between these might develop an Outcome that takes responsibility for the maintenance of social coherence and economising use of natural resources, considering socialization and nature as enjoyable by themselves. However, without Mastery orientation nothing may be achieved, but with extreme mastery orientation the social fabric of the agency may collapse, cooperation may not happen and thus, forcefully competing uncoordinated individual action finally will threaten survival of the agency. Taken to the extreme, excessive Harmony orientation may abolish all incentives to do anything. Thus, nothing would be achieved, no response is sought to survival challenges, and the delight in nature itself may also find its limits when the threats of nature are not mastered. Harmony ensures coherence of the social fabric because it makes social life enjoyable, in particular if something is collectively achieved. The main attribute of Hierarchy is its function in rule setting and ex-ante coordination of action. Hierarchy reduces available options of a broad range of theoretically possible patterns of behaviour to a limited set of ‘useful’ patterns of behaviour, which apparently in the past proved to be efficient. Thus, constraining rules are implemented as there is no perceived need to devote resources to reinvent already known successful patterns of behaviour. Hierarchy also has a physical control function. It sets ex-ante targets to be achieved and which can be controlled ex-post. The limits of hierarchy are set by the information and resource needs of control. Hierarchy depends on the information supplied by those to be controlled, and control needs resources, which if bound in controlling are not available for productive action. Thus, the more subordinate agents are controlled the less correct the supplied information will be and the less resources are available for productive and effective action of the agency. The main attributes of Egalitarianism are loyalty, honesty and responsibility. Strong hierarchical control makes agents less loyal, less honest and less responsible against the agency. Thus, the more power holders of an agency can do without control the less control cost they have and the more they can achieve through loyal and responsible agents. Without hierarchy, no coordination of action would happen; the agency could not develop adequate operative decisions. The demise begins, when costs of control increase faster than the gains which can be achieved with more control. With too much hierarchy, power holders finally will have not much left what would be worth to be controlled. The main attribute of Patterning is curiosity about the social environment, how it works and what services could be supplied to what the authors called elsewhere the ‘task environment’. It collects information. Limits are set to the activities of patterning if no selection and evaluation of this information would take place within the agency and if no adequate strategic and operative action would follow. The main attribute of Dramatising is to make others in the social environment know who we are (I/we – the agency) and what I/we can (do for you)! 43
Dramatising is losing its substance, when counterpart agencies perceive the information provided as being detached from an actual situation. In an Idealistic culture Patterning and Dramatising are such that Patterning collects and controls the validity of information about the outside world, and Dramatising is the art to tell the outside world that the agency does have collected and weighted appropriate information and thus has the knowledge, means and abilities to do something about a specific situation. 15. Traits and Mindsets While cultural orientation of a governing body may refer to its political culture, it is in itself influenced by the ambient host culture into which the agency is embedded. Social orientation is an extension of the agency personality that orientates it within the social environment that hosts it. Both cultural and social traits are therefore part of the agency’s personality environment, and both are able to represent changing contexts that influence personality. They have a guiding or attractor function. The traits and their enantiomer characteristics are summarised in Table 9. With respect to the self-control of an agency, the cultural orientation trait acts to constrain personality through normative self-reference and identity. The figurative orientation trait is concerned with normative self-regulation, and the operative orientation trait is concerned with normative self-organisation - while the two together constitute a coupling in which one drives the other. There is also a second order figurative couple that links the operative couple with its cultural environment and involves identity and self-reference. We have explained that the 3 personality traits constitute 8 possible cognitive Mindset types. We have also said that the agency has a 5 trait schema which calls on both the cultural and social enantiomers, and delivers 32 possible agency types. 32 types are the maximum possible agency types that can develop as combination of the poles from 5 bi-polar traits. However, since on the one hand as an attractor the cultural trait influences the polarity that the other traits will take, the actual number of observable types could be smaller. E.g., if the dominant value of the cultural trait is Sensate, then this predisposes the social trait towards Dramatising values. Similarly if the dominant cultural trait is Ideational, then there is a predisposition towards Patterning. A strong culture may also attract particular personality types, e.g., a strong sensate culture may attract autonomy and mastery orientation, while a strong ideational culture might attract harmony and embeddedness orientation. On the other hand, while traits can take bi-polar values, composite types may also emerge from a balance between the bi-polar pair of enantiomers. We shall take it in this paper that these balance points indicate that the epistemic elements of both of the bi-polar enantiomers can co-exist with equal importance for a given agency. Such balance occurs when the enantiomers of the alternative poles mutually support each other.
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Trait Cultural
Cognitive
Enantiomer Sensate
Nature Reality is sensory and material, pragmatism is normal, there is an interest in becoming rather than being, and happiness is paramount. People are externally oriented and tend to be instrumental and empiricism is important.
Ideational
Reality is super-sensory, morality is unconditional, tradition is of importance, there is a tendency toward creation, and examination of self.
Intellectual Autonomy
People seen as autonomous, bounded entities who should find meaning in their own uniqueness and who are encouraged to express their internal attributes (preferences, traits, feelings and motives). Intellectual autonomy encourages individuals to pursue their own ideas and intellectual directions independently. People are viewed as entities embedded in the plural agency. Meaning in life comes through social relationships, identifying with the group, participating in its shared way of life and striving towards its shared goals. Such values as social order, respect for tradition, security and wisdom are especially important. Embedded cultures emphasise maintaining the status quo and restraining actions or inclinations that might disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order. Embrace responsibility and duty and commit to shared goals. Connected with Transactional scripting that constitutes simple repetition and sameness. Encourages active self-assertion to attain group or personal goals and to master, direct and change the natural and social environment. It is basically monistic in nature. The affective autonomy aspect that is encouraged is the pursuit of affectively positive experiences. It encourages individuals to pursue affectively positive experience for themselves. Likely to treat others as independent actors with their own interests, preferences, abilities and allegiances. Others need autonomy to self-develop own ideas. Trying to understand and appreciate rather than to direct or exploit. This orientation emphasizes the goals ‘unity with nature’, ‘protecting the environment’, and ‘world at peace’. It is basically pluralistic in nature. People are socialized to take the hierarchical distribution of roles for granted and to comply with the obligations and rules attached to their roles. In hierarchical cultures, organizations are more likely to construct a chain of authority in which all are assigned well-defined roles. There is an expectation that individuals operate for the benefit of the social organization. Sees the unequal distribution of power, roles and resources as legitimate. This has an implicit connection with power and power processes. Seeks to induce people to recognize one another as moral equals who share basic interests as human beings. People are socialized to internalize a commitment to co-operate and to feel concern for everyone’s welfare. They are expected to act for others’ benefit as a matter of choice. Organisations are built on co-operative negotiation among employees and management. This has an implicit connection with service to the agency. Individual relationships to others are important, constituted as sequences of interpersonal events. Communication is important, as are individuals and their proprietary belief systems, and individual social contracts. Goal formation should be for individual benefit. Ideocentric agencies are important, operating through social contracts between the rational wills of its individual members. Configurations are important in social and other forms of relationships. There is persistent curiosity. The social is influenced by relationships with individuals. Some importance is attached to symmetry, pattern, balance, and the dynamics of relationships. Goal seeking should be for collective benefit, and collective goal formation takes precedence over personal goal formation. Allocentric collectives are important, where the members operate subjectively.
Embeddedness
Figurative
Mastery & Affective Autonomy
Harmony
Operative
Hierarchy
Egalitarianism
Social
Dramatism
Patternism
Key words/ Values The senses, utilitarianism, materialism, becoming, process, change, flux, evolution, progress, transformation, pragmatism, temporal. Super-sensory, spirituality, humanitarianism, self-deprivation, creativity of ideas, eternal. Autonomy, creativity, expressivity, curiosity, broadmindedness.
Polite, obedient, forgiving, respect tradition, self-discipline, moderate, social order, family security, protect my public image, national security, honour elders, reciprocation of favours.
Ambition, success, daring, competence, exciting life, enjoying live, varied life, pleasure, and selfindulgence.
Acceptance of portion in life, world at peace, protect environment, unity with nature, world of beauty. Social power, authority, humility, wealth.
Quality, social justice, responsibility, honesty.
Sequenciality, communication, individualism, contractual, ideocentric.
Configurations, relationships, symmetry, pattern, balance, dynamics, collectivism, allocentric.
Table 9: Summary of the Traits and their Bi-Polar Enantiomers for an Agency Sources: Sorokin (1962), Sagiv and Schwartz (2007), Shotwell et al. (1980). Note: The non-shaded are those of the normative personality (i.e. the Sagiv-Schwartz Traits)
It should be said here that the intelligences regulate the auxiliary function of the alternate poles and by that contribute to the creation of coherence and efficacy of an agency. Intelligence takes self-creational and self-productive functions of the living system, and establishes connections between ontologically distinct systems. It connects traits with each other, and structures their adoption of epistemic values. Without intelligence no balance between enantiomers and no balanced type would emerge. Strong effects of the intelligences on other traits may make these traits correlated to each other. Therefore, in some cases the number of traits could be empirically reduced during a solely data based 45
micro level study that looks at the impact of intelligences, efficacy and pathologies on traits, and solely relies on empirical analysis of given situations. Empirically, significantly high correlations may emerge between certain traits reducing their appearance as independent entities and indicating that they could be merged in a factor analysis, for instance when individualistic attitudes have a strong and deterministic impact on cognitive, strategic and operative choices. As mentioned before, at the macro level with a given strong culture into which agencies (organisations) are closely embedded, the significance of some of the many theoretical Mindset types may also vanish. If the cultural and social traits have a strong attracting role for interactions between embedded agencies some theoretically possible types could become culturally ‘not permitted’. The Schwartz (2007) classifications have been related to classes of Individualism and Collectivism, determined by the enantiomer values of the cognitive trait. In Table 10 we present them as contrasting Mindset types (where all three alternate enantiomer poles are different), and where variation between two enantiomers are the same and only one is varied. This table also contains, from the Sagiv-Schwartz value universe, six options. We begin with Harmony and move clockwise around the Schwartz value universe (Figure 1). We present variations, where two central pairs of constructs are kept constant. In the Sagiv-Schwartz universe these pairs are located next to each other, because these constructs are correlated to each other. Social orientation also has a role since Ideational and Sensate cultural orientations are directly related to Patternerning and Dramatising enantiomers, determining in the end whether an agency might be either say creative or instrumentalist, or whether they might operate together synergistically according to cultural conditions, this resulting in innovative material outputs typical of socio-industrial revolutions. While formative traits may take values on a continuum, balances may occur such that there are at least three stable states for a trait: each bi-polar extremum, and a mutually supportive role. This is a limiting case since in principle a balance may take intermediate variations in polar enantiomers values. Let us consider some illustrations of the limiting case. Social orientation also has a role since Ideational and Sensate cultural orientations are directly related to Patternerning and Dramatising enantiomers, determining in the end whether an agency might be either say creative or instrumentalist, or whether they might operate together synergistically according to cultural conditions, this resulting in innovative material outputs typical of movements towards socio-industrial revolutions. While formative traits may take values on a continuum, balances may occur such that there are at least three stable states for a trait: each bi-polar extremum, and a mutually supportive role. This is a limiting case since in principle a balance may take intermediate variations in polar enantiomers values. Let us consider some illustrations of the limiting case. Consider policy positioning towards political voting by the public. Where the operative trait enantiomers of Hierarchy and Egalitarianism become balanced we might find that a social collective operates through politics of instrumental democracy in which actual possibilities for participation are just tokenism. Even though many countries operate on a more or less balanced operative trait as part of the political system, not all western political parties and their leaders represent mindscapes with balanced traits.
46
Mindset type (Pole 1)
Enantiomer
7: HC (Hierarchical Collectivism)
Collectivist: Harmony and Embeddedness Embeddedness 8: EC Harmony (Egalitarian Collectivism) Hierarchy Mindscape: S
5: HP (Hierarchical Populism) Mindscape: H 1: HI (Hierarchical Individualism)
8: EC (Egalitarian Collectivism) Mindscape: S 1: HI (Hiererachical Individualism
2: EI (Egalitarian Individualism)
Mindset type (Pole 2)
Hierarchist (Mindscape): Embeddedness and Hierarchy Embeddedness 7: HC Mastery & Affective (Hierarchical Autonomy Collectivism) Hierarchy
Enantiomer Embeddedness Harmony Egalitarianism Embeddedness Harmony Hierarchy
Individualist: Intellectual Autonomy, Mastery & Affective Autonomy Intellectual Autonomy 2: EI Intellectual Autonomy Mastery & Affective Mastery & Affective (Egalitarian Autonomy Autonomy Individualism) Hierarchy Mindscape: I Egalitarianism Mutualist (Mindscape): Egalitarianism and Harmony Embeddedness 4: ES (Egalitarian Harmony Synergism) Egalitarianism Mindscape: G
Intellectual Autonomy Harmony Egalitarianism
Achievment Hierarchist: Hierarchy, Mastery and Affective Autonomy Intellectual Autonomy 5: HP Embeddedness Mastery & Affective Mastery & Intellectual (Hierarchical Autonomy Autonomy Populism) Hierarchy Mindscape: H Hierarchy Generativist: Intellectual Autonomy and Egalitarianism Intellectual Autonomy 4: ES Mastery& Affective (Egalitarian Autonomy Synergism) Egalitarianism Mindscape: G
Intellectual Autonomy Harmony Egalitarianism
Table 10: Six Pairs of Sagiv-Schwartz Mindset Variations, reference to Maruyama's Mindscapes added. Historically instrumental democracy as we know it arose during the balanced Idealistic period of culture that started after the 1600s, notably after the western development of the printing press. As the West moved to the polar Sensate culture before the industrial revolution, which in due course resulted in a move towards a post-normal post-Sensate type condition. Full participation would provide mechanism for civil society (within a western civilisation context) to directly participate in the political decision making processes. However, the feeling is often arising that pushed up ‘urgency’ of select issues, which are open for direct participation, obfuscates the view on other and more fundamental issues. With respect to the figurative trait an enantiomer balance between mastery & affective autonomy and harmony might refer to situations in which goal achievement is constrained by arguments of sustainability within a global context. This has been brought on through crises that have demanded attention to be paid to a coherent society with little poverty (social responsibility) or to the environment as a finite and damageable resource (environmental responsibility). During the current economic crisis, social and environmentalist demands at least indicate towards a temporary rise of an Idealistic culture as we might gradually move through social chaos towards re-arising Ideationalism. The cognitive trait refers to the balance between intellectual autonomy and embeddedness. In organisational contexts, harnessing of individual self-development is involved as issues of 47
knowledge creation (innovation) and knowledge sharing and transfer more prominently became research and management issues. Such a balance has been proposed by culturally Idealistic thinkers, but this is not the current norm for plural agencies. It is still the case in many organisations that knowledge remains locally bound and there is little interest in knowledge sharing, as knowledge difference is an argument for job security, i.e. survival on the job. In the case of a social orientation trait, a balance between Dramatists and Patterners might refer to an organisational situation in which shared problem awareness is leading to shared search for problem solutions. This implies that social structures support collective goals of involved groups and a feeling of fairness is evolving. Problem identification and identified problem resolution by patterners is corresponding to the ‘self-skripts’ of the dramatists who voice the problems and appropriate and broadly accepted solutions. In a more obfuscate dramatist situation, by a large group within the agency voiced problems are often perceived as overstated, and ‘solutions’ as unfair or causing other, perhaps even bigger problems. Now, we recollect that each of the traits may take epistemic type values that are the consequence of the mutually supportive interaction between the bi-polar enantiomers of each trait. Another way of explaining this is that through interaction between trait bi-polar enantiomers, a resultant auxiliary process emerges that acts on its local system. For the cultural trait we can refer to Nieli (2102, p.15) who highlights Sorokin’s (1962) views on the importance of the mutually auxiliary process: ‘A truly balanced or "integral" picture of the manifoldness of reality…. must weave together elements from all three of these different cognitive modes against the all-too human tendency towards occluded vision and one-sided worldviews. Each of the three modes of cognition must be seen as a means of mutually enhancing, supplementing, and correcting the distortions and omissions which inevitably flow from this natural human tendency towards one-sidedness and restricted vision.’ When the auxiliary process fails, pathologies arise, something that we can explain quite simply. The immanent dynamics that occur within the agency is influenced by the cultural orientation trait which creates a potential that all the other traits will respond to, rather like an agency field attractor with a positive valence (Killeen, 1989). We explained earlier that when the cultural Sensate enantiomer takes ascendency, then it sets up a potential for Individualism. This potential also favours social Dramatising types. These disrupt the agency orientation potential, creating a basis for dysfunction. This dysfunction can be anticipated practically if the cultural trait, personality mindset and social trait are inconsistent. In contrast, Ideational ascendency creates a potential for Collectivism, and favours Patterning. These trait orientations will be expected under conditions of agency stability. Bounded instability may arise as active implementation of problem solutions may be staved off until the system has lost is survival capacities. By considering the social orientation trait, we have now referred to a relationship between type and potential for patterns of behaviour. However, there is need to be recognised that patterns of behaviour are often a function of context. Consistent with this, Dockens (2012) distinguishes between three broad classes of contexts (3p: public: private: personal), between and within which variations of mindsets and related patterns of behaviour might emerge. Personality traits regulate the way in which a personality creates attitudes. Since personality is context sensitive, traits may adjust under different contexts. Each of the 3ps creates its own class of distinct contexts for a personality. The nature of the traits may 48
therefore be adaptive to each different context, resulting in different Mindset types for each of the 3p contexts. Dockens (2012) has used the same approach to Mindscape theory. According to him, when mindscape types are different for different contexts, it may be difficult to anticipate patterns of behaviour when contexts are changing. These views are also consistent with Tajfel's (1978) discussion of social identity – which refers to part of the individual self-concept that derives from its knowledge of its memberships in groups, connected with the values and emotional significance associated with that membership. It is also connected with Habermas’ (1987) Three Worlds theory in which Habermas distinguishes between the external, internal and social worlds, which relate respectively to the objective world of things, the subjective world of feelings, and the social world of people. For Triandis (1989), the private self relates to self as self, the public self relates to self in relation to the generalized other, and the personal or social self relates to an assessment of the self by a specific reference group. As such: public can be related to norms, roles, and values associated with a group and its culture that acquires emotional significance (external world); private to the traits, states, or behaviours of a person’s individual psyche (internal world); and personal relating to family, co-workers, tribe, society (social world). An agency may adopt different Mindset types in each of these contexts. Where an agency responds to each context in the same way, reasonable expectations about the potential for certain patterns of behaviour are easy to create. However, where Mindset types vary with context and decision situation, reasonable expectations about potential patterns of behaviour may be more difficult to create. 16. Mindsets related to Individualism and Collectivism The mindset enantiomers have been constructed through the cultural values data generated by Sagiv & Schwartz (2007). It should be noted that most of these values can be related to Individualism and Collectivism, and it is useful to briefly examine the antecedents for these terms, later to elaborate on this. Following Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier (2002), individualism is the doctrine that all social phenomena (their structure and potential to change) are in principle explicable only in terms of individuals – for instance their properties, goals, and beliefs. In contrast, Collectivism in principle and ideally relates to people coming together in a collective to act unitarily through normative processes in order to satisfy some commonly agreed and understood purpose or interest. Agencies that strongly adopt either Individualism or Collectivism have realities that are differently framed, and hence maintain ontologically distinct boundaries constituting frames of reality, which could represent barriers for coherent meaningful mutual communications across these agencies. Individualism and Collectivism are very broad concepts and can mean quite different things to different cultures. Nevertheless, Gelfand et al (1995) believed that an undifferentiated view of Individualism and Collectivism presented a satisfactory way of seeing them. However, Schwartz (1994) had found this unsatisfactory, and had replaced the broad notions of individualism and collectivism by his differentiated value universe devoid of reference to Individualism and Collectivism. It is also worth noting that Schwartz did not perceive individualism and collectivism as mutually exclusive opposites, but referred to values, e.g. wisdom, that are related to both, which have a mutually supportive role to play. Different authors give different weight to specific aspects and illustrate their perceptions of Individualism and Collectivism with “two-word” constructs, like for instance in economics ‘methodological individualism’ versus ‘methodological institutionalism’ (Davis, Marciano & Runde, 2004), or more common to politics ‘transactional individualism’ versus ‘relational 49
collectivism’ (Herrmann-Pillath, 2009; Tangen, 2009; Glasman et al, 2011). However, we also find the use of the same term to describe different constructs, like ‘Conservative Individualism’ as opposed to ‘Socialist (or Collective) Individualism’ or ‘Transactional Individualism’ as opposed to ‘Relational Collectivism’. The respective pairs strongly depend on the ideological position of those who adopt the terms as ideology is seated in the personality. Here, different weight may be given to the intellectual, spiritual, economic or social aspects of “individualism”, or on the intellectual, spiritual, economic or social aspects of “equality”, or on the ‘right to enjoy’ individual achievements without boundaries or ‘responsibilities’ to take care of other human beings and of natural resources. Even so, we will show that the Schwartz value universe has powerful explanatory value for Individualism/ Collectivism when related to concepts of Sorokin (Yolles & Fink, 2013 & 2013a). Indivdualism/Collectivism can then be taken to operate as broad categories, with some consistent differentiation within the categories. Broadly speaking, Individualism is mostly directly related to Intellectual Autonomy, and Mastery & Affective Autonomy, while Collectivism is mostly directly related to Harmony and Embeddedness. Since there are some forms of hierarchy that are practiced by individualists and by power holders of embeddedness oriented societies, the construct of Hierarchy and its opposite enantiomer Egalitarianism may not be directly linked with individualism/collectivism. Different aspects of the relations between Indivdualism and Collectivism were identified by Tamis-LeMonda et al (2007), who recognise that an agency may adopt one cognitive type of a pair under one context and shift to the other as context changes. This is shown in their Individualism/Collectivism study of parents with interest in the development goals of their children. They argue that within cultural value systems, presumed polar opposites may be viewed as conflicting, additive, or functionally dependent (functional dependence may be attributed to an auxiliary process). When in their educational efforts parents embrace Individualism and Collectivism it occurs because these presumed opposites are in dynamic coexistence. In particular it was found that either achievement/individualism or social harmony/caring/collectivist attitudes are emphasized in response to factors that include: changes across situations; developmental time; and response to social, political, and economic sub-contexts. The reason is that without achievement orientation individuals may not exploit their capabilities, but without social orientation, they may care less about social obligations and also of their parents. Individualism frames the development goals of autonomy and independence while Collectivism frames relatedness and interdependence (Tamis-LeMonda et al., 2007; Schartz, Luychx & Vignie, 2011). Individualism and Collectivism both embrace distinct cultural identities (from which organisational structures are a reflection) that are manifested within individuals as self-identity that impacts on basic motives for action (Earley & Gibson, 1998). Viskovatoff (1999) also notes that Individualism-Collectivism represents a dualism, and recognises attempts to overcome its effects by (a) adopting a post-structuralist approach; (b) recognising that reality should be seen as chaotic (and hence subject to chaos), disorganized and fragmented (hence affecting the framing of development goals); and (c) viewing the social world in terms of the decentred subject (thus impacting on self-identity). Collectivism and Individualism each have their own value ranges, but the boundaries between their differentiations can become merged. Thus, the notions of Toennies (1957), Triandis 50
(1995) and White & Nakurama (2004) connect through transactional and relational forms of Collectivism (Yolles, 2009), so that for instance Transactional Collectivism is constituted as a boundary for Individualism. In Table 6 we set up our 8 Mindset types into two broad classes of Individualism and Collectivism. We have noted that the terms Individualism and Collectivism mean different things to different people and within different cultures. As a guiding position we may refer to Sagiv & Schwartz (2007) who present constructs which are clearly related to Individualism and Collectivism:
Individualism: Intellectual Autonomy {broad-mindedness, freedom, creativity, security}; Affective Autonomy {exciting life, varied life, pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgent}; Mastery {capable, successful, ambitious, independent, influential, social recognition, choosing own goals, daring} Collectivism: Harmony {accept my portion in life, world at peace, protect environment, unity with nature, world of beauty}; Embeddedness {polite, obedient, forgiving, respect tradition, self-discipline, moderate, social order, family security, protect my public image, national security, honour elders, reciprocation of favours}.
This recognises that Individualism and Collectivism can be expressed in terms of the trait enantiomers of Table 9. Some 'core values' of Collectivism are captured by the Embeddedness enantiomer. In Table 6 the pairs (3, 6) and (4, 5) the idea of Individualism versus Collectivism prevails, although the Mastery aspect is attached to a Collectivistic culture (i.e. Embeddedness culture), and the Harmony aspect is attached to an intellectual autonomous Individualistic culture. This shows that Individualism versus Collectivism is an undue parsimonious generalisation, i.e. a reduction of a complex system of values and attitudes to one bi-polar dimension. A reduction of a complex system to one single pair of enantiomers perhaps is easily understood, but not adequate for many situations. The traditional understanding of Individualism can be assigned to Intellectual Autonomy + Mastery & Affective Autonomy and that of Collectivism can be assigned to Embeddedness + Harmony (see Table 9 for the list of key word values attached to these enantiomers). The terms Intellectual Autonomy + Harmony and Embeddedness Mastery & Affective Autonomy (combined values: polite, obedient, forgiving, respect tradition, self-discipline, moderate, social order, family security, protective of public image, national security, honour elders, reciprocation of favours, exciting life, enjoying live, varied life, pleasure, self-indulgence) tend to be extensions that are normally beyond what most people would consider to constitute components of either Individualism and Collectivism. However, that these might exist in those who are Individualists or Collectivists is not really significant to the classifications, and may therefore stand as ancillary or “non-core” extensions. Thus, the mindsets with these pairs are able to sit with a more traditional understanding of Individualism and Collectivism. As such we shall allow the terms Individualism and Collectivism to include these additional constructs, and refer to them here as Harmony Individualism and Mastery Collectivism, and we shall mean these extension when referring to Individualism and Collectivism further. In the suggested terminology of Table 9=8, we have labelled the Intellectual Autonomy plus Harmony aspects as ‘Synergism”. The synergy imperative is illustrated by today’s environmentalist movements that are largely driven by individuals who emphasize harmony with nature and within society and who foster intellectual autonomy against current power holders. The Embeddedness plus Mastery aspects we label as ‘Populism’, because many of today’s populist political movements strongly emphasize the embeddedness aspect and claim that their rule would improve the mastery capabilities of societies. 51
In Figure 7 we highlight a number of Mindset type intersections that can be explained in terms of the individual traits themselves and the emerging balances between a bipolar pair of enantiomers. Thus for instance, in Figure 7 a mindset intersection between HC (Hierarchical Collectivism) and EI (Egalitarian Individualism) is represented by HC∩EI. In the personality that gives a congruency that we might wish to call the Collectivistic Individualism Mindset type. An illustration that HC∩EI may exist comes from Limerick & Cunnington (1993) who discuss “Collective Individualism” as a congruency to Individualism and Collectivism for agencies that are seen as a collective network, thus having epistemic properties that embrace both Individualism and Collectivism. It also should be noted that all diagonal congruencies represent the same mindset, since HC∩EI = EC∩HI = EP∩HS = HP∩ES. All coincide at a single point in the middle of the mindset space. Congruency also applies to the other intersections, for instance when there is a balance in the operative trait we find the types HC and EC intersect as HC∩EC. There are only 3 possible congruencies here since they are predicated on balances in a single trait. Similarly, congruencies exist in a given plane, such as HC∩EP, the result of both the figurative and operative traits being in balance, and there are 6 possibilities here. It is quite easy to identify the respective number of possible Mindset types, if one well defines the possible states (2 or more) of a bi-polar trait and based on a consistent theory defines the number of traits. In addition to the extreme polar types in Figure 2 there are types that can arise from balanced traits. For 3 traits with 3 possible states (pole 1, balanced, pole 2) there are 27 possibilities in the system. This illustrates the capacity of mindset agency theory to engage with variation, which enables the modelling of the complexities of human personality beyond a simple classification scheme. These include 8 biased mindsets that are combination of the poles of the three traits – one in each of the 8 corners of the cube (the apexes), 1 congruent mindset composed of 3 balanced traits in the middle of the cube shown in Figure 7. There are 6 strongly congruent mindsets with 2 traits in balance in the middle of the 6 sides of the cube. Finally, there are also 12 weakly congruent mindsets with only 1 trait in balance in the middle of the 12 lateral edges of the cube (Figure 7).
52
1
Hierarchy
(3) HS
(7) HC
Operative trait
HC∩EC
(5) HP
(1) HI
HC∩EP (8) EC
Egalitarianism
(4) ES 1
Cognitive trait
0
Harmony
Embeddedness
HC∩EI
Intellectual Autonomy
Figurative trait
(6) EP
(2) EI
Mastery+Affective 1 Autonomy
Figure 7: Distribution of types and selected ‘balance points’ in a 3-dimensional personality trait space. However, the range of values (scores) that a personality trait may take between the two extreme polar enantiomers may be represented by a continuous variable This would result in the huge discrete set of possible Mindset types becoming a potentially continuous and hence infinite set that can represent any possible values or value balance of a personality. In practice, however, it will be useful that this range is limited to a discrete determinable set, where differences between types do matter. We have indicated that personality mindset congruencies are in principle possible along each axis and on each plane of Figure 7. But, for them to exist there is a need for them to arise as stable combinations, something that depends on the current state of cultural values. We have said that these congruencies will be related to the values that the cultural trait of the agency takes. Sorokin (1962) noted that when the Sensate and Ideational enantiomers reach a common balance the Idealistic state arises. In this case neither Sensate nor Ideational values dominate, but rather a synergy occurs between them so that both forms of value sets are regarded as valid in society. Thus, Ideational people might find themselves in significant social roles just as people with Sensate values, a situation not possible in a predominantly Ideational or Sensate culture. These roles will depend on the strengths of the individuals. Since under normal conditions cultural trait values operate as an attractor for personality, the mindset values adopted are a reflection of the cultural trait, with either a tendency towards Individualism or Collectivism (Table 9). The emergence of variations within Individualism or Collectivism in a given agency likely is a function of the ‘fine tuning’ within a culture that may relate to desired goals and Outcomes, i.e. achievements and possible distortions through one-sided action.
53
17. Immanent Dynamics One thing that has not so far been discussed in this paper is the immanent dynamics associated with the agency, that is, how an agency inevitably moves from one Mindset type to another. This centers on the cultural dynamics of the agency. The cultural trait is an attractor for personality and social orientation traits. This is because the cultural trait represents the core characteristics of environment culture, within which the agency is pursuing goals and setting action. Thus, it functions as a field of attraction that the agency’s personality and social orientation responds to in specific ways as long as no pathologies emerge within that field. Now, the immanent dynamics of an agency emerges from gaps between desired goals and outcomes, which indicate that cultural adjustment through the influence of it auxiliary processes between the alternate poles may be advisable in order to correct for the consequences of one-sided action. Nieli (2012) looks at the changes in cultural dynamic shown in Sorokin’s (1962) original study. We note that Sorokin (1942: vol. 4, 58) refers to the stable Ideational, Sensate, Idealistic (that latter also sometimes called Integral) states of culture as supersystems. While “the total sociocultural world appears as an enormous arena of millions of systems,” they are “subordinated to one another and yielding sometimes the vastest supersystems [which are] now coordinated with one another…” Nieli (2012) notes that between the extreme polar values of Sensate and Ideational enantiomers there are other outcomes associated with the Ideational and Sensate enantiomers. The phase states are shown in Tables 11.1, 11.2 and 11.3. Table 11.1 shows three phases, starting from a normal Ideational state, which then declines during two post-normal phases. While this occurs there will be some growth in the importance of the polar opposite Sensate enantiomer. Table 11.2 shows three phases representing movement away from a normal Sensate cultural state, resulting in two progressively post-normal phases as the importance of the sensate enantiomer decays, with the likely growth of Ideationalism. Table 11.3 shows one phase that constitutes a stable Idealistic cultural state, but Nieli did not note any additional phases, which might illustrate a movement towards a sensate or ideational state. The movement from a predominantly Ideational to a predominantly Sensate state can occur through the state of an Idealistic culture, as is the case with a movement from predominantly Sensate to Ideational culture. However, there is no ‘automatism’. Conditions may arise that prevent an Idealistic culture from materializing. These phases can be set up across a dynamic of change that runs from normal (under sufficient degrees of certainty such that rationality applies) to post-normal to chaos to transformation and illustrated in Figure 8 (Yolles, 2010; Fink & Yolles, 2013) with explanation of the terms in Table 12 These phase shifts are consistent with a movement into cultural instability that occurs with both growth and decline of a social system (White, Tambayong & Kejžar, 2008; Houser et al., 1985). There are two forms of growth and decline: incremental and transformative. Growth and decline will normally occur together, arising from the inherent dynamic interaction between the trait enantiomers. When culture is stable then this refers to the attractor cultural trait, but when it is unstable and is therefore effectively disconnected from the rest of the agency, it also applies to the personality traits. In crisis, incremental changes can shift to transformative change, and when decline is more significant than growth, death results, while if growth dominates the result is transformation. When growth and decline are unable to achieve any form of significant ascendency, this would likely mean the agency continues as it was before. 54
Stable Ideational Culture Outcome Phases of Cycle Ascetical
Explanation
An agency puts emphasis on disengaging any energies and attachments from bodily pleasures and from the great temporal flux of the sensory order so that they might draw nearer to a super-sensible reality
Attractor for Personality Traits Intellectual Autonomy, Harmony, and Egalitarianism
Mindset type Attraction 4
IndividualismCollectivism Type Ideational Individualism
Embeddedness Harmony , and Egalitarianism
8
Ideational Collectivism,
Embeddedness Harmony, and Hierarchy
7
Ideational Collectivism,
Entry to post-Ideational decline towards cultural instability Active
There is an emphasis on the control of human desires, a condition that is disengaged from the social environment which it perceives to be corrupt. It is proselytizing and transformative seeking to remake the unredeemed world according to the tenets of the ideational world-view A late stage of Ideational culture where intuition and the on-going testimony of the mystics, prophets, and saints is replaced by a blind and desperate "will-to-believe" on the part of a people who have lost any kind of direct contact with the supra-conscious.
Fideistic
Table 11.1: Main characteristics of Ideational culture and its decline (adapted from: Sorokin, 1942; Nieli, 2012)
Stable Sensate culture Outcome Phases of Cycle Active
Explanation
Action to transform the external environment to satisfy an agency’s needs and desires. Illustrations are the creation of business empires, innovators in technology, political organizers, pioneers in the wilderness and military conquerors.
Attractor for Personality Traits Intellectual Autonomy, Mastery & Affective Autonomy, Egalitarianism
Mindset type Attraction 2
IndividualismCollectivism Type Sensate Individualism
Intellectual Autonomy, Mastery & Affective Autonomy, Hierarchy Embeddedness Mastery & Affective Autonomy Hierarchy
1
Sensate Individualism,
5
Sensate Collectivism
Entry to post-Sensate decline towards cultural instability Passive
An agency focuses on self-gratification and enjoyment
Cynical
Agencies maintain an advanced state of nihilistic decadence (moral degeneration or decay through total rejection of established laws and institutions), where the Sensate ethos itself undermines its own claims to truth, and produces insincere hedonists (pleasure/ happiness is the highest good) and social climbers without conviction or redeeming merit.
Table 11.2: Main characteristics of Sensate culture and its decline (adapted from: Sorokin, 1942; Nieli, 2012)
55
Stable Idealistic Culture Outcome Phases of Cycle
Idealistic (Integrative or Integral)
Explanation
Attractor for Personality Traits
Super-sensory and creative aspects of life balanced by sensory and material aspects, enabling internal orientations that develop being to be accompanied by externally directed interests and instrumental activities that relate to becoming.
Mindset type Attraction
Embeddedness Mastery & Affective Autonomy Egalitarianism
6
IndividualismCollectivism Type Sensate Collectivism
Table 11.3 Main characteristics of Idealistic culture (adapted from: Sorokin, 1942) The Outcome phases can be described according to this dynamic. Thus when the Outcome takes Ideational, Idealistic or Sensate values, they are in a normal phase. Beyond these they move through a post-normal phase, when the established patterns of relationships between cultural beliefs and values start to lose their connections and dominant culture edges towards becoming dysfunctional. In highly unstable cultures the cultural trait will be losing its attractor function and unable to maintain stable relationships between values. Thus in the post-normal Ideational condition, the active and fideistic phase progressively tend towards more instability with increasing uncertainty. In such circumstances there is a likely tendency for personality inertia (Bailey, 1998) and by implication social orientation inertia to occur when traits are not adapted and are kept at values they had previously taken, simply because there is no other influence on them. In relation to personality, most people develop inertia through fixed ideas, fixed reactions to particular stimuli or situations, and fixed emotional reactions (Wilson, 2011).
1. Ent r y
Mo d e 1 No rma l 2. Syst em dr i f t
8. Compl exi f i cat i on
Mo d e 2 Po st-n o rma l: d rift to more u n certa in ty
Mo d e 4 Tra n sfo rma ti o n
3. Tens i ons
7. 2 Type change: mor phogenes i s
4. Tens i on i ncr eas e &
Mo de 3 Crisis
s t r uct ur al cr i t i cal i ty
7. 1 Type change: mor e of t he s ame
5. Fl uct uat i on 6. Tr i f ur cat i ons 7. 0 Type change: s ys t em : deat h or di s or gani z at i on
Figure 8: Dynamics of a system out of stability, where trifurcation occurs with instability
56
Mode of Science Normal
1.
Post-normal (uncertainty drift)
2. 3. 4.
Crisis
5.
Step Stability System drift Tension development Tension increase and structural criticality Fluctuations
6. Trifurcations 7.0 Systemic death 7.1 Type 1 change
Transformation
7.2 Type 2 change
Movement towards evolution The system is stable, though during normal development the base may incrementally change its form. Dissipative processes are introduced as the system becomes incapable of delivering promises. In a complex application domain, drift enables unexpressed potentials to be actualized. The drift takes the system away from its stable position and gives rise to tensions between its ability to explain and predict, and questions about its methods in relation to observations. The tensions, following the tropic drift that moved the paradigm away from its stable normal mode, are leading it to structural criticality. If the system loses robustness, fluctuations are amplified. Fluctuations occur internally, or in the environment as noise. Through amplification of fluctuations due to tensions following uncertainty drift, a discontinuity occurs in the causal sequence of events. This likely will be accompanied by debates that centre on confling perspectives. When trifurcations occur the system is able to take a variety of possible paths towards its future. At this point three options are possible. In type 7.0, decay represents a process of disorganization, regression, or extinction of the system. In type 7.1 the process of change begins with “more of the same” small changes that maintain its current state but do not resolve issues. This process of iteration, however, will often result in system complexification. In type 2 change, metamorphosis occurs through emergence that occurs with stable states of a system, due to processes of decline and growth, and these are amplified within its critical structure. This is referred to as morphogenic change, occurring through amplification and differentiation. It is a relational process that develops in the system through positive and negative feedback, and integration.
Table 12: Explanation for the terms in the system dynamics (relating to Figure 9). Agencies may also experience habitual depression, or may become habitually anxious or fearful. These negative personality traits, which usually arise during early development in the personality through nutritional imbalances (or resource imbalances in plural agencies), or perhaps traumas create inertia in the personality of many agencies that must be overcome for complete healing to occur. Under normal stable cultural conditions the cultural phases are attractors for personality and social orientation traits, and we have assigned the likely traits and related personality Mindset types to these attractors. In addition we have also identified different forms of Individualism and Collectivism in Tables 11.1-11.3. Here, Sensate Collectivism and Sensate Individualism refer to material attributes of Individualism and Collectivism, while their Ideational qualifier refers to more cognitive interpretations of Individualism and Collectivism that are not connected with the (sensate) material world. Returning to Tables 11.1-11.3 we have deduced mindsets for each of the Outcome values by relating Nieli’s phases of cultural change to Schwartz’ set of values. However, outside stable cultural values of Idealistic, Sensate and Idealistic, these mindsets should be currently seen as a deducible guestimate, one reason being that when cultural instability arises personality inertia may temporarily take over until the personality traits determine their own internal dynamics. Now, the model in Figure 5 arises from a recursive system since the generic living system model was used recursively to generate a structure for personality. So the generic properties of one recursion can typically be applied to another. Hence, using this principle of recursion, when the cultural trait becomes disconnected from the agency, the cognitive trait plays its role, and becomes an attractor for the rest of the personality. Thus, if the cognitive trait takes the value of an Individualist oriented enantiomer (i.e., Intellectual Autonomy), then it will be an attractor for the other traits of the personality, which will take related values. The result to be expected in this case would be the type 1 mindset: Hierarchical Individualism. A relatively similar situation applies if it takes a Collectivist orientated enantiomer - that is a 57
type 8 mindset: Egalitarian Collectivism. However, there is no attraction imperative for the social orientation trait, and its trait value will arise from more arbitrary causes. As a result, personality and social orientation may take conflicting values, resulting in dysfunction. There is an illustration of this for a plural agency. The break-up of the US telecommunications group AT&T (American Telegraph and Telephone) and the privatisation of BT (British Telecom) stimulated an alliance process (Musso, 1998) that proved itself culturally unstable, with disjointed relationships across the set of beliefs and values. The joint alliance that formed was called Concert and resulted in failure after two years of operation at a cost of USD800 million annually before it shut down in 2001. The published rational for the closure was a downturn in the global telecommunications market, but the dysfunction appears clear (Jatras, 2001). In relation to the phase movements of the Outcome, recalling that the cultural trait is ontologically distinct from and an attractor for personality and social orientation traits we can formulate the following construction in relation to Tables 10 and Figure 9. Active Sensate is an attractor for mastery, and is a normal phase of change. Passive and Cynical phases of Sensate are post-normal phases. The Passive Sensate phase is an attractor for Affective Autonomy, as is Cynical Sensate, where beliefs and values lose their relationships, and attitudes become disconnected from beliefs and values. The Cynical Sensate is an extreme case of this, and is consistent with the development of pathologies in the connection between culture and the personality. Looking now to Nieli’s forms of Ideationality, Ascetic Ideationality is part of the normal phase and is an attractor for Mindset type 4, Intellectual Autonomy, Harmony, and Egalitariansim. This is for instance one of classical forms of political anarchism and is also indicative of the beliefs of San Francis of Assisi (Bonaventure 1867, Chesterton, 1924). Active Ideationality is part of the post-normal phase, and likely is an attractor to our Mindset type 8, the Egalitarian form of Embeddedness (into a common belief) plus Harmony. Fideistic Ideationality is also part of the post-normal phase and an attractor for our Mindset type 7; it is illustrated by Sun Myung Moon's15 Unification Church. It would appear that Harmony is the common denominator in personality for cultural Ideational systems. This fits nicely with the perception that Sensatism is an attractor for different aspects of Mastery. As a consequence Ideationality also is an attractor for Mindset type 3. Returning to Sensate and Ideational types of Individualism and Collectivism, we suggest that Intellectual Autonomy is central to Individualism, and Embeddedness is central to Collectivism. This then suggests the following variations: Sensate Individualism Ideational Individualism Sensate Collectivism Ideational Collectivism
= Mindset types 1 + 2, = Mindset types 3 + 4 = Mindset types 5 + 6 = Mindset types 7 + 8.
Within each of these four groups we can further distinguish between the Hierarchical and the Egalitarian form, which provides our 8 types. The only risk of doing this is that it may be argued that Harmony and Ideationality are identical constructs, as are Mastery & Affective Autonomy and Sensate. This argument, however, is inappropriate since Harmony and Autonomy are ontologically distinct from Ideationality and Sensatism, the latter two being attractor enantiomers for the personality and social orientation traits, and if they are seen to be conceptually identical then a conceptual error has been made due to semantic coincidence. 58
These considerations provide improved understanding of the way in which cultural attractors can deliver personality mindset and social orientations, thereby enabling the anticipation of patterns of behaviour. Considering Sorokin’s view that different cultural directions are present in all cultures any time, we might get one step further by indicating that these cultural directions will find their observable expression in competing political streams of thought. (For a selection of sources see the Appendix: Sources about Political Streams of Thought). Sensate individualism might be at the centre of so called ‘conservative’ political orientations, within that group e.g., US & UK conservatives might have a somewhat stronger orientation towards hierarchical individualism (intellectual autonomy, mastery & affective autonomy, and hierarchy (Mindset type 1), while e.g., in comparison the US Tea Party movement may have a stronger conservative/egalitarian orientation (Mindset type 2). Ideational individualism might be at the centre of tendencies towards intellectual leadership (Mindset type 3: intellectual autonomy, harmony, and hierarchy) or social anarchism (Mindset type 4, with orientation towards egalitarianism). Sensate collectivism is at the core of populist political movements with strong emphasis on embeddedness, ‘belonging to and not belonging to’. There is a noteworthy differentiation between ‘left wing populism’ with stronger reference to egalitarianism (Mindset type 6), and ‘right wing populism’ with stronger reference to ‘law and order’ rooted in hierarchy (Mindset type 5). Ideational collectivism has its roots in embeddedness and harmony. A form of small group oriented ideational collectivism with strong emphasis on egalitarianism is e.g. the Kibbutz ideology (Mindset type 8). While larger collectivist groups, tribes and clans, may more strongly rely on hierarchical order (Mindset type 7). 18. Conclusion The main problem with Maruyama mindscapes lies in the lack of transparency in its generative nature resulting in inaccessibility to its horizon of formative meanings. Next, we introduced Boje’s attempt at creating greater generative transparency, by the introduction of real, as opposed to inferable virtual, traits. However, his approach is currently qualitative without the immediate possibility of empirical support, and thereby not improving the potential for its general use. In an attempt to provide more transparent generative capacity that has the needed empirical support, a third concept we built on Schwartz (1994) and on the three theoretically and empirically identified cultural value dimensions of Sagiv and Schwartz (2007). We have shown that the Schwartz value universe can be feasibly used to transparently generate eight Sagiv-Schwartz Mindset types from the three paired enantiomers of the set of value dimensions, interpreting them as normative personality traits. Four of the eight Sagiv-Schwartz Mindset types broadly cover the four Maruyama mindscapes, and with the other four types we are reaching beyond Maruyama mindscape types, completing the three dimensional space, which was on the wish list of Boje. For mindset agency theory we developed a “living system” agency generic model of personality that builds on the concepts of Bandura and Piaget. Its control processes operate through Sagiv-Schwartz traits that couple together and so provide a theoretical foundation for using the Sagiv-Schwartz bi-polar dimensions from which by combination we can derive 8 extreme Mindset types. From this model, patterns of behaviour in relation to attitudes in 59
politics and economics can be anticipated. This agency theory of Mindset types can play a dynamic role within a theory of normative personality. It embraces the cognitive learning concepts of both Bandura and Piaget. This work, while having some relevance to the individual agency, will be more directed towards collective agencies. Our primary interest in this paper has been in plural agencies. We have modelled them generically as a “living system”, having an indirectly observable culture and normative personality from which, using traits, one can in principle to anticipate their patterns of behaviour given a known context. Living system theory can embrace not only our attitudinal schema, the role of which relates to anticipatory control and causality and instrumental action, but also the Jungian temperament schema. While the semantic schema is representative of personality kinematics that enables behavioural anticipation through extrapolation, it works together with the Jungian temperament schema of personality preferences that are indicative of personality latency as it arises with empowerment. Now, since an agency can be described through Mindset types, which have as their basis attitudinal Sagiv-Schwartz traits, which in turn are interactive with Jungian temperament functions, the theory also allows for emotional and arousal personality constructs to influence Mindset types. The generic model we have offered has then been coupled with Mindset Theory, a derivative and further development of Maruyama’s mindscape theory through the introduction of a set of formative traits. We have argued that the 8 Mindset types fall into two opposing classes that can be further divided into four differentiated types of Individualism and four differentiated types of Collectivism. The use of Mindset Theory can also provide useful means of providing anticipatory and post hoc explanations for behaviour in complex situations, knowing contexts. The outcome of this research is direct. Coherent agencies have a culture that establishes a potential that directs its development. As a result the agency is moved towards determinable forms of cognitive and operative orientations, the former through the agency’s normative personality, and the latter through its operative system. When the cultural trait takes Sensate epistemic values, then the personality will be directed towards Individualism and the operative orientation will be directed towards Dramatising. By contrast, if it takes Ideational epistemic values, the personality will be directed towards Collectivism and operative orientation towards Patterning. These orientations enable context related patterns of behaviour to be anticipated, though agency pathologies can perturb both orientations and the potential towards patterns of behaviour. The development of immanent dynamics of a culture is of critical importance, as can be inferred from exploring the cultural phase movements indicated by Nieli. They show that as a culture moves away from its stable cultural state, there is a cultural decline that may be compensated by growth in the opposing enantiomer. The nature of these dynamic processes is not clearly known at this time, and more work is needed to explore them both qualitatively and empirically. Let us now move from the general to the more specific interest in this paper. We originally referred to Mayer (2005) who notes that there are competing psychodynamic, trait, and humanistic theories that result in fragmented personality theory. In concert with this view, 60
L’Abate (2005) is concerned with the state of the theory of personality socialization, developmental, social, and adult psychology, as well as personal relationships. He also notes that there is a need for: relational theory; an environment in particular connected with intimate others; and ability to model psychopathic personalities that can lead to the prevention or treatment of dysfunction. We have shown that our generic model has the capacity to reflect on many of these attributes of personality theory, as well as providing a potential for the dynamic study of how young or mature personalities change, and knowing something of their cultural background, their likely mindset and patterns of behaviour. Here there is even the likelihood that where there is found to be inconsistency in generating such likelihoods, pathologies or examinable instabilities can be identified that may explain why. The generic model that we have created has the potential to defragment theories highlighted by Mayer and L’Abate, with its implicit involvement of relational theory, an environment that has the potential to be framed within the context of intimate others, and a clear potential capability to explore agency pathologies and agency dysfunction. 19. References Adeyemo, D.A., (2007), Moderating Influence of Emotional Intelligence on the Link Between Academic Self-efficacy and Achievement of University Students, Psychology Developing Societies, 19(2) 199-213. Albrow, M., (1997), Do organizations have feelings? Routledge, London. Allport, G.W. (1961). Pattern and Growth in Personality. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Ang, S., Van Dyne, L., Koh, C.K.S., Ng, K.Y., Templer, K.J., Tay, C., & Chandrasekar, N.A., (2007), Cultural intelligence: Its measurement and effects on cultural judgment and decision making, cultural adaptation, and task performance, Management and Organization Review, 3: 335-371. Bailey, A.A., (1998), Esoteric Psychology: Treatise on the Seven Rays, Volume II, Lucas Trust. Originally published in 1942, www.bailey.it/testi-inglese/Esoteric-Psychology-aTreatise-on-the-Seven-Rays-Vol-2.pdf, accessed May 2013. Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. NJ.: Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy. The exercise of control. New York: Freeman. Bandura, A. (1999). A social cognitive theory of personality, in Pervin, L., John, O. (Eds.), Handbook of personality (2nd ed., pp. 154-196), Guilford Publications, New York:. (Reprinted in D. Cervone & Y. Shoda (Eds.), The coherence of personality, Guilford Press, New York. Bandura¸ A. (1999a). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities, Personality & Social Psychology Review 3 (3): 193–209. Bandura, A. (2005), Guide for constructing self-efficacy scales, in F. Pajares & T. Urdan (Eds.), Self-efficacy beliefs of adolescents (pp.1-43), Greenwich, CT, Information Age Publishing. Bandura, A. (2006), Toward a psychology of human agency, Association for Psychological Science, 1(2)164-80. Baron, J. (1982), Intelligence and Personality. In R. Sternberg (Ed.). Handbook of Intelligence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Baron-Cohen, S., Ring, H.A., Wheelwright, S., Bullmore, E.T., Simmons, A., Williams, S.C.R., (1999). Social intelligence in the normal and autistic brain: an fMRI study, European J. of Neuroscience, 11, 1891-1898. http://docs.autismresearchcentre.com/papers/1999_BCetal_FMRI.pdf, accessed June 61
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Appendix: Sources about Political Streams of Thought List of political ideologies: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_political_ideologies UK and US Conservativism: Gehrke, J., 2012, Review of: Dorey, P., 2011, British Conservatism: the Politics and Philosophy of Inequality, to be found at www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1095 US Conservativism: http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_conservatism.html US conservativism: Conservative Party, http://www.conservativepartyusa.com/webelieve.pdf US Tea Party: Jones, J.P., 1778, Voice of the Tea Party: www.conservativepartyusa.com/webelieve.pdf UK labour party: http://www.labour.org.uk/what_is_the_labour_party Anarchism Sources in English: http://www.anarchism.net/anarchism.htm Quellen in Deutsch: http://www.anarchismus.at/ Social Anarchism: Emma Goldman, Anarchism and Other Essays. Mother Earth Publishing Association, New York 1911 “Anarchism stands for the liberation of the human mind from the dominion of religion and liberation of the human body from the coercion of property; liberation from the shackles and restraint of government. It stands for a social order based on the free grouping of individuals…” Emma Goldman, in: Die Kriegsdienstgegner der ganzen Welt, Bericht über die Bewegung in zwanzig Ländern und über die Internationale Konferenz in Hoddeston, Herts., England im Juli 1925 (dt. Version), herausgegeben vom Generalsektretariat der War Resisters’ International), S. 33: “Der Staat selbst ist die ausgesprochenste Form der Unterdrückung. Er greift in jede Lebenssphäre ein und wirkt daher als andauernder Zwang.“
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Kibbutz: Kibbutz Movement,
www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0012_0_11103.html Clans and Tribes: www.academia.edu/379930/_Clan_politics_in_Central_Asia Ze’evi, D., 2008, Clans and Militias in Palestinian Politics, Middle East Brief, Feb., Crown Centre for Middle East Studies, www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB26a.pdf Marxism and different off-springs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxism https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxismus Right-wing populism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right-wing_populism Left-wing populism http://europeandisunion.blogspot.co.uk/2012/04/left-wing-populism-is-not-answer.html Republic of Letters / Gelehrtenrepublik http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Letters http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Die_Gelehrtenrepublik
10. Notes 1
FFM uses factor analysis to is identify the five factors neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness (Goldberg, 1993), which appears to be a development of Eysenck’s (1957) original approach to explore political mindedness. 2 The term enantiomer means a mirror image of something, an opposite reflection. The term derives from the Greek enantios or "opposite," and is used in a number of contexts, including architecture, molecular physics, political theory, and computer system design. We use it in the sense of complementary polar opposites. The related word enantiodromia is also a key Jungian concept used in his notions about consciousness (which is the process by which something becomes its opposite, and the subsequent interaction of the two. For Jung the word enantiodromia represents the superabundance of any force that inevitably produces its opposite. Consequently the word enantiodromia often implies a dynamic process which is not necessarily implied by the word enantiomer. By using the simpler word enantiomer we shall not exclude the possibility of any dynamic action that may have been implied by the term enantiodromia. 3 Boje (2004) also showed that MBTI could be grouped into four mindscape modes, in principle showing that there is broad equivalence between the groups MBTI types and mindscape modes. 4 The Co-Plot Software was developed by David Talby and can be found at www.davidtalby.com/vcoplot/setup.exe, accessed April, 2013. 5 The can be found at http://psychology.huji.ac.il/en/?cmd=Faculty.125&page=2&act=read&id=15&page_id=55 6 Taking the word control as a noun (a control) is to see it as something that creates an influence, according the the On-line Oxford English dictionary: http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/control 7 Autogenesis is a second order form of autopoiesis (Schwarz, 1997) that has a higher level of processes - that is meta-processes that may be represented for instance as guiding personality convictions, principle influences, or even spirit. It occurs when a selectable network of these meta-processes is able to project into the operative couple a set of espoused values as attitudes and mental schemas and operative personality patterns. In effect autogenesis defines the autonomous system through the creation of its own set of laws. 8 Autopoiesis (Schwarz, 1997; Maturana and Varela, 1987) explains how a “living system” self-produces its core relational explanations of reality that influence behaviour. This defines for the personality system it’s own boundaries relative to its environment, develops its own unifying operational code, implements its own programmes, reproduces its own elements in a closed circuit, obeys its own laws of behaviour, and potentially 73
satisfies its own intentions (Jessup, 1990). It also self-produces the network of processes that enable it to produce its own personality components that exist in cognitive, figurative and operative bases. 9 Visualism is an epistemological bias toward vision, which in particular is predominant in postmodernism. 10 In critical theory, a metanarrative is a globalising or totalising cultural narrative schema which orders and explains knowledge and experience. 11 Antenarrative is a pre-narrative, and a bet (ante) that an antenarrative that will become a living story that is world-changing. It is a bet that a narrative will change the extant hegemonic narrative. An antenarrative is a proto-story that is not yet, a before narrative. (Boje 2011). 12 In a letter on 3rd may 1939 that discusses Psychological Types 13 The simpler term enantiomer (also enantiomorph that in particular relates to form or structure) means a mirror image of something, an opposite reflection. This term derives from the Greek enantios or "opposite," and is used in a number of contexts, including architecture, molecular physics, political theory, and computer system design.We use it in the sense of complementary polar opposites. The related word enantiodromiais also a key Jungian concept used in his notions about consciousness (e.g., http://www.endless-knot.us/feature.html), and (from the Oxford English Dictionary Online) it is the process by which something becomes its opposite, and the subsequent interaction of the two: applied especially to the adoption by an individual or by a community, etc., of a set of beliefs, etc., opposite to those held at an earlier stage. For Jung the word enantiodromiarepresents the superabundance of any force that inevitably produces its opposite. Consequently the word enantiodromia often implies a dynamic process which is not necessarily implied by the word enantiomer. By using the simpler word enantiomer we shall not exclude the possibility of any dynamic action that may have been implied by the term enantiodromia. 14 Wollheim (1999) defined cognitive state in terms of impulses, perceptions and instincts, imaginings, and cognitive dispositional drives in terms of beliefs, knowledge, memories, abilities, phobias and obsessions. Mental disposition consists of beliefs, knowledge, memories, abilities, phobias and obsessions, and has duration and history. Both mental states and dispositions are causally related, mental state being able to instantiate, terminate, reinforce and attenuate mental disposition. Mental dispositions can also facilitate mental states. 15 See for instance www.religioustolerance.org/unificat.htm and www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2197242/Sun-Myung-Moon-Self-proclaimed-messiah-dies-age-92.html
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