Factionalism in Japanese political parties revisited or How do factions ...

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Factionalism in Japanese political parties revisited or How do factions in the LDP and the DPJ differ? PATR ICK KÖLLNER

Abstract: This paper offers a comparative analysis of factions in Japan’s longtime governing party, the LDP, and the country’s biggest opposition party, the DPJ, by probing into their respective causes, functions and consequences. Factionalism in the LDP and the DPJ can be traced back to the fact that both parties came into existence as the result of a merger of formerly independent parties. In the case of the DPJ, groups based on former party affiliations still play an important role in the ‘factional landscape’ of the party. While the desire to remain in power has acted in the case of the LDP as an important centripetal force countervailing the immanent centrifugal forces of factionalism, it is suggested that in the case of the DPJ the current electoral system for the Lower House has so far helped to contain such centrifugal tendencies. A central consequence of inter-factional conflicts in the DPJ, however, is the visible lack of a clear profile of the party. Keywords: party organization, factionalism, Liberal Democratic Party, Democratic Party of Japan, personnel decisions, electoral system

For more than four decades now, factionalism in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other political parties has fascinated domestic and overseas observers of Japanese politics. Over the years, factions have officially been disbanded quite a few times, only to reassert themselves again after a short while. It is hard to recall how often their demise has been forecast – most recently in the context of the debate on the consequences of the 1994 electoral reform. It seems that factions in Japanese political parties – in whatever form – will continue to exist for some time to come. On the importance of such informal groups in Japan’s long-time dominant party, Cheol Hee Park has recently rightly noted that their impact ‘goes beyond intraparty competition. . . . LDP factions both define the Japan Forum 16(1) 2004: 87–109 Copyright © 2004 BAJS

ISSN: 0955–5803 print/1469–932X online DOI: 10.1080/0955580032000189348


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Factionalism in Japanese political parties revisited

limits of what change can occur in Japanese politics in general and bear within them the possibilities of future political upheavals. Without understanding how factions work, it will be difficult at best to grasp the dynamics of Japanese politics now and in the future’ (Park 2001: 429). The analysis of factionalism thus remains an important task for political scientists working on Japan. The main aim of this paper consists of showing how factions in the LDP differ from and in what ways they are similar to factions in Japan’s biggest opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The analysis proceeds in four steps. First, some analytical perspectives are derived from the literature on factionalism in political parties worldwide. Second, the findings on factions in the LDP are re-examined in the light of this literature. Third, the origins, characteristics and consequences of factionalism in the DPJ are illuminated. By way of conclusion, the differences and similarities between factions in both Japanese parties are highlighted.

Factionalism in political parties: definitions, conceptual and analytic approaches Readers familiar with the internal dynamics of the DPJ might wonder whether one can really speak of factions with regard to the more or less distinct groupings within that party. Whether one can or cannot depends on the definition of ‘factions’ that is used. In the vast literature on factionalism in political parties worldwide, one comes across nearly as many definitions as studies. So far, only a few attempts have been undertaken to distinguish properly the various groupings – also called party wings, tendencies, cliques or factions – that can be observed in political parties in different parts of the globe.1 One particularly valuable definition stems from Dennis Beller and Frank Belloni. Their definition is noteworthy a) because it is broad enough to encompass various types of intraparty groups and b) because it does not assume the necessity of certain cultural dispositions as some other definitions do. Beller and Belloni define a faction as ‘any relatively organized group that exists within the context of some other group and which (as a political faction) competes with rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is a part’ (1978: 419). Beller and Belloni understand ‘factions’ as an overarching category of differently structured intra-party groups. They differentiate these groups on the basis of their particular organizational characteristics. To be more precise, they distinguish between a) cliques and tendencies, b) personal, client-group factions and c) institutionalized, organizational factions. Very briefly, what characterizes these three ideal-typical modal types is that:2 •

factional cliques and tendencies have very little structure. They are either almost totally unorganized or exhibit only a very ephemeral organization set up for pursuing a single issue or fighting an electoral campaign. Recruitment to such


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amorphous groups does not usually take place in a co-ordinated manner and leadership of the group exists, if at all, on an ad hoc basis. Usually there are no hierarchical command structures. Individual persons might play a prominent role in such groups but this role is usually more based on charisma than on clientelistic links. As a rule, such groups do not have offices or headquarters of their own, structured meetings, formalized procedures or symbols. There is also no real group identity or formal group membership to speak of. More often than not, such groups exist only for a short time, especially if the common interest of the group members is confined to one issue. Personalized factions are based on clientelism, which also serves as the central mechanism for mobilization. Such groups are characterized by what are usually asymmetrical exchanges of power resources. As a rule, hierarchies and chains of command in such groups are vertical. Horizontal links between group members might even be discouraged, although there can be sub-groups. When such personalized groups have a name, it often refers to the group’s leader who is vital to the identity of the group. In temporal terms, the existence of such groups is mostly limited by the political life of the leader. In contrast to the groups just mentioned, institutionalized factions exhibit a developed organizational structure and a higher degree of bureaucratization. Recruitment regularly takes place on a non-personal and egalitarian basis. While the political ambitions of the groups’ leader(s) are important for the cohesion of these groups, their survival and continued existence is – as a rule – not dependent on an individual leader. This is often reflected in the names or symbols of the groups. Also, membership in such groups is formalized and members share a common identity.

Regardless of how intra-party groups are organized, their existence is based on common agendas or aims related to ideology, policy, party and government posts, and/or material resources. Thus, with regard to the functions of factions, and going back as far as David Hume, one can differentiate between factions based on interest and factions based on principles. In other words, and again in ideal-typical terms, one can discern factions whose raison d’être lies in the pursuance of ideological and/or policy concerns and factions whose common goal lies in the distribution of power resources, be they posts or other benefits. A third category consists of factions representing certain socio-economic groups. In reality, of course, factions can exhibit a mix of functions (cf. Sartori 1976: 76–8; Hine 1982). The literature on factions in political parties has also frequently dealt with the consequences of such groups for the parties they inhabit or for the political system at large. It is probably fair to say that, more often than not, factions have been depicted as detrimental to the integrity of political parties and systems. It has been shown that factions can undermine party cohesion, effectiveness and management, and that they can cause personnel decisions to be based on factional affiliation rather than on merit. Factions can also cause high-intensity


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conflict, bringing the respective parties to the verge of breakup or beyond. Moreover, policy debate in parties can become engulfed in factional squabbling and jostling. Factionalism can breed cynicism on the part of voters. It can damage the moral authority and legitimacy of parties and whole party systems. On the other hand, there are cases in which factions have assumed an integrative role. Factions can serve as a transmission belt for intra-party bargaining processes, conflict solution and consensus building. Factions can help to increase participation and mobilization, e.g. when it comes to elections and decisionmaking within parties. Factions can also serve as an ‘early-warning system’ with regard to latent conflict. In addition, factionalism can actually help to foster party unity by providing means to articulate and channel interests of different groups. In summing up, it can be noted that factions can play both positive and negative roles in political parties and systems.3 What the particular consequences of factions are has to be determined in an unbiased manner in every single case. Finally, a few brief remarks on the causes of factionalism in political parties. Most basically, it can be noted that there is no consensus on the general causes of this phenomenon. It is, however, possible to single out some core explanations. They range across the more or less mechanical consequences of various electoral systems used at the national, sub-national or party level, the nature of party competition in a given party system (i.e. in particular the number and ideological polarization of the parties concerned), the organizational character of the mother parties, the channels of party finance (the more decentralized they are, the more autonomous factions can arise) and the particular socio-cultural environment in which parties and factions are embedded.4 In addition, research on party organization in general has emphasized that the particular conditions of party founding – among others the kind of territorial expansion parties undergo, the existence of charismatic leaders and external sponsors such as unions, or existing collective identities in the case of party fusions – can be important factors influencing the establishment and shape of factions in political parties (cf. Panebianco 1988: ch. 4). Again, we often find explanations that combine some of the above-mentioned variables. And, again, we have to examine individual cases to find out what matters most and in what way. Against the background of these general remarks, we shall now revisit the Japanese case.

Factionalism in Japanese political parties: what we know With the possible exception of the Ko¯ meito¯ , all major political parties in post-war Japan (including the Japanese Communist Party) have been afflicted by a heavy dose of factionalism. Focusing on the two main parties under the so-called ‘1955 system’, the LDP and the former Japanese Socialist Party ( JSP), 5 we can note that what differentiated them with regard to factions was that such groups in the JSP were far more ideologically oriented than those in the LDP. Moreover, in


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Sources: Nihon keizai shinbun (23 December 1998, 24 November 2003) Notes * Since the resignation of Kato¯ Ko¯ ichi from parliament, the faction is referred to as the former Kato¯ faction. ** The Horiuchi faction see itself as the ‘true’ successor to the Ikeda faction. The numbers in brackets refer to the number of faction members in both houses of parliament as of 23 November 2003. Apart from the current seven factions, there is also a group of eleven LDP Diet members centred around former LDP president Ko¯ no Yo¯hei.

Figure 1 The development of LDP factions (in terms of generations of faction leaders).

terms of organizational type, factions in the JSP exhibited more the ideal-typical traits of tendencies while the more durable factions in the LDP evolved, as Curtis (1988: 80–8) and Richardson (1997: 58–63) have noted, from personalized to institutionalized factions.6 Underlying this process of ‘informal institutionalization’ has been, among other things, the long-term rule of the governing party. It can be argued that the corresponding stability coupled with continued access to state resources and vast donations under-girded the evolution and durability of factions in the LDP. Figure 1 gives an overview of the development of the main factions in the LDP. Factions in the JSP have, apart from some notable exceptions, not been studied in a very systematic way.7 What is more, due to the decline of the party in the latter half of the 1990s, factionalism in the (now) Social Democratic Party has lost in relevance for politics at large. The remainder of this section will thus focus on the LDP and will provide a brief overview of the findings regarding the causes, the functions and the consequences of the informal groups in Japan’s governing party.

The causes of factionalism in the LDP With regard to the causes of factionalism in the LDP, three distinct analytical approaches can be discerned. All three approaches focus on contingent factors, i.e.


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explanatory variables in the environment of the parties. A first group of scholars has focused on the socio-cultural environment, which is seen to offer a specific ‘cultural organizational repertoire’ to Japanese parties. In very crude terms, the argument has been that, because factionalist tendencies are immanent in all parts of Japanese society, it is not surprising that they can be found in Japanese political parties as well.8 As scholars such as Woodall (1996: 107) have pointed out, however, this overly deterministic socio-cultural approach can really explain neither the organizational and other changes that LDP factions have undergone in the course of time nor the differences between factions in various Japanese political parties. Another school, namely adherents of rational-choice theory, has focused on the formal institutional environment of Japanese parties in order to explain certain organizational characteristics, the electoral behaviour and even the size and number of factions in the LDP. Brushing socio-cultural explanations aside, proponents of this approach have argued that these features basically constituted a rational response to institutional incentives, in particular those emanating from the electoral system for the presidency of the LDP and the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system used in Lower House elections until 1994. In this context, it has first been noted that, to become LDP party president, a politician needed the support of a group of followers (read: faction). In formal terms, party statutes stipulated from the early 1970s that a candidate for the party’s top leadership position required a certain number of endorsements from LDP Diet members.9 Second, every party aiming at obtaining a majority in the Lower House, i.e. in particular the LDP, had to present under the old national electoral system more than one candidate in local electoral districts. For obvious reasons, these candidates could not differentiate themselves on the basis of their party’s platform but had to rely on personalistic appeals. Factions provided candidates with the necessary resources, such as money, posts and endorsements, to compete with other candidates (see, e.g., Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993: ch. 4; Cox and Rosenbluth 1996; Kohno 1997: ch. 6; Cox et al. 2000). While the rational-choice approach has its strength in explaining organizational patterns and behaviour under stable institutional settings, its predictive power in times of change is constrained by its very focus on institutional incentives and sanctions. Moreover, rational-choice theory per se has nothing to say about how factions came into existence in the first place. Finally, a third approach, which can be labelled integrative, has been attentive to the role that both the electoral system for the LDP presidency and the SNTV system at the national level played in terms of furthering the institutionalization of factions in the LDP. Exponents of such an approach have, however, also been careful not to ignore the socio-cultural environment in which Japanese political parties are embedded.10 For example, Fukui (1978: 52) has argued that this embedding of political parties in Japan helps to explain the structural attributes of factions, while institutional factors such as electoral systems at the national and the party level help to explain their functions.


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What most exponents of all three approaches agree upon is that the formation of the LDP in 1955, which resulted from the merger of the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party, laid the basis for factionalism in the governing party. On a different note, it has been pointed out by a number of scholars that the decentralization of party finance in the LDP served, if not as a cause, then at least as an enabling condition for the development of well-structured factions.

The functions of factions in the LDP As noted before, in contrast to factions in the former JSP, factions in the LDP have not been based on a certain ideology, programme or a given set of policies (Richardson 2001: 157). This general assessment holds true even though individual factions have at times been involved in conflicts about policy, especially when these were linked to races for party leadership positions. In a few cases, a distinct longer-term policy stance could be attributed to a certain faction – the Ko¯ moto/Miki faction’s advocacy of clean politics and a limited military profile perhaps being the best-known example (cf. Morris 1994: 137–8). Moreover, it can be noted, however, that some factions have had stronger links to individual ministries than other factions. For example, the Tanaka faction and its successors developed close links to the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications by means of supplying ministers for these portfolios or by faction members playing prominent roles in the party’s relevant policy tribes (zoku) in these areas. Such close links have enabled individual factions to influence policy-making in these areas and to benefit from the distribution of resources by the ministries concerned (cf. Itagaki 1987: ch. 2; Johnson 1995: 214–15). In a related vein, although individual LDP factions have not been the standard bearers of distinct socio-economic groups, certain vested interests have been better connected (through funding and supplying candidates, in particular for Upper House elections) to some factions than to others.11 There is substantial agreement in the literature that the main functions of LDP factions have been concentrated in the areas of a) distributing party, government and Diet posts, b) channelling funds to faction members and c) securing party endorsements for faction candidates standing in national elections (see, e.g., Fukui 1970: ch. 5; Woodall 1996: 108–11; Hrebenar and Nakamura 2000: 122– 6). There have, however, been changes in the course of time. First, the function of distributing funds has been become less important since the political finance reforms of 1975 and even more so since the latest reform steps in this area in 1994. Today, individual politicians are mostly dependent on their own networks and initiatives for raising funds. The funds younger members receive from the leader(s) and other senior members of their respective faction suffice to cover only a minor part of their expenses (Curtis 1988: 179–83; Park 2001: 439; Nihon keizai shinbun 2002a). Second, the role of factions in securing endorsements for individual candidates


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has apparently diminished since the 1994 change in the electoral system for the Lower House.12 For example, in the 1996 Lower House elections a record number of LDP candidates, in particular newcomers, ran without (officially disclosed) factional affiliation (cf. Cox et al. 1999: 42–7; Thies 2002: 106). This trend is bound to continue. We are likely to find more cases in which candidates do not disclose their links with the LDP or other parties in order to attract unaffiliated voters. It cannot be said, however, that factions no longer play a role in the nomination process at all. As Park has noted, ‘fierce competition does arise to win party nomination when seats become available in any given district. Faction leaders are desperate to place members of their own faction in those districts’ (2001: 438). Certainly, LDP factions are still very active in terms of recruiting new members as and among candidates for both Lower and the Upper House elections (cf. Köllner 2002: 127–8). One of the main reasons why factions in the governing party continued to be of interest for LDP Diet members is that their role in distributing party and government posts remained largely intact during the 1990s (cf. Cox et al. 1999: 47–8; Park 2001: 440–1; Reed and Thies 2001: 393). Even Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro¯, who did not consult faction leaders when he put together his first cabinet in April 2001, has seen fit to base nearly all other personnel decisions on recommendations of the party’s factions. Thus, government posts such as senior vice-ministers and parliamentary secretaries, Diet committee posts and the many party posts that exist continue to be allocated via the factions. 13 Factions also continued to play an important, if not always a decisive role in LDP presidential elections during the 1990s. It is noteworthy in this context that the control of faction leaders over the voting behaviour of individual members in such elections has become less pronounced than it used to be in the 1970s and 1980s (cf. Reed and Thies 2001: 392–3). In summing up, we can note that the ‘traditional’ core functions of factions in the LDP have undergone some changes in the course of time and especially so during the last couple of years. Allocation of funds via the factions has lost much of its former importance, factions play less of a role in the pre-election stage and even in the area of allocating posts their central role has been challenged, at least to some degree, in more recent times. It is not surprising, then, that speculation about the decline and the eventual disappearance of factionalism in the LDP has abounded again.14 On the other hand, some analysts have argued that factions will continue to fulfil a vital function in terms of stabilizing and channelling party management. Park, for example, has suggested that, by reducing uncertainty and increasing predictability, factions will continue to exist simply because they contribute to the effective management of the party as an organization (Park 2001: 444–7; see also Richardson 2001: 154–9). This, however, leaves open the question as to who actually benefits from this stability and predictability. Critics of factionalism in the LDP argue that it is party veterans who no longer hold formal party or government posts but still manage


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to pull the strings by virtue of their clout in individual factions. Hence, legitimacy remains the Achilles’ heel of factionalism in the LDP. Moreover, it can be argued that the faction and seniority-based promotion system in the governing party benefits average and even below-average governing-party Diet members who can expect to get promoted and even become minister if they manage to get re-elected a sufficient number of times. It is hardly surprising, then, that some young and ambitious LDP Diet members regard factions as an obstacle to their career. 15 It can be suggested that in some ways the factional system inside the LDP has not been too different from the well-known former ‘convoy system’ of Japanese banks in which strong actors moved at the same pace as weaker ones.

The consequences of factionalism in the LDP Most observers in Japan and abroad have tended to emphasize the dysfunctional effects of factions in the LDP. Even today, many people would agree with the early assessment of Farnsworth that ‘factional politics has generally played a negative role as far as developing party unity, responsible and effective government, and successful leadership attempts at reform [are concerned]’ (1966: 503). Moreover, factionalism in the LDP has frequently been blamed for the spread of corruption inside the governing party. It has to be noted though that the existence of factions has permitted a substantial degree of pluralism – some would even say ‘competitive dynamism’ (Park 2001: 446) – within the LDP. Factionalism has also constrained the power of individuals. The remark of former faction leader Ko¯ no Ichiro¯ in 1963 (cited by Farnsworth 1966: 504), namely that factions serve as a ‘check-and-balance mechanism’ to prevent a dictatorship by the party president, has to be seen in this context. In analytical terms, it can be added that the institutionalized factional system within the LDP has served as an effective ‘functional equivalent’ for more formalized party-management procedures and procedural norms. Just as formal procedures and norms have done elsewhere, factionalism, as an informal institution, has guided and regularized the behaviour and expectations of party members and has helped to channel information and indeed intra-party conflict (cf. Richardson 2001: 150, 157). While factions in the LDP might well continue to weaken and become less institutionalized than they used to be, one should not jump to the conclusion that they will simply wither away. As Reed has recently noted in this context, ‘factions have become part of the cultural repertoire of politics in Japan. People know how to organize and run a faction and they will utilize this knowledge when facing analogous problems under new circumstances. Factions will evolve in new directions in the changed environment but will not disappear’ (2002: 253).


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Factionalism in the DPJ If the LDP has been the archetype of a federation of factions, what about the DPJ then? In what ways is the informal structure of Japan’s biggest opposition party similar to that of the LDP and how does it differ? Beginning with the similarities between the two parties, we can note that both the LDP and the DPJ came into existence as a result of party mergers. Already the ‘old’ DPJ, founded in September 1996 as a liberal ‘third force’ to compete with the LDP and the Shinshinto¯ , was basically composed of two distinct groups of parliamentarians. Out of the then fifty-seven Diet members of the party, thirtyfive hailed from the Social Democratic Party while another fifteen, including party co-leaders Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto, came from the Harbinger Party (Shinto¯ sakigake).16 Shortly after the party’s founding, newspapers began to identify the former socialists as the biggest faction within the DPJ ( Nihon keizai shinbun 1996). Factional movements, however, became really pronounced only after the establishment of the ‘new’ DPJ in April 1998. The ‘new’ DPJ was formed out of the ‘old’ DPJ and four splinter groups from the Shinshinto¯, which had been disbanded in December 1997. Among these splinters were a group of former Democratic Socialist Party (DSP, Minshato¯) Diet members led by Nakano Kansei and a group of conservative Diet members led by Hata Tsutomu, former head of the shortlived Taiyo¯to¯ and Minseito¯ parties. One of the things that set these groups apart was their outlook on unions: while the former socialists and the former DSP politicians in the ‘new’ DPJ entertained close links with the union umbrella organizations So¯hyo¯ and Do¯mei, respectively, conservative circles in the party suffered, as one newspaper put it, from a ‘union allergy’ (Nihon keizai shinbun 1998). Shortly after the ‘new’ DPJ had officially been founded, there was already talk of factionalism based on former party affiliations. Such talk received backing from the establishment of corresponding intra-party groups. As early as April 1998, twenty-seven former DSP Diet members formed the Yu¯ ai kurabu. A month later, the Minsei kyo¯ kai, consisting of around thirty former Minseito¯ Diet members, was founded. As Reed has noted in this context: faction formation [in a newly merged party] is a natural way of maintaining one’s original political identity and making sure the party is not dominated by any single group. However, faction formation [in the DPJ] was specifically stimulated by the prospect of the 1998 upper house election and the debates over the ranking on the PR [proportional representation] list. (Reed 2002: 254) In May 1999, the leader of the former socialists in the DPJ, Yokomichi Takahiro, formed his own study group, called Minshu purasu 21 (Democracy Plus 21). With forty to fifty members, the study group became the biggest grouping within the party. The former socialists were adamant that there should be no revision of the


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constitution and that Japan must maintain a low military profile – positions that frequently brought them into conflict with more conservative-minded Diet members of the DPJ (Asahi shinbun 1998; Nihon keizai shinbun 1999). In late 2000, Yokomichi clashed head on with then party leader Hatoyama over the issue of constitutional revision (Mainichi Interactive 2000). A year later, in December 2001, Yokomichi was even suspended from his post of DPJ vice-chairman after he and twenty-seven other DPJ Diet members had defied party orders to approve in the Diet the dispatch of SDF units to the Indian Ocean ( Japan Times 2001). One month later, he re-founded his intra-party group under the name of Shinseikyoku kondankai. The last couple of years have also seen the emergence and disappearance of a number of loose groupings within the party composed mostly of younger Diet members. Some of these groups have been of a cross-factional type and much resemble similar groups within the LDP. As Morris (1994: 144) has argued, these groups serve as ‘a vehicle to articulate and press for the implementation (or not) of a set of party or policy proposals or an overall political philosophy. However, several originated as a manifestation of one or more national Diet members to increase their influence in the party by being correctly or mistakenly perceived as the leaders of crypto-factions’. The same holds true for such groups in the DPJ. There has been, for example, a group called Shishiku no kai composed of Diet members below the age of 50 who have been elected between one and three times to the Diet. Other groups have been centred around members of former parties, such as the Ko¯ ho¯ kai, with former Sakigake Diet members at the core, or the Seiken senryaku kai, which centred around former Shinshinto¯ Diet members and brought together conservative-minded young and middle-ranking politicians ( Nihon keizai shinbun 2001; Asahi shinbun 2002a).17 In more general terms, it can be noted that most but not all Diet members of the DPJ have belonged to one or more of the intra-party groups (see below). According to sources within the DPJ, party co-founder Hatoyama Yukio never belonged to a particular faction. 18 Although there have always been a few dozen Diet members supporting him, at least until early 2003 Hatoyama was unwilling to form a faction of his own. 19 Table 1 provides an overview of the main groups that existed in the DPJ prior to the party’s presidential elections in September 2002.

Factions in the DPJ by organizational type While most of the groups inside the DPJ can easily be categorized as cliques or tendencies, the Yu¯ ai kurabu and the Shinseikyoku kondankai should be regarded as institutionalized factions. As mentioned above, both factions have in common that they are linked to labour unions’ umbrella organizations, viz. the private-sector-based Do¯ mei and the public-sector-based So¯ hyo¯ . Both factions also have in common that nearly all their members hail from a specific party,


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Table 1 Main factions in the DPJ Name

Membership

Main representatives Issues of interest and/or main positions

Yu¯ ai kurabu

30 former DSP politicians

Nakano Kansei Ito¯ Eisei Kawabata Tatsuo

Defence policy Energy policy Environmental policy In favour of close links with unions (Do¯ mei) Shinseikyoku 20 to 30 Diet members, Yokomichi Takahiro Social policy kondankai with former SDP Saito¯ Tsuyoshi No constititional politicians at the core Akamatsu Hirotaka revision Low military profile In favour of close links with unions (So¯ hyo¯ ) Kuni no katachi 20 to 30 Diet members, Kan Naoto Liberal party profile kenkyu¯ kai many originating from Eda Satsuki Social and human rights citizen networks Ikeda Motohisa Party should not be over-dependent on unions, but needs their support Seiken senryaku C. 40 young and Ueda Kiyoshi Constitutional revision kenkyu¯ kai middle-ranking Matsuzawa Close security coconservative Diet Shigefumi operation with US members, many with Yoshida Ko¯ichi Neo-liberal economic Shinshinto¯ background Noda Yoshihiko outlook Conservative social policy Against close links with unions Mutual aid, information exchange Ko¯ ho¯ kai 20 to 30 young and Maehara Seiji Liberal party profile middle-ranking Diet Azumi Jun Mutual aid, information members, with former Edano Yukio exchange Sakigake members at the core Source: Personal interviews with DPJ Diet members, October and November 2002; Asahi Shinbun, Nihon keizai shinbun, various issues. Note In autumn 2002 the DPJ had a total of 183 Diet members in the Lower and Upper Houses.

viz. the DSP in the case of the Yu¯ ai kurabu and the JSP in the case of the Shinseikyoku kondankai. These former party affiliations are of great importance for the identity of the factions. Party origins also explain some of the positions taken by these factions.


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The most institutionalized faction in the DPJ is clearly the Yu¯ ai kurabu. It has an office of its own, keeps membership records and charges a membership fee. In addition, it has regular meetings (usually once a week) and internal, if not very detailed, regulations. The chairman (kaicho¯ ) of the faction is currently former DPJ secretary general Nakano Kansei. The actual running of the faction is taken care of by the faction’s general affairs manager ( jimukyokucho¯ ) Kawabata Tatsuo, a fifth-term member of the Lower House. What also sets the Yu¯ ai kurabu apart from the other groups in the party is the fact that it possesses substantial funds of its own. These funds stem from the time when the DSP was still an independent party.20 Not unlike the Ko¯ meito¯ (Clean Government Party), the former DSP was able to continue to control its own funds in spite of the 1994 merger into the Shinshinto¯ . At that time, not all the DSP members joined the new party. 21 More importantly, the DSP put its funds into a legally independent political organization (seiji dantai ), the Minsha kyo¯ kai, which has managed them ever since. These funds are used, inter alia, for running the organization, holding conferences, publishing a political magazine called Kaikakusha (Reformer) and last, but not least, for supporting the electoral campaigns of members of the Yu¯ ai kurabu and affiliated new candidates.22 Recruiting new members is actually one of the biggest challenges facing the Yu¯ ai kurabu. In terms of age, most of its members are well above the DPJ average and the faction is having difficulties attracting fresh blood. In particular, acquiring new members by having Do¯ mei-backed candidates elected in the proportional district of the Upper House has become more difficult because of changes in the electoral system and the waning power of the ‘organized vote’ (cf. Köllner 2002). Exactly the same problem also applies to the Shinseikyoku kondankai the average age of whose members is the highest of all intra-party groups in the DPJ. If both groups can find no remedy to solve their recruitment problem, their power inside the party is bound to wane, that is, if the DPJ continues to exist in the medium and long term. The chairman of the Shinseikyoku kondankai is the former governor of Hokkaido¯, Yokomichi Takahiro, who used to be one of only three second-generation Diet members in the JSP. Interestingly, all three ended up in the DPJ (Tawara 1997: 122). Saito¯ Tsuyoshi, a 57-year-old second-term Upper House Diet member, is the general affairs manager of the Yokomichi faction, as it is sometimes called in Japanese newspapers. The real ‘mover’ in the faction, however, is supposed to be Akamatsu Hirotaka, another former second-generation JSP Diet member.23 The Shinseikyoku kondankai is the not only the second biggest but also the most left-wing faction in the DPJ. Its resources in terms of funds and infrastructure are however not as remarkable as those of the Yu¯ ai kurabu. At the time when interviews were conducted with DPJ Diet members in October and November 2002, the above-mentioned three other factions in the DPJ (see Table 1) were largely inactive. Compared to the Yu¯ ai kurabu and the Shinseikyoku kondankai, these intra-party groups have always been more loosely


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coupled. While more or less regular meetings have taken place in the past during Diet sessions, these groups never bothered to keep track of the exact number of their members. In fact, there have also been overlapping memberships, which makes counting the members of the tendencies and cliques within the DPJ a complicated task. Also, none of these factions had internal regulations and formal positions within these groups – if they existed at all – did not carry the same weight as in the case of LDP factions or even the Yu¯ ai kurabu. Still, these groups have been seen as useful by their founders and members. To understand why, we have to look at their functions.

The functions of factions in the DPJ For many of the relatively young and less experienced Diet members of the DPJ, factions are useful in terms of mutual aid during campaign periods and beyond and for exchanging information, e.g. when it comes to dealing with petitions from interest groups. Moreover, factions convey the feeling of belonging to a group of like-minded politicians. In view of the heterogeneous party and other backgrounds of DPJ Diet members, this is of particular significance. 24 The two biggest and most institutionalized factions consisting of former DSP and JSP politicians also serve the representational needs of labour unions, although members of these factions emphasize that they are not the political arm of the unions. Links to particular unions, however, explain at least some of the policy focuses of these factions, e.g. the focus of the Yu¯ ai kurabu on energy policy (relevant for unions in the electricity-generating and the electronics sector) and environmental policy (relevant for unions in the automotive sector).25 Factions in the DPJ have also played a role in personnel politics. They have tried to have their representatives fill important party posts and to secure good positions for their members and candidates on party lists in national elections. In this context, it can be noted that balancing was important when it came to allocating party posts in the ‘old’ DPJ. Balancing has become even more pronounced in the ‘new’ DPJ ¯ take 1999: 127). Thus, the numerous (cf. Seikai tokubetsu shuzaiban 1998: 95–9; O but mostly representative posts of party vice-chairmen ( fuku daihyo¯) went in the beginning to members of the different groups that came together to form the DPJ. 26 Care was also taken by party leaders to allocate the substantially more important posts of secretary general (kanjicho¯), head of the committees for general affairs (so¯mukaicho¯),27 for political affairs (seimukaicho¯), for parliamentary affairs (kokkai taisaku iincho¯) and electoral affairs (sentaiiincho¯) to members of different groups. While these days qualification is supposed to be the central criterion for allocating party posts, in reality balancing still plays a less than negligible role.28 While party leaders have frequently used the balancing principle in personnel politics to contain overt intra-party conflict, ambitious young DPJ Diet members have also used some of the smaller factions to shore up their standing in the party or to position themselves as possible future party leaders.29 It is in this context


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that factional activity became more virulent before past leadership contests in the DPJ, most recently before the two leadership elections in September and December 2002. The election in September 2002 showed that some of the factions could be mobilized in support of particular candidates while others lacked this sort of cohesion. Thus, the Yu¯ ai kurabu, the Shinseikyoku kondankai and the Kuni no katachi kenkyu¯ kai rallied around their leaders, Nakano, Yokomichi and Kan respectively,30 while members of the conservative Seiken senryaku kenkyu¯ kai were divided in their support for particular candidates. The Ko¯ ho¯ kai even effectively split when two of its leadings members, Maehara Seiji and Noda Yoshihiko, both declared their candidacy and started to rally individual supporters among the members of their faction and beyond. 31 The leadership elections of September 2002 proved to be a whirlwind that left only the factions consisting of former DSP and JSP politicians and the smaller Kuni no katachi kenkyu¯kai intact. After the election of Hatoyama, the disgruntled and frustrated members of the groups led by Yokomichi and Kan but also many of the younger Diet members of the DPJ entered what the media called an ‘nonmainstream faction’ (hishu¯ryu¯ha). The only force binding together this tendency in the party, however, was the opposition of its members to party leader Hatoyama and the freshly appointed DPJ secretary general Nakano Kansei. Mounting opposition to Hatoyama, who in November 2002 embarked on a soon aborted plan to merge the DPJ with the Liberal Party of ex-Shinshinto¯ party president Ozawa Ichiro¯, finally led to the resignation of Hatoyama and the election of Kan to the post of party president in December 2002. In this presidential election, the groups led by Nakano, Yokomichi and Kan each acted cohesively again – the Shinseikyoku kondankai and the Kuni no katachi kenkyu¯kai supporting Kan and the Yu¯ai kurabu supporting his opponent Okada Katsuya – while other groups in the party did not put forward a candidate of their own (see, e.g., Asahi shinbun 2002b). Apart from supporting individual candidates in elections at the party and national level, representing external groups, providing mutual aid and fulfilling subjective needs, factional groups in the DPJ have one more function, which is perhaps the most important, namely the articulation of views and positions in areas of central interest to the individual factions. As mentioned above, diverging standpoints over issues such as Japan’s military profile and constitutional revision have pitted factions against each other and have in some cases even led to deepseated animosity between their members. There has also been substantial conflict with regard to economic policy, extending voting rights to foreigners living permanently in Japan or the protection of civil rights. The consequences of such conflicts over substantial policy issues will be discussed in the following section.

The consequences of factionalism in the DPJ A central consequence of inter-factional conflicts in the DPJ is the visible lack of a clear profile of the party. Resorting to vague wording in their official statements,


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party leaders have consistently tried to gloss over substantially diverging standpoints in a number of areas. With the exception of the DPJ’s successful parliamentary initiative in autumn 1998 for re-vitalizing Japan’s financial sector, 32 the party has so far not really managed to position itself as an effective and credible challenger to the governing LDP. In view of the substantial faction-based conflicts in Japan’s biggest opposition party, the question arises as to what has kept the party together until today. A partial answer would be that party leaders Hatoyama and Kan have tried to integrate the various factions by means of a balanced personnel policy (see above). It can, however, be argued that even more important for keeping the party together has been the centripetal force emanating from the current electoral system for the Lower House. The electoral system introduced in 1994 combines elements of majoritarian and proportional voting. Thus, currently 300 members of the Lower House get elected in as many local electoral districts while another 180 seats are allocated on the basis of vote shares for regional party lists. This electoral system has a number of implications and consequences. One of the main implications is that candidates of one and the same party no longer compete against each other in a given local electoral district. However, this also means that successful independent candidates can no longer simply join the LDP after an election. The interest of the LDP today lies mainly with its current Diet member or official candidate in a given electoral district. This makes it difficult for conservative-minded DPJ politicians to switch (back) to the LDP. In principle, only in cases in which the LDP has currently no sitting Diet member or official candidate in an electoral district does a window of opportunity open for potential conservative DPJ renegades.33 The institutional logic of the new electoral system explains why discontented conservative DPJ Diet members have hesitated to turn their back on the party. What is also of importance is that the emphasis on the majoritarian component in the current electoral system creates strong incentives for the establishment of two large political parties. According to Duverger’s well-known law, the application of the simple majority principle to elections furthers party dualism – at least as far as the local level is concerned.34 Incumbents and candidates alike thus do well to belong to one of the two large parties if they want to increase their electoral chances. This makes it understandable why there have so far been no splits of whole factions from the DPJ and ensuing establishment of new small parties. Of course, the consequences of electoral systems should not be treated too deterministically. There will always be cases in which politicians will act, for one reason or another, in a seemingly ‘irrational’ manner. It is, however, clear that the current electoral system for Japan’s Lower House creates substantial incentives and sanctions which every politician has to take into consideration. In sum, it can be suggested that factionalism in the DPJ has been more of a centrifugal force. This force has, however, so far been countered by the centripetal forces emanating from the electoral system. On balance, the faction-based


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‘pluralism’ inside the DPJ has done the party more bad than good. Factional politics has basically served to undermine a coherent profile and corresponding political leadership on the part of Japan’s biggest opposition party. It has thus substantially contributed to blurring the party’s image and to making it unattractive to many voters. In short, factionalism in the DPJ has been at least partially responsible for the fact that the party has not become a more credible challenger to the LDP. It cannot entirely be ruled out that factionalism, combined with intergenerational conflicts, might even lead to a split or a dissolution of the DPJ in the future. As in the case of the now defunct Shinshinto¯ , DPJ Diet members might decide at some point that ‘enough is enough’. On the other hand, the DPJ should not yet be counted out because of its internal problems. The party still has the potential to become a governing party and to find ways to deal with its factional conflicts in a more effective manner. It should be added that the future development of the DPJ depends not only on managing its internal affairs but also on the developments in the ruling LDP.35

Conclusions Having surveyed the literature on factionalism in the LDP, and having presented some findings on factional movements in the DPJ, we can now highlight the main similarities and differences between the two cases. To start with, we can note that factionalism in both parties can be traced back to their respective foundings, which resulted in both cases from a merger of formerly independent parties. In the case of the much younger party, the DPJ, groups based on former party affiliations still play an important role in the ‘factional landscape’ of the party. Similar to the early period of the LDP, we can also find overlapping memberships in intra-party groups in the DPJ. One of the main differences between the LDP and the DPJ lies, of course, in the fact that the LDP has been around for a much longer time and has also been in government for most of that time. Factions in the LDP thus had time to institutionalize, namely to acquire stability, routines and commitment from their members. Intra-party groups in the LDP have developed in organizational terms from personalized to institutionalized factions. This process of institutionalization was furthered by both the former electoral system for the Lower House and the exigencies of presidential elections in the LDP. Institutionalization was also under-girded by the decentralization of party finance in Japan’s governing party. The situation is different for the ‘new’ DPJ, which has been in existence for only about five years.36 Here we find not only two fairly institutionalized factions, namely those consisting of former JSP and DSP politicians, but also a few loosely coupled groupings with younger Diet members at the core. In terms of organizational type, these intra-party groups can be categorized as cliques and tendencies. Looking at the functions of factions in both parties, we can note that in the case of the LDP these functions revolved primarily around distributing posts,


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channelling funds and securing party endorsements for faction candidates standing in national elections. We can also note that the last two functions have become less important while the first function has partially been challenged in more recent years. In general terms, although we can expect factions in the LDP to become less institutionalized, they are unlikely simply to wither away. Factions in the governing party still help to organize party management but it can also be suggested that they are more useful for some party members than for others. In the case of the DPJ, the functions of factions vary with the different intra-party groups found in the party. While the two institutionalized factions in the DPJ have a representational function with regard to the interests of labour unions’ umbrella organizations and also show a more clear-cut programmatic or even ideological profile, the more loosely coupled cliques and tendencies have mainly been useful for their members in terms of mutual aid and exchange of information. Factions in the DPJ also help to foster a sense of belonging. Moreover, they have been involved in personnel decisions but only some of the factions could actually be mobilized in support of individual candidates for the party’s top leadership position. Finally, intra-party groups in the DPJ have been active in articulating views and positions in a number of policy areas. Concerning the consequences of factionalism in both parties, we suggest that the substantially diverging standpoints advanced by factions in the DPJ are to a considerable degree responsible for the blurry profile of the party. As in the case of the LDP, factionalism in the DPJ has helped to undermine party unity and leadership and might even lead to a split of the party in the future. This is not to deny that pluralism engendered by party factions in the LDP can be a positive force permitting adaptability and flexibility. The DPJ, on the other hand, finds itself in a less benign situation because its role as an opposition party demands a substantial degree of cohesion in order to appear as a credible challenger. While the desire to remain in power has acted in the case of the LDP as an important centripetal force countervailing the immanent centrifugal forces of factionalism, it can be suggested that in the case of the DPJ it is the current electoral system for the Lower House which has so far helped to contain such centrifugal tendencies in Japan’s biggest opposition party. Against this background, it would be interesting to observe how factionalism in the DPJ changed if it ever became a governing party for a longer period. Institute of Asian Affairs, Hamburg

Acknowledgements The author thanks Steven R. Reed and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 10th Japanese Politics Colloquium held at St Antony’s College, Oxford, in September 2002. Further research took place during a stay at the Faculty of Law, University of Tokyo. The author would like to express his gratitude to Fujiwara Kiichi for making this stay possible.


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Notes 1. Some well-known attempts to differentiate intra-party groups have been undertaken by Rose (1964), Sartori (1976: 75–81) and Hine (1982). 2. The following is based on Beller and Belloni (1978: 422–30). 3. For detailed discussions of consequences of factionalism in political parties, see Raschke (1977: 226-235), Beller and Belloni (1978: 439–42), Müller-Rommel (1982: 37–9) and Lomax (1995: 136). 4. Discussions of the possible causes of factionalism in political parties can, inter alia, be found in Zariski (1960: 37–50, 1978: 23–31), Sartori (1976: 93–104), Raschke (1977: 147–50, 173– 80), Beller and Belloni (1978: 430–7), Hine (1982: 42–7) and Müller-Rommel (1982: 16–25). For a rational-choice perspective, see Cox and Rosenbluth (1993). 5. In 1991, the JSP changed its English name to Social Democratic Party of Japan. In 1996, it finally also changed its Japanese name from Shakaito¯ to Shaminto¯ and dropped the ‘Japan’ in its English name. In order to avoid confusion, JSP will be used consistently in this article. 6. For good analyses of the instutionalization of LDP factions see also Ishikawa and Hirose (1989: 207–46) and Reed (1991: 94–7). 7. See in particular Fukunaga (1996). Information and analysis on the factions in the JSP can also be found in Stockwin (1966), Hatakeyama (1975: 131–78), Masumi (1988: 222–30, 364–76, 444–8), Honzawa (1989: 123–8, 132–8), Richardson (1997: 69–71) and Hara (2000: passim). 8. See, e.g., Tsurutani (1992: 212–13). Cultural factors also figure prominently in Scalapino und Masumi (1962: 85, 122–3), Ward (1965: 71–2) and Baerwald (1986: 17). 9. The number of endorsements has ranged from ten to fifty. 10. See Totten and Kawakami (1965), Thayer (1969a: ch. 2, 1969b), Fukui (1974[1969]: 155–6), Curtis (1988: 80–8), Stockwin (1989), Richardson (1997: ch. 3) and Hrebenar and Nakamura (2000: 112–18). 11. Cf. Hatakeyama (1975: 112), Mochizuki (1982: 143–60), Murakawa (1989: 302–3) and Köllner (2002: 127–31). 12. Under the new electoral system single-member districts are combined with proportional representation in regional blocs. 13. LDP Diet member and former parliamentary secretary Ko¯no Taro¯, personal interview, 5 November 2002. 14. For a fairly recent example, see Daily Yomiuri On-line (2002b). 15. Second-term LDP Diet member, personal interview, 5 November 2002. 16. Five more Diet members had formerly belonged to the Shimin rı¯gu, a small parliamentary group in the Lower House centred around Kaieda Banri. On the background of the ‘old’ DPJ, ¯ take (1999: 89–102, 2000: 144–7) and Wada (2000). see Igarashi (1996: 46–86), O 17. It should be remembered in this context that the DPJ is relatively a ‘party of political youngsters’. Nearly 60 per cent of DPJ Diet members in the Lower House are only in their first or second term (Daily Yomiuri On-line 2002a). 18. Personal interviews with Matsuzawa Shigefumi, 22 October 2002, Kawabata Tatsuo, 1 November 2002 and Naito¯ Masamitsu, 8 November 2002, all conducted in Tokyo. 19. Speculation about the possible founding of a faction abounded in late February 2003 after Hatoyama had lost the chairmanship of the party and opened his own personal office close to the Diet. See, e.g., Nihon keizai shinbun (2003). 20. Kawabata Tatsuo, personal interview, 1 November 2002, Tokyo. 21. These days, a few former DSP politicians can also be found in the Liberal Party while most politicians connected to the old DSP at the prefectural and communal level are nominally independent. 22. For further information on the Minsha kyo¯ kai and the related Seisaku fo¯ ramu 21 seiken (Policy forum twenty-first century), see Tanaka (2002).


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23. The third second-generation Diet member who moved from the JSP to the DPJ was former JSP chairman Yamahana Sadao who died in 1999. His son Ikuo, also a DPJ Diet member, now represents Tokyo’s 22nd electoral district in the Lower House. 24. For example, Kuni no katachi kenkyu¯ kai chairman Satsuki Eda has argued that what brought the members of the group together was a ‘common natural understanding’. Personal interview, 24 October 2002, Tokyo. 25. The Yu¯ ai kurabu is a staunch defender of atomic energy in Japan. 26. These posts are now given to veteran DPJ members regardless of their former party affiliations. 27. This post was abandoned in the context of an organizational change in September 1999. 28. Personal interviews with DPJ Diet members in Tokyo, October and November 2002. Most recently, the application of the balancing principle could be observed when party chairman Kan Naoto filled central party posts after his election in December 2002. See Nihon keizai shinbun (2002b). 29. The Ko¯ hokai, which otherwise was very close in outlook to the Kuni no katachi kenkyu¯ kai, being a good example in this context. 30. Nakano finally dropped out of the leadership race and pledged his (group’s) support to party leader Hatoyama Yukio (cf. Köllner 2003). 31. Personal interviews with DPJ Diet members in October and November 2002. In the end, Maehara retracted his candidacy in favour of Noda who managed to gather a sufficient number of votes in the first round of the elections to end up in third place behind Hatoyama and Kan but ahead of Yokomichi (see Köllner 2003 for details). 32. See Furukawa (2002) for the view of a DPJ politician on the so-called ‘Finance Diet’. 33. Steven R. Reed, professor at Chu¯ o¯ University, personal interview, 21 October 2002. It has been suggested by some DPJ observers that a number of conservative politicians ended up in the party only because they could get no official nomination from the LDP. 34. Cf. Duverger (1959: 231–42). That this is not necessarily also the case at the national level is shown by Great Britain. In the British party system there is room not only for (New) Labour and the Conservatives but also for the Liberal Democrats and some regional parties. In the Japanese case, smaller parties are, of course, also ‘protected’ by the proportional voting component in the electoral systems for both the Lower House and the Upper House. 35. For a fuller discussion of the perspectives of the DPJ, see Köllner (2003). 36. Because of the different time-spans of the LDP and the DPJ, it would be interesting to compare the factionalism in the latter party with that in the now defunct Shinshinto¯ . Unfortunately, there is a dearth of research on this topic.

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Patrick Köllner is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Asian Affairs in Hamburg, Germany. He has published widely on Japanese politics, political and economic affairs on the Korean peninsula, and the ASEM process. His main research interests include political parties in Japan and South Korea and informal politics in comparative perspective. E-mail: [email protected]